Part 15

All the accounts and memoirs of those times unanimously agree, that the czar, divided within himself, whether or not he should expose his wife, his army, his empire, and the fruits of all his labours, to almost inevitable destruction; retired to his tent, oppressed with grief, and seized with violent convulsions, to which he was naturally subject, and which the present desperate situation of his affairs brought upon him with redoubled violence. In this condition he remained alone in his tent, having given positive orders, that no one should be admitted to be a witness to the distraction of his mind. But Catherine, hearing of his disorders, forced her way in to him; and, on this occasion, Peter found how happy it was for him that he had permitted his wife to accompany him in this expedition.

A wife, who, like her, had faced death in its most horrible shapes, and had exposed her person, like the meanest soldier, to the fire of the Turkish artillery, had an undoubted right to speak to her husband, and to be heard. The czar accordingly listened to what she had to say, and in the end suffered himself to be persuaded to try and send to the vizier with proposals of peace.

It has been a custom, from time immemorial, throughout the East, that when any people apply for an audience of the sovereign, or his representative, they must not presume to approach them without a present. On this occasion, therefore, Catherine mustered the few jewels that she had brought with her, on this military tour, in which no magnificence or luxury were admitted; to these she added two black foxes' skins, and what ready money she could collect; the latter was designed for a present to the kiaia. She made choice herself of an officer, on whose fidelity and understanding she thought she could depend, who, accompanied with two servants, was to carry the presents to the grand vizier, and afterwards to deliver the money intended for the kiaia into his own hand. This officer was likewise charged with a letter from marshal Sheremeto to the grand vizier. The memoirs of czar Peter mentions this letter, but they take no notice of the other particulars of Catherine's conduct in this business; however, they are sufficiently confirmed by the declaration issued by Peter himself, in 1723, when he caused Catherine to be crowned empress, wherein we find these words:--'She has been of the greatest assistance to us in all our dangers, and particularly in the battle of Pruth, when our army was reduced to twenty-two thousand men.' If the czar had then indeed no more men capable of bearing arms, the service which Catherine did him, on that occasion, was fully equivalent to the honours and dignities conferred upon her. The MS. journal of Peter the Great observes, that on the day of the bloody battle (on the 20th July), he had thirty-one thousand five hundred and fifty-four foot, and six thousand six hundred and ninety-two horse, the latter almost all dismounted; he must then have lost sixteen thousand two hundred and forty-six men in that engagement. The same memoirs affirm, the loss sustained by the Turks greatly exceeded that of the Russians; for as the former rushed upon the czar's troops pell-mell, and without observing any order, hardly a single fire of the latter missed its effect. If this is fact, the affair of the 20th and 21st of July, was one of the most bloody that had been known for many ages.

We must either suspect Peter the Great of having been mistaken, in his declaration at the crowning of the empress, when he acknowledges 'his obligations to her of having saved his army, which was reduced to twenty-two thousand men,' or accuse him of a falsity in his journal, wherein he says, that the day on which the above battle was fought, his army, exclusive of the succours he expected from the other side the Moldavian mountains, amounted to thirty-one thousand five hundred and fifty-four foot, and six thousand six hundred and ninety-two horse. According to this calculation, the battle of Pruth must have been by far more terrible than the historians or memorials have represented on either side. There must certainly be some mistake here, which is no uncommon thing in the relation of campaigns, especially when the writer enters into a minute detail of circumstances. The surest method, therefore, on these occasions, is to confine ourselves to the principal events, the victory and the defeat; as we can very seldom know, with any degree of certainty, the exact loss on either side.

But however here the Russian army might be reduced in point of numbers, there were still hopes that the grand vizier, deceived by their vigorous and obstinate resistance, might be induced to grant them peace, upon such terms as might be honourable to his master's arms, and at the same time not absolutely disgraceful to those of the czar. It was the great merit of Catherine to have perceived this possibility, at a time when her consort and his generals expected nothing less than inevitable destruction.

Norberg, in his History of Charles XII. quotes a letter, sent by the czar to the grand vizier, in which he expresses himself thus:--'If, contrary to my intentions, I have been so unhappy as to incur the displeasure of his highness, I am ready to make reparation for any cause of complaint he may have against me; I conjure you, most noble general, to prevent the further effusion of blood; give orders, I beseech you, to put a stop to the dreadful fire of your artillery, and accept the hostage I herewith send you.'

This letter carries all the marks of falsity with it, as do indeed most of the random pieces of Norberg: it is dated 11th July, N. S. whereas no letter was sent to Baltagi Mahomet till the 21st, N. S. neither was it the czar who wrote to the vizier, but his general Sheremeto: there were no such expressions made use of as--'if the czar has had the misfortune to incur the displeasure of his highness;' such terms being suitable only to a subject, who implores the pardon of his sovereign, whom he has offended. There was no mention made of any hostage, nor was any one sent. The letter was carried by an officer, in the midst of a furious cannonade on both sides. Sheremeto, in his letter, only reminded the vizier of certain overtures of peace that the Porte had made at the beginning of the campaign, through the mediation of the Dutch and English ministers, and by which the divan demanded that the fort and harbour of Taganroc should be given up, which were the real subjects of the war.

21st July, 1711.] Some hours elapsed before the messenger received an answer from the grand vizier, and it was apprehended that he had either been killed by the enemy's cannon, or that they detained him prisoner. A second courier was therefore dispatched, with duplicates of the former letters, and a council of war was immediately held, at which Catherine was present. At this council ten general officers signed the following resolution:--

'Resolved, If the enemy will not accept the conditions proposed, and should insist upon our laying down our arms, and surrendering at discretion, that all the ministers and general officers are unanimously of opinion, to cut their way through the enemy sword in hand.'

In consequence of this resolution, a line of intrenchments was thrown round the baggage, and the Russians marched some few paces out of their camp, towards the enemy, when the grand vizier caused a suspension of arms to be proclaimed between the two armies.

All the writers of the Swedish party have treated the grand vizier as a cowardly and infamous wretch, who had been bribed to sell the honour of his master's arms. In the same manner have several authors accused count Piper of receiving money from the duke of Marlborough, to persuade the king of Sweden to continue the war against the czar; and have laid to the charge of the French minister, that he purchased the peace of Seville for a stipulated sum. Such accusations ought never to be advanced but on very strong proofs. It is very seldom that a minister will stoop to such meannesses, which are always discovered, sooner or later, by those who have been entrusted with the payment of the money, or by the public registers, which never lie. A minister of state stands as a public object to the eyes of all Europe. His credit and influence depend wholly upon his character, and he is always sufficiently rich to be above the temptation of becoming a traitor.

The place of viceroy of the Turkish empire is so illustrious, and the profits annexed to it, in time of war, so immense, there was such a profusion of every thing necessary, and even luxurious, in the camp of Baltagi Mahomet, and, on the other hand, so much poverty and distress in that of the czar, that surely the grand vizier was rather in a condition to give than to receive. The trifling present of a woman, who had nothing to send but a few skins and some jewels, in compliance with the established custom of all courts, or rather those in particular of the East, can never be considered in the light of a bribe. The frank and open conduct of Baltagi Mahomet seems at once to give the lie to the black accusations with which so many writers have stained their relations. Vice chancellor Shaffiroff paid the vizier a public visit in his tent: every thing was transacted in the most open manner, on both sides; and indeed it could not be otherwise. The very first article of the negotiation was entered upon in the presence of a person wholly devoted to the king of Sweden, a domestic of count Poniatowsky, who was himself one of that monarch's generals. This man served as an interpreter, and the several articles were publicly reduced to writing by the vizier's chief secretary, Hummer Effendi. Moreover, count Poniatowsky was there in person. The present sent to the kiaia was offered probably in form, and every thing was transacted agreeable to the oriental customs. Other presents were made by the Turks in return; so that there was not the least appearance of treachery or contrivance. The motives which determined the vizier to consent to the proposals offered him, were, first that the body of troops under the command of general Renne, on the borders of the river Sireth, in Moldavia, had already crossed three rivers, and were actually in the neighbourhood of the Danube, where Renne had already made himself master of the town and castle of Brahila, defended by a numerous garrison, under the command of a basha. Secondly, the czar had likewise another body of troops advancing through the frontiers of Poland; and, lastly, it is more than probable that the vizier was not fully acquainted with the extreme scarcity that was felt in the Russian camp. One enemy seldom furnishes another with an exact account of his provisions and ammunition; on the contrary, either side are accustomed rather to make a parade of plenty, even at a time when they are in the greatest necessity. There can be no artifices practised to gain intelligence of the true state of an adversary's affairs, by means of spies, between the Turks and the Russians. The difference of their dress, of their religion, and of their language, will not permit it. They are, moreover, strangers to that desertion which prevails in most of our armies; and, consequently, the grand vizier could not be supposed to know the desperate condition to which the czar's army was reduced.

Baltagi, who was not fond of war, and who, nevertheless, had conducted this very well, thought that his expedition would be sufficiently successful, if he put his master in possession of the towns and harbours which made the subject of the war, stopt the progress of the victorious army under Renne, and obliged that general to quit the banks of the Danube, and return back into Russia, and for ever shut the entrance of the Palus Mæotis, the Cimmerian Bosphorus, and the Black Sea, against an enterprising prince; and, lastly, if he avoided taking these certain advantages, on the hazard of a new battle (in which, after all, despair might have got the better of superiority of numbers). The preceding day only he had beheld his janissaries repulsed with loss; and there wanted not examples of many victories having been gained by the weaker over the strong. Such then were Mahomet's reasons for accepting the proposals of peace. His conduct, however, did not merit the approbation of Charles's officers, who served in the Turkish army, nor of the khan of Tartary. It was the interest of the latter, and his followers, to reject all terms of accommodation which would deprive them of the opportunity of ravaging the frontiers of Russia and Poland. Charles XII. desired to be revenged on his rival, the czar: but the general, and the first minister of the Ottoman empire, was neither influenced by the private thirst of revenge, which animated the Christian monarch, nor by the desire of booty, which actuated the Tartar chief.

As soon as the suspension of arms was agreed to, and signed, the Russians purchased of the Turks the provisions, of which they stood in need. The articles of the peace were not signed at that time, as is related by La Motraye, and which Norberg has copied from him. The vizier, among other conditions, demanded that the czar should promise not to interfere any more in the Polish affairs. This was a point particularly insisted upon by count Poniatowsky; but it was, in fact, the interest of the Ottoman crown, that the kingdom of Poland should continue in its then defenceless and divided state; accordingly this demand was reduced to that of the Russian troops evacuating the frontiers of Poland. The khan of Tartary, on his side, demanded a tribute of forty thousand sequins. This point, after being long debated, was at length given up.

The grand vizier insisted a long time, that prince Cantemir should be delivered up to him, as Patkul had been to the king of Sweden. Cantemir was exactly in the same situation as Mazeppa had been. The czar caused that hetman to be arraigned and tried for his defection, and afterwards to be executed in effigy. The Turks were not acquainted with the nature of such proceeding; they knew nothing of trials for contumacy, nor of public condemnations. The affixing a sentence on any person, and executing him in effigy, were the more unusual amongst them, as their law forbids the representation of any human likeness whatever. The vizier in vain insisted on Cantemir's being delivered up; Peter peremptorily refused to comply, and wrote the following letter with his own hand, to his vice-chancellor Shaffiroff.

'I can resign to the Turks all the country, as far as Curtzka, because I have hopes of being able to recover it again; but I will, by no means, violate my faith, which, once forfeited, can never be retrieved. I have nothing I can properly call my own, but my honour. If I give up that, I cease to be longer a king.'

At length the treaty was concluded, and signed, at a village called Falksen, on the river Pruth. Among other things, it was stipulated, that Azoph, and the territories belonging thereto, should be restored, together with all the ammunition and artillery that were in the place, before the czar made himself master thereof, in 1696. That the harbour of Taganroc, in the Zabach Sea, should be demolished, as also that of Samara, on the river of the same name; and several other fortresses. There was likewise another article added, respecting the king of Sweden, which article alone, sufficiently shews the little regard the vizier had for that prince; for it was therein stipulated, that the czar should not molest Charles, in his return to his dominions, and that afterwards the czar and he might make peace with the other, if they were so inclined.

It is pretty evident by the wording of this extraordinary article, that Baltagi Mahomet had not forgot the haughty manner in which Charles XII. had behaved to him a short time before, and it is not unlikely that this very behaviour of the king of Sweden might have been one inducement with Mahomet to comply so readily with his rival's proposals for peace. Charles's glory depended wholly on the ruin of the czar: but we are seldom inclinable to exalt those who express a contempt for us: however, this prince, who refused the vizier a visit in his camp, on his invitation, when it was certainly his interest to have been upon good terms with him, now came thither in haste and unasked, when the work which put an end to all his hopes was on the point of being concluded. The vizier did not go to meet him in person, but contented himself with sending two of his bashas, nor would he stir out of his tent, till Charles was within a few paces of him.

This interview passed, as every one knows, in mutual reproaches. Several historians have thought, that the answer which the vizier made to the king of Sweden, when that prince reproached him with not making the czar prisoner, when he might have done it so easily, was the reply of a weak man. 'If I had taken him prisoner,' said Mahomet, 'who would there be to govern his dominions?'

It is very easy, however, to comprehend, that this was the answer of a man who was piqued with resentment, and these words which he added--'For it is not proper that every crowned head should quit his dominions'--sufficiently shewed that he intended to mortify the refugee of Bender.

