CHAPTER IX.

WINTER IN THE SALIENT. (DECEMBER 1917—MARCH 1918.)

After the tremendous fighting of the autumn offensive at Ypres and the smashing casualties which were suffered therein by the batteries, a full month in the rest area was required to bring the 33rd Divisional Artillery back to anything like its normal pitch of efficiency once more. Every detachment in every battery had to be reorganised and built up on the foundation of the few remaining gunners who had survived the two months' battle; raw recruits from England needed instruction and drilling, gaps in the non-commissioned ranks awaited filling, newly-joined officers were watched and tested. From highest to lowest the personnel of the two brigades were busily engaged in the tremendous work of smartening up and training, of teaching and of learning, of overhauling equipment and of filling up stores, of removing all traces of the scorching fires through which the batteries had recently passed. By November 3rd both brigades had completed the withdrawal to the wagon-lines at Dickebusch; on the 4th the 156th Brigade marched to the training area around La Nieppe, to be followed the next day by the 162nd Brigade which moved into billets in Bavinchove, Zuytpanne and Trois Rois, all in the neighbourhood of Cassel. Here for a week they remained, at first resting and refitting, then beginning the more elementary forms of training and gradually bringing the batteries back to something approaching a state of efficiency once more.

On November 12th a move was made to the Bouvelinghem area, still further from the line. The 156th Brigade found billets in Bas Loquin and Warlez, the 162nd in Alquines, Le Buisson and Haute Planque. Billets were none too good and horse lines had to be set up in the open, but the surrounding country was more suitable for the advanced training which now became possible, and in real earnest did the instruction and drilling of the batteries set in. Gun drill and driving drill became a daily affair, while battery staff work and manœuvring in the open were added to the curriculum. Training of every description, combined with sports, races and concerts, kept the men busy and contented, with the result that efficiency and smartness appeared once more and the havoc of the autumn became almost completely effaced. As the month wore on and time for a return into action drew near the condition of the batteries grew daily better, and by the end of November it could fairly be said that both brigades had very nearly reached their old high standard once more.

It had been generally understood that a bare four weeks of rest could be hoped for, and that the end of the month would see a return into action. On November 22nd Brigadier-General Stewart and his staff had moved up to the Menin Gate at Ypres to take over command of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division, then holding the line at Passchendaele, and daily the order was expected for the batteries to follow. Semi-officially it had been stated that the brigades would be in action by December 3rd, but night set in on November 30th without any warning order having been received, and the line was distant a full three days' march. It was difficult to believe that, with so much time to spare for the issuing of warning orders, any sudden move could be contemplated, yet that was actually what took place. At five o'clock on the evening of Saturday, December 1st, orders were received for the batteries to march at 8.0 A.M. on the following morning and, moreover, to be in action by the evening of December 3rd.

Such haste, such rushing and such short notice seemed strange, in view of the fact that for over a week the batteries might have had the preliminary notice; yet fourteen hours, and fourteen hours of darkness at that, was all the warning that was received, and far into the night the detachments laboured by the light of lanterns, packing the vehicles and getting ready to move at daybreak. To reach the line in two days meant a very considerable march table for each day, and Zermezeele had accordingly been fixed as the billeting area of the batteries for the night of December 2nd/3rd. Late in that evening and in darkness the brigades, after a long day of trekking, laboured in to the lines allotted to them and hastily settled for the night, as an early start was ordered to be made on the following day.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

DECEMBER 1917—MARCH 1918.

H.Q.R.A.

C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.

Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E. D.S.O. Durie, D.S.O., Bownass, M.C. M.C.

156th Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major F. B. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major D. Jones, Carrell. Studd, M.C. D.S.O., M.C. M.C.

Capt. S. G. Taylor.

162nd Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O.

Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.

"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.

Major W. G. Major H. C. Cory, Major M. M. I. Major F. L. Lee, Pringle, M.C. M.C. Body, M.C. M.C.

