CHAPTER XXXIV

KAUWUKAH AND RUSHDI SYSTEMS--ATTACK--SHERIA--MUNTARET--HUJ--NEJILEH--AND TO GAZA VIA SHERIA

The position to be attacked was on the high ground at Khirbit Kauwukah, just north of the Beersheeba-Gaza Railway and south of Sheria. This was an extensive stretch of trenches about four miles long, which faced south-west from near Samarra Bridge to Abu Heirira on the Wadi Sheria. The left of this trench system was swung round forming a strong defensive flank facing south-east, and it was against this flank that the 60th Division was to make its attack. In front of our objectives stretched an open plain for over a mile and, of course, formed an excellent field of fire for the defenders.

The general plan of attack consisted of an enfilade assault from the east to be started by the 74th Division on our right attacking and rolling up the enemy’s works east of the actual Kauwukah System, followed by our own Division which was to operate against the main defences with one Brigade of the 10th Division on our left; each Division being echeloned back from the right.

Careful arrangements were necessary with regard to the timing of the advance of each Division in order to safeguard the possibility of the troops of the 60th and 10th Divisions being enfiladed from the enemy’s works to be attacked by the 74th Division before the latter had accounted for them.

By the flanking attack it was hoped that the 10th Division on our left would reach the Abu Heirira Redoubt, a strongly-fortified mound on the edge of the Wadi Sheria. In the 179th Brigade the Westminsters and Kensingtons were to form the attacking Battalions and the Civil Service were to be in support; the Brigade Reserve being the London Scottish. A second Brigade of the Division, the 180th Brigade with the London Irish (21/8th) and the St. Pancras (2/19th) Battalions as attacking Battalions were to push forward on our right. The 181st Brigade, of Hill 1,070 fame, being the Divisional Reserve. After the first lines of the enemy’s works had been captured, it was intended that the 2/15th and the 2/19th Battalions should continue the advance and take the rest of the Kauwukah System in enfilade as far as the Rushdi System which adjoined just on the banks of the Wadi Sheria; while the Battalions of the 10th Division on our left should concentrate their energies on the strong redoubt at Abu Heirira, and thus complete the capture of the Turkish positions from the east as far as the Wadi Sheria.

During the night of the 5/6th of November, 1917, the Battalion moved from the Wadi Welfare to its position of assembly preparatory to the opening of the action by the 74th Division on our right at 5.0 a.m. The position of assembly was some two miles south-east of the left flank of the Kauwukah System, and under cover of the undulating ground we waited for the result of the 74th Divisional attack. One thing which worried us, however, was the fact that our water supply had not yet reached us; the camels which had left for Abu Irgeig on the previous evening had not been heard of since. Just as every one gave up hope Gearing and his camels appeared over the crest in front. Here was another adventure of our camel officer. Finding no water at Abu Irgeig, and learning that some was obtainable nearer Beersheba, Gearing trudged back, got the water, and then made a “bee-line” for the Kauwukah System along the Beersheba-Gaza Railway line. True, the route was well defined on the map, but when one thinks of the journey back towards Beersheba from Abu Irgeig wells is a matter of about eight miles, and after that a night march of ten miles towards Kauwukah on the return, it was a grand performance and an exhibition of determination for which Gearing deserved praise. He had apparently arrived at the position of assembly just previous to the Battalion, and seeing no Battalion he had pushed on towards the Turks, and when dawn came, seeing nothing in front of him, decided to return, and luckily met us at the appointed place. Water was quickly issued, and every one was relieved for at least 24 hours.

