CHAPTER XXXIII

BEERSHEBA, 1917 (21ST OF OCTOBER TO 4TH OF NOVEMBER)--WADI WELFARE

The left flank of the Turkish line, which ran south-eastward from Gaza, formed a stronghold around the south-eastern outskirts of Beersheba. In the main scheme of the advance in Palestine the 60th Division was detailed to attack and take those trenches covering the Khalasa Road which ran from Beersheba on the south-west of the town. On the right of the Division were the 21st Corps cavalry regiment (½nd County of London Yeomanry) and they were ordered to make an enveloping movement simultaneously with the main attack on the Beersheba defences. From the desert line held by the Battalion near the Wadi Ghuzze at Gambli a long approach march was necessary. On the 21st of October, 1917, the Battalion moved from the Wadi Ghuzze, near Gambli, where the 179th Brigade had been concentrated. The march was not a difficult one, as the track lay over country of a more solid surface than the desert we had just left, but some sympathy must be given to “D” Company of the Battalion, who had marched some additional eight miles at midday across the desert from Divisional Head Quarters at Shellal, where they had represented the Battalion at a Divisional Church Parade in the morning and had been on parade since the early hours of dawn.

In the cool of the evening the column started out full of glee, knowing that at last a march was to be undertaken without that horrible feeling that the further one went from camp the further one would have to retrace one’s steps. The weather was fine and the journey was along the high ground overlooking the Wadi Shanag, a continuation of the Wadi Ghuzze, past the peak of Goz Mabrouk and across the Shanag at Bir Esani to the high ground that lay between the fork of the function of the Wadis Imalaga and Esani, just south of Rashid Bek. About midnight the column halted, and the Battalion took up an outpost line reaching from Rashid Bek, a desolate, empty eastern house standing some 690 feet above sea-level, to the north bank of the Wadi Imalaga. The remainder of the Brigade extended the line to the north as far as the Karm-Beersheba Road. The line was taken up on the 22nd of October, and the Battalion remained here until the 28th of October. During the week forward reconnaissance work was done, and, under cover of the outpost, stores and guns were brought up by means of tractors, while large columns of camels and small white donkeys brought up ammunition, etc. A large dump of foodstuffs and stores was formed near the Khalasa-Esani road, and it was amusing to think that this dump was some few hundred yards in advance of the outpost line, although in front of the dump there was a cavalry screen of Australian mounted troops. Even if the Turk had attacked in force the outpost line would have proved a strong defence, though perhaps the dump and its camel lines would have been sacrificed. Strict orders were given to the officers in the line that no one was allowed through the line without strict scrutiny, as small bodies of nomadic Arabs acting as spies were always wandering about this neighbourhood. One evening a horseman approached one of our posts and was promptly halted. He was challenged. He argued in his Australian twang that he was friendly, but the officer was adamant and ordered him to advance for further investigation, to which he replied, “Do I look like a ---- spy with these 400 ---- camels?” and lo! from the darkness in front loomed a silent column of camels which had lost their way when returning from the dump and had not used the recognised gap in the line further to our right flank.

During this week every one wrote letters as it was a doubtful thing when the post would next be sent, once the advance had commenced. Every one rested and no movement by day was encouraged. Such relaxation came as a welcome change after the weeks of hard gruelling, and, to quote the words of our Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby, on the occasion of his admission to the Freedom of the City of London, when he referred to the 60th Division:--

“Before it attacked Beersheba it was exercising so hard to keep fit that the G.O.C. ordered his men to eat and drink more and not work so hard.”

Not only for purposes of rest, however, was this stay made at Bir Esani. We had left our old line with its water supply many miles away, and it was necessary for the R.E.’s to develop and exploit wells that existed at Abu Ghalyun under the cover of the mounted patrols out to our front.

