Chapter 30

DIFFICULTIES OF THE LIBERAL GOVERNMENT

I.

The close of 1881 virtually terminated the protracted negotiations with France which had occupied most of Sir Charles Dilke's time, and had kept him for long periods absent from London. In the new year he was more closely concerned with the general business of the Government, and especially with its attempts at legislation.

Two important subjects mentioned in the Queen's Speech of 1882 were the reform of local government in the counties, [Footnote: This was foreshadowed in a note of November 11th, 1881: 'Local Government (Boards in all the three kingdoms on a tax-paying basis) will be the chief measure.'] and the proposed recasting of London's system of government, which appealed to Sir Charles both as a municipal reformer and as a metropolitan member. In the previous summer Mr. Gladstone had shown himself to Dilke as 'very keen' on this latter measure, and proposals to undertake it were actually put before the Cabinet on Lord Mayor's Day, 1881. The choice of a date seemed

'dramatic and courageous.... We all dined with the Lord Mayor, and as the men came in I felt that, knowing what I did as to Harcourt's resolution, we were there under false pretences.'

This project began to take shape when Ministers reassembled after Christmas.

'On the morning of January 3rd, 1882, I saw Harcourt about his London Government scheme, of which he had sent me a rough sketch asking for my criticisms. I found that he had adopted all the ideas of Beal and Firth and of myself. [Footnote: Mr. Firth was Sir Charles Dilke's fellow-member for Chelsea. Mr. James Beal, a Chelsea man and a veteran reformer, was Honorary Secretary of the Metropolitan Municipal Association, which existed to advocate the creation of a general municipality for London.] We formed a committee, consisting of the four, which met daily at Harcourt's house for some time.

'On the 6th regular Cabinets began, and Chamberlain came to stay with me, although he offered to go to the hotel, "as there is no crisis on hand just now." Hartington, who had a shooting party at Hardwick, ... scandalized his colleagues by declaring that he was too lazy to come up for the first Cabinet, although it had been fixed for between a fortnight and three weeks....

'On January 7th a Committee of the Cabinet on the London Government scheme was appointed, but it met only once, for the informal committee of Harcourt, Beal, Firth, and myself did the whole work....

'On January 11th the single meeting of the London Government Committee took place, Harcourt, Spencer, Childers, Chamberlain, and myself being present. But instead of discussing London Government, we discussed the Borneo Charter, to which all present were opposed.'

Over and above this work of preparation on another Minister's Bill, Sir Charles had a variety of occupations outside his own official duties. Thus, he notes on February 12th that he 'had a quarrel with Dodson' (then President of the Local Government Board) 'as to a rating question'; and a few weeks later, on April 28th:

'I was very busy at this moment because I had the Corrupt Practices Bill and the Ballot Bill on hand in the House, as well as Foreign Affairs debates.' [Footnote: In these measures he was helping Sir Henry James, Attorney-General.]

The main difficulties immediately in hand were those caused by Parliamentary procedure, and Mr. Bradlaugh, who had been re-elected during the Recess, and now proposed to take the oath; but the House was unwilling to let him do so, thus bringing itself into sharp conflict with the constituency.

'It was reported by the Prime Minister to the Cabinet of January eth that the Queen refused to open Parliament on the ground of health.... The Queen and Prince Leopold (who was about to marry) had urged that an additional allowance to the Prince should be voted before the discussions on the forms of the House began; but Mr. Gladstone insisted, and the Cabinet decided, that it was to come only after the Address, after the Bradlaugh business (upon which the Cabinet felt certain that we should be beaten), and after the reform of the procedure of the House--that is to say, at Easter at the earliest.'

When Mr. Bradlaugh presented himself to be sworn, Sir Stafford Northcote moved to prohibit his taking the oath. To this motion the Government opposed a motion for the 'previous question,' and were beaten. Feeling ran high, and the House of Commons as a whole would have endorsed a saying of Lord Winchilsea's. Having been asked to subscribe to the Northampton Horticultural Show, he replied:

'"A town which enjoys the flowers of Mr. Labouchere's oratory and the fruits of Mr. Bradlaugh's philosophy can need no further horticultural exhibition."...

