CHAPTER V.

_THE BROAD GAUGE._

ORIGIN OF THE ORDINARY GAUGE OF RAILWAYS--ADOPTION BY MR. BRUNEL OF THE BROAD GAUGE ON THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY--REASONS FOR ITS ADOPTION--THE PERMANENT WAY--REPORTS OF MR. NICHOLAS WOOD AND MR. JOHN HAWKSHAW, 1838--EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF DIRECTORS OF GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY (DECEMBER 20, 1838)--EXTENSION OF THE BROAD GAUGE SYSTEM--BREAK OF GAUGE--ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE GAUGE OF RAILWAYS, 1845--LETTER OF MR. BRUNEL ON THE BROAD GAUGE (AUGUST 6, 1845)--GAUGE ACT OF 1846--THE MIXED GAUGE--REPORT OF RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS, 1847--NORTHERN EXTENSIONS OF THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY--ADVANTAGES OF THE BROAD GAUGE--PARTIAL ABANDONMENT OF THE BROAD GAUGE.

The railways designed by Mr. Brunel were, with a few exceptions, distinguished from those in all other parts of England by a peculiarity in the width between the two rails forming each line of way, or in what is called the _gauge_. In most railways, the distance between the internal edges of the rails is 4 feet 8½ inches, being what is termed the _narrow gauge_; on Mr. Brunel’s railways, it was seven feet, or what is termed the _broad gauge_.

* * * * *

The gauge of the earlier railways, which were but a modification of the old wooden tramway, was made that of the tram plates which they superseded; and this had been originally fixed to suit the distance between the wheels of the country carts in the north of England.

When Mr. George Stephenson introduced the locomotive engine, the gauge of the lines in the Northumberland district had been already fixed. In laying out the Stockton and Darlington line (1821-1825) he saw no reason to depart from the gauge he had previously adopted; and, indeed, some of the waggons to be used on this line were brought from the Northumberland collieries. In this way the first important railway in England was made with the gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches; not from a deliberate choice of this width on the ground of any peculiar advantages, but from the mere fact of its already being established elsewhere.

In the construction of the Manchester and Liverpool Railway, in 1826, the same gauge was adopted as on the Stockton and Darlington; this course was also followed by the Grand Junction and the London and Birmingham Railways, and thus the 4 feet 8½ inches gauge became established in that part of the country.

* * * * *

Long experience appears to have determined the general type of wheeled vehicles: the wheels being of somewhat large size, and the body placed between them, so as to come down close upon the axle-tree.

This type, which gives obvious advantages in a mechanical point of view, appears to have been adhered to in all railway vehicles used before the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway; these, however, were chiefly coal-waggons. But on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway it was soon perceived that the great increase of carrying power which the railway afforded must be met by a corresponding increase of space in the rolling stock, as it was necessary to accommodate light bulky goods and passenger traffic. The available width between the wheels was limited to about 4 feet 6 inches, and to carry in this width any large amount of cotton goods, or of passengers, would have required a train of an inordinate length. To meet this difficulty a new form of vehicle was designed; the wheels were made small, and the body was raised and widened out, projecting on either side over the tops of the wheels.

The earliest description of this form of waggon is contained in the second edition of Wood’s ‘Practical Treatise on Railroads,’ published in 1832, about two years after the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. In Plate III., Mr. Wood shows a truck with a raised platform overhanging the wheels, and adapted for carrying loose boxes of coals; adding, in the description:

Although the drawing shows only the form of boxes used for the conveyance of coals, yet it will readily occur that the form can be varied to suit the carriage of any kind of articles; the framework or body of the carriage being raised above the wheels, the breadth can be extended to any width which the distance between the railways [i.e. between the up and down lines of road] will admit (p. 75).

Such was the state of matters when, in the year 1833, Mr. Brunel was appointed Engineer of the Great Western Railway. With the view of leaving the question of gauge open for future consideration, he procured the omission in the Great Western Act of a clause defining it. He came to the conclusion that it would be desirable to adopt a wider gauge, and he recommended this measure to the Directors in a report dated October 1835.[47]

* * * * *

In October 1836 a Royal Commission, consisting of Mr. Drummond, Under-Secretary for Ireland, Mr. R. Griffith, Colonel (now Field-Marshal) Sir John Burgoyne, R.E., and Professor Barlow, of Woolwich, was appointed to report on the establishment of railways in Ireland. They considered carefully the question of gauge, and their arguments in favour of an increase in the gauge were afterwards stated by Mr. Brunel to be identical with his own.

They drew attention to the advantage of large wheels, the use of which would be facilitated by a wider gauge; and they thought it a matter of importance to be able to place the bodies of the carriages between the wheels, instead of over them.

* * * * *

It was the width of the carriages, and not the distance between the rails, that determined the general dimensions, and therefore the cost, of the works of a railway. Mr. Brunel saw many advantages to be gained by an increase in the gauge, even while retaining the existing dimensions of carriages; and he thought it unwise at the commencement of a work of such magnitude as the Great Western Railway to retain a limit the inconvenience of which had already become apparent.

He says, in his evidence before the Gauge Commission:

Looking to the speed which I contemplated would be adopted on railways, and the masses to be moved, it seemed to me that the whole machine was too small for the work to be done, and that it required that the parts should be on a scale more commensurate with the mass and the velocity to be attained. (Q. 3924.)

The width between the rails being the fundamental dimension of ‘the whole machine,’ on which its entire development must depend, Mr. Brunel proposed to begin by the enlargement of this dimension, and recommended that on the Great Western Railway the gauge should be seven feet. He considered that the whole of the parts of the railway and of its rolling stock would be susceptible of continual, though gradual improvement, and that it was highly advisable to remove, in the outset, a great obstacle in the way of this progress.