Being in reserve is always a weary job and always one of anxiety; if all goes well in front it is easy; but should things go all wrong it is horrible. During the early morning the 74th Division had gained their objectives, and by 8.0 a.m. it was decided to commence operations on our Divisional front. An artillery bombardment of the Turkish trenches was commenced, and the Battalions deployed for the attack. However, from observation it was seen that much of the strong barbed-wire entanglements in front of the Turkish lines was still uncut, and it was decided that two batteries of R.F.A. should go forward and cut the wire at point blank range. By this time the Westminsters on our direct front had advanced to the ridge overlooking the plain in front of the enemy’s trenches, and were suffering many casualties. Suddenly, in rear of our Battalion large clouds of dust were seen, and from these clouds came galloping two batteries of artillery. On they galloped through the extended lines of the Battalion which lay in support near the railway bridge at Samarra, and over the ridge in front until they gained the open plain. Here they unlimbered their guns and opened a rapid rate of fire on the Turkish lines. The battery horses at once returned back over the ridge for cover from the heavy shower of shrapnel which was coming from the enemy gunners. The teams returned at the gallop, but many horses were riderless and teams were often dragging one of their number either dead or wounded. In front of the ridge, in full view of the enemy, the two batteries continued to pour fire on the Turkish entanglements. They were paying for their gallantry, and many wounded artillery officers and men crawled back over the ridge to receive medical attention at the advanced dressing station that had been erected at Samarra Bridge, under cover of the embankment. Only a few men finally remained with the guns, and under the command of a corporal--who afterwards received the D.C.M.--they continued to successfully carry out the cutting of the wire. The whole incident was an inspiration to the infantry, and the gallantry of our brothers in the gunners encouraged us in our attack, which commenced to push forward about midday. The Battalion followed closely on the heels of the Westminsters, with “D” Company leading. Extended order with lines about 70 yards intervals in depth was the formation adopted. Once over the ridge the Battalion came under heavy machine-gun fire and also a shrapnel barrage. But just ahead we could see the Westminsters pushing on towards the trench line which was strongly garrisoned, and with a final rush at 1.0 p.m. they captured their objective. The Battalions on their flanks had also succeeded, and the first lines were won. Without a moment’s delay we, together with the 2/19th on our right, pursued the enemy and captured many lines of trenches without a great deal of opposition. Occasionally a machine-gun would hold us up for a few minutes, but it was soon out-flanked and the line advanced again. All resistance was broken down and the garrisons killed or put to flight. Not until the whole of the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems were in British hands did the Battalion halt, and then finally took up a position overlooking the Wadi Sheria about 2.0 p.m. in the afternoon.

A defensive line in the vacated trenches was made, and in the distance across the valley of the wadi columns of Turks with their transport could be seen hurrying to get out of range of our artillery fire. The whole attack had been successful and our casualties were comparatively light. Great losses had been inflicted on the enemy, and many prisoners were captured. The comparative lightness of our casualties was probably largely due to wide extensions and also to the élan displayed by all ranks who, once they got in close touch with the enemy, pursued him relentlessly, giving him no time to develop counter-attacks or occupy a fresh line of resistance.

The flanking attack of the 60th Division had swept forward over the trenches and the 10th Division on our left altered their direction slightly and concentrated on the Heirira Redoubt, which consisted of a large mound literally honeycombed with trenches and machine-gun emplacements. On the Battalion front things soon quieted down, but on the right flank of the Division the Turk had concentrated and was strongly resisting the British advance towards Sheria Railway Station.

At 3.30 p.m. on the 6th of November orders were received from the XXth Corps to establish a strong bridgehead across the Wadi Sheria in order to secure the water supply; the 10th Division being ordered to relieve the 60th Division in the captured works.

Accordingly the 180th and 181st Brigades were ordered to advance and form a bridgehead north of Sheria in order to attain that object, and were supported by the Divisional artillery, the 179th Brigade remaining in Divisional Reserve. The 74th Division were ordered to operate on our right, with their left resting on Khirbit Barrata. At 5.30 p.m. one Company from the 180th Brigade had captured Sheria Railway Station, securing some prisoners and two machine-guns, while two Battalions from each Brigade prepared to cross the Wadi Sheria and occupy Tel el Sheria, the high ground north of the town.

Before evacuating Sheria Station, however, the enemy had succeeded in firing a large ammunition dump south of the station which commenced to explode just previous to the launching of the attack. The conflagration raged for some hours, and so illuminated the country in the vicinity that further progress was rendered temporarily impossible. Nevertheless, the ground over which the attack was to be made was carefully reconnoitred, and at 3.30 a.m. on the 7th the attack was launched by the 2/17th and 2/20th Battalions of the 180th Brigade west of the Railway, and the 181st Brigade was represented by the 2/22nd and 2/23rd Battalions east of the railway.

The enemy offered a determined resistance, but by 4.30 a.m. our objectives were gained. During this part of the day’s operations our captures included 4 field guns, 4 machine-guns and over 150 prisoners. The Turks were disinclined to accept their defeat without further efforts, and at 9.25 a.m. developed a strong counter attack against the line now held by the 180th Brigade, but this was effectively broken up by concentrated machine-gun, Lewis gun and rifle fire, assisted by the supporting artillery, with great loss to the enemy.

During the foregoing operations the 2/15th Battalion in common with the remainder of the 179th Brigade had handed over their captures in the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems to the 10th Division and were brought back a few miles and remained for the night of the 6/7th of November in reserve near Sammara Bridge. Little rest, however, was possible, as the weather was extremely cold. The next morning was spent in reorganising after the previous day’s attack, and in the early afternoon we were ordered to move to the Wadi Sheria.