No one quite knew how to deal with the situation which was now created by Mr. Bradlaugh's hurried advance up the floor of the House, when he administered the oath to himself.

'On February 22nd there was a Cabinet at one o'clock, at which there was a tremendous disturbance about Bradlaugh, Chamberlain and Mr. Gladstone standing alone against all their colleagues, most of whom, under Hartington's lead, had proposed expulsion, and wanted Mr. Gladstone himself to move it. While Mr. Gladstone was addressing the Cabinet, Harcourt wrote a paper, and got Hartington, Childers, and Dodson to sign it. Forster was in Ireland, and Bright was away with a cold. Harcourt did not ask Chamberlain to sign his paper, which, Chamberlain thought, probably suggested that Mr. Gladstone should himself propose some middle course, but Mr. Gladstone turned round angrily and hissed through his teeth at Harcourt "I cannot!" When the time came, even Northcote did not dare to move expulsion, which showed how foolish our people must be to long to go further in an anti- popular sense than the Tories themselves.'

There was also the other question of reform of Parliamentary procedure.

'On January 7th the Cabinet discussed the Closure, which was warmly supported (in the strongest form) by Harcourt and Chamberlain. Hartington walked in in the middle of the afternoon.

'On February 1st I had a chat with Manning, who says the Church applied the Closure at the Vatican Council to put down the minority against the Promulgation of the Doctrine of Infallibility, and that it must therefore be a good thing.

'On February 9th I was consulted by Harcourt and Chamberlain as to what I thought about sticking to Closure in the face of the great probability of defeat. I advised making it a question of life and death, but advised that if beaten we should immediately prepare for dissolution by bringing in the County Franchise Bill, and if the Lords threw it out, stop in to carry it. On a vote of confidence the Tories could not turn us out, so that we could play the game with them as long as necessary to carry County Franchise.

'On March 26th we learnt our majority on the power to close debate was far from certain, and that on Sir John Lubbock's amendment we very probably should be beaten. Mr. Gladstone began to wish to bow before the storm, but Chamberlain and others were for holding to our proposals at all risks.

'On March 31st there was a Cabinet, at which Mr. Gladstone, thinking with the Whips that we should be beaten on the Closure, again wished to give way. It was decided to make no fresh declaration of standing or falling by our rule.'

The question of Procedure remained till the Autumn Session, a constant embarrassment to the Government. But a difficulty, personal to Sir Charles, and affecting the Government only through him, arose on the Civil List.

'On this day (March 31st) the Queen wrote to Lord Granville to complain of my having walked out on the division on the annuity to Prince Leopold, Duke of Albany, and Sir Henry Ponsonby also wrote. I refused to give any further explanation, and on April 1st Lord Granville wrote:

'"HOLMBURY, DORKING.

'"MY DEAR DILKE,--I thought Chamberlain had voted in the majority. The Queen appears to me to have a _prima facie_ right to complain of any of her servants refusing to support a Government measure which she and the administration think necessary for her comfort and position. But if you stated to the Prime Minister on taking office that you did not intend to vote for these grants, your responsibility ceases. Resignation is not in question either with the Queen, yourself, or Gladstone. The thing to consider is how to put the matter best in answer to Ponsonby's letter. I do not mind the bother in the least.

'"Yours sincerely,

'"Granville."'

A reply from Sir Charles explained to Lord Granville why Mr. Chamberlain's name had come in. Although he had voted for the grant

"neither he nor I would ever be likely to let the other resign alone. Our relations are so close that I should resign with him if he were to resign because he thought Forster did not have his hair cut sufficiently often."

This explanation was promptly endorsed by Mr. Chamberlain.

