Part 1

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THE IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD.

APRIL, 1865.

MEMOIRS OF MY MINISTRY.

BY CARDINAL CONSALVI.

In the lonely hours of his exile at Rheims, whither he had been banished by Napoleon for having refused to assist at the imperial marriage with Maria Louisa, Cardinal Consalvi found employment in tracing from memory an outline of the great affairs which had occupied him during his ministry as Secretary of State. It was no self-love nor mean desire of praise that induced the man of action thus to become the historian of his own deeds. To the same zeal which had nerved him in his conflicts for the cause of the Church, do we owe the truthful record he has left us of the fortunes of these conflicts in which the Holy See was so audaciously attacked and so successfully defended. The thought that, perhaps, one day his words might be of advantage to the interests of religion, or might supply weapons for its defence, was a motive strong enough to influence him to undertake the task under circumstances the most unfavourable that can well be imagined. "I have drawn up these memoirs", he writes, "at most critical moments; how critical, may well be imagined when I mention, that as soon as I have finished a page I must hide it at once in a safe place, so as to secure it from the unforeseen perquisitions to which at all times we are exposed.... I am without notes either to guide or to confirm my reminiscences. I have not the leisure, nor the tranquillity, nor the security, nor the liberty which I require, if I would enrich my narrative with comments and becoming ornaments.... If God grant me life and better days, I hope to give to my work all that perfection of form and style which is at present beyond my power".

But, whatever the narrative may lack in perfection of form and style, is abundantly compensated by the interest attaching to the events it describes. It sets before us a picture of the movement of European society during the stirring period of the Cardinal's administration. The intrigues, and schemes, and falsehoods of diplomacy; the art of masking ambitious designs under generous language, and laying snares for a rival's unwary feet; the dishonourable selfishness, the detestable hypocrisy--in a word, all that goes to make up the strategy of modern statecraft, is laid bare in its pages by a master hand. And what lends fresh interest to the subject is the contrast it offers between the baseness of courts and the loyal rectitude of the Holy See, between the plotting which on the world's side exhibits nought but the cunning of the serpent, and the honourable prudence on the part of the Church which tells also of the simplicity of the dove. On the one hand we have a web of intrigue, each thread of which is meant to secure some perhaps undue advantage; on the other, a straightforward policy placing religion above everything, and worthy of the Pontiff who is vicar on earth of that Lord who loves souls. That the voice of such a policy should be heard at all, is due under Providence to the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See. The folly of those who would wish, for the sake of religion, to see the Pope a subject rather than a sovereign, cannot be better shown than by the history of the relations between the Holy See and the courts of Europe during Consalvi's administration. During that period Naples, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Russia, Malta, and France had each of them separate negociations to conduct with the Holy See on matters affecting the liberty of the Church and the interests of religion. It was a time when the interests of different states crossed each other in a thousand ways, and if the Pope had been the subject of any one of these kingdoms, it would have been simply impossible, humanly speaking, to carry on the government of the Church. Statesmen would have at their hand the ready pretext that the decisions of the Holy Father were coloured by undue national prejudices, and this pretext would serve to excuse their own encroachments upon the liberties of the Church in their own territories. Besides, that jealousy of the Church which has ever impelled statesmen to fetter its action, would certainly influence the sovereign who might claim the Pope as his subject to interfere with the liberty of so formidable a rival. The success which followed Cardinal Consalvi's management of affairs was due, no doubt, in great part, to his surpassing abilities; but these abilities required, as the condition of their exercise, the vantage ground of independence. Speaking from the steps of a throne, with all the liberty which that position secured to him, the Cardinal Secretary had an influence which could never belong to the mere ecclesiastic raising a suppliant voice at the footstool of some haughty sovereign.

The relations of France with the Holy See in the beginning of this century were such as to demand the unceasing attention of the Papal minister. We have already given the history of the negotiations concerning the Concordat with the First Consul; we are sure that the Cardinal's narrative of other transactions between Napoleon and the Pope will prove not less interesting to our readers.

