CHAPTER IV
COMPOSITION AND USE OF THE ARTILLERY
1. Retrospective view. General considerations.
2. Different sorts of artillery: Artillery of an Army; Artillery of an Army Corps; Artillery of a Division; Trench artillery “Tanks,” or artillery of assault.
3. Mission and use of the artillery during a battle.
4. Anti-aircraft artillery.
5. Advance or withdrawal of the batteries.
6. Conclusion.
=1. Retrospective view.= _General considerations._ In the French army long before the war, several clear-headed and well-informed men had foreseen the necessity of having a large, heavy field artillery, similar to that of Germany.
To recall General Pétain’s motto: “The artillery conquers the positions, the infantry occupies them”--this simple axiomatic statement obviously compels the inference that an army shall possess an artillery able to bombard efficiently every species of fortification.
Unfortunately few people in the Government or parliamentary spheres could be brought to consider the possibility of a war; so this question of a heavy artillery, although continually agitated in those circles, remained unsolved.
In 1914, the immense majority of the French nation, including not only the politicians but also a great many army officers, scoffed at the possibility of a war with Germany. The Moroccan imbroglio, the war in the Balkans, and the Austrian policy of conquest were not sufficient warning for them. That France’s military preparation was entirely inadequate, and that this was due solely to the lethargy of the national mind, is generally admitted to-day. During the first year of the war, not only were we hopelessly outclassed in heavy artillery, but at Lille, Maubeuge, and La Fère the Germans captured a goodly number of our heavy guns with their munitions, and turned them against us. Fortunately we are able to assert that they used them with very little advantage to themselves.
Only a few heavy-artillery regiments existed before the war. Their armament included few quick-firing 155 mm. Rimailho guns, which, though rapid in action, were too short in range. Other batteries were armed with 120 and 155 mm. siege guns; good types, but too small in calibre, and too slow in action. Moreover all these guns were placed at the disposal of armies which, at the beginning of the conflict, considered them as a reserve stock and kept them too far from the battle-fields of August and September, 1914.
The impossibility of following up the victory of the Marne gradually opened the eyes of the Government to the need of a very large, heavy artillery, but this necessity was frankly admitted only in the autumn of 1915, and then largely under the influence of the example given by our British Allies. They had much more quickly comprehended that no victory would be possible unless supremacy in artillery was achieved, and, with their usual cold determination, had turned all the resources at their disposal to the manufacture of every kind of gun, and mountains of ammunition.
France followed the example.
The progress made enabled us first to hold our own against the German artillery, then to equal it, and finally to surpass it.
Considering the limited means left to France by the invasion, considering the seizure by the enemy of her Lorraine iron deposits, and of her richest coal mines, it must be acknowledged that the effort made from 1915 to 1917 was gigantic.
=2. Different sorts of artillery.= We shall divide the artillery into three parts: the artillery of an army, of an army corps, and of a division.
ARTILLERY OF AN ARMY. This includes heavy artillery of all sizes. The army unit alone possesses guns of greater calibre than 155 mm. The composition of the heavy artillery in an army varies considerably, the number of different types of cannon allotted to any one arm depending upon circumstances and on the work which it is expected to do. According to local needs, therefore, the Generalissimo orders the heavy artillery to be transferred from one army group to another. Similarly, the Chief of a group of armies can, as he sees fit, order such transfers of guns within his command.
We find in the armies howitzers and mortars of the following sizes: 220, 270, 280, 305, 370, 400 mm. (in inches: 8, 10, 11, 12, 14½, and 15¾). Soon we shall have 520 mm. guns (20½ inches). There are also field guns of 120 and 155 mm. short and 155 mm. long (5 and 6 inches) and naval guns of 19, 100, 240, 274, 305, and 340 mm.
The artillery of an army is under the command of a General.
The field batteries of 120–155 mm. are composed of four pieces; howitzer batteries and naval batteries of 100 and 190 mm. are nearly always of two pieces. The largest mortars, and the heaviest naval guns mounted on railroad trucks, operate singly, and each gun is accompanied by several trucks carrying its material and munitions.
