CHAPTER VII.

THE HINDENBURG LINE AND THE OPERATIONS ON THE COAST. (JUNE-AUGUST 1917).

When the batteries marched back to the wagon-lines on June 20th they knew that they were to set off next day to go into action immediately on another portion of the front, but their actual destination remained somewhat of a mystery. There was a rumour that they were going a considerable distance northwards, even to the Coast it was suggested, and therefore, when they set out in a southerly direction on the morning of the 21st, a certain amount of surprise prevailed amongst the rank and file. Southwards they headed, passing through Beaurains along the great road running down to Bapaume, and gradually they penetrated more and more deeply into the wilderness created by the enemy when he retreated to the Hindenburg Line in February and early March.

As events turned out, the march was to be a short one. After leaving the Bapaume road a few miles south of Arras, wagon-lines were established around Hamelincourt, Boyelles and Boiry St. Rictrude in the VII. Corps area, and one section per battery moved up into action the very same afternoon; the march had represented nothing more than a sideslip of some three miles to the right, but even this short distance brought the batteries into totally different surroundings. They were now moving through the country over which the enemy right had retired in his withdrawal earlier in the year, and on all sides they saw proof positive of the stories of destruction which had been related to them. Every tree, every bush, even the slender apple trees lay cut down and destroyed; roads had been blown up, houses demolished, and the country had the appearance of a great wilderness with every natural feature shaved off as though by a giant razor. The Bapaume road, no longer a stately route bordered by trees, lay like a piece of tape across the naked ground; houses gaped and tottered, blown up not by the shells of the pursuing army but by the prearranged handiwork of the retreating foe. It was a case of wanton destruction, wrath vented upon the countryside by a bitter and chagrined enemy, and, although it has been suggested that all this work was carried out in order to open the country for the great and last German drive westwards which was destined to begin some nine months later, there can be little doubt but that it was merely a continuance of that policy of frightfulness and destruction which marked all his doings.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

MAY—AUGUST 1917.

H.Q.R.A.

C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.

Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E. D.S.O. Durie, M.C. Bownass, M.C.

156th Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler.

Adjutant: Capt. B. L. Oxley, M.C.

Capt. W. G. Sheeres.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major H. McA. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major W. A. T. Richards, M.C. Studd, M.C. M.C. Barstow, M.C.

162nd Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel Conolly.

Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major G. Major H. C. Cory. Major L. Hill. Major W. P. Fetherston, M.C. Colfox.

Major W. G. Major Walker, Pringle. D.S.O.

Despite this, very fair wagon-lines were obtainable around the ruins of the villages aforementioned, for the ground was dry and rolling and, there being no inhabitants in this area of desolation, there were no restrictions as to the setting up of horse-lines. Quickly the brigades settled down in their new surroundings, and as quickly the first sections moved up into action, to be followed next day by the remainder of the batteries.

Ever since May 12th General Stewart and his staff had been near Hamelincourt, controlling the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division in the Bullecourt sector (at that time the 21st and 37th Divisional Artilleries, together with the 150th, 293rd and 79th Field Artillery Brigades), and on going into the line now the batteries came under the administration of the 50th Divisional Artillery. The 156th Brigade occupied the positions vacated by the 123rd Brigade of the 37th Division, situated east-south-east of Henin-sur-Cojeul and just west of the Hindenburg Line. The batteries of the 162nd Brigade were distributed at first amongst the 82nd, 83rd and 250th Brigade groups; ultimately, on the 23rd, they were placed under the control of the 250th (C and D/162) and the 251st (A and B/162) Brigade Groups, and supported the infantry from positions in Heninel (C/162) and east of Henin, all batteries except A/162 being just to the left of the 156th Brigade. The front covered by the brigades was roughly the line running southwards from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles nearly to Bullecourt.

