Chapter 44

Continental questions there was no difference such as Thiers affected to see between the generous policy of Russia and the "cold egotism" of Pitt. As Czartoryski has proved in his "Memoirs" (vol. ii., ch. x.) Thiers has erred in assigning importance to a mere first draft of a conversation which Czartoryski had with that ingenious schemer, the Abbé Piatoli. The official proposals sent from St. Petersburg to London were very different; _e.g._, the proposal of Alexander with regard to the French frontiers was this: "The first object is to bring back France into its ancient limits or such other ones as might appear most suitable to the general tranquillity of Europe." It is, therefore, futile to state that this was solely the policy of Pitt after he had "remodelled" the Russian proposals.]

[Footnote 12: "Corresp.," No. 8231. See too Bourrienne, Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. iv., and Thiers, bk. xxi.]

[Footnote 13: This refusal has been severely criticised. But the knowledge of the British Government that Napoleon was still persevering with his schemes against Turkey, and that the Russians themselves, from their station at Corfu, were working to gain a foothold on the Albanian coast, surely prescribed caution ("F.O.," Russia, Nos. 55 and 56, despatches of June 26th and October 10th, 1804). It was further known that the Austrian Government had proposed to the Czar plans that were hostile to Turkey, and were not decisively rejected at St. Petersburg; and it is clear from the notes left by Czartoryski that the prospect of gaining Corfu, Moldavia, parts of Albania, and the precious prize of Constantinople was kept in view. Pitt agreed to restore the conquests made from France (Despatch of April 22nd).]

[Footnote 14: Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 328-333. It is clear that Gustavus IV. was the ruler who insisted on making the restoration of the Bourbons the chief aim of the Third Coalition. In our "F.O. Records" (Sweden, No. 177) is an account (August 20th, 1804) of a conversation of Lord Harrowby with the Swedish ambassador, who stated that such a declaration would "palsy the arms of France." Our Foreign Minister replied that it would "much more certainly palsy the arms of England: that we made war because France was become too powerful for the peace of Europe."]

[Footnote 15: "Corresp.," No. 8329.]

[Footnote 16: Bailleu, "Preussen und Frankreich," vol. ii., p. 354.]

[Footnote 17: Thiers (bk. xxi.) gives the whole text.]

[Footnote 18: The annexation of the Ligurian or Genoese Republic took place on June 4th, the way having been prepared there by Napoleon's former patron, Salicetti, who liberally dispensed bribes. A little later the Republic of Lucca was bestowed on Elisa Bonaparte and her spouse, now named Prince Bacciochi. Parma, hitherto administered by a French governor, was incorporated in the French Empire about the same time.]

[Footnote 19: Paget to Lord Mulgrave (March 19th, 1805).]

[Footnote 20: Beer, "Zehn Jahre oesterreich. Politik (1801-1810)." The notes of Novossiltzoff and Hardenberg are printed in Sir G. Jackson's "Diaries," vol i., App.]

[Footnote 21: See Bignon, vol. iv., pp. 271 and 334. Probably Napoleon knew through Laforest and Talleyrand that Russia had recently urged that George III. should offer Hanover to Prussia. Pitt rejected the proposal. Prussia paid more heed to the offer of Hanover from Napoleon than to the suggestions of Czartoryski that she might receive it from its rightful owner, George III. Yet Duroc did not succeed in gaining more from Frederick William than the promise of his neutrality (see Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 339-346). Sweden was not a member of the Coalition, but made treaties with Russia and England.

The high hopes nursed by the Pitt Ministry are seen in the following estimate of the forces that would be launched against France: Austria, 250,000; Russia, 180,000; Prussia, 100,000 (Pitt then refused to subsidize more than 100,000); Sweden, 16,000; Saxony, 16,000; Hesse and Brunswick, 16,000; Mecklenburg, 3,000; King of Sardinia, 25,000; Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, 25,000; Naples, 20,000. In a P.S. he adds that the support of the King of Sardinia would not be needed, and that England had private arrangements with Naples as to subsidies. This Memoir is not dated, but it must belong to the beginning of September, before the defection of Bavaria was known ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).]

[Footnote 22: "F.O.," Russia, No. 57; Gower's note of July 22nd, 1805.]

[Footnote 23: Colonel Graham's despatches, which undoubtedly influenced the Pitt Ministry in favouring the appointment of Mack to the present command. Paget ("Papers," vol. ii., p. 238) states that the Iller position was decided on by Francis. The best analysis of Mack's character is in Bernhardi's "Memoirs of Count Toll" (vol. i., p. 121). The State Papers are in Burke's "Campaign of 1805," App.]

[Footnote 24: Marmont, "Mems.," vol. ii., p. 310.]

[Footnote 25: See "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 224; also Schönhals "Der Krieg 1805 in Deutschland," p. 67.]

[Footnote 26: "Corresp.," No. 9249. See too No. 9254 for the details of the enveloping moves which Napoleon then (September 22nd) accurately planned twenty-five days before the final blows were dealt: yet No. 9299 shows that, even on September 30th, he believed Mack would hurry back to the Inn. Beer, p. 145.]

[Footnote 27: Rüstow, "Der Krieg 1805." Hormayr, "Geschichte Hofers" (vol. i., p. 96), states that, in framing with Russia the plan of campaign, the Austrians forgot to allow for the difference (twelve days) between the Russian and Gregorian calendars. The Russians certainly were eleven days late.]

[Footnote 28: "Corresp.," No 9319; Sir G. Jackson's "Diaries," vol. i., p. 334.]

[Footnote 29: _Ibid_.; also Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii. For Prussia's protest to Napoleon, which pulverized the French excuses, see Garden, vol. ix., p. 69.]

[Footnote 30: Schönhals; Ségur, ch. xvi., exculpates Murat and Ney.]

[Footnote 31: Schönhals, p. 73. Thiers states that Dupont's 6,000 gained a victory over 25,000 Austrians detached from the 60,000 who occupied Ulm!]

