Chapter 26

Congress then passed an important measure, the expediency of which Lincoln urged in 1849. This was emancipation in the District of Columbia. Lincoln made no specific recommendations relative to this in his annual message, but later sent a special message to Congress March 6, 1862, taking up the subject in its more extensive aspects. This bill provided for the immediate emancipation of slaves in the District of Columbia, and empowered a commission to distribute to slave-holders for their manumitted slaves a compensation not to exceed an aggregate of three hundred dollars a head, with an additional appropriation for $100,000 for expenses of voluntary emigration of freedmen to Haiti and Liberia.[27] Lincoln did not heartily approve this measure, however, for he did not want this to interfere with his policy of compensated emancipation in the border slave States. Even after the bill had been amended, according to his suggestions, he still hesitated and some of his friends thought that he might never sign it, but he did.

The question of emancipation appeared in another form when, upon the capture of Port Royal the previous November, many slaves, abandoned by the fleeing slave-holders, sought protection in the Union army. These slaves, thus dislodged by the misfortunes of war, outnumbered the whites five to one and had to be organized in groups for government protection. Relief societies in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia sent funds and teachers for the slaves. This educational enterprise received the official sanction of Secretary Chase at President Lincoln's request. Wishing further to improve their condition, General David Hunter, commander of the Department of the South, issued on May 9, 1862, an order of military emancipation, proclaiming the Department of the South under martial law and declaring persons in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, heretofore held as slaves, forever free.[28] Hunter regarded this an act of military necessity, not an instrument of political import as General Fremont's proclamation in Missouri, for Hunter's forces were insufficient for offensive movements, and he was doing this as the first step toward training and arming Negroes within his lines. Assuming that the instructions of the War Department conferred the necessary authority he proclaimed the order without delay.

The news of this proclamation did not travel rapidly. It was published in the newspapers one week later, owing to the slow mail by sea from the South. By this means even Lincoln first learned of this decree, on account of which he was being assailed in many parts. When the news reached Lincoln he took decisive and prompt action. On May 19, he published a proclamation in which he revoked the order of emancipation and recited that the Government had no knowledge of such a decree nor had it authorized General Hunter to give such an order.[29]

Lincoln, however, used this occasion for an admonition to the border slave States, although he carefully distinguished between the limited powers of the commanders in the field and his full executive authority. He reminded the border States of the joint resolution passed by Congress, to authorize compensated emancipation, and he warned them not to neglect this opportunity to obtain financial indemnity, for the "signs of the times" were multiplying to a degree that should have convinced the border States that slavery was doomed.

In the very beginning of the Thirty-seventh Congress there came a series of antislavery measures which constituted a complete and decisive reversal of the policy of the Federal Government.[30] On March 13, 1862, Congress approved an act, which prohibited all military and naval officers and enlisted personnel from returning fugitive slaves. Section 10 of the Confiscation Act, virtually an amendment of the Fugitive Slave Law, which withheld from the claimant the right to use his authority until he had taken an oath of allegiance, and made it tantamount to a crime for any person in the army or navy to surrender a fugitive slave or attempt to validate the owner's claim, was rigidly enforced. Wishing to see Liberia and Haiti welcomed into the family of nations, moreover, Lincoln in his annual message in the previous December recommended the recognition of their independence and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new nations. This resolution was passed by a Congress and approved June 5, 1862. Lincoln then effected the passage of a measure to carry into execution the treaty between Great Britain and the United States for the suppression of the African slave trade. Soon thereafter followed an act to secure freedom to all persons within the territories of the United States. The Republican party had thus carried out its platform by its restoration of the Missouri Compromise, its extension and application to all Territories, and as a logical result the rejection and condemnation of the Dred Scott decision and the subversive property theory of the secessionists.[31]

Then followed the Confiscation Act, the discussion of which was closely followed by Lincoln, who had his views incorporated therein by pointing out its defects and suggesting amendments. Whereas the act of August 6, 1861, freed slaves actually employed in military service, the new Confiscation Act of 1862 proved to be a law to destroy slavery under the powers of war. In conjunction with provisions for punishing treason or rebellion it declared free all slaves of persons guilty and convicted of these crimes, and provided that slaves deserted by rebels escaping from them or coming under control of the United States and slaves of rebels found on Union soil should be deemed captives and set free. Then again, there were enacted other provisions, which by implication permitted the employment of slaves in the United States army that they might work their own enfranchisement. Under this law the President was empowered to enroll and employ contrabands in such service as they were fitted for. Their mothers, wives, and children, if owned by rebels, should be declared free by virtue of such service. The eleventh section of the Confiscation Act authorized the President to employ as many Negroes as he might deem necessary for the suppression of the rebellion. The organization of the earliest Negro regiments resulted from this legislation.

