The last Punic war, Vol. 2 (of 2)
CHAPTER XLV.
1882 AND THE FUTURE.
On the morning of New Year’s Day the French residents as usual paid their official visit to M. Roustan, who addressed them in the following words:—
GENTLEMEN,—I am deeply touched by the expressions of sympathy I have received since yesterday from the French colony, and which you have just renewed. For my part, gentlemen, I was very anxious to see you at the commencement of this year, and to speak to you once again, as I have been in the habit of doing for the last seven years. Each of these seven years which we have spent together has marked a stage in the progress of French policy in Tunis by an increase of our influence in this country. On each of these anniversaries I came before you, you will remember, and spoke to you of the ground already got over, and of what yet remained to be traversed; and I continued my way, strong in your confidence and support, which I am happy to declare have never failed me in decisive hours and moments of crises. Indeed, crises have not been wanting; they have followed each step of our progress. Every step forwards has been greeted by an outcry against the policy which gave, or restored, something to France. I wish to recall to your minds the dates of these attacks; they are those of our successes. They commenced after the concession of the railway, were repeated after its junction with Algeria, were renewed later on, after the concession of the 14th August 1880, and were had recourse to after the success of numerous other French enterprises. You have not forgotten the character of that malevolent policy. After this seventh year, which has marked the last stage, and which has led us to a result which is more complete than we claimed or even desired, I expected that those attacks would be renewed with redoubled vigour. Strong in my own conscience, sure of the support of Government and of yours, I prepared to meet them with the same contempt as on former occasions, without any idea of refusing our adversaries that sad consolation for so many disappointed hopes. But what I was not prepared for, what I could not foresee, was that, at that moment, our foreign adversaries would be joined by adversaries at home, who, more relentless, and, above all, more disloyal than the former, would unblushingly employ calumnies which foreigners in the heat of anger and in the midst of disappointments had shrunk from using. The trial has been severe; you know the result. It has not shaken the confidence which the Government of the Republic had placed in me, neither has it shaken yours, of which I have just received such precious testimony. That is why, surmounting very legitimate repugnance, I have returned to resume my place among you. I am come back, first, as the honest man who has the right and perhaps the duty to present himself again before honest people. I am come back also because my return is a sign of the firm intention of Government to maintain the result attained, because my name, by an honour dearly purchased, has become synonymous with the continuation of the French work in Tunisia. Gentlemen, you will permit me to speak of my good name. You are aware that calumnies of all sorts have been employed to damage it; but before you, who have seen me at work during seven years, before you who judge me with full knowledge of the circumstances, I have the right to reassert that this good name has been placed by me sufficiently high to be out of the reach of all the filth that is flung at it. It is necessary that Frenchmen here and elsewhere should know that the agents of the Republic will not abandon the care of the interests of their fellow-countrymen, but will do their duty whatever it may cost them; in a word, that they will have the courage to surmount all their disgust and disregard all calumnies so long as they find themselves surrounded by worthy people like you, who encourage them, and find behind them a just and strong Government which supports them.
This extraordinary manifesto at once made M. Gambetta’s fatal mistake apparent to all the world; M. Roustan considered his return a purely personal triumph, and both he and his friends acted accordingly. Not a care was bestowed to the increasingly pressing difficulties of the situation; not an attempt was made to smooth down those international asperities which became every day more frequent, nobody thought of anything else but the best way of paying off old debts as regards M. Roustan’s real or fancied enemies. The news which reached Tunis on the afternoon of the 1st January, that no sooner was General Logerot’s back turned, than the Ouerghama and Ouerdna tribes had again revolted, and that a flying column consisting of 2000 infantry, one battery of artillery, and two squadrons of cavalry, had been sent against them, was almost overlooked amongst the matters of more local interest which now occupied the Residency. Madame Musalli’s brother challenged the lawyer Pelletier to mortal combat; the French Consular Court solemnly disbarred him. Taib Bey’s medical adviser prudently put the Mediterranean between himself and M. Roustan, and Taib Bey himself was selected for signal vengeance. As early as the 5th January his arrest was asked for. His brother hesitated, and to please the French issued a notice that any one talking about the possible arrival of Turkish troops would be punished with the bastinado. The troubles in the south still continued. Ali Ben Hlifa now (January 9) sent a letter to the _Jowaib_ by way of Tripoli in which he stated that thirteen of the Tunisian tribes would take the field in the spring, viz.: the Nefet, Zlass, Mitelit, Sondasen, Ouled Said, Ouled Ayar, Ouled Yacoob, Ouerghama, Ouerdna, and Beni Zid, and that as he could count on 170,000 fighting men, all he wanted from his friends abroad was arms. A sort of visible paralysis seemed now to fall over the French plans in Tunis; nobody appeared to know what would come next, and it became evident that the state of affairs in France prevented the adoption of any definite programme for the future. M. Gambetta became more and more unpopular. The same spirit which in an evil hour prompted him to restore M. Roustan to Tunis, became evident in every act of his official life. The hero of 1870 was now denounced as “Cæsar,” “Vitellius,” “dictateur,” “tyran,” “le Louis XIV. de Cahors,” “le Coupeau de Cahors,” “bandit,” “dictateur dégommé,” “l’alcoholisé,” “le fou furieux,” and “le Napoléon d’opportunisme,” and all this in a single issue of the Parisian newspapers, on a single day in January 1882. M. Gambetta resolved to join issue with his foes. Meanwhile he told his friends that “he had other things to think of than Tunis and the Tunisians, and must postpone his African scheme until he knew his own fate and that of the grand ministry.” So the chaos was left undisturbed, and M. Roustan had nothing else to think of but his personal grievance.
Taib Bey’s fate was soon sealed. Although some of his true friends implored M. Roustan to hesitate before taking the final step, he still relentlessly pressed on Muhamed es Sadek the absolute necessity of his brother’s arrest. This demand was all the more impolitic, as M. Roustan admitted on the Rochefort trial that he had himself given Taib a French passport and helped his doctor to get a present of 30,000 francs as a broker in the transaction. The Bey refused to consent, in spite of the constant persuasions of Mustapha, until on the 16th of January M. Roustan assured him, that the orders of the French Government on the subject were explicit and would brook of no delay. During the night his pleasant palace at the Marsa was surrounded by Tunisian soldiers commanded by the titular Minister of War, and on the following morning he was conveyed under a strong escort to the Bardo, in the very carriage in which he had hoped eight months before to come there as M. Roustan’s nominee to the Beylical throne. He was confined as a state prisoner in the lattice-windowed seraglio. The Bey, however, sent an aide-de-camp to assure his brother that he felt no personal ill-will towards him, and that his imprisonment was due to _Kismet_ and M. Roustan. Taib answered, “I am as you say a prisoner by God’s will; but I hope that both my brother and myself will live to see justice done by the same God to the man who is responsible for our common misfortunes.” Three months have passed since then, and Taib Bey is still a prisoner. He has even been removed to a more secure locality than the old seraglio, and in case he might suffer from the cold several of the windows have considerately been walled up. A friend of mine happened to be at the Bardo when this was being done, and noticed the zealous M. Sumaripa benevolently engaged in superintending the task. Thanks to the good offices of M. Paul Cambon, Taib Bey has now been released, and very probably will soon be one of the lions of the Parisian _salons_. He is not likely again to cast his eyes inopportunely on his brother’s honours.
The main body of General Logerot’s column now reached Susa after a short stay at Sfax. The action of the Arabs was now confined to raids and _razzias_, which inevitably occurred as soon as the French troops passed northwards. For the moment no energetic measures could be taken, as the worn-out soldiers required some rest after their two months’ weary march.
February opened with the fall of Gambetta amidst the triumphant acclamations of nine-tenths of the French press. The Tunisian question, and notably the return of M. Roustan, now aggravated by the universally reprobated arrest of Taib Bey, were appreciable elements in his unpopularity and discomfiture. Great things were hoped for from his successor. It was noticed that M. De Freycinet had not been called as a witness in the Rochefort trial, and it was asserted that he would recall M. Roustan at any cost. Under all circumstances it was evident that some time must elapse before M. De Freycinet could present a Tunisian programme, and so the chaos still remained unremedied. A very strong anti-French feeling now showed itself amongst the Italian colonists, which materially added to the embarrassments of the situation. On the 18th February two French gendarmes arrested a Sicilian at Goletta and conveyed him to the military prison. The Italian Consul demanded his release, but before his request could be complied with, an angry and threatening mob assembled. Tunis now seemed to be entering on an era of Franco-Italian affrays in the capital and _razzias_ in the interior.
The neighbourhood of Sfax now again became unsafe. On the 27th February a band of insurgents defeated the “submitted” tribes, _who had been deprived of their arms_, in the immediate vicinity of that town, and once more cut the Gabes telegraph line. Four days later they looted an esparto caravan, killing several persons and carrying off 100 camels. Two small columns were now ordered to enter the disturbed district from Susa and Kairwán, but they proved to be inadequate to crush out the mischief rife there.
On the 4th March, Tunis was _en fête_ to receive General Forgemol. The streets were lined with soldiers, the military band played their most cheerful music, and salutes were fired from the forts. M. Saint- Hilaire’s fiction, however, still survived. The effect of General Forgemol’s triumphal procession was somewhat marred by its being led by a Tunisian officer carrying a large umbrella, apparently for the purpose of denoting that everything was being done by the Bey’s invitation and consent. Two hours later M. Roustan quitted Tunis for ever. The icy coldness which signalised his exit contrasted strangely with the brilliant reception of General Forgemol. M. Roustan’s departure marks an era in the annals of the last Punic War. The Bey sent a special messenger to see that he was really gone, and when he at length learned that the matter no longer admitted of any doubt, gave way to almost childish transports of delight. A week previously M. Roustan had gone to the Bardo to take leave of him, and I afterwards received an account of what had passed at the audience from an eye-witness. It was the most amusing description I ever listened to, and I wrote an account of it at the time, which afterwards appeared in _Vanity Fair_. I cannot expect my readers to regard it in any other light than that of a burlesque, but those who understand the peculiarities of Arab character will at once understand how much of it is really serious:—
_Scene: The Kasr-es-Said Palace at Tunis. Time: The 26th February. Dramatis Personæ: The_ BEY OF TUNIS _and his Councillors. Both the Bey and his favourite_, MUSTAPHA, _wear their Grand Cordons of the Legion of Honour. An interpreter announces that_ M. ROUSTAN _is in attendance with_ GENERAL MUSALLI _to take leave. Handkerchiefs are distributed. An order to weep is given_.
MUHAMED ES SADIK _loq._—We must be very careful. This is the third time he has gone away, but he always comes back. Roustan is a cat. Roustan has nine lives. (_All begin to weep._ ROUSTAN _enters with his friend_.)
BEY _loq._—Good-bye, my dearest friend. (_Here he pauses from agitation, and both he and_ MUSTAPHA _repeatedly embrace the Minister to Washington after the Oriental usage._ BEY _continues, in a voice broken by sobs_)—Allah has sent me many misfortunes, but your going is undoubtedly the greatest of them all. What shall I and poor Mustapha do without you? What will become of my country in your absence? Alas! alas! Tunis is undone! The Almighty is indeed too cruel when He deprives me of my friend and guide. (_The_ BEY _weeps on_ ROUSTAN’S _neck;_ ROUSTAN _and_ MUSALLI _weep in chorus._ ROUSTAN _is conveyed from the room deeply affected_.)
ROUSTAN (_aside to_ MUSALLI _on the staircase_) _loq._—Why, he has not even given me a parting present! At least I expected a diamond snuff- box, or another order. Can it be that even with me it is a case of _le roi est mort, vive le roi?_
(_The_ BEY _watches_ ROUSTAN’S _carriage disappear from the window. He turns to his courtiers. He laughs, he cries, at last he dances_.)
BEY _loq._—_Now_ I am Bey again! Roustan is gone at last, and I breathe once more! No more _frais de voyage_ for the woman Elias! No more estates for her husband! May Allah convey his soul expeditiously to the bottomless pit! May the Angels of Death be his guards and keepers! May the curses of a ruined and desolated country rest upon his head! May the Prophet cause the dark waves of the Atlantic to overwhelm him! May . . . . (_curse, curse, curse_). . . .
Two hours later General Musalli returns. He tenders to the Prime Minister the draft of an order for the sale of three Government estates. Old Muhamed Khaznadar, who has served five Beys and knew Tunis in its palmier days, plucks up courage and tears the paper up before his face.
On the night of the 26th of February there was high festival held in the halls of Kasr-es-Said. The reign of the dynasty of Musalli-Roustan had ended for ever.
