CHAPTER XII.
"And with such care his busy work he plied, That to naught else his acting thoughts he bent. In young Rinaldo fierce desires he spied, And noble heart of rest impatient, To wealth or sov'reign power he naught applied His wits, but all to virtue excellent." _Fairfax's Tasso._
GARIBALDI'S POSITION—A PAUSE IN HOSTILITIES—A PERIOD OF PREPARATION—PUBLIC ANXIETY—THE SICILIAN FORTRESSES—CATANIA— MILAZZO—BOATS, MEN AND ARMS COLLECTED AT FARO—LANDING ATTEMPTED AT SCYLLA—A SMALL BODY SUCCEED.
Garibaldi had now been forbidden by the king to attempt any further conquests, and warned not to attempt to dethrone the King of Naples; and he had declared that he should do both. From that moment Victor Emanuel was virtually proclaimed "King of Italy," in spite of his own will and word. What induced Victor to write that letter may easily be imagined; what induced his prime minister to dictate it, will probably be always a matter of conjecture. Garibaldi's reply, and the measures which he subsequently adopted, with the results to which they led, will ever stand on record, where they can be read by the present and succeeding generations; and the world will form their own opinions of his character and capacity, without the aid of many comments or explanations.
Much was said and conjectured respecting the dissension which had existed before this time, between Garibaldi and Farina, a particular friend of Count Cavour. Garibaldi had appointed Farina counsellor at Palermo, and afterward dismissed him. It appears, even from Farina's own statement, that it did not arise from any disposition in Garibaldi to establish a republic, or otherwise to prevent the final annexation of Sicily to the kingdom of Sardinia, but was merely to postpone it for a time which he thought more favorable. It appears from other evidence, that Farina wished to have severe measures taken against some of the Republicans, but that Garibaldi rejected the proposal with noble scorn; and to prevent his further interference, banished him and two others from Sicily, by the following decree:
"'Signor La Farina, Grasselli and Toti, are affiliated to the police of the Continent. The three were expelled for having conspired against order. The government, which watches over public tranquillity, could not tolerate the presence of such individuals.'
"The 'Opinione National' of Turin, stated that Farina had full power from the Sardinian government to assume the title of royal commissioner, as soon as annexation was declared. Garibaldi, while advocating annexation, thought it advisable that his dictatorship should continue till the whole island was subjected, and finding that the presence of Farina was detrimental to the cause, he ordered him off."
La Farina afterward published the following explanation:
"The causes of my difference with General Garibaldi were as follow: I believed, and still believe, that the only salvation for Sicily is immediate annexation to the constitutional kingdom of Victor Emanuel, the most ardent wish of all the Sicilians, already manifested by the chiefs of more than three hundred municipal bodies. General Garibaldi believed that the annexation should be postponed till the liberation of all Italy, including Venetia and Rome, had been effected. I believed that it was a great act of imprudence to confide a share of authority and of the public forces to unpopular ministers, etc."
There was now a general suspension of hostilities. The entire island of Sicily was quiet, and none of the king's troops remained, except in a few of the fortresses. The circumstances under which some of these had been captured, or been forced to cease resistance, are interesting, but with the exception of Palermo, they have not been given for want of room.
The strait between Sicily and Calabria has been invested with peculiar interest to readers of history from early ages. The rocks and quicksands of Scylla and Charybdis, with the fabulous sirens of which we read in Virgil in our youth, give us impressions which are never lost. But there are more modern associations with that arm of the sea and its shores, of more real importance in the view of persons acquainted with them. American ships have long visited Palermo, Messina, Catania, and some of the other ports of Sicily, and oranges are brought to us from that fruitful island, many of which grow on the opposite coast of Calabria, or Magna Grecia, as it was formerly called. Hills arise from near the water, and mountains appear behind them, where scenes of rocky barrenness are intermingled with valleys of verdure and fertility, inhabited by a population in a simple state of society, the descendants of ancient Greeks, mingled with races which at successive periods came in from different countries. These had been for ages subject to the degrading influences of Romish spiritual rule, and of the despots of various countries, especially those of Spain and the Bourbons. But the seeds of intelligence have been assiduously sown and cherished of late years by the patriotic societies of Italy, who by their cautious, yet often daring and hazardous efforts, have long since brought many of the poor and rude, but brave and faithful Calabrians into the band of Italian unity. The events of late years had proved that the people of that part of the peninsula were to some extent connected with the great union; but the approach of Garibaldi and his reception have since shown that the influences so long and so secretly at work had not been justly appreciated. There was no considerable insurrection in Calabria during the conquest of Sicily, and it might have been presumed, from the general quietness of the population, that they were unable or unwilling to join with the patriots against the government of the King of Naples. Some practised observers of Italian affairs, however, regarded that general tranquillity as the best evidence of a general concert, and looked for a general rising of the people when the hour should arrive, and the signal should be given. Garibaldi, in the whole course of his proceedings, acted as if he had information not known to others; and a review of events, since they have passed, and are now fresh in our memory, is calculated to confirm us in this opinion.