Lincoln had some hesitation about signing this bill, however, for it had to be changed to conform to his views. But he signed it and also an anticipatory resolution of Congress to remedy its defects, placing himself on record by transmitting with his approval a copy of his intended veto, had certain defects remained. Mr. Lincoln objected to the expression that Congress could free a slave within a State, whereupon he suggested that it be changed to read that the ownership of the slave would be transferred to the nation, and that Congress would then liberate him.[32] The Democrats opposed this act, but antislavery opinion gained momentum by increasing accessions to the ranks of freedom and by that unusual ability of the highly talented patriotic membership of Congress. Yet to the proslavery element and the conservative Unionists, Lincoln's proposal of gradual compensated emancipation was a daring innovation upon practical politics. "In point of fact," say Nicolay and Hay, "the President stood sagaciously midway between headlong reform and blind reaction. His steady, cautious direction and control of the average public sentiment of the country alike held back rash experiment and spurred lagging opinion."[33]

Four months after Lincoln's proposal of compensated emancipation to the border slave States and its sanction by Congress, the situation seeming more complicated by the vicissitudes of war, Lincoln saw the necessity for uniting the sentiment of the North for a practical solution of the slavery problem. Looking forward into the future, therefore, Lincoln readily realized that the North must present a united front contending for a plain, practical policy, relative to things both political and military.

Consequently he again met the border State delegations on July 12, and made a second appeal to them to accept compensation for the emancipation of the slaves in their respective States while the opportunity was yet at hand.[34] He pointed out to them that the war would have been ended, had they considered the acceptance of the provisions of his first appeal for gradual emancipation, and that this plan would not be a slow and weak means of ending the war. Dissuading them from secession, he failed not to apprise them of the fact that, if the rebellion continued, their institution would be destroyed without any sort of indemnity or reparation. Again he referred to his revoking General Hunter's proclamation of military abolition, with the hope that he might possibly win them over to his plan, but his effort was futile. Most of them replied with a qualified refusal; twenty of them later presented a written reply, pledging themselves to continue loyal, but at the same time giving the reasons why they could not accept the plan of compensated emancipation.

In the meantime the capture of strategic points like Vicksburg and New Orleans had given the control of the lower Mississippi to the Union,[35] General Grant had crippled and driven back the Confederates in the West,[36] and prospects for military success in the East seemed to require some such a measure as military emancipation. After the refusal of compensated emancipation by the border slave States the President decided to emancipate the slaves of rebellious commonwealths by military order.[37] While riding with Mr. Seward and Mr. Welles one day, Mr. Lincoln made mention of emancipating the slaves by proclamation, if the rebels did not lay down their arms. He believed that such action could be guaranteed only as a military necessity. He thought that the slaves must be liberated, or the Union would be exterminated. Lincoln reached a final conclusion and called the cabinet together on July 21, the day preceding the close of that session of Congress.[38] Since he was at the end of his tether, he determined to take a more definite and decisive step. Accordingly, he prepared several orders which, gave authority to commanders in the field to subsist their troops in hostile territory and to employ Negroes as paid laborers, and further provided for the colonization of Negroes in some tropical country.[39]

As this discussion led to no definite conclusion, the subject was resumed at a meeting on the following day; but Lincoln decided that the time was inopportune. While he thought that more evil than good would be derived from the wholesale arming of Negroes, yet he was not unwilling that the commanders arm, purely for defensive purposes, those slaves who came within the Union lines. But the President had reached a decision on the correlated policy of emancipation with which it appears that his cabinet was not in accord. They were surprised when he read to them the first draft of a proclamation warning the rebels of the penalties provided by the Confiscation Act, suggesting the renewal of his proposition of compensation to the loyal States, and adding a summary order that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, he would declare free the slaves of all States that might be in rebellion on January 1, 1863. The Cabinet was somewhat "bewildered by the magnitude and boldness of this proposal."[40]

