Part 13

3rd. The direct track is the most natural. The Isthmus is traversed by a longitudinal depression, formed by the meeting of the two plains descending with an imperceptible slope, the one from Egypt, the other from the frontier hills of Asia. The Bitter Lakes, filled with the waters of the Arabian Gulf by the action of the tides only, may easily form a reservoir which, with a surface of 280,000,000 _square metres_ by a rise of 2 _metres_ of moving waters, would not receive less than 560,000,000 _cubic metres_, for the service of the Canal, below the water line at the level of the two Seas. Lake Timsah, situated at about an equal distance from Suez and Pelusium, is like an inland port where ships can be revictualled and repaired. Moreover, by another favour of nature, towards Lake Timsah a second not less remarkable hollow abuts perpendicularly on the longitudinal depression, it is that of the Wady-Tomilat (the fertile Goshen of the Bible). This hollow still receives the overflowings of the Nile for a great part of its length, and forms the natural track of a communication starting from the river and joining, at the central part of the Isthmus, the line of maritime navigation which would be established between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean.

4th. The direct track is the most useful. It serves at the same time the interests of commerce in general and the political interests of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. It will require but little to maintain it, and as there will be very few works of art, navigation will not be exposed to those interruptions which it would have to dread on the indirect track.

To these evident advantages of the direct track, to these relative facilities which had attracted the attention of the sovereigns of Egypt, of Amrou and Mustapha III. for example (see Lebeau, _Histoire du Bas-Empire_, tom. XII. p. 490, and the _Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turcs_, pts. III. and IV.), before attracting that of the nineteenth century, there is but one objection, and it is this:—

It is impossible, they say, for large ships to approach Pelusium; and the direct Canal is chimerical, because it cannot open into the Mediterranean.

This oft-repeated objection is but specious, and cannot stand before an examination of the facts. The entrance to Pelusium is certainly a difficult and costly work, but it is perfectly practicable, and engineers have overcome very different obstacles with resources much inferior to those now at their command.

It is well in the first place that it should be known that the level of the two Seas, excepting the difference of the tides, which are pretty high at the south in the Red Sea, and almost nothing at the north in the Mediterranean, is perceptibly the same. The commission of 1799 had found for the Arabian Gulf an elevation of 9 _met._ 90; but its labours, performed in the midst of all the dangers and disturbances of war, had not been verified, and the genius of Laplace resting upon accurate theoretical views, had formally denied the possibility of such a depression within a distance of scarcely thirty leagues. Afterwards, towards 1840, some English officers had proved by the barometer and the boiling water process that there was no difference of level; and in 1843, Prince Metternich, having been informed of these labours, sent instructions to Egypt to induce Mehemet Ali to interest himself in the grand undertaking of the cutting of the Isthmus: his dispatch is still in the Archives of the Austrian Consulate at Alexandria. In 1847 a commission of French engineers, sent out by M. Paulin Talabot under the direction of the learned M. Bourdaloue, and assisted by Egyptian engineers directed by M. Linant, chief engineer to the Viceroy, put the fact beyond all question, and M. Paulin Talabot had the honour of stating it in a memorial that has become famous. Our Academy of Sciences bestirred itself for the honour of the ancient Egyptian commission. M. Sabatier, Consul general of France, asked the Viceroy for a fresh verification, which M. Linant was charged to undertake in 1853, and which confirmed, saying an insignificant variation, the labours of 1847.

So that the considerable super-elevation of the Red Sea cannot be reckoned on for facilitating the approaches from the Mediterranean at the other extremity of the Canal; there is only the difference of the tides.

As a depth of 7 _met._ 50 to 8 _met._ is not found before Pelusium or Tineh, but at a distance of 6000 _met._ into the sea, it is assumed that it is practically impossible to prolong the jetty of the Canal to that distance, because the waters are but _liquid mud_, and that _clouds of earth_ would interfere with the progress of the vessels and the solidity of the works.

This is a complete mistake.

Because Herodotus has said, that the Delta is a present from the Nile, his inaccurate assertion has been repeated without verifying it, and his metaphor has passed for an incontestable truth. But it is an absolute fact, and it is only necessary to ask those who have been at Pelusium, that the water there is as limpid as at Alexandria or Jaffa. The banks of _travelling mud_ seen by Admiral Sir Sidney Smith have no more reality than the _present from the Nile_, and for the twenty years that these coasts have been traversed in every direction by steam boats, no one has ever met again with those muddy banks. The truth is, that the waters of the Nile, which, at the time of the inundation are distinguished for more than ten leagues into the sea, carry far out into the Mediterranean and deposit in its depths, the masses of earthy matter which they hold in suspension (near 1/8000) which do not reappear on the coasts but in imperceptible quantities; the truth is, that a handful of sand may be taken up from the sea beach, at Pelusium, without finding the least particle of mud. The Viceroy’s engineers have proved that the coast, from El-Arish to Tripoli, is pure sand, and the soundings taken along the shore give the same result. Far from the Nile forming accretions at Pelusium, it is an axiom now admitted by science that the muddy or sandy deposits observed at the mouths of rivers are entirely owing to matters brought by the tide. The rivers have no part therein; and the excellent observations made by most able hydrographers at the bay of Mount St. Michael, at the mouths of the Scheld, the Meuse, the Rhine, the Yssel, have superabundantly proved it. The accumulations of sand at Pelusium and Suez, like the whole Isthmus, have been formed by the maritime deposits of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The thorough investigation of the motion of the waves has demonstrated that the bars of rivers are due to the ground swell alone. The Nile, therefore, has no influence upon the approaches to Pelusium, as Herodotus supposed, and as is still the common opinion; and this is so true, that for 20 _kilometres_ above its mouth there are accretions of mud, while below there is nothing but sand. Finally the accumulations of sand are more considerable in proportion as the waters of the river are less abundant.