'Chamberlain wrote on April 2nd two letters, one for me and one for me to show to Lord Granville.... In the latter he said:

'"I am very sorry to hear that any notice has been taken of the absentees in the vote for Prince Leopold's grant. Considering the strong views held on this subject by the Radical party in the country, I think their representatives in the Government made great sacrifices in order to maintain unity of action as far as possible. You and Fawcett and Trevelyan have on previous occasions, both by speech and vote, and on strictly constitutional grounds, opposed these grants, and you could not have supported the present one without loss of self- respect and of public reputation. For myself, I agree in your opposition, but having never taken any public part in reference to the question, and having never voted against the grant itself, I felt myself free to yield my opinion to that of the majority, and to vote with the rest of my colleagues in the Cabinet. In your case such a course was impossible, having regard to the prominence which, through no fault or desire of your own, has been given to your past action in the matter, and which has made you in some sort the chief Parliamentary representative of objections which are widely felt to the present mode of providing for members of the Royal Family. When the Government was formed I mentioned this point to Mr. Gladstone, and told him you could not vote for any grant of the kind. He asked me if I was equally pledged, and I replied that this was not the case. Mr. Gladstone then said that, of course, a divergence of opinion in a member of the Cabinet would be more serious than in a Minister outside the Cabinet, and I took it for granted that under the circumstances you, at least, would not be expected to vote at all. I assume that although the subject has now been referred to, there is not the slightest intention or suggestion from any quarter that you should resign on such a matter. If there were, I have not the least hesitation in saying that I should make common cause with you; and I cannot conceive that any Radical would consent to hold office in a Government which had expelled one of its most popular members, and one of the few representatives of the most numerous section of the Liberal party, for such a cause. But I cannot believe in the possibility of any such intention. If I did I might end with Lord Hartington's celebrated postscript, and 'Thank God we should soon be out of this d--d Government.'

'"Yours ever,

'"J. Chamberlain."

'I received further letters about the matter from Lord Granville, who ultimately replied on April 4th that "Gladstone does not admit your contention." But he said, "The case is not likely to arise again for some time.... In the meantime he approves my writing to the Queen off my own bat," and this was done accordingly, the letter not being shown to me, so that I do not know what was in it. But the whole matter came up again in the autumn, when it was proposed to put me in the Cabinet.'

Sir Charles wished on public grounds to get rid of questions as to these grants, the recurrence of which must always lead to trouble, and to do this by settling them on a principle. But also he was desirous to forward the wishes of the Prince of Wales, and in the month of May he devised a method for meeting the difficulty, which might be proposed by the Prince himself.

'On Friday Mr. Gladstone talked for an hour to me about the Royal Grants question, and the conversation was satisfactory on both sides, for he told the Cabinet yesterday that it had been satisfactory to him. In the course of it he said that many years ago a memorandum on the provision for the younger branches of the Royal Family had been agreed upon by the Cabinet, and shown to the chiefs of the Opposition. He added that this was a course perhaps not so wise as would have been the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons. I at once told him that the consideration of the subject, which had not been discussed by the Civil List Committee at the beginning of the reign, by a later Select Committee, would in my opinion have prevented all but most unreasonable opposition to the various grants. There are many years to spare, and I only write because the matter is fresh in my mind.... My suggestion is that when provision is proposed for the establishment of the eldest son of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, for whom a liberal provision would be made without reasonable opposition, as he is in the direct line of succession, it should (at the same time) be stated by the Government of the day that the question of the extent of the provision for the younger children of the Prince and Princess of Wales should be, on the motion of the Government, considered by a Select Committee. On that Committee all shades of opinion ought in prudence to be represented, and to it as much information be given as is given to the Civil List Committee at the beginning of the reign. Its decisions would be respected by all who value Parliamentary methods, and much unseemly wrangling would be prevented for many years. The fate of this plan, however prudent it may be, would be certain if it came from anyone except His Royal Highness himself or the Prime Minister of the day.'

Sir Charles embodied this suggestion in a letter to Mr. Knollys of May 9th. The proposal was agreed to in principle by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1885, and it was adopted later on.

'On May 3rd I had heard from Knollys that the Prince, who had frequently been restive about not getting Foreign Office information, which Lord Granville would not allow him to have for fear he should let it out, had made Knollys write to Sir Henry Ponsonby to ask him to beg the Queen to direct Lord Granville to send the Prince the confidential telegrams.... On the 7th Knollys sent me Sir Henry Ponsonby's "not very satisfactory reply," and a copy of his answer.'