I am now reluctantly compelled to return to the dark and sad side of the Tunisian difficulty. On the 6th March a band of several hundred mounted Arabs passed in the early morning the gate of Kairwán, and it is even said they obtained a supply of bread there. Moving rapidly northwards to the Enfida they came across a convoy under the care of six unfortunate Italians. One only escaped wounded to Tunis to tell the tale: his companions were all murdered and mutilated. Their assailants pillaged their carts and then turned in the direction of Sidi el Háni. _En route_ some Maltese cart drivers were also met with and killed, one man alone escaping, covered with sword cuts, to Kairwán. It was now raining hard and nearly dusk, but the Arabs had a sharp encounter with the French troops stationed round the _marabout_ I myself had passed in November. Twenty-seven Arabs payed for their temerity with their life, but the rest made good their retreat with all their booty, and finally succeeded in traversing the _chott_ and rejoining Ali Ben Hlifa. In addition to the plunder of the convoys, they had executed several _razzias_ on their compatriots who had come to terms with the French, and I believe their loot of camels, cattle, and goods was ultimately sold in Tripoli for at least £5000. This unhappy occurrence at length convinced the military authorities of the gravity of the situation. The acting Italian Consul- General again went through the now familiar form of protesting against the Tunisian Government, which was day by day becoming more powerless and disorganised. A plan for a forty days’ campaign was agreed upon, but its execution was somehow or other delayed to the end of the month. A column commanded by General Philibert was to leave Gafsa and cross the marsh-lakes in the direction of the Nefzaoua, while a second column under General Jamais marched from Gabes on Matmata and the Tripolitan frontier. This simultaneous movement was to be supported by a third column with Colonel Le Noble approaching the Tunisian frontier from Oued in Algeria, and preventing the insurgents retreating before the other forces from attacking the Algerian Arabs. At the present moment (April 10th) these three bodies of troops are carrying out the above plan, but unexpected and unprecedented rains have as yet proved a serious obstacle to their progress.
On the 2d April M. Paul Cambon, _ex-Préfet du Nord_, arrived in Tunis as M. Roustan’s successor, and was greeted with the same military honours as General Forgemol. Two days later he received the official visit of the French residents, to whom, after a complimentary allusion to his predecessor, he spoke as follows:—“As regards the improvements which may be effected in the present state of things, I have come here to study them. I shall do this without having formed any preconceived ideas on the subject, with an earnest desire to assist the Beylical Government, and to prove that France has not lost her old fame as a civilising power. But this is not the work of a day. Nothing good or durable was ever done in a day. One must proceed methodically, patiently, and prudently. I shall hope to derive information from every available source. We have, I feel sure, all of us a common object—the good of the Regency and the honour of the French Republic.” These words are words of wisdom and promise well. M. Cambon has everything before him. As the reorganiser of the shattered Tunisian Executive, as the pioneer of financial and municipal reforms, as the healer of old wounds, and as the reconciler of conflicting interests, M. Paul Cambon may gain that fame and earn those laurels which the justice of posterity will assuredly deny to the contrivers and authors of the Last Punic War.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
* * * * *
A.
_Instructions issued by the Grand Master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, to the Knights who were to take part in the Expedition of the Emperor Charles V. against Tunis._
Hospitalis
Mag ✝ Consilim
Hierlm
Instructions to the venerated amongst his brethren of the Order, the Captain of our Galleys, Brother Aurelius Botigella, Prior of Pisa, and to the Captain of the reserve forces, Brother Anthony de Grolée, Bailiff of Lango, as to what you are to do in the sacred enterprise against the infidels (in which may God keep you, and from which may He bring you back in safety). First, having information that a portion of the army of his Imperial Majesty is already in the seas of Trapani either to expect or to join the rest at Cagliari, you will start in the name of God for the said places. If his Majesty by chance is there, you will hasten to kiss his hand on our behalf, and express our regret to be unable for want of men and means to send him greater assistance in his service, (tell him also) we have a well-armed galley which we are obliged to retain to convey stores to Tripoli and to protect our island if attacked. You will treat in the same manner Prince Doria and the other Generals of his Majesty, according to your discretion. If the Infante of Portugal, Don Luys, is there, you must regard him as a protector of our Order, offering him particular service according to our ancient usages, honouring and saluting him with the usual customs and ceremonies.
If one of you is wanting (which God forfend!), the other will do what is needful. You will do impartial justice if necessity arises. Supposing a landing is ordered you, Bailiff of Lango will take the command of the soldiery and marines alike, for you, Prior of Pisa, must not quit the galleys. The soldiers must preserve order in going to land. If confusion ensues, call on the offenders to maintain discipline in the name of their holy vow.
If God gives you the desired victory, and the imperial fleet goes eastwards, you can follow it. Think of your own honour and that of the Order, and so thinking act accordingly! Given in Malta the 27th May 1535.
B.
_The Carraca “St. Anne,” the great War-ship of the Knights of St. John._
In the conventual church of St. John is still to be seen a large wooden figure of St. Paul, which is now all that remains of the great _carraca della Religione_, once the terror of the Barbary pirates, and the most prominent object in Vermeyen’s picture of the siege of Goletta. Boyssat thus describes this famous ship:—
“Mouley Hasan came to the camp to pay his respects to the Emperor, and expressed his desire to see the _carraca_ of the Order, which was much larger than the ‘Grimalda,’ although the latter could carry 14,000 Sicilian _salmes_ of grain. She had four decks above the water-mark, and two below covered with lead. The ports were closed by bronze shutters, which did not injure the lead like iron, and they fitted so well that a whole army could not sink her. There was a chapel, an armoury for 500 men, a hall, chamber, and ante-chamber for the Grand Master and the Council, rooms for the knights and officers, and mills and ovens for each day’s cooking. There were galleries, a forge, and flowers in boxes all round the poop. She carried fifty cannons of large calibre and a large quantity of smaller ones. Her mast could be only encircled by six men. She was very light, and decorated throughout with carving and pictures.”
C.
The old cemetery of St. George, near the Carthage gate of Tunis (Bab-el- Carthagena), is the earliest existing Christian relic in Tunis. It was granted, as its name indicates, to England, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but the original deed of gift has been lost. Once outside the battlements, it is now in the very heart of the city. In removing some rubbish three years ago a series of narrow stone tombs, fashioned after the manner of the Arabs, was discovered. The inscriptions on them, carved in bold raised letters, are very curious and as clear as the day they were placed here. These are the most remarkable:—
(1) DEPOSITVM CONSVLIS
CAMPION OBIIT PRIMO
OCTOBRIS MDCLXI
(2) HIC JACET RICARDVS LEAR
ANGLVS SVÆ NATIONIS CONSVLIS
CANCELLARIVS QUI OBIIT XXIII APRILIS
ANNO DOMINI MDCLXIII
(3) SAMVEL COBBE
MERCATOR ANGLICVS OBIIT
SEXTO DIE OCTOBRIS
ANNO DOMINI MDCXLVIII
(4) IN MEMORIAM ~M~RI
GVLIELMI HAINES
MERCATORIS ANGLICI
QVI OBIIT XIX DIE NOVEMBRIS
MDCXLIX.
(5) HIC JACET
BARNABAS HOL
DIN DVX NAVIS
AMITITIÆ OBIIT
INPORTA VTICA
XIII DECEMB
RIS ANº Dº MDCLXI
(6) GVLIELMI HVLL
DVCIS NAVIS MERCVRII
HIC REQVIESCAT PVLVIS QVI
EX HAC VITA MIGRAVIT
XXII DIE JVLII ANNO VERBI
INCARNATI MDCLXXIII.
The seventh stone is the most remarkable of all. At the head is a shield thus:—
Its sides are covered with exquisite Arabesque tracery; the letters are of lead, and it apparently tells a tale of some long-forgotten crime. The annals of the Barrington family may throw some light on its history. In the centre of the slab is this inscription—
THEOPHILVS BARRINGTONVS
GOBRIC PABEMI ESSEXIA
IN ANGLIA EQVITI AVRA
TO SEPTIMO LOCO NATVS
PARCARVM HIC IN IPSO
JVVENTVTIS FLOREINV
IDIAM EXPERTVS ANTI
QVISSIMVM PVNICÆ
ARGVMENTVM NVPE
PRIME CONFIRMAVIT
. . . . .
DIEM CLAVSI IXI
AVGVSTI EXTREMVM
ÆTAT AN XXI VIRG
PARTVS MDCLXXX.
Besides Consul Campion, several other British Political Agents and Consuls-General lie in the cemetery of St. George. The stones in memory of John Goddard and Charles Gordon can no longer be deciphered, but the memorials of Richard Lawrence (1750), James Traill (1787), and Sir Thomas Reade (1849), are still in good repair.
No American ever visits Tunis without making a pilgrimage to the tomb of the poet John Howard Payne, whose body lies under a luxuriant pepper- tree close to the grave of Consul-General Traill. The inscription on it runs thus:—
IN MEMORY OF
COL. JOHN HOWARD PAYNE,
Twice Consul of the United States of America for the Kingdom of Tunis,
this stone is here placed by a grateful country.
He died at the American Consulate in this city after a tedious
illness, April 1st, 1852.
He was born at the city of Boston, State of Massachusetts, June 8, 1792.
His fame as a Poet and Dramatist
is well known wherever the English language is spoken through his celebrated
ballad “Sweet Home,” and his popular tragedy
of “Brutus,” and other similar
productions.
The monument is an oblong, thick slab of white (Italian) marble lying over the grave, and each edge of the slab is inscribed with a line of poetry, thus:
“Sure when thy gentle spirit fled
To realms beyond the azure dome,
With arms outstretched God’s angels said—
Welcome to Heaven’s Home, Sweet Home.”
Several Danish and Norwegian Consuls are also buried in this quiet and picturesque graveyard.
D.
_British Treaty with Tunis in 1662._
1. All past grievances shall be forgotten, and a perpetual peace on a firm basis, coupled with perfect liberty of commerce, shall exist henceforward between the subjects of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and the people of Tunis.
2. The vessels of the two nations shall have the right to enter the ports of both countries, paying the duty on what is sold, and carrying away the remainder of their cargoes without let or hindrance, and freely enjoying all customary privileges. The last duty fixed on the embarkation and disembarkation of merchandise at the Goletta shall be reduced to the old rate.
3. There shall be no seizure of vessels by either of the two parties, neither in port or on the high seas. They shall pass peacefully and without interruption after showing their flags. To prevent any inconveniences which may arise, Tunisian vessels shall in future carry a certificate signed by the British Consul at Tunis declaring that they belong to that place. On such document being produced, the English vessel shall allow two men to go on board in a friendly manner to ascertain if the ship is really English, and then, although they may have passengers belonging to other nations, their persons and property shall be respected.
4. If an English ship receives on board Tunisian subjects or their property, it shall be bound to defend them to the utmost and not to deliver them to the enemy.
5. If the ships of either of the parties be by accident wrecked on the coasts of the other, the crew shall be free and the goods found restored to the owner.
6. The English who actually inhabit Tunis shall be free to transport wherever they desire, themselves, their wives, and children, although born in the country.
7. Neither Englishmen nor Tunisians shall speak rude words or use violence to each other. Whoever does so shall be severely punished.
8. The Consul or any other Englishman residing in Tunis, in case of a dispute, shall not be bound to address any other court than the Dey himself, who shall do justice.
9. The Consul or any other Englishman shall not be required to pay the debts of a third party unless there is an obligation in writing to do so.
10. The ships of war belonging to both parties can use reciprocally any port in the two countries for cleansing, repairs, and the purchase of all kinds of provisions and necessaries at the market price and without the payment of customs duty.
11. If the war vessels belonging to Tunis shall capture on an enemy’s ships English menial servants, they shall be made slaves, but if they are merchants or passengers, they shall enjoy perfect liberty both of person and property.
12. If a Tunisian ship-of-war shall engage an English ship not showing the English flag, and shall capture it, the said English vessel shall be considered a good prize notwithstanding the peace.
13. If a slave of the kingdom of Tunis or any other nation shall escape to or reach any vessel belonging to His Britannic Majesty, the Consul shall not be bound to pay the ransom, unless he has been duly warned to give an order not to receive the slave. If this has been done, he must refund to the owner the market price, and if such price was not fixed, he shall pay three hundred dollars.
These stipulations shall remain for ever without alteration, and for all details not mentioned in them the parties shall be guided by the general capitulations with the Grand Signor.
_October 5th_, 1662.
E.
_British Treaty with Tunis in 1686._
As peace has subsisted between us for several years, &c. &c. &c. We, the very excellent Lords the Governor of the noble City and Kingdom of Tunis, Hadje Bectache Hogia Dey, Mahomet Bey, and Ibrahim Agha, of the Divan and army of our City and Kingdom, have seen, considered, examined, and approved the said articles of peace, and do by these presents accept, approve, ratify, and confirm the same, in our own name as well as in that of our said army, &c., and do hereby formally promise to observe the same in every point with His Majesty James II., &c., and with all his subjects, and to see carefully henceforward that all our subjects shall scrupulously respect them, under the penalty of the severest punishment whenever the offender shall return to Tunis.
And as regards the money due by the Divan and divers our subjects to the English nation according to an account which we have received from Thomas Goodwin, Écuyer, Agent and Consul, &c., we engage to pay it within two months of this date. And as we have a short time ago made a diminution of seven per cent., in favour of the French merchants on import and export customs duty, and have reduced such duty from ten to three per cent., we sincerely promise either within six months to make this reduction also for the English merchants, or to oblige the French merchants to again pay the same rate as heretofore. We promise to observe each point inviolably, and to this end have affixed our seal in the presence of the Most High, and in our City of Tunis, on this the 2d day of October 1686.
F.
_British Political Agents and Consuls-General at Tunis._
The following is a list of the British representatives at the Tunisian Court since the reign of Charles I.:—
Campion died in 1661 (was appointed _cir._ 1640).
Francis Baker, 1675-1683.
Thomas Goodwyn, 1683-1700.
John Goddard, 1700-1712.
(John Waldeck, _locum tenens_, 1708-1712.)
Richard Lawrence, 1712-1750.
(Thomas Thomson acted in 1721.)
Charles Gordon, 1750-1765.
James Traill, 1766-1787.
Robert Traill, (acting) 1787-1790.
Perkins Magra, 1791-1804.
Richard Oglander, 1804-1824.
Sir Thomas Reade, K.C.B., 1824-1849.
Sir Edward Baynes, K.C.M.G., 1849-1855.