Major G. Fetherston, M.C.

At daybreak on December 3rd the march was resumed, and now further rush tactics were adopted. The personnel of one section per battery was conveyed to Ypres by motor lorry while the remainder of the batteries continued the march by road, for it was intended to take over a portion of the battery positions that very night in the line, so that on the following morning the 33rd Divisional Artillery would be able to assume responsibility for the artillery support of the zone without further delay. By midday these advance parties had "debussed" at Potijze Château, where guides were waiting for them, and by three o'clock in the afternoon control of one section per battery had been taken over, while every battery commander was busying himself in learning from his "opposite number" the zone to be covered and the general characteristics of the battery position itself. Thus the programme had been adhered to, and by the evening of the 3rd a portion of the relief was carried out; just forty-eight hours after the receipt of the warning order, and thirty-six hours since the beginning of the march from a training area so far distant as to be within ten miles of Boulogne, two guns per battery of both brigades were in action once more.

While all this had been going on at the gun line, the remainder of the brigades had marched to the wagon-lines which they were to occupy during such time as the batteries were in action—the 156th Brigade taking over an area 1,200 yards south-east of Vlamertinghe, where permanent huts and stables were being built on either side of the road, while to the 162nd Brigade had been allotted an open area half a mile west of Ypres, between Goldfish Château and Belgian Battery Corner. These lines were reached late on the evening of the 3rd and were extremely difficult to get into, in the case of the 162nd Brigade, owing to the fact that the approaches from the road were rendered quite impassable by mud. A most uncomfortable night was spent on the side of the road, and not until daylight came was there any chance of getting horses and men into their permanent "billets"—mud lines and tents in the month of December! Longer notice, less rushing and a spreading of the march over three days would have meant much to both horses and men, yet the programme had been organised and ordered by some Higher Command which was for ever impressing upon Divisional Artilleries the importance of the care of horses and the need of avoiding any unnecessary overwork or strain!

On Tuesday, December 4th, the remaining two sections per battery marched up to the gun line, led by guides from the advance parties, and completed the relief of the outgoing units, the 26th and 311th Army Field Artillery Brigades. The 156th Brigade together with D/162 formed No. 1 Group of the artillery covering the divisional front and was placed under the command of 158th Brigade Headquarters, while Lieut.-Colonel Skinner (162nd Brigade) commanded No. 2 Group which comprised the 18-pdr. batteries of his own brigade. This was, however, only a temporary arrangement, for on December 17th Lieut.-Colonel Butler (156th Brigade) took over command of No. 1 Group which was enlarged to contain the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, while Colonel Skinner and his headquarters moved out to the wagon-line, leaving the 186th Brigade to form No. 2 Group.

As matters now stood, the whole of the 33rd Division was concentrated together, the artillery covering for once its own infantry on the Passchendaele Ridge-Crest Farm-Meetcheele Line. The batteries of the 156th Brigade all lay along the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road north-west of Zonnebeke, between Windmill Cabaret and Kansas Cross, and covered the right of the zone, while the 162nd Brigade supported the left zone from positions around Gravenstafel. "A" and B/156, however, moved their guns to the vicinity of Otto Farm on the 12th and 14th respectively.

Infantry action was at a standstill, for the mud and general condition of the ground precluded movement of any sort; in few places, indeed, was there any fire-trench at all, fortified shell-holes linked together in groups and half-full of water offering the only possible cover to the front-line troops. The forward system was almost completely cut off by a vast sea of mud which extended back to and beyond the battery positions and was traversed at intervals by narrow duckboard tracks, the sole means of communication from front to rear. Any smashing of those tracks, any detour from them to avoid shell-fire meant hours of struggling through the slime, while the wretched men who got wounded while crossing the morass were, as likely as not, engulfed in the mud and never seen again.