It is not a little singular that the earliest negotiation between Pius VII. and France was precisely similar to the latest, and that the name of England held a prominent place in both. It is not at all singular, however, that the Pope followed in the latest the self-same principles of conduct which he professed in the earliest, even though this faithful adherence to his duty cost him his throne, and his liberty. Soon after his arrival in Rome, from Venice, there was some reason to fear lest the French army might proclaim once more the Roman Republic, and thus deprive the Holy Father of his dominions. All anxiety was soon dispelled by the proclamation issued by Murat to his troops, then about to march upon Naples through the Pontifical territory. In this proclamation he commanded his soldiers to observe strict discipline in passing through the friendly territory of the Holy See. This recognition of the papal sovereignty was a joyful surprise to all those who heard of it. But among those who did not hear of it was a Mgr. Caleppi, just named as Nuncio to the Brazils, who had become acquainted with Murat at Florence. Filled with zeal for the Pope, Mgr. Caleppi, without having received any orders from Rome, hurried after the general and overtook him at Florence. He there induced Murat to agree to a treaty, securing the integrity of the Papal territory on certain conditions, which he promised would be at once carried to Rome and gladly accepted by his Holiness. The treaty was short, but contained one article which plunged the Holy Father into a most embarrassing position. This article declared that the Pope would close his ports against the English and all other enemies of France. Nothing could be more opposed than this to the view the Pope took of the duties of his position as common Father of the faithful and minister of peace. He had resolved to maintain a strict neutrality in the great struggle that was going on, hoping by this conduct to preserve the free exercise of his spiritual sovereignty, even in the countries against whose sovereigns France was waging war. The indiscreet zeal of Mgr. Caleppi placed him in the alternative of either breaking through his fixed rule of conduct, or of making a declaration of neutrality at a time when such a declaration was sure to be attended with the most disastrous consequences. He resolved not to ratify the treaty. In a short time Murat came to Rome, and by his frank and loyal character, won for himself the esteem of Consalvi. When they came to treat of the convention, and when the Cardinal disavowed the proceedings of Mgr. Caleppi, Murat gave a signal proof of his affection for Pius VII. It was in his power to insist on the ratification of the treaty, and to inform Bonaparte of the Pope's refusal; but he preferred to lose the credit he could have won for himself by such an act, and after employing many arguments to shake the Pope's resolution, he at length exclaimed: "Well, then, since this treaty is a source of so much trouble to the Holy Father and to you, let us throw it into the fire, and say no more about it".

Soon after this occurrence Consalvi went to Paris to negociate the Concordat. After the ratification of the French Concordat came the discussion of the Italian Concordat for the kingdom of Italy. What the organic laws were to the French Concordat, the decrees of the President Melzi became to the Italian one. The Emperor's decrees--which, while they appeared to revoke those of Melzi in deference to the Pope's opposition, in reality confirmed them--completely frustrated the good effects of the Concordat. The difficulties of these two negociations were hardly over when the marriage of the Emperor's brother Jerome was a source of fresh trouble to the Holy See. Napoleon urged the Pope to declare null the marriage his brother had contracted in America without the consent of his mother or his brother. Cardinal Fesch, the Emperor's uncle, was charged with the management of this affair, and spared no importunities to extort from the Pope the desired decision. The whole question hinged on this: could the Emperor prove that the decrees of the Council of Trent had been published at Baltimore, where the marriage was contracted? If proof of this were forthcoming, the Pope would at once declare the marriage null and void; but if it could not be proved, then the marriage was perfectly valid, seeing that the defect of the consent of the parents was not an _impedimentum dirimens_, but only a civil disability in the eyes of the French law. The Cardinal relates that in the many letters written by the Emperor to the Pope during the course of this affair, he frequently insisted, and with extreme energy, on the fact that his brother's spouse was a Protestant, and he censured in the most abusive language the Pontiff, who, as he said, was desirous of maintaining a heretic in a family every member of which was destined to mount a throne. The Pope's reply was, that although this difference of religion rendered the marriage unlawful, yet it did not make it invalid. After these letters, who could believe that as soon as the ecclesiastical authorities at Paris had declared the American marriage null and void, the Emperor would make Jerome marry another Protestant, the daughter of the King of Wurtemberg, and afterwards Queen of Westphalia?

Next came the great event of the journey of Pius VII. to Paris, to officiate at the coronation of the Emperor. One day a letter came to Rome from the Cardinal Caprera, then legate at Paris, containing an announcement as unexpected as it was important. The Legate stated that the Emperor had summoned him to an audience, and had represented to him that all orders of the state, and the best friends of the Church, believed it likely to be of service to religion that he should be crowned by the Pope under his new title of Emperor of the French; that this was also his own opinion; that the state of France made it impossible for him to co to Rome to receive the diadem there, and that consequently the ceremony could not be performed unless the Pontiff should consent to come to Paris for the purpose, as some of his predecessors had done; that, by reason of the advantages which would accrue from it to religion, the Pope would remain satisfied with his journey beyond all his hopes; that the matter should be laid at once before the Holy Father; and in case he consented, that the government would forward a formal invitation with all the solemnity and pomp befitting such a guest and such a host.

The imperial representations were backed by the Cardinal Legate's own remarks. He added that he was in a position to declare that great benefits would follow the Pope's compliance, whilst the worst consequences might be speedily expected from a refusal; that a refusal would be felt very much, and would never be forgiven; that excuses based on the health or the advanced age of the Pope, on the inconveniences of the journey, etc., would be looked upon as mere pretexts; that a tardy reply would be equivalent to a refusal; and that it was idle to raise objections on the etiquette of the reception and sojourn at Paris, for the writer knew, on the best authority, that the reception of the Holy Father would equal, and even surpass, in magnificence all former occasions; but the Emperor was not willing to undergo the humiliation of binding himself by a formal treaty to do that to which his own heart naturally inclined him.