This part of the front was of intense interest to the batteries. To begin with, they were in touch with the infantry of their own Division for the first time since February; the 162nd Brigade, it is true, was shooting over the trenches north of that part of the Hindenburg Line garrisoned by the 19th and 98th Infantry Brigades, but the 156th Brigade was actually covering the 33rd Divisional Infantry, and to the men there was a feeling almost of being home once more when they thus found themselves amongst their own. Added interest, moreover, was gained from the fact that the much-talked-of Hindenburg Line could here be examined, for the fall of Monchy had outflanked this part of the system, and the enemy with much reluctance but of dire necessity had had to retreat from it, leaving it to be occupied by our troops.

It was a mighty piece of fortification; in front of the fire-trench were three thick belts of wire thirty yards apart, each belt some fifteen yards deep; between the belts, which were so thick that hardly a mouse could get through them, lay concrete emplacements for machine guns or trench-mortars, reached from the front line by underground shafts. The fire-trench itself, about twelve feet in depth, contained concrete pill-boxes at every turn and on every tactical point, while the communication trenches running back to the support line were so wired as to form a defensive flank should any portion of the front be penetrated. On reaching the support line an exact replica of the fire-trench was met with; three belts of wire and the accompanying pill-boxes and machine-gun emplacements lay in front of the trench, but this time a further feature was added. Throughout the entire length of the Hindenburg support, from Beaurains right down to Bullecourt, there ran an underground tunnel seven feet high, three and a half feet wide and thirty feet below the surface. Shafts ran down to it at intervals of twenty yards, and to all intents and purposes it formed a vast dug-out exactly under the parapet of the trench and running beneath it throughout all the miles of its length. Its existence could only be proved as far as Bullecourt, for from that point onwards it was held by the enemy, but doubtless it continued southwards with the Hindenburg Line itself since, offering as it did a perfect refuge for the garrison, it formed an integral part of the defences of this great system. For that portion of the passage which lay in British hands a "Town Major" even had been appointed, and from him could be obtained so many yards of the dug-out as the lawful habitation of the unit on the spot!

The batteries were not slow to get to work here. June 22nd and 23rd were spent in registration of the zone and in careful study of the front to be covered. On the 23rd the 156th Brigade bombarded Tunnel Trench at 11.35 A.M. and 7.30 P.M., and at midnight on the 23rd/24th supported an attack on it by the 19th Infantry Brigade from Lump Lane. The attack proved unsuccessful, and throughout the 24th the bombardment was continued, while the 162nd Brigade took up the running on the left in an attack on York, Bush and Wood Trenches. The 5th E. Yorkshire Regiment (50th Div.) carried out this assault at 12.30 A.M. on the 26th, and at first were successful. All the objectives except for the cross-roads north-west of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles were gained, thirty prisoners were captured and two hostile counter-attacks driven off. There followed, however, such a deluge of hostile shell fire that the newly-gained trenches were entirely demolished, and a large part of the ground gained had to be relinquished.

After this outburst the brigades settled themselves down to "artillery activity," searching for the opposing batteries and shelling all tracks and approaches to the enemy front line. The two brigades each fired some six hundred rounds every twenty-four hours on targets of this nature, and by so doing aroused the ire of the enemy to no small extent. Hostile counter-battery work increased rapidly in activity, but very few casualties were suffered. A/162 (Major Pringle) were much damaged by hostile bombardments on the 22nd and 24th, while Major Richards' guns (A/156) on July 2nd were so heavily shelled that they had to shift their position, having lost three sergeants killed and a number of men wounded. But if the batteries suffered in this manner, at least they gave as good as they took; nightly activity was more than ever directed upon the hostile back areas and gun positions rather than upon the infantry, and to this was added a chemical shell bombardment carried on throughout the night of the 28th/29th which must have worried the enemy to a considerable extent, if the weight of his retaliation on the 29th were to be taken as a guide!

When the batteries came out of action prior to moving down to this part of the front a rumour was circulated, as already mentioned, that their destination was to be the Coast, and surprise prevailed that their route should take them southwards. Battery commanders were told by their Group Commanders on arrival, however, that the Cherisy-Fontaine sector was nothing more than a sorting-area, and that they, like the batteries before them, would probably remain in action only some ten days or so before moving elsewhere. Therefore, when orders were received on July 9th to move out of action in a couple of days' time, the news was not altogether unexpected. The preceding period had been spent in the usual artillery activity with no infantry action of any sort, but unfortunately the enemy, by this continued harassing of his battery positions and roads, had been roused to an extreme pitch of retaliation. He had of late taken to subjecting the valley from Heninel through St. Martin-sur-Cojeul down to Henin to a miniature shell storm, and as certain of the batteries had to utilise this route for their move out it seemed as though his efforts, hitherto fruitless, might meet for once with some success.

As matters turned out, however, the nightly searching took place some thirty minutes before the batteries moved, and the actual march away was carried out undisturbed on the night of July 11th/12th. A/162, nevertheless, and one or two other batteries were very heavily shelled by 5·9 in. howitzers just as the teams and limbers arrived, and only by the greatest good fortune, coupled with some very marked gallantry amongst the men, did the guns get away without serious casualties.

On arrival at the wagon-lines it was found that no further destination had been determined, and that here for the present the batteries were to remain. There was no reason, indeed, for a move to any more distant area, for the horse-lines here were good and dry, tents had been pitched to shelter the men, harness "rooms" had been erected while the batteries were in action, and a very fair degree of comfort offered itself to all ranks. True, the horse-lines were in view of enemy territory at points, but they were a long way back—some five miles from the line—and no trouble from long-range fire was expected; on the other hand the uninhabited state of the area, due to the destructive march by the Germans early in the year, offered an excellent training ground for work of every description.

Refitting, overhauling and training began immediately after the arrival of the batteries at their horse-lines. From the 13th to the 15th a Divisional Artillery scheme with skeleton batteries was carried out around Adinfer Wood; this was followed by days of battery training, gun drill, driving and riding drill, battery staff work, training the detachments to cut gaps through wire entanglements and rush their guns over trenches, and every conceivable form of preparation for more open fighting.

All was not work, however; the weather was glorious and every opportunity was taken of giving the men a holiday, a rest from fighting and preparation for fighting, a chance of enjoying themselves. Five or six jumps were put up near each battery, and the respective wheelers knocked together gates for exhibition driving; the Divisional band came down and gave a concert one afternoon, while another half-day was spent in a cricket match between the two Brigades. Batteries arranged mule races for their own edification or ran off heats for the forthcoming sports, and altogether managed to make the time very pleasant.

As a final flourish, two days were allotted for a Horse Show and sports. On the 18th the Divisional Artillery Horse Show was held near Boiry St. Martin, and produced an excellent programme. Events were ushered in by the somewhat precipitous arrival on the course of a six-in-hand emanating from D/162; a six-in-hand which, although only hooked in to a G.S. wagon and consisting of horses quite unused to this form of equitation, was driven up the course by Major Colfox in true coaching style, the battery trumpeter rendering weird noises from the back, while General Stewart's A.D.C. took a prominent seat "to add tone to the picture!" Followed a series of jumping, driving and "turnout" competitions, mule races and the like, till at last a very cheerful day and one producing some fine horses and horsemanship came to an end. Major Studd won the officers' jumping event. A/156 gathered up many of the other prizes, and the remainder were scattered amongst all the batteries.

Four days later a day was given up to Divisional Artillery Sports, the programme consisting not only of the usual flat race, jumping and obstacle items but also of one or two mounted events, and then the batteries packed their wagons, hooked in the teams and turned their backs sadly on this pleasant spot. They were off to the war once more, and rumour had at last been verified—the Coast was their destination.