ARTILLERY OF AN ARMY CORPS. The artillery of an army corps is under the command of a Colonel. It includes two groups of 75 mm. field guns, two groups of 105 (4 inch), or of 120 (5 inch), and one group of 155 (6 inch), quick-firing. This artillery is reinforced, in case of need, by the heavy artillery which the army can dispose of. The Colonel commanding the artillery assumes the command of all batteries, of whatever size, momentarily put at the disposal of his army corps. He is most specially intrusted with the selection of the ground on which to place the batteries, and it is he who has to specify the part each of them shall take in the action. The divisional batteries of the army corps are also under his command, at least during the preparation for the attacks. It is absolutely indispensable that each battery should be assigned its objective, and should be positively forbidden to scatter its projectiles promiscuously. Thus costly waste is avoided, and a definite purpose accomplished.
While getting ready for their first great attack in the Somme sector, the British, during an artillery preparation of several days’ duration that exceeded in intensity any previously known, fired a vast number of projectiles. At the time of the assault, the British infantry displayed an indomitable courage, and captured several important positions, but, for the want of a proper concentration of the fire of their artillery on the points to be destroyed, their heavy losses in men were too big a price to pay for the gains they made. The British artillery has since modified its methods, and, assisted by an unexcelled service of aviation, it has, over all its Front, impressed the Germans with the power and accuracy of its guns.
ARTILLERY OF A DIVISION. At present, divisional artillery includes three groups of 75 mm. (each group composed of three batteries of four guns), one group of three batteries of four quick-firing 155 mm., and one battery of trench-guns, the number and size of which are variable. This artillery is under the command of a Colonel.
Further on we shall speak of the difficulty experienced in advancing the heavy guns through the country devastated by the Germans in March, 1917. The 75 mm. field artillery, only, was able to advance quickly enough. Guns of 105 mm. should have been able to follow the troops everywhere and give them help until the arrival of the heavier pieces.
In position, and at the time of active operations, the artillery of a division is reinforced by the artillery of the army corps and that of the army.
The longest range of field guns is 8500 metres.
The range of the howitzers varies between 10,000 and 14,000 metres.
Heavy guns have a much greater range. The 380 we shall soon be turning out will send a shell containing 150 kilograms of explosive to a distance of 38 kilometres.
TRENCH ARTILLERY. This artillery includes special mortars, firing at a high angle projectiles containing powerful explosives; their longest range is not over two miles. They are principally used for the destruction of wire entanglements, first-line trenches, and dugouts. Their size varies from 58 to 340 mm.
The projectiles are provided with blades which maintain their direction through the air, as the guns firing them are not rifled. They are really aërial torpedoes, and are tremendously destructive to trenches and defences of every sort.
The armies have a big reserve of trench guns distributed along the Front according to circumstances. These batteries are generally placed in the first-line support trenches.
Small-sized mortars operated by compressed air are now also used. Their range is limited, but for short distances they are very reliable and powerful weapons.
By reason of the great difficulties they experienced in getting heavy artillery up into the mountains the Italians have adopted trench mortars which fire very large projectiles to a considerable distance, and they have succeeded in constructing some examples which will throw heavy torpedoes three and four kilometres.
“TANKS” (ARTILLERY OF ASSAULT). Tanks were first used by the British, to whom they have rendered very valuable service. They have not only been of great assistance to their infantry, but have also produced a very depressing effect on the enemy’s morale.
Their somewhat too great weight caused many to stick in the muddy and unfavourable ground over which they had to operate. We believe that the original model has not been abandoned, but that lighter ones have lately been built.
The French made use of tanks for the first time in their attack on the Aisne on the 15th of April, 1917. Their machines were not absolutely perfect then, and, owing perhaps to faulty tactics, their success was not equal to expectation, but, in the attack of May 5th, they were better handled and proved valuable in the action. The French tanks have since been improved, and now thoroughly fulfil their purpose.
It is important to note that the Germans, who for a long time did not favour the adoption of tanks, probably because the management of these monsters require of their crews qualities not always found among the Boches, have recently constructed some. Of course they are of “Kolossal” proportions. We do not know as yet exactly what results they have obtained.