He did not in the first instance propose any important change in the details as consequent on the wider gauge; and in regard to one of the principal points, the diameter of the wheels, he said:--

I am not by any means prepared at present to recommend any particular size of wheel, or even any great increase of the present dimensions. I believe they will be materially increased; but my great object would be in every possible way to render each part capable of improvement, and to remove what appears an obstacle to any great progress in such a very important point as the diameter of the wheels, upon which the resistance, which governs the cost of transport and the speed that may be obtained, so materially depends. (Report in Appendix I. p. 532.)

Mr. Brunel also looked forward to the advantages which a wider gauge would give for the construction of the locomotive engines. Difficulties had been already experienced from the limited width between the wheels, which cramped the machinery, rendering it difficult of access for repairs; it also limited the size of the boiler and fire-box, on which the power depended. For this reason Mr. Brunel considered that a wider gauge would present great advantages, as it would allow the locomotives to be constructed of greater power, and with their machinery arranged in a more advantageous manner. He also thought that the greater width of base for the carriages would give increased steadiness and smoothness of motion, with greater safety, particularly at high speeds, and that there would be the advantage of being able to use larger wheels for the carriages. Moreover, he had in view the possibility which the broad gauge would give of adopting wheels of a still larger diameter without raising the centre of gravity, the body of the carriage being placed between them, as in the original type of common road vehicles.

The broad gauge was also considered by Mr. Brunel in prominent connection with the peculiarly favourable circumstances of the Great Western line, in regard to its gradients and curves. He thought that ‘it would not have been embracing all the benefits derivable from the gradients of the Great Western Railway, unless a more extended gauge was adopted.’ In the first place, it was evident that a diminution of the frictional resistance would present the greatest advantage where the gradients were flat. In regard to curves, the wider gauge was at that time considered by him to be more advantageously applied where the curves were of large radius than where they were sharp.[48] On the Great Western Railway both gradients and curves were remarkably good; with the exception of two inclines of 1 in 100, on which auxiliary power was proposed to be used, there was no gradient between London and Bristol steeper than 1 in 660, the greater part of the line being nearly level, and except between Bath and Bristol there was no curve sharper than about one mile radius.

For these reasons Mr. Brunel thought that unusually high speed might easily be attained for passengers, and great tractive power for goods. He said:--

I shall not attempt to argue with those who consider any increase of speed unnecessary. The public will always prefer that conveyance which is the most perfect, and speed, within reasonable limits, is a material ingredient in perfection in travelling. (Report in Appendix I. p. 532.)

In deciding that the distance between the rails should be seven feet, Mr. Brunel seems to have been guided by the principle that the wheels should be put sufficiently far apart to admit of an ordinary carriage body being placed between them.[49]

Mr. Brunel did not anticipate that the difference between the gauge he proposed and that of other railways would lead to any important inconvenience. The views he held on this subject were expressed fully by him in a report of December 13, 1838. He says, speaking of the difficulty of communication between the Great Western and other railways:--

This is undoubtedly an inconvenience; it amounts to a prohibition to almost any railway running northwards from London, as they must all more or less depend for their supply upon other lines or districts where railways already exist, and with which they must hope to be connected. In such cases there is no alternative.

The Great Western Railway, however, broke ground in an entirely new district, in which railways were unknown. At present it commands this district, and has already sent forth branches which embrace nearly all that can belong to it; and it will be the fault of the company if it does not effectually and permanently secure to itself the whole trade of this portion of England, with that of South Wales and the south of Ireland; not by a forced monopoly, which could never long resist the wants of the public, but by such attention to these wants as shall render any competition unnecessary and hopeless. Such is the position of the Great Western Railway. It could have no connection with any other of the main lines, and the principal branches likely to be made were well considered, and almost formed part of the original plan; nor can these be dependent upon any other existing lines for the traffic which they will bring to the main trunk.

Mr. Brunel was not singular in holding the opinion that it would be desirable to allot a given district to one railway, which might conveniently serve it by means of a trunk line and branches of a special gauge. In the Eastern Counties line, designed in 1836, by Mr. Braithwaite, and opened in 1839, a gauge of 5 feet was adopted; and Mr. Robert Stephenson, as engineer of another line, the Northern and Eastern Railway, branching out from the Eastern Counties to the northward, adopted the same gauge. It was not till the Northern and Eastern line was extended, some years afterwards, that the rails of the whole system were altered to the narrow gauge.

* * * * *

Mr. Brunel’s recommendation was adopted by the Directors of the Great Western Railway; and, in their report of August 25, 1836, after observing that the generally level character of the line would greatly facilitate the attainment of a higher speed of travelling, they pointed out the advantages of the broad gauge, and stated that engines had been ordered specially adapted to the nature of the line, which would be capable of attaining with facility a rate of from thirty-five to forty miles per hour.

The line was opened between Paddington and Maidenhead on June 4, 1838, and the performance of the engines was considered satisfactory, trains of eighty tons and upwards being drawn at speeds of from thirty-eight to forty miles per hour.

* * * * *

Notwithstanding these favourable results, the change in regard to the gauge did not pass unquestioned. Attacks were made on it in various quarters, and considerable excitement was caused among the shareholders and the public.

