CHAPTER I.

CONCEPTION OF MY PLAN. CHIEFLY 1836.

Amongst the many subjects which casually attracted the attention of our family, the operations of the Post Office naturally took their turn. My father spoke at times of Palmer’s great improvement,[91] which he well remembered, and mentioned its beneficial results. Postal considerations, moreover, came upon us in a very practical form; every day that brought post-letters brought also a demand for payment, the postman waiting at the door till he had received his money. In the very early period, when we were most straitened in means, his rap was not always welcome; the demand being certain and sometimes inconvenient; the recompense, in the way of news, doubtful. Tradesmen’s circulars, in particular, which sometimes came from a considerable distance, and always unpaid, were great causes of disappointment and irritation. Happily they were but rare in those days, or the evil would have been intolerable.

As much more than half the present generation have had no experience of any other system than that of penny postage, it must be difficult, if not impracticable, to give an adequate conception of the state of things at the time referred to, of the height and variety of rates charged, and of the multitudinous shifts resorted to for their evasion. The law gave the Post Office a monopoly, and respect for the law is considered characteristic of our countrymen; but, to the best of my memory, I never knew of any one being withheld from its breach on this point, save by considerations either of convenience or of prudence.

The following facts are given by way of example: If, when residing at Birmingham, we received a letter from London, the lowest charge was ninepence, while the slightest enclosure raised it to eighteenpence, and a second enclosure to two shillings and threepence, though the whole missive might not weigh a quarter of an ounce. We had relatives at Haddington; the lowest rate thence was thirteenpence-halfpenny; others at Shrewsbury, but the postage thence I do not remember, as we never used the Post Office in our correspondence with them, since a tradesman in our town who had occasion to send and, in turn, to receive a weekly packet, was kind enough to enclose our letters, we carrying them more than half a mile to place them in his hands, while the return letters, being dropped by him into the Birmingham Post Office, came to us charged with merely the local rate of one penny. In looking over letters of the period antecedent to the Post Office reform, I find constant reference to expedients for saving postage; thus, in writing to a friend at a particular town, we would trouble him to call upon such and such others to communicate intelligence, or to make inquiries, the result to be reported in his next letter; sometimes, even, we would ask him to call upon tradesmen to give orders, or to urge despatch in commissions previously given. If a friend were about to make a journey to a town where we had connections, we did not hesitate to place letters in his hands, regardless alike of his trouble and the chance of his forgetfulness; being ourselves, of course, ready in turn to perform the like service. In the year 1823, taking a holiday excursion through the lake district[92] to Scotland, and wishing to keep my family informed as to my movements and my health (then in a depressed state), I carried with me a number of old newspapers, and in franking these, according to the useless form then required, while I left the postmark with its date to show the place, I indicated my state of health by selecting names according to previous arrangement; the more Liberal members being taken to indicate that I was better, while Tories were to show that I was falling back; “Sir Francis Burdett” was to imply vigorous health, while probably “Lord Eldon” would almost have brought one of my brothers after me in anxiety and alarm.[93] In later days, more especially after our removal to the neighbourhood of London, and most of all while my eldest brother was in Parliament, we sometimes procured franks, particularly when for any reason we had unusual regard to appearances; but as at that time we were in easier circumstances, we felt some compunction in using franks for general purposes, thinking it questionable to evade an impost by the use of means from which, as we well knew by earlier experience, those lower down were utterly debarred. This feeling became stronger as we learnt the monstrous abuses which had grown up in connection with the franking system; when we found, for instance, that though a member’s frank would cover but an ounce, there were franks of another kind which served for unlimited weight, and were said to have been actually used to free a greatcoat, a bundle of baby-linen, and a pianoforte.