Quite recent reports reveal that in the attack of the 28th of October, north-east of Soissons, the French used tanks far lighter than those first employed. Last spring’s experience has caused them to be handled in a much more efficient manner, and the first reports show that these machines, by destroying numerous machine-gun shelters that had escaped the fire of the artillery, have greatly facilitated the forward march of the troops.
It seems to us that the proper tactics for tanks should not be to advance ahead of the infantry waves and thus, without benefiting them, hinder the barrage fire of their own artillery, but should consist in following slightly behind the first waves in order to complete the destruction of the numerous nests of German machine-guns which the artillery has not always succeeded in silencing, to overthrow obstacles, and flatten the incompletely destroyed wire.
In brief, the mission of the tanks should be to support the infantry and clear the way for its forward progress.
=3. Mission and use of the artillery in the fight.= The mission of the field artillery in the preparation for an offensive consists in tearing up the first-line trenches, the passages of communication, and the wire entanglements, and in locating and silencing the machine-guns through the loopholes of their shelters.
Unless the field artillery is directed with most particular care, it is liable to expose its infantry to heavy losses, which are not only regrettable in themselves but affect considerably the morale of the troops.
For the very reason that the 75 mm. gun is a weapon of great precision, its accuracy is disturbed by very slight causes, such as atmospheric perturbations, and the quality and condition of the different powders. The officers commanding the batteries, immediately upon their arrival in new regions, prepare firing-tables based on the local conditions of the atmosphere and temperature, to guide the firing at the different hours of the day. They correct also the errors resulting from the different propulsive qualities of the various powders. As a rule all the projectiles belonging to the same lot give similar results.
Directly it is in position, the field artillery calculates the distance that separates it from the various points on which it may have to fire. It complies with all the requests of the infantry, when informed of dangerous moves of the enemy; executing rapid barrages on the signalled objectives. By barrages, at about one hundred metres ahead of the advance, it protects the assaulting waves of infantry. It increases the range in proportion as the advance moves on. The groups of 105 mm. may be advantageously used in order to reinforce the action of the 75 mm. field artillery.
Since it has been possible to increase the proportion of 155 mm. quick-firing guns, batteries of this calibre have often been brought in to reinforce the barrages kept up by the 75 mm. guns. In the recent operations on the Anglo-French front this combination has often been used on a large scale, and with disastrous effect whenever fire was opened in time on troops assembled for the purpose of counter-attack.
Heavy artillery has a twofold part to play. It is an artillery for destruction and an artillery for counterfiring; it executes also neutralizing fire. It is guided by the information furnished by scouting airplanes and captive balloons.
_Destructive fire_ is executed against important dugouts, blockhouses, shelters for machine-guns, and everything on the enemy’s front that can check the advance of the infantry.
_Counterfiring_, guided by the same agencies, is executed in order to put enemy batteries out of action. It is certain, indeed, that the one of the two adversaries that succeeds in silencing the opposing artillery can more easily collect his forces, and, at the time of launching an attack or resisting a counter-attack, the task of the infantry will be made easier of accomplishment.
At the time of the preparation of the attacks, the fire of the various artilleries continues for seven and even eight days with unabating or even (if necessary) increasing intensity.
_Neutralization fire_ is made with asphyxiating shells. When the enemy’s batteries have been well pounded by destructive fire, the quickest way to put them completely out of action is to exhaust the gunners by neutralization fire and thus prevent them from serving the guns. Even with gas-proof masks the men very soon become exhausted on account of the difficulty they have in breathing through them. With this end in view, a bombardment with asphyxiating shells is kept up for several hours.
For instance, at the time of the attack, near Craonne, on the 5th of May, 1917, one of our French army corps was faced by about one hundred and eighty German batteries of all sizes. Our destructive fire had terribly damaged those batteries; but the Germans, being undisturbed on their Eastern Front, could bring up fresh batteries at every moment, and were still able to oppose our advance towards the tableland of Craonne.
On the whole length of our Front our artillery fired with asphyxiating shells, and a few hours afterwards, with the exception of four or five, all the German batteries had ceased firing.
The importance of the use of asphyxiating shells may be very great.