It was asserted that the width of 4 feet 8½ inches was exactly the proper width for all railways, and that a deviation from it was tantamount to the abandonment of an established principle which experience had proved to be correct. It was further alleged that the cost of all the works connected with the formation of the line would be greatly increased; that the carriages must be stronger and heavier, that they would not run round the curves, and would be liable to run off the rails, and particularly that the increased length of the axles would render them liable to be broken. These were not advanced as difficulties which, existing in all railways, might be somewhat increased by the increase of gauge, but they were assumed to be peculiar to the broad gauge, and fatal to it. Some urgent representations appear to have been made to the Directors; for in their report of August 15, 1838, they state, that as the gauge and the permanent way, which had also been the subject of adverse criticism, had been sources of some anxiety to them, they had applied to three of the most eminent authorities on the construction and working of railways--Mr. James Walker, President of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Mr. Robert Stephenson, and Mr. Nicholas Wood, of Newcastle-on-Tyne--to undertake a thorough inspection of the line, to investigate the working of it, and to give their opinion on the plan adopted.

Mr. Walker and Mr. Stephenson declined the task, on the ground that they did not wish to become embroiled in professional controversy, but Mr. Wood undertook it; and a similar commission was afterwards given to Mr. Hawkshaw.

In order to put the shareholders fully in possession of all the information in their power, the Directors published a very complete statement by Mr. Brunel on the arrangements adopted by him. It will be seen that in this report, which is given in Appendix I. p. 525, he states his original arguments, and answers the objections brought against his plans; and he contends that the result of experience establishes their success. In regard to the gauge, he says:--

Everything that has occurred in the practical working of the line confirms me in my conviction that we have secured a most valuable power to the Great Western Railway, and that it would be folly to abandon it.

But the two engineers, to whom the consideration of this matter had been referred, differed materially in opinion from Mr. Brunel. The nature of their investigations and reports, and of Mr. Brunel’s replies, is stated in the extracts given below from the report of the Directors in January 1839.

* * * * *

In addition to the question of gauge, another important matter referred to the consideration of Mr. Wood and Mr. Hawkshaw was the construction of the permanent way.[50] On the Great Western a construction had been introduced by Mr. Brunel differing materially from that ordinarily used; and as defects had shown themselves after the opening of the railway, some anxiety was felt in reference to it by many of the shareholders.

The subject of the permanent way adopted on the Great Western Railway does not necessarily belong to the gauge question, and would, perhaps, have been more properly considered in the chapter on Mr. Brunel’s railway works; but, as a matter of fact, the controversy concerning it became so interwoven with that of the broad gauge, that in a historical account it would be difficult to separate them.

It appeared to Mr. Brunel that, with a view of applying the engine power to the greatest advantage, particularly in attaining high speed, more attention ought to be paid to the construction of the permanent way. He says, in a report dated February 1837:--

It appears to be frequently forgotten that although lofty embankments and deep cuttings, bridges, viaducts, and tunnels are all necessary for forming the level surface upon which the rails are to be laid, yet they are but the means for obtaining that end; and the ultimate object for which these great works are constructed, and for which the enormous expenses consequent upon them are incurred, consits merely of four level parallel lines, not above two inches wide, of a hard and smooth surface; and upon the degree of hardness, smoothness, and parallelism (which last has hitherto been very much neglected) of these four lines depend the speed and cost of transport, and in fact the whole result aimed at....

In forming all my plans I have looked to the perfection of the surface on which the carriages are to run, as the great and ultimate desideratum; and in the detail of construction of this last operation, without which all the previous labour is comparatively wasted, I have always contemplated introducing all the perfection of materials and workmanship of which it is capable.

With a view to improvement on this point, Mr. Brunel considered it would be advantageous if two important changes were made. He proposed, in the first place, to abolish the use of stone blocks for the rails to rest on, and to substitute timber; and, secondly, to apply the support uniformly and continuously along the whole length of the rails, instead of only at intervals.

The first of these changes, namely, the substitution of timber for stone, was not wholly new, for transverse wood sleepers were often used in exceptional situations; but it was the general opinion that stone, where it could be applied, formed the best support for the rails,[51] and the exclusive employment of timber was considered a great innovation.

The other principle, that of ‘continuous bearing,’ was similar to that of the old wooden and stone tramways; and, even as applied to iron rails it had been extensively used before, as Mr. Brunel mentions in his report of August 1838 (see Appendix I. p. 535.)

Mr. Brunel designed for this continuous bearing a peculiar shape of rail, which, from the form of its section, acquired the name of the ‘bridge rail.’ The rail was bolted down to the longitudinal timbers, and the timbers of the two rails were connected together at intervals by cross-pieces, called transoms, bolted to them; these served to keep the two rails at a proper distance apart. The longitudinal timbers lay on gravel or other ‘ballast,’ which had been found to form the best foundation, as being firm and solid, easy of adjustment, and allowing free drainage.[52]

Mr. Brunel, however, thought there would be difficulty in giving the longitudinal baulks a sufficiently solid bearing on the gravel below them.

A similar difficulty had already been experienced with the heavy stone blocks used on other railways. As a remedy for this, Mr. Stephenson caused each block to be lifted and dropped several times on its place, so as to consolidate the ballast below.

The same thing could not be done with a long wooden baulk, and Mr. Brunel therefore contrived another mode of overcoming the difficulty. Piles were driven into the ground between the rails, and their heads bolted to the cross-transoms, the object being to hold the timber framework firmly down. The gravel was then rammed hard under the longitudinal baulks, to give the consolidation desired. The result, however, of this mode of construction was far from successful, and the state of the road, when run over by the trains, was in many places very defective.[53]

In the course of his enquiry Mr. Wood tried a large number of experiments on the Great Western and other lines. He was of opinion that stone blocks afforded a permanently firmer base, and so caused less resistance to the train, but that there was less noise with continuous timber bearings, and that they gave a smoother and a more perfect road for high rates of speed. He thought, however, that the piles were objectionable, and that the weight of the trains would in the course of time sufficiently consolidate the foundation. Mr. Brunel accepted Mr. Wood’s conclusions and abandoned the piling, adopting at the same time larger timbers and heavier rails.