[Footnote 32: Marmont, vol. ii., p. 320; Lejeune, "Memoirs," vol. i., ch. iii.]

[Footnote 33: Thiers, bk. xxii. During Mack's interview with Napoleon (see "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 235), when the Emperor asked him why he did not cut his way through to Ansbach, he replied, "Prussia would have declared against us." To which the Emperor retorted: "Ah! the Prussians do not declare so quickly."]

[Footnote 34: "Alexandre I et Czartoryski," pp. 32-34.]

[Footnote 35: See these terms compared with the Anglo-Russian treaty of April 11th, 1805, in the Appendix of Dr. Hansing's "Hardenberg und die dritte Coalition" (Berlin, 1899).]

[Footnote 36: Häusser, vol. ii., p. 617 (4th. edit.); Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Krieg von 1806-1807," vol. i., _ad init_.]

[Footnote 37: For the much more venial stratagem which Kutusoff played on Murat at Hollabrunn, see Thiers, bk. xxiii.]

[Footnote 38: Lord Harrowby, then on a special mission to Berlin, reports (November 24th) that this appeal of the Czar had been "coolly received," and no Prussian troops would enter Bohemia until it was known how Prussia's envoy to Napoleon, Count Haugwitz, had been received.]

[Footnote 39: Thiers says December 1st, which is corrected by Napoleon's letter of November 30th to Talleyrand.]

[Footnote 40: Thiébault, vol. ii., ch. viii.; Ségur, ch. xviii.; York von Wartenburg, "Nap. als Feldherr," vol. i., p. 230.]

[Footnote 41: Davoust's reports of December 2nd and 5th in his "Corresp."]

[Footnote 42: Ségur, Thiébault, and Lejeune all state that Napoleon in the previous advance northwards had foretold that a great battle would soon be fought opposite Austerlitz, and explained how he would fight it.]

[Footnote 43: Thiébault wrongly attributes this succour to Lannes: for that Marshal, who had just insulted and challenged Soult, Thiébault had a manifest partiality. Savary, though hostile to Bernadotte, gives him bare justice on this move.]

[Footnote 44: Harrowby evidently thought that Prussia's conduct would depend on events. Just before the news of Austerlitz arrived, he wrote to Downing Street: "The eyes of this Government are turned almost exclusively on Moravia. It is there the fate of this negotiation must be decided." Yet he reports that 192,000 Prussians are under arms ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).]

[Footnote 45: Jackson, "Diaries," vol. i., p. 137.]

[Footnote 46: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," pp. 205-208.]

[Footnote 47: Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii.]

[Footnote 48: Hanover, along with a few districts of Bavarian Franconia, would bring to Prussia a gain of 989,000 inhabitants, while she would lose only 375,000. Neufchâtel had offered itself to Frederick I. of Prussia in 1688, and its proposed barter to France troubled Hardenberg ("Mems.," vol. ii., p. 421).]

[Footnote 49: Gower to Lord Harrowby from Olmütz, November 25th, in "F.O. Records," Russia, No. 59.]

[Footnote 50: "Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 216.]

[Footnote 51: Printed for the first time in full in "Lettres inédites de Tall.," pp. 156-174. On December 5th Talleyrand again begged Napoleon to strengthen Austria as "a needful bulwark against the barbarians, the Russians."]

[Footnote 52: I dissent, though with much diffidence, from M. Vandal ("Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., p. 9) in regard to Talleyrand's proposal.]

[Footnote 53: Napoleon to Talleyrand (December 14th, 1805): "Sûr de la Prusse, l'Autriche en passera par où je voudrai. Je ferai également prononcer la Prusse contre l'Angleterre."]

[Footnote 54: Report of M. Otto, August, 1799.]

[Footnote 55: Czartoryski ("Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xii.) states that England offered Holland to Prussia. I find no proof of this in our Records. The districts between Antwerp and Cleves are Belgian, not Dutch; and we never wavered in our support of the House of Orange.]

[Footnote 56: These proposals, dated October 27th, 1805, were modified somewhat on the news of Mack's disaster and the Treaty of Potsdam. Hardenberg assured Harrowby (November 24th) that, despite England's liberal pecuniary help, Frederick William felt great difficulty in assenting to the proposed territorial arrangements ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).]

[Footnote 57: Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., pp. 377, 382.]

[Footnote 58: Ompteda, p. 188. The army returned in February, 1806.]

[Footnote 59: "F.O.," Prussia, No. 70 (November 23rd).]

[Footnote 60: "Diaries of Right Hon. G. Rose," vol. ii., pp. 223-224.]

[Footnote 61: _Ib._, pp. 233-283; Rosebery, "Life of Pitt," p. 258.]

[Footnote 62: Lord Malmesbury's "Diary," vol. iv., p. 114.]

[Footnote 63: Letter of December 27th, 1805; Jackson, "Diaries," vol. ii., p. 387.]

[Footnote 64: Mollien, "Mems.," vol. i. _ad fin_., and vol. ii., p. 80, for the budget of 1806; also, Fiévée, "Mes Relations avec Bonaparte," vol. ii., pp. 180-203.]

[Footnote 65: The Court of Naples asserted that in the Convention with France its ambassador, the Comte de Gallo, exceeded his powers in promising neutrality. See Lucchesini's conversation with Gentz, quoted by Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 129.]

[Footnote 66: See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1900.]

[Footnote 67: Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Napoléon," p. 11.]

[Footnote 68: Letter of February 7th, 1806. On the same day he blames Junot, then commander of Parma, for too great lenience to some rebels near that city. The Italians were a false people, who only respected a strong Government. Let him, then, burn two large villages so that no trace remained, shoot the priest of one village, and send three or four hundred of the guilty to the galleys. "Trust my old experience of the Italians."]

[Footnote 69: For a list of the chief Napoleonic titles, see Appendix, _ad fin_.]

