CHAPTER XX

THE RETREAT

Although a big German offensive had been expected for some weeks, and elaborate preparations to meet it had been made during the winter months, there were few signs of the eve of a big battle when the Civil Service Rifles, after a two hours’ train journey from Etricourt, arrived at Winchester Valley late in the evening of the 19th of March, and relieved the 1st Berkshire Regiment (2nd Division) in Lincoln Reserve, the support line on Beaucamp Ridge, near Villers Plouich. The Poplar and Stepneys and London Irish were in the front line, and the 20th of March passed off very quietly.

It was thought that the Brigade was in for another spell of peaceful trench warfare, similar to those experienced before the short and pleasant stay at Manancourt. The rumours of the coming battle, which had been so strong during the winter months, had, in fact, begun to die down. The optimistic went so far as to think that the enemy attack would not take place, whilst the “quietly confident,” thinking of the days of strenuous digging on those wide trenches behind the Hindenburg Line--the “Tank traps”--with the miles of barbed wire obstacles which had been erected all around, felt that, even if the enemy did launch a big attack, he would not get beyond the Hindenburg Line. Not even the most pessimistic had imagined the great crisis through which the Allied armies were to pass before another month was over. Nor was there any indication in the daily routine that the authorities were anticipating such a titanic struggle in the near future. Leave, regarded by the soldier as the most reliable “Military Barometer,” was still being granted, and the allotment was indeed very much better than at any other time during the war. Men were actually going home on leave within six months of their last arrival in France, and in such circumstances how could one take any but the rosiest view of the future? The German attack, if it came off at all, would probably be a repetition of Bourlon Wood, and after that both sides would settle down to another long spell of trench warfare. It was folly to talk, as the newspapers were doing, of a decisive battle.

When day broke on the 21st of March, however, it was clear that there had been some truth in the “big battle” rumours, for the first day of spring was heralded by such an intense enemy bombardment that there was no longer any doubt that the Bosche was making a supreme effort, beside which all his previous attacks faded into insignificance.

The difficulty at first was to find out where the attack was being pushed home, for in spite of the bombardment, which lasted from 4.30 a.m. until 11.0 a.m., there was no infantry engagement on the 21st of March on the 140th Brigade front. It was fortunate, too, that this was so, for the gas shells fell so freely all around that box respirators had to be worn continuously for six and a half hours.

There have been many attempts to write the story of the great retreat and, generally speaking, the experience of one battalion was much the same as that of any other. But it is well-nigh impossible to describe in detail the career of any unit throughout the most strenuous days of the fighting--the 21st to the 26th of March. During these days battalions often became split up into several parties engaged in different small fights, where none knew how the battle fared with their comrades in other parts of the field. The war correspondents, it is true, saw the Allied troops fighting every inch of ground, and killing thousands of Germans as they fell back, but it was difficult indeed for those engaged in the fighting to ascertain what the situation was, and a total lack of information was one of the outstanding features of the retreat. It was only when they ultimately got back into reserve, some days after, that the troops were able to learn from the newspapers that the Germans had been badly beaten all along the line. “Still,” thought the British Tommy, who had marched in six days across country covered by two ordnance maps, “I don’t altogether like this new style of winning the war.”

The story of the Civil Service Rifles during these critical days of their career in France is told briefly in the official War Diary, which contains just a simple record of their movements without any comment.

In that record it is told how the Battalion, which was in support in Lincoln Reserve on the morning of the 21st, became at night the front line battalion, the 17th and 18th Battalions having been withdrawn. The second day of the battle was quiet on the Civil Service Rifles’ front, and the Battalion remained undisturbed in Lincoln Reserve until the early hours of the 23rd, when, orders having been received to withdraw, a position was taken up on the Dessart Ridge Switch, on the right of the Metz-Fins Road. The line was complete by dawn, the dispositions being “A” Company on the left, with their left flank on the road and their right in touch with “B,” with “C” and “D” on the right of “B”: Battalion Headquarters was established in a bank about half a mile behind. “A” was afterwards, owing to congestion, withdrawn to a position slightly in rear of the two companies.

