Chapter 32

EGYPT JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER, 1882

I.

At the beginning of 1881 the form of government which Europe had set up in Egypt was but young. Tewfik, the Khedive chosen by the French and British Governments to replace Ismail, had occupied his position for less than two years. Riaz Pasha, head of the Ministry after the fall of his predecessor Nubar, [Footnote: There is a note of October 13th, 1880: 'I saw Nubar Pasha about Egypt, and I had received an extremely able long letter from Rivers Wilson asking me to interfere to restore Nubar to power, but I did not as a fact discuss Egypt with the French.'] had brought about a mutiny of officers early in 1879, and was carrying on public affairs with difficulty. He had been forced to sacrifice his War Minister to the second mutiny (of February, 1881) which followed on the arrest and secured the release of Arabi. In the spring of the year the smouldering discontent of the army was fanned into flame by the advance of the French to Tunis.

'On May 12th' (1881--the very date on which the French Expeditionary Force constrained the Bey of Tunis to accept French suzerainty) 'steps were taken on behalf of Lord Hartington, Lord Granville, and myself to see whether, now that France had knocked another bit out of the bottom of the Ottoman Empire by her attack on Tunis, we ought to try to get any compensation in Egypt for ourselves. Hartington was to consult the India Office upon the question, and I wrote to Sir Edward Hertslet, asking him to consider how we stood with reference to the despatch of troops through Egypt in the event of (1) a rising in India, (2) an invasion of India by Russia.'

On July 28th, 1881, there took place at the Foreign Office the first meeting of a Committee 'to consider the affairs of Egypt, consisting of Tenterden, myself, Pauncefote, Malet, Scott the Judge, young Maine, and Reilly.' Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, who had been Finance Minister under Ismail, was called in from time to time.

'My own endeavours on this Committee were directed against increasing internationally in Egypt, as I thought the Governments of England and France would be driven sooner or later to occupy the country with a joint force, and that internationality (which would mean German influence) would then be a great difficulty in the way.'

The need for intervention soon grew urgent. On September 9th, 1881, a large body of troops, headed by Arabi, threatened the Khedive's palace, demanding the dismissal of all the Ministers, the convocation of a parliament, and a great increase of the army. Again the mutiny succeeded, and this time, in Sir Edward Malet's words, "it was more than a mutiny, it was a revolution." Riaz Pasha was replaced by Cherif, but all real power was in the hands of the soldiery.

The question now came to be, Who should step in to establish order? The Sultan of Turkey, who saw a chance of making his nominal suzerainty real, proposed to despatch troops, but confined himself to sending envoys. As a counter-demonstration, France and England each sent a warship to Alexandria; and Gambetta's accession to power in November meant a great reinforcement to the policy of joint intervention.

Sir Charles was then in Paris engaged in the commercial negotiations already described, and he chronicled in his diary a sporting suggestion:

"_September 19th_, 1881.--After the seventeenth sitting of the Treaty Joint Commission I had an interview with Delia Sala, the Italian who is an Egyptian General, and governs the Soudan. He is a great fencer, and has killed his man before now. He declares himself willing to put down insubordination in the Egyptian Army by calling out three of the Colonels in succession. A more practical but hardly less bold suggestion of his is that he should be allowed to increase his anti- slavery regiment of 600 men, and then to use it as a bodyguard for Malet instead of the putting down of slavery."

'On December 27th, 1881, Lord Granville asked me by letter to discuss with Gambetta all the possible alternatives, and especially joint occupation (to which Lord Granville saw objection), and a Turkish intervention under the control of England and France (to which French opinion was opposed): "The more you can get out of Gambetta without committing us the more grateful we shall be." I have no recollection of having discussed Egypt with Gambetta.'

Shortly afterwards

'Malet wrote from Cairo to Paris, telling me that he still had confidence in the moderation of the progressist party represented by Arabi and the Colonels, and that he was managing them through Wilfrid Blunt, who was acting as a go-between; but a little later on the relations between Blunt and Malet became such as to show that each had thought he was using the other as a tool.'

"Moderation" is an ambiguous term. When the Chamber of Notables met at the end of December, 1881, the army put forward through the Minister for War a demand for an increase of 18,000 men. This increase the European controllers refused to sanction, on the ground that the country could not afford it. Thus came to pass a conflict between the national movement and the joint European control upon an issue which united the interests of the military party with the aspirations of the parliamentarian Nationalists for the power of the purse. Gambetta, however, was now dominant in France, and Gambetta had no tolerance for the pretensions of what he called a "sham assembly." A Joint Note, dated January 6th, 1882, was issued by the two Powers, in which England and France declared their intention to "guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt." Another phrase in the Note attributed the exchange of views between the Powers to "recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive," and this was naturally construed by Nationalists to mean that parliamentary institutions were internal causes of complication.

The issue of this Note is one of the marking-points of modern Egyptian history. It asserted the determination of the joint Powers to make their will obeyed in Egypt, by force if necessary. According to general admission, its issue was due to the overmastering influence of Gambetta. Dilke, whom everyone knew to be Gambetta's intimate, was in France almost continuously from the time when Gambetta became Prime Minister on November 10th, 1881, till the eve of the issue of the Joint Note. In 1878, while in Opposition, he had publicly advocated a policy of annexation in Egypt, and it was inevitable that critics should fasten upon him a special responsibility for the course pursued.

Yet, as the Memoir makes clear, in 'this weighty affair' Dilke had virtually no voice. He was not in the Cabinet, and he was absent from Paris for nearly the whole of December, taking a holiday in Provence from commercial negotiations. Only on his return, on December 27th, did he receive Lord Granville's letter--which was dated December 21st--asking him to discuss with Gambetta the possible alternatives. But although the two men met repeatedly between December 27th and January 2nd, when Dilke left Paris, Gambetta refrained from discussing Egypt. The Memoir says, under date January 7th, 1882:

'The Cabinet had before it the state of affairs in Egypt, and resolved upon agreeing on Gambetta's policy of a Joint Note on the part of England and of France in support of the Khedive against the revolutionary party. Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, misled by the dates of interviews, has asserted from that time to this (1890) that the Joint Note was arranged in Paris between Gambetta and myself. I have repeatedly denied that statement, for curiously enough it so happens that the Joint Note was the only important matter relating to Foreign Affairs which happened while I was at the Foreign Office in which I was not consulted. Gambetta never broached the subject with me, and I knew nothing of it until it was done. As we talked a little about Egypt, I suppose that he had reasons for not wishing to speak of the Joint Note to me, but I do not know what they were.'

II.

Sir Charles Dilke's policy for Egypt differed from that of his chief, who always inclined to leave Turkey to undertake the necessary coercion, under the surveillance of England and France. Dilke, with Gambetta, desired joint intervention. [Footnote: Lord Cromer wrote to Sir Charles Dilke asking him about a letter of M. Joseph Reinach's of July 28th, 1909, in which the latter spoke of his doubts as to the complete sincerity of the English Government at the time of the Gambetta Ministry. At that moment Dilke, in whose company he had breakfasted at Gambetta's with MM. Rouvier, Spuller, and other guests, did not, in spite of his great friendship for Gambetta, believe in the duration of his Ministry, any more than the English Government did. M. Reinach thought that Sir Charles Dilke's Diary would throw an interesting light on the point as to whether, foreseeing Gambetta's fall, the English Government did not foresee the probability of their sole intervention in Egypt.