Infantry operations, it has been said, were at a standstill, but the same could by no means be recorded of the artillery. From dawn till dusk the enemy was for ever pounding away at our lines, raking battery positions from end to end and destroying the wooden roads which offered the only possible route for the supply of ammunition and rations. Gravenstafel, Kansas Cross and the road right back to Wieltje were in a continual state of eruption, while devastating shell-storms daily descended upon the battery area between Gravenstafel and Zonnebeke. It was a grievous time for the gunners; dug-outs were impossible, as water was met only eighteen inches below the surface, and pill-boxes were few and far between. Even the latter, with their doors facing towards the east, were by no means sure refuges, and it was while actually standing inside such an one that Captain Gallie, who had distinguished himself so wonderfully in the autumn fighting, was killed on December 14th. The only way to minimise casualties was to scatter a number of little shelters all around the battery positions and, by keeping the men thus separated, to reduce the damage which one direct hit alone could do. Yet even so the strain of being eternally wet and cold, of being for ever soaked with mud and under continuous shell-fire was tremendous, and, as far as was possible, detachments at the guns were relieved every four days.

There was, indeed, little for the men to do except to keep the gun-pits and ammunition serviceable, and to try to keep themselves alive. Firing was reduced to the minimum of registration, calibration and response to infantry calls, for it needed a full day's work by every man to keep the guns clean, to rebuild the gun-pits after their daily destruction by hostile shell-fire and to keep dry the ammunition which, even when it was not blown up by enemy bombardment, used to sink of its own accord in that bottomless mud which rendered almost any form of foundation useless. Moreover, every round fired necessitated the bringing up of fresh supplies from the wagon-lines, and this was work not lightly to be undertaken. As late as September 1920 the road from Wieltje to Gravenstafel was still but a faint track of ploughed-up earth winding across the shell holes and literally paved with the skeletons of horses and, in some cases, of men; it was one of the main arteries—and there were but few in that wilderness of mud—from the wagon-lines to the batteries, and, to the terrible cost of the drivers and teams, well the enemy knew it.

Thus, from December 4th, the batteries just barely existed; they had had a month's rest in the back area and knew that, for gunners, this would be considered sufficient to keep them going for a long time to come—hopes of relief, therefore, were not even entertained. At intervals the guns were registered on the Gasometers east of Passchendaele; at intervals they bombarded enemy positions around Moorslede, but mostly the detachments contented themselves with preparing for emergencies by keeping the guns as serviceable as was possible. It was a nightmare existence from which all ranks hoped that they might one day awaken, but the awakening was not yet expected.

It seemed, therefore, scarcely credible to the 162nd Brigade when, on December 19th, orders were received to march out next day to the wagon-lines. Foul as were the conditions in the line, a mere seventeen days of continuous action was never regarded by Higher Authority as sufficient to entitle a battery to a rest, and neither officers nor men had in their wildest dreams hoped to spend Christmas out of the line; yet such was now to be the case. On Thursday, December 20th, all batteries of the brigade had reached their wagon-lines in safety, and on December 23rd they marched back to Divisional reserve in a camp on the Poperinghe-Busseboom road, leaving their less fortunate comrades of the 156th Brigade to carry on the war in their absence. Less fortunate the latter certainly were, for they were destined to spend Christmas in action, but on the other hand the positions they were occupying were not so bad as those of the 162nd Brigade, nor had they been subjected to such violent shell-storms.

December 23rd to the 26th were spent by the 162nd Brigade in overhauling kit and equipment, in helping to build permanent standings in the camp they were occupying, and in celebrating the unexpected luxury of a Christmas in rest. On Christmas night a dinner for the officers was given at "Skindles" in Poperinghe, while on Boxing Night the batteries organised dinners for their men. On this day, also, the 156th Brigade was relieved by the 48th Army Field Artillery Brigade and came down to the wagon-lines, with the result that the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery was able to see out in peace the old year which held for it such mighty, such proud and such undying memories.