[Footnote 70: January 2nd, 1802; so too Fiévée, "Mes Relations avec Bonaparte," vol. ii., p. 210, who notes that, by founding an order of nobility, Napoleon ended his own isolation and attached to his interests a powerful landed caste.]

[Footnote 71: Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 390-394.]

[Footnote 72: Hardenberg to Harrowby on January 7th, "Prussia," No. 70.]

[Footnote 73: I have not found a copy of this project; but in "Prussia," No. 70 (forwarded by Jackson on January 27th, 1806), there is a detailed "Mémoire explicatif," whence I extract these details, as yet unpublished, I believe. Neither Hardenberg, Garden, Jackson, nor Paget mentions them.]

[Footnote 74: Records, "Prussia," No. 70, dated February 21st.]

[Footnote 75: Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. ii., pp. 463-469; "Nap. Corresp.," No. 9742, for Napoleon's thoughts as to peace, when he heard of Fox being our Foreign Minister.]

[Footnote 76: See "Nap. Corresp.," Nos. 9742, 9773, 9777, for his views as to the weakness of England and Prussia. This treaty of February 15th, 1806, confirmed the cession of Neufchâtel and Cleves to France, and of Ansbach to Bavaria; but did not cede any Franconian districts to Prussia's Baireuth lands. See Hardenberg, "Mémoires," vol. ii., p. 483, for the text of the treaty.]

[Footnote 77: The strange perversity of Haugwitz is nowhere more shown than in his self-congratulation at the omission of the adjectives _offensive et défensive_ from the new treaty of alliance between France and Prussia (Hardenberg, vol. ii., p. 481). Napoleon was now not pledged to help Prussia in the war which George III. declared against her on April 20th.]

[Footnote 78: It is noteworthy that in all the negotiations that followed, Napoleon never raised any question about our exacting maritime code, which proves how hollow were his diatribes against the tyrant of the seas at other times.]

[Footnote 79: Despatch of April 20th, 1806, in Papers presented to Parliament on December 22nd, 1806.]

[Footnote 80: Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiii.]

[Footnote 81: "I do not intend the Court of Rome to mix any more in politics" (Nap. to the Pope, February 13th, 1806).]

[Footnote 82: I translate literally these N.B.'s as pasted in at the end of Yarmouth's Memoir of July 8th ("France," No. 73). As Oubril's instructions have never, I believe, been published, the passage given above is somewhat important as proving how completely he exceeded his powers in bartering away Sicily. The text of the Oubril Treaty is given by De Clercq, vol. ii., p. 180. The secret articles required Russia to help France in inducing the Court of Madrid to cede the Balearic Isles to the Prince Royal of Naples; the dethroned King and Queen were not to reside there, and Russia was to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as King of the Two Sicilies.]

[Footnote 83: In conversing with our ambassador, Mr. Stuart, Baron Budberg excused Oubril's conduct on the ground of his nervousness under the threats of the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke, who scarcely let him speak, and darkly hinted at many other changes that must ensue if Russia did not make peace; Switzerland was to be annexed, Germany overrun, and Turkey partitioned. That Clarke was a master in diplomatic hectoring is well known; but, from private inquiries, Stuart discovered that the Czar, in his private conference with Oubril, seemed more inclined towards peace than Czartoryski: when therefore the latter resigned, Oubril might well give way before Clarke's bluster. (Stuart's Despatch of August 9th, 1806, F.O., Russia, No. 63; also see Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiv.; and Martens, "Traités," Suppl. vol. iv.)]

[Footnote 84: "Memoirs of Karl Heinrich, Knight of Lang."]

[Footnote 85: Garden, vol. ix., pp. 157, 189, 255.]

[Footnote 86: "Corresp.," Nos. 10522 and 10544. For a French account see the "Mems." of Baron Desvernois, p. 288.]

[Footnote 87: "F.O. Records," Naples, No. 73.]

[Footnote 88: This was on Napoleon's advice. He wrote to Talleyrand from Rambouillet on August 18th, to give as an excuse for the delay, "The Emperor is hunting and will not be back before the end of the week."]

[Footnote 89: So too Napoleon said at St. Helena to Las Cases: "Fox's death was one of the fatalities of my career."]

[Footnote 90: Despatches of September 26th and October 6th.]

[Footnote 91: Bailleu, "Frankreich und Preussen," Introd.]

[Footnote 92: Decree of July 26th.]

[Footnote 93: See "Corresp." No. 10604, note; also Talleyrand's letter of August 4th ("Lettres inédites," p. 245), showing the indemnities that might be offered to Prussia after the loss of Hanover: they included, of course, little States, Anhalt, Lippe, Waldeck, etc.]

[Footnote 94: Gentz, "Ausgew. Schriften," vol. v., p. 252. Conversation with Lucchesini.]

[Footnote 95: "Corresp.," Nos. 10575, 10587, 10633.]

[Footnote 96: "Mems.," vol. iii., pp. 115, _et seq._ The Prusso-Russian convention of July, by which these Powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of their States, was mainly the work of Hardenberg.]

[Footnote 97: Bailleu, pp. 540-552. See too Fournier's "Napoleon," vol. ii., p. 106.]

[Footnote 98: Bailleu, pp. 556-557. So too Napoleon's letter of September 5th to Berthier is the first hint of his thought of a Continental war.]

[Footnote 99: Queen Louisa said to Gentz (October 9th) that war had been decided on, not owing to selfish calculations, but the sentiment of honour (Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 133).]

[Footnote 100: A memorial was handed in to him on September 2nd. It was signed by the King's brothers, Henry and William, also by the leader of the warlike party, Prince Louis Ferdinand, by Generals Rüchel and Phull, and by the future dictator, Stein. The King rebuked all of them. See Pertz, "Stein," vol. i., p. 347.]

[Footnote 101: "F.O.," Russia, No. 64. Stuart's despatches of September 30th and October 21st.]