Sir Charles's comment was as follows:

"My diary (agreed to by Chamberlain after he had changed the opinions he held at the time described) shows that permanent occupation was not thought consistent with British interests by any who took a leading part in the Cabinet action. I was not in the Cabinet until after Tel- el-Kebir, but, as you know, I was--from the time of the riots at Alexandria--of the 'inner Cabinet' for such purposes. Of course, all men knew that the Gambetta Cabinet was dead before its birth. Hanotaux ... is right on this. But we wanted the Turk to go for us, and, failing the Turk (under our lead), then Italy in place of France, after France backed out....

"There was no moment up to '96--or perhaps '98--when if France had known her mind and meant business she could not have had her way-- 'reasonably.'

"Gambetta's policy was dominated by hatred of Russia. 'I will seek my alliances--n'importe où, même à Berlin'--meant anywhere except at St. Petersburg.... Say to Reinach that I tell you that I don't mind _showing_ him the governing passages in my diaries if he wants to _see_ them, but that they are dead against him."]

'On January 15th, 1882, I started the idea that England and France should not act as England and France only, but should ask Europe for a mandate, and on the 16th Lord Granville took it up, and wrote to Lord Lyons in its favour on the 17th. I sent to Lord Granville notes of what I proposed to say in a speech on Egypt. I pointed out that I had been one of those who had opposed the creation of the Anglo-French control, but that it was the invention of our predecessors. Lord Derby had created, when Conservative Foreign Secretary, a mild form of control, which had been raised into the sharper form of control by Lord Salisbury, who had refused successively to Germany, to Austria, and to Italy, any share in the control. Lord Salisbury was wholly responsible for it; but, however great its political dangers, from the Egyptian and the economical point of view it had worked well, and, being there, must be maintained, as it was the only thing between us and anarchy. It was due to the controllers that the country had been relieved from arbitrary rule. The co-operation with France deliberately created by Lord Salisbury must be loyally maintained.

'Lord Granville wrote back praising the proposed statement, but suggesting that I should not run down the control so much, and not initiate an attack upon our predecessors. Although I slightly toned down my observations upon this occasion, when we were afterwards attacked on the matter in the House of Commons I more than once said everything that I had proposed to say against the control and our responsibility for its existence.'

'On January 18th Sheffield' (Lord Lyons's secretary) 'came to see me. He said that Gambetta was angry with Malet, as Malet was under the influence of Wilfrid Blunt, which meant that of Arabi Bey. I wrote a minute of our conversation upon this point, and Lord Granville replied: "Gambetta must not drag us into too arbitrary a way of dealing with the Egyptians. He is _très autoritaire_." On the 20th Lord Granville received a private letter from Lord Lyons, who would not hear of the mandatories of Europe plan for Egypt, which, however, Mr. Gladstone had approved. It was from Lord Lyons's reply that I discovered that Lord Granville had given the credit of the scheme to Malet. I had never heard Malet mention any such idea; but on the next day, January 21st, Malet did telegraph the plan, and I could not help wondering who had sent it to him.

'On the 26th Lord Granville informed me that at the Cabinet of the previous day my Egyptian "Mandatories" proposal had been considered, and had been opposed by Lord Kimberley, but had received pretty general support.'

On January 26th an event happened which destroyed the chances of joint intervention. Gambetta fell. The policy of joint intervention in support of any menace to the established order in Egypt, to which both Powers were committed by the Joint Note of January 6th, now passed into the hands of Lord Granville and of M. de Freycinet, concerning whom Sir Charles wrote on March 9th, 1882:

'I noted that Freycinet had begun his official career by doing what he had done when in office before--namely, asking Bismarck's consent to every act. He was so anxious to stop the Turks from going to Egypt that he was willing at this moment to agree even to Italian intervention in the name of Europe; and he was personally anxious for reconciliation with Italy.'

Meanwhile in Egypt there had been a new ministerial crisis. Cherif Pasha was deposed from the Presidency of the Council, and Arabi was made the Minister for War. The control, according to Sir Edward Malet, "existed only in name." In the provinces there was anarchy. Either the order of things established in Egypt must disappear, or intervention in some shape was inevitable.

'On February 1st there was a Cabinet upon the Egyptian Question. Lord Granville wrote to me before it met to say that the Cabinet had complained that we had not told them anything about Egypt, to which he had replied that they had received the telegrams if they had not read them.... At this day's Cabinet Hartington alone was in favour of Anglo-French intervention, and he fell out with Lord Granville over it, and they were on bad terms for some time. Some of the Cabinet wanted English intervention, and some wanted Anglo-French-Turkish intervention....

'On March 4th there was a Cabinet, at which Hartington made a great fight against all his colleagues, who were unanimous against him upon the question of Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

'On March 20th the new French Ambassador Tissot came. I had previously known him when he was the Agent of the Government of National Defence inhabiting the London Embassy, virtually as Ambassador but without a staff. On this occasion he immediately startled us out of our senses by proposing that we should depose the Khedive and set up Prince Halim. He had converted Freycinet to this madcap view.'

Halim, the heir by Mohammedan law, was Arabi's candidate for sovereignty. During Sir Charles's visit to France in the middle of April this suggestion became fully official, as he learnt on returning.

'France had proposed to us to depose the Khedive and set up Halim, and we had refused on the ground of breach of faith. On April 20th the Cabinet decided absolutely and unanimously against any suggestion with regard to Halim.'

Since the policy of united intervention in the name of Europe, to which Sir Charles had sought to fix the Powers, had no longer any support in France, and since the French proposal of a new Khedive had been rejected, the plan of Turkish intervention which Lord Granville had always preferred, as being the least bad, was now formally put forward.

'On April 23rd Lord Granville invented a plan of sending three Generals to Egypt, because the French had told him that we had refused their plan without having one of our own. The idea was that a Turkish General should go with full powers, and accompanied by a French and an English General, the full powers not to be used by the Turk unless his French and English colleagues should agree.

'On Friday, May 12th, I noted in my diary that the French had suddenly "caved in" to us about Egypt, and declared that a Turkish intervention at the request of England and France would not be Turkish intervention; and on Saturday, May 13th, I found Lord Granville ten years younger than on the 12th in consequence. But the French afterwards not only got out of this, but pretended that they had never done anything of the kind.'

The decision to call in Turkey was not publicly announced, and the situation at Cairo grew daily more threatening. Sir Edward Malet telegraphed that a fanatical feeling against foreigners was being sedulously fostered. The Governments then, says Lord Cromer, "authorized their Consuls-General to take whatever steps they considered possible to insure the departure from Egypt of Arabi and his principal partisans, and the nomination of Cherif Pasha to be President of the Council." [Footnote: Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_, vol. i., chap, xv., p. 273.] Acting on this instruction, Sir Edward Malet and his French colleague, on May 25th, 1882, handed in an official Note to the President of the Council, which demanded, first, the temporary withdrawal of Arabi from Egypt, and, secondly, the resignation of the Ministry. On May 26th the Egyptian Ministry resigned. Thereupon the French Government decided that the need for Turkish intervention had passed.

'Late on Tuesday afternoon, May 23rd, Lord Granville was in such a hurry to adjourn the House of Lords, and bolt out of town for Whitsuntide, that he let the French send off our Identic Note to the Powers in a form in which it would do much harm, although this was afterwards slightly altered. On the next day, Wednesday, the 24th, Mr. Gladstone brought Lord Granville up to town again, and stopped his going to the Derby, and at 1.30 p.m. they decided to call for immediate Turkish intervention in Egypt. The necessity for it had been caused by the childish folly of the French in trying to conceal the fact that they had proposed in writing to us, through Tissot on the 12th, to send six ships to Alexandria, and that if in addition troops must be employed on shore, they should be Turkish. The agreement between England and France was useless unless it was to be known, but if known, would have prevented the need for intervention. The most foolish course possible was that adopted by the French in first agreeing, and then concealing. On May 24th, at night, we proposed to the French to call in the Turks at once, and Freycinet went to bed to avoid answering.

