CHAPTER IX.

_STEAM NAVIGATION. THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’ STEAM-SHIP._

A.D. 1838--1847. ÆTATIS 33--42.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE BUILDING OF THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’--REPORT ON THE ENGINES (JUNE 13, 1839)--EXPERIMENTS ON THE SCREW PROPELLER--ITS ADOPTION IN THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’--COMPLETION OF THE SHIP--HER VOYAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC--STRANDING OF THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’ IN DUNDRUM BAY--LETTER TO CAPTAIN CLAXTON ON THE CONDITION OF THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN,’ AND ON THE MEANS TO BE ADOPTED FOR SAVING HER (DECEMBER 10, 1846)--REPORT TO THE DIRECTORS ON THE SAME SUBJECT (DECEMBER 14, 1846)--APPOINTMENT OF CAPTAIN CLAXTON TO SUPERINTEND THE EXECUTION OF MR. BRUNEL’S PLANS--LETTER TO CAPTAIN CLAXTON ON THE DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME (DECEMBER 29, 1846)--REPORT ENCLOSING CAPTAIN CLAXTON’S ACCOUNT OF THE ERECTION OF THE BREAKWATER (FEBRUARY 27, 1847)--REPORT ON THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FLOATING OFF THE SHIP (MAY 4, 1847)--SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE FLOATING OPERATIONS--SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE ‘GREAT BRITAIN’--_NOTE_: DIMENSIONS OF THE SHIP AND ENGINES.

The Directors of the Great Western Steam-Ship Company, encouraged by the success of the ‘Great Western,’ determined shortly after her first return to England to lay down a second ship of not less than 2,000 tons burden. As they did not at that time contemplate the use of iron, a portion of the timber was purchased, and drawings were put in hand for a wooden ship. The proposed vessel was intended to be in all respects a companion ship to the ‘Great Western;’ only she was to be of larger dimensions, as it was found that additional cargo space would be remunerative.

In October 1838, Mr. Guppy (one of the Directors) communicated to the Board the results of some calculations Mr. Brunel had made relative to the cost and efficiency of iron vessels as compared with wooden ones. Mr. Brunel then suggested that Captain Claxton and Mr. Patterson, accompanied by one of his assistants, should make a voyage to Antwerp and back in the ‘Rainbow,’ an iron steam-boat of 407 tons burden, and report on the subject. On receiving their report, which was revised by Mr. Brunel, and which was strongly in favour of the adoption of iron, the Directors resolved to build their ship of that material, and of not less than 2,000 tons measurement, the same size as that which they had intended for their wooden ship. They also determined to erect the shops, and provide the tools for building her themselves.

As in the case of the ‘Great Western,’ the details of construction were settled by the Building Committee--Captain Claxton, Mr. Guppy, and Mr. Brunel--who were assisted by Mr. Patterson.

The preparation of the design occupied some time. In each succeeding drawing an increased size was proposed; at length the fifth design, showing a ship of 3,443 tons burden, was finally approved of. On July 19, 1839, the flat keel plates were laid, and the construction of the hull was commenced.

It will be necessary to enter with some detail into the history of the construction of the engines of the ‘Great Britain,’ as it has often been stated that it was on Mr. Brunel’s recommendation that the Company built their own engines. It appears, however, that Mr. Brunel repeatedly urged upon the Directors the utmost caution and economy, and that they ultimately acted ‘against his suggestion.’

When the Directors determined, in May 1838, to build a second ship, they did not entertain any idea of undertaking so great a responsibility as the manufacture of the engines; nor had they any intention of doing so, even when, towards the end of the same year, they resolved to build the ship themselves, and to construct her of iron.

The dimensions of the proposed paddle engines (for at this date the use of the screw propeller was not contemplated) were sent, in November 1838, to Messrs. Maudslay and Field, Messrs. Hall, and Messrs. Seaward.[125]

Messrs. Maudslay declined to tender, and the negotiations seem to have fallen through at the time; but they were renewed in April 1839, when estimates for engines (with cylinders of 100 inches diameter and seven feet stroke) were again invited from several makers.

The contest lay eventually between Messrs. Maudslay and Mr. Humphrys (whose patent for trunk engines was worked by Messrs. Hall). At Mr. Brunel’s desire they prepared designs for engines with cylinders of 120 inches diameter. He twice induced the Directors to postpone coming to a decision on the subject, in order that Messrs. Maudslay might mature their new patent for double-cylinder engines.

When their tender was placed before the Board, the Directors were of opinion that it largely exceeded the estimate of Mr. Humphrys. Mr. Humphrys’ estimate, however, had been more than once sent back to him for revision, at the suggestion of Mr. Brunel, who expressed doubts as to the possibility of Mr. Humphrys being able to construct his engines within the sum named by him.

Messrs. Hall stated that if they tendered for the supply of engines on Mr. Humphrys’ plan, large tools would have to be purchased by them, and the cost charged on the one pair of engines; they therefore strongly recommended the Company to become their own engine makers.

Influenced by these considerations, the Directors determined to adopt the plan of Mr. Humphrys, and to construct their own engines; and they appointed him the superintending engineer of their works.

It appears from a report by the secretary, Captain Claxton, dated March 23, 1840, that ‘previous to coming to this decision, Mr. Brunel succinctly laid before the Directors his views of the matter, and his opinion of the great responsibility they would incur if they made their own engines; and doubtless the Directors would have yielded to his suggestions, but for the report of Mr. Humphrys, showing the utter hopelessness of getting the engines made piecemeal in Bristol.’

The following is the report of Mr. Brunel on the subject:--

June 12, 1839.

At the request of Mr. Maze and Mr. Scott, whom I had the pleasure of meeting on Saturday last, I send you the following observations on the two plans and the estimates of Messrs. Maudslay, and of our Mr. Humphrys.

I have a copy of Messrs. Maudslay’s letter of the 29th ult. containing their tender, and a subsequent letter of the 11th inst. in reply to some enquiries of mine respecting their tender and Mr. Humphrys’ estimates, according to which the total cost of a pair of engines of 110 inches diameter and 8 feet stroke, upon his plan, and I presume modified as last recommended by Mr. Guppy and myself, including boilers and fixing on board, would be 29,296_l._, or, as stated by Captain Claxton in a letter to me of the 1st inst., 30,700_l._

First, as to the comparative merits of the plans, I consider them both excellently adapted to our particular case, and that the choice will depend upon other circumstances than the construction of the engines, and these circumstances, I consider, would be, the relative cost and the advantages of forming an establishment which will eventually become necessary for the repair and maintenance of our engines, contrasted with all the advantages to be derived from the responsibility and experience in all the details of a first-rate manufacturer, and to which I attach very great value, particularly in the early proceedings of a Company like ours. As regards the cost, I understand Messrs. Maudslay’s tender to be for an engine of four 75-inch cylinders, which is equal to a pair of ordinary engines of about 106 inches.

Engine, boiler, and paddle-wheels, fixed on board, supposing the £ vessel in London, and with reduced size of boiler, 41,400

Deduct allowance for coal-boxes and combings for hatchways as proposed by Messrs. Maudslay, 500

40,900

Additional expense incurred by Messrs. Maudslay in consequence of the engines being fixed on board at Bristol instead of London, I estimate at, 250

Total amount to be paid Messrs. Maudslay, 41,150

In addition to this will be the freight and insurance, which we are to pay, and also the unloading at Bristol and placing in the vessel, which I take at Captain Claxton’s estimate, 2,000

Making a total of 43,150

It is to be observed that this includes Mr. Field’s apparatus for changing water, Kingston’s cocks, casing the cylinders, and all those extras which were applied to the ‘Great Western,’ and also the paddle-beams and paddle-wheels. Without these latter the nett cost of the engine, fixed in place, and including all other extras, would appear to be about 40,000_l._ or 40,500_l._ If the cylinders be increased to 77¾, which would be equivalent to the pair of 110 inch, and supposing the cost of the engines to increase in the same ratio as the power resulting from this increase, but which ought not to be the case, the total cost, according to Messrs. Maudslay’s estimate, will be 46,500_l._, and deducting the paddle-beams or framework for carrying the paddles, which do not, I think, form part of Mr. Humphrys’ estimate, probably about 45,500_l._ as compared with Mr. Humphrys’ estimate of 30,700_l._ With respect to this latter estimate, I cannot help expressing the fears I entertain that Mr. Humphrys is over-sanguine, and that the cost would greatly exceed the sum named. The items seem to me to be moderate prices only for each article named, and I see no allowance for those alterations, damages, and waste of parts, and a variety of other contingencies, which in a piece of machinery of this magnitude and novelty is certain to amount to a very large sum.