Even in our early days, however, necessity being the mother of conception as well as of invention, my father, while testifying great admiration for the postal system generally, had repeatedly expressed the opinion that, even for fiscal purposes, postage was unwisely high, an opinion which in all probability tended to draw my attention to postal affairs. Be this as it may, the earliest record on the subject that I can find in my memoranda, and which is dated August, 1826 (that is, ten years before the publication of my pamphlet), gives my first conception of a travelling post office. It is as follows:—

“The mails reach London at six in the morning, and the distribution of letters does not commence till after nine. Might not the mails arrive three hours later, and consequently leave the respective towns three hours later, if the letters could be assorted and marked on the road? And might not this be done by the guard, if he had the inside fitted up with shelves, &c., for the purpose? The charge for postage might be marked with a stamp; as each bag was received, all the London letters it contained would require the same stamp-mark, except in cases of double and treble letters, when the mark might be repeated. If, from any defects in the address, the guard should not be able to assign any letter to its proper district, he might put it by for assortment at the General Post Office, to be delivered the next day.... An additional body might be added to the coach for inside passengers, or, the load being less, two of the horses might perhaps be spared, which would enable the speed to be increased (as with a proportionate load two will go quicker than four horses), and would save time in changing them.”

At a yet earlier date than this, however, though how many years before I do not know, I had given some little thought to the subject of more rapid locomotion; having mainly in view, I believe, the speedier conveyance of the mail. I had considered, as well as some others, the question of propulsion by steam, being of course entirely unaware of the great invention then progressing in the mind of George Stephenson; and, indeed, having no notion that the laying of a railway would be a necessary preliminary. Steam, however, I soon abandoned for a more potent as well as more portable agent, viz., gunpowder;[94] and with this I made some experiments; but these proving unsatisfactory, I carried my researches no further, and so escaped, perhaps, a serious explosion. My next memorandum bears date January 11th, 1830, and suggests the feasibility of conveying the mails through tubes by atmospheric means; but this, also, remained a crude and unpublished conception.

I have already mentioned[95] that our opinion was from first to last, and without reserve or exception, in favour of free trade. Such being our views, we had welcomed with joy the gradual relaxation of the protective system, which, commencing under Mr. Huskisson, never absolutely stopped until protection was no more. We had remarked, with satisfaction, that the lowering of the tariff had not produced a corresponding reduction in the public revenue; and we indulged in sanguine hopes that, even where reduction appeared in a particular department, it either would be temporary or would be made up in some other.

The year 1835 having brought a large surplus in the general revenue, we naturally speculated as to its application in the reduction of duties;[96] and it was then that my thoughts first turned earnestly to the Post Office. I now examined more in detail the result of the late financial reforms: and I found (as subsequently stated in my pamphlet[97]) that in the reductions hitherto made, the relation between the relief to the public and the loss to the revenue had varied greatly; so that, while in the instance of leather and soap the reduction of one half of the duty had eventually caused to the revenue a loss of one third, in that of coffee the same reduction had actually produced a gain of one half. This brought me to the conclusion that, “when a reduction of taxation is about to take place, it is exceedingly important that great care and judgment should be exercised in the selection of the tax to be reduced, in order that the maximum of relief may be afforded to the public with the minimum of injury to the revenue.”[98]

My next attempt was to arrive at some rule which might serve for general guidance in such cases; and I came to the conclusion that, with some allowance for exceptions, the best test would be found by examining each tax “as to whether its productiveness has kept pace with the increasing number and prosperity of the nation. And the tax which proves most defective under this test is in all probability the one we are now in quest of.”[99]

This test brought the tax I had in mind, viz., that on the transmission of letters, into bad pre-eminence; since, during the previous twenty years, viz., from 1815 to 1835 (my investigations being made in 1836), the absolute revenue derived from the Post Office, whether gross or net, instead of increasing, had even somewhat diminished; whereas, if it had merely kept pace with the growth of population, to say nothing of the concurrent spread of education, extension of trade, and advancement in prosperity, the revenue—I mean the net revenue—would have increased by no less than £500,000.[100]

To try the matter further, I looked out for some other tax, which, while less exorbitant, was in other respects liable to as nearly as possible the same influences, and I naturally took the duty on stage-coaches. I found that the amount yielded by this, instead of diminishing, like that in question, had more than doubled in the same period; increasing from less than £218,000 to nearly £500,000, or about one hundred and twenty-eight per cent. I found, again, that if the Post Office revenue had risen in like proportion (and it seemed scarcely to be doubted that the demand for the conveyance of letters had increased in the same ratio as that for the conveyance of persons and parcels), the increase of net revenue would have been no less than £2,000,000.[101] The general fairness of this conclusion was afterwards shown by the fact; 116 per cent. having been the ratio of increase in the net revenue of the Post Office during the twenty years between 1847 and 1867.