The 23rd of March was the most critical day in the career of the Civil Service Rifles in France. The official narrative disposes of it in less than a page, but a whole book could be written on the many situations which arose on that day, and the many acts of heroism, determination and devotion to duty performed by different members of the Battalion.

The story of the fighting can be followed more or less from the map on the opposite page.

Immediately the position on Dessart Ridge Switch was taken up, i.e., about 5.0 a.m., “D” Company on the right became engaged with the enemy, who attempted to rush in from the right flank, which was unprotected, and by 7.0 a.m. the Battalion was engaging the enemy all along the line. At 8.0 a.m. the enemy made a determined bombing attack on the right of “D” Company, and established machine gun posts which enfiladed the position. Shortly afterwards large numbers of troops were seen to be retiring, apparently from the position known as Metz Switch. Colonel Segrave went over and rallied these, and took them forward with his Headquarters Company to the ridge between Metz and Dessart Wood (east of the Metz-Fins Road), and took up a position facing east, and at right angles to the Dessart Switch line. This was done to form a rallying line for retiring troops and a defensive flank to Dessart Ridge Switch.

After shelling the whole area for an hour or two more, the enemy gained a little more ground and established further machine-gun posts, this time towards the left, south and south-east of Metz. Shortly after noon, troops on the left retired, leaving the left flank of the Civil Service Rifles exposed, and the Battalion now held an isolated position with the enemy working his way round both flanks. The Headquarters Company was accordingly withdrawn to the Vallulart Wood Line, and the remaining Companies, in the Dessart Switch Line facing South, continued the fight in the same position, forming a flank to what had been the third British system of defensive positions, now occupied by some Civil Service Rifles and other troops.

This third system and the Dessart Switch Line were abandoned at about 4.0 p.m., but “D” Company on the right had by this time been surrounded and was never extricated. The cause of this disaster was the fact that the Company’s right flank was completely “in the air” from the time it reached the position. Indeed, this may be said of every position the Battalion took up during the day. There was not at any time any support on the right flank, the troops of the 9th Division (5th Army) having already departed before the fighting began. Many explanations of these repeated withdrawals have since been made, both in after-dinner speeches and in statements to the Press. At least one book has been written on the subject. There was, and apparently still is, considerable difference of opinion as to the justification for the action of the troops of the 5th Army. This story is not concerned with the controversy. The statement is made simply to illustrate how the Civil Service Rifles, on the right of the 47th Division, felt the full effect of the rapid withdrawal of the troops on their right.

The movements of the various parts of the Battalion after 4.0 p.m. on the 23rd are not even now very clear. Battalion Headquarters (less Headquarters Company) left the third system at 4.0 p.m. and moved to Rocquigny, when Colonel Segrave collected a party of about fifty and put them in position along a ridge north of Four Winds Farm, about a mile and a half south-west of Ytres, where they remained until the enemy drove them out at dusk.

At this point the official narrative breaks down with the remark: “By this time the remnants of the Civil Service Rifles were split up into so many parties, whose movements are too complicated to follow.” The survivors from those small parties, remembering their night of wandering in the dark over rough and strange country, and their inexplicable reunion at dawn, will bear out the truth of the last sentence.

By 9.0 a.m. on the twenty-fourth, the Battalion had been reduced to a mere handful of troops, who were worn out by their twenty-four hours’ continuous fighting. The fate of the majority of the absentees was only too well known, but there were a good many missing whose fate was uncertain. The survivors, however, gallantly stuck to their task, and, numbering about 150, they took up a position under Colonel Segrave, just east of the Bapaume-Peronne road, and about a mile south-east of Le Transloy. Here they remained in support of a party of the 1st Surrey Rifles holding the higher ground to the east, until at noon they had to move back another two miles almost due west, and a position was taken up about half a mile south of Le Transloy and just off the western side of the Le Transloy-Combles road. This position was only held for three hours, when the party, now acting as a rearguard, moved round the western side of Le Transloy to a line north-east of Gueudecourt, whence they were withdrawn at 5.30 p.m. by order of the Brigade Commander through Gueudecourt and Flers to Martinpuich.