Sir Richard Wood, C.B., G.C.M.G., 1855-1879.
Thomas Fellowes Reade, 1879-1882.
G.
_Tabarca and the Tabarchini._
The old fortress, which was demolished by the French fleet on the 26th April 1881, was an historical monument of no mean interest. Tabarca was the Tabraca of the Romans, and the little island on which the castle stands is just opposite the mouth of the Rubricatus river, now called the Oued el Berber. In the fourteenth century a galley of the Knights of St. John was wrecked there. The commander, a member of the Lomellino or Lomellini family of Genoa, managed to defend the place against the Arabs, and subsequently erected fortifications on the island. Charles V. granted it as a fief to the Lomellini, with the title of Marquis. This family held it till 1741. In the month of February in that year a monopoly of the Barbary trade was granted by the King of France to the _Compagnie Royale d’Afrique_, which very nearly succeeded in acquiring Tabarca. James Lomellino was anxious to dispose of it, but on Ali Pasha hearing of the proposed transaction, he resolved to himself seize the island rather than it should fall into the hands of the French. His son Heussein Ben Ali occupied Tabarca, and all its Christian inhabitants were brought to Tunis, where their descendants, the Tabarchini, still exist and form a little colony of their own.
H.
_An Arab’s Account of the French Expedition to Tunis in 1770._
El Háj Hamouda Ben Abdel Aziz, secretary of Ali Pasha, has left a curious account of a former French invasion of the Regency. The following extracts are translated and somewhat abridged from the Arab text:—“The following were the causes of the war which happened in the year of the Flight 1183. Hostilities had commenced between Tunis and the island of Corsica, when France resolved on its conquest. One after another of the Corsican towns fell into the hands of the invaders, and in order to ensure the safety of the provision transports, the French King asked our master to issue patents of protection for twelve ships. His request was granted. Shortly afterwards other Corsican ships were captured on the high seas, and the crews reduced to slavery. When the conquest of Corsica was completed, a high French functionary came to Goletta, and demanded that these captives should be released, and that the inhabitants of Corsica be treated as Frenchmen. Our master said, that as twelve patents were asked for, it was clear that all ships beyond that number had no claim to immunity. On the messenger confessing he had brought no letter from the King, the Pasha said, ‘Go and tell your master if he wants anything of me, let him write and I will send him an answer.’ The envoy went away, and this rupture became one of the causes of the war.
“Another motive was the dispute as to the coral fishery, which is very abundant on the Tunisian coasts. After the capture of Tabarca, La Calle became the principal seat of this industry. Our master desired to prevent the French vessels from entering Tunisian waters. An ambiguous convention was agreed upon, allowing a limited number of boats to fish during two years. When the term fixed therein expired, our master cut all discussion short by forbidding any further coral fishing on his coasts. This grievance furnished a second motive, but there was a third. Soleiman el Jerbi was the captain of a Tunisian corsair. Meeting a French merchant-ship at sea, he went on board according to custom to obtain provisions, but he exaggerated his wants, and took possession forcibly of a barrel of wine. When the Frenchman complained, he abused him and gave him a sound beating. These three things brought about the war. On the 23d May 1770, three French frigates appeared off Goletta, and took on board one of them the French Consul, De Saïrieu, who, on the plea of ill health, had removed to the Abdellia Palace at the Marsa. Our master at once made preparations for resistance; Hassan Kahia Boutaghane was charged with the defence of Bizerta, and Heussein Agha with that of Susa. Every town was strongly garrisoned, and reinforcements were sent to Tabarca. The whole community thirsted for the fray, and everybody purchased arms, which now rose to an exorbitant price. The sale of weapons paralysed all other commerce in the bazaars.
“Goletta was now blockaded by three French ships, and a little Tunisian vessel, which endeavoured to enter the canal surreptitiously, was obliged to take refuge in going on shore under the Gamart hill. The French merchants now quitted the city, but our master placed guards over their dwellings to protect their property. He also humanely allowed the French merchant captains to join their ships. On the 16th June 1770, the whole French squadron anchored off Goletta. It consisted of sixteen ships-of-war, together with two corvettes and another vessel contributed by the Order of Malta. After two days a boat was sent on shore with a letter to the Pasha, threatening to bombard Goletta if seven conditions therein mentioned were not accepted in thirty hours. Our master sent an answer inviting the French admiral (Count de Broves) to come and read over the treaty, and judge for himself which party was in the wrong. Other correspondence followed, but the expected attack did not take place. An incident now happened, which proves that every event in our master’s life was predestined in the corner of felicity. He wanted beautiful slaves for his seraglio, and sent a French ship before the war began to bring a cargo of them from Constantinople. Every one became very anxious as to the fate of this priceless freight. The news now arrived that the vessel had put into Monastir. The Caid had already taken the precaution to land the slaves and put the captain and crew in irons. This circumstance was honoured with public rejoicings as a presage of good fortune, and on that very day by our master’s order the captives were employed in the gunpowder manufactory, that they might assist with their own hands in the production of the material which would afterwards deal death to their compatriots. About the same time it transpired that a second French ship laden with oil had arrived at Galippia in ignorance of the outbreak of hostilities. The ship and its cargo were confiscated, and the captain with his crew brought as slaves to Tunis to work in the powder mill.
“Towards the end of July the squadron sailed for Porto Farina, which was bombarded for two days. On the 1st August it arrived at Bizerta, the bombardment of which commenced at noon on the following day. When the fleet quitted Goletta, Ali Raïs, who happened to be there, took the command of a small force, and followed the enemy along the shore in order to resist any attempt at landing. In this manner he came to Porto Farina, and superintended the fire directed from the batteries on the French fleet. When the fleet again set sail for Bizerta he pursued the same plan, and entered the place just as the ships were anchoring in the roadstead. A panic seized on the townsfolk of Bizerta; fire-ships sent towards the shore spread consternation everywhere, although the cannon from the batteries commanded by Ali Raïs answered vigorously those of the men-of-war. The bombardment lasted only one day and one night. More than 300 shells were thrown into the town. The inhabitants sought refuge from the projectiles, together with their wives and families, in the neighbouring gardens. Captain Ali Raïs defended the west, and Heussein Kahia the east of Bizerta. The news of the critical state of affairs then reached Tunis next morning, and our master at once ordered Redjeb Khaznadar to proceed thither with reinforcements. He also decreed the call to arms of all those whose names appeared in the registers of the _divan_, and the lowering of the flagstaff of the French Consulate.
“The reinforcements arrived at Bizerta on the evening of the same day. Although the French fire had ceased, Redjeb sought to encourage his soldiers by presents. A storm came on, and the French squadron was obliged to leave Bizerta and return to Goletta. Two days later French ships appeared before Galippia and Hammamet. Although the inhabitants were prepared to defend themselves, they were not molested. On Tuesday the 13th August the squadron anchored off Susa and commenced to bombard it the next day. The inhabitants deserted the town. By placing cannon on the beach the ships were kept at a distance, and of 1000 projectiles thrown, not more than 250 took effect. After remaining a week at Monastir, the fleet regained the Goletta roads.
“While the enemy was bombarding the different places on the coast, a _khoja-bachi_ (envoy extraordinary) arrived at Tunis from Constantinople to ask our master for a contingent of troops and ships to assist the Sultan in continuing his war with Russia. Seeing that all our forces were absolutely required for the struggle with France, he asked leave to return, and so did an officer who had accompanied him. These persons embarked on the ship in which they had come, naturally believing, that their mission would be sufficient protection if they happened to meet the French at sea. Just at this juncture the squadron appeared at Goletta, and its commander invited the Turkish envoys to go on board his vessel. They at once did so, and on the conversation turning upon the war, the _khoja-bachi_ did not disguise the fact that it would be very displeasing to the Sultan, as the French forces had come to attack one of his provinces at the very time he was himself engaged in hostilities with his enemies. He added that what the squadron had done at Tunis constituted a breach of existing treaties, and was in itself sufficient to disturb the peace existing between two powerful states. He finally exhorted the Count de Broves to resume friendly relations between France and Tunis, being persuaded that the peace would be ratified by the two states. He asked earnestly to be allowed to undertake the negotiation. Having taken all this into consideration, the Admiral authorised the _khoja-bachi_ to proceed to Tunis on this errand.
“The envoy found our master very much disposed to accept his proposals. He even ordered him to return to the French commander-in-chief, and ask that the French Consul and some other persons of position be deputed to treat the matter with him. The Consul soon disembarked with some officers to advise him, and renewed the seven demands already mentioned. Our master made the following answers: first, as to the participation of Corsica in the benefit of the French treaties:—‘We grant this demand, which is very just, for it is not possible that a government can be at peace with a power, as far as one part of its dominions is concerned, and not at peace as regards another. This reclamation is consequently admitted.’ In the matter of the slaves seized since the incorporation of the island with France:—‘We only seized these slaves because the Corsicans had no treaty with us; nevertheless as you insist on their surrender, and as their country has now become a part of France, we will consent to extend to them the benefits of the peace. Consequently we will give them up.’ As regards the liberation of Corsicans captured prior to the said incorporation:—‘This is a demand essentially different, which nothing justifies, and which we cannot admit.’ Concerning the punishment of the captain, Soleiman el Jerbi:—‘If he is guilty according to our laws he shall be punished when he is in our jurisdiction; at the present moment he has absconded.’ As to the coral fishery:—‘The treaty on the subject allows us to choose between putting an end to the agreement or renewing it. This alternative is common to both parties. We desire to suppress the fishery. Upon what can you ground any valid objections to our resolution?’ About Tamekart (Cape Negre):—‘This is an establishment which you have lost, and which was closed by our predecessors. In a treaty which has been made since then, you have agreed not to reopen it. We are unable therefore to cede this point.’ As for the war indemnity:—‘We have done nothing to provoke the hostilities, which you commenced without any motive. We cannot, therefore, pay your expenses.’ After much discussion the following conditions were agreed to—(1) The island of Corsica shall enjoy the advantages conferred by the French Treaty. (2) The slaves captured since the annexation of Corsica to France shall be liberated. (3) The coral fishery shall last for five years more; twelve boats of La Calle may be employed in this enterprise. The _Compagnie Royale d’Afrique_ may export 3000 _cafis_ of wheat duty free. (4) Presents must be made by France to the Tunisian Government, as is the custom whenever peace is concluded. (5) As the demand of the French has been rejected, the Tamekart establishment is not to be reopened. These were the conditions of the treaty signed between the two nations. The French fleet set sail for France, and in this manner God put an end to the war waged against the true believers.”
I.
_Secret Clause in the French Treaty of 1830._
In the name of God the Clement and Merciful! This treaty, which contains all conceivable promises, and by God’s aid will reconcile many different interests, has been concluded between the Marvel of the Princes of the nation of the Messiah, the Glory of the races adoring the Saviour, the Crown of Monarchs, the Shining Object of the admiration of his armies and ministers, Charles X., Emperor of France, and the Prince of peoples, the Chosen of the Great Ones, the descendant of royal blood, brilliant by the most conspicuous virtues, Heussein Pasha, master of the kingdom of Africa, &c. &c.[11]
· · · · · · · · · ·
1830, August 8th. Secret and additional article in the treaty concluded between France and Tunis on the 17th of the month of Safr A.H. 1246. “Praise be to the one God to whom all things return!” “We cede for ever to His Majesty the King of France a site, in the Maalka, sufficient to erect a religious monument in honour of Louis IX. at the place where the prince died. We agree to respect and cause to be respected this monument consecrated by the Emperor of France in memory of one of his most illustrious ancestors.”
J.
_Literal Translation of the Letter of Sidi Muhamed Bey to the Sultan of Turkey, asking for investiture as Bey of Tunis._
My God! I approach thy presence with prayers and due praises unto thy Prophet and his Caliphs in their order of succession; I require to be guided in the path of the Faithful, and with humble praises for thy favours, I knock at the Gates of thy Generosity,—the Gates of the Sublime Ottoman Government, the Monarchy of Glory, the Empire of Kháns, which is served with acts inspired by sincerity of purpose; which is sought for realising wishes; whose favours reach all parts of the world by every road;—The sun is superior to praises;—it being sufficient that it has raised supports to the Hanáfite sect, and produced balances for weighing truth; and added to the traditions of Divine assistance, a complete and meritorious evidence, whose sovereigns have inherited the earth. They were just; one Monarch after the other, from the one named “Dy-lanourin” (the one of the two lights, viz., the sun and the moon) until the one who has been chosen by the glorious god (“Elmedjiel,” an allusion to the Sultan’s name) to guide his creatures in order to maintain through him the symbols of obedience to his religion, the obligation of engaging in his war, and to whom he has granted his assistance and blessings for gladdening through his means the countries and towns belonging to him!
May every heart be ever associated in submission to him; may every sword and every pen be ever at his service; may all tongues be ever just in confessing their impotence to express all that is due to him! How shall I salute his lofty and exalted majesty, and the feet which are firmly set on every sort of grace! The means of expression found are but limited, and there only remains the way of merely hinting at them, with a sense of respect to the Traditions of the Prophet, and of praises to those who are in Paradise! Salutations to the Prince of the Faithful and God’s mercy are invoked by the slave of his benefits, the assiduous one, who has grown in his service, Muhamed, son of the Servant of your Majesty’s Father of happy memory, Hassen Basha Bey.