For yet further comparison, I turned to the accounts of the Post Office revenue in France, where the rates of postage were less exorbitant than with us, and taking the gross revenue (the net revenue not being given), I found that this had risen from somewhat less than £1,000,000 in 1821 to nearly £1,500,000 in 1835, about fifty-four per cent. in fourteen years.[102]

Nor was I proceeding without authority in thus condemning the existing postal rates as unsound in policy, Sir Henry Parnell having attributed the non-increase of the revenue to the high duty charged on letters; while Mr. McCulloch had not only taken the same general view, but attributed the loss to the illicit conveyance of letters, for which the increased number of coaches gave so much facility.[103] Of the important services of Mr. Wallace in elucidating the same point I shall speak hereafter.

While thus confirmed in my belief that, even from a financial point of view, the postal rates were injuriously high, I also became more and more convinced, the more I considered the question, that the fiscal loss was not the most serious injury thus inflicted on the public; that yet more serious evil resulted from the obstruction thus raised to the moral and intellectual progress of the people; and that the Post Office, if put on a sound footing, would assume the new and important character of a powerful engine of civilisation; that though now rendered feeble and inefficient by erroneous financial arrangements, it was capable of performing a distinguished part in the great work of national education. I became also more alive to the consideration that the duty of rendering its operation as beneficial as possible, incumbent as this must be on any institution, became doubly so on the Post Office, from its being a monopoly; that, as it forbade all others to perform its functions, it was bound to render its own performance as complete as possible.[104] Of this view I found strong confirmation in the recent report of a Government Commission.[105]

Being thus fully convinced that the present arrangements were wrong, I had next to inquire as to the changes most effectual for redress. As I had never yet been within the walls of any Post Office[106] (an advantage which was, indeed, reserved for me until after the adoption of my plan), my only sources of information, for the time, consisted in those heavy blue books, in which invaluable matter too often lies hidden amidst heaps of rubbish. Into some of these, as previously implied, I had already dipped; but Mr. Wallace having supplied me by post with an additional half hundred weight of raw material, I now commenced that systematic study, analysis, and comparison, which the difficulty of my self-imposed task rendered necessary.

I started, however, with the simple notion that rates must be reduced,—but soon came to the conclusion that such reduction might be carried to a considerable extent not only without loss to the revenue, but with positive benefit; that a larger reduction might be made without loss, and a still larger without drawing upon the surplus beyond a reasonable extent.[107] The question to be decided therefore was, how far the total reduction might safely be carried; and this involved two preliminary inquiries; first, what would be the probable increase of correspondence consequent upon such or such reduction; secondly, what would be the augmentation of expense consequent upon such increase.

Investigation upon this latter head brought out three important facts. The first was that one great source of expense was to be found in what is technically called “taxing” the letters, that is, ascertaining and marking the postage to be charged on each; the second, that great expense likewise arose from complicated accounts, postmasters having to be debited with unpaid postage on letters transmitted to their offices, and credited with their payments made in return; while they again had to receive and check the payments of the letter carriers, who, it must be remembered, received, at that time, from the public, almost all the postage paid; the third, that the cost of delivering letters, great as it inevitably was, was much augmented—indeed, save in rural districts, more than doubled—by being saddled with the collection of postage. It further appeared that these expenses must increase in something like direct proportion to increase in the number of letters.

These conclusions led me to perceive that for the effectual reduction of expense it was necessary to obtain simplicity of operation, and therefore to reduce the prodigious variety of rates (then extending, on single inland letters alone, to upwards of forty), and further, to adopt means to induce prepayment, so as to save the time at once of the letter carriers, of the clerks with whom they had to account for postage received, of the provincial postmasters, and, lastly, of the clerks at the central office.

In considering how far the variety of rates might be reduced, I was naturally led to inquire what proportion of postal expense proceeded from the conveyance of letters between town and town, and further, how far such expense, whatever it might be, varied in relation to distance. On pursuing this inquiry, I arrived at results so startling that nothing but the most careful verification could satisfy me of their accuracy. I first perceived that the expense of such conveyance, which one would naturally suppose to be very great, was in fact, when divided by the number of missives, very small.