'On Friday, the 26th, Tissot wrote to Lord Granville, "M. de Freycinet telegraphs to me that he is better, and will call the Cabinet together for to-morrow to submit to it your proposal"; and on Saturday, May 27th, accordingly, the French completely sold us, and we once more realized the fact that they are not pleasant people to go tiger- hunting with.'

He quotes from his diary of the moment the comment:

'"The French tried to throw us (and themselves) over as to Turkish intervention. I wanted to say so in the House. Lord Granville agreed."'

'On May 30th I strongly urged that we should tell the truth and say so, and a Cabinet was called for the next day, and on the 31st decided that we were not to say so; but Hartington agreed with me, and made himself very disagreeable to Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone, who held the opposite opinion.'

Sir Charles's entry of the moment was--"Lord G. and Hartington fell out even rather more than usual."

'On June 1st, in the House of Commons, I half said what I meant, but Mr. Gladstone spoilt the whole debate. I noted in my diary: "When Mr. Gladstone begins to talk on foreign affairs it is impossible to tell what he will say--witness his revelations of a cock-and-bull telegram of Malet's to-day as to the immediate proclamation of Prince Halim by Arabi." On the same day, it having been decided on the previous day that we should send ships to Egypt, Tenterden and I sent off a telegram _en clair_ to Lord Lyons about it in order that the French should know what we were doing....

'The Parliamentary difficulties of the Government upon the Egyptian Question at this moment were considerable, as the Opposition were taking with much vigour two inconsistent lines; Wolff and Chaplin violently attacking us upon Jingo grounds because we did not intervene by force in Egypt, and Bourke threatening us at every sign of intervention.'

Meanwhile the Khedive had failed to form another Ministry, and on May 28th Arabi had been reinstated, with the result that his supporters redoubled their confidence and that panic was general among the European residents.

'On June 13th we received full information with regard to the riots which had happened in Alexandria on the 11th' (there being a British and a French fleet there), 'in which several British subjects had been assaulted and our Consul severely beaten. I formed a clear opinion that it was impossible for us not to take active steps in intervention after this, [Footnote: A private letter of this date gives the estimate that "there is an overwhelming public opinion here for very strong measures; that the great majority of the Cabinet share that view; that France is most unpopular; and that Lord Granville, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Bright will apparently bow to the storm."] as we had been acting strictly within our rights along with France and representing joint control. If the French would not go with us in restoring order or allow the Turks to do so, I felt that we must do it for ourselves, but I was clearly of opinion, and have always remained so, that it was undesirable to embark upon a prolonged occupation of Egypt. I thought, and still think, that anarchy could have been put down, and a fairly stable state of things set up, without any necessity for a British occupation. The riots, however, were the cause on my part of a considerable error. I believed on the information furnished me from Alexandria and Cairo that they were the work of the revolutionary leaders in the capital. A long time afterwards I gradually came to think that this had not been so, and that they had been purely local and spontaneous. This does not, however, affect my judgment upon the need for intervention.

'On Wednesday, June 14th ... brought me a telegram from Wilfrid Blunt to Arabi ... "Praise God for victory." This abominable telegram naturally had much to do with exciting the suspicions that I have just mentioned as to Arabi having organized the riots. But I now believe that the English sympathizer was more extreme than the Egyptian revolutionist. In my diaries I wrote: "Our side in the Commons are very Jingo about Egypt. They badly want to kill somebody. They don't know who. Mr. G., who does not like the Stock Exchange, sent 'Egypts' up 3 1/2 per cent. by a word in his speech." [Footnote: Mr. Gladstone on June 14th: "... The ends we have in view ... are well known to consist in the general maintenance of all established rights in Egypt, whether they be those of the Sultan, those of the Khedive, those of the people of Egypt, or _those of the foreign bondholders_."] At 6.30 in the afternoon there was a Cabinet on Egypt, Chamberlain and Hartington pressing for action, and I being most anxious that action should take place. As there was now to be a conference at Constantinople upon Egyptian affairs, I urged without success that Rivers Wilson should be sent out to assist Lord Dufferin, on account of his incomparable knowledge of Egyptian affairs, Lord Granville refusing on the ground that "there's great jealousy of him among the Egyptian English. He is under the charm of that arch-intriguer Nubar." But we needed Nubar to get us out of our difficulties, and had ultimately to call him in as Prime Minister.

'On June 15th the French Ambassador came to fence at my house at ten, and I reported to Lord Granville: "He volunteered the statement that Freycinet was 'an old woman'; in fact, talked in the sort of way in which Bourke used to talk of Lord Derby in '77-'78."

'In the evening I met Musurus Bey at the French Embassy, and had a conversation with him, which I reported and he afterwards denied, but I don't think much importance was attached to his denial. I need not discuss the matter, as the despatches were laid before Parliament.

'On the next day I wrote to Lord Granville: "The one thing we have to fear is the murder of Malet or of the Khedive. If the Khedive obeys the Sultan and returns to Cairo, it is very difficult to keep Malet at Alexandria. I think we ought to tell the Sultan that we are sorry to hear of the direction given to the Khedive to return to Cairo, and tell the Khedive and Malet that we have said so. Also privately tell the Khedive not to move." This I think was done.

'On June 17th I decided that I would resign if no steps were taken with regard to the Alexandria massacre; but in the evening Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Ampthill: [Footnote: Lord Odo Russell had become Lord Ampthill, and was still Ambassador at Berlin.] "No. 130 ... it is impossible that the present state of things should be allowed to continue, and if the Sultan is unwilling to do anything, some other means must be found." On the 18th, after much pressure and a threat of resignation from me, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Ampthill: "No. 131. Intimate to Prince Bismarck ... that sharing as he does the strong wish of H. M. G. to avoid unnecessary complications, he must feel that, even if H. M. G. did not object, as they do, public opinion would prevent them permanently acquiescing in any arrangements in Egypt, especially after the late massacres at Alexandria, which would destroy not only the prestige of this country, but also of Europe, in the East...."

'The French having, according to Count Hatzfeldt, stated to the Germans, as reported by Lord Ampthill in his No. 214, "that to sanction Turkish intervention in Egypt would be to commit suicide," I proposed that we should direct Lord Ampthill to read to him Tissot's communication of May 12th. in which the French had agreed to the use of Turkish troops. Lord Granville assented. On June 19th Lord Granville repeated, through Lord Ampthill, to Prince Bismarck, "the strong warning contained in my 131 of yesterday." I afterwards found out, however, that at the last moment, on June 17th, Lord Granville had telegraphed withdrawing the word "must" in his No. 130, and substituting the word "should." He afterwards telegraphed again, resubstituting "must," and wrote to me: "I have let the word stand, as Hartington and you attached importance to it, and as it had been already sent." There was great trouble about this change afterwards, for Lord Granville was not exact in saying that he had let the word "stand." What he had done was, as I say, first to withdraw it, and then to resubstitute it upon our strong pressure.

'On June 19th there were two meetings of the Cabinet about Egypt, to which I was called in; one at two, and another at six o'clock. I simply said, like the servants when they fall out: "Either Arabi must go or I will."