Our own part of the line was held by “C” and “D” Companies, with “A” and “B” in support. Fortunately the Turk did not trouble us, although a short distance further north a skirmish took place between the 74th Division and the Turk near the Karm-Beersheba road. The enemy was driven off with loss and gave no further trouble. On Sunday evening, the 28th of October, the march was resumed as far as Abu Ghalyun, which lay some seven or eight miles south-west of the Beersheba defences. The march was only a matter of a few miles and was along the level though stony bed of the Wadi Imalaga. The Battalion halted but bivouacs were not erected, and the very minimum of movement was made. It was a glorious day, and final preparations for the attack were made; aeroplane maps were studied and final orders were issued. The Commanding Officer told the Company Commanders, and through the usual channels the real facts of the case were put before the private soldier. Arrangements for transport and water were made, but the great event was the issue of a small bottle of tea and rum to each man. Rum was not a regular issue in this hot climate, but by this time (October) the nights were becoming colder and the light kit worn by the men required something more than keenness to get at the Turk to cheer the dawn, hence the rum and tea. No sign of the enemy was seen this day except two Turkish aeroplanes flying at a great height over the concentration of troops from Karm to Abu Ghalyun, but British air scouts were soon after them and by great skill drove them down. Later, when the plates in their cameras were developed at Cairo, a complete set of photographs showing the concentration of troops was obtained. Had these planes succeeded in reaching their lines our reception at Beersheba might have been even warmer.

On the evening of the 30th, before leaving Abu Ghalyun, the Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Bisdee addressed the Battalion and in a few words told us what he expected of us. The result was never in doubt, and the regiment rose as one man and cheered him. It is safe to say that at no time previously was the morale of the Battalion so high, and the morrow augured badly for “Jacko,” as the Turk was called. It was our first time “over the top,” as a Battalion, and every man from the Colonel down to the latest-joined private determined to prove that the 2nd Battalion of the Civil Service Rifles was worthy in every way to uphold the traditions of the Regiment, which had been so gloriously upheld in France by the 1st Battalion. The 60th Division had had a great deal of hard work and a rough time with no prospect of glory, but that night it was to start a career of much glory equal to that of any Division in the War.

The first stage of the march towards Beersheba that night was as far as Wadi Mirtaba, where the R.E.’s had developed an efficient water supply a little more than two miles from the Turkish positions. Here the whole of the wheel transport was parked under the cover of the steep banks of the wadi, and the infantry shed their packs and resumed the march in fighting kit. From this point we were only accompanied by camels carrying ammunition and medical and signal stores. A section of the Machine Gun Corps was attached to the Battalion here, for the actual attack.

From this point the Khalasa Road ran direct to Beersheba and formed a splendid guiding line through the wadis and hills on either side. From aeroplane maps sketches of the wadis had been reproduced, and each wadi had been allotted a familiar name; the local Arabic names were far too difficult to memorise. Such names as Service, Scottish, Kensington, Westminster, St. Pancras and Blackheath were given; while each Battalion had named the wadis in their own particular sector by popular names; some of our nicknames were Strand, Dorking, Watford, Walden and Ware Wadis.

About 3,000 yards from the Wadi Mirtaba the Khalasa Road was joined by the Wadi Halgon, and from this point right up to the Turkish trenches they intertwined so much that one could hardly tell whether one was walking on the road or in the wadi; from this fact the quality of the “road” can be best judged.

At night-time the Turks sent out patrols to the hills in advance of the trenches, and from these patrols resistance soon came in the shape of rifle fire, and after sharp skirmishes they were driven back to their lines. The only casualty on our side was a camel belonging to “C” Company. Later machine-gun fire down the road became heavy and the Companies soon got off the road into their prearranged wadis, where protection was good. It might be mentioned here that the wadis in this part were not deep ravines some sixty feet deep, like the Wadis Ghuzze, Imalaga and Mirtaba, which we had passed, but were simply small valleys between the hills, where a dried water-course was termed a “wadi” after the larger variety further south.