Having, according to the best information then accessible, estimated the number of letters and newspapers annually passing through the Post Office at 126,000,000, I calculated the apparent cost of what I termed the primary distribution, viz., the receipt, conveyance and distribution of missives passing from post town to post town, and found that this cost, on all such letters, newspapers, &c., within the United Kingdom, was, on the average, only 84-hundredths of a penny each; and that of this sum only one-third, or 28-hundredths of a penny went to conveyance; the remaining two-thirds, or 56-hundredths of a penny, appertaining to the receipt and delivery of letters, the collection of postage, &c. I further remarked that, as the cost of conveyance for a given distance is, under ordinary circumstances, in tolerably direct proportion to the weight carried, and as a newspaper or franked letter (and franked letters were then very numerous) weighs generally as much as several ordinary letters, the average expense of conveying a letter chargeable with postage must be much lower yet; probably about one-third of the sum mentioned above, or, in other words, nine-hundredths of a penny; a conclusion pretty well supported by the acknowledged fact that the chargeable letters did not weigh more than about one-fourth of the whole mail.[108] Beyond this, I found, by another calculation, based on more exact data, that the cost of transit as regards the great mass of letters, small as it appeared to be, was in reality still smaller; being probably loaded with charges not strictly appertaining to it, and certainly enhanced by the carriage of the mail to places which were “not of sufficient importance to repay the expense.”[109]

Having found, with tolerable accuracy, the total cost of conveying the mail from London to Edinburgh;[110] having in like manner estimated the weight of the mail so conveyed, and from these premises deduced the cost per letter, I found this to be no more than one thirty-sixth part of a penny, though the distance, four hundred miles, is far above the average.[111]

Thus, then, I found, first, that the cost of conveying a letter between post town and post town was exceedingly small; secondly, that it had but little relation to distance; and thirdly, that it depended much upon the number of letters conveyed by the particular mail; and as the cost per letter would diminish with every increase in such number, and as such increase would certainly follow reduction of postage, it followed that, if a great reduction could be effected, the cost of conveyance, per letter, already so small, might be deemed absolutely insignificant.

Hence, then, I came to the important conclusion that the existing practice of regulating the amount of postage by the distance over which an inland letter was conveyed, however plausible in appearance, had no foundation in principle; and that consequently the rates of postage should be irrespective of distance. I scarcely need add that this discovery, as startling to myself as it could be to any one else, was the basis of the plan which has made so great a change in postal affairs.

New prospects having thus opened upon me, I was next led to consider two further questions, both important to that simplicity of arrangement of which I was in quest.

First, was it possible that the existing variable charge should be exchanged for a single uniform rate?

Second, was it practicable to require prepayment?

No great sagacity was needful to perceive how vast would be the convenience to the public, and the economy of labour to the Post Office, if either of these points could be secured, and how prodigious the gain from attaining both.

As regards the first, it was clear that as the expenses of the receipt and delivery were the same for all letters, while the cost of conveyance, already so small, seemed reducible to absolute insignificance, a uniform rate would approach nearer to absolute justice than any other rate that could be fixed.

It further appeared that as lowness of rate was essential to uniformity (since no serious elevation of the lowest existing rates would be tolerated, and the same lowness was the only condition on which prepayment could be successfully required) every reduction of working expenses, however obtained, would itself, by facilitating decrease of rate, become a means of attaining the simplicity indispensable to my plan.

Seeing that there would be great difficulty in establishing any uniform rate higher than the minimum then in use, viz., one penny, I was of course led to consider whether the uniform rate could be fixed as low as that small sum; or, in other words, what loss of net revenue would be involved in the adoption of a penny rate; and next, whether such loss would be admissible for the sake of the great advantages to be thereby secured.

Again, however, perceiving that though simple distance did not justify increase of rate, yet such increase might be required by remoteness from the great highways of traffic, I thought that probably general uniformity might be more easily secured by sacrificing universality; and hence arose my conception, now doubtless generally forgotten, of a practical distinction between primary and secondary distribution. By primary distribution, I meant the transmission of letters, &c., from post town to post town throughout the United Kingdom, and the delivery within the post towns; and by secondary distribution, that distribution which proceeds from each post town, as a centre, to places of inferior importance;[112] my plan being that within the range of primary distribution there should be a uniform rate of one penny, retaining an additional charge for secondary distribution (to be collected on delivery), unless, indeed, any district so served might choose to take the cost of such distribution upon itself.