About 4 p.m. on the 7th the Battalion, with the London Scottish on its left, moved forward from a ridge on the eastern side of the valley of the Wadi, “B” Company under Captain Lewis leading. While moving across the open we were heavily shelled. After crossing the Wadi, however, the advance was pressed, and after considerable opposition and stubborn fighting the enemy was driven back and we established an outpost line on the high ground west of the Wadi. During this advance “B” Company, as advance guard, had engaged a considerable force of Turks, but led by the personal dash of their Company Commander, they pushed forward and inflicted severe losses on the enemy. The Battalion soon followed up and passed over a large Turkish camp where “B” Company had captured an anti-aircraft gun, and the night was spent in digging in. Patrols pushed forward, but no sign of the Turk was found. Taking up this line ended the second phase of our operations in Palestine. Beersheba and Sheria had fallen under the pressure of the 60th Division. The following summary from Divisional Headquarters on the attacks on Kauwukah and Sheria defences will no doubt be interesting.

“The total prisoners at the end of this stage amounted to 31 officers and 521 men. During the whole of the day the Division was engaged in severe local fighting, while at times the hostile shell fire, especially in the afternoon, was particularly troublesome, the Turkish command obviously realising the importance of denying us access to the water supply in the Wadi Sheria. It afterwards transpired from prisoners’ statements that picked troops had been hastily formed into composite units and entrusted with the defence of the position. The large number of enemy regiments represented among the prisoners lent colour to these assertions, the opposing commanders doubtless fully realising the vital importance of delaying our advance at this point in order subsequently to secure the exposed flank of the retreating Gaza garrison.”

On the following morning, the 8th of November, the situation had sufficiently cleared for an advance to be made upon Huj, a few miles north-east of Gaza, where it was thought there would be an efficient water supply. Transport and water camels had joined the Battalion, and we were complete to move off about 7 a.m. Cavalry patrols were sent forward to gain touch with the enemy, who was retiring with all speed. The ground was undulating grassland with an occasional outcrop of sandy desert, and movement was fairly easy. The 179th Brigade formed the advance guard of the Division, having the 2/15th Civil Service and 2/14th London Scottish as its leading Battalions and covering a wide front. Instructions were issued to advance towards the high ground near Khirbit Muntaret, which was known to be occupied by the enemy. For several hours under glorious weather conditions the Brigade pushed forward across the undulating country and found no signs of the enemy except his numerous dumps which he had left hurriedly behind him. About 10 a.m. cavalry patrols brought in information to the effect that the enemy was strongly entrenched on the high ground on the north of the village of Muntaret, and the Battalion was deployed for attack. There was a considerable force of Turks near Muntaret and they were well supported by artillery. The Battalion, having “C” Company under Captain Wills for their advanced guard, opened out into irregular artillery formation or, in other words, “blobs” of Platoons at 150 yards interval. The approach to Muntaret was over an open stretch of country, and while going over the ground the Battalion came under very heavy artillery fire, and suffered considerable casualties. “C” Company soon opened out into extended order and advanced to the bottom of Muntaret Hill which was steep and, except for a small ravine a few feet deep, offered little cover. In spite of the machine-gun and rifle fire from the trenches, “C” Company crept up the hill for the final assault, and within a few hundred yards of the enemy the men took off their packs and prepared for their final charge. Led by Captain Wills, they captured the position (thus forestalling the cavalry, whose objective it had been), while the London Scottish on their left made a flank attack on the position at the same time. The rest of the Battalion soon followed on to the ridge, having also dumped their packs at the foot of the hill. However, the Turkish artillery continued to heavily bombard the captured position, and it was necessary to dig in and consolidate. Further advance was impossible across the plain west of Muntaret, and any attempt to cross the plain would mean considerable casualties from shell fire. The G.-O.-C. Division, Major-General Shea, came up and ordered the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry to charge the Turkish batteries which were holding up our advance. None of us had had the fortune to see the Balaclava Charge in the Crimean War, but it was our privilege to see a similar type of gallantry, and I insert here an account from a newspaper cutting of the charge.

“On November the 8th the Londoners while occupying a ridge less than two miles from the enemy lines, came under extremely heavy gun fire. Meanwhile the Yeomanry had come up. The Londoners’ commander, who had seen the whole enemy’s position and their guns, ordered the Yeomanry to charge them. There were 10 troops of Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry, commanded by a Colonel, Master of Hounds.

“He and his men swept over the ridge in successive lines about 2,000 yards from the enemy, raced down the slope across the flat, partly obscured by a mound in front. Over this rise the yeomen spurred their chargers, took the final rise at a terrific pace, the ranks somewhat thinned by gun, machine-gun and rifle fire, which the enemy switched off the Londoners soon after trails of dust told of advancing cavalry.