In his estimate of the fittings and smaller parts, I think also he has greatly underrated them.

The outlay for tools and tackle would, I think, also be greater than he seems to anticipate, and on the whole I cannot but come to the conclusion in my own mind, and I should not act rightly if I did not communicate that opinion to you, that the first outlay will be fully as large and probably larger by adopting the plan of making our own engines than by employing a manufacturer. It is true we shall have some valuable and costly tools and shops included in this outlay, and a fine establishment formed, which may be rendered fully competent in point of means to continue the manufacture of engines for others, and to keep up the repairs of any number of engines which the Company are likely to have at work. My only fear would be that of the risk of the undertaking being too great for a newly-formed establishment. The making of the vessel itself is no mean effort, and to superadd the construction of the largest pair of engines and boilers yet made, and upon a new plan, is calculating very much upon every effort being successful, and particularly upon the continued assistance of those who have hitherto attended to the subject; as it must be well known to the Directors that if Mr. Guppy, for instance, should be prevented from giving his time as he has hitherto done, or if Mr. Humphrys should, from illness or other causes, leave us, the manufactory would be brought to a stand, and the loss would be serious. I have no wish to deter the Company from becoming their own manufacturers--I think it a course which must ultimately be adopted if the Company thrive--but I should have much preferred that it had been adopted gradually, that we had commenced with a vessel, and then proceeded with boilers and repairs; and, as our establishment became formed and matured, and when we might no longer depend entirely upon the engineering talents and assistance of one Director, who may be unable to attend to it, or upon the health of one superintendent who, as yet, is alone in possession of all our plans and ideas, and at present is alone capable of carrying them out, we might then have ventured upon making the engines perhaps for the third vessel. Circumstances may, however, render it necessary that we should proceed more expeditiously, and I am only anxious that the Directors should be aware of the difficulties that we may have to encounter, and that they should not form expectations as regards economy in which they may be disappointed. The result of the best consideration I have been able to give to it is, that the question does not seem to be one of cost. In that respect, according to my view, the two modes of proceeding would be nearly balanced, but it resolves itself into the following question:--Is it better in our present position to enter at once upon the manufacture of the engines and boilers, in doing which we shall in part repay the cost of tools and shops, which must eventually be required, and by which we shall be more independent, and more capable of expediting the works, should it become desirable to incur any additional expense for that purpose, or to throw all the responsibility and risk on another party or contractor--the vessel, for which we could not easily contract, being still made in the Company’s yard?

I have thus reduced the question to that state in which I can offer no further opinion or advice; it is now for you to determine. The question is one which has frequently to be decided upon by the Directors of public works; it is very much a matter of feeling, but it is simplified in the present instance by the circumstance that the expense in either case will be, to my view at least, about the same, and the work, I have no doubt, equally good in either case.

Upon this point, as perhaps upon the subject of cost, I have no doubt there will be some difference of opinion. It will be said that the work done under our own superintendence can be more relied upon than the work of a manufacturer, and that even in the engines of the ‘Great Western’ steam-ship, coming from one of the most experienced manufacturers, many defects may be pointed out.

I should agree fully with both these arguments, but I think these advantages are fully counterbalanced by that of the experience in all the details which is brought into operation in an old-established manufactory, and the great relief from responsibility and risk obtained by contracting for the whole work.

The Directors having determined to make the engines, erected shops and fitted them up with proper tools. The services rendered to them by Mr. Brunel at this period were fully acknowledged at the next meeting of the shareholders.[126]

Mr. Brunel’s attention was now anxiously devoted to the consideration of the numerous questions involved in the construction of the ship and her engines; and, in order to obtain reliable information on many points, he sent one of his assistants, Mr. Berkeley Claxton, in the ‘Great Western.’ His sole occupation during six voyages was to note the amount of rolling and pitching, and the exact performance of her engines, with the effect of the use of the expansion valves on her speed, and on the consumption of fuel. These reports furnished Mr. Brunel with information which was of great value, especially when, shortly afterwards, he advised the Directors to adopt the screw propeller instead of paddlewheels.

The circumstances which led to the adoption of the screw propeller in the ‘Great Britain’ instead of paddlewheels were as follows:--

In the early part of the year 1840, the performances of the ‘Archimedes’ steamer began to attract the attention of scientific men. This vessel, which was fitted with the screw propeller patented by Mr. Francis Pettitt Smith, arrived at Bristol in May. A few trips were made up and down the Float, but the advantages of the screw propeller were not fully appreciated by those to whom they were explained.

But Mr. Guppy, who had attended some of these trials, went round in the ship to Liverpool. On his return he made a report to the Building Committee, and the Directors, on Mr. Brunel’s advice, passed a resolution delaying the progress of the engines of the ‘Great Britain,’ and of those parts of the frame which would be affected by any change of plans. Mr. Brunel was also requested by them to give his attention to the question of the adoption of the screw, and to report thereon.

During the next three months experiments were made by Mr. Brunel, assisted by Mr. Guppy and Captain Claxton, on the screw propeller in the ‘Archimedes.’[127] These experiments afforded ample opportunity of trying the performances of several forms of screws.[128]

On October 1, Mr. Brunel attended a special meeting of the Board, and read and explained a report he had drawn up, in which he laid before the Directors at great length the results of the different experiments he had made, and the advantages which he believed would attend the use of the screw propeller.[129] A resolution was passed adopting it for the ‘Great Britain.’

Mr. Brunel at first thought that he would be able to retain the form of engines which had been originally determined on for working the paddle wheels; but, on consideration, this was found impracticable. As the Company had by this time erected complete engine works, there could now be no question as to their undertaking the construction of the new description of engines required for working the screw propeller.[130]

Mr. Humphrys resigned the post of superintendent of the works, and Mr. Harman was appointed assistant engineer under Mr. Guppy, to whom the Directors, on the advice of Mr. Brunel, entrusted the supreme control of their manufacturing establishment.

The duties and responsibilities which devolved on the Building Committee--Captain Claxton, Mr. Guppy, and Mr. Brunel--were most arduous. To design and construct a steam-ship larger than any that had, up to that time, been launched, to make this ship of a material which had but lately been introduced into shipbuilding, and which had never before been employed on a large scale, to adapt to this ship a novel form of propeller which had not previously been used save in a merely experimental steamer, and to build in a newly opened manufactory marine engines of a much greater size than any that had hitherto been contemplated, and of a totally different character, was indeed a bold enterprise. Mr. Brunel had, as has been shown, recommended the Company not to undertake one part of the work, that, namely, of the manufacture of the engines, which he thought would have been better entrusted to the most experienced engine builders. But although the Directors had acted contrary to his advice, this circumstance in no way diminished the zeal with which he and his coadjutors entered upon their task.

A short statement of the principal dimensions of the vessel and engines is given in a note to this chapter; but some of the more remarkable features in the design may be mentioned here.