[Footnote 102: Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben."]

[Footnote 103: Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Krieg von 1806-7," p. 163.]

[Footnote 104: See Prince Hohenlohe's "Letters on Strategy" (p. 62, Eng. ed.) for the effect of this rapid marching; Foucart's "Campagne de Prusse," vol. i., pp. 323-343; also Lord Fitzmaurice's "Duke of Brunswick."]

[Footnote 105: Höpfner, vol. i.p. 383; and Lettow-Vorbeck, vol. i., p. 345.]

[Footnote 106: Foucart, _op. cit._, pp. 606-623.]

[Footnote 107: Marbot says Rüchel was killed: but he recovered from his wound, and did good service the next spring.

Vernet's picture of Napoleon inspecting his Guards at Jena before their charge seems to represent the well-known incident of a soldier calling out "_en avant_"; whereupon Napoleon sharply turned and bade the man wait till he had commanded in twenty battles before he gave him advice.]

[Footnote 108: Foucart, p. 671.]

[Footnote 109: Lang thus describes four French Marshals whom he saw at Ansbach: "Bernadotte, a very tall dark man, with fiery eyes under thick brows; Mortier, still taller, with a stupid sentinel look; Lefebvre, an old Alsatian camp-boy, with his wife, former washerwoman to the regiment; and Davoust, a little smooth-pated, unpretending man, who was never tired of waltzing."]

[Footnote 110: Davoust, "Opérations du 3ème Corps," pp. 31-32. French writers reduce their force to 24,000, and raise Brunswick's total to 60,000. Lehmann's "Scharnhorst," vol. i., p. 433, gives the details.]

[Footnote 111: Foucart, pp. 604-606, 670, and 694-697, who only blames him for slowness. But he set out from Naumburg before dawn, and, though delayed by difficult tracks, was near Apolda at 4 p.m., and took 1,000 prisoners.]

[Footnote 112: For this service, as for his exploits at Austerlitz, Napoleon gave few words of praise. Lannes' remonstrance is printed by General Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," p. 169. The Emperor secretly disliked Lannes for his very independent bearing.]

[Footnote 113: "Nap. Corresp.," November 21st, 1807; Baron Lumbroso's "Napoleone I e l'Inghilterra," p. 103; Garden, vol. x., p. 307.]

[Footnote 114: This decree, of 10 Brumaire, an V, is printed in full, and commented on by Lumbroso, _op. cit._, p. 49. See too Sorel, "L'Europe et la Rév. Fr.," vol. iii., p. 389; and my article, "Napoleon and English Commerce," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of October, 1893.]

[Footnote 115: This phrase occurs, I believe, first in the conversation of Napoleon on May 1st, 1803: "We will form a more complete coast-system, and England shall end by shedding tears of blood" (Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., chap. xiv.).]

[Footnote 116: _E.g._, Fauchille, "Du Blocus maritime," pp. 93 _et seq._]

[Footnote 117: See especially the pamphlet "War in Disguise, or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags" (1805), by J. Stephen. It has been said that this pamphlet was a cause of the Orders in Council. The whole question is discussed by Manning, "Commentaries on the Law of Nations" (1875); Lawrence, "International Law"; Mahan, "Infl. of Sea Power," vol. ii., pp. 274-277; Mollien, vol. iii., p. 289 (first edit.); and Chaptal, p. 275.]

[Footnote 118: Hausser, vol. iii., p. 61 (4th edit.). The Saxon federal contingent was fixed at 20,000 men.]

[Footnote 119: Papers presented to Parliament, December 22nd, 1806.]

[Footnote 120: After the interview of November 28th, 1801, Cornwallis reports that Napoleon "expressed a wish that we could agree to remove disaffected persons from either country ... and declared his willingness to send away United Irishmen" ("F.O. Records," No. 615).]

[Footnote 121: Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xv.]

[Footnote 122: In our "F.O. Records," Prussia, No. 74, is a report of Napoleon's reply to a deputation at Warsaw (January, 1807): "I warn you that neither I nor any French prince cares for your Polish throne: I have crowns to give and don't know what to do with them. You must first of all think of giving bread to my soldiers--'Bread, bread, bread.' ... I cannot support my troops in this country, where there is no one besides nobles and miserable peasants. Where are your great families? They are all sold to Russia. It is Czartoryski who wrote to Kosciusko not to come back to Poland." And when a Galician deputy asked him of the fate of his province, he turned on him: "Do you think that I will draw on myself new foes for one province." Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the Poles was not wholly chilled. Their contingents did good service for him. Somewhat later, female devotion brought a beautiful young Polish lady to act as his mistress, primarily with the hope of helping on the liberation of her land, and then as a willing captive to the charm which he exerted on all who approached him. Their son was Count Walewska]

[Footnote 123: Marbot, ch. xxviii.]

[Footnote 124: Lettow-Vorbeck estimates the French loss at more than 24,000; that of the Russians as still heavier, but largely owing to the bad commissariat and wholesale straggling. On this see Sir R. Wilson's "Campaign in Poland," ch. i.]

[Footnote 125: Napoleon on February 13th charged Bertrand to offer _verbally, but not in writing_, to the King of Prussia a separate peace, without respect to the Czar. Frederick William was to be restored to his States east of the Elbe. He rejected the offer, which would have broken his engagements to the Czar. Napoleon repeated the offer on February 20th, which shows that, at this crisis, he did wish for peace with Prussia. See "Nap. Corresp.," No. 11810; and Hausser, vol. iii., p. 74.]

[Footnote 126: "I have been repeatedly pressed by the Prussian and Russian Governments," wrote Lord Hutchinson, our envoy at Memel, March 9th, 1807, "on the subject of a diversion to be made by British troops against Mortier.... Stettin is a large place with a small garrison and in a bad state of defence" ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 74). in 1805 Pitt promised to send a British force to Stralsund (see p. 17).]