'On June 20th another meeting of the Cabinet took place at half-past three. Lord Hartington called attention to the fact that Lord Granville had altered "must" into "should" in No. 130, for the telegram had after all been printed for the Cabinet and the Embassies with the word "should." The Cabinet sat for four hours, and then adjourned to the next day, on a proposal by Northbrook and Childers to ask the French whether they would go halves with us in sending 15,000 men to guard the Canal. On June 21st I came down a little from my position of the previous day, and stated that I would go out with Hartington if he liked, but that if he would not, and I stood alone, then I would swallow Arabi on the ground that the oath to take him out was sworn by England and France together, and that if France would not do her half, we could not do both halves, provided that they gave me (1) protection of the Canal, (2) a startling reparation for the murders and the insult to our Consul at Alexandria.

'At two o'clock the Cabinet met again. Lord Granville had in the meantime written me a letter ... as to the leaving out of "must" and inserting "should." He said that if we changed our minds or had to adopt palliatives, such as the defence of the Canal and reparation at Alexandria, "our nose would be rubbed in 'must.'" I wrote back that our position was not the same, inasmuch as he was evidently looking forward to having to defend in Parliament a complete surrender, which I was determined I would not do. On the same day, however, we exchanged very pleasant letters about an accident to Lady Granville, of which Lord Granville wrote: "It frightened me out of my wits."

'The Cabinet decided on the instructions to Dufferin for the Conference, adopting proposals with regard to them which were made by Chamberlain, and which were, in fact, mine. Lord Granville refused to take them from Chamberlain, but Mr. Gladstone, with some slight changes, made them his own, and then Lord Granville took them directly. Northbrook went off delighted to continue his transport preparations. Hartington warned Indian troops without consulting his colleagues, but escaped censure. On June 23rd I suggested that somebody should be appointed to assess damages to property at Alexandria by the riots, as a ground for a claim against the revolutionary Government, and suggested Lord Charles Beresford for the work; but Lord Granville refused the man though he accepted the thing. I obtained his consent to telegraph that we should insist on payment of money to the relatives of the eight British subjects killed, of money for the men hurt, of damages for the destruction of property, on the execution of the murderers, on a salute to our flag at Alexandria, and a salute to our flag at Cairo.

'On Saturday, June 24th, as I was only getting my way from day to day upon these points by continually threatening resignation, Lord Granville wrote to me in solemn reproof: "Nothing should be so sacred as a threat of resignation." But I cannot see, and never could, why if one intends to resign if one does not get one's way about a point which one thinks vital, one should not say frankly exactly what one means. I never blustered, and never threatened resignation except when I fully meant it.

'On Sunday, June 25th, there came a curious telegram from Dufferin, stating that the Sultan was "quite prepared to hand over to us the exclusive control and administration of Egypt, reserving to himself only those rights of suzerainty which he now possessed. In fact, what he offered was an Egyptian convention on the lines of the Cyprus convention." Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone took upon themselves to decline this offer without laying it before the Cabinet, and on Tuesday, the 27th, the Queen sent to Hartington to express her anger that the Sultan's offer of Sunday should have been declined without consultation with her. I certainly think that a Cabinet ought to have been called, but the Cabinet would have backed the refusal, though they afterwards regretted it.

'On June 28th I was again sent for to the Cabinet, which discussed a proposal from the Sultan to send troops.

'On June 30th I dined with the German Ambassador, who told me that Musurus had said to him exactly what he had said to me at the French Embassy, and that he had placed the conversation upon record. On the same day two additional British gunboats were ordered to the Canal.

'On July 1st I had one of the most difficult tasks to perform that were ever laid upon me. I had wanted to get off the Cobden Club dinner fixed for that day; but, Lesseps having come over as a flaming Arabist for the express purpose of making a ferocious Arabi speech at this banquet, I had to go in order to propose his health, to sit next him at the dinner, to frighten him out of making his speech, and to make such a speech myself that he could not without provoking his audience mention Egypt at all. In all this I succeeded. I told him privately that, after the massacre of eight British subjects at Alexandria and the promise by England and France that they would jointly keep order in Egypt, if he introduced the subject I would speak again after him and raise the audience against him. The old gentleman was very angry, but he made a different speech, and the matter passed off successfully. Lord Derby was in the chair, and gave me great assistance, because, through Lord Granville, he allowed me to inform Lesseps that if he began to deliver the speech which he had in his pocket, he should rise and tell him that it was contrary to the rule of the Club to introduce controversial topics likely to lead to violent discussion, and, in fact, make him sit down. Lesseps brought me a telegram from his son, who was at Ismailia, stating that there could be no danger in Egypt unless there were an armed intervention, and threatening us with the destruction of the Canal if intervention should take place.

'On July 3rd there was a Cabinet on a proposal by Italy for the free navigation of the Canal. This was most unnecessary, as a virtual neutralization in practice existed, but the Italians wanted to do something, and after an enormous deal of discussion they ultimately got their way upon this unimportant point.

'On Monday, July 3rd, I received from Bourke, my predecessor, the first warning of strong Tory opposition to British intervention in Egypt.

'On the 4th Mr. Gladstone, Hartington, and Childers met to decide whether the reserves should be called out and the troops sent forward, but just before their meeting I saw Lesseps come past my door and go to Mr. Gladstone's room at the House of Commons, which was next to mine, and going in afterwards to Mr. Gladstone I saw the effect that Lesseps had produced. Lesseps had a promise from Arabi to let him make a fresh-water irrigation canal without payment for the concession, as I afterwards discovered.

'On this day I wrote a memorandum on the subject of intervention (I have an impression that it was based on Chamberlain's views, but I am not sure). I pointed out that many Liberals thought that intervention was only contemplated on account of financial interests--that if we intervened to protect the Canal and to exact reparation due to us for the Alexandria outrages, this feeling need not be taken into account; but that if we were going to Cairo, we ought to make our position clear. As far as Arabi personally was concerned, his use of the phrase "national party" was a mere prostitution of the term. But there was in Egypt a very real desire to see Egyptians in office, and a certain amount of real national sentiment, and that sentiment we might conciliate. I thought that if we intervened by ourselves the control might be considered dead. The intervention must be placed on the ground either of the need for settled government at Cairo, in order to make the Canal safe and our route to India free, or else on that of the probable complicity of the revolutionary party in the Alexandria massacres, or on both. But in the event of such an intervention I was of opinion that we should say that the recommendations of the Notables for the revision of existing institutions would be favourably considered, with the proviso, however, that the army should be either disbanded or diminished, the only military force necessary in Egypt being one for the Soudan and a bodyguard for the Khedive. To these views I have always adhered, and while I strongly supported an intervention of this kind, I was always opposed to an intervention which made us in the least responsible for Egyptian finance, or to an intervention followed by an occupation.

'Late on this afternoon of July 4th I secretly informed the Khedive, through Rivers Wilson, of the instructions that had been given to Beauchamp Seymour to bombard the Alexandria forts if the construction of new earthworks erected against our ships were not discontinued; for I felt that the man's life was in danger. I had been refused leave to tell him, and I did it without leave. When I saw Wilson he told me that Lesseps had officially informed him--Wilson being one of the British directors of the Suez Canal, and Lesseps Chairman of the Company--that we by our action were endangering the Canal. This was evidently a French menace on behalf of Arabi, and I took upon myself not to report it, as it would have only further weakened the minds of men already weak. Lesseps was not truthful. He told Mr. Gladstone that the Khedive had informed him that he was satisfied with the existing situation. We immediately telegraphed to the Khedive, through Sinadino, his Greek banker, who was representing him in London, to ask him whether this was true, and the Khedive answered by sending us all that had passed between him and Lesseps, from which it was quite clear that it was not true....