Only two members of the cabinet concurred in the proposal. Secretary Chase favored this plan of military emancipation, but could not approve the method of execution. Blair, the Postmaster General, deprecated this policy on the ground that it would cost the administration the fall elections. Secretary Seward approved it and yet questioned the expediency of its issue at that stage of the war, owing to the depression of the public mind and the repeated reversals for the Union armies. He further deemed it to be a last measure of an exhausted government that was crying for help, stretching forth its arms to Ethiopia instead of awaiting a reverse appeal from Ethiopia. Consequently he urged a postponement of the issue of the proclamation until the country was supported by military success. Lincoln, struck by the wisdom of Seward's views, which he had entirely overlooked, laid it away and postponed the proclamation on July 22 until the Union forces reported a victory. Instead, after a three-day interval, he issued a short announcement that contained warnings as required by the provisions of the Confiscation Act.

Lincoln's postponement of the issue of the proclamation was wise. Military reversals made the situation more serious for the President's supporters. The radicals and the conservatives, resorted to incessant criticism, railing against him and his policy. Lincoln, however, kept up appearances of indecision, even though his own course had been clearly and inalterably mapped out; but circumstances did not admit a revelation. His main object was to restrain impatience and zeal, and yet maintain the loyalty of both factions.[41]

Horace Greeley attacked Lincoln unmercifully in _The New York Tribune_ and accused him of being responsible for the deplorable results coming from his failure to enforce the Confiscation Act. Lincoln, on the contrary, lost no time in replying to Greeley, and declared that he intended to save the Union by the shortest possible way in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution; that his paramount object in the struggle was to preserve the Union and not either to preserve or destroy slavery; that he would save the Union, either without liberating any slaves, or by freeing all the slaves, or by freeing some and leaving others in servitude; that, at any rate, he would save the Union; and that his efforts at emancipation would be determined by its bearing on the more important question of saving the Union.

The expected easy victory did not follow; but, on the contrary, came sad and humiliating defeat of Pope in the second battle of Bull Run in August, 1862. At this juncture Lincoln was urged by both individuals and delegations to follow one or the other decision relative to emancipation, but his attitude remained the same. On September 13, he informed a Chicago delegation that he was unable to free slaves by the Constitution, especially when the Constitution could not be enforced in the rebel States, and declared that any emancipation proclamation would at that time be as effective and operative as "the Pope's bull against the comet."[42] What the antislavery group wanted was not granted; but wholesale emancipation was going on by virtue of the provisions of the Confiscation Act, slavery had been abolished in the District of Columbia, and the territories had been restored to freedom. Lincoln, moreover, left himself a margin for action according to his declaration, in his interview with the Chicago delegation, that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, he had the right to take any measure which might best subdue the enemy.[43]

Upon hearing of the Union victory at Antietam three days after, Lincoln immediately seized this opportunity to announce the policy upon which he had already decided. He had promised to withhold his Emancipation Proclamation until the rebels were out of Frederick. Now that they had been driven from Maryland and Pennsylvania, Lincoln was ready to carry out his plan. On September 22, 1862, therefore, he announced, read, and published his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.[44] It embraced propositions that provided for the renewal of the plan of compensated emancipation, voluntary colonization, military emancipation of all slaves in rebellious States on January 1, 1863, and the ultimate recommendation of compensation to loyal owners.

Although this proclamation was endorsed by an assembly of Governors from the Northern States, who had already convened at Altoona, Pennsylvania, to consider emergency measures for the protection of their respective States,[45] the political test of this announcement of military emancipation came, as expected, in the autumn elections. Popular discontent had arisen as the result of military failure. The Democrats boldly declared that the war of the Union had been changed to a war for abolition of slavery. Party conflicts became bitter and resulted in a loss to the Republicans although they still retained a majority.

In his next annual message, however, President Lincoln did not discuss the Emancipation Proclamation, but he renewed his argument for compensated emancipation. On December 11, 1862, George H. Yeaman of Kentucky introduced in the House of Representatives a resolution dubbing the President's proclamation as unwarranted by the Constitution and a useless and dangerous war message. This resolution was tabled by a vote of ninety-four to forty-five. Four days later Representative S. C. Fessenden of Maine, on the contrary, offered a resolution putting into affirmative form the identical phraseology of Mr. Yeaman's proposition, and secured its passage by a test vote of seventy-eight to fifty-four. No other action of consequence then followed except a manifestation of interest in compensated emancipation in Missouri.