In peace the old year went out, but by no means in idleness. On Boxing Day orders had come for the preparation of ten reserve battery positions to cover the Army defence zone and to be occupied in the event of a German offensive on the Ypres sector, and every day before dawn working parties from each battery set out in motor lorries to Potijze Château, between which spot and Oxford Road the proposed positions lay. From December 26th to January 7th the work was carried out during every hour of daylight, for orders, inspired possibly by the fears of a German Spring offensive, were imperative that the work should be pushed on as hard as possible.

On January 7th the work ceased temporarily and one section per battery of each brigade went into the line again, relieving the 250th and 251st Brigades of the 50th Divisional Artillery. January 8th saw the relief complete, and once more the brigades were back in action, the 162nd occupying the same positions around Gravenstafel, the 156th remaining as before round Windmill Cabaret, Otto Farm (the pill-box where Captain Gallie of A/156 was killed) and Van Issacker's Farm, but with two guns of B/156 (Major Studd) and two 4·5 in. howitzers of D/156 (Major Jones) in forward positions for use as anti-tank guns. The front to be covered remained unchanged, while the "grouping" of the batteries showed but little alteration—Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler commanding No. 1 Group which consisted of the whole of the 156th Brigade and B/119, while No. 2 group (162nd Brigade) was controlled by Major N. G. Jervis from a pill-box east of Frezenburg. Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner commanded the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery group which was made up of the 156th, 162nd and 119th Brigades.

The organisation and allocation of the brigades were therefore but little changed since the previous tour of duty in the line before Christmas, but a great difference showed itself in the attitude of the enemy. Hostile artillery activity had died down in an extraordinary way, and comparative quiet reigned in the battery area after the shell-storms of the earlier period. Roads were only occasionally searched, battery positions were subjected merely to a few sniping rounds or at most to short neutralising bursts of fire, and the long concentrated bombardments which previously had been the order of the day were now exceptional events. "Quiet day," "light shelling of tracks," "intermittent bursts of fire on Zonnebeke Road and Windmill Cabaret" appear frequently in the official diaries of that period, and only on two days—January 13th and 20th—did the hostile artillery show any marked activity. On those two days the Zonnebeke-Windmill Cabaret area and the Crest Farm-Meetcheele line were bombarded respectively, the latter very heavily indeed, but these two outbursts marked isolated exceptions to the quietness which had now set in and were not of long duration.

On January 29th, after a most uneventful period in the line, one section per battery of each brigade was relieved by the 50th Divisional Artillery and marched again to the wagon-lines. Next day the relief was completed and the batteries marched to the Oudezeele area, the gun line parties handing over their guns in action and moving by lorry to the first night's halting place, there to join up with the wagon-line personnel who had marched by road in the ordinary way. The next day saw a continuation of the move to Zudrove and Le Bas, and on February 1st the ultimate rest billets were reached in Thiembronne, Merck St. Lievin and Bout de la Ville. Here the batteries carried out the usual overhauling and training, rejoicing at the quite phenomenal number of "rests" which they had of late been enjoying.

It was, indeed, most unusual for artillery to reach the rest area so often as had the 156th and 162nd Brigades of late. Gunners were usually kept in the line almost continuously, staying on after the infantry of their division had been relieved and covering the incoming troops. A scheme was now in practice by which the whole of the 33rd Division—infantry and gunners alike—held the line together and went into rest together, the 50th Division acting as their "opposite number," and by this scheme the two brigades were benefiting. It could not last for long—it was too good for that; but while it lasted it was wondrously pleasant!

There came an interruption in the ordinary routine of training on February 12th; the 18-pdr. batteries of the 156th Brigade were ordered to march to Tilques, there to have their guns calibrated by the Sound-ranging Section, after which they were attached to the 98th Infantry Brigade for tactical exercises. On the 14th the 18-pdrs. of 162nd Brigade were also calibrated, so that, by the 15th, all guns were ready for the return into action which had been ordered for February 22nd. Before this march took place, however, C/162 (Major Hill) was detached from the Divisional Artillery for special duties. On February 18th it marched to Tilques to join the 2nd Army Artillery School as a training battery, and there it was left when once more the move to the line was made.

