CHAPTER XL

NEUVE EGLISE--MESSINES--HOUTHEM--WYTSCHAETE

In the Neuve Eglise area the Companies were spread over a considerable area, the whole of which was under the direct observation from the German lines on Messines Ridge. “A” Company was in immediate support to the London Scottish, who were in the line on Hill 63, north of Ploegsteert Wood, while the remaining three Companies were dotted along the defensive line of trenches just east of the village of Neuve Eglise. The Battalion was under orders to garrison this reserve line should the Bosche make an attack on our immediate front. Movement, of course, during daylight was restricted, and at the slightest sign of smoke the enemy would deluge the area with shells, and during one of these strafes “B” Company had to move its home further back, but not without suffering a few casualties. “A” and “C” Company were also unfortunate one night while furnishing working parties in the line, and several of their men were killed and wounded during an enemy bombardment of Hill 63. On the whole, however, a quiet time was spent in this area, and the Battalion was ordered up the line on the 26th of September. We relieved the 6/7th Inniskillings and took over the line in front of Messines town from the right of the main road from Wulverghem to Messines. Headquarters was situated near South Midland Farm, “A” Company were in the front line on the sector adjoining the road, and “C” Company on their right, having Stinking Farm as their right flank. “B” Company provided supports to both front Companies, while “D” Company were held in reserve behind South Midland Farm. The intention was that within a few days the Battalion, in conjunction with other units, should attack and capture Messines Ridge, so that the first days in the line were spent in reconnoitring our front, from which it was learnt that the enemy had a plentiful supply of machine guns. At night-time we were also busy in bringing up and distributing stores which are peculiar to an organised attack, such as red lights, Verey pistols and so forth. To recapture the ridge was less an operation by itself than an operation supplementary to a much larger attack further north.

The 2/16th Queen’s Westminsters were on our right and the 2/17th Londons on our left. The main road from Wulverghem to Messines formed the general line of the direction of our attack. On the Divisional front the first objectives were some enemy strong points close to our front line, and directly in front of our Battalion were three such strongholds, viz., Big Bull Cottage, Boyles Farm and Rome Alley. The attack was timed for dawn on the 28th, and at 5.30 a.m. our artillery opened up their bombardment on our front. It was not a creeping barrage, which had by that time become fairly perfect, but was rather a treatment of carefully-selected places and areas to cover the advance of our Companies on their allotted strong points to be attacked. Both our attacking Companies got well off the mark under this artillery preparation and possessed themselves of their objectives, the greatest resistance coming from Big Bull Cottage, where most of the occupants were killed, and before 7 a.m. the Battalion had claimed seventeen prisoners and nine machine guns. The Battalion on our left were also successful in capturing Mortar Farm and Ontario Farm. This clearing of the way for the advance to the Messines Ridge, though perhaps more an affair of fighting patrols than a staged attack, called for a good deal of initiative on the part of Company, Platoon and Subordinate Commanders in rushing and getting around machine guns when even the mere covering of the ground alone presented considerable difficulties. All the enemy strong points to be attacked had the armaments of machine guns, Captain Peatfield’s Company, “A,” our left attacking Company, accounting for six, Second-Lieutenant Pittam leading the platoon that captured them. Lance-Sergeant P. Mason, of “A” Company, mopped up a post of four with no little dash and skill, helped by the daring reconnaissances of the previous night, in which Private J. Volke had a notable share.

“C” Company (Captain F. H. Du Heaume) had also pushed forward and captured a network of trenches known as Rome Alley, driving off the garrison and killing a few of the enemy, while their patrols afterwards pushed towards Gabion Farm, which was strongly held by the enemy. Against this strong point “C” Company had to form a defensive flank, as the 2/16th Battalion had not advanced in the first stage of the day’s operations. No determined counter-attack was made on our front, although the enemy was active with his snipers and machine guns.

“B” Company moved forward during the attack from their position in support and occupied our original front line, while “D” Company was brought up to occupy the support line vacated by “B” Company.

The new front was then held pending the result of the greater attack taking place further north, while on our right the 2/16th Battalion (Queen’s Westminsters) assisted during the afternoon on the left flank of the attack of the 31st Division through Ploegsteert Wood, which met with considerable resistance, and the Westminsters suffered considerable casualties. The actual attack took place about 3 p.m. in the afternoon of the 28th, and turned out to be no easy task. The element of surprise which had assisted us was of course entirely lacking, and the progress of the troops on our right was attended with difficulties, and the Bosche made a determined stand, but under pressure gradually gave way.

By this time the success of the operations further north had begun to tell and, pressed on his right flank as well as in front, the enemy began to withdraw over the ridge in the late afternoon. His passage over the ridge, which of course was visible, was hastened by our artillery and machine-gun fire, which the sight of the enemy on the run in broad daylight naturally provoked. More than that, the Division could now, while still preserving the role of flanking the attack further north, push on to the ridge. Orders were accordingly issued for further patrols to advance over the ridge in the evening and secure a line east of Messines itself, curving back on the right to keep in touch with the troops there. This implied following the dip into the hollow of the Steenbecque River and its steepish rise to the top of the ridge, the whole way a pitted and torn desolation of the familiar type. Progress in the dark--it was pitch dark that night--was necessarily slow over such ground.

During the late afternoon and the evening our advance companies pushed forward, meeting small resistance from the enemy’s rearguards. “A” Company on the left were able to push forward past Hospice Mill and actually entered the ruined village of Messines before midnight. The advance of “C” Company was necessarily slower as the troops on our right were held up, and it became necessary for us to form a defensive flank. Unfortunately, it was found inadvisable to hold the village of Messines, as the Battalion on our left had also met some strong resistance, and the salient which we formed became particularly unpleasant and it was ordered that we should withdraw from the village itself and occupy Hospice Mill, on the western outskirts, where “B” Company had pushed out in support of “A” Company during the advance to the village. In view of the advance being continued the following day, it was decided that “D” Company should relieve “A” Company in the front line, and “B” Company should continue as supports and “A” and “C” Companies be held in Battalion reserve. Great credit is due to all concerned for the excellent manner in which this reorganisation was carried out on such a dark night and over strange country covered with shell-holes, trenches and with entanglements. The first day’s work had been very successful.

Our casualties were comparatively small when one realises the advance we had made, and most of them were the result of heavy artillery fire which had continued all day on our old front line, and, curious as it may seem, Headquarters suffered most, one unlucky shell killing nine and wounding five others seriously. Amongst those killed by this shell was our R.S.M. H. W. Lovelock, well known to both the 1st and 2nd Battalions.

By daylight on the 29th, however, the ridge was ours for the taking, and in the heavy mist at dawn parties of the Battalion pushed forward and by seven o’clock were in the village and over the ridge. Messines, with its memories of four years’ fighting, passed into British hands again, and this time for good. There was, indeed, little else than memories, save the jagged cairn which had been the church, the ruined houses which had been made into concrete blockhouses, some of them left intact, or nearly so, and a few broken tombstones on the site of the cemetery. The Messines Ridge in the chill of a misty, late September morning, when you have been fighting since dawn the day before, and do not know where in the mist the enemy is hidden, provides neither time nor the place for philosophising. The ridge, from being an objective, became merely a road to the valley of the Lys. Somewhere there, as not infrequently in the history of Flanders, we might expect a stand to be made. The task of the Division was to see that it was made as far east of the ridge as possible--at any rate, as far as the line of the Ypres-Comines Canal, so well known and so little loved in the Salient farther north.

In order to carry out this idea the Battalion was ordered to push forward at dawn and advance as far as Houthem, and if possible make for the line of the Canal, a distance of over three miles. Except for constant artillery fire the first mile of the advance on our actual front was carried out with few losses to ourselves. However, we soon came under the direct observation of the captive balloons behind the German lines, and his artillery fire became heavier and well directed.

As no other British troops were to be seen over the ridge it was decided to halt about 2.0 p.m., and while waiting for further developments we had the pleasure of seeing one of our airmen bring down two of the enemy balloons in flames. They were immediately replaced by another balloon, but its life was short and the airman returned and downed it. An enemy plane, flying low, came over our position, but luckily no artillery fire resulted.

Just after 2.0 p.m. we saw a British skirmishing line advance on our left, and patrols soon got in touch, to find that it was the 2nd Battalion of the South Lancashires, of the 89th Brigade, who had pushed through the 2/17th Londons and taken up the pursuit. After consultation between the two Battalion commanders it was decided to push on together towards Houthem Church, as the 2nd South Lancashires were in touch with a Battalion of the 41st Division on their left. On our right matters were not so clear, and the heavy machine-gun fire confirmed our idea that the Boche was making a stand. The first part of our advance from Messines was over ground which had been in our hands the previous winter, while the latter half was enemy territory and unknown to us. The “going” down the slope was easier than on the west side of the ridge, though still a desolation of rank grass and old shell-holes. Houses, of course, there were none. Remnants of trenches and wire entanglements still served to remind us of the former British front line area. The only solid things were the pill-boxes left vacant, and in many cases intact, by the retreating enemy. By our rapid advance we were able to materially assist the advance of the 41st Division on our left by outflanking the enemy machine-gunners.

On our right the advance had been taken up by the London Scottish, and during the night of the 29th of September they entered Warneton.

After we had linked up with the South Lancashires we were able to push forward without meeting much opposition, and lost only a few men wounded. When darkness came we had reached the Ypres-Comines Canal, and took up a defensive line near the Canal near Houthem, turning our right flank to face south, as we had not at that time obtained touch with our troops on the right. We used the numerous pill-boxes as rain began to fall, and except for intermittent artillery fire and an occasional burst of machine-gun fire which caused us a few casualties, the night was quiet. Signal communication by lamp was obtained with Brigade Headquarters on Messines Ridge. By dawn on the 30th of September our right flank was secured by the Queen’s Westminsters who arrived during the night, and the Brigade formed the extreme right of the great advance which was proceeding successfully from the banks of the Lys to the north. The River Lys forming a protection to the retiring enemy made it necessary for a great deal of preliminary work to be done before any advance in that direction could be undertaken.

Next day brought no further advance on our front, the 30th Division was flanking an attack rather than making one, and so regulated its movements to those of the forces on the left where the line went away north-east towards Gheluwe and onwards. We were free to close up the tail of the Division behind Messines Ridge, to improve shelter where there was none--which was practically everywhere--to clear roads, and to count the spoil. The number of prisoners taken was small, but if there is a peculiar pleasure in capturing guns which have shelled you for days and nights together, that pleasure was ours, for the Division took four 8-inch howitzers, three 5·9-inch howitzers, one 5·9-inch gun, three 4·2-inch howitzers and a similar number of guns, and 24 field guns. Any one who cared might possess himself of a trench-mortar or a machine-gun with sufficient ammunition for a month’s fighting. The whole battlefield was, in fact, strewn with material from trench boards to 15-inch “duds”--relics of the British bombardment the previous year. The only road for transport and guns was the Wulverghem-Messines road. A very large crater completely demolishing it had been blown just east of the Steenbecque, where the road ran over an embankment. The enemy had also placed 36 tank mines across the road. These were all removed and the crater bridged to take lorry traffic by midday on the 29th of September. On the morning of the 30th the Divisional front, which had been gradually lessened in width by the advance from the north of the 41st Division and on the south by the 31st Division, was handed over to the reserve Brigade (the 21st Brigade) and the Battalion was withdrawn and marched back to Messines Ridge, and occupied old Hun dug-outs and pill-boxes near Blauen Mullen, where Colonel Gaze rejoined from leave. Our rest, however, was soon disturbed, and the area was heavily shelled, causing casualties, especially among the men of “B” Company, and after a short and unpleasant stay on this part of the ridge the Battalion moved to Oosttaverne Wood, a little farther north. The march proved exciting, as a Boche plane came over our lines and cleverly set fire to five of our observation balloons in such quick fashion that no less than ten airmen were parachuting to earth at the same time.

Oosttaverne Wood proved a very desolate spot, and it was with great difficulty that the Battalion obtained sufficient cover from the cold weather. Most of the dug-outs and pill-boxes in this devastated wood were under water. However, being free from enemy observation and the consequent artillery fire made up a great deal for the discomfort. A few days later the Battalion went farther back towards Wytschaete, where a fairly clean area was found and better accommodation was discovered. It was a restful time and some of the more energetic members of the Battalion journeyed to Ypres to see the “sights.” Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Gaze, M.C., left the Battalion for a Senior Officers’ Course at Camberley, and the command of the Battalion was given to Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. H. Benké, M.C.