'On July 5th there was a Cabinet as to the sending forward of troops, at which it was decided to somewhat "strengthen our garrisons in the Mediterranean." Chamberlain afterwards told me that before this Cabinet Lord Granville had begged his colleagues to remember who Mr. Gladstone was, and not push him too hard. On this day, however, Mr. Bright, Lord Granville, and Mr. Gladstone stood alone against the rest of the Cabinet in supporting a let-alone policy.'

On the 7th, as has been told in the last chapter, Mr. Gladstone, under the combined irritation of Irish and Egyptian difficulties, used words in debate which indicated his intention to resign, and "the two representative Radicals," Dilke and Chamberlain, had to consider what their course would be if he went out.

They agreed, as has been seen, to go with Mr. Gladstone and Bright; to refuse to join a new Administration should Mr. Gladstone be outside it; to reconsider their position if--Mr. Gladstone going to the Lords or quitting political life--they were satisfied with the new Government's programme; but the storm blew over. [Footnote: The full diary dealing with the difficulties of this moment has been given in the chapter on Ireland of this date (see supra. Chapter XXVIII., pp. 446, 447).]

'On Monday, the 10th, it again seemed probable that Mr. Gladstone would resign,' but this time it was in consequence of the loudly expressed intention of the Lords to throw out the Arrears Bill.

Mr. Gladstone, however, decided not to go; the majority prevailed, and Sir Charles was able to write on Monday, July 10th:

'I had now given the reply which informed the House exactly of the steps which would be taken. Guns having been again mounted on the 9th, the Admiral told the Commander of the troops at daylight on July 10th of his intention to open fire on the forts at daylight on July 11th. Exactly one month after the Alexandria riots reparation for those riots was tardily exacted at the same spot.'

Sir Charles's personal attitude cost him some friends in France. His brother Ashton wrote to him from La Bourboule a letter (received on July 9th), in which he said: "To judge by the French newspapers, you are as popular in France as Pitt at the height of the great war." A note from the Memoir renders this state of feeling explicable: [Footnote: A very different current in French opinion from that of the newspapers found outlet in this letter from M. Émile Ollivier:

"SAINT TROPEZ, "_4 Août_, 1882.

"MON CHER MONSIEUR,

"Vous avez été si aimable lorsque j'ai eu la bonne fortune de faire votre connaissance, que vous ne pouvez douter de l'intérêt sympathique avec lequel j'ai suivi le brillant développement de votre carrière politique. Aujourd'hui je tiens à sortir de mon adhésion muette et à vous exprimer combien j'admire et combien j'approuve la politique actuelle de votre gouvernement en Égypte. Commissaire du gouvernement égyptien auprès de la compagnie de Suez depuis près de vingt ans, j'ai étudié de près ce qui se passait sur le Nil, et je ne crois pas céder à un mouvement d'amitié pour le Khédive, en pensant que c'est de son côté que se trouvent le Droit, la justice, la civilisation. Après l'avoir intronisé, lui avoir promis de l'appui; l'avoir poussé contre Arabi, le laisser entre les mains d'une grossière soldatesque, ce serait une félonie doublée d'une sottise, car on perdrait ainsi ce qui a été gagné sur la barbarie par les efforts de plusieurs générations. Aucune paix ne vaut qu'on l'achète aussi cher. Votre pays s'honore et se grandit en le comprenant, et sa victoire sera celle de la civilisation autant que la sienne propre. En se séparant de vous, nos seuls amis, en ce moment, en abandonnant le Khédive malgré tant d'engagements répétés, les personnages qui nous gouvernent consomment la première des conséquences qu'il était dans la logique de leurs idées d'attirer sur nous--l'anéantissement à l'extérieur. Les autres suivront. Nous ferons une fois de plus la triste expérience qu'on ne supprime pas impunément de l'âme d'une nation l'idée de sacrifice, de dévouement, d'héroïsme, pour réduire son idéal aux jouissances de la vie matérielle et à l'amour bestial des gras pâturages. Vous êtes bien heureux de n'en être pas là.

"Je vous félicite chaleureusement de la part que vous avez prise aux mâles résolutions de votre gouvernement, et je vous prie de croire à mes sentiments les plus sincèrement cordiaux.

"Émile Ollivier."]

'The French Government having ordered their ships to leave Alexandria in the event of a bombardment of the forts, I suggested that our sailors ought to pursue them with ironical cheers, such as those with which in the House of Commons we were given to pursue those who walked out to avoid a division.'

III.

From July 11th it was clear that France had decided to do nothing. England's course of action was still undecided.

'Although reparation at Alexandria was being virtually exacted by the bombardment, in spite of this having been put only on the safety of the fleet and the defiance of Beauchamp Seymour's orders, yet it had not, on account of Mr. Gladstone's opposition, up to this time been settled that we should land troops. There was now no hope that the threat which the French had proposed to us, and which we had accepted in January, declaring that "the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed ... would certainly find England and France united to oppose them," would be acted upon; but there was still some idea that Turkish troops might be landed under strict safeguards for supervision. On July 11th Chamberlain suggested to Lord Granville that Lord Ampthill should be sent to Varzin to see Bismarck, and ask him what intervention would be best if Turkish failed. This suggestion was not accepted, but Lord Granville wrote to the German Ambassador to the same effect.

'Mr. Gladstone was in a fighting humour on the next day, July 12th. I have the notes on which he made his speech, which give all the heads, and are interesting to compare with the speech as it stands in Hansard. He put our defence upon "the safety of the fleet" and "safety of Europeans throughout the East." He was indignant, in reply to Gourley, about the bondholders, and, in reply to Lawson, about our "drifting into war," and he certainly believed, as I believed at that moment, that the Alexandria massacres had been the work of Arabi, for one of his notes is: "International atrocity. Wholesale massacre of the people, to overrule the people of that country." [Footnote: Sir Charles, as has been said, did not adhere to his view concerning Arabi's responsibility.]

'On July 13th the Foreign Office prepared a most elaborate despatch from Lord Granville to Lord Dufferin, explaining the whole position of affairs in Egypt. The despatch was much knocked about by Chamberlain and myself. It had recited how an officer and two men of our fleet had been killed, another officer wounded, the British Consul dragged out of his carriage and severely injured; six British-born subjects killed, and the Greek Consul-General beaten; but it had omitted the important fact that a French Consular-Dragoman, and one, if not two men of the French fleet, and several other French subjects had been killed. The chief alterations, however, which we made, or tried to make, in the despatch were in the direction of omitting all reference to the financial engagements of Egypt, which we were most unwilling to take upon ourselves in any manner. I actively pursued the question of the outrages upon British subjects at Alexandria and of compensation. We went into the case of Marshal Haynau, that of Don Pacifico, [Footnote: Both cases furnished precedents for dealing with an instance in which foreigners had been maltreated when visiting or residing in another country. Marshal Haynau, the Austrian General infamous for his brutalities in Italy (especially at Brescia) and in Hungary in 1848, came to England on a private visit in 1850, went to see Barclay and Perkins' brewery in Southwark, and was mobbed by the employees. The Queen, in response to indignant remonstrance by the Austrian Government, pressed the sending of a note of apology and regret for this maltreatment of "a distinguished foreigner." Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Minister in Lord John Russell's Ministry, sent the Note, but added a paragraph which indicated that, in his personal opinion, the brewery men were justified in their action, and that Haynau had acted improperly in coming to this country at all, knowing the feeling against him here.

Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew who had settled in Athens, was, as a native of Gibraltar, a British subject. Having had his house pillaged by a Greek mob, he appealed to the Home Government, and Lord Palmerston sent the Fleet to the Piraeus to enforce his demand for settlement of the claim put in. Greece appealed to Russia and France, and part of Don Pacifico's claim was referred to arbitration by a Convention of the Powers signed in London. Our Minister at Athens continued to take measures which resulted in the Greek Government giving way, and, in consequence, the French Ambassador was recalled, while Russia threatened to recall Baron Brunnow. It was in the Don Pacifico debate that Lord Palmerston made his great speech of five hours, containing the famous _Civis Romanus sum_, which turned the House of Commons in his favour, and saved him from defeat by a majority of forty-six.] and others mentioned in a memorandum printed for the use of the Foreign Office in August, 1877; but the inquiry afterwards held broke down our case.

'On July 14th the Admiralty and War Office fell out; the Admiralty maintaining that they could put down all the trouble in Egypt by the employment of a few marines commanded by an Admiral, whereas the War Office had set their hearts upon a great expedition under Wolseley.

'On July 16th the German Ambassador complained of my having stated in the House of Commons that Germany approved our action, not denying the fact that she did, but saying that such "announcements made confidential communications impossible," and I had to reply that, while Austria had approved and Germany not disapproved, I was not justified in stating that Germany had approved, although there had been "circumstances calculated to make me believe that such had been the case." On July 16th Wolff wrote to me from the country: "I suppose Bright has resigned. _Si sic omnes_ except yourself." Bright had resigned, and there were some who were anxious that I should be put into the Cabinet in his place, but I was not one of them. On July 17th Wilfrid Blunt was at the window of the St. James's Club in Piccadilly, and, seeing me pass, cried out to Lord Blandford and others who were with him: "There's Dilke that has done it all." That seemed to me to be an answer to those who wanted me put in in the place of Bright. "The great peace man goes out, and they want-Mr. Gladstone to put in a man who is looked upon as a war man, although he thinks he is not and thinks he is right." ...

'On July 18th I received a letter from Labouchere which was characteristic: "Dear Dilke,--I am one of those who regretted that the late Government did not seize Egypt.... Many on our side--being fools --regret that we ever interfered in Egypt.... Personally I think ... unless you seize upon the opportunity ... to establish yourselves permanently in Egypt, you all deserve to be turned out of office. Success is everything. This is the 'moral law' as understood by the English nation. Bombard any place, but show a _quid pro quo_." There was, however, no member of the Government, unless it was Lord Hartington, who held these views, and not one who at this moment even contemplated a permanent occupation, though I was fearful that unless the matter was fairly faced, in advance, upon the lines which I had suggested, a permanent occupation would be set on foot.

'Late on July 18th there was a Cabinet to discuss a proposal from me to tell Dufferin in a "personal" telegram that we should not object to Italy being third with England and France; which was afterwards expanded into a direct invitation, upon my suggestion, for Italy to go with us without France, which Italy declined. [Footnote: The reason for Italy's refusal will be found explained in the Appendix to this chapter (p. 477) in a letter from Baron Blanc, who was Italian Ambassador at Constantinople.]

'After the sitting Lord Granville told me that Mr. Gladstone's letter to Bright about his resignation was far from pleasant in tone, and had put an end to a very long friendship. Morley, in his _Life of Gladstone_, states the contrary, but he is wrong. [Footnote: _Life of Gladstone_, iii. 83-90.]

'On July 19th I suggested that Arabi had probably told the people in Cairo that he had defeated us at Alexandria, and that it would be well to inform the Khedive, and through him the Governor of Cairo, that intervention was about to take place on a scale which would make resistance ridiculous, and Lord Granville asked Sinadino to do this.

'On July 20th the German first secretary came to me about Bismarck's complaint of my speech, and Lord Granville wrote back in reply to my report of the conversation: "I do not think much of Stumm's observations.... There is something in Bob Lowe's maxim, never to admit anything; but if you do, I have always found it better to shut the admission against any rejoinder." After all, Count Münster admitted that we had the "moral support" of Germany, and I could not myself see much difference between "moral support" and "approval." Lord Granville even reported in writing that we had Bismarck's "good wishes, good will, and moral support," and I certainly could not see that I was wrong. The last position of all of Bismarck was that we were not justified in saying even "moral support," but that we had his "best wishes," I think he must have had a touch of gout at the moment when he read my speech.

'A Cabinet was to have been held early on July 20th to decide to send out an army corps; Mr. Gladstone forgot to call it, and it had to be brought together suddenly (some members being absent), and agreed to the proposal for a vote of credit. Mr. Gladstone informed his colleagues that he should not meet Parliament again in February, but should leave the House of Commons after the Autumn Session, if not before it. Late at night there came the news that Arabi had turned the salt water from the Lake into the great fresh--water canal, and I had to go to inform Mr. Gladstone and Childers in their rooms. Their replies were full of character. Mr. Gladstone dramatically shivered, and said with a grimace: "What a wicked wretch!" Childers said: "How clever!"

'Early in the afternoon of Saturday, July 22nd, when the House of Commons sat, I was two hours in Mr. Gladstone's room with Lord Granville, Northbrook, and Childers. There had been a mistake in the vote of credit, really a blunder of £1,300,000; not of £1,000,000 only, as was afterwards pretended, for the estimate had been cut down in the meantime. It was entirely Northbrook's fault, ... but Childers, like a good-natured fellow, in spite of their many quarrels, let it rest upon his shoulders, where the public put it. In the course of our conversation it came out that Childers was in hot water with the Queen, and had sent her a letter of apology on the Friday night, Mr. Gladstone writing at the same time that he himself had nothing to add to what Childers said. Childers broke out against the Duke of Cambridge, who "went chattering about the place, refused to behave as a subordinate, and wrote direct to the Queen." I guessed that the trouble had been either about the employment of the Duke of Connaught or about the sending of the Household Cavalry; both of which had been decided. The Queen likes the Duke of Connaught to be employed, but never to run the slightest risk; and in dealing with soldiers this is a little awkward. The Duke of Cambridge was always a great source of trouble to Governments, Liberal or Conservative, for even Conservative Governments have, from the necessity of the case, to desire military reform. He is essentially not a grandson, as history tells us, but a son of King George III., just such a man as the royal Dukes whose oaths and jollity fill the memoirs of the time of the great war. But the Duke of Cambridge ... knows how to stop all army reform without incurring personal responsibility or personal unpopularity with the public. A distinguished General once said to me: "When we are invaded and the mob storm the War Office, the Duke of Cambridge will address them from the balcony, and, amid tumultuous cheering, shout, 'This is what those clever chaps who have always been talking about army reform and brains have brought us to,' and lead them on to hang the Secretary of State for War."

'On Monday, July 24th, there was a Cabinet to consider the obstruction of the French, who were trying to prevent our intervention. I was not called in, but I believe that my suggestion as to Italy was again mentioned, for on Tuesday, the 25th, Lord Granville told me that he had been intending to ask the Italians to go with us, but that the Queen had objected and caused the loss of a day, and that he thought he should be able to ask them on the morrow.