It is now brought to your Majesty’s notice (whose attributes are long years and boundless power), that the pledge of your favours and the slave of your obedience, the tenth member of the family devoted to your interest, the cousin of your servant, whom he has considered as a brother, the Muchir Ahmed Bascia Bey has passed to God’s mercies; provided for his journey with the obedience in which he died towards the Caliphat, and with his actual as well as contemplated services. At that very moment the inhabitants of the Tunisian Dominions hastened, _generally and individually_, forward, and becoming solid foundation for your slave, offered to him the keys of their affairs, and the administration for guarding their private and public concerns.
Your servant has maintained the obligation imposed upon him by the _unanimous vote of Islam_ with prayers from the pulpits for the sublime empire of Abdelmedjid, trusting that the government of the Caliph may approve of our having secured the tranquillity of the country, put an end to the terror of the inhabitants, and a stop to the roads of violence, and we have attached ourselves together in God’s compact. The servant of your majesty succeeded to his cousin, willingly and submissively, according to the customs observed by your servants his predecessors, towards the preceding holy and glorious Sultans. The circumstance which supports your slave is, that he has grown under the shade of your empire; he has been nourished with the milk of your benefits, and has experienced various and manifold kinds and modes of your generosity; your favour has caused him to shine with a light by which he is distinguished amongst people; and the noble-minded look on his inner services as a recommendation for augmenting the degree of favour; and your Majesty’s grace is hoped for, founding our trust on your Majesty’s kindness and invoking no other consideration. The usages of illustrious leaders are themselves the leaders of usages; and it is hoped that you will add the services of your servant to the services of his predecessors, in order that he may experience approbation under the Lord’s shade;—may God deal with me according to my intentions (before paying the debt of nature) in the hopes I have expressed. Your servant has commenced his service by continuing what he had begun together with his predecessor, with hearts and bodies assisting each other, by sending some troops in aid of the small force that had been sent before, and which was favourably received; and the hope on which we repose our greatest confidence is that they may meet the favour formerly experienced. It is the result of the greatest efforts of the indigent, and the utmost possibility of the weak. The present is in proportion with the means of the donor as far as this military assistance is concerned. Your Majesty knows the state of things, and its mention is a subject of bitter regret. It will be presented by the servant of the writer, for whom it is sufficient to live in faithfulness, political wisdom, and nobleness of mind, one of the confidential persons belonging to your servant, who is considered like a son of his—General Muhamed, who will act as spokesman for your servant in asking for a favour which is based on a sense of hope and trust; and the favours of the noble- hearted are never suspended by a consideration of their acts. O God! aid us in the duty of submission which Thou hast imposed towards this empire, and the performance of justice according to the utmost of my faculties; and cause its outstretched and far-reaching hand to protect us from perdition; cause us to bear the fruits of its approbation, according to the rules of tradition and of the congregation. Great God! we look up to him; by his orders we proceed, and we are in anxious expectation of the performance of the promises that Thou wilt help those who assist Thy religion. They will never fail to find Thee out, nor err in their requests, amen! O Lord of Hosts! Salutations be on the Prophets, the Caliphs who are the guides to the right path, and on those who follow them till the day of judgment.
20th Shawal 1271.
K.
_Literal Translation of the Grand Vizier’s Reply to His Highness the Bey of Tunis._
What has been forwarded through His Excellency Khair-ed-Din Pasha, viz.: your Highness’s letter conveying your thanks for the marks of imperial regard with reference to the lamentable events which have occurred in the province of Tunis the well-protected, and reiterating the assurances of your Highness’s obedience and laudable devotion, as well as your letter to me, your Highness’s sincere and obliged friend, have been submitted by us to the High Imperial Gate, and have been taken into consideration by His Majesty the Sultan (may God perpetuate his existence upon his throne of glory, and render him an ornament to the seat of his justice and of his Caliphate, which is the real refuge of mankind and the asylum of Islam in honour of the Prophet, salutations be rendered unto him for ever and ever!)
His Majesty is by the grace of God endowed with virtues and qualifications that promote the welfare of the people depending upon his sublime government; and he therefore wishes and hopes that a prosperous state and unbroken peace of mind may perpetually and unceasingly attend you personally and those who belong to your high family, as well as the persons whose good administration is dependent upon your Highness.
May God assist him! Having felt sorry and grieved at the occurrence of the revolt, his Majesty was rejoiced at its early termination, achieved, thank God, in such a short time! He has felt great satisfaction at the expressions of devotion employed, but which are only commensurate with his Eminence, and the interest he has taken in the termination of those unhappy events.
His Majesty’s real desire and absolute wish is in accordance with the following written statement explanatory of what is required for the maintenance of tranquillity in Tunis and the promotion of its welfare, for the sure foundation of its peace, and uninterrupted security of its inhabitants and people. In order to attain the fulfilment of this _desideratum_ which relates to and concerns the Regency, it will be a constant object of solicitude and assistance at all times.
The fresh and manifest proof of the above assertion will tend to remove and avert all possible apprehension, and strengthen the ancient privileges by way of official renewal.
These privileges are that the “Khatba,” or public prayers, and the coinage shall be respectively in the name of the Sultan as they have been from ancient time, being the public tie which unites the province of Tunis as forming an integral part of the Ottoman dominions. This forms its legitimate connection by divine law with the Caliphate of Islam.
The flag actually used shall remain as it is both in regard to its peculiar shape and colour.
The connecting relations actually existing with the Sublime Porte to the present time shall be observed and continued as heretofore; and, upon condition of the maintenance and preservation of these things (the above conditions), the order of succession shall be as formerly exclusively vested in your high family.
You are to exercise independent power in the appointment of ecclesiastical, administrative, and military functionaries, and in their removal in accordance with the rules of justice; and you are likewise to exercise equal power in the internal administration of the said province agreeably to the divine law, as well as in conformity with such administrative enactments as are sufficiently efficacious to protect individual security, property, and honour, as circumstances and time may require.
Furthermore, you are to have the permission to continue as heretofore your customary relations with the friendly powers; and the inheriting Prince shall send and solicit the Imperial Firman (of investiture), which shall be granted to him according to custom.
Whenever your Highness shall request and demand the promulgating of the High Rescript and Imperial Firman on the whole of the above-recited points, it shall be issued to you in obedience to the commands of His Majesty on the subject; and pursuant to my instructions. I hasten to communicate the matter to your Highness, which I do with great satisfaction, that you may be apprized of the foregoing.
From a perusal of this letter which is a proof of singular regard, as well as from what Khair-ed-din Pasha will explain to you verbally, your Highness will perceive that the intention of the Sultan is only to promote the improvement and consolidation of the province of Tunis, and of your own person, and only seeks to preserve its old connection, and distinguished dependence upon the seat of the Sublime Caliphate; as well as to prevent whatever may create disturbance or estrangement, so that you may derive from it (the connection and honourable dependence) a fixed and a certain position.
We have no doubt but you will always endeavour to merit the benevolent consideration of His Majesty the Sultan of Islam, the reward being both salvation in this and the next world, and an honourable mention at all times.
We have therefore deemed it sufficient to write the foregoing, and have laid at the foot of the throne the blessings you have invoked from the Almighty.
Let what we have written be a pledge to your mind; and everything belongs to the Disposer of events.
_N.B._—Some of the expressions made use of in Arabic seem to have been literally translated from the Turkish, and are not very clear.
L.
The following is the text of the Imperial Firman promulgated in 1871 and regulating the future relation between the Sublime Porte as Suzerain and the Bey of Tunis as vassal:—
“To our Vizir Muhamed es Sadek Pasha, bearer of the imperial decorations of the Osmanli and the Medjidié in diamonds, Governor-General of the province of Tunis.
“We are aware of the laudable conduct you have pursued as well as the services you have rendered, and the loyalty and fidelity of which you have given proof, since the government of the province of Tunis, which forms part of our empire, has been confided to you, in the same manner as it was intrusted to your predecessors.
“The talents with which you are endowed induce us to hope that you will persevere in the same path, and by directing all your efforts to the prosperity, happiness, and tranquillity of this province and of our subjects, you will become more and more worthy of our favour and of the trust we place in you, of which you will appreciate the value.
“Our sincere desire and our deliberate intention is that this important province of our empire shall enjoy permanent security, and that a feeling of public confidence should exist on a solid basis amongst its inhabitants.
“It is evident that in virtue of our sovereign rights, we shall never refuse to accord our support or devote our care to the complete realisation of our desire.
“According to the demand contained in the petition addressed to us, we hereby confirm your appointment as Governor-General of the said province of Tunis, the boundaries of which shall remain as they were _ab antiquo_, and according to you moreover the right of hereditary succession upon the following conditions:—
“With the object, as we have before stated, of augmenting the prosperity and wealth of the said imperial province and the people who inhabit it, and taking also into consideration the present diminished resources and the wants of the country, and animated besides by our feelings of generosity and interest towards our faithful Tunisian subjects:
“We renounce in their favour the payment of the sum which this province was heretofore required to furnish under the form of tribute.
“As an act of recognition of the ancient and legitimate ties which attach Tunis to our Caliphate and Government as an integral portion of our Empire, the _Khatba_ (‘Friday’s prayer for princes and rulers’) must be said, and all money issued, coined in our imperial name.
“The flag shall preserve its form and colour.
“In case of a war arising between Turkey and a foreign country, the imperial province shall be bound to furnish a military contingent in proportion to its ability.
“All other ties up to this time existing with our Government shall be maintained.
“Under these conditions we order and decree as follows:—
“The hereditary government of our province of Tunis shall remain in your family.
“The Governor-General shall have full power to appoint and dismiss, according to the rules of justice and equity, all the judicial, military, civil, or financial officers of the province.
“The internal administration shall, however, be carried on in conformity with the sacred law and other ordinances of the empire, securing the life, honour, and property of our subjects, in accordance with the requirements of the epoch in which we live.
“The Governor-General of Tunis is authorised to maintain relations with Foreign Powers, but he is not entitled to conclude treaties or enter into international engagements with the said Powers, of a political nature or relating to declarations of war or rectification of frontiers. All these matters appertain exclusively to our sacred sovereign rights.
“Whenever the governor-generalship may become vacant, on a petition being preferred to nominate a successor in the person of the eldest member of your family, an imperial rescript granting the rank of Vizir and Mouchir, together with a firman of investiture, shall be issued.
“The sovereign decree, which has been written by our Divan (council) and is sealed with an imperial seal, is promulgated.
“As has been said above, in our fatherly desire we have no other object than to improve the status of our important province of Tunis and consolidate the position of the reigning family; at the same time we are anxious to furnish fresh means for assuring the happiness, tranquillity, and protection of all classes of persons placed under our authority and domiciled in this province.
“Our sovereign will is therefore, that you direct all your energy to these objects, and as the preservation of our ancient and indisputable right over the province of Tunis, as well as the permanent security of the life, honour, property, and immunities of our subjects residing in this province, intrusted to your care, constitute the fundamental conditions and _sine quâ non_ of the privilege of hereditary succession, you should be careful that these essential conditions are faithfully observed, and abstain from every act which may be at variance with them.
You, and all the members of your family, who may find themselves at the head of the government by the order of succession, will appreciate doubtless the value of this imperial favour, and will pay scrupulous attention to the fulfilment of the conditions thus established. By doing this our approbation will be secured.”
On the 8th November 1871 the _Tunis_ published the following remarks on the foregoing Firman, which under existing circumstances deserve careful attention:—
“The Tunisian Regency is now _de jure_ and _de facto_ an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the Porte never alienated his sovereign right over that country, but practically the existence of such right had for many years been totally ignored by the Regency, and I may say, by all the Powers which dealt with it. Now it is different; the Tunisians having frankly avowed their dependence on the Sultan. This change is the more creditable and satisfactory to the Porte, as it has not been brought about by any encouragement or pressure on their part. It must, indeed, be acknowledged that they have not been in search of the sheep that has gone astray, but merely welcomed it when, of its own accord, it returned to them. It is the population that has demanded the removal of the old ties between the Regency and the Empire. It is Mahommed Sadyk Pasha himself who, apologising for the past, has humbly besought the Imperial Throne to confirm him in the government of the province of Tunis, and to allow him to transmit it to the eldest member of his family after his death.
“The Tunisian ruler has been for several years alive to the dangers of his position. In 1864, after the insurrection of his Regency, he fully understood that he could neither consolidate his Government, nor protect his territory from external oppression, except by putting himself on a true footing with the Sovereign Court. He, therefore, hastened to send Keiredine Pasha to Constantinople ostensibly to thank the Porte for the moral support it had given him during the insurrection, but in reality to unite his country to the Empire, and to secure its government to his country. Keiredine Pasha has then been assured that the Porte was neither desirous nor willing to waive or diminish the privileges enjoyed by Tunis _ab antiquo_, and that a firman, conferring on Mahommed Sadyk Pasha’s family the hereditary government of his province, would be granted if he were to apply for it in writing. Keiredine returned to Tunis with a letter to this effect from Fuad Pasha, then Grand Vizier. Nothing more was heard of the matter until a month ago, when Keiredine Pasha arrived unexpectedly at Constantinople, and presenting a formal demand from Sadyk Pasha, together with a petition signed by all the chiefs of the Tunisian population, applied for the firman which had been promised to his master in 1864, and was accordingly issued on 3d October 1871.
“The firman thus granted is as liberal as it could be consistently with the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and does not much modify the _status quo_ existing in Tunis. The integral administration of the province remains as heretofore, independent, the Government having full power to appoint and dismiss public officers of all ranks and description. He is, moreover, authorised to coin money in the name of the Sultan, and to continue to entertain direct relations with Foreign Powers, but, of course, he cannot treat with such Powers on political matters, make peace or war, dispose of the territory, or do any other act appertaining exclusively to the Sultan. In consideration of the poverty of the country, His Imperial Majesty has been further pleased to dispense with the payment by its inhabitants of all tribute. The firman concludes by reminding His Highness Mahommed Sadyk Pasha that the maintenance of the privilege of the hereditary tenure of the Government of Tunis is essentially conditional on the observance of the Sultan’s rights over the Province, and the good government of its inhabitants.”