In the reply Mr. Knollys pointed out that the Prince was under the impression that the Queen would have wished him to know as much of what was going on as possible. The question whether telegrams were to be shown to the Prince depended entirely on Her Majesty, as Lord Granville would not be likely to raise difficulties in the matter if the Prince put his wishes before him. The fact that the private secretaries of Cabinet Ministers had Cabinet keys, and therefore had access to all confidential documents, was quoted as showing the curious position of the Prince.

The Queen persisted in her objection, and Sir Charles supplied the lack of official access to the papers by keeping the Prince privately informed from day to day in critical moments. He spent the first Sunday in February of this year at Sandringham,

'where the company was chiefly sporting, even the clergyman who performed the service being the famous "Jack" Russell, eighty-seven years of age, known in Devonshire as "the hunting parson"....

'On March 21st the Prince of Wales invited me to go with him to see the Channel Tunnel works, and to bring the map of Central Asia, and to explain to him the matters that we were discussing with the Russians. But I was unable or unwilling to go--probably unwilling because of overwork, and dislike to commit myself to the Channel Tunnel project. I was one of those who thought that the Channel Tunnel was far less important in a commercial sense than was generally believed, and, on the other hand, I feared that the creation of it might lead to panic....'

Later: 'I converted the Prince of Wales to oppose the Channel Tunnel.'

The one matter which, Sir Charles notes, still caused serious friction between himself and his Chief came up in this Session. On February 12th

'I was still fighting about Borneo and about a Garter Mission to the King of Saxony, which I thought a waste of public money, and I was in a difficulty with the Cabinet as to Errington's mission--of the details of which I was not kept informed.

'Wolff, who evidently had been told something by Errington himself, gave notice of a question to ask Hartington whether communications had taken place with the Papal See as to prelates in India, and Lord Granville directed me to answer that no such communications had been made by Her Majesty's Government. As, however, I thought that communications had been made by Errington, I felt that this would be a virtual lie, and wrote to Hartington to ask him. Hartington then took the answer upon himself, and in his reply to me he said that there had been some discussions on a closely connected matter, but not exactly on that mentioned in the question, and that nothing had been done by him in the matter. Who, then, instructed Errington?... The Errington mission led for a moment to strained relations between Lord Granville and myself, and one of my letters he said was evidently intended to be "wholesome in Lent." "The tone of it is hardly that of two members of the same Government, more particularly when they are excellent friends."'

Sir Charles apologized frankly and cordially for the tone of his certainly peremptory letter, but

'I had to stick to my text....

'It was evidently monstrous that I should be made to answer questions about negotiations of which I knew nothing, thus leading the House of Commons to believe that I was in some sense responsible to them for what passed, when as a matter of fact I was not informed, except privately, and in strict confidence, by Errington himself. One result of the concealment as to the whole Errington business was that Mr. Gladstone on one occasion gave an answer in the House of Commons which was untrue, although he did not know that it was untrue, and that on another occasion the same thing happened to Courtney, who as Under- Secretary of State for the Colonies denied that a Roman Catholic question affecting the Colonies' (the proposal for a cathedral at Gibraltar) 'had been discussed, when Errington himself told me that it had. The Colonial Office did not know.'

Later:

'There never was a more discreditable piece of business than the whole of this Errington matter. Errington himself is an excellent fellow. I have not a word to say against him. It is the Government and not Errington that must be blamed.

'At this time I received a pamphlet from Auberon Herbert on the title- page of which he had drawn a picture of Gladstone in the fiery pit beckoning me, and I, winged and crowned as an archangel, falling from heaven to him, with the inscription: "Lapsus e coelo; or how C.D. accepted an invitation."'

II.

Notwithstanding his attention to domestic politics, Sir Charles was first and foremost the representative of the Foreign Office, and during the spring of 1882 he was ceaselessly concerned in the negotiations which were in progress between the Russian Government and the British India Office, over which Lord Hartington then presided.