[Footnote 127: Lord Cathcart's secret report to the War Office, dated April 22nd, 1807, dealt with the appeal made by Lord Hutchinson, and with a _Projet_ of Dumouriez, both of whom strongly urged the expedition to Stralsund. On May 30th Castlereagh received a report from a Hanoverian officer, Kuckuck, stating that Hanover and Hesse were ripe for revolt, and that Hameln might easily be seized if the North Germans were encouraged by an English force ("Castlereagh Letters," vol. vi., pp. 169 and 211).]

[Footnote 128: "F.O.," Russia, No. 69.]

[Footnote 129: "Correspond.," No. 12563; also "La Mission du Gen. Gardane en Perse," par le comte de Gardane. Napoleon in his proclamation of December 2nd, 1806, told the troops that their victories had won for France her Indian possessions and the Cape of Good Hope.]

[Footnote 130: Wilson, "Campaign in Poland"; "Opérations du 3'me Corps [Davoust's], 1806-1807," p. 199.]

[Footnote 131: "Corresp.," Nos. 12749 and 12751. Lejeune, in his "Memoirs," also shows that Napoleon's chief aim was to seize Königsberg.]

[Footnote 132: "Memoirs of Oudinot," ch. i]

[Footnote 133: The report is dated Memel, June 21st, 1807, in "F.O.," Prussia, No. 74. Hutchinson thinks the Russians had not more than 45,000 men engaged at Friedland, and that their losses did not exceed 15,000: but there were "multitudes of stragglers." Lettow-Vorbeck gives about the same estimates. Those given in the French bulletin are grossly exaggerated.]

[Footnote 134: On June 17th, 1807, Queen Louisa wrote to her father:" ... we fall with honour. The King has proved that he prefers honour to shameful submission." On June 23rd Bennigsen professed a wish to fight, while secretly advising surrender (Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 469).]

[Footnote 135: "F.O.," Russia, No. 69. Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 185) that Bennigsen was plotting to murder the Czar, and he (S.) warned him of it.]

[Footnote 136: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 468; also Garden, vol. x., pp. 205-210; and "Ann. Reg." (1807), pp. 710-724, for the British replies to Austria.]

[Footnote 137: Canning to Paget ("Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 324). So too Canning's despatch of July 21st to Gower (Russia, No. 69).]

[Footnote 138: Stadion saw through it. See Beer, p. 243.]

[Footnote 139: "Nap. Corresp.," No. 11918.]

[Footnote 140: _Ib._, No. 12028. This very important letter seems to me to refute M. Vandal's theory ("Nap. et Alexandre," ch. i.), that Napoleon was throughout seeking for an alliance with _Austria_, or Prussia, or Russia.]

[Footnote 141: Canning to Paget, May 16th, 1807 ("Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 290).]

[Footnote 142: Garden, vol. x., pp. 214-218; and Gower's despatch of June 17th. 1807 (Russia, No. 69).]

[Footnote 143: All references to the story rest ultimately on Bignon, "Hist. de France" (vol. vi., p. 316), who gives no voucher for it. For the reasons given above I must regard the story as suspect. Among a witty, phrase-loving people like the French, a good _mot_ is almost certain to gain credence and so pass into history.]

[Footnote 144: Tatischeff, "Alexandre I et Napoléon" (pp. 144-148).]

[Footnote 145: Reports of Savary and Lesseps, quoted by Vandal, _op. cit._, p. 61; "Corresp.," No. 12825.]

[Footnote 146: Vandal, p. 73, says that the news reached Napoleon at a review when Alexander was by his side. If so, the occasion was carefully selected with a view to effect; for the news reached him on, or before, June 24th (see "Corresp.," No. 12819). Gower states that the news reached Tilsit as early as the 15th; and Hardenberg secretly proposed a policy of partition of Turkey on June 23rd ("Mems.," vol. iii., p. 463). Hardenberg resigned office on July 4th, as Napoleon refused to treat through him.]

[Footnote 147: "Corresp.," No. 12862, letter of July 6th.]

[Footnote 148: Tatischeff (pp. 146-148 and 163-168) proves from the Russian archives that these schemes were Alexander's, and were in the main opposed by Napoleon. This disproves Vandal's assertion (p. 101) that Napoleon pressed Alexander to take the Memel and Polish districts.]

[Footnote 149: "Erinnerungen der Gräfin von Voss."]

[Footnote 150: Probably this refers not to the restitution of Silesia, which he politely offered to her (though he had previously granted it on the Czar's request), but to Madgeburg and its environs west of the Elbe. On July 7th he said to Goltz, the Prussian negotiator, "I am sorry if the Queen took as positive assurances the _phrases de_ _politesse_ that one speaks to ladies" (Hardenberg's "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 512).]

[Footnote 151: See the new facts published by Bailleu in the "Hohenzollern Jahrbuch" (1899). The "rose" story is not in any German source.]

[Footnote 152: In his "Memoirs" (vol. i., pt. iii.) Talleyrand says that he repeated this story several times at the Tuileries, until Napoleon rebuked him for it.]

[Footnote 153: Before Tilsit Prussia had 9,744,000 subjects; afterwards only 4,938,000. See her frontiers in map on p. 215.]

[Footnote 154: The exact terms of the secret articles and of the secret treaty have only been known since 1890, when, owing to the labours of MM. Fournier, Tatischeff, and Vandal, they saw the light.]

[Footnote 155: Gower's despatch of July 12th. "F.O.," Russia, No. 69.]

[Footnote 156: De Clercq, "Traités," vol. ii., pp. 223-225; Garden, vol. x., p. 233 and 277-290. Our envoy, Jackson, reported from Memel on July 28th: "Nothing can exceed the insolence and extortions of the French. No sooner is one demand complied with than a fresh one is brought forward."]