On February 19th the 156th Brigade moved to the Elnes area and on the 20th to La Nieppe, the 162nd Brigade reaching Renescure on the same day. On the 21st advance parties from each brigade moved by rail to Vlamertinghe to take over the wagon-lines of the 50th Divisional Artillery, while the batteries continued their march to Zermezeele and Rietveld—D/162, which had gone round by Tilques to calibrate its guns, rejoining the rest of the brigade on this day. February 22nd saw the arrival of the batteries at their wagon-lines east and south-east of Vlamertinghe, the same which they had occupied on the return to action in early January; A/162, however, remained near Goldfish Château, and B/156 went to Ypres Asylum. On the 22nd also lorries took one section per battery direct to the forward area, the 156th Brigade this time relieving No. 2 Group (251st Brigade), the 162nd Brigade No. 1 Group (250th Brigade).

The relief was complete by Saturday, February 23rd, and on the next day 33rd Divisional Artillery Headquarters took over the control, at Menin Gate, of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on a two thousand yard front opposite Passchendaele and due west of Moorslede. On this occasion the 162nd Brigade took over the positions previously held by the 156th along the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road, "A" and D/162 (Major Fetherston and Major Lee) at Windmill Cabaret, some six hundred yards north-west of Zonnebeke, B/162 (Major Cory) about two thousand yards also to the north-west of the village, while Brigade headquarters were situate in a pill-box one thousand yards north-east of Frezenburg. The 156th Brigade positions, with the exception of Major Carrell's battery (A/156) which remained at Otto Farm, were those which had previously been held by the 162nd Brigade at Gravenstafel.

The policy adopted by the batteries on their return into action now was to remain quiet, only registration and calibration being carried out. The enemy on the whole were also inactive until the end of the month; one or two attempts were made to rush our advanced posts, and a large raid was executed—unsuccessfully, however—upon the division on the right. Apart from this, and from a certain amount of activity with high-velocity guns upon our back areas, the enemy attitude was very similar to ours.

March saw a change in the general policy of the Germans holding this part of the line. An ever-increasing volume of artillery fire began to be directed upon our battery positions, while high-velocity guns were continually searching the roads and back areas. On the 2nd nearly all our batteries were heavily shelled, while severe bombardments were carried out upon both flanks of the division; on the 3rd enemy aeroplanes were very active and continued so for several days, especially on the 7th when low-flying machines appeared everywhere. On the 6th a big shoot was carried out on the Windmill Cabaret area N.W. of Zonnebeke, and on the 9th the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery were bombarded with gas shell. The front was indeed gradually boiling up to a state of high enemy activity, and, with the fine weather which supervened and the knowledge that an enemy offensive was almost inevitably coming on some part of the front, the plan of action to deal with such an emergency was continually tested. On March 10th in the early morning all batteries fired "counter-preparation," a slow barrage which was to be used in the event of an enemy attack being expected. On this and the succeeding days fire was also directed upon special targets, upon machine guns, dug-outs and likely places for the concentration of hostile troops, while all batteries constantly practised the drill of pulling their guns out of the pits at short notice and of engaging targets on the flanks and at short ranges.

On the 14th a heavy German raid was repulsed, a prisoner who had been taken beforehand having given information concerning it, and on the 17th all batteries again fired in response to an S.O.S. call at 4.40 A.M., but in this case no infantry action took place. All this time the enemy long-range guns were for ever bombarding Ypres, Wieltje, St. Jean, Potijze and every road leading up from the back area, as many as one thousand high-velocity shells being poured into the neighbourhood of Ypres each day. At the same time battery positions, and especially the area between "Seine" and Abraham Heights, were continually shelled, gas at night being the usual practice.