The advanced guard was carried out by “D” Company, with orders to reach Poplar Wadi, about 500 yards from the enemy trenches, and to form a defensive line on the ridges on the further side of the Wadi; this was carried out without loss, and strong forward positions were taken up in advance of Poplar Wadi on both sides of the Khalasa Road. Patrols went forward nearly to the enemy lines and were able to ascertain that there were no wire entanglements in front of the enemy position. This information was invaluable to the artillery, as many rounds of ammunition were saved, instead of bombarding imaginary wire. From aeroplane map photographs, definite lines of white spots could be detected in front of the line of trenches, but that night it was proved that they were merely white stones cunningly arranged by the Turk. Throughout the night Turkish machine-gun fire was intermittent and spattered the whole front with bullets. When dawn broke, any advance up the Wadi Halgon was impossible, as it was raked by the fire of two machine guns. Runners kept clear of the road and made their way to the forward companies by rushing over each ridge into the wadi in front. One runner, however, unaware of the dangers of the Wadi Halgon, calmly strolled along in the early morning and of course, drew violent fire both from machine guns and rifles on to his tracks, and after a certain amount of dancing about he fell down. Every one thought he had been hit, but Captain Wills, regardless of his personal safety, dashed from the cover of the Wadi and ran out to the man. This again was the cause of a further hail of bullets, and Wills fell down near the man. Thinking that both of them were dead the Turks ceased fire, but a moment or two later Captain Wills got up and made a successful dash for safety in the wadi, and although the Turks reopened their fire they did not hit Wills, who was no worse for his adventures. The man, inspired by Wills, got up a few minutes later, and also made a dash for our wadi, through a hail of bullets. Now comes the amusing side of the incident. The breathless runner handed us a note, and when it was opened the following words were exposed: “What time shall the platoon drink its rum and tea? ----, Lieutenant, Officer Commanding ---- Platoon, ‘C’ Company.” Needless to say no reply was sent to this request.

So much for the events of the night and early morning in the Wadi Halgon.

In the general scheme it was arranged that the 181st Brigade on the left of the 179th Brigade, should attack and capture the strongly fortified hill known as “Hill 1,070,” which towered up in advance of the general line of the Beersheba defences. Not until this hill was captured was the main attack to be made.

As soon after dawn as light permitted, the operation of wire-cutting on the enemy’s advanced works on Hill 1,070 was commenced by the Artillery and was continued, with short checks owing to dust clouds, until 8.30 a.m., when the 181st Brigade moved to the attack, which was undertaken by the 2/22nd and 2/24th Battalions, London Regiment, under cover of an intense barrage and overhead machine-gun fire.

At 8.42 a.m. the positions were entered and captured, the Artillery lifting on to the reverse slopes.

During this phase the 179th Brigade, led by the 2/14th and 2/15th Battalions were gradually moving forward for the attack on the main positions in conjunction with the 181st Brigade. At 10 a.m. the latter had reorganised and were reported ready for the next phase, which was preceded by wire-cutting on the part of the Artillery. This having been completed by 11 a.m., orders were received from the 20th Corps for the assault to take place in conjunction with the 74th Division on the left at 12.15 p.m. By 12.45 p.m. the whole of the enemy main positions were in our hands, and our left artillery group were left free to assist the attack of the 74th Division, who were slightly checked on our left.

While the operations against Hill 1,070 were proceeding the Battalion formed up under cover for their attack; and orders had been previously issued to “D” Company in the advanced positions that should the Turk leave his trenches on our direct front, as the result of the attack on Hill 1,070, he was to be pursued with fire. Odd men had been seen to retire, and the message came through that the Turks were retiring, and “D” Company lined their ridge and poured fire into the enemy trenches. However, the message of the Turks’ retirement which came from a rear observation post was not quite correct, and was far too sanguine. The retirement was not so wholesale as had been anticipated, and the Turk returned strong retaliatory fire. “D” Company stuck to their positions, and although suffering heavy casualties, continued to fire at the Turks in the trenches. While this battle of cross fire was proceeding, orders for the general advance were given, and, under the covering fire of the advanced company, the attacking Companies “B” and “C,” with “A” Company in immediate support, rushed the enemy’s line. In spite of heavy opposition no one hesitated, and the attackers assaulted and captured the trenches, killing the occupants and pursuing with fire those who had retired. The Turks fired until the very last moment, and when our fellows were within bayoneting distance held up their hands and cried “Kamerad” or “Arab.” They were poorly clad, and apparently the sprinkling of German N.C.O.’s had kept up their morale until the sight of our bayonets. By 12.45 p.m. the position was in our hands, and a line some 800 yards beyond the trenches was immediately consolidated. Patrols pushed forward, but little was seen of the Turk; only small groups could be seen in the distance running away as fast as their legs could take them.