'On July 25th I made a speech which was much liked by the House, and Northcote congratulated me quite as warmly as did our own people. When Mr. Gladstone was finishing his letter to the Queen late at night, Chamberlain asked him to let him look at it, which I never had the "cheek" to do. The phrase about me was "answered the hostile criticisms with marked ability and with the general assent of the House," and there was no praise of Chamberlain's own speech, which had been spoilt by mine. On this occasion, as in the great Zulu debate in the previous Parliament, when he had been my seconder, it so happened that I took all Chamberlain's points beforehand, and in almost the very words in which he had meant to take them. On the other hand, on occasions when he spoke before me and I had to follow, as, for example, in the famous debate with Randolph Churchill about the Aston riots, [Footnote: At the height of Mr. Chamberlain's influence in Birmingham Lord Randolph Churchill proposed to stand against him, and held a meeting at Aston. Lord Randolph accused Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons of having hired roughs to break up this meeting.] the converse occurred. This was, of course, the inevitable result of our habit of very free and continual conversation.

'When we sounded Paget in advance as to our invitation to the Italians on this evening, he replied that "if we pressed her, swearing she would ne'er consent, she _would_ consent." But, although I afterwards thought and said that I had been amazed at her refusal, my notes of the moment show that I had anticipated it.

'On July 27th a new element of disturbance was introduced by the Prince of Wales applying to the Government for leave to take a military command in Egypt. The Queen at once interfered to stop it; some members of the Cabinet consulted together at a sudden meeting in the Cabinet room at Downing Street, to which I was called in, Childers, Northbrook, and Mr. Gladstone being present, and it was decided to back the Queen's refusal. It was agreed between Lord Northbrook, Childers, and myself that for the future I should see all the Admiralty and War Office telegrams.

'At 5.30 there was a regular Cabinet to consider the tardy consent of the Turks to send troops at once. They were informed that circumstances had changed, and that we must go on with our intervention; but that they would be allowed to occupy forts not at Alexandria.

'One of the first Admiralty telegrams that were brought to me was one which directed the Admiral to inform the Khedive that we were going to restore his authority, which was the most emphatic thing which I had seen.'

On July 29th M. de Freycinet's Government was defeated on a vote of credit for money to send ships to protect the Suez Canal, [Footnote: A new Ministry was formed under M. Duclerc.] and so terminated all possibility of France's partnership in the enterprise. On the same day General Menabrea politely refused an invitation that Italy should co-operate.

But the Turks were still disposed to assist, on their own terms, and these did not yet make it clear what, if they landed, would be their attitude towards Arabi and his partisans. Accordingly,

'On Monday, July 31st, we had to tell the Turks that if they insisted on going to Alexandria we should sink them, and matters began to look like a second Navarino.

'On Thursday, August 3rd, the Cabinet approved our previous proposals to send instructions to the Admiral not to allow the Turks to land in Egypt until they agreed to all our terms.

'On Tuesday, August 8th, Childers insisted that if Turks landed in Egypt they should not be treated as allied forces, but as a portion of our forces under our General. Lord Granville, Hartington, and Northbrook thought this too strong, and it was left to the Cabinet to decide, and on the next day, Wednesday, the 9th, Harcourt expressed his concurrence with the majority.'

'About this time I had a letter from Dufferin, describing how he had tried to frighten the Sultan by the bogey of an Arab caliph. But Dufferin was at this moment in despair; the face of politics changed too rapidly for Turkish diplomacy, and just as he had succeeded in getting the Turks to send troops to Egypt, as he had been told to do, it was so much too late that we had to tell them that we should sink them if they went--so doubtless the Turks were a little confused in their minds as to what we really wanted.'

The Memoir now carries the story down to the close of the expedition by which Sir Garnet Wolseley destroyed Arabi's power in the Battle of Tel-el- Kebir.

'_August 10th_.--At this moment the Prince of Wales being most anxious as to what was going on in Egypt, and having again failed to obtain the telegrams, I promised that I would write to him daily, or whenever there was anything of importance, and keep him informed, and this I did.

'On August 16th there was a debate in which we defended the general policy of the expedition, and I again have Mr. Gladstone's notes for his reply to Sir Wilfrid Lawson, in which he again asserted that the supporters of Arabi Pasha were not only rebels, but criminals as well, accusing them of misuse of a flag of truce, and of deliberately setting fire to the town of Alexandria.

'On August 17th I had a visit from a brother of the Khedive, Ibrahim Pasha, who said: "I want to go to Egypt. I should be very glad to go as a Sub-Lieutenant, although there may be a little difficulty, for I am a Field-Marshal in the Turkish Army." This modest youth, who looked like the full moon, had been trained at Woolwich, spoke English well, and was a devout Mohammedan, thought that he would be of use to us, but his brother would no more let him land in Egypt than he would any of the other and abler brothers.'

Parliament was prorogued on August 27th.

'On August 28th Mr. Gladstone thought that we should refuse to make a Convention with the Turks, which they had now agreed to. But Lord Granville and I thought that we had better make it for the sake of the effect in Egypt, and Mr. Gladstone half yielding, our willingness was telegraphed. On September 5th, however, Lord Granville told me at Walmer that the Queen was strongly opposed to the Convention, and I noted that this was the first time when I had ever known the Queen and Mr. Gladstone to be agreed upon any subject.

'We took time by the forelock as a Government with regard to the preparation in advance, and, even before our landing in Egypt, for that which was to happen after the revolutionary movement was put down. Sir A. Colvin thought that 4,000 men in addition to the military police would be ample for the security of the country, and Sir E. Malet appeared to agree. Mr. Gladstone wrote a minute himself upon the future of the country, in which he proposed to act upon all my ideas. He suggested the banishment of Arabi, a minimum military force '(Egyptian),' a large police force, in which Indian Mohammedans were to be allowed to enlist; but he wished a small British force to remain temporarily in the country--a point to which I was much opposed, inasmuch as I felt certain that if we stayed there at all we should never be able to come away.

'A good deal of Cabinet work fell upon me at this moment because Harcourt buried himself in the New Forest, and Chamberlain went away to Sweden, asking me for a full table of instructions as to what he was to do as to calling upon Kings, inasmuch as, he declared in his letter, I was his _arbiter elegantiarum_. I went down to Birmingham in his absence to see my son' (who was living at Mr. Chamberlain's house). 'Hartington came up to town now and then, but apparently was soon tired of it, as in the middle of September he wrote to me to ask what was the meaning of the Cabinet on the 13th which he meant "to shirk." There were two Governments at this moment--the one consisting of Childers and Northbrook in London, carrying on operations in Egypt; and the other consisting of Lord Granville at Walmer and Mr. Gladstone at Hawarden, connected by the telegraph, explaining them to the Powers.

'During the period of the invasion of Egypt by us I used to meet Childers, Northbrook, and Hartington at the War Office almost every day, when Hartington was in town, and the other two when Hartington was away. Tel-el-Kebir was on September 13th, and we met on that day as well as the days before and immediately after.

'Immediately after Tel-el-Kebir I had from Auberon Herbert a letter, which began: "My dear successful Jingo, whom Heaven confound, though it does not appear to have the least intention of doing so.... How I hate you all! But am bound to admit you have managed your affair up to this point skilfully and well. The gods, however, do not love, says Horace, people who have three stories to their houses."'

APPENDIX

'The refusal of the Italian Cabinet was afterwards explained to me in a most interesting letter from Baron Blanc, at that time (March, 1888) Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, and afterwards (December, 1893) Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

'"The refusal of the Cabinet of Rome in 1882 to intervene, with England only, as allies in Egypt was a success of French diplomacy, but at the same time a result of the past policy of England.