In the construction of the ‘Great Britain,’ the same care which had been spent in securing longitudinal strength in the wooden hull of the ‘Great Western,’ was now given to the suitable distribution of the metal. Over the transverse angle iron ribs at the bottom of the ship were laid ten deep longitudinal beams (see woodcut, fig. 13, _a_), which, over the greater part of the bottom of the ship, were covered with an iron deck (_b_) riveted to their upper edges by angle irons, thus forming a cellular structure which added greatly to the strength of the ship. It does not appear that this deck was designed to be watertight, so that it did not form the same security against accident as the inner skin of the cellular structure which Mr. Brunel afterwards adopted in the ‘Great Eastern.’

The upper part of the sides of the ship, in the middle of her length, were carefully designed so as to give her longitudinal strength. The side plates were thickened, and were riveted to iron shelf-plates three feet broad (_c_); and two bands of iron, six inches wide and one inch thick, with the joints strengthened, ran along the top of the ship’s side. There were bands of iron riveted to the shelf-plate, and iron deck beams crossed diagonally under the planking of the upper and main decks. Also at the junction of the ship’s side with the shelf-plate there ran longitudinally a tie of Baltic pine timber, 340 square inches in section (_d_); this being well secured to the shelf-plate and ribs, added considerably to the strength of this portion of the hull.

The ship had five watertight bulkheads, and was thus separated into six compartments.

She had no keel, as there did not appear to be sufficient advantage gained by such an appendage to make up for the increase of the ship’s draught by the amount of the depth of the keel. There were two side or bilge keels (_e_), reaching down to the level of the keel plate of the ship, so that when grounded in dock she might rest on three points in her width.

The ‘Great Britain’ had what is termed a balanced rudder, a portion of the rudder (in this case about one third) being in advance of the pivot on which it turned. The result of this arrangement was that, the pressures on either side of the pivot nearly balancing one another, there was no difficulty in putting the helm over rapidly. This rudder was knocked away when the ship ran ashore at Dundrum, and was subsequently replaced by an ordinary rudder.[131]

In the construction of the hull of the ship, instead of a mere imitation of the arrangements of the timber in wooden ships, the proper distribution of the material to receive the strains that would come upon it was carefully considered. In the result, the ship contained, in the structure of her bottom, bulkheads, deck shelves, and longitudinal kelsons, the longitudinal principle of construction which Mr. Brunel afterwards so fully developed in the ‘Great Eastern.’

Apart from their size, the design of the engines of the ‘Great Britain’ necessarily presented many peculiarities. The boilers, which were six in number, were placed touching each other, so as to form one large boiler about thirty-three feet square, divided by one transverse and two longitudinal partitions. This boiler, which was fitted in between the longitudinal bulkheads of the ship, had a double set of furnaces, and therefore of stoke-holes, one at the fore end, and the other at the after end, next the engine room.

It would seem that the boiler was only worked with a pressure of about eight pounds on the square inch.

The feed water for the boiler was passed through a casing surrounding the funnel, in which it was heated before passing into the boiler. This casing was open at the top, and the water flowed thence into the boiler by gravitation. A similar arrangement was adopted by Mr. Brunel in the ‘Great Eastern.’

The condensers were made of wrought iron, being in fact part of the frame of the ship. The main shaft of the engine had a crank at either end of it, and was made hollow, a stream of water being kept running through it so as to prevent heating in the bearings. An important point in the design was the method by which the motion was transmitted from the engine-shaft to the screw-shaft, for the screw was arranged to go three revolutions to each revolution of the engines. Where the engines do not drive the screw directly, this is now universally effected by means of toothed gearing; but, when the engines of the ‘Great Britain’ were made, it was thought that this arrangement would be too jarring and noisy. After much consideration, chains were used, working round different-sized drums with notches in them, into which fitted projections on the chains. The greater part of the length of the screw-shaft consisted of a hollow wrought-iron boiler-plate tube, the metal being thus very advantageously placed for taking torsional strain, and the shaft was in this way made very light. The engines were designed to work expansively, the steam being cut off at one-sixth of the stroke.

The completion of the ‘Great Britain’ was delayed many months, owing to the financial difficulties in which the Great Western Steam-Ship Company had become involved; the profit on working the ‘Great Western’ having been seriously diminished in consequence of the competition of the Cunard steamers.

At length, however, the ship was finished; and she was floated out of dock into the Floating Harbour on July 19, 1843, in the presence of His Royal Highness Prince Albert.

This seems a fitting place to insert the following letter from Mr. Brunel to Mr. Guppy, written at the beginning of August 1843:--

I have been thinking a great deal of your plans for iron-ship building, and have come to a conclusion which I believe agrees with your ideas; but I will state mine without reference to yours. At bottom and at top I would give _longitudinal_ strength and stiffness, gaining the latter by the former, so that all the metal used should add to the _longitudinal tie_, while in the neutral axis and along the sides, and to resist swells from seas, I would have vertical strength by ribs and shelf-pieces, thus: the black lines being sections of longitudinal pieces, the dotted lines vertical and transverse diagonal plates, throwing the metal as much as possible into the outside bottom plates, and getting the strength inside by form, that is, depth of beams, &c., the former being liable to injury from blows, &c., the latter being protected.

And now for the screw of which I am constantly thinking, and in the success of which for the ‘Great Britain,’ remember, I am even more deeply interested than you.

If all goes well we shall all gain credit, but ‘_quod scriptum est manet_,’ if the result disappoint anybody, my written report will be remembered by everybody, and I shall have to bear the storm--and all that spite and revenge can do at the Admiralty will be done! The words ‘better sailing qualities than could be given to the “Polyphemus,”’ which I used in my first report to the Admiralty, I believe have never been forgotten.

Well, the result of all my anxious thoughts--for I assure you I feel more anxious about this than about most things I have had to do with--is first that we must adopt as _a principle not to be departed from_, that all mechanical difficulties of construction must give way, must in fact be lost sight of in determining the most perfect form--if we find that the screw determined upon _cannot_ be made (but what cannot be done?), then it is quite time enough to try another form; though even then _my_ rule would be to try _again_ at making it....

The ‘Great Britain’ was built wider than the locks through which she would have to pass, as it was supposed that the Dock Company would allow them to be temporarily widened.[132]

After a good deal of discussion, negotiations were satisfactorily concluded, and the requisite alterations were made: the ship passed through into Cumberland Basin, and the upper lock was restored to its original state in a few days.

On December 10, everything was ready for her passing into the Avon through the lower lock. A steam-tug commenced towing her at high water, but, before she had moved half her length in the lock, it became evident to Captain Claxton, who was on board the tug, that there was not an inch to spare; she was touching the lock walls on either side--in fact, she had stuck between the copings. Upon this he gave orders to haul her back again as quickly as possible. This was hardly effected before the tide began to fall; a few minutes later, and the ship would have remained jammed in the entrance.

As the tides had passed their highest, it was necessary immediately to widen the lock, in order not to lose the spring tide; and this was accomplished under Mr. Brunel’s superintendence, just in time to get the vessel through that night.

Mr. Brunel described this occurrence in the following letter, written to excuse himself from keeping an important engagement in Wales:--

December 11, 1844.

We have had an unexpected difficulty with the ‘Great Britain’ this morning. She stuck in the lock; we _did_ get her back. I have been hard at work all day altering the masonry of the lock. To night, our last tide, we have succeeded in getting her through; but, being dark, we have been obliged to ground her outside, and I confess I cannot leave her till I see her afloat again, and all clear of her difficulties. I have, as you will admit, much at stake here, and I am too anxious about it to leave her.

The ‘Great Britain,’ after making several experimental trips, sailed for London on January 23, 1845, and, although she experienced very severe weather, made an average speed of 12⅓ knots an hour.

The excitement caused by her arrival at Blackwall was very great. Thousands of persons flocked to see her, and she was honoured by a visit from Her Majesty and His Royal Highness Prince Albert.