The experience of the permanent way, as thus altered, fully justified the favourable anticipations Mr. Brunel had formed of the continuous timber bearing.[54]

* * * * *

After the reports of Mr. Wood and Mr. Hawkshaw, with Mr. Brunel’s replies to them, had been circulated among the shareholders, a special general meeting was called in London, to receive and consider these documents. It was convened for December 20, 1838, but was adjourned till January 9, 1839. This meeting was of great importance, not only to the Company, but to Mr. Brunel personally, as on the resolutions to be passed depended whether or not his plans should be proceeded with.

He had, however, the warm support of the Directors, as will appear from the following extracts from their report.

It may be here concisely stated, that Mr. Wood deduces from experiments upon the performance of engines on the Great Western and other lines, that although a higher rate of speed has been attained on the former, it would appear only to have been accomplished by the increased power of the engines, with a much greater consumption of coke when calculated per ton per mile. He ascribes this result principally to the resistance presented by the atmosphere to the motion of railway trains, especially at high rates of speed. His remarks on that subject are qualified, however, by the expression of a doubt as to the value to be assigned to the single set of experiments on each of two inclined planes, which are quoted as the authority for the degree of atmospheric resistance supposed to have been discovered.

The reduction of friction by the employment of wheels of increased diameter, and the benefit of lowering the carriages between the wheels, are affirmed by Mr. Wood as incontrovertible. The increased stability, and consequent increased steadiness of motion to carriages on the wider base, are also admitted by him....

The various propositions of doubtful advantage from the wide gauge, as well as of alleged objection to it, appear to have been thoroughly considered in the report in question. The experiments on the consumption of coke at high velocities were unfavourable, and, in connection with the theory of atmospheric resistance, appear to have influenced the mind of Mr. Wood to consider that a seven-feet gauge was beyond the width which he would deem the best. At the same time, upon a review of all the circumstances, and considering that there are counteracting advantages, incidental to an increased width of gauge, he does not think that the result of his enquiries would justify a change in the dimensions adopted on this line, and he recommends the present width should be retained.

The advice thus given by Mr. Wood, upon mature reflection, being directly at variance with the conclusion at which Mr. Hawkshaw had previously arrived upon an investigation similarly delegated to him, it became the duty of the Directors to consider most attentively the train of reasoning and argument which led the latter to urge such an opposite course. Naturally expecting from that circumstance to find in his report a clear and definite statement of the positive loss or disadvantages accruing from the increased width of gauge, the Directors could not fail to remark with some surprise that he enforces his recommendation, not upon any ascertained injury or failure in the plan, but almost exclusively upon the presumption that all railways, however disconnected or locally situated, should be constructed of one uniform width. While he appears to think that it might be an improvement to have an addition of a few inches, five or six at the most, he still questions the expediency of any variation from the 4 feet 8½ inches gauge. Mr. Hawkshaw, in his report, also considers any additional expense upon the gauge, as well as upon the improvement of gradients, to be undesirable, and assumes it at a scale of augmentation far beyond the real difference of cost. His estimates on that head are impeached in the engineer’s observations, and no doubt exists in the minds of the Directors, that the subject, reduced to a mere question of figures, in its present position, would undeniably show a pecuniary loss to be borne by the Company by any such change of system as he advocates, even if it were on other grounds deemed advisable. The objection that the wide gauge might prevent a junction with other lines seems both to Mr. Wood and the Directors to have but little weight, as applied to the Great Western Railway. Already has the same width been contemplated and provided for in the extension lines through Gloucestershire to Cheltenham and from Bristol to Exeter. Any local branches hereafter to be made would undoubtedly follow the same course, and the proprietors, therefore, may be satisfied that no apprehension need be entertained by them on that head.

The advantage of following Mr. Wood’s advice, in not making any alteration in the width of way, has been since most forcibly shown by more recent experiments, which have entirely changed the results upon which the chief objections to the gauge were founded. The performance of the engines, shown by Mr. Wood’s experiments in September, gave such a disproportionate result in their power upon the attainment of high velocities, as to render it all but impossible that the effect could be entirely produced by the action of the atmosphere on the trains. All doubts were shortly removed by its being ascertained that a different cause (a mere mechanical defect in the engine itself) had been in operation. If Mr. Wood had witnessed these recent performances of the engines, he must unquestionably have changed his opinions as to the means and practicability of carrying full average loads at a high speed, without the great increased expense of fuel. The Directors have satisfied themselves of this very important fact, by personally attending an experiment (accompanied by several gentlemen, among whom was a very eminent practical mechanic), on which occasion the ‘North Star’ took a train of carriages, calculated for 166 passengers, and loaded to 43 tons, to and from Maidenhead, at a mean average speed of thirty-eight miles per hour, the maximum being forty-five miles per hour, consuming only 0·95, or less than 1 lb. of coke per net ton per mile, instead of 2·76, say 2¾ lbs., as previously shown. This was accomplished by a mere altered proportion in the blast pipe of the engine, in the manner explained by Mr. Brunel, being a simple adaptation of size in one of the parts, which admits a more free escape of steam from the cylinder, after it has exerted its force on the piston, still preserving sufficient draft in the fire.[55]