Recently in Champagne an asphyxiating shell of large size penetrated through a hole made by previous heavy shell-fire into a concreted German tunnel and exploded. This tunnel, which sheltered an important garrison, comprising two companies and many machine-guns, had already suffered heavily. Its exits were obstructed, but it was still holding out.
All but one man were suffocated, surprised by the gas before they had time to put on their masks. A French surgeon, peering through the hole made by the shell and seeing no sign of life, crept into the corpse-filled gallery, and, after a brief reconnoissance, signalled to the nearest French troops that they could occupy it.
It is not unusual to see, during the big attacks, the various artilleries established in eight and even more rows, occupying all the available vantage ground.
The occupation of Hill 304 in August, 1917, is a striking example of the results of a thorough co-ordination of the different elements for the preparation of the attack and the capture of the position.
Commencing with the systematic destruction of the enemy’s defences by several days’ continuous bombardment, accompanied by a most careful location of his batteries, with the help of all possible means of investigation (such as wireless telegraphy, photography, location of the guns by light and sound, interception of code signals, interrogation of prisoners, etc.), the guns of our counter-batteries, having duly apportioned these various objectives, succeeded on the morning of the 24th in neutralizing the fire of the German artillery, and exhausting the defenders of Hill 304.
At the time of the attack our battle-planes, by driving the enemy’s aircraft far beyond their lines, allowed our scout-planes to direct accurately the fire of our 75 mm. guns, and permitted the aircraft accompanying the assaulting waves of infantry to fly close to the ground and attack the enemy in their very trenches.
To such a co-ordination of all our efforts is due the seizure, with a minimum loss to our troops, of most important positions.
The Germans have a way of attempting to regain lost ground by counter-attacks in mass-formation, which has cost them terrible losses. Field artillery has a capital part to play in the repulse of these attacks, which are usually broken up by the rapidity and power of the barrages. The guns of 75 mm. are assisted by the groups of 105 and by the destruction groups of 155, and also by counter-battery or neutralization fire from the heavy artillery, according to the necessities of the moment.
=4. Anti-aircraft artillery.= Airplanes are the most reliable and effective weapons against airplanes and Zeppelins, but it is impossible to command at all times a sufficient number of machines to prevent the enemy’s incursions.
Behind the lines have been placed special sections of anti-aircraft guns of different sizes (75, 47, and 37 mm.) mounted on special carriages that allow vertical fire. Without entering into details, we may say that the fire of these guns has been rendered so accurate that, though every airplane thus attacked may not be destroyed, projectiles shower so close around them that they are forced to fly away at all speed. A certain number of aircraft are brought down by these guns every month.
One of these sections hit and brought down a Zeppelin near Verdun in February, 1916; another shot down, near Compiègne, in the spring of 1917, a large Zeppelin on its way back from England. Quite recently five Zeppelins returning from a raid on London were brought down in France by airplanes and anti-aircraft cannon. We mention these well-known events as indicating the unquestionable superiority of the airplane over the dirigible, which, we repeat, has been of real military service only at sea. They also demonstrate that by increasing the number of anti-aircraft sections both behind the front and in proximity to the whole enemy line, the raids on open towns can be rendered impossible.
The Germans have recently invented a new gun, probably a mortar, which projects with great accuracy and to a high altitude a big cluster of whirling balls of fire, each having a potential diameter of five or six feet of fire. The whole cluster has an apparent radius about as great as the spread of an airplane from tip to tip. These new projectiles, known as “flaming onions,” have been used principally on the British Front, and do not appear to have done much actual damage, but should a great number of them be discharged at large, slow-moving planes, they might become dangerous.
ARMOURED MOTOR-CARS. On some armoured motor-cars small cannon are used; on others, machine-guns are placed. They are intended to throw the enemy lines into confusion at certain points. Their action must be swift, sudden, and brief. Their mobility enables them to dodge the fire of the enemy’s artillery. These cars can be much more useful in open field operations than in trench warfare. They will be especially useful as a help to cavalry when the latter can once more be used.
Every regiment of infantry is now provided with a section of three 37 mm. guns which being light, easy to move, and very accurate are employed principally, either all together or in the proportion of one to each battalion, against machine-guns. They have been greatly appreciated by the regiment commanders; a large number will probably be distributed as soon as they can be manufactured.