At a cabinet meeting on the last day of December, 1862, Lincoln read the final draft of the Emancipation Proclamation and invited criticism. He made some revision of a minor nature but rejected the proposal to eliminate from the order the provision that the freedmen be armed. In this form the Proclamation was issued the following day, January 1, 1863. The constitutionality of this document has been questioned. It is conceded, however, that it did actually abolish slavery within the rebellious area and as a moral stimulus to the struggle for freedom, it proved to be of great value.

HARRY S. BLACKISTON

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Edwards, _History of Illinois_, 179.

[2] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, I, 72; W. H. Lamon, _Life of Abraham Lincoln_, 83.

[3] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, I, 15, 140, 151, 642.

[4] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, I, 148, 285-288.

[5] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, I, 286.

[6] _Ibid._, I, 373, 375, 380-390.

[7] _Ibid._, I, pp. 391, 392.

[8] Nicolay and Hay, II, 85, 89.

[9] Nicolay and Hay, II, 136-138, 143.

[10] Nicolay and Hay, II, 137, 156, 157; _Lincoln-Douglass Debates_, p. 8.

[11] Nicolay and Hay, II, pp. 75, 147.

[12] _Ibid._, II, p. 149.

[13] Nicolay and Hay, II, 156, 157, 216.

[14] Murat Halstead, _Conventions of 1860_, 6.

[15] _Ibid._, 7.

[16] Nicolay and Hay, II, 255.

[17] Nicolay and Hay, II, 287, 382.

[18] Rhodes, _United States_, III, p. 357.

[19] Burgess, _Civil War_, II, p. 76.

[20] Nicolay and Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, IV, 416-420; V, p. 211.

[21] Burgess, _Civil War_, II, 79-80.

[22] Nicolay and Hay, V, 206.

[23] Nicolay and Hay, V, 207.

[24] Dodge, _View_, chap. xi.

[25] Nicolay and Hay, V, p. 209.

[26] McPherson, _History of the Rebellion_, p. 210.

[27] Nicolay and Hay, V, 214.

[28] _Ibid._, VI, p. 90.

[29] Nicolay and Hay, VI, 94-96.

[30] _Ibid._, VI, 97.

[31] Nicolay and Hay, VI, 99-100.

[32] Nicolay and Hay, VI, 103.

[33] _Ibid._, VI, 107.

[34] _Ibid._, VI, pp. 109-111.

[35] King, _New Orleans_, ch. xiii.

[36] Dodge, _View_, ch. x.

[37] Nicolay and Hay, VI, p. 121.

[38] _Ibid._, VI, pp. 123-124.

[39] Warden, _Life of S. P. Chase_, p. 439.

[40] F. B. Carpenter, _Six Months at the White House_, pp. 20-22.

[41] Dodge, _View_, ch. xiv. Rossiter Johnson, _History of War of Secession_.

[42] Nicolay and Hay, VI, 155.

[43] Dodge, _View_, pp. 102-115.

[44] Nicolay and Hay, VI, pp. 168-169.

[45] Nicolay and Hay, VI, p. 164.

THE JOURNAL OF ISAACO[1]

I

The time approaches when all the wildness of this little world will be overrun and tamed into the trimness of a civilized parterre; when the last trail will have been trodden, the mystery of the last forest bared, and the last of the savage peoples penned into a League of Nations to die of unnatural peace. What will our children do then, I wonder, for their books of high romance? How satisfy their thirst of daring with nothing further to dare? Who will appease them, when

"The Rudyards cease from kipling And the Haggards ride no more,"

when Robinson Crusoe and the classics are once read, and in a hencoop world no saga-man arises in their stead? They say that by then we shall have enlarged our borders and gone in our chariots of petrol to visit the wheeling stars. But I misdoubt these Icarian flights. It seems to me more likely that the harassed parents and publishers of those days will be driven earthward to rummage into the lumber of the past and bring out as new the obscure things that a former more heroic age had buried. In those stricken times, I hope someone may have the fortune to light upon my manuscript _Journal_ of Isaaco, a slim, alluring folio that now glitters in red-and-gold upon my study shelves. It would be a pity if Time, the All-Merciless, were allowed to throw the dust of oblivion over these pretty pages, for they possess in good measure that trait of "pleasant atrocity" which wins the attention of youth.