CHAPTER III.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME. (JULY 14th—SEPTEMBER 6th 1916).

Early on the morning of July 10th the long troop trains carrying the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery drew into the stations of Longueau and Sallieux, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, and began to unload with every due speed. All ranks fully expected to march into action forthwith, and therefore with something akin to dismay it was learnt that the destination of the batteries was the area around Soues, Arouves and Le Mesge, villages some miles _west_ of Amiens, and far away from the battle lines. The 156th Brigade and half of the 162nd Brigade marched first to Cardonette, but their stay there was only temporary, and on the evening of the 10th, after a long and exceedingly dusty march in great heat through Amiens, Ailly and Picquigny, the Divisional Artillery was reported concentrated in the area allotted to it. There it stayed during the whole of the 11th, resting, overhauling after the long journey and generally making preparations for the great battle which all realised was very near indeed at hand.

This was different country to the late surroundings of the batteries. Hills and valleys, pleasant little villages with orchards and pastures proved an agreeable change to the flat monotony of Flanders, and, keen as the men were to prove their mettle in the great struggle being waged over the far horizon, a day of rest in this quiet country proved very welcome. On the 12th, however, all was hustle and stir once again, and the four brigades marched together as a Divisional Artillery to the Vecquemont-Daours area. The heat was tremendous, and several inches of fine dust lay on the roads; the result of a column, many miles in length, of horses and guns on the march under these conditions may well be imagined, and on their arrival—the 156th Brigade at Corbie, the 162nd Brigade at Daours, with the 166th and 167th Brigades at Vecquemont—all were covered and half choked with a mixture of dust and perspiration which nothing short of a dip in the neighbouring stream could remove. Here the batteries bivouacked for the night, while battery commanders were detached from the column to ride on at daybreak to reconnoitre the front and generally to learn the tactical position into which they must shortly lead their batteries; and from here at 8.0 A.M. on the 13th the column, after the previous night's halt, continued the march to Treux and the neighbouring Marette Wood, where the brigades waited and gained such rest as was possible in view of the fact that they were ordered to be prepared to move at thirty minutes' notice.

Not until 1.30 A.M. on the 14th were the expected orders to move received, and even then for one and a half hours the batteries stood tense and expectant, gunners by their guns, drivers at the horses' heads, while in the distance the throb and roar of the great attack on the second German line of defence came down to them. At last, at 3.0 A.M. in the half-light the 162nd, 166th and 167th Brigades moved off to Becordel-Becourt, the 162nd Brigade proceeding in the first place to Méaulte for a few hours, while the 156th Brigade moved off in the afternoon of the same day to Méaulte, bivouacking on the spot which the 162nd Brigade had just vacated on completing the march to Becordel. Now was the battle very close at hand indeed; the roads were choked with infantry, guns and transport moving up, always moving up, with their faces set towards the east where lay a mighty, seething cauldron, the melting pot of two great armies in mortal conflict. Against this never-ending stream came down, in a slowly moving column, the fruits—fruits indeed, though often very bitter—of victory. Ambulances, walking wounded, shattered guns, depleted and exhausted infantry battalions coming out to rest, and, a sight more cheering to the up-going troops, long lines of German prisoners. The appearance of this highway, one of the main arteries to the actual front line, brought home to the batteries, who were drawn up off the side of the road awaiting orders, a very grim realisation of the ordeal they were about to undergo, but detracted not one whit of eagerness from the minds of the men to plunge into that struggle just as soon as circumstances should permit.

At 4.30 P.M. on the 14th the brigade commanders of the three brigades at Becordel rode on to reconnoitre positions; it was generally understood that no move into action would take place until shortly before dawn of the following morning, and preparations were accordingly made for a night bivouac. It was a disturbed night; the road hummed and buzzed with traffic unceasingly, the battery horse lines were twice shelled by a 4-in. high velocity gun—once so heavily that the horses had temporarily to be withdrawn—and at 1.0 A.M. on the morning of Saturday, the 15th, two brigades, the 162nd and the 166th, received orders to march into action at dawn.

Independently at 3.0 A.M. the batteries of these two brigades moved off in full fighting order, and, passing over the old front line system near Fricourt, headed for the positions which had been reconnoitred on the previous day on the slopes of the valleys running from Caterpillar Wood to Montauban and Bazentin. Gas hung thickly in the valley east of Fricourt and necessitated the wearing of P.H. helmets, while a thick fog rendered progress of the utmost difficulty, but gradually the batteries pushed their way up past the ruins of Mametz and, topping the ridge, moved down the slopes into the ill-famed and deadly Caterpillar Valley which, in the next few days, was destined to be subjected to the most ruthless of shell-storms. Here certain of the batteries in their innocence halted and prepared for action, and Providence for once smiled upon them. A few stray shells pitched over Mametz Wood, a few fell on the road ahead, but Caterpillar Valley at that particular hour remained untouched, and the batteries, after a short halt, continued unharmed. Signs of battle were now to be found everywhere; the dead, friend and foe alike, lay all around, broken and twisted guns and transport, discarded equipment, rifles, bombs, all the disorder of battle were strewn about, while the shell-pocked ground offered that dead and forbidding appearance which is a characteristic only to be found in ground recently fought over.

Through the now clearing mist the batteries advanced and, as in open fighting, manœuvred in the manner so often taught in the plains around Bulford. A, B and C/162 took up positions on the northern slopes of the Caterpillar Wood-Montauban valley several hundred yards north of Montauban, as previously reconnoitred, but D/162, by an unfortunate misunderstanding, dropped into action just short of the crest of the slope four hundred yards north of Caterpillar Wood and about a mile to the left of the 18-pdrs., instead of falling in practically alongside them. This alteration was very regrettable, for, although for tactical purposes the range was the same in either position, D Battery and its teams almost immediately came under heavy fire directed at the cavalry in the valley between it and Caterpillar Wood, and lost its battery commander, Major W. P. Bennett, who was killed by a shell within the first few minutes. The 166th Brigade at the same time came into action two hundred yards east of Mametz Wood, and by 8.30 A.M. both brigades were heavily bombarding that portion of Switch Trench which ran west from High Wood. Of the remaining brigades the 156th marched through Fricourt during the morning in rear of the 19th Infantry Brigade (33rd Division), halted in reserve and reconnoitred the whole position, while the 167th Brigade moved to a position of assembly midway between Caterpillar and Bazentin-le-Grand Woods, experiencing great difficulty _en route_ in getting past our heavy batteries which, in many cases, were in action off the side of the road and firing directly across it. These two brigades came into action on the night of the 15th/16th, with the exception of A/167 which was not in action till 7.0 P.M. on the 16th, and took up positions at 1.0 A.M., the 156th Brigade just north of Bazentin-le-Grand village, the 167th Brigade close together in line half a mile north of Caterpillar Wood. The wagon lines of all batteries lay immediately west of Becordel. Thus, by dawn on the 15th, two brigades were in action, while at dawn on the 16th the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery was in the very midst of the Battle of the Somme, and was bombarding the enemy to the utmost of its ability.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

JULY—AUGUST 1916.

H.Q.R.A.

C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.

Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. T. C. Sadler, M.C. Usher.

156th Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Capt. Lutyens. Capt. R. D. Capt. G. Lomer. Capt. M. A. Russell Studd. (_wounded_).

Lieut. W. G. Pringle (_temporarily_).

Capt. Mansell.

162nd Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Lieut. Hill.

Lieut. B. R. Heape.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Capt. F. C. Major R. G. M. Capt. A. van Major W. P. Packham. Johnston Straubenzee. Bennett (_killed_). (_killed_).

Capt. Hill. Capt. V. Capt. T. St. P. Benett-Stanford. Bunbury.

166th Brigade.

Colonel A. H. S. Goff, C.M.G.

Lieut.-Colonel Murray.

Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Capt. H. A. Major T. E. Capt. H. Freeman. Capt. W. A. T. Littlejohn. Durie. Barstow, M.C. (_wounded_).

Capt. Maxwell.

167th Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff.

Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O.

Adjutant: Lieut. H. C. Cory.

Lieut. J. S. Campbell.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery.

Capt. S. Talbot. Major D. Stewart. Capt. G. Fetherston.

It is now necessary, in order to understand what follows, to turn our attention from the affairs of the batteries, and to endeavour to grasp the tactical situation as it presented itself at 4.0 A.M. on July 15th 1916. At dawn on July 14th the great attack had been launched on the German Second Line from Contalmaison on the left to Longueval on the right. This line covered the important villages of Bazentin-le-Petit, Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval, while to the rear of it lay the sinister woods of Bazentin, High Wood and Delville Wood. The actual assault was carried out by the 23rd, 7th, 3rd and 9th Divisions, the 23rd being on the left opposite the northern end of Bazentin-le-Petit, while the 9th Division on the right faced the village of Longueval. At 3.25 A.M. the great attack began, and the German Second Line on a front of three miles was broken; the flanks remained firm, however, and before the advance could be carried further it was considered essential that the gap should be widened by an attack towards Pozières on the left, and against Ginchy and Guillemont on the right. In addition to this, certain local operations had to be carried out upon the front from Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval, which embraced the zone covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery, and it is with these operations that we must necessarily concern ourselves.

By nightfall on the 14th the whole of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, village and windmill, Bazentin-le-Grand and the southern portion of Longueval were in our hands, our line running just to the north of these places; but High Wood, although reached and captured by a gallant charge of cavalry supported by infantry, proved too tough a nut to crack, and remained in German hands together with the still uncaptured Delville Wood and the northern end of Longueval Village which was under the fire of enemy machine guns in High Wood. To clear these two woods and the remainder of Longueval was essential, and therefore, on the morning of July 15th, an advance was ordered by the 98th and 100th infantry brigades of the 33rd Division upon that portion of Switch Trench which ran westwards from High Wood, while a South African brigade was ordered up from Montauban to capture Delville Wood and the northern part of Longueval which still lay in German hands. With the latter attack, which indeed culminated into a battle of assaults and counter-assaults spread over several days, we cannot concern ourselves now. This history aims at perpetuating the deeds solely of one unit, and, to preserve the sequence of events, it is manifest that the operations upon that unit's immediate front must receive the closest attention; for this purpose we shall turn to the attack on Switch Trench launched on the morning of the 15th by the 98th and 100th infantry brigades covered by the guns of, amongst others, the 162nd and 166th Brigades of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, the first big attack in which these brigades took part.

From 8.30 A.M. for one hour the guns of both brigades bombarded Switch Trench where it ran west from High Wood, and at the end of the hour lifted on to Martinpuich, while the infantry assaulted the objectives which had just undergone this short but intense shelling. On the left the 98th infantry brigade reached its objective, but the 100th brigade was held up by machine-gun fire on the flanks and, after suffering some casualties, returned to its original line; the 98th brigade, with its right flank left thus in the air, had to follow suit, and by ten o'clock in the morning the battle had died down, leaving the guns free, apart from the usual day firing and registration, to get slightly more settled in their new surroundings. It should be remembered that the batteries had been marching, travelling by train and marching, day in day out, since the early morning of the 9th, and now, plunged into a great battle, it might have been hoped that at least a few hours' rest could have been obtained. This was not to be, however; no sooner had the batteries ceased co-operating in the infantry operation above referred to than they set to digging rough shelter trenches for the men in case of bombardment, digging pits for ammunition, camouflaging the guns as far as possible, getting up from the wagon lines heavy dumps of ammunition, and generally trying to get the battery positions into such a condition as would enable the guns to inflict the maximum of damage upon the enemy with the minimum of casualties to themselves. Open warfare was still the order of the day, and at any moment orders might be received for a further advance by the batteries, but on the other hand those orders might never come, and all ranks had already seen sufficient of the fierceness of the enemy's barrage to give them will to urge their already tired limbs to further efforts at self-protection.

As events turned out, no further assaults were made by the infantry on the zone covered by the 33rd Division batteries till the 20th; for five days the batteries were able to register accurately every outstanding feature and point of importance on their zones, while communications were elaborated and perfected from the somewhat rough and ready open warfare methods which had been set up when first the brigades came into action. O.P.'s were established in the old German second line between Longueval and Bazentin, from which points very clear observation upon High Wood and the ground lying to right and left thereof could be obtained, although the ground, consisting as it did of open undulating downs, offered but few salient objects upon which to register; there were, however, one or two points—the corner of High Wood, the orchards north of Longueval and the mysterious iron gate standing on the sky line between High Wood and Delville Wood—which enabled every battery commander to divide his zone up into areas each containing at least one fairly clear reference point, while to the left of High Wood an odd bush or tree and an occasional view of Switch Trench served the same purpose.

It must not be supposed, however, that because there was no infantry assault the guns had little to do. From the 15th until the night of the 19th/20th every battery kept Switch Trench under continual fire, cutting wire, bombarding the trench itself and generally rendering that line of defence as difficult and as uninhabitable as possible to the enemy. By night Switch Trench and Martinpuich were kept under intermittent bursts of fire, and it is safe to say that at no moment between the dates given above were all four batteries of any one brigade silent. This was no trench fighting position; the enemy had been got on the move, he must be kept on the move, and to do this every battery was firing more ammunition in twenty-four hours than had been normally fired by a whole brigade in a week on its late front opposite to La Bassée. On the 17th C/156 (Captain Lomer) was forced to withdraw to Flatiron Copse, 800 yards south of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, as part of High Wood was still in German hands, and the battery, being under direct observation, was not only subject to a galling fire but was in serious danger of being rushed by a counter-attack on the part of the enemy. B (Captain Russell) and D (Captain Studd) batteries of the same brigade stuck it out until the early morning of the 21st, and then, the operations of the 20th which we shall shortly describe being over, withdrew to south of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and Flatiron Copse respectively. As A/156 (Captain Lutyens) had in the first place dropped into action at the northern end of the valley running from Caterpillar Wood to Bazentin, the result of this movement was that the whole of the 156th Brigade was now behind, that is south of, Bazentin-le-Grand Wood, and no longer in the exposed position north of the village which it had hitherto occupied.

It has already been stated that, from the O.P.'s in the old German second line, a very fair view of the ground to the right and left of High Wood could be obtained; this was indeed a fact, but with such skill had the Germans sited their main front line—the ill-omened Switch Trench—that it was exceedingly difficult to observe the actual effect upon it of the shelling to which it had been subjected, nor was the condition of the wire visible even through powerful field-glasses. Accordingly it was ordered that one officer per artillery brigade should advance from the outpost line of our infantry and make such examination of the German wire by daylight as was possible at close range. The opposing infantry were still in a condition of open fighting—sentry groups and outposts being the order of the day, with the main front line some distance behind them; shortly before dawn on July 19th, therefore, the officers in question crawled out from our sentry groups and, passing in some cases right through the line of German outposts, made an examination, as careful and thorough as the proximity of the enemy in broad daylight would permit, of the condition of the Switch Trench wire. The examination was not reassuring; in many cases the wire stood firm and untouched, and it was realised that further and strenuous efforts by the batteries would be essential that day if the coming attack was to have any chance of success. It is a regrettable duty to relate that one of the officers (Lieut. Elliott) who made this reconnaissance never returned; having passed beyond a German sentry group he was severely wounded, and, although his orderly dragged him into a shell-hole and left him in such shelter as it offered while he went for help to bring him back into our lines, his body was never again found. The whole of the day was, indeed, a bad one for the 33rd Divisional Artillery. Colonel A. H. S. Goff (166th Brigade) was wounded and evacuated; all the batteries were heavily shelled, in particular the batteries of 162nd Brigade which wilted beneath a storm of shrapnel during the entire day, while the headquarters of the same brigade received a three-hour bombardment of lachrymose gas shell, making the carrying on of the administration extremely difficult. None of this, however, was allowed to cause any interruption of the day's work, and by nightfall all batteries of the Division had received orders for the following day's assault upon High Wood, and had made the necessary preparations.

At 3.25 A.M. on Thursday, July 20th, the first infantry operation took place in this zone since the attack on the morning of the 15th. Following on a half-hour bombardment by the 33rd and 21st Divisional Artilleries (XV. Corps) which began at 2.55 A.M., the 19th infantry brigade advanced to the assault of High Wood. Two thousand rounds of 18-pdr. and 500 rounds of 4·5 in. howitzer ammunition per brigade were fired in support of the infantry, the target of the batteries being High Wood until "zero" hour (3.25 A.M.), when the batteries lifted to the northern or enemy edge of the wood, bombarding it for half an hour until 3.55 A.M. and then making the final lift to the far side of the wood. The assault was successful, the wood was carried, but during the whole day the infantry were subjected to the most intense and galling artillery fire by the enemy guns, light and heavy. All day long our batteries searched the roads and approaches from Flers, and the hollows north of the wood—anywhere whence an enemy counter-attack might develop—and, with the exception of one which was launched at 12.30 P.M. and beaten back by artillery and infantry combined, this fire was successful in keeping the enemy at bay.

The hostile artillery fire, however, was terrible; not one inch of the wood but was torn and swept by high explosive shell, rent by shrapnel and rendered completely uninhabitable to any human being. At 6 P.M. the effect of this shell-storm came to a head, and for half an hour our batteries put down a heavy barrage along the northern edge of the wood, under cover of which the infantry retired to the southern half; it was no hostile counter-attack which thus drove them back—it was the sheer weight and force of the thousands of shells which, from all around, the enemy poured into the wood, and which smashed and shattered the unfortunate troops who were trying to hold what they had so gallantly won. At first the report came through that the whole of the wood had been evacuated and that the infantry were back in their original line in front of Bazentin, but this was proved to be erroneous, and the southern half of High Wood at any rate was retained in our grasp. At 9.30 P.M. the enemy opened a vicious gas shell barrage on the ridge in front of D/162 and on the batteries of the 167th Brigade, and at 11 P.M. followed this up by a counter-attack on the scene of the morning's fight. After three hours' firing the situation became quieter, and in the morning the position on the whole had not changed since dusk the previous evening.

For the next two days there ensued another period of comparative inactivity as far as infantry assaults were concerned. Both sides paused, as it were, to draw breath, but not for one moment did this cause a lull in artillery activity. The enemy, as well as our own Higher Command, was beginning to realise more and more the immense importance of counter-battery work, and these intervals between the attacks were, from the gunners' point of view, almost more to be feared than the attacks themselves. Morning, noon and night first one battery and then another would be subjected to a sudden burst of intense fire, while at other times a ponderous and deliberate bombardment of a fixed area in which a number of batteries were in position would be carried out—a system which had the most harassing effect upon the men, and to the success of which an ever-lengthening casualty list of guns and gunners bore eloquent testimony. July 21st was a typical day of this sort; starting at 10 A.M., a prolonged and widespread enemy bombardment was carried out during the whole day with 4·2 in. and 5·9 in. upon the valley running from Longueval to Montauban, and its adjacent slopes. The 18-pdr. batteries of the 162nd Brigade, together with the headquarters of the brigade itself, came heavily under fire, and a long casualty list was only averted by the use of the shelter trenches which by this time had been dug in all the battery positions. While this was in progress the 167th Brigade, farther to the left, was also undergoing a severe bombardment by 5·9 in. howitzers. Direct hits were obtained upon B/167 (Major Stewart), and in all the batteries, including D/162 which lay just behind the 167th Brigade, a number of casualties were sustained. Murderous fire was, at the same time, opened upon Caterpillar Valley, from the fork between Mametz and Caterpillar Woods down the entire length of the valley nearly to Mametz village itself, and at times during the day it was almost impossible to see a single battery position from which the smoke, flame and dust of bursting shells were not flying. Nothing could be done; it was a case of "wait and see"—the hardest test to which troops can be put—and to the eternal credit of the men it may be said that they waited on this, as on all other similar occasions, with quiet philosophy and with a stoicism which it would be hard to equal.

Meanwhile, what of our friends the infantry? On the morning of the 21st the hard-pressed 33rd Division was withdrawn from the line and was succeeded by the infantry of the 51st Division (153rd, 154th, and 155th infantry brigades). At the same time the zones of the 33rd Divisional batteries side-slipped to the right and, coming under the 51st Divisional Artillery for tactical purposes, covered the line to the right (_i.e._ east) of High Wood. Day firing was carried out upon Switch Trench, the new zones were registered and night firing, consisting of 500 18-pdr. and 75 4·5 in. howitzer rounds per brigade, was directed upon the hollows in rear of and approaches to the divisional zone. At 10.15 P.M. Caterpillar Wood and the neighbouring localities were heavily bombarded by gas shell and high explosive, and all communications of the 167th Brigade were cut; lamp signalling was immediately taken up, however, and proved itself entirely reliable as a means of communication, despite the gun flashes all around and in the sky.

The morning of July 22nd was devoted to further registration and short bombardments. From 3.0 A.M. until 3.30 a general bombardment of Switch Trench was ordered at the rate of 2 rounds per minute from the 18-pdrs. and one round per minute from the howitzers, totalling upwards of three thousand rounds fired by the fifteen batteries. At the end of the bombardment the 162nd Brigade stood by to carry out a registration by aeroplane, but no machine ever appeared and soon afterwards normal firing for the day was continued, D/162 shortly after one o'clock carrying out a destructive shoot on some machine guns and dug-outs to the west of High Wood which were, by their enfilade fire, holding up the whole situation and preventing an advance in the neighbourhood. Their destruction was essential, for an advance had been ordered for the following day, and at 7 P.M. in the evening the whole of the front burst into flame in preliminary bombardment for the assault. At the rate of 80 rounds per battery per hour the guns of the XIII., XV. and III. Corps bombarded the positions which troops of the 5th (on the right), 51st and 19th (on the left) divisions were to attack next day, the objective of the 51st division, which was covered by the guns of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, being the N.E. and N.W. edges of High Wood, together with a portion of Switch Trench running E. and W. therefrom.

"Zero" was 1.30 A.M. on July 23rd, and seven minutes previous to that hour the fire of the batteries was increased to intense rate. At half-past one to the second the infantry went over the top, and the batteries searched back by short lifts to a line 200 yards beyond the objective. For half an hour was this searching fire continued, and at two o'clock the batteries slowed down and set up a protective barrage 200 yards beyond the late German trench, under cover of which it was hoped the infantry would be able to consolidate their position. Such, however, was not the case. Although in places the attacking troops had gained their objectives, at many points our men had been held up by machine gun fire and, by their failure to advance, had compelled their more successful comrades to retire to their starting place. All along the line the assault failed, and when at 5 A.M. the enemy counter-attacked fiercely the guns shortened their range and bombarded Switch Trench once more. By 8.30 A.M. all was quiet again, the attack was over—and our infantry were back holding the same line from which they had advanced earlier in the morning.

From July 23rd-27th there ensued another of those lulls which have already been described; for the moment our advance was checked and held up while the Higher Command appeared to be seeking a solution to the very determined and successful opposition which the enemy showed to our troops in this sector, and during the interval which elapsed the usual harassing was carried out night and day by the now rapidly wearying batteries. Two thousand rounds by day and 700 by night were poured on to the German defences by each brigade, and in return the German batteries gave no peace to our guns, daily subjecting the area in which the batteries were located to a vicious and effective bombardment. Mametz and Caterpillar Woods, the valleys running from Caterpillar Wood to Bazentin on the one hand and Montauban on the other were daily ploughed from end to end by shells varying in calibre from 77 mm. to 12 in., while the valley running from Longueval to Montauban, together with the ridge to the west thereof, became a veritable death trap. It was of no use seeking to move the battery positions; one place was as bad as another, and there was nothing to do but to sit tight and trust that, before our batteries were completely wiped out, a further advance might check the ever-increasing storm of German shells.

There was another, and a very serious, difficulty to be faced at this time also; owing to the enormous strain placed upon the guns by the incessant day and night firing, the running-out springs began to give way and to fail, and great difficulty was found in obtaining new ones. Previous to the war almost all these springs had come from Germany, and, with this source of supply cut off, British manufacturers at home had found it impossible as yet so to organise their output as to meet the ever-increasing and insistent demands from the various theatres of war. As an instance of the seriousness of this trouble it may be mentioned that on July 26th only five guns of the 162nd Brigade were in action, the remainder having no serviceable springs left, whilst of these five two had to be pushed up by hand after the firing of each round. Such a state of affairs, which cut down the volume of fire of the brigade by over one half, was bound to reflect seriously upon the preliminary bombardments and barrages in any attack, nor was the trouble confined to the 162nd Brigade alone.

On July 24th the 33rd Divisional Artillery ceased to work in contact with the infantry, and was put under direct orders of the XV. Corps to carry out counter-battery work on the whole Corps front, searching hostile battery positions, hollows and approaches, and in addition answering any S.O.S. call when required upon all portions of the Corps front. Such duties naturally incurred still more firing and work; two batteries (A and B) of the 162nd Brigade were unable to get sufficient right switch to cover the now wider front, and were forced to move further up the slope, new O.P.'s in front of Longueval had to be reconnoitred and linked up with the batteries by telephone, while the new zone which stretched from the south of Martinpuich to Delville Wood had to be registered before dusk. Hardly had this been done than, at 8.30 P.M., a report was received that the enemy were leaving their trenches between High Wood and Delville Wood, and the batteries immediately opened a rapid rate of fire to break up the expected counter-attack which, surely enough, was launched at 8.45 P.M. under a very heavy barrage. Both sides bombarded with the utmost fury, and ultimately the counter-attack melted under our fire, but not till midnight were the tired batteries able to report "all quiet," and even then night firing was carried on in the usual way. The 51st Divisional Artillery was at this time responsible for the direct support of the infantry, and it was by way of co-operation that this bombardment of the hostile trenches was carried out.

It has been previously stated that from the 23rd to the 27th a lull occurred in the infantry operations. This, broadly speaking, is a fact, but it must not be supposed that during that time our front line troops were entirely inactive. Bit by bit each day they had been bombing their way through Longueval, sometimes without artillery support, sometimes assisted by the guns, as on the 26th when for one hour from dawn the guns poured shells into the northern end of the village. It was slow work, this gradual penetration, but by the evening of the 26th a very appreciable advance had been made, and, when orders were received at 4 P.M. that a general assault on Delville Wood and the orchards north of Longueval would take place next day (27th), our troops were in a far more favourable position for "taking off" than they had been a week earlier.

The assault was delivered at 7.10 A.M. on the morning of Thursday, the 27th, and was preceded by an artillery bombardment beginning at 5.30 A.M. For this bombardment 1,500 18-pdr. and 400 4·5 in. howitzer rounds were fired by each brigade, and were directed mainly upon the trenches to be assaulted and the back areas thereof. To the 5th Division was entrusted the capture of the objectives on the front directly under the guns of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, and the line of this ran from the north-west edge of Delville Wood through the enclosures 150 yards north of Longueval village, along the sunken road running west from these enclosures to the High Wood-Longueval road. The chief interest of the attack, however, lay in the fact that the creeping barrage, as already practised in the opening days of the Somme battle, was now being more and more carefully elaborated. It had not yet reached that high stage of perfection which, in the offensives of Arras and Passchendaele in 1917, enabled the gunners to provide what was almost an ever-moving curtain of fire advancing yard by yard in front of the infantry, but it did even now remain upon one point until the very last moment and then lift off, but scarcely creep, to the next point to be attacked while the infantry stormed the first.

All day long fierce fighting continued but, although on the right of the line the 2nd Division gained their objectives, on the left the men of the 5th Division were held up at points. The climax of the day was reached at six o'clock in the evening, when a heavy counter-attack was launched all along the line by the enemy, but this counter-attack, in common with a similar one launched at 10.30 P.M. on the following night (28th), broke up under the fire of our guns. During this attack green flares were lighted all along the front by our foremost infantry at specified times, and although it was difficult to persuade them to do this, inasmuch as they considered that the flares would be equally useful to the enemy as well as to our guns in showing up their position, the information thus obtained of the progress of the assault was of very great value.

During the 28th and 29th the batteries busied themselves in preparing for future operations. Casualties in men and guns had been severe throughout the fighting, vast quantities of ammunition had been expended, and all this had now to be replaced. On the morning of the 27th a 5·9 in. shell had exploded directly in the pit where the men of B/162 (Major Johnston) were getting their breakfasts, killing and wounding every man in the pit, while on the afternoon of the 29th D/162 (Captain Bunbury) was heavily shelled and lost one and a half detachments who were practically blown to pieces. A 5·9 in. shell burst right upon a pile of ammunition beside one of its guns and exploded a number of rounds; in addition to the wiping out of the detachments, the gun itself was completely destroyed by the explosion, and only the piece and a portion of the spade were ever found afterwards. It is curious to note that the force of the explosion, which made a huge crater in the ground, threw a complete wagon of ammunition so high into the air that it came down some 150 yards from the battery, yet not a single round in the wagon exploded. As, in addition to this, all the guns of C/167 (Captain Fetherston) were out of action and the other batteries had suffered the usual daily casualties which now had become inevitable, it will be seen that the Divisional Artillery was in a fairly serious plight. However, the work had to be carried on, and on the afternoon of the 29th the batteries set themselves to the now familiar task of bombarding Switch Trench with 45 rounds per gun, in preparation for another attack which was due to take place on the morrow.

The bombardment proper for this attack began at 4.45 P.M. on the 30th, but previous to this there had been the short burst already referred to and another similar effort in the early morning from 3.15 to 5.15. At the same time our heavy artillery carried out a series of destructive—or, at least, would-be destructive—shoots on the enemy batteries; this was a most essential procedure, for the work of the batteries had been greatly impeded all the morning by an intense hostile gas shelling of the positions while, during the whole of the afternoon, the batteries on the ridge north of Caterpillar Wood were raked from end to end by high explosive. At last, however, the final bombardment opened, and from 4.45 P.M. till 6.10 P.M. the German defences between High Wood and Delville Wood were subjected to 800 rounds per 18-pdr. battery and 400 rounds per 4·5 in. howitzer battery all along the front. Seven minutes before zero, which was at 6.10 P.M., fire was quickened to intense rate, and at zero hour troops of the XIII. and XV. Corps advanced to the attack, having for their objectives the sunken road running from the N.W. face of Delville Wood to the east corner of High Wood. The XIII. Corps, who were on the right, reached their objectives successfully, but the XV. Corps, advancing on the left of the XIII., were not so fortunate; enfilade machine gun fire from strong points near the orchards north of Longueval held them up, while their left, although successful in reaching the sunken road near the corner of High Wood, was subjected to such a perfect hell of high explosive that it was shelled out and forced to retire. Thus at 8 P.M., when firing was reduced to normal, the situation was but little different to what it had been before the attack.

The attack of the 30th was very typical of the tactics in practice at this time in the Somme battle. The same thing had been seen in the previous assaults of the 20th and 23rd, and the same thing was to be seen in subsequent operations; small attacks on limited areas—perhaps only on a two division front—were launched and, nine times out of ten, were doomed to failure by their narrow scope. There is no doubt that individual strong points were holding up the general advance and had to be overwhelmed before any more ambitious plans were undertaken, but there is also no doubt that, when these unfortunate battalions went over the parapet upon some purely local undertaking, they were immediately subjected to machine gun fire in enfilade from the flanks, where no attack was taking place, and to overwhelming shell fire from batteries on neighbouring zones, which, owing to the undisturbed state of their own zone, were able to add to the already heavy volume of fire on the front attacked. It may be that the Higher Command was right in its handling of the situation, but for the men on the spot it was heart-breaking to see battalions of the finest material launched to certain death on an attack which, by the narrowness of its front, was doomed to failure before it ever began.

July 30th and 31st contained nothing more of importance than three S.O.S. calls from Delville Wood, and on Tuesday, August 1st, at 5.30 A.M. orders were received with dramatic suddenness for the 162nd and 166th Brigades to be relieved by the 78th and 79th Brigades of the 17th Divisional Artillery. In a fever-heat of expectation the batteries of the two brigades waited all day long for the orders to take effect; at last, between four and seven o'clock in the afternoon, the incoming units arrived, and with heartfelt thanks the batteries, taking their guns with them, marched back to the wagon lines. It was unfortunate that D/78 should have chosen the moment to relieve D/162 when four low-flying German aeroplanes were right overhead, but choose it they did, and the price had to be paid. The incoming battery was a little ahead of its time, and, as a result, when the teams and limbers of D/162 appeared on the scene the shell storm for which the aeroplanes had called was just beginning. Whizz bangs, 4·2 in. and 5·9 in. shell poured down upon the battery position and horses for over half an hour, and how the battery escaped with such light casualties as it did, was a marvel. One gun and one ammunition dump were destroyed, several drivers and horses were hit, but in no way was the relief disorganised, and D/162, after manœuvring under a hail of shells, ultimately withdrew towards the Montauban flank. For the rest of the evening Caterpillar Valley all around and south-west of Mametz Wood was deluged with shells, and the batteries who chose that route for their outgoing march had an extremely unpleasant time. All got away in the end, however, and after a short halt at the wagon lines continued the march. Dernancourt, which was the destination of the batteries, was reached at 2.30 A.M., and here they remained till the 11th resting, refitting and generally cleaning up after the ordeal of the past eighteen days.

Only two brigades were now left in the line—the 156th and the 167th—and, as Headquarters staff of the 33rd Divisional Artillery had gone into rest at Dernancourt, these two were put under the command of the 51st Division. The zone covered by the 156th Brigade extended along the High Wood—Bazentin-le-Petit road southwards from the north-west corner of the wood, while the 167th Brigade looked after the road running south-east from the eastern edge of High Wood; D/156 (Captain Studd) carried out counter-battery duties. From August 1st to August 11th little of importance in the way of operations occurred. Hostile attacks on Bazentin-le-Petit on the 2nd and against High Wood on the 10th were repulsed by our fire, while on the 4th and the 7th minor infantry engagements were carried out by our troops on the orchards and houses along the north-west edge of Delville Wood and on High Wood respectively.

Very heavy firing took place throughout this period, and during the week ending August 17th the 156th Brigade fired no less than twelve thousand rounds, while the German artillery must have flung something like the same amount into our positions. B/167 (Major Stewart) was shelled out and had to move on the 3rd to a position six hundred yards east of Caterpillar Wood, where it was joined next day by Captain Fetherston's battery (C/167) which had also undergone a severe gruelling at the hands of the enemy. A/167 (Captain Talbot) proved no less unfortunate than the other two batteries, and on the 5th, after a very heavy shelling which lasted all day, it was compelled to move to a position alongside "B" and "C," where it went to form two six-gun batteries instead of three consisting of four guns each. At the same time the brigade was temporarily handed over to the command of Major Stewart, for Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff had on the previous day been evacuated sick to England. Thus the two brigades remained shelling and being shelled, day in day out, until August 11th, when the other two brigades (162nd and 166th) came up into the line from the Dernancourt rest area and relieved them. The 156th and 167th had been in action continuously since July 16th under the most trying and harassing of conditions. They had been subjected to shelling more severe than any yet experienced in the war, and, when they marched out to rest on the evening of the 11th, they were utterly exhausted, utterly worn out, a party of very tired and weary men.

On returning to the line on the 11th the batteries of the 162nd Brigade did not reoccupy their old positions but, after reconnaissance by Lieut.-Colonel Harris, formed two six-gun 18-pdr. batteries under the command of Major Johnston and Captain van Straubenzee, and took up positions on the southern slopes bordering Caterpillar Valley, at a point about three hundred yards N.N.W. of Montauban. At the same time D/162, which from the 8th onwards had been sending parties up from Dernancourt to dig gun-pits and prepare the place for occupation, came into action under the northern bank of Caterpillar Valley about five hundred yards to the right front of the other two batteries, which was the position it had originally been intended to occupy on July 15th. The 166th Brigade took up positions 500 yards north of Caterpillar Wood.

While these two brigades had been out at rest a change had taken place amongst the infantry, and the guns now covered the 33rd Division (forming part of the XV. Corps), with the 14th Division on the right and the 1st Division on the left, the tactical command of the batteries being in the hands of the 14th Divisional Artillery. From the 11th until the 18th the lull in infantry fighting, which had been noticeable in this sector since the beginning of the month, continued, but the work of the guns was as usual very heavy. In addition to counter-battery work and minor bombardments, four hundred and fifteen 18-pdr. rounds by day and five hundred by night had to be expended by each brigade on searching and sweeping roads and hollows behind the brigade zone, while the 4·5 in. howitzers carried out the same work to the extent of two hundred and thirty-three rounds by day and one hundred and sixty-six by night. The zone in question was the extreme right of the 33rd Divisional front, along the enemy front line known as Wood Lane. Fortunately for the batteries, hostile shelling upon the gun positions was far less violent than had been the case before the two brigades went into rest, and it was now possible to get through a very fair amount of registration without interference from enemy shell fire; this was important, for the guns had to be ranged upon a number of new points owing to the change in position, while a wireless set which had been installed at Brigade Headquarters enabled numerous "N.F." calls to be picked up from our aeroplanes, all of which were acted upon by the howitzer batteries of the respective brigades.

On the 16th orders were received for an attack to be delivered on Friday, the 18th, and in preparation for this the ammunition allotted for night firing was doubled on the nights of the 16th and 17th, while by day the guns bombarded Wood Lane, cutting the wire and shelling not only the trench but also No Man's Land in front thereof, lest the German machine-gunners should creep out forward and thereby escape our barrage. At 2.45 P.M. on the 18th the attack was launched by the 33rd Division, with the 14th Division on its right. In addition to the preceding two-days shelling, the whole of the morning of the attack, with two short forty-minute intervals, was devoted to barrage firing on the enemy trenches, the barrage of 18-pdrs. lifting at three given times to suggest an impending assault, whereupon the 4·5 in. howitzers, a few minutes after the "lift," dropped back on to Wood Lane (the enemy front line) to catch such of the enemy as had manned the parapet to withstand an attack. Immediately prior to zero hour there was no bombardment; it was hoped to start the attack simultaneously along the whole front, and the best means of achieving this was considered to be an opening of the barrage at zero itself, without any bombardment during the preceding five minutes.

The order of battle in this attack showed the XIII. Corps on the right, the III. Corps on the left and the XV. Corps in the centre. The two flank Corps successfully gained their objectives, as did also the right of the XV. Corps, but the 33rd Division was held up partly by flank machine-gun fire and partly by hostile machine guns which had, after all, succeeded in pushing forward into shell holes in No Man's Land, and had thus avoided our barrage. The objective of the 33rd had been Wood Lane Trench, from about 150 yards north-west of its junction with Orchard Trench to the cross-roads just outside the western corner of High Wood; at 3.15 P.M., when the failure of the infantry to gain the objectives was realised, the batteries of the 162nd and 166th brigades dropped their range from the protective barrage they had established four hundred yards beyond Wood Lane Trench, and put down a heavy barrage along a line two hundred yards north-east of the trench. This was maintained throughout the afternoon until, the position on the right being somewhat obscure, the batteries were requested by the 14th Division to lengthen their range by one hundred yards. A situation report was received shortly afterwards, however, which entirely justified the original shortening of the range, and this was resumed till half-past seven in the evening when normal night firing was begun. Once again the attack had been beaten off by the deadly and ubiquitous machine guns, and once again our infantry looked at the grim and forbidding Wood Lane Trench across a No Man's Land thick with dead and wounded.

On the 19th the zones of the batteries side-slipped two hundred yards to the right, and for two days registration, in addition to the usual harassing fire, was carried out on the new zones. Teams were at work day and night to replenish ammunition which the past few days had seen so lavishly expended, and, thus reinforced, a further effort was made on the 21st to advance our line in the neighbourhood of Wood Lane and Tea Trench (running N.E. from Wood Lane), while the 14th Division advanced to the capture of the last line of enemy defences in Delville Wood.

Once again we were defeated; after a short preliminary bombardment Wood Lane was assaulted at 3.30 P.M., while at 1.30 A.M. on the following morning (22nd) the attack on Tea Trench was carried out, but in neither case were we able to advance. The enemy front line was stiff with men and machine guns, and our troops were swept away by a blast of fire before they were even able to get to grips with the enemy. Thus ended a tragic series of short attacks on portions of the enemy trenches, attacks which failed in their objects, which wore out our troops—infantry and gunners alike—and which cost us many thousands of lives that we could ill spare.

On the afternoon of August 22nd signs and portents were not lacking of a new and great effort all along the line to continue the advance which latterly had been so severely held up. The previous day Lieut.-Colonel Harris (162nd Brigade) had been ordered to reconnoitre a position for a forward gun which should be able, at a range of not more than 2,000 yards, to enfilade the new German trench running north-east from Wood Lane, and such a position had, after taking bearings from various O.P.'s, been chosen. Now, at 4 P.M. on the 22nd, the gun was ordered into action, and was accordingly brought into position in a shell-hole on the southern edge of the road which ran east and west due north of Bazentin-le-Grand. Three hundred rounds were dumped alongside it, the whole was placed under command of Lieutenant V. Benett-Stanford (C/162), and a most satisfactory registration was obtained with seventy rounds burst immediately over and into the enemy trench in true enfilade at a range of 1,600 yards. Following on this, on the morning of the 23rd, the 156th Brigade came out of rest and went into action about half a mile south-west of Montauban, as a group under Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd; to this group was added A/167 which took up a position in the same area, and later B/167 which, on the 25th, joined the 156th Brigade group in a position near A/167. The 167th Brigade, now under the command of Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, did not come into action as a unit, but kept its remaining battery out at rest to replace casualties as they might occur.

On the 23rd the orders for the attack were received. This time it was to be the biggest operation since July 14th, the order of battle showing the French to attack on the right from the Somme itself to Maurepas, the XIV. Corps from south of Guillemont to the western edge of Ginchy Village, the XV. Corps from a point in the Longueval-Flers road north of Delville Wood to the western edge of High Wood, and the III. Corps from that point westwards to the extreme left of the attack.

On the immediate front of the batteries (of which the 156th group was attached to the 7th Division, the 162nd and 166th to the 14th Division), the right infantry brigade (100th) of the 33rd Division was to establish itself in Wood Lane, while the 14th Division was to advance the right of its line so as to connect up with the left of the XIV. Corps, to clear the remainder of Delville Wood, to establish a line outside the wood from the position already held by the Division in Beer Trench to the Longueval-Flers road, and there to connect up with the right of the 33rd Division. The bombardment began at 3.45 P.M. on Thursday, the 24th, and, so far as the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery were concerned, consisted in shelling New Trench (behind Wood Lane) and the ground in rear thereof, Tea Trench, Tea Lane and Tea Support (west of the Longueval-Flers road), but chiefly Tea Trench, while the advanced enfilade gun of the 162nd Brigade was ordered to sweep New Trench in enfilade from 5.45 P.M. until the moment of attack. The average rate of fire was one round per gun per minute, but towards the close of the bombardment the rate gradually quickened up until, at zero, the rate of fire became intense.

Zero hour was at 6.45 P.M. on the 24th, and, two minutes after the infantry had gone over the top, a general lift was started by the guns. The howitzers lengthened their range straight away and bombarded the Flers-Longueval road, while the 18-pdr. barrage gradually crept forward by 25 yards at a time, until it finally came to rest along a line about 200 yards north-east of the infantry objective. At a quarter-past six the rate of fire dropped to the original one round per gun per minute, while at half-past ten the close barrage was terminated and intermittent searching and sweeping of the enemy zone was adopted in its stead.

Meanwhile, how had the day gone with the infantry? On the extreme right the French had won a great victory and had swept all before them; the XV. Corps had gained all its objectives save the extreme eastern corner of Delville Wood and a small portion of Beer Trench, while on our own immediate zone the infantry had at last swept over the objectives they had for so long striven to capture; the enfilade gun in particular did tremendous damage, the infantry reporting numbers of the enemy found dead in New Trench and thereby testifying to the great effects which may be expected of field guns firing in true enfilade. All night long till 7.30 A.M. on the 25th the batteries stood by to answer S.O.S. calls, and kept a slow rate of fire on their zones whilst the infantry consolidated the position, but no counter-attack materialised, and in the morning we still held firmly the ground we had captured the previous day. Great praise accrued to infantry and gunners for the success of these operations; in particular the G.O.C. R.A. 14th Division sent personal congratulations to Lieut.-Colonel Harris (162nd Brigade) who, from his observation station near Longueval whence all the battle could clearly be viewed, sent back situation reports which reached the General Officer commanding the 33rd Division before reports came in from any other source, thereby enabling him to deal quickly with every new point as it arose. There was only one disappointing feature in the whole of the attack, and that was the enormous number of "dud" shells fired by our heavy artillery. Not more than 40 per cent. of their shells burst properly, whilst the German heavies obtained at least 95 per cent. detonations which caused the most appalling destruction wherever they occurred. It was a sidelight—but an important one—of the battle, nor, for many months, did this serious state of affairs right itself.

Hitherto the enemy had not shown many signs of retaliation for the operations of the past few days, but at 8 o'clock on the morning of Friday, the 25th, the storm broke. Every battery position was heavily bombarded throughout the day with shells of every calibre up to 8 in., and this at a time when it was essential that ammunition wagons should be able to reach the guns to refill their depleted stocks. All day long the storm raged so severely that in certain cases the detachments had to be withdrawn from the guns. Major Johnston of B/162 was killed whilst sending his men into cover—a loss which the brigade ill could suffer—and many of the detachments were killed and wounded; so violent, indeed, was the shell fire that the 18-pdr. battery positions of the 162nd Brigade, churned up from end to end, were rendered quite uninhabitable, and during that night and the following day new positions were taken up about 500 yards further to the north-east.

While this was going on, the batteries of the 156th Brigade group were also changing positions, but this time for tactical purposes. In order to be able to bombard Ginchy, new positions 1,500 yards south-east of Longueval and along the sunken road running from that village to Bernafay Wood had been reconnoitred, and were now taken up, while the zones of the other brigades at the same time side-slipped 800 yards to the right and covered the ground immediately north-east of Delville Wood. Fearful weather, moreover, broke over the whole battlefield. Rain and wind in endless storms turned the countryside into a vast sea of mud, and, catching the batteries of the 156th and 162nd Brigades in their new and only partially prepared positions, caused them not merely extreme discomfort but real difficulty in being able to fight their guns at all. No roads led to the batteries, but merely dry weather tracks across roughly beaten-down shell holes and trenches, and for a time it seemed as though they must be cut off from all sources of ammunition supply. Nevertheless, during the 27th and 28th the wagons of the batteries, aided by our own D.A.C. and the Column of the 7th Division, struggled through the mud with load after load, gunners and passing infantry helping the teams to reach the positions, and by the evening of the 27th not only had all the batteries refilled their normal gun-line dumps, but the 156th Brigade had gone even further and had brought up 6,000 rounds per battery in conformation with an order they had only received 24 hours previously! It had been intended on the 29th to resume the offensive with the French and Fourth Armies, and indeed the 156th Brigade group did actually carry out a seven-hour bombardment of Ginchy before the order to stop reached them; the weather was too bad, no infantry could have attacked with any hope of success, and accordingly the operations were postponed until finer weather should supervene.

This lull was very welcome, for it gave the batteries an opportunity of digging in and of draining their positions so as to render them slightly more habitable. The infantry of the 14th Division had, on the 26th and 27th, bombed their way with only minor artillery support right through the remaining corner of Delville Wood, and now held the entire wood together with a portion of Beer Trench which hitherto had successfully resisted capture. The position therefore seemed entirely favourable for a renewal of the attack if only the weather would clear, but this it showed no signs of doing.

As a matter of fact, the first renewal of hostilities came from the German side. On the 30th the 33rd Division infantry had been relieved by the 24th Division, and hardly had the latter settled into their trenches when, at 1 P.M. on the 31st, the Germans launched a big attack along the whole line from High Wood to east and south-east of Delville Wood. A heavy barrage was immediately opened upon them, while Captain van Straubenzee and Lieut. Body, who were at the O.P. at the time, got all the guns of the 162nd Brigade to bear with tremendous effect upon a large force of the enemy in Cocoa Lane, and the infantry on the front of the 33rd Divisional batteries held their ground. For a long time the situation was obscure and, indeed, extremely anxious; the final report, however, showed that the part of Tea Trench lying west of the Flers Road and a portion of Wood Lane had been evacuated by our infantry, but that elsewhere no serious encroachment had occurred on our front, although serious reports were heard of the state of affairs to the east of Delville Wood.

So ended the month of August, and with September there came an improvement in the weather, and a consequent promise of further operations. On the afternoon of the 1st the expected orders were received; once again the French and the Fourth Army were to attack, once again was an attempt to be made to beat down the stubborn German resistance. The bombardment was due to begin on the 2nd, but before this could be done a slight rearrangement of the batteries had to be carried out. On the night of August 31st, from 11 P.M. till 4 P.M. on the morning of the 1st, thousands of lethal and lachrymose shells had been poured down upon the batteries of the 156th Brigade group, and especially upon A and B/167. Casualties from gas poisoning were fortunately slight owing to the immunity offered by P.H. helmets, but B/167 proved an exception and suffered so many casualties, including its battery commander, that it had to be withdrawn immediately from the line, its place being taken by C/167 which, it will be remembered, was still out at rest. At the same time Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart took over the command of the 166th Brigade in place of Lieut.-Colonel Murray, who was evacuated also suffering from gas poisoning.

The bombardment for this new attack began at 8 A.M. on the 2nd, operation orders showing that it was to be on a great scale, extending along the whole of the Fourth Army front from Thiepval on the left to Guillemont on the right, and from there being carried on by the French to as far south as the Somme. The Fourth Army attack was to be carried out by the XIV. Corps (on the right), the XV. (centre) and the III. Corps (on the left), the objectives of the XIV. Corps being Falfemont Farm and Guillemont, and from there to advance and establish a line along the Wedge Wood-Ginchy road to as far north as the right of the XV. Corps. The XV. Corps aimed at capturing Ginchy and its surrounding trenches, also Vat Alley, Pint Trench to its junction with Ale Alley, and Ale Alley itself. Further to the left the 24th Division were ordered to capture Beer Trench from its junction with Ale Alley, or such portions as had not been previously captured, to retake the portion of Wood Lane which they had lost during the previous two days and to link up with the 1st Division on their left, the objective of which was the north-east half of Wood Lane and the German intermediate line both to High Wood and to a point 200 yards west thereof. The 162nd and 166th Brigades were supporting the 24th Division, while the 156th Brigade group bombarded Ginchy.

All the day and night of the 2nd and during the morning of the 3rd the guns bombarded their allotted targets—the enemy front and support line and the hollows in which his reserves might congregate. Very special injunctions had been issued by the Commander-in-Chief for every possible step to be taken which would lead to success, and all ranks were to be fully impressed with the necessity of knowing what was expected of them. In addition, every care was to be taken to nurse guns and howitzers during the bombardment, so that as many as possible might be in action when the infantry assault took place.

Zero hour was noon on Sunday, September 3rd, and it is most satisfactory to note that, as the infantry went over the top, every gun and howitzer in the brigades was in action, firing at intense rate and none the worse, owing to careful attention, for the heavy work of the previous days. Lieut.-Colonel Harris observed and reported upon the battle during the entire day from his observation station in an old German trench west of Delville Wood, and from his position informed Divisional Headquarters of the somewhat sensational events of the day, sensational in victory upon most parts, in unexpected reverses around High Wood.

At first the attack swept forward unchecked; at 12.15 P.M. Cameron Highlanders of the 1st Division were seen to advance into Wood Lane almost without opposition; parties proceeded round the east corner and along the north-east face of the trench[1] and reached, towards the east, a point fifty yards beyond the enemy trench. At the same time parties crossed Wood Lane and were seen to jump into the trench running eastwards along the crest. At 12.30 P.M. a second infantry battalion left Black Watch Trench, about three hundred yards south-west of Wood Lane, and advanced towards the latter under heavy machine-gun fire from the right flank; the Camerons were still seen to be advancing over the sky-line east of High Wood, and seemed to be working towards New Trench which ran at right angles to Wood Lane. At 1.25 P.M. these troops appeared to be held up by parties of the enemy, but the Camerons surrounded the latter to the north and bombing encounters took place; the whole of the remainder of the Camerons then disappeared over the sky-line towards Switch Trench, where they were stopped and suffered heavy casualties. During all this time there was very little hostile artillery activity except for a medium barrage of 5·9 in.'s upon Delville Wood, and the infantry attack continued successfully and uninterrupted, the depth of assault being small.

Footnote 1:

_The front-line here ran north-west and south-east._

At two o'clock in the afternoon, however, came the first hint of the turn of the tide. A report was received that large numbers of the enemy were collecting in Switch Trench along two hundred yards of its length east of the Flers-Longueval road, and the howitzers opened a fifteen minutes' intense bombardment for their dispersal. At twenty-five minutes past three the enemy were seen to advance on Wood Lane, our infantry retiring about two hundred yards in front of them. The Germans came from a north-easterly direction, entered the east corner of High Wood, the north-west portion of Wood Lane and the trench running east along the crest; we still held the southern portion of Wood Lane. As soon as this was seen, nine guns of the 162nd Brigade were pulled out and switched round on to the enemy counter-attack which, however, did not advance over the crest but halted on reaching the trench running along the crest. At the same time small parties of the enemy were seen advancing westwards from the gate which stood out on the sky-line midway between High Wood and Delville Wood. By 3.35 P.M. the enemy were occupying the whole of the sky-line from High Wood for three hundred yards eastwards, and appeared to be unmolested by any artillery fire except that of the nine guns already referred to. No other battery or brigade appeared to get on to them or even to observe them, and this extraordinary and quite inexplicable state of affairs lasted for a considerable time. Not till very late was any sort of barrage put down upon them, and even then it was a long way over the crest and very meagre in quality. In the meantime the enemy dug themselves in again, and at ten minutes to six about one hundred of our men were seen actually retiring from the direction of Switch Trench.

Thus, on this front, the whole attack was rendered utterly fruitless by the assaulting troops being apparently ignorant of the nature and locality of their objective; consequently, finding little resistance, they overran the points to be taken, and were cut up on retiring. The attack itself in its initial stages was as fine as there ever has been, and had the promise of a great victory, but the final result of the whole day's operation was that our line at seven o'clock in the evening between High Wood and Delville Wood was the same as before the attack, while the sacrifice and loss of life had been appalling. It was all the more difficult to bear this disappointment, moreover, when news of the battle on the rest of the front was received. All along the line great successes had been achieved both by our troops and by the French; the roll of prisoners and captured guns was appreciably swelled, and a considerable and important advance had been made. Only on the High Wood-Delville Wood sector did the front remain unchanged; there the two woods, black, forbidding and grim, shattered by shells and burnt by both sides to clear the appalling stench of the dead, stood like two sentinels barring all further progress, obstacles of the most deadly type.

It was not granted to the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to see these two woods completely and permanently in our hands. On the morning of the 5th the battery commanders of the 1st and 2nd New Zealand Field Artillery Brigades came up with one section apiece, and began to take over from the 33rd battery commanders. Next day, Wednesday the 6th, the relief was complete; New Zealanders took over our positions together with the support of the front, and the batteries wound their way wearily back to the wagon lines, whence, after a short halt, they continued the march to Bonnay (156th and 162nd Brigades) and to Neuville (166th and 167th Brigades).

Thus closed a chapter in the life of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. For eight continuous weeks—with one rest of ten days in the middle—they had been in action in the Battle of the Somme, the greatest offensive undertaken up to that date. For eight weeks they had continuously bombarded the enemy and had, as continuously, been raked by hostile shell fire in return. It would be impossible to estimate the number of shells—which ran into tens of thousands—which the batteries had fired in that period; suffice it to say that in spite of nervous and physical exhaustion, in spite of the fact that seldom could more than two hours' sleep in twenty-four be obtained, that food was oft-times short, that daily the men saw their comrades maimed, shattered, blown to pieces before their eyes, and daily waited for their own turn to come; despite all these trials and horrors not one single order was ever issued to the batteries, not one single request was ever made by the infantry which was not immediately acted upon by the guns. Eight different divisions were covered by the batteries during the period July 15th to September 6th; fourteen separate attacks were carried out during that time and, whether acting under the orders of their own C.R.A. or of the C.R.A. of a strange division, the part allotted to the batteries was invariably carried out to the letter.

From August 1st onwards the headquarters of the 33rd Divisional Artillery had remained out at rest, and the tactical handling of the brigades had, during all the remainder of the time and in all the succeeding battles, been under the control of other and strange divisions. In view of this, it would be impossible to praise too highly the Brigade commanders who throughout the operations were responsible for the handling of the batteries; to the battery commanders there was always—even in the worst of times—the supreme comfort of knowing that behind them was their own brigade headquarters, and that whatever happened they were amongst friends; but to the brigade commanders there was the great responsibility, the great burden of knowing, during the final five weeks, that above them, watching them, relying upon them, was a strange division with whom they had never co-operated before, whose officers were, in many cases, unknown to them.

Yet the real and full measure of praise was due and was agreed by all to be due entirely to—the men. No words can aptly describe their splendid courage and endurance maintained right up to the end of these eight weeks of continual battle; those men who, some of them twelve months before, had been ordinary civilians, who in the early days of July had marched from Cuinchy and Cambrin, full of enthusiasm and eagerness, up to this their first battle, _they_ were the real victors. As they marched back now to the wagon lines, a body of tired and weary men with the strain of the past weeks writ deeply in their faces and in their eyes; as they turned their backs upon the battery positions, where the torn and shell-strewn ground held many a rough cross and many a mound to bear silent but eloquent testimony to the sacrifices which had been made, they presented a spectacle to silence for ever the pessimists and pacifists at home who, by their whining and selfishness, were undermining the morale of the nation. If the men of England, half-trained, inexperienced, civilians of twelve months ago can perform such deeds as these, then must England indeed live!