The knowledge of this destination had been obtained by the batteries some time back. As early as July 4th General Stewart and his Brigade-Major (Major Durie), who had been relieved in the line by the C.R.A. of the 21st Divisional Artillery three days previously, set out for XV. Corps Headquarters to attend a conference, and did not return until the 8th. On the 13th orders had been received for one officer and fourteen men per battery to move ahead of the main body and report at headquarters of the 1st Division at Coxyde Bains, to prepare the positions which the guns were to take up, and with the name of the destination now disclosed an immediate rush had been made for maps to discover its locality. "Bains" certainly suggested the Coast, and surely enough it was ultimately found there—a small village some four miles west of Nieuport and right on the sea front. It was therefore with the knowledge of great events impending that the batteries marched off on July 23rd, glistening in the new paint and added burnish which eleven days in the rest area had made possible. Authieule and Amplier, both in the neighbourhood of Doullens, were their destinations that night, and these they reached in the evening after a march through very fine country under a glorious sky.

From 6.0 P.M. and throughout the night of Tuesday, the 24th, the batteries entrained at Doullens North and South and at Authieule. Eight horses in each van, guns and wagons lashed to long trucks by French porters, men crowded into big cattle trucks, they journeyed throughout the night and early morning past Hazebrouck and Bergues, and finally arrived in the forenoon of the 25th, the 156th Brigade at Adinkerke, the 162nd Brigade at Dunkirk. A rapid detrainment, water and feed for the horses and a hasty meal for the men, and the batteries set out in long columns for their wagon-lines. The 156th Brigade went right up to Coxyde Bains and established wagon-lines in the dunes behind the village; the 162nd Brigade marched to Ghyvelde, a village two miles from the Belgian frontier and some distance behind the line, and sent up one section of horses from each battery to be attached to the 156th Brigade at Coxyde for use as a forward wagon-line.

The next morning battery and brigade commanders rode up to the line to reconnoitre the positions they were to occupy, and to inspect the work done by the advance parties, while on the 27th and 28th the guns of every battery were calibrated at the Coxyde Bains range, firing out to sea through electric screens, by which process the muzzle velocities of the guns were measured. On the night of the 28th/29th the 156th Brigade, with "A," "B" and C/162, moved up into action in the positions already prepared, and next night were followed by D/162. Considerable difficulty was experienced on both occasions owing to an enemy bombardment of the neighbourhood with gas shell throughout the night; respirators were worn for two and a half hours and casualties were thereby averted, but the difficulty of finding the way in the darkness on an unknown road was naturally greatly increased.

On July 30th, when the batteries had opportunity to review their new positions, they found themselves in surroundings totally different from any yet experienced. On their left lay the sea, all around them was sand broken up by huge dunes, and practically nowhere could any shell holes be seen. This did not, unfortunately, mean that there was no hostile artillery activity; on the contrary the enemy artillery, and in particular his high-velocity guns, showed the most amazing persistence in raking our battery positions. The reason for the absence of shell-holes was that the sand, continually kept shifting by the wind, silted up and filled in any hole within a few hours of its being made, leaving all the shell splinters lying on the surface like pebbles on a sandy beach. There arose from this the disadvantage of not being able to tell from the nature of the ground whether it was subject to enemy shelling or not, but on the other hand it offered real relief to eyes now physically wearied by the continual sight of torn and desolated country.

These coastal positions, indeed, offered many new and hitherto unexperienced features, but for every advantage there was at least one disadvantage. The sand, kept moving by the wind, removed the depressing sight of shell-holes; but the same sand blew into men's eyes, blinding them, and jammed the guns at almost every other round fired. The view of Ostend—visible on a clear day from the Grand Dune—with the German destroyers occasionally entering and leaving its harbour, offered an object of great interest; but the proximity of Ostend involved the presence of an infinite host of high velocity naval guns on land mountings, which blasted impartially infantry, batteries and roads right back to and beyond the wagon-lines. The sand was excellent in the wagon-lines for harness cleaning, and ensured dry standings for the horses; but it offered a constant threat to any animal which should eat of it, and necessitated the setting up of double picket-ropes for the horses, to prevent them from getting their heads down and contracting sand colic.