[Footnote 157: That he seriously thought in November, 1807, of leaving to Prussia less than half of her already cramped territories, is clear from his instructions to Caulaincourt, his ambassador to the Czar: "Is it not to Prussia's interest for her to place herself, at once, and with entire resignation, among the inferior Powers?" A new treaty was to be framed, under the guise of _interpreting_ that of Tilsit, Russia keeping the Danubian Provinces, and Napoleon more than half of Prussia (Vandal, vol. i., p. 509).]

[Footnote 158: Lucchesini to Gentz in October, 1806, in Gentz's "Ausgewählte Schriften," vol. v., p. 257.]

[Footnote 159: See Canning's reply to Stahremberg's Note, on April 25th, 1807, in the "Ann. Reg.," p. 724.]

[Footnote 160: For Mackenzie's report and other details gleaned from our archives, see my article "A British Agent at Tilsit," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of October, 1901.]

[Footnote 161: James, "Naval History," vol. iv., p. 408.]

[Footnote 162: "F.O.," Denmark, No. 53.]

[Footnote 163: Garden, vol. x., p. 408.]

[Footnote 164: "Corresp.," No. 12962; see too No. 12936, ordering the 15,000 Spanish troops now serving him near Hamburg to form the nucleus of Bernadotte's army of observation, which, "in case of events," was to be strengthened by as many Dutch.]

[Footnote 165: "F.O.," Denmark, No. 53. I published this Memorandum of Canning and other unpublished papers in an article, "Canning and Denmark," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of January, 1896. The terms of the capitulation were, it seems, mainly decided on by Sir Arthur Wellesley, who wrote to Canning (September 8th): "I might have carried our terms higher ... had not our troops been needed at home" ("Well. Despatches," vol. iii., p. 7).]

[Footnote 166: Castlereagh's "Corresp.," vol. vi. So too Gower reported from St. Petersburg on October 1st that public opinion was "decidedly averse to war with England, ... and it appears to me that the English name was scarcely ever more popular in Russia than at the present time."]

[Footnote 167: Letters of July 19th and 29th.]

[Footnote 168: The phrase is that of Viscount Strangford, our ambassador at Lisbon ("F.O.," Portugal, No. 55). So Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 136.]

[Footnote 169: Report of the Portuguese ambassador, Lourenço de Lima, dated August 7th, 1807, inclosed by Viscount Strangford ("F.O.," Portugal, No. 55).]

[Footnote 170: This statement as to the date of the summons to Portugal is false: it was July 19th when he ordered it to be sent, that is, long before the Copenhagen news reached him.]

[Footnote 171: "Corresp.," No. 12839.]

[Footnote 172: See Lady Blennerhasset's "Talleyrand," vol. ii., ch. xvi., for a discussion of Talleyrand's share in the new policy. This question, together with many others, cannot be solved, owing to Talleyrand's destruction of most of his papers. In June, 1806, he advised a partition of Portugal; and in the autumn he is said to have favoured the overthrow of the Spanish Bourbons. But there must surely be some connection between Napoleon's letter to him of July 19th, 1807, on Portuguese affairs and the resignation which he persistently offered on their return to Paris. On August 10th he wrote to the Emperor that that letter would be the last act of his Ministry ("Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 476). He was succeeded by Champagny.]

[Footnote 173: "Corresp.," Nos. 13235, 37, 43.]

[Footnote 174: "Corresp.," Nos. 13314 and 13327. So too, to General Clarke, his new Minister of War, he wrote: "Junot may say anything he pleases, so long as he gets hold of the fleet" ("New Letters of Nap.," October 28th, 1807).]

[Footnote 175: Strangford's despatches quite refute Thiers' confident statement that the Portuguese answers to Napoleon were planned in concert with us. I cannot find in our archives a copy of the Anglo-Portuguese Convention signed by Canning on October 22nd, 1807; but there are many references to it in his despatches. It empowered us to occupy Madeira; and our fleet did so at the close of the year. In April next we exchanged it for the Azores and Goa.]

[Footnote 176: "Corresp.," July 22nd, 1807.]

[Footnote 177: Between September 1st, 1807, and November 23rd, 1807, he wrote eighteen letters on the subject of Corfu, which he designed to be his base of operations as soon as the Eastern Question could be advantageously reopened. On February 8th, 1808, he wrote to Joseph that Corfu was more important than Sicily, and that "_in the present state of Europe, the loss of Corfu would be the greatest of disasters_." This points to his proposed partition of Turkey.]

[Footnote 178: Letter of October 13th, 1807.]

[Footnote 179: "Ann. Register" for 1807, pp. 227, 747.]

[Footnote 180: _Ibid._, pp. 749-750. Another Order in Council (November 25th) allowed neutral ships a few more facilities for colonial trade, and Prussian merchantmen were set free (_ibid._, pp. 755-759). In April, 1809, we further favoured the carrying of British goods on neutral ships, especially to or from the United States.]

[Footnote 181: Bourrienne, "Memoirs." The case against the Orders in Council is fairly stated by Lumbroso, and by Alison, ch. 50.]

[Footnote 182: Gower reported (on September 22nd) that the Spanish ambassador at St. Petersburg had been pleading for help there, so as to avenge this insult.]

[Footnote 183: Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 138.]

[Footnote 184: "Nap. Corresp." of October 17th and 31st, November 13th, December 23rd, 1807, and February 20th, 1808; also Napier, "Peninsular War," bk. i., ch. ii.]

[Footnote 185: Letter of January 10th, 1808.]

[Footnote 186: Letter of Charles IV. to Napoleon of October 29th, 1807, published in "Murat, Lieutenant de l'Empereur en Espagne," Appendix viii.]

[Footnote 187: "New Letters of Napoleon."]

[Footnote 188: "Corresp.," letter of February 25th.]

[Footnote 189: Murat in 1814 told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 131) he had had no instructions from Napoleon.]

[Footnote 190: Thiers, notes to bk. xxix.]