It was still light when Martinpuich was reached, and there were a few of the 150 or so survivors to whom the sight of the ruins of Eaucourt L’Abbé and the Flers Line recalled their grim struggle of October 1916. It was by no means a happy coincidence that brought the Civil Service Rifles back to this battlefield, where, eighteen months previously, they had paid such a price for the capture of High Wood. On their previous visit to this area they had been filled with confidence and the offensive spirit. They had felt they were really doing something towards winning the war. To retreat across the same country now made it seem as though all the labours of the past eighteen months had been wasted--the lives lost in vain. It had been better if this battlefield had not been reached until darkness had fallen, and perhaps spared those men the bitter reflections on the autumn of 1916 and all they had gone through since.

There was little time, however, for reminiscences, for only a very short stay was made in Martinpuich, and 10.0 p.m. found the Battalion reforming at Bazentin-le-Petit, where further officers and other ranks rejoining brought the strength up to about 230 all ranks. An outpost position was then taken up along the eastern edge of Bazentin-le-Petit and occupied until 10.0 a.m. on the 25th, when a withdrawal was made to Contalmaison Ridge, where the Battalion remained until 3.0 a.m. on the 26th.

After the rapid changes of position during the past two days it had seemed quite a long stay on Contalmaison Ridge, but the troops were not destined to settle there, and the next move was to Bouzincourt. The fighting had now ceased for the time being, so far, at least, as the Civil Service Rifles were concerned, but there was still no rest to be had, and it was not until after a five hours’ march via Contalmaison, La Boiselle and thence across country to Aveluy and Bouzincourt, that billets were reached. The Battalion was now supposed to be resting, but after eight hours in Bouzincourt, the men were on the march again, and at 4.0 p.m. on the 26th they trudged along to billets at Louvencourt, where the night was spent.

At 9.0 a.m. on the 27th the march was resumed and after a rest for an hour or two at Clairfaye Farm, a move was made to billets at Toutencourt, where a halt was made for quite twelve hours!

During these marches the Battalion had been in reserve, but now it began to move back to the front line, but before relieving the 6th Buffs (12th Division) in Aveluy Wood on the night of the 29th, a very welcome twenty-four hours’ rest had been enjoyed in billets at Warloy.

While the fighting portion of the Battalion had been having such a strenuous time in the retreat, the Administrative portion had also had plenty of excitement, and the men of the transport section and Quartermaster’s staff had frequently had to think about knocking the ashes out of their rifles and sharpening their bayonets during days when they were often in touch with the enemy. For a time they had to carry on as a separate unit, and the story of their travels is told in the following narrative contributed by Transport-Sergeant G. M. Sladden, to whom much credit is due for the withdrawal of the Regimental transport without the loss of a man or a horse.

“The period of the ‘Great Retreat’ was an arduous one for the Battalion Transport, entailing conditions vastly different from the ordered routine incidental to trench warfare. Their lines were stationed on the 21st March in a field on the Metz-Fins road, the Quartermaster’s stores being then in Metz, where the Battalion had been billeted prior to relieving the 2nd Division in the line. The stores were filled with an unusually heavy stock of material, including the blankets of the Battalion, the officers’ valises and the men’s packs. In fact, mobile conditions did not exist at this time.