She left Liverpool on her first voyage on August 26, and arrived at New York on September 10, having made the passage out in fourteen days and twenty-one hours. She made her return passage in fifteen days and a half.

She started again in October, taking sixteen days and a half across. On her homeward passage, she broke her screw, and got home under canvas after eighteen days of rough weather which fully tested her sailing qualities.

The experience of these voyages showed that the supply of steam from the boilers was defective; the necessary alterations were carried out during the winter months, and the ship was fitted with a new screw.

In the beginning of 1846, everything seemed to promise well for the success of the ‘Great Britain.’ She started on May 9, with her full complement of passengers and cargo, but again an accident happened, which prevented this passage from affording a trial of her steaming power. On May 13, the guard of the after air-pump broke; but up to that time her speed had averaged eleven and three-quarters knots.

She returned from New York in thirteen days and six hours, against adverse winds for ten days, with a speed varying from eight and a half to twelve knots. On one day of her voyage, June 13, she ran 330 knots in the twenty-four hours, or nearly sixteen statute miles an hour. This was said to have been the quickest passage which had, up to that time, been made under similar circumstances of wind and weather.

She left Liverpool again at the beginning of July, and arrived at New York in thirteen days and eight hours, or, deducting stoppages, in twelve days and eleven hours--the shortest passage then and for some time afterwards recorded. Her homeward passage was accomplished in thirteen days, including a stoppage of eighteen hours to repair the driving chains which had been damaged.

She started again from Liverpool on her outward voyage on the morning of September 22, 1846, having on board 180 passengers (a larger number than had ever before started to cross the Atlantic in a steamer), and a considerable quantity of freight. A few hours after her departure, and at a time when it was supposed that she was rounding the Isle of Man, the ship ran ashore, and all immediate efforts to get her off were unavailing. When daylight came, the captain found, to his surprise, that she was in Dundrum Bay, on the north-east coast of Ireland. The passengers were landed safely when the tide ebbed.

Captain Claxton, the managing Director of the Company, went at once to the ship. He found her lying at the bottom of a deep and extensive bay; the ground on which she rested had an upper surface of sand, but underneath this were numerous detached rocks. The ship had settled down upon two of them, and had knocked holes in her bottom. Her head lay NW., leaving her stern and port quarter exposed to a heavy sea, which, at Dundrum, always accompanies southerly gales.

When Captain Claxton got to the ship, he made arrangements for trying to get her off at the next spring tides, which were on the following Monday (September 28); but on the Sunday, a gale of wind from the southward sprung up, and at the night flood-tide the water broke over her; nothing remained to be done but to drive the ship higher up the beach into a position of greater safety. Sails were therefore set, and she was driven forward a considerable distance.

Mr. Patterson was sent by the Directors to Dundrum with Mr. Alexander Bremner (who had had considerable experience in floating stranded ships), and they endeavoured to protect the vessel by breakwaters. These, however, were soon carried away; and, after this misfortune, the Directors seem for a time to have lost all hope of saving their ship.

On December 8, when the immediate pressure of Parliamentary work was over, Mr. Brunel went to Dundrum, having some time before been requested by the Directors and underwriters to examine and report on the ship. He was delighted, he said, in spite of all the discouraging accounts he had received, to find the ‘Great Britain’ ‘almost as sound as the day she was launched, and ten times stronger and sounder in character,’ though at the same time he was grieved to see her ‘lying unprotected, deserted, and abandoned.’

Whatever may have been the misgivings of others, he felt no doubt as to the possibility of saving the ship, by at once protecting her by a breakwater made of fagots; and before he left Dundrum he set Captain Hosken at work at the new arrangements, and he guaranteed the immediate expense in the event of the Directors not sanctioning the measure.

Immediately on his return to town, he wrote the following somewhat vigorous letter to Captain Claxton:--

December 10, 1846.

I have returned from Dundrum with very mixed feelings of satisfaction and pain, almost amounting to anger, with whom I don’t know. I was delighted to find our fine ship, in spite of all the discouraging accounts received, even from you, almost as sound as the day she was launched, and ten times stronger and sounder in character. I was grieved to see this fine ship lying unprotected, deserted and abandoned by all those who ought to know her value, and ought to have protected her, instead of being humbugged by schemers and underwriters. Don’t let me be understood as wishing to read a lecture to our Directors; but the result, whoever is to blame, is, at least in my opinion, that the finest ship in the world, in excellent condition, such that 4,000_l._ or 5,000_l._ would repair all the damage done, has been left, and is lying, like a useless saucepan kicking about on the most exposed shore that you can imagine, with no more effort or skill applied to protect the property than the said saucepan would have received on the beach at Brighton. Does the ship belong to the Company? For protection, if not for removal, is the Company free to act without the underwriters? If we are in this position, and if we have ordinary luck from storms for the next three weeks, I have little or no anxiety about the ship; but if the Company is not free to act as they like in protecting her, and in preventing our property being thrown away by trusting to schemers, then please write off immediately to Hosken to stop his proceeding with my plans, because I took the pecuniary responsibility of the cost of what I ordered until he could hear from you, and of course I do not want to incur useless expense, but still more I do not wish any proceeding taken as from me to be afterwards stopped. I will now describe as nearly as I can what I have seen, and what I think.

As to the state of the ship, she is as straight and as sound as she ever was, as a whole. She is resting and working upon rocks, which have broken in at several places, and forced up perhaps 12 to 18 inches many parts of the bottom, from the fore stoke-hole to about the centre of the engines, lifting the boilers about 15 inches and the condenser of the fore engine about 6 or 8 inches; the after-condenser, perhaps, half an inch. The lifting of the fore-condenser has broken that air-pump, the connecting rod having been unwisely left in, and the crank being at the bottom of the stroke. Of course the air-pump could not help being broken; except this, the whole vessel, machinery, &c., are perfect. I told you that Hosken’s drawing was a proof, to my eye, that the ship was not broken: the first glimpse of her satisfied me that all the part above her 5 or 6 feet water line is as true as ever. It is beautiful to look at, and really how she can be talked of in the way she has been, even by you, I cannot understand. It is positively cruel; it would be like talking away the character of a young woman without any grounds whatever.

The ship is perfect, except that at one part the bottom is much bruised, and knocked in holes in several places. But even within three feet of the damaged part there is no strain or injury whatever. I think it very likely that she may have started leaks where she has been pounding away upon the rocks, but nothing more; and as I said before, all above her 5 or 6 feet water line is uninjured, except her overhanging stern; there is some slight damage to this, not otherwise important than as pointing out the necessity of some precautions if she is to be saved. I say ‘if,’ for really when I saw a vessel still in perfect condition left to the tender mercies of an awfully exposed shore for weeks, while a parcel of quacks are amusing you with schemes for getting her off, she in the meantime being left to go to pieces, I could hardly help feeling as if her own parents and guardians meant her to die there.

Why, no man in his senses can dream of calculating upon less than three months for the execution of any rational scheme of getting her off; and no man in his senses, I should think, would dream of taking her across the channel in the winter months, even if he had got the camels or floats fast. Of this I don’t feel so competent to form an opinion, though I think I can judge, and I should consider it a wanton throwing away of my shares if the Directors allowed her to be taken out, even if afloat; but at all events I am competent to judge of the probable time occupied in getting means to float her, and I maintain that it would be absurd to calculate upon less than two or three months. It is not therefore the mode of getting her off that we ought to have been all this time thinking of, but how to keep her where she is. I feel so strongly on this point that I feel quite angry. What are we doing? What are we wasting precious time about? The steed is being quietly stolen while we are discussing the relative merits of a Bramah or a Chubb’s lock to be put on at some future time! It is really shocking.

Having expended a little of my feeling, I will tell you what I have done, and what I should recommend.