'I had received from the India Office on January 6th a private communication suggesting arrangement with Russia as to the delimitation of the new Russo-Persian frontier. The India Office were inclined to hand over Merv nominally to Persia, regardless of the fact that the Russians would not consent to any proposal of the kind. I wrote to Lord Granville on the 9th, "I must say I don't like it at all," and he answered: "It appears to me that some of the permanent Jingoes in the I.0. want to establish that they are always pressing the F.O. to do spirited things, and constantly thwarted. I rather agree with you that it is better to do nothing than to do that which is not really effective, but Hartington is very anxious not to be altogether quiet.--G."

'On January 17th I had the first of a series of important interviews with Brett, Hartington's secretary, with regard to Central Asian affairs. He gave up Merv, and in return I agreed with him that the Foreign Office should propose to the India Office to ask Russia to define the Persian frontier by an English-Russian-Persian Commission, and the Afghan frontier by an English-Russian-Afghan Commission. Lord Granville was unfavourable, Lord Hartington favourable to this view, which after a great number of meetings at the Foreign Office prevailed, the Russians ultimately accepting the Afghan delimitation, a matter to which I shall have to return. The policy to which I have always adhered was on this occasion stated in a paper which we drew up--a secret "Memorandum on the question of the undefined frontiers between Persia, Afghanistan, and Russia"--in words which, referring to the probability that without an agreement Russia would establish herself at Herat, went on:

'"Peace might be maintained for a time, but it would always be a precarious peace, for the direct influence of Russia, backed by her show of military force, would in time overawe the Afghans, and give her a preponderance of which we should feel the effects, either in the necessity for costly defensive preparations and a large increase of the garrison of India, or in the danger to the tranquillity and permanence of our rule.... Secure on a strong line, flanked at one end by Balkh and at the other by Herat, covered towards Kabul by a zone of friendly Hazara tribes ... and connected by rail and steam with her bases in the Caucasus and on the Volga, she could afford to laugh at threats from India, and might deal at leisure with Afghan tribes and leaders."'

Two later jottings on the manuscript follow:

'"This is still true in 1906."

'"In 1908 I approved the main lines of an agreement with Russia."

'On February 20th (1882) a conference took place between Lord Granville, Lord Hartington, Tenterden, and myself as to Central Asia. Hartington wanted to pay Persia to hold the Turcoman oasis--a most monstrous proposition.

'On the next day, the 21st, a telegram was written to go to India, which was so drawn by Hartington as to make the Foreign Office approve his absurd Merv scheme. I got it altered, and Merv left out, and guarding words put in.

'On February 22nd the Russian Ambassador promised Lord Granville that we should be allowed to carry out my idea of a joint commission for the Afghan frontier.

'On March 10th there was a meeting between Lord Hartington and Lord Granville and myself as to Central Asia.'

Lord Ripon wrote from Simla on May 15th to condemn Lord Hartington's policy of

'"trying to interpose Persia as a buffer between Russia and the Afghans.... I do not believe either in the strength or in the good faith of Persia," said Lord Ripon. "...I am afraid that the India Office have by no means got rid of the notions which were afloat in Salisbury's time." On the other hand, Lord Ripon was in favour of a treaty with the Afghans, to which I was opposed except in the form of a mere frontier delimitation.'

The India Office, however, never caused Dilke so many heart-burnings as sprang from his concern with those African and Australasian matters on which the Foreign Office was obliged to secure co-operation from the Colonial Office.

'On January 13th, in addition to further trouble about Borneo, a new controversy sprang up between me and the Colonial Office. It was, I think, on January 6th, 1882, that I received from Mr. Gladstone the letter which began: "Cameroon River, West Africa. Mr. Gladstone. Dear Sir, We both your servants have meet this afternoon to write to you these few lines of writing, trusting it may find you in a good state of life, as it leaves us at present. As we heard here that you are the chief man in the House of Commons, so we write to you to tell you that we want to be under Her Majesty's control." It ended: "Please to send us an answer as quick as you can. With kind regards, we are, dear sir, your obedient servants, King Bell and King Akua."