It must be almost needless to point out to those who have perused the reports, how importantly this change bears upon the subject in almost every relation of the enquiry. It negatives the assumption that the velocity can only be attained by a ruinous loss of power. It establishes beyond doubt that the consumption of fuel as now ascertained, in proportion to the load, is only one-third of that which from the former experiments had been the basis of Mr. Wood’s arguments. An analysis in the report of the performance of the Great Western engines, with heavy loads varying from 80 tons to 166 tons, shows in every respect a peculiarly satisfactory result at a small cost of fuel, and warrants the expectation of very great benefit to the Company from the economical transport of goods on the line. That the expenses of locomotive repairs, especially on that heavy class of repair which arise from lateral strains on the wheels and framing of the engines, have been materially less than on other lines is ascertained by very detailed accounts, accurately made and submitted to the Board by the superintendent of that department. The experience of some months has now enabled the Directors to witness the progressive improvement in the practical working of the railway. A higher rate of speed has been generally maintained than on other lines, and at the same time, with that increased speed, great steadiness of motion has been found in the carriages, with consequent comfort to the passengers. If speed, security, and comfort, were three great desiderata in the original institution of railway travelling, the Directors feel sure that the public will appreciate and profit by any improvements in those qualities, the Company deriving ample remuneration in the shape of increased traffic. A saving of time upon a long journey, with increased comfort, will necessarily attract to one line in preference to another many travellers from beyond the ordinary distance of local connection, and will thus secure a valuable collateral trade which would not otherwise belong to it. It has also a decided tendency to avert competition, which may with much reason be regarded as the chief peril to which railway property is subjected.

The Directors, upon a deliberate reconsideration of all the circumstances affecting the permanent welfare of the undertaking, divesting the question of all personal partialities or obstinate adherence to a system, unanimously acquiesce in the abandonment of the piles, in the substitution of a greater scantling of timber, and of a heavier rail, retaining the width of gauge with the continuous timber bearings, as the most conducive to the general interests of the Company.

The views of the Directors were approved of by the majority of the shareholders (the numbers being 7,792 for, and 6,145 against); and the construction of the line was proceeded with according to Mr. Brunel’s plans.

* * * * *

By June 30, 1841, the whole length of the Great Western Railway was opened from London to Bristol. Some of the Directors’ reports mention the fact that the speed uniformly maintained by the engines much exceeded the ordinary rate of railway travelling, and allude to the ‘general testimony borne to the smoothness and comfort of the line and carriages.’

* * * * *

As has been before mentioned, extensions and branches on the same gauge, to all of which Mr. Brunel was engineer, were projected and ultimately carried out, in accordance with the original scheme of the undertaking, to Exeter, Plymouth, and Cornwall, and to Gloucester, Hereford, and South Wales, as well as to Oxford, Windsor, and other towns in the immediate neighbourhood of the line.

About 1844, the attention of the Company began to be directed to projects involving extensions of a much more serious character, and which were destined to have a powerful influence on the position of the gauge question. During the railway mania, the Great Western Company found it impossible to stand aloof from the contests which were going on around them, and thought it necessary, in order to protect their own interests, to extend their lines beyond the district to which they had originally intended to confine themselves.

At the general meeting in August, an extension from Oxford to Rugby was determined on, as ‘of the greatest importance to the Great Western line.’ About the same time a broad-gauge line was promoted from Oxford to Worcester, and thence by Kidderminster and Dudley to Wolverhampton, in order to open an immediate communication with the Staffordshire and Worcestershire districts. There were also rival projects on the narrow gauge, promoted by the London and Birmingham Company; and the competing plans were referred, as was the custom at that time, for the examination of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade.

In regard to the communication from north to south, through Oxford, the question was, where the break of gauge should be.[56] The Board of Trade saw nothing in the relative merits of the gauges to determine this question, and from commercial considerations, they recommended that the change of gauge should be made at Oxford. On this and other grounds they considered that the narrow gauge schemes to the north of Oxford were preferable to those of the Great Western Railway.

The rival schemes then went before Parliament, and after a protracted enquiry, obstinately fought between the parties, the decision was given in favour of the Great Western lines, contrary to the recommendation of the Board of Trade. It was, however, stated by the chairman of the Commons Committee that the decision had been founded on the local and general merits of the respective lines, without any reference to the comparative merits of the two gauges. On this account some peculiar provisions were made in the Acts; for though the lines were sanctioned on the broad gauge, the proprietors were bound also to lay down narrow gauge rails upon them, if required to do so by the Board of Trade. At the same time the House of Commons, on the motion of Mr. Cobden, passed a Resolution praying her Majesty to refer the gauge question to a Royal Commission.

A Commission was issued in July; the Commissioners being three in number--Sir J. M. Frederic Smith, R.E.; Mr. G. B. Airy, Astronomer Royal; and Professor Barlow, of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. They took a large amount of evidence, both oral and documentary, and made some examinations of the working of the two gauges. Their report was presented to Parliament early in the session of 1846.

Of forty-eight witnesses, thirty-five were advocates of the narrow gauge; and against these were arrayed but four champions of the broad gauge, all officers of the Great Western Railway:--Mr. Charles Alexander Saunders, the secretary; Mr. Seymour Clarke, the traffic superintendent; Mr. (now Sir Daniel) Gooch, the locomotive superintendent; and Mr. Brunel.

The report was of considerable length, and in it the Commissioners addressed themselves to three heads of enquiry, viz.:--

1. Whether the break of gauge was an inconvenience of so much importance as to demand the interference of the legislature.