First, instantly to disconnect the engines and air-pumps, and remove all the working gear, so at least to leave the mischief to the lower part. By the bye, the cylinders are not disturbed or hurt in any way at present, but with the engines exactly at the bottom of the stroke, and the connecting rods on, it is a wonder they are not. If the air-pump had been disconnected it would not have been broken. I have taken upon myself to order this.

Secondly, I suggested to Hosken, in which he quite agreed with me, to take off all strain from her extreme stern. At present she has cables out from this prodigious mass overhanging nearly 30 feet from any part capable of bearing the strain.

I recommend his taking the chain cables through the ship’s side, and making them fast with a spar or timber outside the starboard side, about as far forward as the capstan. At present she is canted seaward.

I thought she was better so than presenting the hollow lines of her quarter to the sea, and both Hosken and Bremner came round to my opinion.

Thirdly, there is a stream of water which now washes away the sand from her bottom. I think it essential this should be diverted, and kept so.

Fourthly, my plan for protecting her is totally different from any that have been proposed, and if we have not such excessively bad weather as would prevent anything being done, I believe it may easily be done. And if done will, I am convinced, be perfectly good; while any solid timbering, even if made, would, I think, be most likely the cause itself of tremendous damage, if once beat by the sea. I will only premise by saying that both Hosken and Bremner came to the conclusion that it was the best thing that could be done.

I should stack a mass of large strong fagots lashed together, skewered together with iron rods, weighted down with iron, sandbags, &c., wrapping the whole round with chains, just like a huge poultice under her quarters, round under her stern, and half way up her length on the sea side.

The detail of the mode, and the precautions of detail, I have not time now to describe. I am as certain as I can be of anything that, once made, such a mass of fagots would stand any sea for the next six months, and the chances of making it (after one or two failures, no doubt) are so good, that if properly taken in hand, I look upon it as certain. I will write more fully to-morrow--in the meantime I have ordered the fagots to be begun delivering. I went myself with Hosken to Lord Roden’s agent about it, and I hope they are already beginning to deliver them. Write and stop them or not--if not, of course my responsibility ceases. I will write again to-morrow, but let me know by train how we stand with the underwriters.

This letter was a few days later supplemented by the following formal report to the Directors, which was printed and circulated amongst the proprietors.

December 14, 1846.

According to your request I have, as soon as my engagements would allow of my leaving London, paid a visit to the ‘Great Britain,’ and I now beg to report to you the state in which I found the vessel, and my opinion of the best means to be taken for recovering the largest possible amount of the property invested in her. If I state these opinions concisely, and without any qualifications, you will not suppose that I have the presumption to think them infallible, but merely that I am compelled, by the shortness of the time left me to write to you, to avoid all circumlocution, and to give you as simply and briefly as possible the opinions I have formed--at the same time I am bound to say that I have not formed them hastily, and that my convictions upon the several points upon which I may express my feelings are very strong.

First, as regards the present state of the vessel, I was agreeably disappointed, after the reports that had reached me, to find her as a whole, and, independently of the mere local damages of which I will speak presently, perfectly sound, and as strong and as perfect in form as on the day she was launched.

In receiving this statement you must bear in mind the great difference between an iron vessel and a timber-built ship. In the former, parts may be considerably damaged or even destroyed, and the remainder may not only be untouched, but may be left unstrained and uninjured. In a timber ship this can hardly be the case; if any considerable portion of a ship’s bottom is stove in, the timbers or ribs completely across the ship and the planking longitudinally, cannot fail to be strained to a very considerable distance in both directions. You must therefore remove from your minds all impressions derived from your experience of damages sustained by timber-built ships in order to understand my statement, which is strictly correct:--that, except the parts actually damaged, the extent of which is comparatively small, the ship is perfectly sound, and as good as at the hour when she struck. This soundness and freedom from any damage extends from about the 5 feet water line to the top (with the exception of the injury sustained by the knocking away of the rudder post and a blow under the stern); nearly the whole of the vessel is therefore sound: the principal injury is in her bottom under the boilers and engines. The vessel has evidently been thumping upon the rocks, and almost entirely upon this part of the bottom from the first few days after she grounded; and at present in all probability her whole weight is resting upon this part; yet notwithstanding this she is perfectly straight, and has not broken nor even sprung an inch in the whole length. The boilers have been forced up about 15 inches, and one of the condensers has been lifted about 8 inches, breaking the air-pump. At present this is nearly the extent of the damage done; all of which could easily be repaired if the vessel were in dock.

I will now state my opinion of the best means of recovering the largest possible amount of the property which has been invested in her. In this view I can only imagine two alternatives--the one to break her up on the spot and make the most of the materials; the other to get her afloat and into port, and restore her into good condition, or sell her to those who would so restore her.

The first alternative may I think be discarded at once; the plates and ribs of an iron vessel are difficult enough to convert into useful materials for any other purposes, even in the midst of workshops and with tools and appliances at hand. In such a place as Dundrum Bay I do not believe the materials would pay the expense of cutting up; the masts, spars, chains, &c., in fact the stores and perhaps a few of the lighter part of the engines, might repay the cost of removal, but the whole would certainly not amount to many thousands; probably hundreds would be a safer estimate of the amount to be realised clear of all expenses. To remove the vessel and take her into port, and either restore her or sell her, is then the only means of recovering any part of the whole of the capital invested in this ship. If she is so brought into port she may be worth, unrepaired, 40,000_l._, 50,000_l._, or 60,000_l._, according to the opportunities that may offer themselves of employing her usefully or selling her. The only question is, then, how at the least expense, and at the smallest risk, is the vessel to be got into port? But, as I will now endeavour to prove to you, the mode of getting the vessel off the shore and into port is again quite secondary to the consideration of how to preserve her where she is so that she may be in a condition to be removed, _and to be worth removing_, when the means of doing this are ready, and the proper time is arrived for attempting it.

In the first place I assert unhesitatingly, that no man in his senses and who thoroughly understands the circumstances of the case, the weight and position of the vessel, the amount of the rise and fall of the tide, and the draught of water around her, and the extraordinarily exposed situation, would dream of calculating upon completing the requisite means for floating her under three months.

_In the meantime the ship must be protected._ Even if it were practicable to construct the necessary apparatus, and to float the vessel to-morrow, it would be little short of madness to go to sea with her at this time of the year; but I am doing wrong to discuss a case which cannot arise. The vessel cannot, according to any rational calculation of chances, be got off under three months, and it is equally against all probability that, if left unprotected, there would be anything worth taking off at that time. It is useless, therefore, at this moment discussing the best mode of floating the vessel; and I think, under such circumstances, it would be most unwise hastily to determine upon any plan. The first thing is to know whether there are any means of preserving the vessel, and whether any such plans can be carried into effect at some reasonable cost, which it may be worth incurring. I have looked at the vessel, and considered the very exposed situation in which she is placed (and a more exposed one could hardly be found), and I am convinced that no fixed breakwater of ordinary construction could be made at any reasonable expense, or in time to prevent mischief. There is no depth of sand into which to drive piles, and the rock is too uneven and broken to allow of any framing being constructed and secured to it; and any framework would be liable to be destroyed during the progress of its construction, as that already attempted has been, and the timber might be the cause of serious damage to the ship. The plan I should recommend would at least be free from these objections, would be comparatively inexpensive, and I am firmly convinced would be perfectly effectual as a protection. At the same time few persons who have not seen the effect of a sea beating against fagots will share in that conviction; what I recommend is, to form under the stern and along the exposed side of the vessel a mass of fagots made of strong and long sticks, and used in the manner which has been so successfully practised in Holland and elsewhere, for the repair and protection of banks against the sea. The fagots should be packed closely, and for a considerable thickness against the ship’s side and up to the level of the decks, and secured with rods run vertically through the mass, and chains laid horizontally and binding the whole tightly to the ship. The heaviest sea has no effect upon such a mass, and I believe the vessel would remain as uninjured and indeed as unaffected by the sea as if in dock; 8,000 or 10,000 fagots, 300 or 400 fathoms of 1 inch or ¾ inch second-hand chain cable, none of which need be lost, 300 or 400 ¾ inch rods sharpened at the ends, 1,000 bags to fill with sand, with what stores you have on board, would suffice; and, if next coming springs and the gales which have hitherto accompanied them are safely passed, I cannot foresee any difficulty whatever in the way of completing the protection I propose. Of course, in all works dependent upon wind, weather, and tides, certainty cannot be obtained; but of one thing I am quite certain, that no other plan offers the same chance of success, or at so small a cost. I have communicated to Captain Claxton the steps which I took, in conjunction with Captain Hosken, for procuring the fagots before I left Dundrum; I have also communicated to him the directions which I gave with respect to the engines, &c., and it is unnecessary therefore that I should repeat them. I will only recapitulate in a few words the substance of the advice I have above given, and of my reasoning. You have a valuable piece of property lying on a most exposed shore; if preserved for a few months that property will in all probability be worth 40,000_l._ or 50,000_l._; if neglected for a few weeks longer it will probably be worth nothing. Can you, as men of business, under such circumstances, waste your time at this moment in discussing what you will do in three months hence, and what plan you will then adopt to take your property to market, but will you not rather first and immediately adopt decisive steps for preserving that property, and then consider what you had best do with it?

I have no wish to escape the responsibility of advising you, as you request me to do so, as to my opinion of the best plan to be adopted hereafter for removing the ship; but adhering to the principle that I have laid down, I should decline to do so at present, did I not see reason to fear that you might be losing time and money by relying upon expectations which I am convinced would be disappointed. I would strongly urge upon you not to place your reliance upon any plan which depends upon floating the vessel by camels, and taking her to sea unrepaired, and therefore entirely dependent upon those camels. The immense breadth of these floating camels, and the risk of taking such an unmanageable floating ill-connected mass to sea, cannot have been correctly or sufficiently estimated; and the certainty of the whole going to the bottom, in the event of even a very moderate gale of wind or a slight swell, has been apparently quite lost sight of. I am also of opinion that the difficulty of lifting the vessel at all by auxiliary floats has been underrated. The vessel has worked herself about 5 or 6 feet into the solid rock and sand, and may very probably get a little deeper before the time for lifting arrives. She must therefore be lifted, say at least 4 feet to 4 feet 6 inches, before she could be got out of the dock she has made; and the floating power must therefore be calculated at least to raise her 5 feet 6 inches, so as to be quite sure of moving her. Now there is not more than 10 feet water around the vessel even at high water of ordinary springs, and it would be impossible to calculate upon more than 9 feet as a certainty. No floating power worth having can be got in the vessel, and the floating vessels must therefore be capable of sustaining the whole weight, with a draught when the vessel is lifted of only about 4 feet. The weight to be sustained is 2,000 tons, and to do this with vessels drawing only 4 feet would require that they should be upwards of 30 feet in breadth on each side, forming with the ship a total width of upwards of 100 to 120 feet, and upwards of 300 feet in length. I do not say that this operation is impracticable, but it is at least a very difficult one, and must be almost entirely dependent upon weather, and, unless in perfectly smooth water, a very hazardous one. My belief and conviction is that the safe mode of proceeding, and by far the cheapest, will be to lift the vessel by mechanical means, to lay ways under her, and to haul her up sufficiently far for her to be safe from the sea; to repair her just sufficiently to make her water-tight, then launch and bring her to Liverpool or Bristol. But, as I have before stated, there is time to consider these points, if in the meantime we take steps to preserve the ship. If the property is not even now worth protecting, it will indeed be waste of money to be preparing at some considerable expense to remove what will in all probability be only then a valueless carcase.

If the Directors should determine upon adopting the course I have recommended, I must remind them that the plan is one depending entirely on the skill, the vigour, the aptitude for expedients, and possibly, if bad weather should come on, and day after day the work be destroyed, on the unwearying perseverance and determined confidence in the plan of the person directing it, and the sufficiency of means at his command.

I cannot conclude without doing justice to Mr. Bremner, whom I met on board, and acknowledging the friendly and liberal manner in which he discussed the various means to be adopted, and assisted me with his valuable advice; and, although I may have somewhat differed with him as to the advisability of attempting to float the vessel away to sea without first repairing her, yet upon most points we were perfectly agreed; and I firmly believe that if any man could take her off (and if it would be prudent to let him do so), Mr. Bremner’s great experience and sound practical knowledge and good sense in devising any plan, and his energy and skill in carrying it out, would ensure every chance of success which the circumstances admit of.[133]

The Directors adopted Mr. Brunel’s suggestions; and, at his urgent request, they appointed Captain Claxton to superintend the execution of his plans.

Captain Claxton thereupon went to Dundrum, where he took sole charge of all the subsequent operations.

The following is selected from the many letters written by Mr. Brunel to Captain Claxton at this time.

December 29, 1846.

You have failed, I think, in sinking and keeping down the fagots from that which causes nine-tenths of all failures in this world, from not doing quite enough. Two and a half hundredweight of sandbags, weighing barely one hundredweight [_in water_], would not of course keep quiet a large fagot of five bundles, and two and a half hundredweight of fire-bars, I should think, would only barely do. The load must always be excessive, to make sure of a thing.... I would only impress upon you one principle of action which I have always found very successful, which is to stick obstinately to one plan (until I believe it wrong), and to devote all my scheming to that one plan, and, on the same principle, to stick to one method, and push that to the utmost limits before I allow myself to wander into others; in fact, to use a simile, to stick to the one point of attack, however defended, and if the force first brought up is not sufficient, to bring ten times as much; but never to try back upon another point in the hope of finding it easier. So with the fagots--if a six-bundle fagot wont reach out of water, try a twenty-bundle one; if hundredweights wont keep it down, try tons.

The able manner in which Captain Claxton carried out Mr. Brunel’s plans, and suggested important modifications of them, is acknowledged by Mr. Brunel, in a report to the Directors, written after the successful completion of the breakwater.

February 27, 1847.

I beg to enclose Captain Claxton’s account of the proceedings at Dundrum Bay during the time that he has been engaged in forming the breakwater or protection to the ship in the manner recommended by me.

Notwithstanding the great difficulties he has had to contend with from almost incessant bad weather, with the wind blowing dead on shore nearly the whole of the month of January, and consequently preventing the tides from ebbing sufficiently out to allow of the work being properly proceeded with, and notwithstanding the occurrence of more than one storm at the most critical period of the work, he has, as I fully relied upon his doing, succeeded in so far protecting the ship, that she has been comparatively unaffected by violent seas, which, there is no doubt whatever, would otherwise have seriously damaged her. We may now calculate with tolerable certainty upon preserving her without further injury until the finer or at least more settled weather sets in.

In the work which Captain Claxton undertook, and has so successfully completed, he has been compelled to vary very materially the mode of proceeding first laid down; he has, in fact, been obliged to adapt his plans to his means of execution, and almost from day to day to devise modes of proceeding with only the experience of the past day to guide him. Numerous unforeseen difficulties have occurred, upon which he kept me daily informed; and simple as my plan might have appeared to others, it required much skill, contrivance, and unwearying perseverance to carry out so many alterations and improvements as it progressed. I had relied confidently on success when my friend Captain Claxton undertook the work, and the result has fully confirmed my expectations.

It is now necessary to turn our attention to the best mode of removing the ship. I hope in about a fortnight from the present time to be able to give you some opinion upon this point, but it is one requiring much consideration; and until I had the opportunity of conferring with Captain Claxton on the subject, and also had before me all the measurements and data which he has collected, it was useless to attempt it.