This proposal was of a nature to require the most careful consideration. The impetuous character of Napoleon made it easy to foresee what disastrous consequences might spring from a refusal; and on the other hand, the state of European feeling towards the Emperor was such as to convince any one that to accept the invitation was to provoke the indignation both of governments and of individuals. What was the Holy Father to do in such a crisis? He did what the Popes have ever done; calling to mind that human wisdom is weak at its best--_cogitationes mortalium timidae et incertae_, as he expressed it in his allocution--he implored from God light and help to the end that he might discover which of the two courses would better promote the honour and the interests of religion. He set aside all earthly influences, and refused to take counsel from human motives. He convoked the Sacred College, and laid before it the letters of the Cardinal Legate and of Cardinal Fesch, who, as French Ambassador at Rome, had been charged by his government with the negotiation. The Cardinals gave their opinion in writing, and by a majority declared that the invitation should be accepted. The Emperor had formally pledged his word that the journey would be productive of much good to religion, and it was thought the Pope could not refuse an invitation so expressed. A refusal would throw all the blame of the consequences on the Holy See, and it was of the last importance that no pretext for these calumnies should be afforded to the enemies of that See. Besides, all the Catholic powers of Europe, and many besides, had already recognized the new empire. In addition to these general reasons, there were two to which special weight was attached. The organic laws, and the installation of constitutional bishops, who had not retracted their errors, were two outrages upon religion in France, which caused perpetual grief to the Holy Father. The formal promises of Napoleon, coupled with the advantage of the Pope's presence in Paris, gave good grounds to hope that these two evils could be remedied if the Emperor's invitation were accepted. It was not thought prudent, however, to accept the invitation in the dark, as it were, nor did the Emperor's verbal promises to the Legate, nor Cardinal Fesch's vague generalities on the good of religion, inspire confidence enough. Before the Pope would give his final consent, he determined to reduce to something tangible and obligatory these vague indefinite promises of the French government. Cardinal Fesch advised that the Pope should exact, as a condition of his consent, the restitution of the three Legations which France had torn from the States of the Church. But the pure soul of Pius VII. revolted against the idea of admitting any thought of temporal advantages; not only did he reject the Cardinal's well-meant suggestion, but positively forbade him ever again to make mention of it. He refused to give his consent unless the French government would promise to withdraw the organic laws, and to abandon those of the constitutional bishops who should refuse to make a public and sincere retractation. It took four or five months of negotiation to extort these promises from Napoleon. During that period Consalvi had daily conferences with Cardinal Fesch, whose warm temper frequently led to lively debates. At length M. de Talleyrand addressed an official note to the Cardinal Legate, in which it was expressly declared that as to the organic laws the Emperor would treat directly with the Holy Father, whose representations should be attended to in such a way as to give his Holiness the most complete satisfaction. The Emperor was ready to do even more than the Pope had asked; and it was insinuated that he would be happy to listen with favour to any requests the Pope should make concerning his temporal interests. Touching the intruded bishops, M. de Talleyrand made large promises, but their tenor was so vague that the Holy Father did not remain satisfied until he held in his hand a written promise that the constitutional bishops should make their retractation in the Pope's hands in the form prescribed by him, and that any who might refuse to do so should be forced to resign their sees. This point having been arranged, it was thought that the due regard for the majesty of the pontifical dignity demanded some other precautions. The Holy Father felt that he ought not to expose his high office to insult or irreverence, and this consideration urged him to request some information as to the manner in which he was to be received at Paris by the Emperor. In his reply to the inquiries made on this point Talleyrand employed these remarkable words: "Between Pius the Seventh's journey to France, his reception there, his treatment, and the results which are to spring from it, and Pius the Sixth's journey to Vienna, there shall be as much difference as there is between Napoleon I. and Joseph II.". Another precaution judged necessary by Consalvi regarded the coronation itself. The later notes of Cardinal Fesch were remarkable for a strange variety of expressions. Instead of the word _coronation_ (_incoronazione_), employed in the original invitation presented by the Cardinal Legate in the Emperor's name, the Cardinal Fesch had commenced to use the word _consecration_ (_consecrazione_). Consalvi at once demanded the reason of this change, and Cardinal Fesch replied: "Beyond all doubt, the Pope is to crown the Emperor, but I believe there is to be a double coronation, one in the Church by the Pope, the other in the Champ de Mars by the Senate". The Pope at once sent a despatch to the Legate at Paris commanding him to signify to the Emperor that the Holy Father could not allow his Majesty to be crowned by other hands after he had been crowned by the Pope; that a second coronation would be an insult to the dignity of the Head of the Church; and that, consequently, if it were intended that the Emperor should be twice crowned, the Holy Father would not go to Paris at all. Talleyrand replied in an official note that the Emperor set too high a value on his coronation by the Pope to wish to receive a second diadem from the hands of others.

The choice of those who were to form the suite of the Pontiff next came under discussion. The French government was anxious that the Pope should take with him twelve cardinals and a corresponding number of prelates and of Roman nobles. The Holy Father resolved to bring only four cardinals and four bishops, besides the prelates attached to his immediate service, such as his _maggiordomo_ and his _maestro di camera_. The two Roman princes who commanded the noble guard were to follow him. However, in deference to Cardinal Fesch's requests, he added to this little court the two cardinal deacons, Braschi and de Bayane. The other four cardinals were Antonelli, de Pietro, Borgia, and Caselli.