PART I.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS. (APRIL-MAY 1918.)

Early on the morning of Tuesday, April 9th, there came to the batteries, as they lay resting in their wagon-lines, the sound of tremendous shelling to the south, a continuous thunder which was maintained throughout the whole of that and the succeeding day (April 10th), giving rise to considerable speculation and rumour. Clearly a great weight of artillery was at work and almost certainly an attack was, if not already begun, at least imminent, but what was happening and why did not the batteries move up to take part in the battle? Of news or orders there were none, and not for many hours did the men learn of the mighty German thrust which even then was in progress, the thrust which, starting between Givenchy and Bois Grenier on the 9th, spread northwards to Messines on the 10th and marked the beginning of the greatest battle yet seen on the Flanders front.

At last, on the afternoon of April 10th, news came to the 156th Brigade that the Germans had attacked and advanced on a long front between Ploegsteert Wood and Givenchy; that they had taken Armentières and had advanced well in the direction of Bailleul, though Neuve Église was still ours, and that the batteries were to move up into action immediately to stop this onslaught. At 5.0 P.M. the march began, and the brigade set out for its rendezvous, a point about one mile west-north-west of Neuve Église, which it reached in pitch darkness after many weary hours on roads greatly congested by traffic and by refugees who, in the last stage of exhaustion, had scarcely strength to get out of the way of our troops. Here the situation was found to be very obscure; nobody knew where the infantry were, but warnings were received that parties of Germans were believed to be little more than a mile to the south, and at any moment the guns might be called upon to open fire. Consequently the horses remained fully harnessed up all night and practically alongside the guns, the latter having their trails dropped in a position ready to fire, Lewis guns and guards were posted in every battery position, and so the brigade stood awaiting information which would clear up a little the prevailing chaos.

At three o'clock on the morning of Thursday, the 11th, the expected orders arrived, and at half-past four began the march to Vierstraat, where positions had been allotted to the brigade. By ten o'clock Lieut.-Colonel Butler had completed his reconnaissance of Vierstraat cross-roads, by half-past ten the four battery commanders were engaged upon the same work, and midday saw the batteries in action bombarding the enemy who had by then reached a line running just east of Wytschaete and curving away thence towards the north-east. The battery positions lay around Vierstraat and between that village and Kemmel, and from observation stations north-east of Wytschaete the S.O.S. lines of the guns were quickly registered.

Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade, farther back in the Poperinghe rest area, had also received urgent orders to move into action. On the morning of April 10th the batteries had paraded for a drill order of the whole brigade and had moved off to some open country near by to begin the exercise. While this was actually in progress a dispatch rider arrived and brought the parade to an abrupt conclusion, for he carried with him orders for the brigade to join the 19th Division at Dranoutre immediately and to move into action without a moment's delay. Leaving Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant) to collect the batteries and lead them to the rendezvous, Lieut.-Colonel Skinner (O.C. 162nd Brigade) set off by motor with his orderly officer to report for orders to the C.R.A. 19th Division near Neuve Église. Owing to various difficulties on the way these orders were not received until 2.0 P.M., but their effect was that Colonel Skinner should bring his batteries into action immediately near Spanbroekmolen. As no horses were available, the reconnaissance of these positions had to be carried out on foot and took a long time, but when the positions were finally chosen the orderly officer (Lieut. Bartholomew) was sent back to Dranoutre to await the arrival of the batteries and to guide them to their positions.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

APRIL—AUGUST 1918.

H.Q.R.A.

C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.

Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E. D.S.O. Durie, D.S.O., Bownass, M.C. M.C.

Brig.-Gen. G. H. W. Nicholson, Major W. A. T. C.M.G. Barstow, D.S.O., M.C.

156th Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major F. B. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major D. Jones, Carrell. Studd, D.S.O., D.S.O., M.C. M.C. M.C.

Capt. S. G. Taylor, M.C.

Major W. G. Sheeres, M.C.

162nd Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O. (_wounded_).

Lieut.-Colonel Ramsden.

Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Warren, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt, M.C.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major G. Major H. C. Cory, Major M. M. I. Major F. L. Lee, Fetherston, M.C. Body, M.C. M.C. D.S.O., M.C.

Major R. D. Russell, M.C.

Meantime Colonel Skinner set out to find the infantry Brigadier in that part of the line, so that he might inform him of his plans. This was a long and tedious business in an unknown place in a now dark and rainy night, and, on finding the Brigadier, Colonel Skinner to his disgust, if not surprise, was told that the positions he had chosen had, since he had left them, practically fallen into the hands of the enemy. There was only one thing to do, and that quickly. Setting out as fast as possible, he covered the four miles to Dranoutre in pitch darkness and, arriving there at the same time as the batteries, he stopped them and held a consultation with the C.R.A. of the 19th Division, who had just been shelled out of his headquarters. After a short discussion regarding the general situation which, as can be judged by the foregoing narrative, was very obscure, the batteries marched at once into action between Rossignol Wood and Parrot Camp (North of Kemmel Village), and by 3.0 A.M. on Thursday, April 11th, were in action, Brigade Headquarters being at Parrot Camp. Thus they found themselves after a seventeen-mile march along roads congested with troops, transport, refugees and cattle, a march which had been preceded by over an hour's work on drill order the previous morning; unfavourable conditions, those, to usher in one of the greatest battles yet fought.

From April 11th onwards the batteries were under the administration of the 19th Division. Brig.-Gen. Stewart and his staff had, on April 9th, handed over control of the artillery in the Passchendaele sector to Colonel Paterson (119th Brigade R.F.A.), but had marched straight to Dranoutre, and on the 11th remained with headquarters of the 33rd Division. On that fateful day General Stewart commanded a composite infantry brigade until the early morning of the 12th, when he took over command of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on the Meteren front, south of the 156th and 162nd Brigades. The latter were therefore left with the C.R.A. 19th Division.

During this period from the 11th onwards both brigades underwent the severest trials. Great demands were made upon them; the batteries were required to shoot on a big area whenever an enemy attack showed signs of developing, yet never did the guns fail to carry out their work. Attempts were daily made to man O.P.'s on Kemmel Hill, but although the gallantry of observing officers and signallers always enabled communication to be established, the heavy and continuous fire which the enemy brought to bear upon the hill rendered it impossible for that communication to be maintained. In the case of the 156th Brigade observation was usually carried out from a point north-east of Wytschaete, while the batteries of the 162nd Brigade were able to obtain a very good view of the enemy from the ridge just in front of the guns.

From the moment that the batteries dropped into action they were shelled almost continuously, but no infantry actions developed. This was in a large part due probably to the efforts of the batteries, by which every sign of concentration was smashed at the outset. Especially was this the case on the 12th, when small bodies of the enemy were continually advancing in the open, but were as continually broken up by the fire of the guns. Every suspicion of movement was shelled and, whether movement was visible or not, harassing fire was maintained night and day. On the 15th information was received that our line was to be withdrawn to Vierstraat-Lindenhoek, but in the evening this retirement was cancelled, and the fatal morning of April 16th dawned to find the batteries still occupying the same positions.

A dense fog hung over the ground on Wednesday, 16th April, blotting out all vision and deadening sound. There was no suggestion of an enemy attack on the front covered by the batteries, no preliminary bombardment—other than the continuous shelling which had characterised every day since the offensive began—no S.O.S. signals, yet early in the morning of that day the enemy made a heavy attack from the south and, advancing his line in a north-westerly direction, captured Wytschaete Ridge, Wytschaete Village and Wood, together with the Hospice and Peckham. Apparently the Germans, making use of the thick fog, advanced without an artillery barrage, and the same fog hid the infantry S.O.S. signals. The first intimation of an attack was obtained by the Forward Observing officer of the 156th Brigade, who from his O.P. three hundred yards north-east of Wytschaete suddenly saw Germans twenty-five yards away. He opened rifle fire upon these at point-blank range, but needless to say was unable to stop them. He then tried to get away in order to warn the neighbouring batteries, but was shot in the stomach and later died of his wounds. The batteries, however, were by now fully roused and were pouring gun fire into the advancing troops to try and check their onslaught. Those of the 156th Brigade were just able to remain in their positions, and, as soon as dawn broke, set up O.P.'s on the ridge of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road, the original O.P.'s being by then in enemy hands. From this ridge observed fire was directed all day upon Wytschaete Village and Ridge, and great havoc was wrought amongst the Germans as they advanced in the open.

Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade was also enduring a deluge of shell similar to that which was descending upon the 156th but, being further to the right, was in more imminent danger of being captured, since the enemy advance was, as already described, taking the form of a north-westerly sweep from the south. Shorter and shorter grew the ranges of the guns, until at last the necessity of a retirement became imperative; reluctantly the withdrawal began, one section per battery at a time. In this operation conspicuous gallantry was shown by all ranks, for the gun positions were being torn and swept by a veritable tornado of shell which rendered the approach of the teams well-nigh impossible. As an instance of this, the retirement of a section of A/162 under Lieut. J. R. B. Turner may well be quoted; such heavy fire was directed upon his guns that the teams could not get near them, and guns and wagons had to be manhandled out of action. Under a hail of shell each gun in turn was saved, every temporary lull being taken advantage of for a team to dash in, limber up and get clear, and ultimately the section was successfully withdrawn. Similar deeds were enacted in every battery, and ultimately the whole brigade was withdrawn, the leading sections coming into action in fresh positions and covering the withdrawal of the remainder by their fire. By this means every gun was saved, while the continuity of the barrage covering our own infantry was never broken—a most gallant performance by the personnel of the batteries, and a fine example of the tactical handling of a brigade of artillery.

After the first rush the enemy advance slowed down and ultimately stopped, there being no further attack on the evening of the 16th nor on the night of the 16th/17th. Lieut. Bruce and Lieut. McDonald of the 156th Brigade went forward to Byron Farm and got good information regarding the position of the infantry, and during the whole of the night the batteries kept up a slow harassing fire upon all likely places where the enemy might concentrate for a further assault. 162nd Brigade Headquarters, which had been set up in the ruins of a small cottage a short distance in front of the new positions occupied by the batteries, was heavily shelled, although hitherto the spot had been more or less immune; after losing the wireless operator and several men, together with a great deal of stores destroyed, it moved out and was established at dawn with D/162.

Thursday, April 17th, brought with it a heavy enemy bombardment of all the battery positions. The 162nd Brigade, as a result of its retirement on the previous day, lay east of the Millekruisse-Hallebast road, between the road and Kemmel-Beek; Major Cory's battery (B/162) was on the left, nearest Hallebast Corner, with C/162 (Major Body) next on the right. A/162 (Major Fetherston) lay further to the right still, and then came Major Lee's guns (D/162) on the Millekruisse-Kemmel road. The 156th Brigade was still hanging on to the original positions held prior to the enemy attack on the previous day, but the flashes of the more forward batteries must have been clearly visible to the enemy on Wytschaete Ridge, and the guns came in for a heavy gruelling. This did not prevent them, however, from giving the utmost support to a counter-attack launched by our infantry upon Wytschaete at 7.30 P.M., in which the guns of the 162nd Brigade also took a large share. The counter-attack was unsuccessful, and, with the enemy still on Wytschaete Ridge, the necessity of a withdrawal of a portion of the 156th Brigade to a more covered position became apparent. Next day (April 18th) a reconnaissance was carried out and positions were chosen some one thousand yards further west, behind the road known as Cheapside which ran parallel with and about eleven hundred yards west of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road. On the 19th these positions were occupied by two batteries and the guns were registered from just in front, the whole Brigade except for Major Carrell's battery (A/156) being now clustered around Lieut.-Colonel Butler's headquarters in a line five hundred yards in length. A/156 lay further to the north-east, little more than a quarter of a mile from Ridge Wood.

From April 17th until the 25th the enemy did not make any considerable advance, and, although the batteries were daily shelled, a fair amount of opportunity offered itself for strengthening the gun line. A certain readjusting of positions also took place about this time. D/162 sent forward a section under Lieut. Bennet and Lieut. Garrod to a position two hundred yards south of Siege Farm, near the old position which had been held prior to the loss of the Wytschaete Ridge, and from which some excellent harassing fire was carried out. On the 22nd Major Studd (B/156), with only four serviceable guns left, moved two of them some three hundred yards further south on the Kemmel-Ridge Wood road, and to this latter position was added on the 23rd a third gun, received that morning from the I.O.M. On April 24th A/156, who had been very heavily shelled on the previous day, moved two guns to a position three hundred yards north of Siege Farm; the remainder were to have moved thither on the morning of the 25th, but the events of that day, as will presently be shown, put an end to any such ideas. About the 23rd also Major Jones (D/156) put one 4·5 in. howitzer two hundred yards to the north of the A/156 "Siege Farm" section. Thus the batteries were more split up, each brigade having a main line of guns with detached sections thrown out slightly in front, from which latter the majority of the firing was done.

Before the further operations on this front are described a word must here be spoken of the battery wagon-lines. As a rule the wagon-lines were looked upon as comparatively safe—a "cushy" job for those whose lot it was to live there—but the wagon-lines during the German advance were far from restful. True, they did not suffer the dense barrages which the gun line had to face; but they were constantly shelled by high-velocity guns at long range, a most disconcerting performance which meant that day and night, at odd intervals, a shell would crash into the crowded horse-lines or work havoc amongst the men's bivouacs, and even occasional shells are terribly upsetting when they burst amongst a mass of horses. In addition, enemy aeroplanes came nightly and scattered bombs along the length and breadth of the lines, while daily the weary drivers and teams had to make their way up to the batteries with ammunition, usually being shelled all along the road. The consequent strain upon horses and men may well be imagined.

Throughout this period the wagon-lines were kept in two portions—a forward wagon-line, in which were kept the gun teams and such wagons as were necessary to the batteries in a move of any emergency, and rear wagon-lines where lived the main body of drivers and teams. From April 12th until the loss of Kemmel on April 25th the forward wagon-lines of both brigades were situated between Hallebast Corner and Vierstraat, the rear wagon-lines of the 156th Brigade being in the Reninghelst-Ouderdom area, while those of the 162nd Brigade lay at first at Canada Corner, north of Locre, moving on the 17th to the area between Reninghelst and Busseboom. There they were all kept continually moving, sometimes in Reninghelst, sometimes nearer Busseboom, every spot they inhabited being shelled by the enemy and, after a very short period, rendered uninhabitable. In both rear and advanced wagon-lines the casualties amongst horses and men mounted rapidly, but it is safe to say that the "emergency" teams at Hallebast Corner had far the worst time.

To return to the tactical situation, however. On April 19th both brigades had been put under the command of the C.R.A. 9th Division, but on the 22nd the French 28th Division came up into the line and the French Artillery Commander took over control of the 162nd Brigade. Headquarters of the latter moved over to Scherpenberg to be near the French commander, but the distance from there to the batteries was too great for any efficient control to be carried on, and permission was obtained by Lieut.-Colonel Skinner to move his headquarters back to Millekruisse so as to be near the batteries, and also near the commander of a "groupe" of French artillery which had just come up and lay in action to the east of and near the village. Lieut. Norton (C/162), who could speak French fluently, was left as liaison officer with the "C.R.A." of the French division.

The disposition of the two brigades on April 24th, therefore, was as follows. The batteries of the 156th were grouped together about 1,800 yards due north of Kemmel, with an advanced section of 18-pdrs. (A/156) and one advanced 4·5 in. howitzer (D/156) near Siege Farm and about 600 yards in front of the main line of guns. Lieut.-Colonel Butler's headquarters were right amongst his guns, between "C" and B/156, but the remaining two sections of A/156 were some 1,200 yards to the north-east and were so far away that, when the battle began on April 25th, it was found impossible to exercise command over them.

The 162nd Brigade also lay together between the Millekruisse-Hallebast road and the Kemmel-Beek, and therefore slightly in rear of the 156th Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters were in Millekruisse, and in this case one advanced section of 4·5 in. howitzers (D/162) was thrown forward in a position just west of Rossignol Wood.

As far as communications were concerned, a party of scouts was kept on the top of Mount Kemmel in visual signalling with the guns, while O.P.'s were manned at Desinet Farm, at Vierstraat Cross-roads and elsewhere, whence good observation of Wytschaete Valley and Wood and all the country to Spanbroekmolen was obtainable; these O.P.'s were also in visual communication with the guns, but the fog and smoke during the battle of the 25th rendered all their work impossible. Each brigade had, in addition, a liaison officer with the infantry battalion in the line, and therefore the system of communication between infantry and artillery, and the observation kept upon the enemy by the guns, was as good as could be hoped for. Buried cables, however, were scarce, and it needed but a few well-placed shells to cut off all connection of this kind.

April 24th was an unusually quiet day, though prior to this date the enemy counter-batteries had been very active, each of our batteries being carefully and accurately registered. This may have been done by sound-rangers, but stringent precautions to avoid being located by them were taken, and the universal opinion, which was reported by Colonel Butler to Corps Headquarters, was that the location of the batteries was being carried out by expert observers in the German balloons. These had come very close to the line and numbers of them were constantly in the air, entirely unmolested either by the Flying Corps or by the R.G.A. April 24th, therefore, gave little hint of what was coming, unless the exceptional activity of the German anti-aircraft guns were taken as a sign. The quietness, however, was soon to be broken; at 1.0 A.M. on Friday the 25th a few of the batteries were warned that an enemy attack might be expected at dawn, but the remainder were completely unaware that any untoward events were impending until suddenly, at 2.0 A.M., there descended upon them with a roar and a crash the most appalling barrage that they had ever yet undergone.

With a fairly extensive experience of shelling, it was acknowledged by all ranks that never before had such a bombardment been endured. In the battery positions it was hell, the gunners working their pieces in a perfect hailstorm of shell fire, while, to add to this tremendous test of endurance, a large proportion of the barrage consisted of gas shell which necessitated the wearing of gas helmets by all ranks. How any of the guns or gunners survived that terrible morning remains to this day a mystery, yet survive it they did and to most excellent effect. The barrage which enveloped the guns was also beating down upon the front line system, and the batteries, in order to show the infantry that they were not forgotten, opened fire on their S.O.S. lines. It was soon very clear, however, that an attack was imminent, and accordingly "counter-preparation" was begun and continued for several hours.

From 2.0 A.M. until 5.30 A.M. the barrage did not relax, but from 4.30 A.M. onwards high explosive gradually superseded gas shell until the bombardment became one almost entirely of high explosive. Although this change did even more to wreck the battery positions than had the chemical shell, it at least dispersed the gas and enabled the men ultimately to remove their respirators; they were by now almost dropping with the physical exhaustion of firing their guns at top speed in gas helmets, combined with the nervous strain of this terrific bombardment, and a breath of fresh air came to them as a blessed relief.

At 5.30 A.M. a considerable bombardment was maintained on the battery positions, but the full fury of the barrage dropped back on to the infantry and, after resting on the trenches for about forty-five minutes, began to creep forward towards the batteries once more. Under cover of this creeping barrage the enemy infantry advanced to the assault, and as it rolled up inexorably towards the guns again—who all this time were being pounded and smashed by the enemy artillery—the Germans advanced swiftly over the front line and began to approach the battery area. Thick fog enveloped their movements, practically every telephone wire was cut and, as the same fog prevented any visual signalling at all, the situation became extremely obscure. With a visibility of only fifty yards it was impossible for battery commanders to know when the enemy might not be right up to and amongst the guns.

At 6.10 A.M. the infantry got through their last message to the guns; on a buried cable to 156th Brigade Headquarters the company commander of a front-line company stated that he was still being shelled, but that the Germans had so far made no movement. Shortly afterwards the cable was destroyed and a terrible silence, as far as information was concerned, set in. It would appear that, very shortly after the despatch of that last message, the enemy assault was delivered.

At about 7.0 A.M. Lieut.-Colonel MacCullock of the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. rode up to the battery positions. His battalion had been lying in support in the valley of the Kemmel-Beek, where it had been heavily gas shelled, and he now decided to move up to a line of disused trenches on the forward slopes of Hill 44, just in front of the guns. While his men were settling down into position, Colonel MacCullock rode up along the main road to find out what was happening towards Wytschaete, and, penetrating as far as the Grand Bois, he discovered that this was still in our hands, whereupon he returned to complete his dispositions for the defence of Hill 44. While this was still in progress, Lieut. Phipps (156th Brigade) returned from Desinet Farm at about 7.50 A.M. and reported that the enemy's rifle fire had got very near. Owing to the fog he had been unable to see any Germans, but there was no doubt but that they were rapidly approaching; he further added that there were practically no French troops to be seen in that area. Even while he was making his report some French infantry retired through the line of guns, shouting that the enemy were in Kemmel village and were coming on fast. It was therefore clear that there now remained no infantry between the guns and the enemy except for the K.O.Y.L.I. whose right flank terminated in front of B/156, there being from there southwards an ominous gap.

At 8.45 A.M. patrols sent out reported that there were no British troops to be seen on the other side of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road, and following almost immediately upon this news small parties of Germans were seen coming across the road. These were immediately engaged by such of the guns as were still serviceable, but by 10 A.M. the enemy had pushed across the road and, although he did not appear to have made much progress in the visible ground near Godizonne Farm, had got beyond Siege Farm further to the south and was within five hundred yards of the batteries.

Shortly before this last period a decision had had to be come to as to the withdrawal of the guns. The only infantry in the neighbourhood were the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. and some stragglers of the late front-line battalion whom Major Barker (C/156) had collected to form an escort to his guns; the line held by these troops ran about one hundred yards in front of the batteries, but stopped on the right at Hill 44, and south of this point no troops were to be seen at all. Northwards the left of the K.O.Y.L.I. was continued by some other infantry, but the whole line was terribly thin and could not hope to stop a determined rush by the enemy. Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner were therefore faced with this problem:—Hill 44, a slight rise in the ground on the Ridge-Wood—Kemmel road, had a surprisingly good command over the country from Dickebusch Lake round by the west to the northern slopes of Mount Kemmel; it was, therefore, very important to hold it. For this purpose the only infantry available were the 9th K.O.Y.L.I., but they were in the best of spirits. On the other hand, reconnaissance showed that, whereas the Germans were only using volatile gas on Hill 44, they were using mustard gas some 700 yards to the rear, and the natural deduction was that Hill 44 was part of the enemy objective. If, therefore, the enemy gained the hill he would capture the guns _en bloc_, and there would be no further obstacle to impede his progress. It was accordingly decided to withdraw, one by one, a proportion of those guns which were still undamaged, but to keep the remainder in action in their present positions until the retired guns, from a line further back, could open a full volume of covering fire upon the enemy opposite Hill 44.

Hitherto the tactical continuity of the narrative has been maintained in order to relate, as clearly as possible, the true story of the attack by which the Germans captured Kemmel Hill, but now a digression must be made so as to follow closely the action of the batteries in their withdrawal. To do this, the story of each Brigade will be taken separately, beginning with the 156th.

At 9.0 A.M., shortly after the first crossing of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road by the Germans, the order to prepare for a withdrawal was issued from Lieut.-Colonel Butler's headquarters. Since as early as 6.0 A.M. A/156 had in its main position only one gun capable of firing, and by 8.45 A.M. this gun also had been silenced; therefore, on receipt of Colonel Butler's message, the battery withdrew from its main position and moved to a fresh line in the direction of Ouderdom. Shortly afterwards a section of Major Barker's battery (C/156) was also withdrawn.

By 11 A.M. practically all the ammunition in B/156 southern position had been expended, and moreover the guns were unable, owing to trees, to fire at ranges of less than 1,200 yards. Major Studd therefore removed the breech-blocks and dial sights from these guns and, sending back a portion of his detachments to the wagon-lines to hurry up the teams which had already been sent for, concentrated his efforts on the two guns which he had kept in a position 300 yards further north. Of these two guns, one was taken away by a team belonging to C/156 to a previously reconnoitred spot north of La Clytte; the other was run forward by hand, with the assistance of nine men of the K.O.Y.L.I., for a distance of some one hundred yards to the crest of the hill, whence Major Studd and his four remaining gunners engaged the enemy over open sights at a range of 300 yards.

By 11.15 A.M. the remaining two sections of C/156 were in full view of the enemy, some five hundred yards away, and, as their ammunition was running out, a withdrawal to a line north of La Clytte was decided upon. From a position of assembly two hundred yards to the rear the limbers were brought up, one at a time; the first gun got away without being fired upon; the second and third escaped under heavy rifle fire, but the lead driver of the fourth gun took it through a patch of soft ground which made the pace so slow that all the horses and one of the drivers were shot, and the gun had to be abandoned for the time. The withdrawal of this battery was rendered very difficult by the fact that there were only one sergeant and six men still unwounded; all the officers and the remaining other ranks had been either killed or disabled, though Major Barker continued to command his battery despite his wound. They had put up a most brilliant fight, and the gallantry of all ranks was unsurpassable, typical of every battery on this grim morning.

There remained now only the advanced section of A/156, D/156, and the single gun of B/156. The advanced section of A/156 (Lieut. Blackwell in charge) for a long time had been firing upon the enemy at point-blank range; early in the morning teams were sent up to try and save these two guns, but the rapid advance of the enemy had not been realised and, fight to the last though they did with the enemy all around them, the guns together with their teams were captured. The advanced gun of D/156 near by had been knocked out earlier in the day and had to be abandoned, after the withdrawal of dial sights and breech-blocks. D/156 main position had also to be abandoned temporarily.

Thus, by 11.0 A.M. the only gun in action in the forward positions was the solitary 18-pdr. manned by Major Studd and his four men. This little party was now joined by Colonel Butler who, by his quiet bearing and confidence, greatly inspired both gunners and infantry. He collected and controlled a party of machine gunners whose officer had just been killed, and for some time remained with Major Studd's gun, the capture of which was only prevented by the thin line of K.O.Y.L.I. in front. Machine guns and a 5·9 in. howitzer worried this party considerably, but steady harassing fire was kept upon the enemy and prevented them from making any further advance.

At about 11.30 A.M. this single gun was switched round through 180° to fire on some Germans who were making for La Clytte, almost directly in rear. At first about twenty of the enemy were visible who, on being fired at, ran back one hundred yards into some scrub. This movement, however, caused some three hundred of the enemy to get up and bunch round their officers. Major Studd turned his gun on these and obtained a number of bursts right amongst them, with the result that they ran back five hundred yards into a patch of dead ground.

So the morning wore on, the enemy making no considerable advance since he had established himself well across the Kemmel-Vierstraat road. By 1.0 P.M. the ammunition of B/156 solitary gun had all been expended; as its presence was drawing fire upon the K.O.Y.L.I., it was run back behind the slope, and Major Studd, removing breech-block and dial sight, set out with his four men to find out what had happened to the remainder of his battery.

Thus, at 1.0 P.M., the last gun of the 156th Brigade ceased to operate in the forward positions; all the remainder had either got away or been silenced by 11.0 A.M., and it only remained to remove those which had had to be abandoned. At 5.0 P.M. in the evening Captain S. G. Taylor took up teams and attempted to save the guns of B/156, but was only able to reach the single gun in the northern position as it was impossible in the darkness to tell where the enemy was. During the night of 25th/26th and the morning of the 26th the howitzers of D/156 (less the advanced one, which had been hit) were removed from under the enemy's nose, as was also the one gun of C/156 which had been abandoned, and on the morning of the 26th also Captain Taylor brought up his teams and saved the three guns of B/156 in broad daylight with the enemy only four hundred yards away—a very fine performance.

So ended the doings of the 156th Brigade on April 25th; three guns had fallen into the hands of the enemy, but all the remainder, although a few had temporarily to be abandoned, were saved; in every case the guns had been fought to the last, tremendous casualties being inflicted upon the enemy. Let us now turn to the 162nd Brigade and follow their doings also on this memorable day.

The four batteries of the 162nd Brigade had, in common with all the other guns, been enveloped in the tremendous barrage which the enemy put down at two o'clock in the morning. In spite of this terrific storm of shell—the intensity of which may be judged from the fact that Lieut. Squire of B/162 was killed by the concussion of the bursting shell all around him, his body being otherwise unwounded—the detachments under their battery officers' control maintained a steady rate of fire upon the enemy. All communication between "A," "B" and C/162 and Brigade headquarters completely broke down, and runners were either killed or prevented by wounds from reaching their destination; to quote the words of one who was a witness of the batteries' deeds:—"Standing on the fringe of that barrage was hell enough for me; to think of Fetherston, Body, Lee and Cory (the four battery commanders) and all the others walking about in their batteries in the thick of it—I don't know how they ever got out." Casualties came thick and fast amongst the detachments, guns were disabled or completely knocked out, yet the fire of the guns never faltered, and all through the morning they offered a determined opposition to the enemy advance.

The first guns to move back were, of course, the forward section of D/162 at Rossignol Wood. By great good fortune the wire between this forward section and the main battery position remained intact, as did also the wire from there on to Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters, and the most useful information was thereby transmitted to the Divisional Commander. At about 8.0 A.M., the enemy being then almost on top of the two forward guns, orders were sent to Major Lee to withdraw this section, and teams were immediately sent forward under Lieut. Escott to carry this into effect. Making their way through the barrage, the little party reached the forward section just as the latter, who had been firing at intense rate the whole morning, had expended practically all the ammunition. In front the enemy were only three hundred yards away; on either flank they had worked right round until they had almost closed in on the guns, yet the withdrawal was carried out successfully under heavy rifle, machine-gun and shell fire, the gunners with their officers walking beside the guns. It is impossible to say too much for such a fine feat; the section, under two young officers (Lieut. Bennet and Lieut. Garrod, and later Lieut. Escott who was in charge of the teams), had been in a very exposed and advanced position; it came under the most intense fire both prior to and during the retirement, every horse in both teams—there were no wagons—was hit, yet the guns were saved without the loss of a single small store, and all the wounded were brought safely away. In recognition of this performance every driver of both teams was awarded the Military Medal.

Shortly after the return of this advanced section to the main line of guns, the withdrawal of the latter to previously reconnoitred positions began. The batteries had now been firing for many hours in the face of a perfect hail of shell, and, great as had been the tenacity and determination shown by officers and men in keeping up a vigorous rate of fire upon the enemy in spite of terrific retaliation, still greater tenacity and courage was shown in the carrying out of the retirement. For some time past not a single runner had succeeded in making the double journey from Brigade Headquarters to the batteries and back, each man in turn falling a victim to the intensity of the enemy barrage, but finally Lieut. Stanley-Clarke of B/162, with much good fortune and considerable gallantry, succeeded in conveying to the guns the order to withdraw.

Gun by gun the retirement began, each battery retaining a proportion of its guns in the forward position until the remainder had got safely away. It was a performance on the part of the officers, gunners and drivers which has never been surpassed; while other brigades were being forced to abandon their guns, the 162nd Brigade retained practically its full tactical powers. Only three guns, two of C/162 and one of A/162, could not be removed until nightfall and were then got away with the enemy only a few hundred yards distant, but not one single gun was lost to the Germans by the 162nd Brigade on April 25th, and in this achievement they stood practically alone. Many of the neighbouring batteries of other Divisions had earlier been silenced or had been forced to abandon their guns, and too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men of this Brigade who, in the face of overwhelming short-range fire, continued to serve their guns long after they might reasonably have been expected to retire, and even then withdrew them in an orderly manner.

On the withdrawal of the batteries being completed, Brigade Headquarters moved back to a prearranged rendezvous on the Reninghelst-Ouderdom road. No horses or transport could come up to assist in this, and the entire equipment had to be carried by the Headquarters' staff under the direction of Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant). A number of casualties were suffered during the march from shell-fire and from low-flying aeroplanes, but ultimately the new control-post was reached and command of the batteries was carried out from there.

Thus has been described in detail the story of the two brigades and the part they played in one of the great battles which threatened the Channel ports. Before we return to the main narrative again and describe the doings of the rest of that day, a word must be said of the officers and men who put up such a wonderful fight. Names have already been mentioned in connection with deeds of especial gallantry, and yet with hesitation has this been done, for how can one name in one battery be singled out from amongst the others when all behaved in such a magnificent way? Every officer, every man on that day showed such gallantry as can never be surpassed, and proud should be he who can say, "I served with the 33rd Divisional Artillery on April 25th, 1918!"

Yet two names must be mentioned, for without them this narrative would be incomplete. Through all the trials and horrors of the day, through all the great strain of the whole of this period every battery was inspired and encouraged by the presence of the two Brigade Commanders, Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler and Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner. When times were grim and depressing, when the enemy seemed to be pushing remorselessly on, when the brigades, with their backs to the wall, appeared to be forgotten by God and man, there was ever the presence of those two to cheer up and hearten the weary spirits of their officers and men. With the control of the artillery continually passing from one Division to another, even from one nation to another, but little was done for the gunners who were left to look after themselves. Orders from above were few and far between, and in many cases came too late to be of any use; communications from Division and Corps were seldom received, and it remained with the two Brigade Commanders to discuss between themselves the situation as it appeared to them, and to issue orders to the batteries accordingly. The battery commanders and their officers and men—wonderfully gallant fellows all—had behind them the moral support of their Brigade Commanders, but Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner had no such comforting support from above. Yet they were for ever calm, confident and cheerful, and bore the tremendous strain of acting on their own initiative in a way which the batteries strove hard to repay. Colonel Skinner was wounded on May 10th and taken away in an ambulance; Colonel Butler met a soldier's death in the final British advance in the autumn, but the names of both will ever bring to the minds of those who served under them a sense of deep gratitude and a happy memory of a very highly valued friendship.

The main narrative of the battle was broken off at the point where, at 10.0 A.M., the Germans had established themselves firmly across the Kemmel-Vierstraat road and had pushed on past Siege Farm towards the battery positions. It was about this time—shortly before it, to be exact—that the withdrawal of the 156th Brigade had begun, and it was about now that the culminating point of the battle was reached. Having got past Siege Farm, the enemy advance seemed to slow down as though requiring a breathing space, and for this the fire of the guns and of the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. who were still on Hill 44 was largely responsible. At 11.30 A.M., as already recounted, a strong attempt was made by some five hundred of the enemy to work round by the south to La Clytte so as to cut off the retreat of our troops, but this manœuvre was defeated, and Colonel MacCullock, taking the initiative, decided to counter-attack without delay. As many guns as could be collected were warned of the plan but, just as the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. prepared to launch their assault, a counter-attack was delivered by fresh British troops from the direction of La Clytte, with the result that Colonel MacCullock considered that any movement on his part was unnecessary.

A condition of stalemate now ensued. Whenever the enemy showed himself he was fired on, while he on his part began sniping very actively. Artillery fire was slow, taking the form of occasional rounds thrown about promiscuously and varied by five-minute barrages. The roads, however, were kept under constant fire by enemy high-velocity guns, while counter-battery work on both sides was maintained. About 3.30 P.M. one section of A/162, still in action near Millekruisse, fired at the request of the infantry on some Germans who were collected in huts on the far side of Cheapside, and shortly afterwards our infantry reinforcements arrived.

The situation now seemed well in hand, and during that night and the following day no further enemy advance took place. The 162nd Brigade, having succeeded in withdrawing all its guns except three, was able to come into action again immediately, and indeed some of its guns were in their fresh positions before the withdrawal of the remainder had begun. Therefore in a very short time they were all bombarding the enemy from a line east of the Zevecoten-Ouderdom road and, under the orders of the 9th Division, were covering an infantry brigade of the 49th Division along the La Clytte-Millekruisse road. The 156th Brigade had fewer serviceable guns and did not come into action again as a unit until next day, when positions were taken up one mile north of La Clytte and were occupied until the 28th. On the night of the 28th/29th the 156th Brigade pulled out and began to march to the Winnezeele rest area; the German attack on the 29th, about to be described, delayed this march for a few hours, but ultimately Winnezeele was reached. Next morning (30th) this brigade was again called up into action, but only for a few hours, and ultimately returned to Winnezeele with the prospect of a few days of rest ahead.

From April 26th to 28th the whole of the battery area was heavily shelled by the enemy, while the roads and wagon-lines were searched by high-velocity guns. The wagon-lines, indeed, came in for a very bad time and, after being shelled out of different camps, came ultimately to rest about one mile west-south-west of Poperinghe, with forward wagon-lines between Ouderdom and Reninghelst. On the 26th Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters were shelled out and forced to move to Reninghelst, and on the 27th the whole of the 162nd Brigade changed positions; "A," "B" and "C" batteries occupied an area near Goed Moet Mill, east-north-east of Ouderdom, "D" battery moved 600 yards north of Ouderdom, while Brigade headquarters went to De Drie Goen Farm.

On Tuesday, April 29th, even while the relief of the 156th Brigade was still in progress, the combined effort of both brigades was called upon to resist yet another German attack, for at 5.0 A.M. the enemy assaulted with eleven divisions in mass formation, the density being from six to eight bayonets to the yard. It was again the same story, from the batteries' point of view, of terrific shelling resolutely borne, but this time there was the satisfaction of knowing that the work of the guns had been successful. The attack, after getting up to within one hundred yards of the line held by the 49th Division, was repulsed, as was also a second assault at 6.0 A.M.; the German effort to turn the Ridge Wood flank proved a costly failure, and the enemy dead lay in rows in front of our line.

The fight of April 29th was the last big episode of the German offensive in Flanders. From that date onwards there were a number of local actions but no large-scale attacks, nor was any serious penetration made by the enemy. From May 1st until the 7th the 162nd Brigade continued to bombard the enemy and to be heavily shelled in return. On the 6th Brigadier-General Stewart and his Staff took over from the C.R.A. 9th Division the control of the artillery covering the front, which extended from Kruisstraathoek cross-roads on the north to just south of Vierstraat. This artillery consisted of the 50th, 51st and 122nd Brigades (9th Division), the 149th Brigade (30th Division) and the 162nd Brigade. On the 7th/8th, however, one section of the 162nd Brigade was relieved by the 121st and marched into rest at Winnezeele, while at the same time the 156th Brigade came up from the back area and took over the positions of the 149th Brigade, in the very area where the wagon-lines had been when the batteries were in action at Passchendaele five short weeks earlier.

April 29th had been the last large-scale operation which the enemy undertook on the Lys front, but Thursday, May 8th, saw a most determined local action, in which the 156th Brigade and the two sections per battery of the 162nd Brigade still in the line took an active part. At 3.0 A.M. on the morning of the 8th the enemy put down a very heavy barrage on the battery and back areas, to which was added, at 5.0. A.M., a severe bombardment on the front system. All the morning until 11.0 A.M. this barrage continued, and under cover of it the Germans attacked. The right brigade front was penetrated, but the left brigade formed a defensive flank from Hallebast Corner to the southern end of Dickebusch Lake. All day long the batteries fired on their S.O.S. lines, a steady rate being maintained until 6.15 P.M., when a quarter of an hour's intense bombardment was followed by a counter-attack on the part of the 19th Infantry Brigade. By this counter-attack all objectives were regained except on the extreme left where the situation remained obscure, and, after a night of intermittent harassing fire with counter-preparation fired at 3.30 A.M. in the morning (9th), the remainder of the 162nd Brigade withdrew from the line and marched to Winnezeele for a short period of rest.

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

BY

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE.

I wish to convey to all ranks of the Royal Regiment of Artillery my deep appreciation of the splendid service rendered by them in all stages of the Somme and Lys battles since the opening of the enemy's attack.

The difficult conditions imposed by a defensive fight against greatly superior numbers have been faced with the same skill, courage and devotion to duty which characterised the work of all branches of the Artillery throughout the offensive battles of 1917. With less constant and loyal co-operation on the part of both field, heavy and siege batteries, the great bravery and determination of the infantry could scarcely have availed to hold up the enemy's advance. The infantry are the first to admit the inestimable value of the artillery support so readily given to them on all occasions.

The knowledge possessed by each arm, doubly confirmed by the severe tests already passed through successfully, that it can rely with absolute confidence upon the most whole-hearted and self-sacrificing co-operation of the other is the greatest possible assurance that all further assaults of the enemy will be met and defeated. I thank the Artillery for what it has already done, and count without fear of disappointment upon the maintenance of the same gallant spirit and high standard of achievement in the future.

(Signed) D. HAIG, F.-M., British Armies in France.

General Headquarters. _May 9th, 1918._