Of the equity of such a distinction it is needless to speak, since the difference of charge would have proceeded from a difference in actual expense; of its feasibility it is enough to say that it was to a considerable extent in actual use, the common practice being, on the arrival of a letter at any post town, for delivery beyond a certain range, to charge an additional penny. In one instance at least the existing difference was yet greater, the additional charge in the London district being as high as twopence. In some towns in each of the three kingdoms the secondary principle was carried so far as to impose a special charge, generally of a penny, on all letters not fetched from the office by the receiver;[113] a practice continued, I believe, for some time even after the establishment of penny postage. The only remaining question was whether, supposing this distinction to be set aside, the advantage of absolute uniformity would compensate for the injustice involved in establishing equality of charge with inequality of expense.

At the same time, wishing to give primary distribution its greatest possible range, and to make the rates even on secondary distribution as low as could fairly be done, I proposed that the whole weight of taxation should be thrown on the primary distribution, which was to include every place which could be reached without absolute loss to the revenue, and that each department of the secondary distribution should just defray its own expenses.[114] On this plan I hoped that, under economical management, every important village would be able to obtain at least one delivery per day, and the importance of such extension will be strikingly manifest when the reader is reminded that at the period in question there were, even in England proper, districts as large as the county of Middlesex in which the postman never set foot.

Upon looking back to this question as it then stood, I am inclined to think that the early abandonment of this distinction (made for reasons that will appear hereafter) was on several accounts unfortunate; one serious consequence being a great aggravation of the immediate loss to the revenue, but a far more important one its effect in retarding that extension of postal facilities of which I have yet to speak, and which was so important both to public convenience and fiscal recovery. As the additional charge would have repaid the cost of extension, the most ostensible as well as the most valid objection thereto, would have been removed; and that development might have been rapid which was, in fact, lamentably slow. Doubtless the distinction would have been but temporary, save, perhaps, in those remote places where there is now no delivery at all; elsewhere, secondary distribution would have gradually yielded to primary.[115]

One important circumstance on which I relied for increase in the number of post letters was the extent to which, under the stimulus of high rates, contraband conveyance was carried. Of this I have already made some little mention, but there was a systematic evasion of the law that far outstripped anything that could be done by merely private hands. I had learnt, for instance, that the carriers plying between Birmingham and the neighbouring towns, to the distance of twelve or thirteen miles, were in the constant habit of conveying letters, which they delivered at one penny each (justifying so far my proposed reduction); and a highly respectable merchant and manufacturer of that town gave it me as his opinion that the number of letters so distributed very greatly exceeded the number distributed in the same district by the Post Office.[116] It was also well known that vast numbers were every day forwarded by carriers and coach proprietors. Of course, discoveries sometimes occurred, and penalties were levied, but the traffic was so openly carried on that the risk could not have been great—an occasional seizure doing little more than show the extent of the practice, which, indeed, was not likely to be suppressed so long as it was sanctioned by the moral sense of the public; in face of which the Post Office itself could not levy its full penalties. Thus, in the year 1833, though one of the fines incurred was as high as £1,000, the highest amount actually paid was only £160.[117] Such a seizure had lately been made, bringing to light in a carrier’s warehouse one bag containing no less than 1,100 letters.[118] Independently, however, of positive evidence, it was clear that “the vast extent to which the trade of the country had increased during the previous twenty years” (viz., those immediately following the close of the great war with France and the second war with the United States) “must have been attended by a proportionate increase in the amount of mercantile correspondence, while the spread of education and increase of population during the same period must have greatly augmented the correspondence of all kinds.”[119]

Now it was easy to foresee (though, as will afterwards appear, the very probability was then not merely questioned, but denied) that the proposed reduction to one penny would cause all, or nearly all, this correspondence to pass through the Post Office, which, by its superior organisation and command of means, would render private competition on equal terms altogether futile.