“The cavalry’s target was not so much the infantry as the guns. Giving full-throated cheers they went straight for the field and heavy pieces. There were 12 guns in action against these valiant boys from the Shires--nine German-made field guns and three 5·9 howitzers. The field guns banged as fast as the Austrian and German gun crews could load them, but every enemy artillery man was sabred by his piece. The Londoners heard the fire of all the guns stop dead almost at the same moment.”

After witnessing this magnificent feat of arms and benefiting by the resulting “cease fire” from the Turkish guns, a hasty meal was taken and a short halt was made. Later on in the afternoon under the protection of the London Scottish as advanced guard, the Brigade pushed forward in the direction of Huj. The 2/14th breasted the high ground at Tor Dimrah, near Huj, about 4.50 p.m. in the evening of the 8th of November, and were soon followed by the rest of the Brigade. It will thus be seen that between 3 a.m. on the 6th of November and 4.50 p.m. on the 8th, the Division marched 23½ miles, in the course of which advance the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems of defensive works were captured, the bridgehead at Sheria stormed, a determined counter attack repulsed, and the Turkish rearguard driven from Muntaret to beyond Huj, entailing attacks upon three defensive positions on the way.

The total captures by the Division in the whole operations amounted to 12 guns, 26 machine-guns, 51 officers and 907 other ranks.

The following newspaper extract, I think, might be included here without any shadow of a boast, and summarises our doings from the commencement of the Palestine campaign.

“The achievements of the London Territorials, who had the hardest part to do in the thrust from our right flank, will rank in the deeds of the war. A distinguished officer of my acquaintance, who has seen nearly three years of war in France and watched every movement of the London County Territorials here, told me that he could not speak of these warriors without a lump rising in his throat. This is his considered judgment:--

“‘These Cockneys are the best men in the world. Their spirits are simply wonderful. I don’t think any division ever went into a big show with higher morale. After three years of war it was refreshing to hear the men’s earnestly expressed desire to get into action again. These grand fellows went forward with the full bloom upon them. There never was any hesitation. Their discipline was absolutely perfect, and their physique, and courage alike magnificent. Their valour was beyond words. The Cockney makes the perfect soldier.’”

In eight days the men marched 66 miles and fought a number of hot actions. The march may not seem long, but Palestine is not Salisbury Plain.

On reaching Tor Dimrah near Huj on the evening of the 8th of November, the Battalion was bivouacked on the grassy slopes and waited for water and rations to be brought up from Sheria. During the evening a large British bombing squadron of some 30 planes flew over our heads and no doubt dropped their missiles with great effect on the columns of retreating Turks fleeing northwards.

Late at night water and rations arrived and these, together with cigarettes made from dried tea leaves, helped every one to retire for the night satisfied with the day’s work.

For the next two days we remained here and the Battalion was reorganised; transport came up from Sheria and fatigue parties were sent back to Muntaret for the packs which we had dumped just before the attack; while others had been left as far back as Sheria by “C” Company who it will be remembered started off from the Sheria Wadi as an advance guard. Unfortunately the water supply at Huj was not so promising as expected and the damage done to the wells by the retreating Turk did not help matters. Horses and mules were sent out in all directions without finding a sufficient supply and lack of water became so acute that the Artillery men near by sacrificed their own limited supply for their horses. The difficulty of our own transport is best described by the following letter from Lieutenant Pearson, our transport officer at the time:

“On one occasion we left the lines at 5.30 a.m. with the animals to go about 10 miles for water, and had to be back ready to move off at 2.30 p.m. When we arrived at the given place there were several thousands of Australian Cavalry horses, artillery horses, and several infantry units, animals with only one 30-foot long portable trough. The Australians’ horses had not had any water for over 36 hours, so you can imagine there was no system or order, the horses could not be held back. We had to return without watering, and arrived back at 2 p.m. In the meantime, the Battalion had received further orders to the effect that they would not move until next day. After feeding the animals, and after the men had had a snack, we were told there was a well near at hand. We went in search and found it was about 60 feet deep and had to pull up a bucketful at a time by means of a long rope; anyway, we arrived back at 1.30 a.m. The men and animals only having had one meal at midday between 5.30 a.m. and 1.30 a.m. the next day. We moved off at 8.30 a.m. the same morning.”

The foregoing incident actually occurred while we were at Tor Dimrah on November 9th, 1917.