'"Nothing on the part of England had prepared the Italian Government to believe it possible that England would cease to gravitate towards France in Mediterranean questions, especially when Mr. Gladstone was in power. The hope that England would join the Italian-German understanding, concluded in principle in 1882, had remained in these early days merely theoretic. The Mancini Cabinet, in doing that which Minghetti, Visconti, Bonghi--the old Right, in short--had not dared to do--that is, in drawing towards the Central Powers--did not go so far as to understand that the rupture of the English-French condominium in Egypt--brought about in 1881- 82 by the appearance on the scene of the Arabi party, secretly pushed from Berlin--offered Italy the chance of leading Gladstone himself to lean on Italy and her allies, and no longer upon Paris and Petersburg; or, if it was understood, faith and courage were wanting.

'"It was an axiom with Menabrea, with Nigra, with Corti, that Italy and England herself could do nothing in the Mediterranean without France, still less do anything against France. The last conversation of Corti with Crispi shows plainly his conviction that a real alliance of Italy and England was a Utopia. How many times after 1870 had not Italy been disappointed in attempts to obtain from England a share of influence in Egypt! How many times had not Italy been sacrificed to the private arrangements of England with France in Egyptian affairs! How could the idea that Germany was to replace France in the Eastern policy of Italy and England have entered into the mind of the Cabinet of Rome when it had not entered into the mind of the Cabinet of St. James's!

'"A thousand financial, journalistic, parliamentary connections attached to France both the Gladstone Cabinet and the Ministry of Mancini--the legal counsel of M. de Lesseps. The dream of treble condominium in Egypt was strong in Mancini and Depretis, as in Minghetti, Visconti, and Cairoli. This dream was encouraged by the Cabinet of Paris, which kept Italy in tow by this vain hope, and also by the fear of fresh French enterprises in Africa, for the French threatened Italy with renewing in Tripoli the precedent of Tunis if Italy broke towards French policy in the East the bonds contracted between them in the Crimean War and the treaties of 1856.

'"The reserve, the abstention of Germany and Austria, which Powers pretended to disinterest themselves from the Egyptian question, and opened to France in Africa a chance of compensation for the loss of Alsace, helped to keep Mancini and Depretis, tied also by party connections to the French democracy, in the absurd idea that Italy could keep herself in stable equilibrium between two alliances--an alliance with Germany in Continental affairs, and with France in Mediterranean questions. This idea had for its result to render unintelligible for the Italian public the alliance of Italy with the Central Powers, sterilized and perverted through not being boldly applied by Italy to the affairs of the Mediterranean and of the Levant. But once again Italy did not believe herself strong enough to overcome the indifference which England showed for Mediterranean questions--more and more thrown into the background in English minds by the interests of the British colonial empire in distant seas. Australia seemed looked upon at London as more important than Turkey or Egypt itself, and the idea that the first line of defence of India is at Constantinople, the seat of the Khalifat, seemed forgotten by the successors of Disraeli. It took seven years for the idea, born in 1881, of making Italy a connecting link in an Anglo-German alliance, to become a practical one at Home, as it did under Crispi.

'"To return to the question of the refusal of Italy to intervene alone with England in Egypt in 1882, it is necessary to know that when the French Government was informed of the drawing together of Italy and of the Central Powers, France hastened at the end of 1881 to exercise pressure upon the Mancini-Depretis Cabinet by threatening it, not only with fresh enterprise in Tripoli, but with direct hostility if Italy took sides against France in those Egyptian affairs which were at that moment becoming complicated. The Radical Committees of France and Italy were threatening armed movements in the former Papal States, and French money was spent in the Italian elections of 1881. The greater part of the Italian Press was bought up by a Gambetta-Wilson group in such a way that Italian opinion was directed from Paris by the Italian newspapers, as it had already been by the Stefani-Havas Agency. The effect of this preparation was seen when the bombardment of Alexandria was taken as the text for a general opening of fire on the part of the Italian and French Press against England. When Freycinet refused the English proposal for treble intervention, he caused it to be known at Rome that France would look upon it as an act of hostility on the part of Italy if that Power should take in Egypt the position which belonged to France, and occupy, without France, any portion of Egyptian territory.

'"He also used as a bait to Mancini the idea of a treble condominium, by making him believe that Italy and Russia could, by procuring for a treble intervention the adhesion of the whole concert of European Powers, prevent it becoming dangerous from the point of view of the two-faced policy of which Germany was suspected at Rome. To act so that France could, without the fear of a snare on the part of Germany, intervene in Egypt with Italy and England--such was the part which France proposed to Mancini that he should play, and which he accepted and did play in the Constantinople conference. The outward and visible sign of this programme was that wonderful patrol of the Canal which was adopted in principle on the motion of Corti, and was intended to lead up to the treble condominium by the treble occupation of the Suez Canal with a mandate of Europe. 'Success seemed certain,' funnily declared the Mancini telegrams of the moment, when came the British invitation to Italy for a double intervention. Neither Menabrea, nor Mancini, nor Corti, took this invitation seriously, and they saw in it only the hesitation of England, a Power which they supposed entirely incapable of such boldness as isolated action. They never believed for a moment but that the refusal by Italy of a double intervention would have for effect a treble occupation. You know how this illusion of a treble occupation died a wretched death in the ridiculous appearance of Italian and French ships in the neighbourhood of the Canal just at the moment when Wolseley seized it before Tel-el-Kebir.

'"The same idea of becoming the binding link in Mediterranean affairs, not between Berlin and London, but between Paris and London, continued to animate Mancini and Depretis even after England had become the sole power in occupation of Egypt. The expedition to Massowah in 1885 was an expression of this tendency. From the beginning of 1884, in face of the Hicks disaster, of the prolongation of the British occupation, of the return to power of Nubar, France considered a plan for disembarking at Massowah troops recalled from Tonquin, where she was supposed to be safe after the success of Sontay. In order not to leave without some counterweight in the Red Sea the consolidation of British domination in Egypt, France would have returned to Egypt by Massowah and the Soudan. When she decided to suspend this operation, she advised it to Italy as a means of giving expression to the Franco-Italian view of the internationality of the Canal and Red Sea. Mancini, whom the Italian Chamber blamed for having not taken part in the colonial fever which had affected Germany herself in 1884-85, adopted the idea of an expedition to Massowah at the moment when Wolseley seemed likely to enter Khartoum.'

'"We have not as yet been able to get out of this trap in which we are caught, and in which the Russians and French try to keep us paralyzed. Capital and disastrous blunders, evident contradictions with the idea of the alliance of Italy with the Central Powers, completed by the understanding with England! But England herself, is she without fault? Is her Egyptian policy more clear and more strong? Is she not herself in Egypt also taken in the toils of Franco-Levantine influences, as dominant at Cairo as they are at Constantinople? It is not on the national and Mohammedan spirit that England in Egypt leans, but on Franco-Levantine cliques and Graeco-Armenian cliques sold to French finance. Hence the decline of British influence in the Levant. The memorandum which I have sent shows what a different line Italy and England may follow if they do not wish the Mediterranean to become a Franco-Russian lake, and the Khalif, in the character of a new Bey of Tunis, lending the flag of the Prophet to Russia for the conquest of India and to France to complete her African Empire."

'The memorandum enclosed by him to which he refers was sent by him for the purpose that it should be communicated by us to friends in Rome who were likely to bring it before Crispi, whose Foreign Minister in 1893 Blanc became.'