2. What means could be adopted for obviating or mitigating such inconvenience.

3. Considerations on the general policy of establishing a uniformity of gauge throughout the country.

The general conclusions arrived at on these points were thus summed up by the Commissioners:--

1. That, as regards the safety, accommodation and convenience of the passengers, no decided preference is due to either gauge, but that on the broad gauge the motion is generally more easy at high velocities.

2. That, in respect of speed, we consider that the advantages are with the broad gauge; but we think the public safety would be endangered in employing the greater capabilities of the broad gauge much beyond their present use, except on roads more consolidated, and more substantially and perfectly formed, than those of the existing lines.

3. That, in the commercial case of the transport of goods, we believe the narrow gauge to possess the greater convenience, and to be the more suited to the general traffic of the country.

4. That the broad gauge involves the greater outlay, and that we have not been able to discover, either in the maintenance of way, in the cost of locomotive power, or in the other annual expenses, any adequate reduction to compensate for the additional first cost.

Therefore, esteeming the importance of the highest speed on express trains for the accommodation of a comparatively small number of persons, however desirable that may be to them, as of far less moment than affording increased convenience to the general commercial traffic of the country, we are inclined to consider the narrow gauge as that which should be preferred for general convenience, and therefore, if it were imperative to produce uniformity, we should recommend that uniformity to be produced by an alteration of the broad to the narrow gauge....

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Commissioners recommended that 4 feet 8½ inches should be fixed by law as the standard gauge of the country; and that as to the existing broad gauge lines, either they should be altered to the narrow gauge, or some course adopted which would admit of narrow gauge carriages passing along them.[57]

This adverse report was a great surprise to the supporters of the broad gauge system, as rumours had led them to hope for a different result. Immediately after its appearance, several documents were published, containing powerful and severe strictures on the proceedings and opinions of the Commissioners. The most important of these was written by Mr. Saunders, Mr. Daniel Gooch, and Mr. Brunel. It occupied fifty closely printed folio pages, and was entitled, ‘Observations on the Report of the Gauge Commissioners, presented to Parliament.’ To this, ‘Supplemental Observations’ were added, after the publication of the Evidence and the Appendix to the Report.

In the conclusion of the ‘Observations’ the writers gave a summary of the points they considered to have been proved in the controversy, namely--

* * * * *

That the question of ‘break of gauge’ originated as a cloak to a monopoly.

That even if the gauge were uniform, through trains would be impracticable.

That the transfer would be of little inconvenience.

That any advantage of small waggons was applicable to the broad gauge, but that the advantage of large waggons was not applicable to the narrow.

That the competition between the two systems was advantageous.

That the final recommendations of the Commissioners were at variance with their separate conclusions.

That it would be unjust to refuse to allow the broad gauge to be laid down on lines for which it was already sanctioned by Parliament.

That the enquiry before the Commissioners was not properly conducted, and that consequently no legislation ought to be founded on it.

That the data published by the Commissioners were often wrong, and in some cases led to the reverse of their conclusions.

That greater economy was proved on the broad gauge.

That the broad gauge was superior in the points of safety, speed, and conveyance of troops.

That the experiments made in the presence of the Commissioners had demonstrated beyond all controversy the complete success of the broad-gauge system.

For these and other reasons, a strong protest was made against any legislative interference with the broad-gauge system.

A reply was published to these arguments; and during the controversy a large number of pamphlets, articles, and other publications appeared on both sides.

* * * * *

Mr. Brunel’s views on the whole question, about this time, are concisely expressed in the following letter, written to a friend in France, who asked for information on the subject of the broad gauge:--

August 4, 1845.

I am just off for Italy, but write a few hasty lines in reply to Mons. ----’s queries, and which you must scold him for not addressing direct to me. Nobody can answer such questions but myself, and I am compelled to be very brief.

In answer to the _first_, I send a drawing.

_Secondly._ I see no reason why the ordinary construction of rails, chairs, and sleepers should not be equally applicable to the wide gauge as to the narrow. I have used them occasionally. I should think 75 lbs. per yard heavy enough for any purposes.

_Thirdly._ Within all ordinary limits, certainly in curves of more than 250 metres [12½ chains] radius, the gauge does not affect the question of curves. The effect of a curve of larger radius than this appears, both from much observation as from theory, to arise merely from _two_ causes, the one centrifugal force, which is easily neutralised, and is independent of gauge; the other from the axles not being able to travel in the direction of the radius, and consequently the wheels not running in a tangent to the curve. This also is unaffected by the width of gauge. Practically I believe the conditions are not altered.

_Fourthly._ The expenses of construction are not dependent on the breadth of gauge unless the total width allowed for the loads or carriages is thereby or for other reasons increased, which is not a necessary consequence of a seven-feet gauge.

The wide gauge could be laid upon the London and Birmingham Railway without altering any of the works, but in constructing the Great Western Railway I thought it desirable to provide for carrying larger bodies, and I placed the centres of the two railways 13 feet apart, instead of 11 feet, and therefore my railway became _four_ feet wider in total width.

The increased cost of this, including the cost of land, will vary from 300_l._ to 500_l._ per mile.

_Fifthly._ The increase of width will not increase the weight of an engine (of the same power) 500 lbs., but I avail myself of the larger width to get more powerful engines, and they weigh, with water in the boiler, 18 to 21 tons. I send a drawing of one; the stroke is 18 inches.

_Sixthly._ The passenger carriages are all on six wheels, and excessively strong; at present the framework of carriages and the whole of the waggons are made of iron. The first-class carriages weigh, with wheels, &c., 7 tons 16 cwt. (17,472 lbs.), and carry 32 passengers. Second-class about the same weight, and hold 72.