M.
_Draft of a Concession for a Crédit Foncier presented to the Bey of Tunis for signature by M. Léon Renaud, Deputy, in December 1880_:—
“It being our desire to ensure to our subjects the advantages of the institution of a bank, to which all persons may have recourse in years of scarcity, as well as to diminish as much as possible the sacrifices to which the possessors of land are exposed by being obliged to contract loans on their property at an exorbitant rate of interest, we have considered it desirable to accord a permission to establish a bank, for the purpose of making cash advances on real estate, and, to which the proprietors of such may address themselves to improve their lands, and to sow, plant, and irrigate them.
In consequence we have decreed as follows:—
1st. We authorise M—— to found at Tunis a bank with the above-mentioned object. He is empowered to open branches of the said bank in all parts of the Regency, when he shall deem it expedient. The establishment in Tunis shall begin its operations, at the latest within a year of the date of the present decree, and shall bear the title of the _Banque de Crédit Foncier et Agricole_.
2d. The operations of the said bank are the following:—
_a._ To lend money on the mortgage of real property and title-deeds. The latter will be restored on annual payments being made at long or short dates, and simultaneously with the repayment of the capital by instalments.
_b._ To advance funds on obligations to towns, villages, _tribes of the interior_, companies, and others, which shall have the power of contracting loans in virtue of a legal and formal authorisation, in accordance with the dispositions of the religious law.
_c._ To open accounts current on mortgage.
_d._ To make advances on crops.
_e._ To undertake all financial operations with the scope of facilitating loans on real property, in order to improve roads, to improve and irrigate lands, to reclaim marshes, to plant forest trees, to develop industries and agriculture, to construct country houses, and dwellings in the towns.
_f._ To receive sums in deposit, both with and without interest.
3d. The said bank shall have the exclusive right of issuing bank-notes to an amount equivalent to the sums lent to proprietors of real estate, or employed in the different operations designated in Article 2, for which the authority of the Tunisian Government is necessary.
4th. The establishment of any other commercial institution, bearing the name of _Crédit Foncier et Agricole Tunisien_ shall not be permitted, until after the expiry of 99 years after the date of the present decree.
5th. M—— is authorised to form a company to participate both in the advantages and responsibilities of the present decree.
6th. The capital of the company destined to guarantee the obligations thus incurred shall not be less than twenty millions of francs divided into shares. The company shall have the right to increase its capital without any further authorisation on our part.
7th. The administration of the _Crédit Foncier et Agricole Tunisien_ shall be under the care of M——, or of the company, which shall succeed him, and that, during the whole term of the concession, and without restriction or exception.
8th. The Tunisian Government shall be entitled on its part, to name a delegate to watch the operations of the bank, and with the mission to bring to our notice any infractions which may be committed against the terms and spirit of the foregoing decree.
9th. The _Crédit Foncier et Agricole Tunisien_ must conform to the local laws. It shall have the right to demand from us the promulgation of a special decree _in which shall be specified the guarantee which shall be accorded to the company in order that it shall not lose what it has lent_. Our Government is not responsible for the disputes which may arise concerning the title-deeds to property, and particularly as to the documents relating to the religious trust. For all the foregoing provisions, the Company agrees to conform to the religious law of the country, to recognise no other regulation that the local law, and to have recourse to arbitrations.”
As soon as M. Renaud presented this draft, Mustapha asked time to consider it, and at once gave copies of it to his advisers. It was only when the Bey of Tunis refused to give the Regency to M. Léon Renaud that the Khamírs were invented, and the country invaded. M. Renaud “went away in a rage” on the 26th December. On the 26th April, the French troops crossed the frontier. Although M. Roustan saw no inconvenience in M. Léon Renaud inundating Tunis with his personal acceptances to a practically unlimited amount, his predecessor seven years before denounced a proposal to allow Messrs. Ranking of London to issue bank- notes (without any of the other privileges contained in M. Renaud’s draft), as “a menace to European commerce.” The Bey adroitly escaped from M. Renaud’s _imperium in imperio_ by producing the following document:—
“TUNIS, _28th May_ 1873.
“HIGHNESS,—The undersigned members of the _corps consulaire_ have the honour to transmit to your Highness the subjoined memorandum, by which they take respectfully the liberty of calling your Highness’s attention to the consequences which may be entailed on his country by the authorisation accorded to the firm of Ranking to establish a bank with the power of issuing notes on conditions contrary, as they contend, to their several treaties of commerce and the interests of their subjects, &c.
(Signed) “A. DE BOTMILIAU,
_Chargé d’Affaires de France, &c. &c._”
N.
_Notes about the Khamírs._
Since writing the text I have had access to a source of very valuable and authentic information about the people and country whose name became almost synonymous with the earlier phases of the Tunisian Expedition. Prior to the month of April 1881, the Khamír districts were totally a _terra incognita_ to European travellers: all existing maps were based on the dubious authority of Arab description and native legends, and, as afterwards turned out, had no practical value. The very charts used during the advance were but an illustration of the blind leading the blind, and proved to be wholly fallacious and misguiding. One of the most striking of the vulgar errors existing about the Khamírs relates to the question of population. They have been generally reckoned at about three times their real number, and other neighbouring tribes, such as the Ouchtetas, have been more or less confounded with the Khamírs proper. The only detail not overpainted and exaggerated seems to be the natural difficulties of the country itself. The essential features of Khamír-land are mountains with steep sides and razor-like ridges, dense forests of oak and impenetrable tangle, and an entire absence of roads or paths. Under these circumstances, wholly apart from the Khamírs themselves, the military movements were both arduous and remarkable, especially when we consider that they were to a great extent performed during the fall of torrential rain. One of the few results of the campaign has been a minute survey of the whole province, and a sufficient knowledge of the people who live there.
The Khamírs are grouped into _three_ great tribes, containing many divisions and subdivisions. The following exhaustive table was drawn up by an able officer on the staff, who was one of the first French soldiers to enter, and the last to leave, the Khamír country:—
_Selloul._
Huts or Tents, 208 } } Inhabitants, 892 } Nine divisions, one of them having three and } another two subdivisions. Guns, 384 }
_Slelma._
Huts or Tents, 620 } } Inhabitants, 2751 } Six divisions, two of them having three and } one two subdivisions. Guns, 866 }
_Tedmaka._
Huts or tents, 1007 } } Inhabitants, 3674 } Six divisions, one having six, three having } four, and two having three subdivisions. Guns, 1030 }
Total, Huts or tents, 1835.
Inhabitants, 7317.
Guns, 2270.
It is strange to notice that Commandant Villot, in his brochure, estimates the fighting men alone of these three tribes at 9900! (See _ante_.)
The same officer composed another table, showing the strength of the three columns invading Khamír-land, and the casualties which happened to each of them during their expedition of forty-nine days (24th April-10th June):—
Brigade Brigade Brigade Caillot. Vincendon. Galland.
Officers, 128 170 149
Men, 3725 4641 4024
(In all 2120 mules and 628 horses.)
Entered hospital, 767 222 311
Wounded in action, 177 14 26
Killed in action, 8 6 3
Transfered to other hospitals 216 103 123 (_evacués_),
The following is a correct summary of the movements of the invading force during the same period:—
“April 26th.—Brigade Ritter at Demanet-Rebah.
Brigade Vincendon at El Aioun.
Brigade Galland at Ain Smain.
The Brigade Ritter ascended the Djebel Addeda as far as Baba Brik in two columns, setting out at 3 A.M. and arriving at 8.30. The column Vincendon advanced into the defile Fedj-Kahla in two divisions, with the 7th Battalion of Chasseurs as advance guard, and reached at 8 A.M. Hadgar Menkoura. General Galland’s brigade skirted the mountain with two cannons. The insurgents cut off the 2d company of the 22d Regiment, and killed five soldiers besides wounding seventeen. Position in the evening:—The Brigade Galland at Hadgar Menkoura, the Brigade Vincendon at Kef Cheraga, and the Brigade Ritter at Baba Brik. Tabarca is occupied by Colonel Delpech.
April 27th.—Ritter attacked with apoplexy, and removed to La Calle. His brigade at El Aioun. No other movement.
April 28th.—General Forgemol advances to Hadgar Menkoura, and brings back the wounded.
April 29th.—No other movement. Raids (_razzias_) executed in several directions.
April 30th.—Position maintained. Brigade Galland makes a reconnaissance towards Babanet, and Sidi Abdallah. It was arranged that if the Khamírs asked terms, the conditions were to be—(1) Surrender of arms, (2) Hostages, (3) Requisition of mules, (4) Work on the roads, (5) Payment of a war indemnity.
May 1st and 2d.—No movement.
May 3d.—The brigades are concentrated at Djebalue. The ambulances are organised with 78 mules, each to convey 2 wounded and 7 litters.
May 4th.—Brigades Ritter and Galland move to Sidi Yusef.
May 5th.—The three brigades are concentrated at El Mana, where General Forgemol arrives.
May 6th and 7th.—Same camp. Torrential rains.
May 8th.—Reconnaissance of the three brigades on the Djebel and Marabout Sidi Abdallah.
May 9th.—Rain.
May 10th.—Three soldiers assassinated.
May 11th.—The Brigade Vincendon, followed by that of General Galland, ascends the Sidi Abdallah mountain. The Brigade Caillot moves to Dar-el- Abidi. Skirmishes all day long. General Forgemol starts for Fernána.
May 12th.—Rain. Dense fog.
May 13th.—The Brigade Vincendon goes to Ain Draham or Drahan. General Caillot makes a reconnaissance on the Kranget El Meridge, sighting the column Logerot. Brigade Galland remains at Sidi Abdallah.
May 14th.—The Brigade Caillot crosses the Kranget El Meridge and arrives at Ben Metir. The column Logerot engaged.
May 15th.—Reconnaissance in the valley of the Oued Lille.
May 16th.—The Brigade Caillot moves to Redir Tebeinia, General Vincendon to El Atatfa, and General Galland to Ain Drahan, occupying also Sidi Abdallah.
May 17th.—Same camps. Rain. Fog.
May 18th.—Reconnaissance towards El Guemaïr. Battalion attacked returning.
May 19th.—Brigade Caillot reaches El Guemaïr (advance guard of _Tirailleurs_ attacked _en route_), and Brigade Vincendon Sattora and Ouldj Souk. The Mecknas incessantly attack the Brigade Caillot.
May 20th and 21st.—No further movements.
May 22d.—Same position.
May 23d.—The Brigade Logerot at Souk el Temis.
May 24th.—Brigade Caillot reaches Faïd el Aïech. General Galland arrives at Glimett from Ain Drahan by way of Guemaïr. General Vincendon attacks the Mecknas.
May 25th.—Logerot advances to Seriou, Caillot to Sidi Kreider, Galland to Khradouma. Vincendon traverses the valley of the Oued Mellah in two columns, and attacks Djebel Abiat. His left is engaged by the enemy, but he reaches Sidi Asker.
May 26th.—A portion of the Brigade Caillot marches without knapsacks on Berzigue. General Vincendon makes a reconnaissance over the sand-hills, and a portion of his troops are attacked, but the enemy were repulsed. Only two soldiers were killed.
May 27th.—Early in the morning, General Forgemol with the 4th Hussars left Khradouma for Berzigue. Caillot makes a reconnaissance against the Mecknas amongst the sand-hills, conjointly with the Brigade Vincendon. General Forgemol decides to attack the Moggods thus:—
General Logerot from the south, Bréart from the east (Mater), and Caillot from the west.
May 28th.—No movement.
May 29th.—Galland advances to Berzigue.
May 30th and 31st.—No movement beyond reconnaissances.
June 1st.—Reconnaissance against the Ouled Yahya, Ouchteta, and Nefza.
June 2d.—Same camps.
June 3d.—Galland moves in the direction of Ben Metir.
June 4th.—Caillot marches towards Cape Négre.
June 5th.—Vincendon at Sidi Asker completes the road to Tabarca.
June 6th.—Caillot arrives at Fedj Recheder-Sekker. Roads ordered to be constructed from Tabarca to Fernána through Ain Drahan, and from El Aioun to Sidi Fatullah by way of Ain Drahan.
June 7th.—Caillot remains at Fedj Recheder Sekker. No other movement of importance. The “Vienne” arrives at Tabarca with 200,000 rations.
June 8th.—The three brigades shift their positions:—Vincendon to Kasr Tautia, Caillot to Dar el Melah, and Galland to El Guemaïr.
June 9th.—No movement of importance.
June 10th.—Galland at El Guemaïr, Caillot and Vincendon at Berzigue.
June 11th.—The Brigade Caillot goes to Lag-Haf. The Brigade Galland at El Guemaïr works on the road from Ain Drahan to Ben Metir. The Brigade Vincendon completes the road from Ain Drahan to Tabarca.
June 12th.—No movement.
June 13th.—The Brigade Caillot goes to Oun el Ouch.
June 14th.—The Brigade Vincendon quits Kasr Tautia for Tabarca and commences embarkation. The Brigade Caillot moves to Ain Drahan.
June 15th.—The transports with the Brigade Vincendon quit Tabarca for Marseilles.