There was only one real consolation, and that was the presence of the sea. The sea, with its submerged wire entanglements, offered a zone free from the enemy; the sea occasionally provided the thrills of destroyers passing and of monitors bombarding Ostend and Westende. The sea, on a fine evening, somehow brought Home very near as it stretched in a glory of shimmering gold, unconcerned and utterly oblivious of warfare, back to and beyond the far horizon whither lay England. The land could be smashed, the land could be blasted and torn, but the sea remained ever the same, stronger and mightier than any war, the connecting link between Hell and the peace of an English home.

The batteries were very close to the sea, for they were on the extreme left of the whole of the line. Headquarters of the 162nd Brigade were established in the West Sand Dunes about 700 yards south of Groenendyk Plage. "A" and B/162 lay some 150 yards in rear of headquarters; D/162 was almost on the beach, for it took up a position in the East Dunes 150 yards from the water's edge, with C/162 not far off in the West Dunes about three hundred yards from the shore; both these batteries lay in front of headquarters and south of the Groenendyk Plage-Nieuport Bains road. The 156th Brigade was farther inland but still quite close to the coast, B/156, the southernmost battery, being 300 yards south of the Yser. Both brigades, since they were situated on the extreme left of the line, covered the left or Nieuport Bains sector, which ran from the Coast along the south side of the Yser and along New Trench to Barnes Bridge. In addition to the 33rd Divisional Artillery, the infantry of the 66th Division, who held this front with one infantry brigade (two battalions in the line), were also covered by the 66th Divisional Artillery and three Army Field Artillery Brigades, the whole being under the command of Brigadier-General D. B. Stewart, C.R.A. 66th Division.

It may seem strange that such a great mass of guns should cover a one-brigade front, and in the ordinary course of trench fighting this weight of artillery would far have out-reached requirements. The coastal zone, however, was not an ordinary part of the line; there was a great deal of mystery hanging around it, a great deal of "hush-hush" talk and, to give a hint as to the truth of this talk, a vast concentration of artillery. Ever since the batteries had detrained at Adinkerke and Dunkirk the men at the wagon-lines had seen, day after day and hour after hour, heavily laden trains pull in, disgorge batteries and battalions, shunt out and be replaced by more trains. Every day fresh batteries marched up the pavé road long the Nieuport canal to occupy positions amongst the sandhills; every day an inspection of the dunes around Nieuport discovered fresh batteries congregated in every hollow, in every depression of the ground, until there seemed to be no room for more.

It was, indeed, a mighty concentration; close up to Nieuport the field guns lay in tier upon tier; behind them the six-inch howitzers occupied every possible position and many that were almost impossible; eight-inch, sixty-pounders and 9·2 in. jostled each other for room further back, while over their heads rushed the shells of the long-range guns in action near Coxyde Bains. Clearly an offensive was impending, but how and where? The area immediately in front of the 66th Division was flooded and impassable, and on the left lay the sea. Was it from there that the blow was to fall, or was the right to attack and, piercing the German lines, force the enemy troops facing Nieuport to retire? Rumour held orgy.

Meantime the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to all outward appearances cared for none of these things. They were in action, there was certain destructive work to be done, and the enemy was making the doing of it very uncomfortable. From Dune 18 and the neighbouring O.P.'s targets were registered and bombarded, destructive and harassing fire was maintained on selected "sore" spots, and the front was kept in continual turmoil. On August 2nd the 49th Division on the right carried out a daylight raid with the assistance of the batteries, and on the night of the 7th/8th the guns supported two raids on the Lombardzyde and St. Georges sectors, both of which were successful. There followed, on the night after this raid, a projector gas attack which was launched on the enemy in the Nieuport Bains sector in conjunction with a barrage fired by all batteries, and it is scarcely surprising to record that the enemy's temper now became extremely frayed. Every battery was shelled by high-velocity guns, 5·9 in. howitzers and innumerable gas shells; the roads and approaches—especially the Coast road—were under continual bombardment, and the strain upon the detachments grew increasingly heavy. 162nd Brigade wagon-lines, in order to cope with the ever-increasing demand for ammunition, had moved up on July 31st to St. Idesbalde, and the 156th Brigade, which on August 1st had sent its horses back to La Panne, now, on the 5th, brought them up to Coxyde Bains once more.