'Lord Kimberley had absolutely refused; but I, holding that this spot was after all the best on the West Coast of Africa, and the only one where a health station could be established, urged acceptance, without being able to get my own way. Lord Granville wrote concerning Lord Kimberley' (not without a retrospective glance at his own Under-Secretary): '"Perhaps he fears Cameroon cold water too much in consequence of the scalding water from Borneo." Being entirely unable to get my way, I proposed that the letter of the Kings should be "made official," and sent to Lord Granville; that he should officially invite the opinion of the Colonial Office on it, and that if the Colonial Office wrote a despatch against it we should refuse, but not refuse without the Colonial Office opinion being on official record. The offer of the cession of the Cameroons having been renewed later, and I having again most strongly urged acceptance, a consul was sent to the country to investigate the matter, when the Germans suddenly interfered; snapped it up, and made it a new colony. Kimberley was entirely responsible, as I had persuaded Lord Granville to agree with me.'

III.

Among the passages which carry on the Parliamentary narrative come sundry jottings and observations. Those for the first session of 1882 concern themselves mainly with two names--Bismarck and Gambetta.

'On January 14th I heard from Germany that the Crown Prince had suddenly broken away from Bismarck on the issue of the last rescript, and that he had sent his secretary to the Liberal leaders to tell them that he had first heard of the rescript when he read it in the paper. Writing to Grant Duff, I added that the Crown Prince "swears that nothing will induce him to employ Bismarck when he ascends the throne." This was but a passing feeling caused by Bismarck's attacks on the Princess.'

"Herbert Bismarck is coming to see me in Paris at his father's wish....

"_18th_.--He is confined to his bed in London; I am to see him there instead of here."

'On January 20th Herbert Bismarck dined with me--a man to whom I took a liking. I had not seen much of him before this date, but from this time forward we had continual meetings--a man of far stronger ability than that for which the public gives him credit. He had a special aversion to being called "Herbert," and insisted on being called the Count of Bismarck-Schoenhausen.

'On Sunday, January 22nd, I dined with the German Councillor of Embassy... and met again Count Bismarck. I wrote in my diary on this day: "Bismarck is a chip of the old block: not a bad sort of brute, with a great deal of humour of a rough kind. He saw through ----, an Austrian, who is a toad-eater, in a moment, and stopped a pompous story of his about ----. As soon as we were told by the narrator, with a proper British shake of the head, that he 'drank,' Bismarck shouted at the top of his voice: 'Well, that is _one_ point in his favour.' ----, disconcerted, went on and said: 'He fell from the landing and was killed.' 'Ah,' cried Bismarck, 'what a wretched constitution he must have had!'" In an aside to me Bismarck violently attacked Papists, and broke out against the Confessional in the tone of Newdegate, or of Whalley, or of General Grant. To the whole table he stoutly maintained that it was right that no Jew should be admitted into the Prussian Guards or into clubs. One man at table said: "But you had a Jew in the Guards"; to which Bismarck replied: "We precious soon hunted him out." The man hunted out was the son of Prince Bismarck's banker, the Rothschilds' agent, British Consul at Berlin, and Bismarck's confidential adviser at the time of the treaty of Versailles. I added in my diary of young Bismarck: "He is only 'sham' mad."

'On March 29th I received a letter from Crowe [Footnote: Of Sir Joseph Crowe, British Commercial Attaché, Sir Charles says:

"Joseph Archer Crowe had been known to me as _Daily News_ correspondent in Paris when I was six years old in 1849, and when my grandfather was managing the _Daily News_. Many years afterwards I got to know of a Crowe, a great authority on Italian Painters, but I had not the least idea that this Crowe was the same person as the other Crowe. When I entered the Foreign Office I became aware of the diplomatic and consular work that had been done by J. A. Crowe, but I was not aware of his identity with either of the others till we sat together on the Royal Commission. After ceasing to be a young painter in Paris, Crowe became _Illustrated London News_ correspondent in the Crimea, and then accepted an art appointment in India. He was at Bombay during the Mutiny. Subsequently he went through the Franco- Italian campaign of 1859 as the war-correspondent of the _Times_, being present at the battle of Solferino. He was appointed in 1860 Consul-General for Saxony. Few men wrote four languages so well, and while I never heard him speak German I'm told that it was as good as his English, and his French was as good as either."] from Berlin, saying that the Chancellor was weak in health and prophesying ultimate war. In sending it to Lord Granville, I wrote: "I obstinately refuse to believe that the Russian Emperor will go to his destruction at the behest of his revolutionists." And Lord Granville wrote back: "I agree. Herbert Bismarck confirms the account of his father's weakness. Cannot walk eighty yards without sitting down."'