In clearing the trenches to our right flank, Private E. J. Cook, “C” Company, the last unwounded member of his Lewis gun team, greatly distinguished himself. Crawling out of the trench he engaged a German-manned machine gun point-blank, and although the Lewis gun was hit and he was twice severely wounded, he continued to serve his gun until the enemy gun was knocked out, whereupon it was promptly captured by a bombing party.

The cavalry who had worked around the flank from the east of Beersheba occupied the town that evening, and the Reserve Battalions of the 60th Division were sent forward to cover our front.

The conclusion of the day’s planned operations was marked by the concentration of the attacking Brigades in the captured positions, with outposts pushed out on the high ground overlooking Beersheba. The 2/13th (Kensingtons) which had been detailed for this duty in our Brigade succeeded in capturing two 77mm. guns which had been causing us casualties earlier in the day.

To return to the actual attack by the Civil Service Rifles, the whole operation had been a great success, and in spite of considerable casualties the losses could not be considered too heavy. “D” Company, the advanced Company, had suffered most while giving support to the attacking Companies. “C” Company had the next highest total, as it was their misfortune to advance over the machine-gun swept valley of the Wadi Halgon. The casualties in “B” Company were much lighter, as they were able to use the cover of the small branch nullahs in their advance. “A” Company had very few casualties, but this does not reflect that they did not do their share; it was their fortune. The whole Battalion had at last been able to display its fighting qualities in a real attack. The Battalion’s captures included three officers and over 50 men, while more than sixty dead Turks were buried by us afterwards in their old trenches.

An amusing incident of the final scene of the attack was when the stentorian voice of one of the sergeants of “C” Company was heard during the lull in the rifle fire, shouting, “All officers and sergeants”--an order which had palled on our ears at the close of the numerous practice attacks during our training on the desert.

The evening was quiet enough and the Battalion was not worried by Turkish artillery fire, and it was only an hour after the success of the attack was known, when the Battalion transport under Lieutenant Pearson and the water camels under Lieutenant Gearing arrived from their hiding-place in the Wadi Mirtaba, where we had left them the previous evening. Souvenir-hunting in the Turkish lines was our evening pastime; but not until search parties had found and collected all the killed and wounded and every man was accounted for.

The night was cold, but men availed themselves of the protection of the trenches, and some of the more fortunate succeeded in obtaining captured tents and bivouac sheets; but these were unpleasant dwellings and smelt horribly. With the dead Turks lying around, the whole place was no health resort. The Turk was a filthy fellow, as his trenches showed, and the whole area was infested with flies. The next day the dead Turks were collected and buried in their trenches. The British guns had fired with great accuracy into the trenches, and in one instance had knocked out a machine gun and its team of eight men.

On the 1st of November the infantry were employed in clearing the battlefield while the 519 Field Company, R.E., entered the town of Beersheba soon after dawn for the purpose of water development.

The captures by the 60th Division included two 77 mm. guns, many machine guns, 15 officers and 193 other ranks unwounded, and 5 officers and 85 other ranks wounded.

On the morning of the 3rd of November the Battalion moved to the valley on the south-eastern outskirts of the town. The whole valley was crowded with British troops and transport. Beersheba as a town appeared to be of little value, but its importance as a stronghold on the flank of the Turkish line was considerable. Water was obtained from the wells which had been quickly repaired by the R.E.; the Turk having blown up the winding gear before he left. In the town, prisoner of war compounds were established, while a still larger compound for the natives and Arabs of the surrounding district was made in the valley outside the town.

The soil of the valley where there is some moisture is exceedingly rich and is rudely cultivated by the natives, and in the tracks around Beersheba the Bedouin find ample pasturage for their flocks and herds which in the evening assemble around the wells as they did 3,000 years ago. The desert of Beersheba is very beautiful in spring and early summer when the surface is carpeted with herbage and flowers; but later in the year it is parched and desolate in the extreme, not a tree breaking the monotony of the landscape or the rays of the sun. It was in the latter state when we arrived.

On the evening of the 3rd of November the Battalion moved again to Bargut, some two miles or more north of the town of Beersheba, but were not privileged to pass through the town; passing it on its western outskirts. At Bargut a bivouac camp was erected, and the Quartermaster’s Stores and transport sections moved with us. Officers were allowed the benefit of their valises which had been reduced to 25 lb. in weight, and blankets were issued to the men.