The night of the 15th/16th saw another projector gas attack on the Nieuport Bains sector, during which the batteries fired on the areas around Golf Road and Polder Trench, and which was followed by increased enemy artillery activity. Nieuport and the batteries around it, Pelican Ridge and the roads running inland from the coast were all raked by enemy fire which increased in violence on the 18th, when a practice barrage on the right divisional front was carried out. There followed four more days of practice barrages and then, on the night of the 24th/25th, the 19th Infantry Brigade, supported by the guns, attacked and captured Geleide Post. It was only a small operation, however, and the batteries covering it merely fired on their S.O.S. lines; moreover it was a short-lived success, for the following night the enemy won it back again.

For four weeks now the batteries had carried out continual bombardments of the enemy; practice barrages had been fired, and an immense concentration of artillery had gathered together. An attack was clearly impending and it was evident that the enemy realised the fact, for his guns had shown the very greatest activity for some weeks; they were forever bombarding battery positions, roads and communications, usually with high-velocity naval guns on land mountings, but also with 5·9 in. and 8 in. howitzers, while of late a 17 in. howitzer had been in the habit of blasting the field batteries around Nieuport. Therefore the news came like a bombshell when, on the night of August 27th/28th, the batteries were ordered to withdraw to their wagon-lines. It seemed incredible that this great concentration of artillery should be broken up without being used for any offensive operations, and at first it was thought that the 33rd Divisional Artillery might be an isolated case. But no! Every day battery after battery—some heavy, some of field guns—pulled out from the sand dunes and headed for the rest area, their work over, their object unfulfilled. The mighty hosts of batteries, which for weeks now had been lying in every hollow and valley amongst the dunes, melted away and disappeared without ever learning the object of their coming.

Many and varied have been the reasons put forward for the breaking off of this attack. Some say that the advance of the enemy at Lombardzyde early in July put a check to our plans; some attribute it to the long spell of wet weather and to the non-success of the great attacks at Ypres on July 31st and August 16th, while many assert, not without truth, that the enemy obtained our entire operation orders for the battle and took counter-preparations accordingly. Undoubtedly an attack had been planned, and an attack on some entirely novel lines. The 1st Division had, for weeks past, been kept isolated from all other troops while it practised unusual offensive operations. Some of the batteries had received orders that on a certain date they were to embark on a certain ship at a certain port—all at present described in code—and the general belief was that an offensive by land was to be launched in conjunction with an attack somewhere near Ostend from the sea. Imagination, running riot, spread the report that large rafts were to be towed inshore on which there would be field-batteries firing as they floated in, while other rafts were to carry infantry and tanks. The whole idea sounded fantastic and a desperate adventure in view of the manner in which the Belgian coast bristled with enemy guns and submerged wire-entanglements; and, with the memory of Gallipoli fresh in the minds of all, it is surprising how any such operation could have been considered worth the gamble and the inevitable cost.

Whatever had been planned, however, nothing was carried out. The batteries were left to reorganise in their wagon-lines for two days—a period which the enemy utilised by bombarding with long-range high-velocity guns the horse-lines of both brigades, and especially those of the D.A.C. which suffered severe casualties—and on Saturday, September 1st, under sudden orders they marched out, battery by battery, on a three-day trek which brought them in glorious weather through Ghyvelde and Cassel to the back areas of the Ypres Salient. At Reninghelst and at Dickebusch their march terminated, and wagon-lines were there established while parties went up to the line to prepare positions for the guns to occupy. At last, after nearly two years' fighting, they were to experience the desolation and horror of the Salient, the deadliest portion of the whole line for gunners, and were to take part in the autumn battles for the Passchendaele Ridge; had they known it, few of the men who, early in September, marched up past Dickebusch and Shrapnel Corner to the battery positions beyond Zillebeke Lake were ever destined to return, while the majority of those who did came down on stretchers, the wreckage of modern war.