Setting aside from the question the hypothetical assertions, it remains therefore incontestable that the only difficulty at Pelusium, is the length of the jetties in the sea. Pelusium, with its ruins, is at the same point where Strabo saw it, where the Egyptian commission saw it, which found the twenty stadia of the Greek geographer between the shore and the town quite correct. But are jetties of a league and a half into the sea possible, or are they indeed a work that cannot be executed? The answer to this question is easy: a hundred years ago, the Hollanders, not so rich and not so skillful as we are now, although quite as bold, erected at the Cape, in the bay of the Lion, at a depth of 16 _met._, in spite of the most frightful tempests, a dyke of 8000 _metres_, that is, a work of at least four times the extent of that required for the entrance of the Canal at Pelusium.

As for the harbour of Suez, the work there would be comparatively trifling because it is sheltered from all the winds, excepting that from the south-east, and ships keep the sea there very well, as is proved by the English Magazine corvette, moored there for two years, without sustaining any damage.

What is to be deduced from these observations?—That it is possible to make a canal 100 _metres_ wide from Suez to Pelusium, with a draught of water of 8 _met._, below low water in the Mediterranean, with parapets, towing path, &c. and available for the passage of screw and paddle frigates, and vessels of 1000 to 1500 tons burthen, and that this canal, following the straight line between the two Seas is the only practicable one, as it will be one of the grandest and most useful works ever performed by man.

To conclude, this track is the only one that the prince who now rules in Egypt will allow. Well informed himself in nautical arts and sciences, the inheritor of the policy of Mehemet Ali, which he approves while he practises, he has declared in dictating his own terms for the firman of concession, that he would have the shortest and least expensive track, and one that would be available for the largest ships. It is not in the scheme of an inland canal that the real junction of the two Seas consists; the indirect canal cuts through Egypt, and not the Isthmus; its extent is not only tripled, but the cost of execution and maintenance are enormous, and the existence of a canal constructed upon these conditions would be always uncertain and precarious while the direct track, which unites so many advantages, has none of these drawbacks.

HÔTE.

FOOTNOTES

[1] I think it to the purpose to insert here a letter, which I addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador, on my leaving Constantinople:—

_Pera_, 28th February, 1855.

“There are questions which require to be boldly met in order to be well resolved, as there are wounds which must be opened in order to be healed. The frankness with which you received my first remarks upon a subject, the gravity of which I do not affect to disguise, encourages me to submit to your consideration a point of view from which it appears to me advisable to contemplate the question of the Isthmus of Suez. The great influence which your character and your long experience naturally give you the right to exercise in the decisions of your Government on all Eastern questions, makes me especially anxious to neglect no opportunity of enabling Your Excellency to form an opinion from a perfect acquaintance with the case.

The results already obtained from the intimate alliance of France and England, testify sufficiently to the advantages that the European balance and civilization in general derive from that union of the two peoples. The future and the welfare of all the nations of the universe are therefore concerned in maintaining intact, in preserving from any attack, a state of things, which, to the everlasting honour of the Governments that have brought it about, can alone, with time, ensure the blessings of progress and of peace to the human race. Thence the necessity of getting rid, beforehand, of all causes of rupture, or even of coolness, between the two peoples; thence, consequently, the paramount duty of anticipating amongst future contingencies, those circumstances calculated to awake ancient feelings of antagonism, and to raise, in the bosom of either nation, those emotions against the violence of which, the wisdom of Governments is powerless to struggle. The motives for hostile rivalry are tending successively to give place to that generous emulation which gives birth to great things.

Looking at the situation of affairs in a general way, it is scarcely to be perceived upon what ground and upon what occasion, those struggles, which so long desolated the world, could be renewed. Is it financial and commercial interests that could cause division between the two peoples? Why, British capital thrown into all the undertakings of France, and the immense developement of international commerce, have established ties between them which become closer every day. Is it political interests and questions of principle? Why, the two nations have but one common aim, one same ambition: the triumph of right over might, of civilization over barbarism. Is it, finally, a sordid jealousy of territorial extension? Why, they acknowledge, at the present time, that the globe is vast enough to offer to the spirit of adventure that animates their respective populations, countries to make available, human beings to withdraw from the state of barbarism; and, moreover, from the moment that their flags wave together, the conquests of the one profit by the activity of the other.