June 16th to 21st.—The portions of the other brigades not destined to garrison Tabarca, Fernána, and Ain Drahan, embarked for France. The staffs of General Forgemol and the other Generals broke up on the termination of the campaign. I reach Tunis by way of Fernána and Souk- el-Arba.”
The following is an exact copy of the report presented to the Bey of Tunis by General Younes El Dziri, Governor of Beja, and the Kahia Allela Jouini “on the subject of the recent events in the Khamír country:”—
“There was a sort of partnership established between some individuals of the Khamír tribes and others belonging to the neighbouring Algerian clan of the Nahads. The object of this association was the sale by the Khamírs of goods stolen by the Nahads, and the subsequent division of the proceeds, and _vice versâ_. On a dispute arising as to a division which the Khamírs had failed to make, a quarrel ensued in which a Khamír lost his life. This business was communicated to the ministry (of the Bey) by the Governor of Beja, who had conferred on the subject with the Commandant of the French troops at Roum-el-Souk. The affair was to all appearances arranged, when, on the 29th March, the French Commandant invited some of the Sheikhs of the Khamírs to meet him at Roum-el-Souk, for the purpose of a further discussion about it. They accordingly repaired thither in company with some Sheikhs of the Tunisian tribe of Beni-Mazens. The Commandant told them to give up, by way of hostage, the “tents” of the chiefs of the Ouled Cedra subdivision (“fraction”) of the Khamírs, and to pay an indemnity of 4702 francs for two Nahad tents, which had been burned during the above-mentioned disturbance, telling them at the same time that if they did not comply with his orders they would be attacked on the following day. The Khamír Sheikhs answered that they could not give the required hostages without the consent of the Bey, and that they were not prepared to pay for the burned tents unless the ‘price of blood’ arising from the death of the Khamír in the same dispute was taken into consideration, and unless both parties were allowed to take an oath, as is usual in cases where no agreement can be come to. The Sheikhs added that this arrangement had been agreed to by both the Commandant and the Governor of Beja, subject to due confirmation by the superior authorities on both sides, and cited as a proof that one of the Khamírs had been detained as a hostage, for the due execution of the compromise. ‘To-day,’ they added, ‘you change the conditions; nevertheless we ask you to give us a delay to prepare what you seek from us and to fix the sum which we ourselves claim.’ The Commandant said that he had no delay to accord them or indemnity to pay them, that their demands were totally devoid of foundation, and that unless they carried out his orders promptly he should attack them the next day. The Khamír Sheikhs then withdrew.
“At the same moment the Commandant enjoined the Nahad people to collect their tribesmen on the frontier, and, in case the Khamírs did not give the satisfaction required, to invade their country and attack them. Persons not obeying the injunction were to be fined 500 francs each, without prejudice to other and more serious penalties. The day after this conference (Wednesday, March 30th), the Nahads came to the frontier, _and attacked upon their own territory_ the Khamírs of the subdivision (_fraction_) of the Bechainas, while engaged in their lawful and peaceful pursuits. The Bechainas defended themselves with the help of their compatriots and killed a Nahad man. The officer in command of the troops at La Calle having heard of the business, at once repaired with a company of soldiers to the scene of the combat. Although the struggle was over, a troop of cows were fired at, and one killed and the others wounded. The owners of the cattle abstained from resistance to avoid a dispute. The officer went away, but returned next day (Thursday), with more Arabs, the Caid Ben Hamada, and soldiers, and renewed the engagement. The Khamírs defended themselves. In the result the French lost 7 killed and 6 wounded; the Khamírs 15 killed and 13 wounded. This is the exact truth concerning the affair.”
O.
_The Modest Gains of a Tunisian Premier._
I have told in the text the story of how the coffee-house drudge, Mustapha Ben Ismael, became Prime Minister of Tunis, and how his French friends first “delighted to honour him,” and then pitilessly but prudently relegated him to the seclusion of private life. It is almost incredible, but nevertheless true, that even now at the time I am writing (April 1882), a strong party is working and intriguing for his speedy restoration to place and power. A glance, therefore, at a list of Mustapha’s more notorious gains during the past ten years will be useful as a warning to those who have rendered themselves responsible before the world for the destinies of the Tunisian Regency, and to the ordinary reader it may perchance be interesting as showing the profits of a lucky favourite at even a petty Oriental court.
Names of Estates. Localities. Notes.
Ain Sciala. Beja. } } Sidi Soltan. „ } } Elzrelli. „ } } Arbir. „ } } Sold to General Hamida Ben Sciauatt. Tebourba. } Ayad for 500,000 francs. } Nahba. Mater. } } Elzriba. „ } } Ermil. „ }
Elmebtuh. Bizerta road. } } Buarada. Elfahs. } } Sold to Signor Rivoltella Borj Elamri. Tunis. } and a syndicate for 975,000 } francs. Elazib. Bizerta. } } Ghiran. „ }
Fritisa and Asciafir. „ } } Beny Ata. „ } } Sold as in the last case for Beny Meslem. „ } 200,000 francs. } Sidi Hassan. „ }
Gafur. Teboursak. Not sold, but worth 600,000 francs.
Elmornaghia. Manouba. Not sold, but worth 200,000 francs.
Seltan. Hamman-el-Lif. Not sold, but worth 300,000 francs.
Village of Grambalia. Not sold, but worth 1,500,000 francs.
Mkada. Bizerta. } } Udai. „ } Not sold, but worth 200,000 } francs. Elzaina. „ }
In addition to all these splendid properties:—
100,000 olive-trees at Menzel.
Two caravanserais in the city of Tunis.
Twenty shops.
Jewels of the value of 3,000,000 francs belonging to Sy Mustapha Khaznadar, the disgraced favourite, and Sy Ismael Sunni and Sy Rescid, the strangled ministers.
Furniture worth about 1,500,000 francs, belonging to the same persons.
_N.B._—The greater part of the real estate absorbed by Mustapha were portions of the theoretically inalienable royal domain, belonging to the various princes and princesses of the Hassanite family—_e.g._, the village of Grambalia was the property of the late Muhamed Bey, of whose son Mustapha was appointed guardian. So complete has been the nest- feathering to which the Bey has been exposed on all sides, that the Financial Commission has been lately compelled to reduce his annual Civil List by £15,000 at one blow. The first reform which should occupy the attention of the French authorities is the dilapidation of the public or quasi-public State lands, and the bringing to justice of the persons concerned in it. The list of Mustapha’s “tokens of affection” from his sovereign was compiled by a person for some years in his confidence, after consulting the purchasers of his estates. Mustapha is now thinking of a rainy day; the proceeds of his Tunisian lands are being prudently expended in Parisian house-property. If the French Protectorate is to receive recognition at the hands of Europe, by all means let the Minister Resident be Prime Minister as well _de facto_ as _de jure_. We have had enough of absorptive Grand Viziers.
P.
_Strength and Arrangement of the First Corps Expéditionnaire on the 8th June 1881._
Staff: 46 officers, 383 men, 171 horses, 198 mules.
Division Delebecque: Staff, 22 officers, 167 men, 143 horses, 57 mules.
Brigade Caillot: 130 officers, 3771 men, 125 horses, 415 mules.
„ Vincendon: 167 officers, 4681 men, 303 horses, 479 mules.
„ Galland: 148 officers, 4092 men, 137 horses, 386 mules.
„ Logerot: 151 officers, 3660 men, 465 horses, 689 mules.
„ Gaume: 65 officers, 868 men, 937 horses, 34 mules.
„ De Brem: 82 officers, 2130 men, 522 horses, 81 mules.
Fourth Brigade (General Bréart): 244 officers, 6669 men, 1247 horses, and 1209 mules.
Kef: 46 officers, 1274 men, 127 horses, 130 mules.
Ghardimaou: 20 officers, 496 men.
Beja: 9 officers, 325 men, 3 horses, 4 mules.
Souk-Erras (Algeria): 2 officers, 120 men, 82 horses, 60 mules.
Tabarca: 60 officers, 1516 men, 95 horses.
Total: 1202 officers, 30,152 men, 4357 horses, and 3742 mules.
Q.
_Troops sent from France to take part in the First Tunisian Expedition._
1st Brigade 202 officers. 4987 men.
2d „ 191 „ 5245 „
3d „ 189 „ 5247 „
Brigade of Reserves 258 „ 6587 „
Detachment at Tabarca 54 „ 1550 „ ----------- Total 23,616 men.
Of these the following were left in Tunis:—
1st Brigade 44 officers. 1112 men.
2d „ 91 „ 2772 „
3d „ 89 „ 2890 „
Brigade of Reserves 80 „ 3477 „
Detachment at Tabarca 34 „ 1109 „ ----------- Total 11,360 men.
The following were sent to Algeria:—
1st Brigade (one battery) 4 officers. 177 men.
2d „ 3 „ 695 „
3d (Company Commissariat) 3 „ 695 „
Reserves (Cavalry and transport service) 27 „ 585 „ --------- Total 2152 men.
A round number of 10,000 were therefore sent back to France on the breaking up of the Corps Expéditionnaire.
R.
_Troops sent to Algeria to take part in the First Tunisian Expedition._
6 Battalions of Zouaves.
5 „ Turcos.
1 „ Infantry.
3 Squadrons of Cavalry.
2 „ of Spahis.
5½ Batteries of Artillery.
5 Companies of Engineers.
4 „ Military Train.
Thus constituting a total force of 8200 men.
At the end of the expedition all the troops were sent back to Algeria, where their presence was necessitated by the affairs of Saïda, with the exception of one squadron of Spahis, one battery of Artillery, and two companies of Engineers, and left the Regency on the following dates:—
June 13.—Embarked 2 battalions of the 1st Tirailleurs for Algiers.
„ „ „ 2 „ „ 2d „ for Oran.
„ 19. „ 1 „ „ 2d Zouaves for Oran.
„ „ „ 1 battery of Artillery for Oran.
July 1. „ ⅓ „ „ for Algiers.
„ „ „ 4 companies of Military Train for Algiers.
„ 4. „ 1 company of Engineers for Algiers.
„ 8. „ 2 battalions of Zouaves for Algiers.
„ „ „ 1 company Engineers for Algiers.
„ 13. „ 1 battery of Artillery for Algiers.
The rest, viz., 4 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 2 batteries, recrossed the frontier into the province of Constantine, with General Forgemol, on the 28th June.
S.
_Troops sent to Tunis to take part in the Second Campaign._
July 9.—Tunis, 4 battalions (71st, 93d, 136th, and 137th) 2000 men.
(Afterwards sent to Sfax.)
„ 13. „ 1 battalion (77th) 450 „
(Afterwards sent to Sfax.)
„ 21. „ 2 battalions (107th and 114th) 1000 „
(Afterwards sent to Gabes.)
„ „ „ 1 battalion (78th) 500 „
(Afterwards sent to Jerba.)
„ „ „ 1 battery (35th) 188 „
(Afterwards divided between Sfax and Gabes.)
„ 24 —Tunis, 2 companies of Military Train (6th brigade) 180 „ & 26.
„ 27.—Tunis, 2 battalions (25th, 55th, 6th brigade) 1030 „
„ 28. „ 1 battalion 135th (6th brigade) 500 „
„ 29. „ 1 company of Engineers 141 „
(Afterwards sent to Sfax, Jerba, and Gabez.)
„ 31.—Bizerta, 2 battalions (65th, 28th Chasseurs, 6th 1000 „ brigade)
„ „ Tunis, 2 batteries (31st, 95th, 6th brigade) 360 „
„ „ „ 1 battalion (125th, 6th brigade) 515 „
Aug. 1. „ 1 battalion (6th, 6th brigade) 500 „
„ 31.—Goletta, 3 battalions (80th, 114th, 118th) 1500 „
Sept. 6.—Susa, 3 battalions (66th, 116th, and 48th) 1500 „
„ 4. „ 1 battery (33d) 185 „
„ 1.—Tunis, 3 battalions (33d, 43d, 110th) 1500 „
„ „ „ workmen and hospital assistants 125 „
„ 11. „ 3 battalions 1500 „
„ 12. „ 2 squadrons (1st Hussars) 360 „
„ „ „ 1 battalion of the 127th 515 „
„ 14. „ 2 battalions (8th and 73d) 1200 „
„ „ „ 2 batteries (31st and 33d) 360 „
„ „ „ 1 squadron (1st Hussars) 125 „
„ „ „ others 150 „
„ 16. „ 1 company of Engineers (3d battalion) 128 „
„ „ „ Telegraphists 44 „
„ „ „ Hussars 85 „
„ „ „ 1 battery (34th) 188 „
„ „ „ ambulance of the 6th brigade 128 „
„ „ „ Topographical service 14 „
„ 20. „ 1 battery (34th) 180 „
„ „ „ convoy of the 6th brigade 234 „
„ 25.—Susa, 2 battalions (10th and 138th) 1040 „
„ „ „ 1 company of Engineers (11th battalion) 124 „
„ 27. „ 1 battalion (23d Chasseurs) 509 „
„ „ „ 1 squadron (6th Hussars) 189 „
„ „ „ ½ battery (32d) 90 „
„ „ „ staff of the 7th brigade 17 „
„ 28.—Manouba, 2 battalions (111th and 61st) 1128 „
„ „ Susa, 1 battalion (62d) 534 „
„ „ „ 2 squadrons (6th Hussars) 307 „
„ „ „ 1 battery (29th) 187 „
„ „ „ staff and other services 118 „
„ 30. „ 1 battalion (46th) 549 „
„ „ „ 1 battery (10th) 188 „
„ „ „ others 9 „
Oct. 3.—Goletta, gendarmerie 99 „
„ „ „ others 25 „
„ 5. „ train and others 127 „
„ „ Susa, ambulance and convoy 300 „
„ 7.—Tunis, Artillery 97 „
„ 9.—Susa, ½ battery of Artillery (32d) 118 „
„ „ „ others 97 „
„ 10.—Tunis, 3 battalions (1st, 84th, 101st) 1694 „
„ „ „ _section de munitions_ 179 „
„ „ „ others 28 „
„ „ Susa, military railway corps 205 „
„ 12.—Tunis, train and gendarmerie 160 „
„ „ Susa, train and telegraph 60 „
„ 17.—Tunis, 3 battalions (87th, 119th, and 128th) 1698 „
„ 19. „ train 90 „
„ 21. „ „ 89 „
„ 24. „ telegraphists 30 „
„ „ Susa, ammunition train 130 „
„ „ „ train 10 „
„ 25.—Tunis, 3 battalions (130th) 1627 „
„ „ „ 1 battery (27th) 184 „ ----------- 30,421 men.
T.
_Formation of the Columns employed in the Concentric Movement on Kairwán._
The troops forming part of the columns Forgemol and Étienne have been enumerated in the text. The following details explain the constitution of the column Saussier, Logerot, and Sabatier, which marched on Kairwán from Tunis and the Manouba:—
_Infantry_— (1.) The battalions of the 65th, 125th, and 135th Regiments attached to the _corps expéditionnaire_, which formed the 1st _Regiment de Marche_.
(2.) The 2d _Regiment de Marche_, composed of the battalions belonging to the 25th and 55th Regiments.
(3.) The 28th battalion of the _Chasseurs à pied_.
_Cavalry_— (1.) 7th Regiment of the _Chasseurs à cheval_.
(2.) One squadron of the 1st Regiment of _chasseurs d’Afrique_.
(In addition to these, there were one battalion of the 33d Regiment and one of the 46th Regiment detached from the Brigade Philibert.)
_Artillery_—10th battery of the 9th Regiment (field guns).
3d _section de munitions_ of 36th Regiment of Artillery.
_Engineers_— 3d company of the 3d battalion of the 3d Regiment.
_Transports (Train des équipages)_— 5th company and 5 _bis_ company of the 5th squadron.
U.
_Details of the Positions and Strength of the French Army of Occupation in the Regency of Tunis on April 1_, 1882.
DIVISION DU NORD.
GENERAL JAPY (_now General Guyon Vernier_).
* * * * *
_Commandement des places de Tunis et la Goulette_—GÉNÉRAL LAMBERT, _à Tunis_.
LA GOULETTE.
4e zouaves (1 bataillon et le depôt).
114 régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
11 régiment de hussards (1 péleton).
Parc d’artillerie No 3.
14e escadron du train (1 détachement).
11/4 génie (1 détachement).
_Services administratifs._
21e section d’ouvriers.
21e id. d’infirmiers.
Dépôt des convalescents.
Ambulance.
TUNIS.
4e zouaves (2 bataillons).
1er de ligne (1 bataillon).
101e id. id.
118e id. id.
11 régiment de hussards (1 péleton).
1er batterie 19me d’artillerie 90 mm.
10e id. 34me id. 80 mm.
14e escadron du train (1 détachement).
15e id. id.
18e id. id.
20e id. id. (3 compagnies).
11/4 génie, portion principale.
Gendarmerie.
21e section d’infirmiers.
* * * * *
_Subdivision de Testour_—GÉNÉRAL D’AUBIGNY, _à Tebourba._
TEBOURBA.
8e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
20e id. id.
11e régiment de hussards (1½ escadrons).
Génie (1 section).
MEDJEZ-EL-BAB.
127e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (1 section montagne).
12/2 génie.
TESTOUR.
84e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
21e section d’ouvriers.
21e „ d’infirmiers.
BORDJ MESSAOUDI.
128e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
LE KEF.
83e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
122e id. id.
128e id. (2 compagnies).
13e chasseurs à cheval (3 péletons).
3e batterie 26e d’artillerie 80 mm.
10e id. 13e id. (1 section montagne).
18/2 génie.
21e section d’ouvriers.
21e id. d’infirmiers.
Ambulance.
AÏN TUNGA.
73e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
11e régiment de hussards (1 péleton).
10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (section montagne).
ELLEZ.
80e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
13e chasseurs à cheval (1 péleton).
10e batterie 33e d’artillerie (section montagne).
* * * * *
_Subdivision d’Aïn Draham_—GÉNÉRAL GUYON VERNIER, _Aïn Draham._
AÏN DRAHAM.
29e bataillon de chasseurs.
18e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
22e id. id.
14e escadron du train, 5e compagnie bis.
13e batterie 16e d’artillerie (montagne).
16/3 genie, à El Aioun (1 section).
21e section d’ouvriers.
21e id. d’infirmiers.
Ambulance.
BÉJA.
57e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
142e id. id.
10me batterie 13e régiment d’artillerie.
14e escadron du train (détachement).
11/4 génie (détachement).
GHARDIMAOU.
96e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
13e régiment de chasseurs à cheval (1 escadron).
18/2 génie (détachement).
TABARKA.
143e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
13e régiment de chasseurs à cheval (1 escadron).
1er batterie 19e d’artillerie (1 section).
8e id. 12e id. id.
14e escadron du train.
15/2 génie à 16e Teboul (détachement).
SOUK-EL-ARBA.
1re compagnie de fusilliers de discipline.
18/2 génie (détachement).
* * * * *
_Subdivision de Tunis_—GÉNÉRAL MAURAND, _à Tunis._
TUNIS.
115e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
HAMMAM-LIF.
88e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
119e id. (3 compagnies).
9e batterie du 27 d’artillerie (montagne).
9e id. id. id.
11/4 génie.
Gendarmerie.
ZAGHOUÁN.
87e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
92e id. id.
11e regiment de hussards (un péleton).
16/3 génie (détachement).
HAMMANET.
1 compagnie franche.
BIZERTE.
38e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
1er batterie 19e d’artillerie (1 section, 80 mm.)
14e escadron du train (1 détachement).
11/4 génie.
21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).
MATEUR.
30e bataillon de chasseurs à pied.
14e escadron du train (détachement).
21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).
MANOUBA.
119e régiment de ligne (1 compagnie).
11e régiment de hussards (½ escadron).
14e escadron du train 5e compagnie pp.
18e id. id.
21e sections (ouvriers et infirmiers).
Ambulance.
Depôt de remonte.
RÉCAPITULATION.
_Infanterie._
1er régiment de ligne Tunis.
8e id. Tébourba.
18e id. Aïn Draham.
20e id. Tébourba.
22e id. Aïn Draham.
38e id. Bizerte.
57e id. Béja.
73e id. Aïn Tounga.
80e id. Ellez.
83e id. Le Kef.
84e id. Testour.
87e id. Zaghouán.
88e id. Hammam-Lif.
92e id. Zaghouán.
96e id. Ghardimaou.
101e id. Tunis.
114e id. La Goulette.
115e id. Tunis.
118e id. id.
119e id. Hammam-Lif.
122e id. Le Kef.
127e id. Medjez-el-Bab.
128e id. Le Kef.
143e id. Tabarka.
142e id. Béja.
29e bataillon de chasseurs Aïn Draham.
30e id. id. Mateur.
4e zouaves (3 bataillon et depôt) Tunis et La Goulette.
1er compagnie franche Tunis.
1re compagnie de fusilliers de discipline Souk-el-Arba.
_Cavalerie._
13e chasseurs Le Kef, Tabarka, Ghardimaou.
11e hussards Tébourba, La Goulette, Manouba.
id. Tunis, Aïn-Tounga, Zaghouán.
3e Spahis Aïn Draham.
_Artillerie._
12e régiments, 8e batteries Tabarka.
13e id. 10e id. Béja, Kef.
16e id. 13e id. Aïn Draham.
19e id. 1re id. Tunis, Bizerte, Tabarka.
26e id. 3e id. Le Kef.
27e id. 9e id. Hammam-Lif.
31e id. 9e id. id.
33e id. 10e id. Medjez, Aïn Tunga, Ellez.
34e id. 10e id. Tunis.
Parc No. 3 La Goulette.
_Train des Equipages._
14e escadrons, 5e compagnies, pp. Manouba.
14e id. 5e id. bis. Aïn Draham.
18e id. 5e id. pp. Manouba.
20e id. 3e id. Tunis.
_Génie._
11e escadrons, 4e compagnies Tunis, Bizerte.
12e id. 2e id. Medjez-el-Bab.
15e id. 2e id. Tabarka.
16e id. 3e id. Aïn Draham, Tabarka.
18e id. 2e id. Le Kef.
_Troupes d’administration._
21e section, ouvriers Tunis, La Goulette.
id. infirmiers Manouba.
19e section de secretaires d’etat-major force publique, Tunis.
DIVISION DU SUD.
GÉNÉRAL LOGEROT.
* * * * *
_5e Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL SABATIER.
CAMP DE SOUSSE.
65e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
28e bataillon de chasseurs à pied.
125e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
135e id. id.
6e id. id.
25e id. id.
7me régiment de chasseurs.
10e batterie du 9e d’artillerie (montée).
10e id. du 35e id. (montagne).
6e section de munitions (36e d’artillerie).
Un péleton de génie (3e régt., 3e bon., 3e cie).
Train des équipages (5e cie. pp. et 5e cie. bis)
ENFIDA.
65e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
EL DJEM.
125e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
* * * * *
_6me Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL PHILIBERT.
GAFSA.
27e bataillon de chasseurs.
46e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
61e id. id.
111e id. id.
1er régiment de hussards (1 escadron).
10e batterie du 31e régiment (2 sections montagne).
Génie (1 section, 3e cie., 3e bon., 3e régt.)
Train des équipages (5e cie. pp.)
OUED GILMA.
33e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
43e id. id.
110e id. id.
1er régiment de hussards (escadron).
Détachement de la section de munitions (36e).
Génie (1 section, 3e bon., 3e cie., 3e régt.)
Train des équipages (5e cie. bis détachement).
RAZ-EL-OUED GABÈS.
1 regiment de hussards (1 escadron).
* * * * *
_7me Brigade_—GÉNÉRAL ÉTIENNE.
EL-MELAH.
23e bataillon de chasseurs.
KAIRWAN.
48e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
66e id. id.
62e id. id.
138e id. id.
6e régiment de hussards (2 escadrons).
10e batterie (29e régiment d’artillerie).
9e id. du 10e id.
Génie (2e cie. du 3e bon. du 3e regt).
Train des équipages (5e cie. et 5e cie. bis détachement).
SOUSSE.
19e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
10e batterie du 32e d’artillerie.
Parc No. 2.
3e cie. d’ouvriers mixte du chemins de fer.
Train des équipages (5e cie. détachement).
SIDI-EL-HANI.
6me hussards (½ escadron).
3e section des munitions (36e artillerie).
Train des équipages (détachement de la 5e cie.)
OUED-LAYA.
19e de ligne (2 compagnies).
6e hussards (½ escadron).
* * * * *
_Brigade de la Côte_—GÉNÉRAL JAMAIS.
RAZ-EL-OUED GABÈS.
Un bataillon de zouaves.
14e régiment de ligne (1 bataillon).
77e id. id.
107e id. id.
137e id. id.
6e id. id.
25e id. id.
1er hussards (un escadron).
9e batterie du 35e d’artillerie (2 sections montagne).
Génie (2 sections du 4e régt.)
SFAX.
136e regiment de ligne.
55e id.
9e batterie du 13e régiment (montagne).
MEHDIA.
71e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
ILE DE DJERBA.
_Houmt-Souk._
73e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
_Borj-Marsa._
73e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
10e batterie du 13 régiment (13e montagne).
_El-Kantera._
71e régiment de ligne (2 compagnies).
9e batterie 35e d’artillerie (une section montagne).
RÉCAPITULATION.
_Infanterie._
6e régiment de ligne Gabès.
14e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.
19e id. Sousse et Oued-Laya.
25e id. Gabès.
46e id. Gafsa.
48e id. Kairwán.
55e id. Sfax.
61e id. Gafsa.
62e id. Kairwán.
65e id. Sousse et Enfida.
66e id. Kairwán.
71e id. (Djerba), Médra-el-Kantara.
77e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.
78e id. (Djerba), Bordj Marsa.
107e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.
111e id. Gafsa.
125e id. Sousse-el-Djem.
135e id. Sousse.
136e id. Sfax.
137e id. Ras-el-Oued Gabès.
138e id. Kairwán.
4e zouaves (1 bataillon) Gabès.
23e bataillon de chasseurs El-Melah.
27e id. Gafsa.
28e id. Sousse.
_Cavalerie._
7e régiment de chasseurs Sousse.
1er hussards Gafsa, Ras-el-Oued, Gabès.
id. Oueld Gilma.
6e id. Kairwán, Ouled-Laya.
6e id. Sidi-el-Hami.
_Artillerie._
9e régiments, 10e batteries Sousse.
10e id. 9e id. Kairwán.
13e id. 9e id. Sfax.
13e id. 10e id. Bordj-Marsa.
29e id. 10e id. Kairwán.
31e id. 10e id. Gafsa.
32e id. 10e id. Sousse.
35e id. 9e id. Ras-el-Oued, Randam.
35e id. 10e id. Sousse.
Parc No. 2 id.
_Train des equipages._
Escadrons. compagnies.
... 5e 5me bis.