“Early on the morning of the 22nd the hostile attack developed on our part of the front, and it rapidly became apparent that the attack was making headway, though hitherto no news had been heard of the great German success on the previous day further south. To the right was seen an aerial attack in great force on the 9th Division, of which some details soon began to pass in retreat by the transport lines. The officers’ mess cart, which had gone early to Nurlu canteen, returned to report the canteen shelled out and Nurlu deserted. Soon orders arrived that the Battalion was to retire after nightfall to the Dessart Switch line, and the Transport to withdraw to Bus. Accordingly, all wagons not required to take up rations and move the Battalion that night were sent off at once with loads to Bus, and orders to return for a second load as soon as possible. Blankets were sent first, valises were left for the second journey: but the congested state of the roads and the rapidity of the enemy advance upset all calculations. The A.S.C. wagons, which were to have cleared the Quartermaster stores, were prevented by the road controls from returning to Metz. Consequently, there are certain officers who cherish regretful memories of persistent but futile efforts to induce a harsh War Office to compensate them for the loss of valuable but non-regulation articles of kit. Some of the limbered wagons--luckier or perhaps swifter than the A.S.C. motors--got back to the Transport lines late that night and picked up second loads. They were none too soon, for as they finished loading they were fired upon by machine guns from a patrol which had reached the ridge overlooking the lines from a few hundred yards away. The wagons, luckily, were standing in a sunken road and down this they were able to escape without casualty. Meanwhile, the ration wagons had gone up to the line, where they found the front line now withdrawn to the support line and preparing to evacuate the position. Ammunition dumps--notably the great dump at Trescault--were being blown up all round: indications of a big retreat abounded. Having delivered rations, the column waited to pick up Lewis guns and other equipment, and to take them back to the new position. Gradually the guns came down until all but one had arrived; the Battalion was clear and platoons of other Battalions continued to file by--still no Lewis gun. Yet orders were definite, to wait till all the guns had come. But when the last platoon of the last Battalion had passed, it seemed certain that the missing gun must have gone some other way. The boy who stood on the burning deck was doubtless noble but certainly idiotic: moreover, it seemed possible that the fifteen guns on the wagons _might_ be wanted. So orders were stoutly disobeyed and away went the wagons. They had been warned not to go back by the route by which they had come up, which had been reported occupied by the enemy; so in the blackness of a pitch-dark night, over unreconnoitred ground, they made a bee-line for the road between Metz and Trescault.

“Over hill, over dale, Through bush, through briar, Over park, over pale, Through trench, through wire--”

and hit it at last, though once nearly ingulfed in a bog. And so up the Fins road to the appointed place, where everything was safely handed over. The next stage was to the Transport lines, where the trekking loads of the wagons were waiting to be picked up; but, at a short distance from the lines, bullets coming from that direction made it appear probable that the enemy was in possession, and this was confirmed by the Battalion Intelligence Officer who happened to meet the column at this juncture. Nothing for it then but to get away and join up with the rest of the Transport at Bus.

“At Bus the whole of the Brigade Transport was standing by waiting orders to move; so the tired horses could not even be unharnessed. There was, however, opportunity to water and feed both for horse and man before a move was made, which was not actually until midday. The line of march was by Le Mesnil and Saillisel to Le Transloy, over by roads much cut up. At one point the column had to pass over a quaking bog, of which the thin crust had to be continually reinforced, after the passage at the gallop of each vehicle, with fascines, bits of plank, and anything that came handy. The prevailing fine weather was a god send; without it the column could not have passed this spot. Night had fallen before the column pulled off the road on to a shell-riddled stretch of the old Somme battlefield where wagons and horses could only stand higgledy-piggledy wherever a spot without a shell-hole could be found. Here the A.S.C. supply wagons were waiting, and at once rations were loaded on the limbers and sent off to find the Battalion. This was successfully done, and meanwhile the remaining horses and men were able to snatch a little sleep, though standing by to move at ten minutes’ notice. Orders were hourly expected, for the front line was falling back fast, and shortly before midnight part of it--in the shape of ‘A’ Company, which had lost touch--drifted into the lines in search of the rest of the Battalion. After they had pushed forward again to take up a defensive position it was found that other units of the Brigade Transport had moved off. Assuming that orders had miscarried (as afterwards was found to be the case), and knowing that if the column was to get away at all, it must be before dawn, a move was made without orders. It was found afterwards that the rest of the Brigade marched via Les Boeufs, where they had some casualties through shell fire; so the choice of route of the 15th via Saillisel and Combles was a lucky one, for the column was unmolested on this road except by a little heavy shrapnel that did no harm. Some trouble was caused at Saillisel, where, just as dawn began to break, and with the enemy on a ridge only a short distance away, the road was found to be blocked by part of an ammunition column. After some difficulty they were passed--another stroke of luck, for it was heard afterwards that this column failed to get away. Combles, too, was found to contain the Divisional Ordnance Depot, where all stores were being destroyed. A few men were able as they passed to snatch articles of kit that they had lost: the Battalion saddler still mourns over his failure to ‘scrounge’ a complete saddler’s outfit. He found it too heavy to catch the last wagon and stow it there.