In France, the greatest of French statesmen had been turned out of office on January 26th. [Footnote: The Gambetta Ministry fell by a vote on Scrutin de Liste on January 26th. The Freycinet Ministry succeeded to office on January 31st. On January 31st, 1882, Sir Charles wrote to Mr. Frank Hill: "No member of the new French Government is taken from the majority that overthrew Gambetta. All who are deputies voted in the Minority. All who are senators would have so voted."] But already people were saying that Gambetta must be President, and that by 1886, the date of the next Presidential election, he would have recovered all his popularity--or lost it for ever. 'The alternative of death,' says Dilke, 'had not occurred to them; yet it was death, coupled with popularity, that came.'

The friends had not met since Gambetta's fall, but

'Gambetta found time to write and thank me for my speech, as well as for what I had said to him about his fall. He again promised a visit to London in one of these letters.'

"PARIS, "_Le 31 Janvier_, 1882.

"MON CHER AMI,

"Je vous remercie de votre bonne et forte parole. Elle me plaît par- dessus tout venant de vous, qui êtes bon juge en fait de dignité et d'autorité politique.

"Je ne regrette en partant qu'une seule chose--de n'avoir pu terminer le traité. Mais j'ai grand espoir d'avoir porté les choses assez loin pour empêcher les successeurs de reculer.

"Quand vous reverrai-je? Je compte bien que ce sera ê Londres, qui sera toujours en beau quand vous y serez.

"Bien cordialement,

"LÉON GAMBETTA."

'But the visit was destined never to take place,' though for years it had been continually talked of between them. About August, 1876, when it was almost settled, Sir Charles had noted:

'Gambetta never came to England in his life but once (about 1869), and that was on a curious mission, considering what the future was to bring forth; for he came under the Empire as the representative of the Republicans to enter into consultation with the Orleans Princes for the overthrow of Louis Napoleon. This interview would no doubt be denied if mentioned by many of Gambetta's friends, but he told me of it himself.'

On April 16th, 1882, Sir Charles, on his way back from spending the Easter recess at Toulon, breakfasted with Gambetta, who told his friend 'that he was "unique among fallen Ministers, for others, once fallen, are forgiven," whereas he was "worse hated and more attacked than when in power."'

He was none the less witty. There was talk of reforms in Russia--reforms that had been suddenly obliterated by the murder of the reforming Tsar. "What did Russia want with a 'Parlement'?" (Gambetta asked). "She has two Generals who provide her with it. Skobelef, _Parle_; et Ignatief, _Ment._"

'On the 21st January, 1882, Alfred de Rothschild came to see me to tell me that Bontoux had been to "Alphonse" [Footnote: The head of the Paris house.] to ask him to help the Union Générale, which had been a Catholic alliance against the Jews, and was now on its last legs. On the next day Alphonse de Rothschild decided that he would not, as was indeed to be expected, unless he had very strong, purely financial, reasons the other way. He ultimately helped enough to save the brokers, but not enough to save Bontoux or the rest. I found that, ever since the Battle of Waterloo, the Rothschilds in London and in Paris have been in the habit of writing to one another long letters every day, and from time to time I saw these letters from Alphonse when they bore upon political affairs.'

Sir Charles was not impressed by the political insight of those documents, which seemed to him 'extraordinarily uninteresting,' expressing old- fashioned Conservative ideas, though 'the Rothschilds all think they are Liberals.'

The jottings end with a definition of diplomacy:

'On the 24th January, 1882, I dined at the French Embassy, where Baron Solvyns, the Belgian Minister, amused me with the saying that diplomacy meant "to pass one's life à expliquer les choses sans les comprendre."' [Footnote: Adapted from Beaumarchais, who thus describes "la politique" in 'Le Mariage de Figaro,' Act III., Scene ii.]