At the first glance, then, nothing is perceived in the general state of affairs that could impair our cordial relations with England.

If, however, we look closer, an eventuality presents itself which, causing the most enlightened and most moderate cabinets to partake in popular prejudices and passions, is capable of reviving old antipathies, and of compromising, with the alliance, the benefits to be derived from it.

There is, in fact, a point of the globe with the free passage of which the political and commercial power of Great Britain is bound up, a point, the possession of which France had, on her part, aspired to in former times. This point is Egypt, the direct route from Europe to India, Egypt bathed once and again with French blood.

It is superfluous to define the motives which would not allow England to see Egypt in the possession of a rival nation without opposing it by the most energetic resistance; but what should also be taken into serious consideration, is, that with less positive interests, France under the dominion of her glorious traditions, under the impression of other feelings more instinctive than rational, and therefore more powerful over the impressionable spirit of her inhabitants, would not, in her turn, leave to England the peaceable sovereignty of Egypt. It is clear that, so long as the route to India is open and certain, that the state of the country ensures the facility and promptitude of the communications, England will not set about creating the most grave difficulties by appropriating a territory which, in her eyes, has no other value than as a means of transit. It is likewise evident that France—whose policy, for the last fifty years, has been to contribute to the prosperity of Egypt, both by her counsels and by the concourse of a great number of Frenchmen distinguished in the sciences, in administrative capacity, in all the arts of peace or war—will not seek to realize, in this direction, the projects of another epoch, so long as England does not interfere.

But let one of those crises occur which have so often shaken the East, let a circumstance arise wherein England should find herself under the rigorous necessity of taking a position in Egypt to prevent another power from forestalling her, and tell us then if it is possible that the alliance could survive the complications which such an event would occasion. And why should England consider herself obliged to become mistress of Egypt, even at the risk of breaking her alliance with France? For this single reason, that Egypt is the shortest and most direct route from England to her Eastern possessions; that this route must be constantly open to her; and that, in whatever concerns this mighty interest, she could never temporise. Thus, from the position given to her by nature, Egypt might still become the subject of a conflict between France and Great Britain; so that this chance of rupture would disappear if, by a providential event, the geographical conditions of the ancient world were changed, and, that the commercial route to India, instead of passing through the heart of Egypt, were removed to its confines, and, being opened to all the world, could never be exposed to the chance of its becoming the exclusive privilege of any one.

Well! this event, which must have been the design of Providence, is now within the reach of man. It may be brought about by human skill. It is to be realized by the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez, an undertaking to which nature opposes no obstacle, and wherein English capital, as well as that of other countries, will certainly take part.

Let the Isthmus be cut through, let the waves of the Mediterranean mingle with those of the Indian Ocean, let the Railroad be continued and completed, and Egypt, in acquiring an increased importance as a productive country, as a country of internal commerce, as a general storehouse and common transit, loses its dangerous pre-eminence as an uncertain and contested passage of communication.

The possession of its territory being no longer an object of interest to England, ceases to be a possible bone of contention between that power and France, the union of the two peoples is for the future unalterable, and the world is preserved from the calamities which a rupture between them would produce. This result affords such securities for the future, that it is sufficient to point them out, to attract to the undertaking destined to produce it, the sympathy and the encouragement of the Statesmen whose efforts are directed to the settlement of the Anglo-French alliance upon an immoveable basis. You, my Lord, are one of those Statesmen, and you have too large a share in questions of high policy, to which I am a stranger, for me not to entertain the wish to communicate to you my aspirations.

FERD. DE LESSEPS.”

[2] These very sensible observations are taken from a correspondence which appeared in the “Times” of the 13th June last.

[3] The other two were Mr. Stephenson for England, and M. Négrelli for Austria.

[4] As the work of the Viceroy’s Engineers will be published, an extract only is here given, which will suffice to make known the importance of their labours, and show the practical results of their investigations.

[5] Extracts from _Communications with India, China, &c. Observations on the Practicability and Utility of opening a Communication between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, by a Ship Canal, through the Isthmus of Suez. By Arthur Anderson. London, Smith, Elder & Co. Cornhill, 1843._

[6] Since writing this, an article on the “Suez Canal” has appeared in the Foreign and Colonial Quarterly Review, which, although containing some inaccuracies of minor importance, and professing only to take a general view of the subject, the writer would exempt from the above description.

[7] Extracts from _Inquiry into the Means of establishing a Ship Navigation between the Mediterranean and Red Seas_. _By James Vetch, Capt. R.E., F.R.S. London, Pelham Richardson, 23, Cornhill, 1843._

THE END.

CHISWICK PRESS: PRINTED BY C. WHITTINGHAM, TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE.