CHAPTER XXXVI

IBN OBEID--BETHANY--JEBEL EKTIEF--JERUSALEM--MUKMAS

The capture of the Bireh Heights, and driving the Turk towards Nablous, completed the capture of Jerusalem, as far as attacks from the north of the city were concerned, but on the east and south-east there was still danger. On the 1st January, 1918, after a night in Jerusalem, the Battalion was ordered to take up an outpost line to the south-east of the town from Sur Bahir just off the Bethlehem Road, running in a north-easterly direction via Khirbit Jubb er Rumm to Abu Dis, just outside Bethany. The line, therefore, formed a defence about three or four miles from the city. Sur Bahir was held by “D” Company, Khirbit Jubb er Rumm by “C” Company, while “A” and “B” were at Abu Dis. The day was fine when the Battalion marched out of the town during the morning, but before proper communication could be established along the line, a heavy rain fell, and the whole countryside was enveloped in a thick mist. Each company, therefore, had to form its own strong points, and wait for dawn on the following day. In the darkness and mist it was impossible to move over the rough hilly country, and patrol work was limited to a couple of hundred yards. However, the next morning in brilliant sunshine patrols were pushed out, but no sign of the Turk was to be seen. Communication with the flank companies was obtained, and rations and water supplies were sent out to each of the companies in the line. Every one looked forward to a quiet tour of outpost duty. “D” Company, however, received orders to push out as far as the monastery at Ibn Obeid on the Wadi en Naar, which in Biblical times was known as the Brook Kidron, and was three miles south-east of Sur Bahir. The new line, therefore, ran from north to south, from Abu Dis to Ibn Obeid, passing through Jubb er Rumm.

The country over which the line ran was composed of stony hills with deep wadis in the valleys, sometimes 500 feet below the summit of the surrounding hills. The monastery at Ibn Obeid which was the southern terminus of the line stood on the top of the cliffs of the Wadi en Naar which descended steeply for some 800 feet to the bed of the Wadi.

The monastery had been the scene of some heavy fighting a few weeks previous to our arrival, in which a battalion of the Middlesex Regiment had fought with distinction, and had driven off repeated attacks of the Turks. When “D” Company, however, came upon the scene everything was peaceful. Only a few monks lived in the monastery, and they were soon packed off to Jerusalem; in case they acted as enemy spies. On the 10th January, the whole Battalion was relieved by the 2/13th Battalion (Kensingtons) on this outpost line, and moved to Bethany.

At Bethany three companies were billeted in the local school and a monastery near by, while “A” Company took up an outpost position at Sniper’s Post, overlooking the Jericho road, about a mile or so ahead of the Battalion. Here we reorganised our specialist sections which had suffered heavy losses in the fighting around Jerusalem during the latter part of December. A new draft had just arrived from England, and they were initiated into the art of warfare in the East by constant training over the local hills. The remainder of the Battalion was employed on “road making,” or perhaps I should say making cart tracks through the wadis near Abu Dis, and occasionally a strong force of about 200 men would reconnoitre the ground in front of the Turkish positions along the Jericho road; especially towards the Arak Ibrahim Caves, some four miles away, where the Turk had a considerable garrison.

On the 20th “D” Company relieved “A” Company at Sniper’s Post, but except for the occasional noise of two captured field guns at Bethany which were used against the Turks at Arak Ibrahim Caves, there was no sound of war. Six days later the Battalion moved back to Jerusalem and billeted in some empty schools in the German part of the city, while many of the officers were placed in private houses. The journey was full of interest, and the Mount of Olives, the Garden of Gethsemane, St. Stephen’s Gate, were passed among other famous sights. On the way we met a Jewish funeral; we thought that the Macedonian method of carrying the coffin lid in front of the procession, with the body exposed to the eyes of the curious, as being a crude method, but this funeral was even more gruesome. The party rushed along the road at a great pace, and the corpse wrapped in a blanket was merely suspended by cord at the head and foot to a long pole, which was carried on the shoulders of two men, while the body limply swung from side to side as they hurried along.