[Footnote 191: "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution d'Espagne, par Nellerto"; also "The Journey of Ferdinand VII. to Bayonne," by Escoiquiz.]

[Footnote 192: "Corresp.," No. 13696. A careful comparison of this laboured, halting effusion, with the curt military syle*style of the genuine letters--and especially with Nos. 93, 94, and 100 of the "New Letters"--must demonstrate its non-authenticity. Thiers' argument to the contrary effect is rambling and weak. Count Murat in his recent monograph on his father pronounces the letter a fabrication of St. Helena or later. It was first published in the "Mémorial de St. Hélène," an untrustworthy compilation made by Las Cases after Napoleon's death from notes taken at St. Helena.]

[Footnote 193: Napoleon had at first intended the Spanish crown for Louis, to whom he wrote on March 27th: "The climate of Holland does not suit you. Besides, Holland can never rise from her ruins." Louis declined, on the ground that his call to Holland had been from heaven, and not from Napoleon!]

[Footnote 194: Memoirs of Thiébault and De Broglie; so, too, De Rocca, "La Guerre en Espagne."]

[Footnote 195: See the letter of an Englishman from Buenos Ayres of September 27th, 1809, in "Cobbett's Register" for 1810 (p. 256), stating that the new popular Government there was driven by want of funds, "not from their good wishes to England," to open their ports to all foreign commerce on moderate duties.]

[Footnote 196: Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," ch. vii. It is not published in the "Correspondence" or in the "New Letters."]

[Footnote 197: Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., ch. iv., and App. II.]

[Footnote 198: In the conversations which Metternich had with Napoleon and Talleyrand on and after January 22nd, 1808, he was convinced that the French Emperor intended to partition Turkey as soon as it suited him to do so, which would be after he had subjected Spain. Napoleon said to him: "When the Russians are at Constantinople you will need France to help you against them."--"Metternich Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 188.]

[Footnote 199: So Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 171).]

[Footnote 200: Vandal, vol. i., p. 384.]

[Footnote 201: Metternich, "Mems.," vol. ii. p. 298 (Eng. edit.).]

[Footnote 202: I think that Beer (pp. 330-340) errs somewhat in ranking Talleyrand's work at Erfurt at that statesman's own very high valuation, which he enhanced in later years: see Greville's "Mems.," Second Part, vol. ii., p. 193.]

[Footnote 203: Vandal, vol. i., p. 307.]

[Footnote 204: Sklower, "L'Entrevue de Napoléon avec Goethe"; Mrs. Austin's "Germany from 1760 to 1814"; Oncken, bk. vii., ch. i. For Napoleon's dispute with Wieland about Tacitus see Talleyrand, "Mems.," vol. i., pt. 5. When the Emperors' carriages were ready for departure, Talleyrand whispered to Alexander: "Ah! si Votre Majesté pouvait se tromper de voiture."]

[Footnote 205: "F.O.," Russia, No. 74, despatch of December 9th, 1808. On January 14th, 1809, Canning signed a treaty of alliance with the Spanish people, both sides agreeing never to make peace with Napoleon except by common consent. It was signed when the Spanish cause seemed desperate; but it was religiously observed.]

[Footnote 206: Madelin's "Fouché," vol. ii., p. 80; Pasquier, vol. i., pp. 353-360.]

[Footnote 207: Seeley, "Life and Times of Stein," vol. ii., p. 316; Hausser, vol. iii., p. 219 (4th edition).]

[Footnote 208: Our F.O. Records show that we wanted to help Austria; but a long delay was caused by George III.'s insisting that she should make peace with us first. Canning meanwhile sent £250,000 in silver bars to Trieste. But in his note of April 20th he assured the Court of Vienna that our treasury had been "nearly exhausted" by the drain of the Peninsular War. (Austria, No. 90.)]

[Footnote 209: For the campaign see the memoirs of Macdonald, Marbot, Lejeune, Pelet and Marmont. The last (vol. iii., p. 216) says that, had the Austrians pressed home their final attacks at Aspern, a disaster was inevitable; or had Charles later on cut the French communications near Vienna, the same result must have followed. But the investigations of military historians leave no doubt that the Austrian troops were too exhausted by their heroic exertions, and their supplies of ammunition too much depleted, to warrant any risky moves for several days; and by that time reinforcements had reached Napoleon. See too Angelis' "Der Erz-Herzog Karl."]

[Footnote 210: Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," pp. 205, 323 _et seq._ Desvernois ("Mems.," ch. xii.) notes that after Austerlitz none of Napoleon's wars had the approval of France.]

[Footnote 211: For the Walcheren expedition see Alison, vol. viii.; James, vol. iv.; as also for Gambier's failure at Rochefort. The letters of Sir Byam Martin, then cruising off Danzig, show how our officers wished to give timely aid to Schill ("Navy Records," vol. xii.).]

[Footnote 212: Captain Boothby's "A Prisoner of France," ch. iii.]

[Footnote 213: For Charles's desire to sue for peace after the first battles on the Upper Danube, see Häusser, vol. iii., p. 341; also, after Wagram, _ib._, pp. 412-413.]

[Footnote 214: Napier, bk. viii., chs. ii. and iii. In the App. of vol. iii. of "Wellington's Despatches" is Napoleon's criticism on the movements of Joseph and the French marshals. He blames them for their want of _ensemble_, and for the precipitate attack which Victor advised at Talavera. He concluded: "As long as you attack good troops like the English in good positions, without reconnoitring them, you will lead men to death _en pure perte_."]

[Footnote 215: An Austrian envoy had been urging promptitude at Downing Street. On June 1st he wrote to Canning: "The promptitude of the enemy has always been the key to his success. A long experience has proved this to the world, which seems hitherto not to have profited by this knowledge." On July 29th Canning acknowledged the receipt of the Austrian ratification of peace with us, "accompanied by the afflicting intelligence of the armistice concluded on the 12th instant between the Austrian and French armies."