From the heights at Tor Dimrah the result of our recent fighting could be well appreciated. A few miles to the south-west could be seen the town of Gaza, the scene of heavy fighting some months previously, while to the west stretched the coastal plain which ran up country as far as Jaffa. Frontal attacks on Gaza had proved unsuccessful earlier in the year, and therefore General Allenby decided to attack from a flank. The line of attack commenced at Beersheba and was made in a north-westerly direction, rolling up the Turkish line from the east, and hoping at the same time to reach the north of Gaza in time to cut off the garrison. While this flank movement was in progress local frontal raids on Gaza were made under heavy artillery bombardments from both land and sea. However, the Turkish leaders were able to thwart the full intention of the scheme and by their strong resistance, by powerful flank guards at Kauwukah, Sheria and Muntaret, were enabled to give time for their troops at Gaza to retire north with minimum losses. However, as soon as the Gaza front gave way, the XXIst Corps under our old Divisional Commander, General E. S. Bulfin, relentlessly pursued the Turks as far as Jaffa.

Except for the 53rd Division, our own Corps, the XXth, was withdrawn from the pursuit and, in order to assist the advance, much of our corps transport was lent to the XXIst Corps. The 53rd Division just mentioned had been kept at Khuweilfeh just north of Beersheba since the beginning of the offensive, and had fought manfully against repeated attacks and thereby protected the right flank of our advance across Palestine.

On the 11th of November the Battalion moved a few miles north-east to the Wadi Jemmemiah where the whole of the surrounding country was covered with well planned trenches and all the valleys covered with machine-gun emplacements; but the numerous ammunition dumps round about signified how hastily the Turk had withdrawn without making a strong resistance. Only a day was spent here, and on the 13th we moved still farther north to Nejilah; a pleasant spot after the filth and dust which existed around Jemmeniah. The route was lined with large collections of war material which had been left by the retreating Turk and everywhere was desolate and uninviting. Not until a mile or so from Nejilah did the scenery improve and then a stretch of undulating grassland presented itself; a restful change for our tired eyes after a lengthy stay on the glaring yellow desert. A few flocks of sheep strayed over the pastureland and the quaintly dressed shepherds, at last, presented to us a fair representation of Biblical Palestine as we had imagined it in our youth. This was the first clean, healthy spot, free from sand and the filth which the Turks always left behind them, we had struck since our arrival at Belah.

For three days the Battalion remained here on these grassy hill-sides overlooking a wide plain of pasture land to the north. Just near the camping ground a stream of crystal clear water flowed and bathing parades were again indulged in. To give the Britisher his due, he does love cleanliness and even through the recent advance most of the men had used a portion of their limited ration for purposes of shaving, although a proper wash was out of the question. No parades were ordered and a restful time was spent at Nejilah. However, difficulties arose with regard to supplies; much of our corps transport having been lent to the other corps pursuing the enemy. Consequently the Battalion was ordered to return to Sheria.

As I have already said the Turk revelled in filth and pollution, and no better illustration could be seen than the Sheria area where he had apparently had a large base camp since the early days of the war. For miles around Sheria the place literally stank and flies were present in their millions. The ground was strewn with dead Turks, camels, horses and mules, and the presence of these carcasses did not improve the polluted atmosphere. However, the desert was expansive and camps were arranged as far from this debris as possible.

While we had been fighting during the past few weeks miracles had been performed by the A.S.C. and R.E. The former corps had worked well and supply dumps had been advanced with rapidity; camel and horse transport working in conjunction with the railways in the captured area. The latter corps had repaired the Turkish railways and used the captured rolling stock to good purpose; other sections of R.E.’s had exploited the wells and obtained good supplies of water in the Wadi Sheria.

November the 17th, just after the arrival in the Sheria area, was known as “Parcel Day”: it was the first post since our departure from our desert line on the Wadi Ghuzze. Not only letters arrived but huge bags of parcels; nearly every man received a parcel. The owners of many, however, were not to be found; some had given their lives for their country while others had been sent to base hospitals either wounded or sick. But each platoon or mess made short work of these and divided the spoil; it was an unwritten law and not stealing. Luxuries were plentiful and hundreds of tea parties and dinner parties were held that evening. Every unit, however, has its “grousers,” not that they mean any harm, but it is their privilege as British Tommies. They could not legitimately grouse this night with all the good things around so they turned their morbid thoughts to treks and predicted a move on the morrow, when every one would be laden with luxuries. Their prophecies came true and the following morning camp was struck and the Battalion marched towards Gaza as far as Muntaret. On the 19th of November the march was resumed to the outskirts of the town of Gaza. The day’s march was not a great distance but the downpour of heavy rain in the evening drenched all. This was the commencement of the rainy season in Palestine.