During this stay in the city of Jerusalem, parties under the expert guidance of our Padre (Rev. G. C. Cavalier) were allowed to visit the Holy Places in the town. I need hardly recite the wonders of the Holy City as many guide-books will do so far better. As far as the Battalion was concerned we enjoyed the privilege of seeing these ancient Biblical landmarks. Souvenir hunting in the shops and the purchasing of food stuffs (chiefly fruit and bread, which was of a greenish hue when cut, and of the consistency of gluten) formed the chief amusement during the day. At night time, however, the two Divisional concert parties, the “Barnstormers” and “Roosters,” both of which had made great “hits” in Cairo and Alexandria, were in full swing at their respective temporary theatres, and provided us with splendid recreation.

Major Grissel from the 74th Division took over command of the Battalion on the 28th January, our own Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Bisdee, having been granted leave to the United Kingdom.

Danger, however, soon occurred from the epidemics of disease and fever in the city, and the Battalion was moved out of the town to tents and bivouacs on the slopes of the Mount of Olives; Headquarters being in a sheik’s house near by. The camping site was just off the Nablous Road, overlooking the Garden of Gethsemane, and was on dry, dusty terraces of barren land which in a few days became a wretched quagmire. Heavy torrents of rain continually poured down for four days and four nights without a break, and every one was swamped out and miserable. Refuge each night was taken in the Divisional theatres, and large parties would march across the city in the pouring rain simply for the comfortable shelter of the “theatre.” When the weather had cleared a little the Battalion was employed on road-making, and one day an exhibition of “sangar” building was given by a company of Indian troops who were past-masters in hill-fighting.

It was, however, unhealthy to live in the mud of the camp, and the Battalion was moved up to Sir John Grey Hill’s house at the top of the hill. It was a large desolate mansion, overlooking the valley of the Jericho Road, while in the far distance the Moab Mountains could be seen. A short stay of two days here and the Battalion was moved to bivouacs in the wadis of the Abu Hindi Wadi on the 13th of February, where preparations were made for an attack eastwards over the hills towards the Jericho Plain.

The Turkish line east of Jerusalem consisted of a line of entrenched strongholds on the hills some eight miles from the city. The southern extremity of the line rested on Muntar, a high hill just east of Ibn Obeid Monastery, and came north via Jebel Ektief, Talat ed Dumm, across the Jericho Road to the Arak Ibrahim Caves, and thence over Ras el Tawil to the deep ravine of the Wadi Um Farrar.

The British line ran practically parallel to this line, a few miles nearer the city, with Ibn Obeid forming the right or south flank, and ran north via Jubb er Rumm, Abu Dis, Sniper’s Post, on to the Jericho Road, and thence north over Suffra to Mukmas.

The intention of the attack was to drive the Turk from the high ground on the west of the Jordan Plain, and thereby render the Holy City immune from attack from the east. The advance was to be made in three distinct phases as follows:

(1) The capture of Muntar, Arak Ibrahim Caves and Ras el Tawil.

(2) The capture of Jebel Ektief and Talat ed Dumm.

(3) To advance to the steep cliffs overlooking the Jericho or Jordan Valley.

* * * * *

The three Brigades of the 60th Division were holding the line in this sector, and the objectives were allotted as follows:

(a) 181st Brigade, Ras el Tawil.

(b) 180th Brigade, Arak Ibrahim Caves and Talat ed Dumm.

(c) 179th Brigade, Muntar and Jebel Ektief.

* * * * *

In the 179th Brigade, the 2/14th Battalion (London Scottish) were given the hill of Muntar as their objective, and they concentrated in the depths of the Wadi en Naar near Ibn Obeid. During the night of the 19th of February the companies deployed and crept up the hill-side under cover of darkness. At dawn the trenches were heavily bombarded, and the attack was pushed home under the artillery support. The hill was captured, and fortunately the strength and resistance of the enemy had been over-estimated, with the result that the Scottish casualties were small. The same morning, the 180th Brigade were successful and captured the caves at Arak Ibrahim in the centre of the Turkish line with comparatively few casualties. Further north, however, the 181st Brigade had met with strong opposition at Ras el Tawil, and after several hours of heavy fighting gained possession of the hill and put to flight a strong force of Turks. Casualties, however, on both sides were fairly heavy.