“It took a weary while to reach Bazentin Le Petit that day, for after Ginchy the road was congested with an enormous mass of traffic. However, it was done, and horses and men, utterly weary hoped for a little rest there. But it seemed that the march would never end, for orders came for the retreat to continue; and at dusk all (except enough cookers and ration wagons to supply the Battalion with food that night) moved off via Albert to a new halting ground. During the afternoon a slight diversion had been caused by several enemy aeroplanes that came over and dropped a few bombs intended for the Brigade Transport; it was, however, a very timid raid of the tip-and-run variety and did no harm. Of a very different kind was the relay raid that the column passing through Albert that night experienced. From dark to light a succession of machines dropped bombs up and down the main street of Albert and the main roads approaching the town. The street was full of moving traffic, and things were made much worse by many motor transport drivers leaving their lorries standing and taking cover in houses. It seemed at one time as if the column of the 140th Brigade would be utterly unable to go forward; but the acting Transport Officer and Quartermaster, Lieutenant A. L. Mills, did excellent work in sorting out the disorganised mass of vehicles ahead, and the Brigade column finally got through with far fewer casualties than might have been expected, and of these the 15th incurred none. Meanwhile the ration column had set out with an escort of armoured cars to meet the Battalion at Bazentin Le Grand. The Battalion was, for the moment, not holding a position, and it was possible to give every man the good, hot meal of which he stood in need. The escort proved unnecessary, and as it was growing light when Albert was passed on the return journey, the ration column escaped the bombing that the others had undergone. But the bodies and the wreckage showed them how much Albert had suffered that night. They rejoined the rest of the transport in the small hours of the morning of the 25th, but within four hours the whole column was on the move again to just outside Millencourt. Here was another short halt, during which the 15th acquired two ‘buckshee’ horses--one of them an excellent animal, who served them well until he was killed six months later, the other blind and vicious: it was easy to guess how he came to be roving free--and he was soon given his freedom back again. Tired though every man and beast was, it was necessary to move again that afternoon, because the unit was said to be on the wrong side of road. They were sent to a pitch which was also useless because too soft for wagon or horse lines--involving another move, unauthorised this time. Rations went up as soon as the third move had been carried out, and after a long wait at the rendezvous were sent back to the lines, for the Battalion was at last coming out of the line. The ration column got back to the lines just in time to move with the rest of the Transport to Bouzincourt, where the relieved Battalion was met early on the morning of the 26th. From which time for a while the history of the movements of the Transport merges again with that of the Battalion as a whole.

* * * * *

A second phase of the fighting opened when the Battalion moved to Aveluy Wood on the night of the 29th of March.

There had been no time for a proper re-organisation, and the troops had not yet recovered from their exertions during the retreat. The casualties since the morning of the 21st of March numbered no less than 350 (all ranks) and as no reinforcements had joined, it was as well that the second phase opened quietly.

One and a half companies occupied an outpost position in Aveluy Wood, and the remainder of the Battalion was in a ravine 800 yards south of Martinsart. The 22nd Battalion was on the left, with a gap of 400 yards between the two units. For three days this position was held, and except for hostile shelling there was little enemy activity, the casualties for the three days numbering little more than a dozen. The 20th Battalion on the night of the 1st of April, relieved the Civil Service Rifles, who moved into billets in Senlis, and after two days’ rest and a more than welcome bath, the Battalion, now somewhat reorganised, returned to the front line and relieved the 1st Surrey Rifles on the night of the 4th of April. “A” Company held the right, “C” the centre, and a company of the 1st Surrey Rifles, who were attached, held the left. “B” and “D” Companies were in support and Battalion Headquarters was in Bouzincourt. The 9th Royal Fusiliers (12th Division) were on the right of the Civil Service Rifles and the 142nd Brigade on the left.

The few reinforcements who had joined included Major L. L. Pargiter, of the Middlesex Regiment, who came to the Battalion on the 4th of April as second in command.

Such were the dispositions when the battle for Aveluy Wood opened on the morning of the 5th of April.

As usual, the enemy opened with a heavy bombardment on the front line, support trenches, and Bouzincourt, gas shells being freely mixed with the heavier missiles. The bombardment began at 7.0 a.m. and except for three short intervals of about half an hour each, it continued until 4.30 p.m. Throughout the afternoon the bombardment of Bouzincourt was particularly intense. The enemy was excellently supported by his machine guns, which were active all day on the front line and support trenches with both direct and indirect fire.