* * * * *

The construction of the breakwater will be understood by the following extracts from a report made by Captain Claxton to the Admiralty.

‘Great Britain,’ July 16, 1847.

...Mr. Brunel’s instructions to me were principally by word of mouth; the difficulty to be got over, in his opinion, being the foundation upon sand, varying in depth according to the points or hollow of a substratum of rock, and according to the quarter from which the wind blew.

The foundation could only be made at low water, and as fast as a layer of fagots was laid, it was rapidly pinned down with iron rods, bent at the heads, varying from 9 to 6 feet in length, and driven to the rock under, loaded with stones quarried from the nearest reefs, and upon these, the last thing as the flood came in, chain cables, air-pump covers, fire-bars in large bundles, and the ship’s guns were dropped, care being always taken to have the ends of the chains, and the slings of other heavy matters, fast to the ship. As the tide in smooth water began to recede, or in heavy seas began to lose effect in striking, these iron weights were lifted, and the fagots which were ready were ... placed; and the same process followed tide after tide when the water ebbed sufficiently, which upon the neaps it never did at all, and upon the springs it only did for about an hour, unless there was either no wind at all, or unless the wind blew off the land, or from the West round by the North to ESE. It is necessary, to a proper understanding of the nature of this really large work, to describe a bundle of fagots, lest an idea should be formed that it is a small thing and easily handled. They averaged 11 feet in length, and 5 feet in circumference near the butts, which all pointed one way. When tied in Lord Roden’s wood, many were 13 feet long, and none were taken under 10 feet. A cart of the country with one horse could carry about ten bundles when well lashed, and as they came down there was rarely more than the head of the horse to be seen. Sixpence per bundle, and sixpence for delivery, was the contract; the distance at high water nine miles, at low water six miles; and our sailors made them into large bundles of twos, threes, and fours; now and then we experimented with bundles of eight or even ten, in the middle of which were bags of sand (old guano bags), varying in number, of 2 cwt. each, and sometimes as many as amounted to a ton in weight. These large bundles stood if the water remained smooth; but if, before we could build up to their height with smaller bundles, and, as it were, prop or shoulder them fore and aft, we were caught by a breeze and sea, we found them rolled up to high water mark, or on spring tides four hundred yards; while some are now being hove out of the sand entire, and with the sand bags and sand complete....

Having got the foundation, on which, I may mention, we placed one of the ship’s iron life-boats, 30 feet long, 8 feet wide, and 5 feet deep, and loaded her with stones, and which also, although over bundles of fagots, went bodily down, until only the gunwale was above the level of the strand, we began to build the part which was to save the ship from the blows of the sea, and which I was instructed by Mr. Brunel to bring up to a point to the ship’s gunwale in the form of a large poultice, occupying the whole space under her counter, the whole of the exposed quarter (the port quarter), and inclining inwards from the outside, and declining from the top to the same point forward, to the after end of the bilge keel. I was to be, and was, as careful as I could be to secure as well as to weight down as we built. Chains were secured in many places to the lower bundles of fire-bars sunk in the sand outside all, and these were brought into the arms of the screw, and to ring bolts let into the ship; and rarely were two layers placed without a repetition of the securing and weighting process all the while we had chains to use....

We were frequently beaten; whole masses were capsized, but it was found that even the foundation broke the ground swell, which, instead of having a fair run as it has over the strand, seemed stopped, and to break differently; and certainly the ship was daily eased of the blows of the sea.... Finding the wind keeping on shore, the fagots we placed shrinking, sinking, or settling down, and, notwithstanding the weights and lashings, commonly breaking away, I proposed to try spars. Mr. Brunel acceded, and recommended my trying four long ones, to the heels of which were to be attached chains with a spread of eight feet, the spars being pointed at the heels, the slack of the chains, and the height at which they were stopped to the spars, being intended to be sufficient to embrace about a dozen bundles of fagots, the points of the spars sticking through the foundation below the level of the sand. After placing the first pair of spars at an angle from the gunwale of about 70 degrees, and before the second pair with its fagots could be got in place, and after heaving them down tight with a tackle to each from the head to the gunwale, a heavy sea came with the flood dead on, and although the spars were seven inches square, they stood the blows of the sea, bending in the middle full five feet when heavily struck. This gave me the idea of green trees: firs being the first that occurred to me; first because of their height, and next because in Lord Downshire’s grounds at Dundrum the castle wood consisted of them only, and lastly, because they were cheap and at hand. The spars we fortunately placed, and which stood so well, were American elm, a large balk of which had been sawed in four lengths of 42 feet for framing, for Mr. Bremner’s breakwater.... The lengths required to allow the application of a tackle to the head to heave them tight down to the gunwale, or to the scuttle-holes of the ship, were from 45 to 50 feet. I found that the firs of this length were scarce, and too fine at the head; but on looking in Lord Roden’s wood, a better substitute was offered in the form of beech trees of any size, and a contract was speedily made, and as speedily completed; the carts of the country bringing in one tree at a time, until about eighty were placed at the most exposed point, the quarter, in three rows, the outside row at an angle of 45 degrees. Beech-trees were found decidedly better than firs, or, I believe, than any other description of tree, as their weight was soon found sufficient to keep them in place without the heaving down tackles. They can be got of great length, without being so large and (carting, pointing, and handling considered) so unwieldy a butt as firs, and they are of greater diameter aloft, consequently stronger, and altogether tougher than firs. Having got the whole stern surrounded, and having continued them at from 4 to 5 feet apart up to the bilge keel, or about 80 feet of the ship from the screw, I applied smaller spars (easily and economically obtained from the Tyrella domain, or within half a mile of the ship) laterally and diagonally, and about a foot apart in the former case, and 3 or 4 feet in the latter; the number about 300, of all or any lengths between 15 and 30 feet. While this was about, the fagot process was going on; and before that was completed, I found the foundation with the boat, and its 40 tons of stones, and even the spars, although pointed at the angles, indicated an inclination to move forward through the sheer force of the rollers. To check this, tackles were made fast to three warps out to seaward, with two anchors to each, and brought to the spars with four spans to the inner block. Thus twelve of the largest spars were grappled, the falls taken on board, and all hove tight; the whole of the spars having first been attached to one another by a round turn of a half-inch chain with strong staples, and of course by the lateral spars or spreaders, and their innumerable seizings. Suffice it to say, as regards the spars, that when struck by violent seas from half-flood to half-ebb, they bend in a body from 3 to 4 feet, and spring back after the blow; and this is, I believe, the whole secret of the efficiency of the spar part of the breakwater, which has stood the whole winter, only one having broken, and that because the head took against the topsail yard, lashed along stanchions of the rails as a hold-down for the tackles attached to their heads. As a proof that this is the probable cause of its standing so well, I may refer to Mr. Bremner’s breakwater, which went with the first heavy gale and sea, although made of balks of from 17 inches to 13 inches thick: also to our having ourselves placed a pine spar 9 inches diameter down by the side of the outside tree on the starboard quarter, and which broke in two right in the middle with the first sea that struck it. The sea struck very hard against the spars and framework, from which it was received by the fagots without any shock to the ship worth speaking of. With respect to the fagots, I could not find materials to go on weighting down as we went on piling up.... I therefore ran the remaining fagots up light. No sooner, however, was this done, and a gale came on, than we were compelled to let go the lashings, and to help some of the top ones to escape, as the whole of the unloaded body rose and fell full three feet with the sea, and would have done mischief to the spars and to the ship, by shouldering her quarter, and twisting her. About 200 bundles broke away in this gale. They were, however, all recovered, and placed further forward and low down, and then loaded with stones; about one third of the top space having after this been left open, or one third down from the apex levelled. Shrinkage did much towards this, and breaking in pieces a good deal; so it was not deemed advisable to fill that space again.