_Seventhly_ and _Eighthly_. The comparison being on different railways under different managements and totally different circumstances, no strictly correct comparative results can be given; and of course the most opposite opinions are entertained and expressed. I believe we travel much quicker at the same cost and with more ease, and certainly the wear and tear of engines and carriages is _very much less_ with us than with the other lines; but for the reasons above stated it cannot be made matter of exact proof, but remains matter of opinion.

The report of the Gauge Commission, on being presented to Parliament, was referred by the House of Commons to the Board of Trade, who reported on it in June 1846. They did not, however, concur with the Commissioners to the full extent of their recommendations; for, while admitting the break of gauge to be an evil, they could not, having regard to the circumstances under which the broad gauge companies had been established, and the interest they had acquired, recommend either that the broad gauge should be reduced to narrow, or that rails should be laid down for narrow gauge traffic over all their lines. Such measures would involve great expense, and they were unable to suggest any equitable mode of meeting it.

This conclusion necessarily affected the opinion of the Board of Trade in regard to the several lines under construction connected with the Great Western Railway, which the Board recommended should be all made on the broad gauge.

In regard to the broad-gauge lines sanctioned by Parliament from Oxford to Rugby, and from Oxford to Worcester and Wolverhampton, the Board determined to exercise their powers in requiring the narrow gauge to be laid down, in addition to the broad.

The House of Commons adopted the recommendations of the Board of Trade, and passed a series of resolutions in conformity thereto, and ‘An Act for regulating the Gauge of Railways’ received the Royal Assent on August 18, 1846.

It was enacted that it should not be lawful to construct any new passenger railway on any other gauge than 4 feet 8½ inches in England, and 5 feet 3 inches in Ireland.

Exceptions, however, were made in favour of certain lines in the west of England and South Wales.

The provisions relating to the gauge in the Acts for the Oxford and Rugby, and the Oxford, Worcester, and Wolverhampton Railways, were left in force.

The Act also generally excepted ‘any railway constructed or to be constructed under the provisions of any present or future Act containing any special enactment defining the gauge or gauges of such railway or any part thereof.’

This Act, while it professed to establish the narrow gauge as the standard throughout the kingdom, did so only nominally; in reality, by the words ‘present or future,’ in the passage above quoted, it left the question of the gauge of any new railway open for the consideration of the committee on the particular bill; and it only obliged the promoters of the undertaking to adopt the narrow gauge when no case could be proved by them for the adoption of some other. This was equivalent to the former state of things, so that all the agitation of the question had ended in a mere expression of opinion, and the broad-gauge party were not only left with all their former liberty, but were encouraged, and almost compelled, to push their system still farther wherever they could.

* * * * *

About the time of the passing of the Gauge Act, a Board of Commissioners of Railways was established, to whom the powers formerly possessed by the Board of Trade were transferred.

One of the first duties of the Commissioners was to provide for the due compliance with the order of the Board of Trade respecting the introduction of the narrow gauge, in conjunction with the broad, on the Oxford and Rugby Railway.

It was proposed to effect this either by laying a narrow gauge line concentrically between the two rails of the broad gauge, or by laying down only one additional rail between the two broad-gauge rails, making one of the latter serve for both broad and narrow gauges. Mr. Brunel recommended the second of these plans to be adopted on the Oxford and Rugby line.

After a careful consideration of the question, the Commissioners sanctioned the mixed gauge formed by the introduction of a third rail; this was accordingly laid down, and none of the dangers which were at the time prognosticated in reference to it were found to exist. It has been the plan almost exclusively used in the many cases where the combination of the two gauges has been required.

* * * * *

In 1846 the Great Western Railway Company had promoted a bill for a branch to Birmingham from the Oxford and Rugby line at Fenny Compton. The Act was obtained, but they were defeated on the question of the gauge. However, after the passing of the Gauge Act, the Company again attempted to carry the broad gauge to Birmingham. Their application was backed by a strong memorial from the districts interested, and in June 1847 an order was passed by the House of Lords directing the Board of Commissioners of Railways--

To inquire into the accommodation afforded by the several lines of railway now open, or in the course of construction, or projected, between London and Birmingham; and to report to this House, early in the ensuing Session of Parliament in what manner they are of opinion that the interests of the public may be most effectually ecured in regard to such lines; and whether it is expedient that the broad gauge should be extended to Birmingham; and if so, in what manner such an arrangement can be carried into effect with the least interference with existing interests....

This, of course, opened up again the whole question of the comparative merits of the two gauges.

The Railway Commissioners issued a series of queries addressed to the officials of the Great Western and the London and North Western Railway Companies, and others. On the part of the Great Western, answers were given by Mr. Brunel and Mr. Daniel Gooch. Mr. Gooch also furnished the results, with tables and diagrams, of a very comprehensive series of dynamometrical experiments, made by him on a mile of straight and level line on the Bristol and Exeter Railway. These experiments fully demonstrated the advantages of the broad gauge, and are still the chief authority on train resistances.[58]

In their report the Commissioners adopted the opinion of the Gauge Commissioners ‘that a break of gauge was a most serious impediment in the transport of merchandise, and that the broad gauge did not offer any compensating advantage so far as that description of traffic was concerned.’ In regard, however, to passenger traffic, they found a case for further enquiry. They said--

It is notorious that higher speeds, with larger and heavier passenger trains, are regularly maintained on a part of the line of the Great Western Railway than on any other railway in the country. This fact is known and greatly appreciated by a very large portion of the public; and no opinion respecting the extension of the district within which the broad gauge should be adopted is likely to be received with confidence which is not founded on a full consideration of the circumstances to which the above fact is to be attributed, and of the extent to which, under differing circumstances, if attributable to the breadth of gauge, the gauge of the Great Western Railway offers this advantage (p. 11).