When the bombardment began the enemy could be seen along the crest opposite the front line in twos and threes (total about 150). These small groups were dispersed by rifle fire, but at about 10.0 a.m. small groups again began to dribble forward over the crest, and these advanced in spite of Lewis gun and rifle fire, by using the cover afforded by huts and sheds, until they reached the trees and broken ground on the outskirts of Aveluy Wood. It is estimated that roughly 300 of the enemy with light machine guns pushed forward in this way. The front line held by the Civil Service Rifles was by this time enfiladed with machine-gun fire and minenwerfers, and under cover of this fire the parties in the broken ground crept forward to within 100 yards of the British front line. These parties showed up several times as if about to rush the position, but whenever they appeared, Lewis gun and rifle fire kept them back, and the intended assault was not delivered.

In the afternoon the enemy was seen to be digging in on the crest from which he had doubled forward earlier in the day, and by 6.0 p.m. this ground was effectually swept by artillery fire, with the result that no further signs of an advance were seen at that point.

By nightfall the enemy appeared to give up the attempt, at all events for that day, and the situation became considerably quieter. “D” Company now relieved the attached Company of the 1st Surrey Rifles in the front line, and this latter Company moved into support. The casualties in the Civil Service Rifles numbered fifty (all ranks), including Colonel Segrave, who was slightly gassed, and who was sent to the transport lines for a well-earned rest, Major Pargiter taking command of the Battalion.

The 6th of April was a day of alarms, but although small parties of the enemy were detected in the early morning moving forward under cover of the mist, there was no real infantry engagement. The snipers were busy on both sides and those of the Civil Service Rifles got many targets, and one of the enemy was captured after being wounded.

Intermittent bombardments were the feature of the day, but the battle died down for good after 10.0 p.m. with the Germans really well held, and with this night came to an end the fighting in the great Retreat on this front, and the Bosche thereafter did not gain any ground at all.

After holding the line for one more day, which was fairly quiet, the Battalion was relieved on the night of the 7th of April by the 17th and 21st Battalions, and marched to billets in Senlis. It was not yet known that the Division was about to move back to a training area, but the rumour soon began to get round to that effect, and the prospect of a real rest acted as a splendid tonic to the weary survivors of the darkest days in the history of the Division. They had been dark days, indeed, but those who came through could look back on them with satisfaction in the knowledge that their Battalion had played its part nobly during a period when a trip to Germany--or elsewhere--had often seemed to be the most probable end to their career in France.

This story of the movements of the 1st Civil Service Rifles during the Retreat is based on the official narrative written by Battalion Headquarters, but it should be borne in mind that the fighting during the last days of March was of so extraordinary a character that the description here given will fall very far short of the affair as it appeared to many of the members of the Battalion. Only those who took part in it will be able to realise the difficulty of describing a series of actions in which the Battalion was split up into several different bodies, each fighting battles of their own, with little or no knowledge of the whereabouts of their comrades. If this feature of the fighting is considered, it will help to explain why so many of the casualties were reported as “wounded and missing” or “missing, believed killed” without any definite information as to the place where they occurred.

The casualties among officers, warrant officers and N.C.O.’s were very heavy, but these serve to emphasise the splendid spirit of the men. Nothing could illustrate their excellent discipline, determination and fighting qualities more forcibly than that assembly at Bazentin le Petit on the night of the 24th of March. In spite of being cut off from their comrades these several small parties had carried on the fight for more than twenty-four hours--often without even a Lance-corporal in charge--and the simple statement that “10.0 p.m. saw the Battalion reforming at Bazentin le Petit” is in reality a record of the finest achievement of the men of the 1st Civil Service Rifles during the war.

A good many of the N.C.O.’s and men were decorated for their work during the Retreat, but every one of those 230 all ranks who refused to be beaten on the 23rd and 24th of March, 1918, is deserving of the highest praise. It would have been some small recognition of their great gallantry and devotion to duty if the names of these men could have been inscribed on a special Roll of Honour.