The first phase of the advance had proved successful, and the battalions detailed for the second day’s move were able to push forward and prepare for the assaults on Jebel Ektief and Talat ed Dumm. Like the first day’s operations the second day’s attacks resulted in the objectives being taken, although the fighting was more strenuous as the objectives were surrounded by more difficult country, which provided the defenders with better cover. The Turk, finding himself overwhelmed and outmanœuvred, retired over the hills to the Jordan Valley, covering his withdrawal with machine-gun rear-guards so that the third day’s work came under the heading of “peaceful penetration.” Thus the 60th Division was master of the Jordan Valley from the commanding heights on the west of the plain, and the possibility of an attack on Jerusalem from the east had disappeared.

To return to the particular part in these operations performed by the 2/15th Battalion it will be remembered that they were in bivouacs in the Wadi Hindi on the 13th February.

For the few days previous to the commencement of the advance we were occupied in road-making in the wadi beds to assist the bringing forward of guns, ambulances and transport for the attack. Reconnaissances were also made towards the front, and on one of these “stunts” our Brigade Major, Captain Sherston, was seriously wounded in the leg.

On the early morning of the 19th of February we were awakened by the artillery fire from Abu Dis, where our heavies were assisting the attack of the London Scottish on Muntar. A few hours later we learnt of the success, and realised it was now our turn. During the morning the Battalion gradually moved along the valley of the Wadi Hindi under cover of the surrounding heights, “D” Company forming the advance guard. After advancing some three miles the Battalion was halted as further advance was impossible by day. Under the cover of an outpost line the Battalion rested until darkness came, thus making further progress possible. During the afternoon patrols were sent out and reconnaissance towards Jebel Ektief was made, and resulted in a sharp skirmish with the Turkish advanced posts, but no casualties occurred to our party, although several Turks were seen to be carried away on stretchers.

About 6 p.m. the order was given to advance to the attack, and three platoons of “D” Company were ordered to “make good” the high ground west of the deep ravine in front of Jebel Ektief while a fourth platoon under Sergeant Cross moved along the wadi bed to a point where the deep wadi in front of Jebel Ektief branched off to the left. When these platoons had pushed ahead sufficiently the remainder of the Battalion marched along the wadi in order to reach the line of deployment before daybreak.

Probably of all the country over which the Battalion had passed throughout its stay in both Salonika and Palestine none could compare with the deep ravines and precipitous cliffs over which the advanced guard had to pass, and if this statement is accepted, there is no need for further comment on the difficulty of the advance. To move forward a matter of three miles occupied a full six hours of hard climbing over ridges and difficult descents down precipices. The night was exceedingly dark, and great credit is due to Lieutenants Clark and Neall, platoon commanders in “D” Company, for maintaining their direction and reaching their objective; the men behaved splendidly and struggled along through this wretched patch of the Holy Land. Fortunately no opposition in strength was met except an occasional volley of fire from the Turkish advanced posts, but they soon retired to their main position on Jebel Ektief. Great caution, however, was necessary as large bodies of the enemy had been seen that afternoon leaving Jebel Ektief, and advancing towards our lines. When, however, the advanced guard had reached the limit of their advance, the Battalion pushed along the bed of the stony wadi, and were supposed to halt at the junction of the wadi in front of Jebel Ektief and the main wadi, where they hoped to turn the corner into their place of deployment. However, the noise had apparently disturbed the Turk, and he constantly poured machine-gun fire on to this junction corner. It was therefore found necessary to find another way into the Jebel Ektief Wadi, and the only way was to climb the steep, precipice-like sides of the main wadi on to the high ground held by “D” Company. This was accomplished, but how, no one can tell; when the Battalion with its Lewis guns, regimental aid post, and signalling mules reached the crest, dawn was appearing in the east. It was decided, therefore, to make a hurried descent into the Jebel Ektief Wadi in spite of the casual fire from the enemy’s snipers and machine guns. Luckily the going down into the second wadi was easier and more speedily accomplished than the climb from the first wadi, and just as daylight arrived the tail of the Battalion disappeared into the bed of Jebel Ektief Wadi, out of sight of the Turks. Once in the bottom of the wadi the companies sorted themselves out and prepared for the actual assault, “A” and “B” being the attacking companies, “C” in support, and “D” in reserve. It had been arranged that the 2/13th (Kensingtons) were to assault the position on our left, having approached the wadi at Jebel Ektief by a night march on a parallel route to the one we had taken. Unfortunately, the ground over which the Kensingtons had to pass had proved too difficult, and when daylight came they found themselves perched on a precipice unable to cross the deep ravine before them.