=5. Advance or withdrawal of the artillery.= One of the most interesting questions for an army in the making, such as the American Army, is that of the rapid moving of the heavy artillery, at a given moment.
We do not hesitate to say that this problem is far from being entirely solved on the Western Front, and that its study and organization will be a very hard task for the engineers entrusted with its solution.
American engineers will have to go to the Western Front and see for themselves all the difficulties to be surmounted.
ADVANCE. During the spring of 1917, the French Army had to pursue on a large front an enemy who had not only devastated the country behind them to a depth of from 30 to 35 kilometres, but had also accumulated in this wilderness all the obstacles their fertile imagination could suggest.
The 75 mm. field artillery alone, at the cost of great efforts and tremendous loss of horses, managed to overtake, though somewhat late, the advance of our infantry, which had succeeded in going forward everywhere.
The sections for the supply of munitions followed their batteries, but more slowly; and some batteries, which at the cost of great and continuous efforts, had come into position, had no munitions.
The only way to guard against such delays, in the future, will be to keep in reserve complementary teams of horses, to replace those that are killed, or to help the batteries and their ammunition sections through the worst passages.
We have not the right to give here in detail the difficulties encountered in the advance of the heavy artillery. We were informed of them by a confidential note from the High Command.
However, while this confidential note sets forth in detail all the difficulties encountered, it makes no recommendation whatever as to what should be done on such occasions in the future.
There is absolutely no doubt that wherever the Germans retreat, they will endeavour to accumulate obstacles behind them as they did on the Somme and the Aisne. The question of the advance of the different artilleries must therefore be very carefully considered. Means must be found to ensure it, while keeping within the immediate reach of each battery the requisite munition supply.
America, however great her participation in the war, will never be able to mobilize more than a small part of her immense population. Unlike France, she will not be forced to suspend the activities of ordinary industrial and commercial life. Assisted by technicians, she will succeed in training all the special troops required and in supplying them fully with material. She will even be able to lend some of them to France, who, having mobilized all her fencible men for service at the front or rear, experiences great difficulty in recruiting the technical troops she needs.
The problem of the rapid advance of the artillery is to be solved by increasing the road-making facilities. Whatever the difficulties encountered and the obstacles created by the enemy, we must be able to make, with the least possible loss of time, large and solid roads in sufficient number, and to repair or build entirely new lines of railroads of all gauges.
WITHDRAWAL. We must always foresee the possibility of a defeat, prepare everything to lessen it, and leave as few guns as possible in the hands of the enemy. This problem is easier to solve than that of an advance towards the enemy, and in order to be able to withdraw the various artilleries rapidly, it will be sufficient, when preparing the attack, to have foreseen the number of roads and tracks necessary to remove the batteries from the front.
These roads and railway lines have to be constantly kept in order by special gangs, and the holes made by shells must be immediately filled up.
In fact we shall see that the perfect repair of all these ways of communication is intimately connected with the supply of munitions.
=6. Conclusion.= From the mere general outlines we have just given concerning the use and mission of the artillery, we may draw the following conclusion:
Till the end of the war it will be necessary to constantly increase the manufacture of guns of all sizes, especially those of the largest calibres, and to accumulate a reserve of ammunition far beyond the actual needs. The adversary that will have succeeded in silencing the opposing artillery will be sure of victory, and will obtain it without the enormous losses in human life that all combatants have sustained since the beginning of the war.
These losses, it may be remarked in passing, have been considerably reduced of late by the employment of more scientific methods of fighting.
The transference of heavy artillery from one army to another, according to local needs, has many disadvantages. Such a practice prevents the High Command from deceiving the adversary as to the real point of attack. If the artillery preparation could be maintained with equal intensity for equal periods of time on the Fronts of several armies, the enemy could not possibly foresee which of the armies would strike the principal blow, and would be much embarrassed as to the disposition of their reserves.
It will never be possible on a 600 kilometre front to accumulate a sufficient number of guns literally to accomplish this, but by constantly turning out new guns, by increasing the number of batteries and of large artillery concentrations on many points distant from one other, the enemy will be kept guessing.