Sousse, Gafsa, Oued-Gilma, Kairwán, Sidi-el-Hami.
_Génie._
Sousse, Gafsa, Oued-Gilma, Kairwán, Raz-el-Oued-Gabès.
V.
_An American Prophecy about Tunis._
Mr. Amos Perry was, from July 1862 till September 1867, United States’ Consul at Tunis. On his return to America he published, in 1869, a book entitled, “Carthage and Tunis—Past and Present.” His note as to “the political future of the country” has been so curiously verified that it may be reproduced with advantage. He writes:—
“Just as I was leaving Tunis, after having endured the heat of the summer of 1867, and breathed a noxious air, that brought cholera and death to thousands around me, I received from an eminent diplomatic source a pointed inquiry, whose definite answer, which was then confidential, implied on my part some insight into the future. Though not a prophet, nor the son of a prophet, I embraced my privilege as a Yankee and guessed.
“Since then, I have seen no reason to change my views. As the great ship canal across the isthmus of Suez progresses under French auspices, Tunis, centrally situated on the great highway between the canal and the ocean, acquires a new importance, which the French people and government are not slow to appreciate, and turn to their account. They see on the Tunisian coast better harbours, and a richer soil, than are to be found in their Algerian possessions, and they evidently mean to bring them under their control. Instead of being animated by a chivalrous spirit and a desire to diffuse the blessings of civilisation, they seem disposed to take advantage of the weakness of this government to extend their power and increase their territorial possessions. Despite his graceful air and comely looks, the French eagle is savagely rapacious; and now the British lion, which seeks the gratification of his own appetite, is powerless to restrain the soaring and plunging movements of this keen-eyed bird. The American eagle, distrustful of both the bird and beast that hovered and prowled around his western domains in the season of his exposure, contents himself with simply noting passing events. The inquiry and reply were as follows:—
“WHAT IS TO BE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF TUNIS?
“This question is often put, and gives rise to a variety of speculations and answers. Frenchmen apparently regard Tunis as the supplement of Algeria. Englishmen see here an important source of supplies for Malta, and Italians claim special consideration on account of their language and customs, which have to some extent prevailed here from the Roman period to the present time. Italy has the largest colony here; England has the most pressing need of supplies for Malta; but France has the greatest force at hand to control the country.
“Politically, too, France has the most intimate relations with Tunis. From the beginning of the war against Algiers, the French have been near neighbours of the Bey, and much of the time have been patronised as his special friends. On one occasion they prevented the Ottoman fleet from an organised effort to get control of this government. They have employed the full range of diplomatic arts to introduce and keep up intimate relations between the two countries. The French consul at length acquired a leading, not to say controlling, influence with the Bey. He was consulted, and his aid was regarded as needful to the success of all important enterprises. French subjects were invited to fill places of emolument and trust, and to them were given the most important contracts, such as establishing telegraphic communication between different parts of the regency, making loans to the government almost on their own terms, and introducing water into the city and its environs from the mountains of Zaghuán.
“With French influence thus strongly established and recognised, in the year 1864, a French consul, with little experience in the country, attempted to inaugurate a new line of policy, boldly treating the Bey as a French vassal by interrupting his vessels in his own waters, demanding the dismissal of some of his ministers, and recommending other important changes in the government. Not being able to execute this line of policy without resorting to force (from which measure the consul did not shrink), and giving serious offence to other nations, the French government withdrew this consul, and has since sent other officers who have pursued a more conciliatory course. Still, during their administration, the Bey has been made to feel the arbitrary power of the French government.
“When the Bey was relieved of the presence of the offensive consul, it was regarded as a victory on his part, and was so proclaimed abroad. But I believe France took this step, both because she did not wish to encounter the displeasure of other nations and especially because she was not disposed unnecessarily to have another religious war similar to that waged in Algeria. But her ultimate purposes in regard to this country are scarcely to be questioned. While she watches it with a vigilant eye lest it escape her irritating touch, she sees that gentleness is in general better than harshness. Feeling secure of her plunder, she can afford to await the maturity of plans of slow development.
“If the French were to take forcible possession of the regency, other nations might protest, and Mussulmans might massacre and plunder. The seizure could be made and the country held. Difficulties would, however, naturally arise in regulating many complicated affairs while encountering the hatred of Mussulmans and the ill-will of Europeans. In view of all the facts in this case France decides to await the progress of events. Her experience in Algeria and in Mexico probably serves as a warning. Her legitimate influence as a powerful neighbour of the Bey is great, and she has but to persist in the maintenance of apparently friendly relations, and seize every petty occasion to assert her presumed authority, to secure present advantages and a final triumph.
“I am, then, persuaded that this country will at length come under the acknowledged protection and control of France, if not with the consent and approbation of other nations, probably without violent opposition. Such at least is the manifest tendency of affairs at the present time, notwithstanding a species of statecraft employed to produce a counter result. The malady is too deeply seated to be overcome by empirics in the name of diplomacy. The Gallic eagle, already scenting the prey, prepares to clutch it, despite the lion’s growl and all the shrieks and howls that may be raised as he enjoys his repast.”
W.
_A Foreign Diplomatist’s Note on Tunis._
The following _mémoire_ was sent to Lord De la Warr by a foreign diplomatist last May. It affords very valuable aid to the serious study of the Tunisian Question, if the reader has not already made up his mind, that political conventions and diplomatic assurances are not altogether subservient to the doctrine of expediency:—
“The jesuitical language employed by certain portions of the Russian and Austrian Press on the subject of the aggressive policy of France in the Mediterranean is the more remarkable, and at the same time the more immoral, because it was precisely the diplomatists of Austria and Russia who, at the Congress of Vienna, extorted from the representatives of France a declaration guaranteeing the integrity and independence of the Regency of Tunis. It is superfluous to point out now that the present policy of France, who seems to have entirely deserted the path of peace and honour, menaces the great and vital interests of England, commercially in Europe, and politically in the East. Very patent facts oblige British statesmen now-a-days to remember the traditions of George Canning, who by an energetic policy saved the prestige of his country and the interests of modern civilisation; then, as now, menaced by the struggle for supremacy carried on by a restless Power which is trying by all possible means to subject nations and races to the despotism of a so-called universal Republic.
“‘The régime changes,’ says George Canning, speaking of France, ‘but the hereditary character of the French people never alters.’ The French are Chauvinists now as they were under Henry IV., Louis XIV., Charles X., Louis Philippe, and the Napoleons, who, to blind the English, invented as it suited them that now exploded fiction, ‘L’Empire c’est la paix.’ Let us glance for a moment at Protocol XIII. ‘of the Conference held at Vienna, April 26th, 1855.’
“Prince Gortschakoff: ‘A territorial stipulation being once guaranteed, should we not extend it to the most distant points, _as, for instance, in the case of Tunis_, and make a _casus belli_ of all attacks on the outlying portions of the Empire?’
“M. Drouyn de Lhuys: ‘I would point out that France not only promises to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but has engaged to cause the principle to be respected by others; as far as I am concerned, _I see no difficulty in extending to that country (Tunis) the operation of the Treaty_ I am ready to subscribe.’
“The Baron de Bourquenet: ‘I am of entirely the same opinion as M. Drouyn de Lhuys.’
“This Protocol was communicated by Her Majesty’s Government to the Houses of Parliament on the 10th May 1855. It bears the signatures of the Plenipotentiaries of France, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the Baron de Bourquenet, as well as those of M. le Comte Buol Schauenstein, Baron Prokesch-Osten, Lord Westmorland, M. de Titoff, Prince Gortschakoff, Aali Pasha, and Aarif Effendi.
“By this international convention it is evident that France actually confirmed the obligations which she had already entered into by her adhesion to the Treaty of London in 1841—obligations which, in the eyes of every honest man in Europe, were solemnly ratified afterwards at Paris and Berlin.
“It results, therefore, that the admission of Sir Charles Dilke, as to the recognition by Europe of the Tunisian Firman of 1871, is actually based on great international engagements; but it merely confirmed a state of things existing _ab antiquo_. Is there any record of a Bey of Tunis _not_ being invested by the Sultan? Did the Sultan obtain from his Tunisian vassal a contingent of 15,000 men during the war of 1854?
“An examination, however, of historical facts abundantly proves that the advance on Tunis is nothing more nor less than an incident in one long- continued and traditional policy of Chauvinistic aggression. Before the dawn of the present century, Citizen Devoize played very effectively at Tunis the rôle of the Roustan of to-day, and let it be noted that M. Devoize’s proceedings were speedily followed by the invasion of Malta, Syria, and Egypt by the French troops. ‘La mission de civilisation’ is no new phrase; it is as old as the time of the First Napoleon. Let us pursue our inquiry into the traditional politics of France. In 1795, M. Devoize, under the veil of coral-fishing, did his best to enable France to annex the Regency, and even then the pretext was an old one, for a quarter of a century before, her consul had endeavoured to purchase Tabarca _and Bizerta_ for the same purpose. France has always coveted Tunis as the political and strategic key of her vast plans for the foundation of a French Carthage.
“Hence Bonaparte’s expedition; hence the revolt of Mehemet Ali, the emissary of France in Egypt, Syria, and South Arabia. Did not France encourage Abdul Jelil to excite a rising in Tripoli? The most eloquent testimony as to the ultimate aims of France on the whole African littoral is afforded by the reports of the British Political Agents at Tunis and Tripoli for the past twenty years; but they appear to have been written only to be treated as a sealed book. The famous letter of M. Sabattier (then Consul-General for France in Egypt) addressed to the Parisian paper _L’Union_ should just now be consulted. Lord Salisbury should have remembered at Berlin that the day after the Treaty of Paris Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, Lord Russell, Mr. Disraeli, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe all said that _now_ the possibility of a further French advance on Tunis was removed for ever. This opinion was also communicated by England to H.E. Nusret Pasha, Ottoman Commissioner to Tunis, then in Paris, and appeared in all the French newspapers of that date.
The memoirs of Captain Carette (_vide_ ‘Bulletin de la Société de la Géographie,” 4ième série, vol. ii. No. 21, 1852), as quoted by M. de la Roquette, affirm that ‘the possession of Tunis would give France _political frontiers_, and enable her to annex a great Oriental empire, at the same time guaranteeing to her supremacy both in Europe and in the Mediterranean, and assuring her a monopoly of African trade.’ Strange to say, the letter of the ill-fated Colonel Flatters, of the 29th January 1881 (reproduced in the St. Petersburg papers two months later), contains the same ideas. This document speaks of positive instructions from the Minister, M. Freycinet, ‘_to form a French party_ at Mourzouk (Fezzan) amongst the Touaregs,’ and adding, ‘_it is absolutely necessary to go to the Soudan_.’
“On the 20th of June 1865, Napoleon III. wrote thus to Marshal MacMahon, Governor of Algeria:—‘When our manner of regenerating a vanquished nation becomes an object of envy to the fifteen millions of Arabs scattered over other parts of Africa and Asia; when our supremacy, established at the foot of Mount Atlas, appears to them an intervention of Providence, _that day_ the glory of France will resound from Tunis to the Euphrates!’
“The Protectorate of France over Tunis will very shortly menace the freedom of trade at the great Saharian Fair of Berbera Zeilah (the Roman _Avalites Emporium_), which lasts six months, and up to the present time affords the most important means of commerce between England and Africa. By this Protectorate she also assures to herself not only a practical monopoly of commerce, but the possession of the Soudan as a recruiting ground, from which no less than four hundred thousand fighting men are obtainable (_vide_ Report of M. Selve, afterwards Solyman Pasha, organiser of Mehemet Ali’s army, and Lieutenant of France under Louis Philippe Egalité).
“It is known that the Soudan furnished 300,000 men towards Louis Philippe’s _levée de boucliers_, but he was ultimately vanquished by the energetic policy of Lord Palmerston and the diplomacy of the Berlin Foreign Office.
“The political manifesto of France in Africa (from which Napoleon’s letter has been quoted) is now very studiously ignored by British opportunist statesmen. Article IV., which is particularly instructive, and is entitled ‘Les Turcos,’ says, ‘_the most useful products which Africa can give to France are her soldiers_.’ The same article speaks of bounties of 300 francs for each enlistment, &c.
“Messrs. Gladstone and Dilke should read carefully a once popular pamphlet in France, entitled ‘La Regénération Militaire Française.’ It was written by General Yusef, and is dedicated to Marshal Bugeaud (the Arab roaster). At page 1 he says: ‘AFRICA BELONGS TO-DAY TO FRANCE,’ and, later on, ‘by the aid of her camels and dromedaries, France _is to go_ into the Soudan, _and_ FROM TUNIS UP TO THE EUPHRATES.’ General Yusef extols the expedition of General Carbuccia, and his plan of alliances with the tribes and with the Kabyles, which is also glorified by the apostle of _chauvinisme par excellence_, M. Thiers, in the second volume of his ‘History of the French Revolution.’
“The fatal error of England is, that she never understood this self- evident fact—that the political aim of France, both before and since her usurpation of Algeria, has been to found the Empire _Carthage Gauloise_, and so dictate the law to England in the East.
“This undoubted truth is shown in bold relief by M. Louis Blanc in his ‘Histoire de dix ans.’ Having described the annexation of Algeria, he speaks of the interviews at Paris between M. de Polignac and the English Ambassador, Lord Stuart. The quotation of one or two astounding passages is sufficient. Irritated by Lord Stuart’s tone, the French diplomatist allowed the following words to escape him: ‘If you require a diplomatic answer, the Resident or the Council will give it to you. As for me, I can only tell you in unofficial language, _we can do without you_.’ In