In the long and anxious suspense which occurred before any movement was made against Calabria, questions were asked, how the flotilla of boats, which Garibaldi was collecting on the coast of Sicily, could be risked across the strait without a single ship of war to convoy them, and with only two small steamers and one larger one to tow them, while a squadron of the king's steamers was cruising between the shores, and the landing-place was strongly defended by three forts, with heavy cannon, and the whole Calabrian coast was occupied by royal troops. The currents, so terrible to mariners in ancient times, are still violent and irregular.
It was natural to ask, What is coming? What is about to happen? Are the apprehensions of Victor to be realized? Has the king a clearer sight than his gallant precursor, who has hitherto proved his prudence an equal match with his valor? Is this famous strait to prove its fatal character, so long ago recorded in fable; and is this passage then, so dreadful to mariners, to be the destruction of our noble sailor? Will he pass safely between Scylla and Charybdis, or meet his end on one or the other? On which and how will he be wrecked; and by what unfortunate circumstances? Not far distant from this spot, on a point on the coast of Calabria, the two Bandieras, sons of an Austrian admiral, but true Italian patriots, were decoyed to their death, by means of letters violated in the British postoffice. Has Garibaldi been made a dupe, by any artifice; and has Victor been apprised of danger? Has Louis Napoleon once more changed his policy, and, after favoring Italy in her "latest victories," as Garibaldi recently acknowledged, has he prepared, in consistency with his conduct in 1849, a scheme for something on the opposite side?
These, and many other questions, naturally disturbed the minds of the friends of Italy, while standing in reality or in fancy on the shore of Sicily, and looking in vain for any sign of the fate which awaited him on the other coast? But, when we turned, even in imagination, to observe Garibaldi, there was, as ever, something to dispel apprehension, and to encourage the highest hopes; for, as that patriot priest-poet, Dall'Ongaro wrote:
"O, well you might say that a saint was his mother, For there a mild brilliancy beams in his eyes, Which sure was sent down from Paradise."
But on the morning of the 8th of August, Garibaldi began to collect his troops near Faro, which amounted to 15,000 or 18,000 men, without counting the garrison of Messina. The Point of Faro had the appearance of a vast fortified camp, being covered with cannon of all sizes, from mountain howitzers to English 68-pounders, ready to be embarked in the three steamers, which were under steam; while 300 boats were drawn up ready to receive Garibaldi's troops.
About midnight twenty-five or thirty boats sailed from the coast of Sicily. They were going to attempt a first landing. In three quarters of an hour they crossed to the other side. Unfortunately the current did not permit them to keep the order of their position. Some were driven toward Faro, others swept under the forts of Scylla; some ran fast on sandbanks further south, while others again were thrown toward Pizzo. The soldiers, however, did not lose their courage at this misfortune. Two or three hundred were landed in all haste, and the flotilla returned to Faro without accident.
On the morning of the 10th a new attempt was made, under the command of an old officer of the French marine service, M. Deflotte: but scarcely had this expedition appeared on the coast, when the enemy rushed upon them from a thousand ambuscades, vineyards, gardens, ditches, and houses. A sharp firing ensued: two Garibaldians were wounded, and the expedition was compelled to return, not, however, without having vigorously responded to the fire of the Neapolitans.