About the 1st of May the progress made in lifting the ship by tightening her from the inside, and by lightening her of everything moveable, led me to believe that we should be about getting her off towards the end of this month. I therefore felt that it was time to begin removing the fagot portion of the breakwater.... The process of levelling went on for about three weeks, when all above the loaded portion was taken away. We commenced on that portion from necessity, and found that by no contrivance of purchases and levers could our ten men get up or out more than four or five bundles per tide. This became, and even now is, a serious matter. We have got up all our chains and weights, and nothing remains but the fagots and stones, which are so embedded in sand as to form a mass which is more difficult to move than granite rock would be, as we cannot blast. Twenty labourers have been twenty-one tides at work, by contract, and certainly they have made an impression; but it is not lowered over two feet. The lower portion was made of furze bundles, here called whins, and they are great collectors of sand, and only come up at all by being cut to pieces. I mention this to show that furze and fagots loaded with stones on sand 500 yards from high-water mark, exposed to the sea, will form a foundation on which a building of any weight might be erected....

Mr. Brunel informed me, when I undertook to carry out his views, that there was nothing new in using fagots to stop breaches in sea-walls, as in Holland; and that he saw no reason why they should not stop the force of the sea in protecting ships as well, provided they could be secured, and a foundation got. They were to be made of alders, ash, holly, laurel, oak, or anything tough, to be cut down, and made up green, to be placed with all their leaves on, to be pointed to the sea at their butts; and inside the walls of them, if I may so speak, whin (furze) bundles were to be weighted down, the fagots placed in steps or rows of about 4 feet from the outside to the ship’s gunwale.

* * * * *

As the summer came on, the mode of lifting and floating the ship had to be decided. On this point Mr. Brunel wrote to the Directors:--

May 4, 1847.

You have heard from time to time from Captain Claxton of the result of the means adopted by him for protecting the ‘Great Britain’ from the effects of the sea, and which, I am happy to say, have been quite successful; and you will have heard also generally from him of the steps which we have since taken, preparatory to getting off the ship.

I will now explain to you the object I have kept in view in these preparations, and the course I should now advise you to follow.

After completing the works for the protection of the ship, and before determining upon any mode to be recommended to you for getting her off, I thought it would be desirable to lighten her of all that could be easily removed, and to ascertain how much of the vessel could be made water-tight, and what extent of buoyancy could be obtained in the vessel herself, as, in my opinion, upon our success in this would depend altogether the practicability of lifting the ship by camels. If no great extent of buoyancy could have been obtained, I should certainly have recommended lifting the vessel by mechanical means, as I do not consider that, with the draft of water which could be calculated upon around her on ordinary tides, sufficient floating power by camels could be obtained in an easy practicable manner. It was also quite possible that we might succeed in making the vessel alone sufficiently buoyant to lift high enough on the spring tides; and by shifting her position, or by other means, to maintain the lift thus got, to allow of getting under her bottom to repair her.

By great exertion nearly the whole of the compartments forward and aft of the engine space, and part of the coal bunkers, have been made tight; and if the tides had ebbed as low as usual, the other bunkers and the boilers, fireplace and flues, would also have been made water-tight by these last springs.

Unfortunately, from the direction of the wind and other causes, these tides have neither ebbed nor flowed to their full extent; still, the vessel has been lifted, and some of this lift has been maintained, and if we were fortunate, it is evidently quite possible that our utmost expectations might be realized, and possibly the vessel might be lifted sufficiently to be made tight without any external assistance. This, however, would be too much to calculate upon, and the weight to be lifted having been reduced to one-half what it was, and being capable of still further reduction, the operation of lifting by camels becomes a much more practicable undertaking.

I should now therefore recommend that application be made to some parties who have had the most experience in such work, to lay their proposals before the Directors; and that in the meantime we should continue to make every effort to add to the buoyancy of the ship....

I believe that, in such a case, quiet, sober consideration, assisted by experience, and by careful examination of all the circumstances on the spot, will be infinitely more valuable than the most ingenious and brilliant schemes. And I believe we are most likely to obtain these conditions by calling in a man like Mr. Bremner, and leaving him to confer with Captain Claxton, and that he should have the benefit of our advice and assistance, and then lay his plans and proposals before the Directors.

Mr. Bremner and his son, assisted by Captain Claxton, made preparations for releasing the ship. The system followed was that sketched out by Mr. Brunel--namely, that of lifting the ship by mechanical arrangements, and then making good the leaks. The difficulties they had to contend with are graphically described in the reports which were sent almost daily by Captain Claxton to Mr. Brunel, and which were afterwards printed by the Directors at Mr. Brunel’s suggestion.[134]

The principal leak was stopped, and the ship’s head raised 8 feet 7 inches by ramming wedges and stones under her at high water. At last, on August 27, the ship was floated, and Captain Claxton wrote to Mr. Brunel:--

Huzza! huzza! you know what that means.... I made up my mind to stop her at the edge of low water, and then examine and secure all that might discover itself. The tide rose to 15 feet 8 inches. She rose therefore easily over the rock, but was clear of it by only just five inches, which shows how near a squeak we had--it was a most anxious affair, but it is over. I marked 170 yards in the sand and on our warp, and at that extent I stopped her.... I have no doubt that to-morrow we shall see her free.

The following day they started for Liverpool. One hundred and twenty labourers were hired to work at the pumps, but only thirty-six came on board, and their services were unavailable, as they spent their time in discussing how much they were to be paid. Consequently, when the ship was taken in tow at 4 A.M. on the 28th there was 6 feet of water in the engine room and 5 feet in the fore hold, and she was making 16 inches an hour. Men from Her Majesty’s ships ‘Birkenhead’ and ‘Victory,’ which had been sent by the Admiralty to assist, were drafted on board, and the influx of water was reduced to four inches an hour. It was evident that Liverpool could not be attempted, so they made for Strangford Lough. A dense fog came on when they were off the entrance, and they pushed on to Belfast Lough, where the ship was grounded. During the night she was cleared of water, and the next day she started for Liverpool. The landsmen who had been hired the previous night to work the pumps were incapacitated by sea-sickness; and the ship was only kept afloat by the exertions of Captain Claxton and the dockyard hands who had been sent to assist in navigating her across. When she arrived at Liverpool she was placed over a gridiron, on which she sank when her pumps were stopped.

Notwithstanding the successful result of the efforts made for her rescue, the stranding of the ‘Great Britain’ in Dundrum Bay led to the ruin of the Company; and she was some time afterwards sold to Messrs. Gibbs, Bright, & Co., of Liverpool, by whom she was repaired, and fitted with auxiliary engines of 500 nominal horse-power. On a general survey being made, it was found that she had not suffered any alteration of form, nor was she at all strained. She was taken out of dock in October 1851, and since that time she has made regular voyages between Liverpool and Australia.

She is known as one of the fastest vessels on that line; and remains to testify to the ability and wisdom of those who, more than thirty years ago, were daring enough to build so large a ship of iron, and to fit her with the screw propeller.

* * * * *

NOTE (p. 255).

_Dimensions of the ‘Great Britain’ Steam-Ship._

feet inches

Total length 322 0

The length of keel 289 0

Beam 51 0

Depth 32 6

Feet of water 16 0

Tonnage measurement 3,443 tons.

Displacement 2,984 "

_Dimensions of original Engines, &c._

Number of cylinders 4

Diameter of cylinders 88 inches

Length of stroke 6 feet

Weight of engines 340 tons

Weight of boilers 200 "

Water in boilers 200 "

Weight of screw-shaft 38 "

Diameter of screw 15 ft. 6 in.

Pitch of screw 25 ft.

Weight of screw 4 tons

Diameter of main drum 18 feet

Diameter of screw-shaft drum 6 "

Weight of coal 1,200 tons