At seven o’clock on the morning of the 20th February, the artillery opened up a heavy bombardment on the hill. The advance up the hillside described officially as “trickling forward” should have taken place under this barrage, while the assault was timed for eight o’clock when the barrage was to lift.

Unfortunately little or no progress could be made owing to the fact that the heavies were shelling the “bench mark” some 1,000 yards behind the enemy’s forward lines thereby leaving the enemy’s machine guns undisturbed, while at the same time other machine guns on our left raked us, those, in fact, which should have been concentrating their attention on our brother battalion, the Kensingtons, who had been so unfortunate in their advance march.

At eight o’clock, when we should have assaulted, the attack was therefore hung up for a while. An hour later a Forward Observation Officer having come up, a second barrage was fired for fifteen minutes concentrating accurately on the forward Turkish trenches.

At the same time “C” Company was taken from support, and by means of quick concealed movement succeeded in moving to our left flank, thereby taking up the position and rôle in the action which should have been the Kensingtons’.

“C” Company was able to make some ground and also was able to give great assistance to “A” and “B” Companies by bringing enfilade fire to bear on the snipers and machine guns that were holding them up.

As this second barrage lifted, the Battalion assaulted the steep hill and in spite of heavy frontal fire were successful in capturing the first line. By this time the two companies of the Queen’s Westminsters had come up on to our left, and under the gallant leadership of Captain Flower silenced the machine guns which had enfiladed our attack. When the first ridge was gained it was found that a valley beyond led to the second ridge, and here the Turks were again strongly resisting. After a breather, however, the “Charge” was given, and the men, led by Captain Wills and Company Sergeant Major Oldcorn of “C” Company, rushed over the valley and gained the second ridge only to find a still further ridge strongly held. Machine-gun fire from the flank was still causing considerable casualties to us, but after a breather, the Battalion assaulted the third ridge, and thus completed the capture of Jebel Ektief. The Turks fled down the precipitous slopes, into the Jordan Valley, and could be seen collecting in small groups as though preparing for a counter-attack. The Battalion’s casualties in this action numbered about one hundred.

Further north of Jebel Ektief, the London Irish of the 180th Brigade had succeeded in capturing Talat ed Dumm after heavy fighting. The Turk, however, still had isolated machine guns on the hills between the recently captured positions of Jebel Ektief and Talat ed Dumm, and these poured a persistent fire into our flank. In the late afternoon the Kensingtons came up on our left, and soon cleared the ground of these irritating machine guns, and by the evening everything was quiet except for an occasional shell from a Turkish battery which could be seen some couple of miles away across the Jordan Plain, well out of the range of our guns. Just before dark we had a splendid view of the Jericho Plain.

No other valley in the world presents such extraordinary physical features, none other has been the subject of such various theories as to its origin and character. From our position on the eastern edge of Jebel Ektief, the ground sloped steeply for about 2,000 feet to the flat plain below, which stretched for over twenty miles to the foot-hills of the Moab Mountains. Winding through the plain the river Jordan could be seen in places where its steep banks were broken by small branch ravines; while to the south the dismal flat water of the Dead Sea was visible. The only town on this extensive plain was Jericho, and as the light failed it appeared as a dead city of mud huts.

The following morning, the 21st February, the London Scottish were moved on to the plain as far as the white ruins of Neba Musa, and Australian cavalry patrolled the Jericho area. The Turk had crossed the Jordan, and all was quiet. About midday, however, four enemy planes flew over our positions, and, but for a remarkable cloud which suddenly enveloped the hill, would no doubt have poured bullets into our bivouacs. When the cloud lifted they were nowhere to be seen. For two days the Battalion remained on the heights of Jebel Ektief, and although free from fighting it was a most strenuous business carrying rations and water from the Quartermaster’s Stores and Transport which were now in the Jebel Ektief Wadi, from which the attack had started, some 600 or 700 feet below the summit of the hill.

On the 23rd February, the Battalion was ordered to move as far back as Jerusalem.