I have already remarked on the encouragement afforded by the increased sale of various articles after the reduction of the duties thereon; but perceiving that such reduction could tend to increased sale only by its effect on price, and that the chief element of price is cost, over which legislation has no control, I was naturally led to expect that here, where the reduction would be directly and fully in the price itself, the consequent increase of custom would be very much greater.[120]

As a means of giving some indication of the results to be looked for, I took two or three articles, of which, from whatever cause, the price had fallen, and observed how far cheapening had been followed by increase in consumption. Thus, the price of soap having fallen by one-eighth, the consumption had increased by one-third; in tea, a reduction of one-sixth had increased consumption by almost a half; in coffee, a gradual reduction of one-fourth (occurring during the previous thirteen years) had been accompanied by an increase in consumption amounting to three-fold;—while in cotton goods, a similar reduction of one-half, spread over about twenty years, had been accompanied by a corresponding increase of no less than fourfold.

Thus, it appeared that reduction in price, even if it does not increase the total expenditure on the article affected, seldom, if ever, permanently lowers its amount.[121]

Hence it followed that, even supposing the postage to be reduced to the low rate contemplated, the public would probably continue to expend as much in postage as before; and that thus the gross revenue would be sustained. According to my calculation, this implied an increase in the number of letters posted to the amount of between five- and six-fold.

Moreover, the soundness of the principle had already stood the test of experiment, though on a small scale, in the Post Office itself; the chief trial having taken place in the London district, and considerable reductions having also been recently made in the postage of foreign letters, all speedily followed by great increase in the amount of receipts therefrom. Of loss to revenue following reduction of postage, save as a very temporary consequence, I knew no instance.

In brief, I arrived at the following conclusions:—

First, that the number of letters passing through the post would be greatly increased by the disuse of franks and abandonment of illicit conveyance; by the breaking up of one long letter into several shorter ones, by the use of the post for the distribution of circulars and the issue of many circulars hitherto withheld; and, lastly, by an enormous enlargement of the class of letter-writers.

Further, that supposing the public, according to its practice in other cases, only to expend as much in postage as before, the loss to the net revenue would be but small; and again, that such loss, even if large, would be more than compensated by the powerful stimulus given by low postage to the productive power of the country, and the consequent increase of revenue in other departments.

Finally, that while the risk to Post Office revenue was comparatively small and the chance of eventual gain not inconsiderable, and while the beneficial effect on the general revenue was little less than certain, the adoption of my plan would certainly confer a most important, manifest, and acceptable benefit on the country.[122]

It is now high time to speak of one whose valuable services in the cause of Post Office reform are, I fear, but insufficiently remembered at the present day, but who, nevertheless, was in the field more than two years before I began my investigations, and who, while unconsciously preparing the way for my proceedings, procured, by persevering efforts, some immediate changes of considerable value. This was the late Mr. Wallace, who, having been elected to the first reformed Parliament for the new borough of Greenock, began, in 1833, a course of bold criticism on the proceedings of the Post Office, which, though received at first, perhaps because of some over-earnestness, with unmerited ridicule, gradually succeeded in obtaining attention in Parliament, and even in some degree from the public.

Up to that time the Post Office, notwithstanding its manifold imperfections, had for a long period—perhaps ever since the adoption of Palmer’s great reform—almost always escaped general censure. Nor, indeed, is this surprising; for it must be admitted that, however far it lagged behind the knowledge of the age, it was even then, abstractedly considered, a wonderful machine, conveying missives to and from the most distant places with much more approach to regularity and certainty than any other means had yet afforded; so that it was generally regarded in those days as an admirable mystery, whose apparent vagaries and shortcomings resulted, no doubt, from insuperable difficulties well understood by the initiated, but far beyond the comprehension of the profane vulgar. The merit of breaking down this prestige is due in great measure to Mr. Wallace’s exertions; for, though the Commissioners of Revenue Inquiry, already referred to, had a short time before with great ability exposed much mismanagement in the Post Office, and recommended various improvements (some of which were afterwards taken up by Mr. Wallace, and some still later by myself), yet these exposures and recommendations, buried as they were in voluminous reports, attracted little attention from the public.