Meals were soon prepared, and a day of complete rest away from the filth of the Turkish trenches was thoroughly enjoyed by all.

At this time it had become apparent to the Higher Command that the enemy had been able to anticipate our threat of enveloping his left flank, by a concentration of his reserves on the high ground in the neighbourhood of Khuweilfeh. The Corps Commander therefore decided to throw our whole weight upon the centre of the Turkish defences represented by the Kauwukah system and a series of works extending some 5,000 yards to the east, and at the same time occupying the enemy’s left flank by the employment of the 53rd Division and mounted troops at Khuweilfeh.

Accordingly the 60th Division moved over in the direction of Kauwukah on the 4th of November, the Battalion moving to Wadi Welfare, a distance of 7 or 8 miles as the crow flies. This was a most trying march over sandy desert and the sand was not of that “golden” type which one associates with the east when reading books, but was of a dirty black variety, and our memories went back to that first dusty march from Belah to Abu Sitta some months previously. Every one was covered with black dust, and eyes and nostrils became unbearable. Water was limited and the day’s supply had not been received before starting. The water camels had returned to Beersheba, but here the supply was insufficient, and they were re-directed to Abu Irgeig, which was about 7 miles in the direction of Gaza, and in quite a different direction to that taken by the Brigade.

The ground over which we travelled was extremely hilly, and the Battalion constantly descended into deep wadis and ascended over the steep ridges for practically the whole of the last four miles. It was getting dark, and the difficulties were tremendous, and credit is due to those responsible that the various battalions of the Division ever found their allotted areas, most of which were in the beds of deep wadis. The Battalion halted about 10.0 p.m., and an outpost line covering the Divisional front was taken up by the 181st Brigade. No water, however, was obtainable. All we knew was that the camels had gone back as far as Beersheba, and knowing the difficulties of the march that we had encountered, the possibility of the camels arriving that night appeared remote. However, shortly after midnight a small voice was heard on the surrounding heights, “Who is down there?” “2/15th,” we shouted. “Thank God,” uttered the small voice, “How the devil do you get down there?” No one could say how we had got down into this basin-like dip, in the darkness it appeared to be surrounded by steep cliffs. The small voice was heard no more, but an hour afterwards the swishing of the water in the “Fanatis” was heard approaching along a branch wadi, and Lieutenant Gearing appeared, followed by his convoy of water camels and their weary leaders. How this officer performed the journey that night from Bargut to Beersheba and thence to Abu Irgeig--where water was drawn--and eventually across the wilderness to the Battalion, which was concealed in one of the many holes in the ground, is beyond imagination. The water camels, with their officer and his Company guides had dragged over a distance of at least 15 miles in the dark. Even Gearing himself cannot explain; in fact, he never attempted, and “Sparrow,” as our tiny water officer was called, simply grinned and felt pleased. There were heroes in the battle of Beersheba, but no one was so deservedly popular as Gearing that night. He had done great things through sheer grit, where thousands would have failed (and not without reason). Great was the relief on the arrival of the water camels, and then our minds turned to the transport and Quartermaster’s stores with its precious rations which had not yet arrived. However, ere long the voice of Lieutenant Pearson (not a small one this time) was heard, and we knew that the “gods” were with us. The route taken by the Battalion had been impossible for wheeled transport, and it had been diverted some four miles back on to a different track. Even this second route was extremely difficult, but the transport section “stuck to their guns,” and after a somewhat lengthy and tedious journey had struck the Battalion. It was simply a matter of “striking,” too. Maps were indistinct, and in the darkness every wadi is a replica of its neighbour; signposts were badly needed in these parts. However, daylight came, and this put a better complexion on the state of affairs.

Officers were called to Headquarters and given details of our next attack which was to be against the centre of the Turkish line in Palestine, at a place called Kauwukah. The rest of the day was spent in reconnaissance of the ground. Landmarks were few, but all hoped for the best, and compass bearings were taken. Final preparations were made in the evening and rations were issued. Water again presented a difficulty, as the wells at Abu Irgeig had run dry, but it was hoped that the R.E. would open up a new source during the night.