Charles gained nothing by his journey, but the pleasure of tearing the vizier's robe with his spurs; while that officer, who was in a condition to make him repent this splenetic insult, seemed not to notice it, in which he was certainly greatly superior to Charles. If any thing could have made that monarch sensible, in the midst of his life, how easily fortune can put greatness to the blush, it would have been the reflection, that at the battle of Pultowa, a pastry-cook's boy had obliged his whole army to surrender at discretion; and in this of Pruth a wood-cutter was the arbiter of his fate, and that of his rival the czar: for the vizier, Baltagi Mahomet, had been a cutter of wood in the grand seignior's seraglio, as his name implied; and, far from being ashamed of that title, he gloried in it: so much do the manners of the eastern people differ from ours.

When the news of this treaty reached Constantinople, the grand seignior was so well pleased, that he ordered public rejoicings to be made for a whole week, and Mahomet, the kiaia, or lieutenant-general, who brought the tidings to the divan, was instantly raised to the dignity of boujouk imraour, or master of the horse: a certain proof that the sultan did not think himself ill served by his vizier.

Norberg seems to have known very little of the Turkish government, when he says, that 'the grand seignior was obliged to keep fair with Baltagi Mahomet, that vizier having rendered himself formidable.' The janissaries indeed have often rendered themselves formidable to their sultans; but there is not one example of a vizier, who has not been easily sacrificed to the will or orders of his sovereign, and Mahomet was in no condition to support himself by his own power. Besides, Norberg manifestly contradicts himself, by affirming in the same page, that the janissaries were irritated against Mahomet, and that the sultan stood in dread of his power.

The king of Sweden was now reduced to the necessity of forming cabals in the Ottoman court; and a monarch, who had so lately made kings by his own power, was now seen waiting for audience, and offering memorials and petitions which were refused.

Charles ran through all the ambages of intrigue, like a subject who endeavours to make a minister suspected by his master. In this manner he acted against Mahomet, and against those who succeeded him. At one time he addressed himself to the sultana Valide by means of a Jewess, who had admission into the seraglio; at another, he employed one of the eunuchs for the same purpose. At length he had recourse to a man who was to mingle among the grand seignior's guards, and, by counterfeiting a person out of his senses, to attract the attention of the sultan, and by that means deliver into his own hand a memorial from Charles. From all these various schemes, the king of Sweden drew only the mortification of seeing himself deprived of his thaim; that is to say, of the daily pension which the Porte of its generosity had assigned him for his subsistence, and which amounted to about one thousand five hundred French livres.[88] The grand vizier, instead of remitting this allowance to him as usual, sent him an order, in the form of a friendly advice, to quit the grand seignior's dominions.

Charles, however, was absolutely determined not to depart, still flattering himself with the vain hope, that he should once more re-enter Poland and Russia with a powerful army of Turks. Every one knows what was the issue of his inflexible boldness in the year 1714, and how he engaged an army of janissaries, Spahis, and Tartars, with only himself, his secretaries, his valet de chambre, cook, and stable men; that he was taken prisoner in that country, where he had been treated with the greatest hospitality; and that he at length got back to his own kingdom in the disguise of a courier, after having lived five years in Turkey: from all which it remains to be acknowledged, that if there was reason in the conduct of this extraordinary prince, it was a reason of a very different nature to that of other men.

CHAP. XXI.

Conclusion of the Affairs of Pruth.

It is necessary in this place to repeat an event already related in the History of Charles XII. It happened during the suspension of arms which preceded the treaty of Pruth, that two Tartarian soldiers surprised and took prisoners two Italian officers belonging to the czar's army, and sold them to an officer of the Turkish janissaries. The vizier being informed of this breach of public faith, punished the two Tartars with death. How are we to reconcile this severe delicacy with the violation of the law of nations in the person of Tolstoy, the czar's ambassador, whom this very vizier caused to be arrested in the streets of Constantinople, and afterwards imprisoned in the castle of the Seven Towers? There is always some reason for the contradictions we find in the actions of mankind. Baltagi Mahomet was incensed against the khan of Tartary, for having opposed the peace he had lately made, and was resolved to shew that chieftain that he was his master.

The treaty was no sooner concluded, than the czar quitted the borders of the Pruth, and returned towards his own dominions, followed by a body of eight thousand Turks, whom the vizier had sent as an army of observation to watch the motions of the Russian army during its march, and also to serve as an escort or safeguard to them against the wandering Tartars which infested those parts.