Mr. Wallace, however, not contented with denouncing abuses, proceeded to indicate various remedies; thus, he advised the adoption of weight as a measure of charge, instead of the absurd and troublesome plan then in use, which regulated it mainly by the number of enclosures. Again, he proposed that the contract for the construction of mail-coaches should be thrown open to public competition; a measure which being soon afterwards adopted, effected a saving of more than £17,000 per annum. He also urged the consolidation of the London General and District Post Offices; a measure which subsequently formed part of the plan of penny postage, though not carried into effect until many years afterwards; and, lastly, he urged the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry into the management of the Post Office; a measure carried into effect early in 1835—the Commission continuing its labours until 1838, during which period it issued no less than ten reports; its efforts fairly entitling it to the credit of much of the subsequent improvement. During the first year of its operations Mr. Wallace, suspending his efforts in Parliament, more effectually served the cause to which he had devoted himself by assisting in the investigations of the Commission; giving evidence, in the course of which he recommended, amongst others, the following improvements: first, the establishment of day mails—which subsequently formed part of my plan, and was eventually carried into effect, with great advantage to the public and to the revenue; secondly, a reduction in the rates of postage; and thirdly, more frequent communication between place and place.

In 1836, resuming his labours in Parliament, while urging various other measures, he repeated his recommendation of a reduction in the rates of postage, naming eightpence or ninepence as a maximum (a limitation which, whatever may be thought of it now, would then have been regarded as a great improvement); he advised, secondly, the registration of letters (afterwards carried into effect with advantage both to the public and the revenue); and lastly, the abandonment of a rule, so monstrous that its maintenance seems now hardly credible, by which the rate of charge, instead of being regulated by the actual distance between place and place (supposing distance to be the true criterion), was varied according to the length of the course, often very circuitous, which the letter was made to take for the convenience of the Post Office. It was in this year (1836) that my acquaintance with Mr. Wallace began; but I must now return for a time to my own proceedings, merely observing here, though I shall have occasion to recur to the subject, that any one wishing for a concise, but I believe tolerably complete, statement of Mr. Wallace’s services, may refer to the report of a speech, given in the Appendix (F), which I made at Greenock in the year 1850, at a meeting convened for the purpose of originating a national testimonial to Mr. Wallace, for his services in relation to postal reform.

Being now prepared with my main facts and conclusions, I had to consider how best to give them effect. The time seemed propitious, the Liberals being in power, the almost superstitious respect for the Post Office being, not indeed shattered, but certainly shaken, and a large surplus being ready to make good the immediate loss likely to follow reduction, as well as to provide for the moderate permanent loss on which I had reckoned, as a proper sacrifice to the public good, in view of the great advantages to be thereby secured. By this time, moreover, I had many friends in Parliament, and even some acquaintance with one or two members of the Government; which encouraged me to hope that my plan would, at least, receive attention; and attention, I was sanguine enough to think, must soon induce adoption.

I set to work, therefore, to give my matter such shape as seemed best fitted to illustrate my facts and give force to my arguments. In urging the various benefits to be anticipated from cheap and easy postal conveyance, I did not fail to dwell on its aid to education, which was then at length beginning to be regarded as a matter of national interest and national duty, though the movement in its favour was still grievously clogged by sectarian prejudice and political animosities. The following passage will show that I gave it the chief place in my summary:—[123]

“Its object is not to increase the political power of this or that party, but to benefit all sects in politics and religion; and all classes from the highest to the lowest. To the rich, as to the less wealthy, it will be acceptable, from the increased facilities it will afford for their correspondence. To the middle classes it will bring relief from oppressive and irritating demands which they pay grudgingly; estimating them even beyond their real amount, because probably of their frequent recurrence—which they avoid by every possible contrivance, and which they would consider quite intolerable if they knew that nearly the whole is a tax. And to the poor it will afford the means of communication with their distant friends and relatives, from which they are at present debarred. It will give increased energy to trade; it will remove innumerable temptations to fraud; and it will be an important step in general education; the more important, perhaps, because it calls on Government for no factitious aid, for nothing in the shape of encouragement, still less of compulsion; but merely for the removal of an obstacle, created by the law, to that spontaneous education which happily is extending through the country, and which, even the opponents of a national system will agree, ought to be unobstructed in its progress.”[124]