They assumed that the greater speed was due to greater engine power, and they admitted that the increase of gauge allowed of an increase in the size and power of the locomotive. They arrived at the result that the broad-gauge engine ‘can draw on a level an ordinary ‘passenger train of 60 tons with as much facility at ‘sixty miles an hour as the narrow-gauge engines can at ‘fifty,’ the advantage, however, diminishing with steep gradients. In their report the following passages are to be found:--

Such appear to the Commissioners to be the advantages which the broad gauge at present offers; and although they cannot consider them sufficient to compensate the evils attendant on two gauges, if it were now possible to obtain uniformity of gauge, yet, as two gauges are established, it appears to them that it might be expedient, and for the public interest, on account of those advantages, to extend the broad gauge to Birmingham ... (p. 14.)

By introducing the mixed gauge on the Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway, the line from Birmingham by Fenny Compton to London would probably offer, as a broad-gauge railway, as rapid a communication as the existing direct line;[59] and great as the advantages which the public have received by the rivalry between the gauges, in the rapid improvement in railway travelling, have been, it might even be expected that these would be further increased when the two systems are brought into direct competition, which as yet they have not been (p. 16).

The report of the Railway Commissioners was presented in May 1848. Their decision was ratified by the passing of an Act in the same session for extending the broad gauge from Oxford to Birmingham; and the line was opened in October 1852.

Beyond Birmingham the Great Western Company purchased existing railways leading through Wolverhampton and Shrewsbury to Chester, and obtained access to Birkenhead and Manchester. It thus secured a communication with the great Lancashire towns and the manufacturing districts.

But all the lines north of Wolverhampton had been constructed on the narrow gauge, and therefore, unless the broad gauge had been laid down on these lines, there was a break of gauge between the northern districts and London.

The break of gauge was found to be a much more serious evil than had been anticipated by the Great Western Company when they were fighting their great battle in 1845. For passengers the inconvenience was unimportant; but for the goods traffic between the manufacturing towns and London it was serious, partly on account of the expense, but more especially in consequence of the loss of time. The delay of some hours by change of waggons, where great competition existed, was fatal.

For these reasons the abolition of the break of gauge became desirable. The number of narrow-gauge lines had by the year 1861 been so increased that there was no longer any hope of advantageously extending the broad gauge in the north. Therefore the mixed gauge was completed to London.

After the establishment of the narrow-gauge communication on the northern lines of the Great Western, and its prolongation to London, there was but little inducement to use the broad gauge north of Didcot.

* * * * *

So far as it extended, the broad gauge had exhibited in a marked degree the advantages Mr. Brunel claimed for it, and which were neither few nor unimportant.

It may be desirable before concluding this chapter to sum up those advantages:--

1. It gave the power of constructing more powerful engines, by which greater speed for passenger trains and greater tractive power for heavy goods trains were obtained.[60]

2. It gave more space for the convenient arrangement and beneficial proportions of the machinery, as well as for convenient access to it. In all these points difficulties had been found on the narrow gauge; and the compulsory restriction of so important a dimension as the width between the rails has been a bar to any improvements of great magnitude or comprehensive nature.

3. It gave, even with the overhanging carriage, the facility for obtaining large wheels, and consequently diminishing the axle friction without sacrifice of stability.

4. The greater width of base for the carriages to rest on gave increased steadiness and smoothness of motion, particularly at high speeds. It was the impulse given by the increase of speed and comfort obtained without difficulty on the broad gauge, which had led to the chief improvements introduced in railway travelling.

5. Greater safety was secured, particularly at high speed, from the greater stability of position due to the wider base, producing increased steadiness and diminishing the chance under exceptional circumstances of the derangement of any part of the train.

6. While the broad gauge was but little more costly than the narrow, the width of the works being determined not by the width of the rails, but by the width of the carriages, and the extra cost of rolling stock being very small,[61] the broad gauge could be worked more economically under parallel circumstances than the narrow.

7. It gave the facility of using broader vehicles with equal steadiness, in cases where the extra breadth would be useful, though the extra breadth was by no means an essential part of the scheme.

* * * * *

The truth of these assertions, as establishing the superiority of the broad gauge, was of course vehemently denied by the advocates of the narrow gauge.

One objection urged by them, the inconveniences of the break of gauge, has undoubtedly been proved by experience to be a very powerful one, so powerful indeed as to compel the abandonment of the broad gauge on the lines where any considerable quantity of goods traffic has to be carried in competition with other companies.

Had Mr. Brunel’s original plan been carried out, and had the broad-gauge companies taken possession of all the western portions of England, and avoided extensions into the north, the points of contact would no doubt have been so unimportant that no great inconvenience would have arisen, or a few miles of double gauge would have removed any difficulty; but, under the actual circumstances of the case, the Great Western Company were forced to yield.

* * * * *

The advantages of the broad gauge were so much appreciated by the districts it served, that its abandonment was viewed with considerable displeasure, particularly in the neighbourhood of Birmingham; but the inconvenience of double traffic arrangements far outweighed the advantages derivable from the use of the broad gauge, to the limited extent it could be applied on those outlying portions of the Great Western system. For these reasons the Company came to the determination to work their northern lines on the narrow gauge only.

The broad gauge is therefore now confined to the district for which it was originally intended. Even in this district there are many points of contact with the narrow gauge; but the inconveniences of break of gauge are by no means so important as they were in the north, and do not, at present at least, menace the continued existence of Mr. Brunel’s design.