On the night of the 10th and 11th, another landing was vainly attempted. The Neapolitan squadron came up nearer to Faro, and watched every movement of the Garibaldians. The day of the 11th was passed in embarking the artillery. A desperate attempt was spoken of for the next night. At seven o'clock in the evening the Garibaldian steamers began to fire up, and the troops placed themselves in readiness for embarking; but at eleven o'clock a counter-order arrived. About one o'clock in the night was heard a loud cannonade; the firing extended from the forts of Scylla to the fortifications of Pizzo. The squadron remained silent; the engagement had therefore taken place on the land.
It seemed to be evident that the forts were simultaneously attacked by the volunteers and the Calabrians. At a quarter past two the firing ceased: it recommenced after a quarter of an hour in order to cease again after a few minutes. At daybreak, a small boat, chased by a Neapolitan corvette, sought protection under the guns of Faro.
The small party destined to land first in Calabria were under Major Missori, and had been picked from the different volunteer corps. They had been ordered to land on the opposite coast between Scylla and Forte del Cavallo. It is on the extreme point of the Calabrian shore that these forts are situate, at a little distance one from the other. The castle of Scylla stands upon a rock, quite inaccessible from the seaside. Forte del Cavallo is a little further to the left of it, and its walls and fortifications slope gradually down toward the road which skirts the sea, very much like that from Nice to Genoa, which is called the Corniche Road.
On Wednesday evening, the sky so generally blue and bright in this country, was covered with dense whitish clouds, and the night, therefore, was very dark. Garibaldi, who knows how to take advantage even of the smallest incident, at once ordered Missori to sail. Major Missori, having embarked his men on board of large fishing vessels, consequently started at half-past nine o'clock from the Sicilian shore. The Neapolitan cruisers steaming up and down the straits, though numerous and powerful, did not seem to possess the eyes of Argus, and therefore the little expedition was able to land at the intended point. Before reaching the Calabrian coast, however, one of the boats parted company from the other, and sailed a little down toward Scylla Point, just where a Neapolitan battery had been erected. The men on guard in this battery gave the alarm, and the boat was fired at and one English volunteer wounded. Garibaldi had ordered Missori to endeavor to surprise the garrison of Fort Scylla, and to capture the fort. But on hearing the rattling of musketry, and the report of a gun on his left, Missori rightly thought that it would be impossible to seize Fort Scylla by surprise. He therefore hastened to make the concerted signal, informing the Dictator that he had safely landed, and he and his men ascended the rough paths into the Calabrian mountains. As for his companions in the boat which had missed its way, they returned to the Sicilian shore to relate the cause of their failure.
Menotti, Garibaldi's eldest son, arrived at night from Palermo with 800 of the volunteers of Bertani's last expedition. The Dictator had then 20,000 or 25,000 men. His army had been formed into four divisions. That of Medici was at Messina, watching the movements of the Neapolitans, who still held the citadel; the other three were partly concentrated at Faro, a brigade posted at Milazzo and Barcelona, and another, under Bixio, was sent to Bronte, in the province of Catania.
Through the evening of August 11th, fires were seen on the Calabrian mountains behind Pizzo. They were evidently signals made to Garibaldi by the Calabrian bands which had joined the expedition of Major Missori. From about half-past ten, firing was heard in the direction of Fort Scylla; but as that place is hidden from view by the land about Torre del Cavallo, nothing could be clearly distinguished except the heavy boom of artillery. The Neapolitan steamers were cruizing all night, as usual; but they did not fire, and only made signals with rockets. It is supposed that the firing was caused by an attack made by Major Missori's party on Fort Scylla.
The following proclamations appeared the next day:
ORDER OF THE DAY.
"FARO, AUG. 12.
"OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE LAND AND SEA FORCES: The General Dictator having for a short time quitted headquarters, left me the following Order:
"GENERAL SIRTORI: I leave to you the command of the land and sea forces, being obliged to leave for a few days.
"G. GARIBALDI.
"OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS: My greatest title to your confidence is the confidence which the man reposes in me who represents your noblest aspirations. I trust that you will obey me as you would obey Gen. Garibaldi.
"G. SIRTORI, Chief of the Staff."