Thursday, March 21st, 1918, was a comparatively quiet day in the Ypres sector. The batteries had not been worried much, and for their own part had not done more than to direct bursts of fire upon enemy dug-outs and machine guns which were annoying the infantry. About 1.0 P.M., just as the detachments were sitting down to their midday meal, came the first message, telephoned up from Divisional Headquarters, of the beginning of the great German offensive in the south. Little news was given beyond the fact that the attack had been launched and that our troops, after giving up the advanced system, "were holding the enemy on the main Army Defence Line." Every few hours further messages came in, admitting certain losses of ground but stating that the enemy was being held in the main, and that the day was going in our favour. Such reports were certainly encouraging to the men, and in no way gave any suggestion of defeat; bit by bit, however, names of villages which had been captured by the enemy began to appear, and reference to a map disclosed the disquieting fact that a deep penetration into our lines had been made, a penetration which must necessarily become deeper still owing to the loss of certain tactical points. Information was very sparse and rumours immediately became rife everywhere, so that a fair idea of the situation could hardly be obtained. It was, indeed, of little use to worry; the batteries had their own share of the front to look after and knew that, sooner or later, they would be plunged into the battle themselves—"sufficient unto the day ..." then, for in France it was not good to worry about troubles before they came.

On March 25th the front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery was extended some five hundred yards further to the south, S.O.S. lines being rearranged accordingly, and on March 28th/29th one section each of "B," "C" and D/156 moved out to alternate positions S.E. of Kansas Cross, S.E. of Bostin Farm and east of Kansas Cross respectively. During the preceding weeks the enemy had been constantly shelling the Abraham Heights area with gas and had rendered it quite untenable, B/156 having as many as forty gas casualties in one week; the change of position described above had therefore become an urgent necessity. Although the enemy artillery activity had died down since the 21st it was still fairly vigorous, especially upon roads, back areas and wagon-lines—the latter suffering considerably.

A further extension of the brigade zones to the south was made on March 29th, and on the same day another section of "B," "C" and D/156 moved back to the alternative positions described above. Next day Major Hill's battery (C/162), which had left Tilques on the 27th and had marched up via Godewaersvelde to wagon-lines at Goldfish Château, sent one section into action at Bostin Farm, one thousand yards west of Zonnebeke Church, to be joined by the rest of the battery on the night of March 31st/April 1st; by the end of March, therefore, the 33rd Division had its guns well distributed in depth, and could be certain of giving adequate protection to the infantry even should the latter be forced back behind the line of forward guns.

Thus the batteries remained for the first week of April. March had made its exit with a heavy enemy bombardment on the evening of the 31st upon the forward, battery and back areas, with a heavy gas concentration upon the Frezenburg line, to all of which the batteries had at infantry request responded. April came in, bringing with it little news save an ever-increasing expectation of attack on the Divisional sector, and so the first week passed while everybody held his breath, as it were, in anticipation.

On Sunday, April 7th, portions of the 156th and 162nd Brigades were relieved by the 28th Army Field Artillery Brigade (Colonel Paynter) and marched out to their wagon-lines near Vlamertinghe. On the 8th the relief was completed and the batteries were all resting in the wagon-lines, hourly expecting orders to move down south to the aid of the hard-pressed 5th Army, for thither they all believed they were to go, nor is it too much to say that considerable despondency was felt in both Brigades at not being engaged in the battle then in progress. Before any such orders were issued, however, an enemy offensive was suddenly launched upon them from much nearer at hand, and, although the 162nd Brigade marched to the Peselhoek-Poperinghe area on April 9th, there was to be neither for them nor for the 156th Brigade any rest. The Germans were about to start their great attack in the north which grew into a drive for the coast, and every man, every gun, every available round of ammunition was needed in the great struggle shortly to begin.