Napoleon at St. Helena said to Montholon that, had 6,000 British troops pushed rapidly up the banks of the Scheldt on the day that the expedition reached Flushing, they could easily have taken Antwerp, which was then very weakly held. See, too, other opinions quoted by Alison, ch. lx.]

[Footnote 216: Beer, p. 441.]

[Footnote 217: Vandal, vol. ii., p. 161; Metternich, vol. i., p. 114.]

[Footnote 218: Letter of February 10th, 1810, quoted by Lanfrey. See, too, the "Mems." of Prince Eugène, vol. vi., p. 277.]

[Footnote 219: "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 365 (Eng. ed.).]

[Footnote 220: Bausset, "Mems.," ch. xix.]

[Footnote 221: Mme. de Rémusat, "Mems.," ch. xxvii.]

[Footnote 222: Tatischeff, "Alexandre et Napoléon," p. 519. Welschinger, "Le Divorce de Napoléon," ch. ii.; he also examines the alleged irregularities of the religious marriage with Josephine; Fesch and most impartial authorities brushed them aside as a flimsy excuse.]

[Footnote 223: Metternich's despatch of December 25th, 1809, in his "Mems.," vol. ii., § 150. The first hints were dropped by him to Laborde on November 29th (Vandal, vol. ii., pp. 204, 543): they reached Napoleon's ears about December 15th. For the influence of these marriage negotiations in preparing for Napoleon's rupture with the Czar, see chap, xxxii. of this work.]

[Footnote 224: "Conversations with the Duke of Wellington," p. 9. The disobedience of Ney and Soult did much to ruin Masséna's campaign, and he lost the battle of Fuentès d'Onoro mainly through that of Bessières. Still, as he failed to satisfy Napoleon's maxim, "Succeed: I judge men only by results," he was disgraced.]

[Footnote 225: Decree of February 5th, 1810. See Welschinger, "La Censure sous le premier Empire," p. 31. For the seizure of Madame de Staël's "Allemagne" and her exile, see her preface to "Dix Années d'Exil."]

[Footnote 226: Mollien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 183.]

[Footnote 227: Fouché retired to Italy, and finally settled at Aix. His place at the Ministry of Police was taken by Savary, Duc de Rovigo. See Madelin's "Fouché," chap. xx.]

[Footnote 228: Porter, "Progress of the Nation," p. 388.]

[Footnote 229: Letters of August 6th, 7th, 29th. The United States had just repealed their Non-Intercourse Act of 1807. For their relations with Napoleon and England, see Channing's "The United States of America," chs. vi. and vii.; also the Anglo-American correspondence in Cobbett's "Register for 1809 and 1810."]

[Footnote 230: Mollien, "Mems." vol. i., p. 316.]

[Footnote 231: Tooke, "Hist. of Prices," vol. i., p. 311; Mollien, vol. iii., pp. 135, 289; Pasquier, vol. i., p. 295; Chaptal, p. 275.]

[Footnote 232: Letter of August 6th, 1810, to Eugène.]

[Footnote 233: "Progress of the Nation," p. 148.]

[Footnote 234: So Mollien, vol. iii., p. 135: "One knows that his powerful imagination was fertile in illusions: as soon as they had seduced him, he sought with a kind of good faith to enhance their prestige, and he succeeded easily in persuading many others of what he had convinced himself. He braved business difficulties as he braved dangers in war."] [Footnote 235: Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. xv. For some favourable symptoms in French industry, see Lumbroso, pp. 165-226, and Chaptal, p. 287. They have been credited to the Continental System; but surely they resulted from the internal free trade and intelligent administration which France had enjoyed since the Revolution.]

[Footnote 236: "Nap. Corresp.," May 8th, 1811.]

[Footnote 237: Goethe published the first part of "Faust," _in full_, early in 1808.]

[Footnote 238: Baur, "Stein und Perthes," p. 85.]

[Footnote 239: Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxv.]

[Footnote 240: Letters of October 10th and 13th, 1810, and January 1st, 1811.]

[Footnote 241: Letter of September 17th, 1810.]

[Footnote 242: Letter of March 8th, 1811. For a fuller treatment of the commercial struggle between Great Britain and Napoleon see my articles, "Napoleon and British Commerce" and "Britain's Food Supply during the French War," in a volume entitled "Napoleonic Studies" (George Bell and Sons, 1904).]

[Footnote 243: Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xvii. At this time he was taken back to the Czar's favour, and was bidden to hope for the re-establishment of Poland by the Czar as soon as Napoleon made a blunder.]

[Footnote 244: Tatischeff, p. 526; Vandal, vol. ii., ch. vii.]

[Footnote 245: "Corresp.," No. 16178; Vandal, vol. ii., ch. vii. The _exposé_ of December 1st, 1809, had affirmed that Napoleon did not intend to re-establish Poland. But this did not satisfy Alexander.]

[Footnote 246: Letters of October 23rd and December 2nd, 1810.]

[Footnote 247: Vandal, vol. ii., p. 529.]

[Footnote 248: Tatischeff, p. 555.]

[Footnote 249: Vandal, vol. ii., p. 535, admits that we had no hand in it. But the Czar naturally became more favourable to us, and at the close of 1811 secretly gave entry to our goods.]

[Footnote 250: Quoted by Garden, vol. xiii., p. 171.]

[Footnote 251: Bernhardi's "Denkwürdigkeiten des Grafen von Toll," vol. i. p. 223.]

[Footnote 252: Czartoryski, vol. ii., ch. xvii. At Dresden, in May, 1812, Napoleon admitted to De Pradt, his envoy at Warsaw that Russia's lapse from the Continental System was the chief cause of war; "Without Russia, the Continental System is absurdity."]

[Footnote 253: For the overtures of Russia and Sweden to us and their exorbitant requests for loans, see Mr. Hereford George's account in his careful and systematic study, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia," ch.