Chapter 18

_Reflections on what gives Occasions to Wars in_ Louisiana. _The Means of avoiding Wars in that Province, as also the Manner of coming off with Advantage and little Expence in them._

The experience I have had in the art of war, from some campaigns I made in a regiment of dragoons till the peace of 1713, my application to the study of the wars of the Greeks, Romans, and other ancient people, and the wars I have seen carried on with the Indians of Louisiana, during the time I resided in that Province, gave me occasion to make several reflections on what could give rise to a war with the Indians, on the means of avoiding such a war, and on such methods as may be employed, in order either to make or maintain a war to advantage against them, when constrained thereto.

In the space of sixteen years that I resided in Louisiana, I remarked, that the war, and even the bare disputes we have had with the Indians of this Colony, never had any other origin, but our too familiar intercourse with them.

In order to prove this, let us consider the evils produced by this familiarity. In the first place, it makes them gradually drop that respect, which they naturally entertain for our nation.

In the second place, the French traffickers, or traders, are generally young people without experience, who, in order to gain the good-will of these people, afford them lights, or instruction, prejudicial to our interest. These young merchants are not, it is true, sensible of these consequences: but again, these people never lose sight of what can be of any utility to them, and the detriment thence accruing is not less great, nor less real.

In the third place, this familiarity gives occasion to vices, whence dangerous distempers ensue, and corruption of blood, {97} which is naturally highly pure in this colony. These persons, who frequently resort to the Indians, imagined themselves authorized to give a loose to their vices, from the practice of these last, which is to give young women to their guests upon their arrival; a practice that greatly injures their health, and proves a detriment to their merchandizing.

In the fourth place, this resorting to the Indians puts these last under a constraint, as being fond of solitude; and this constraint is still more heightened, if the French settlement is near them; which procures them too frequent visits, that give them so much more uneasiness, as they care not on any account that people should see or know any of their affairs. And what fatal examples have we not of the dangers the settlements which are too near the Indians incur. Let but the massacre of the French be recollected, and it will be evident that this proximity is extremely detrimental to the French.

In the fifth and last place, commerce, which is the principal allurement that draws us to this new world instead of flourishing, is, on the contrary, endangered by the too familiar resort to the Indians of North America. The proof of this is very simple.

All who resort to countries beyond sea, know by experience, that when there is but one ship in the harbour, the Captain sells his cargo at what price he pleases: and then we hear it said, such a ship gained two, three, and sometimes as high as four hundred per cent. Should another ship happen to arrive in that harbour, the profit abates at least one half; but should three arrive, or even four successively, the goods then are, so to speak, thrown at the head of the buyer: so that in this case a merchant has often great difficulty to recover his very expenses of fitting out. I should therefore be led to believe, that it would be for the interest of commerce, if the Indians were left to come to fetch what merchandize they wanted, who having none but us in their neighbourhood, would come for it, without the French running any risk in their commerce, much less in their lives.

For this purpose, let us suppose a nation of Indians on the banks of some river or rivulet, which is always the case, as all {98} men whatever have at all times occasion for water. This being supposed, I look out for a spot proper to build a small terras-fort on, with fraises or stakes, and pallisadoes. In this fort I would build two small places for lodgings, of no great height; one to lodge the officers, the other the soldiers: this fort to have an advanced work, a half-moon, or the like, according to the importance of the post. The passage to be through this advanced work to the fort, and no Indian allowed to enter on any pretence whatever; not even to receive the Pipe of Peace there, but only in the advanced work; the gate of the fort to be kept shut day and night against all but the French. At the gate of the advanced work a sentinel to be posted, and that gate to be opened and shut on each person appearing before it. By these precautions we might be sure never to be surprised, either by avowed enemies, or by treachery. In the advanced work a small building to be made for the merchants, who should come thither to traffick or truck with the neighbouring Indians; of which last only three or four to be admitted at a time, all to have the merchandize at the same price, and no one to be favoured above another. No soldier or inhabitant to go to the villages of the neighbouring Indians, under severe penalties. By this conduct disputes would be avoided, as they only arise from too great a familiarity with them. These forts to be never nearer the villages than five leagues, or more distant than seven or eight. The Indians would make nothing of such a jaunt; it would be only a walk for them, and their want of goods would easily draw them, and in a little time they would become habituated to it. The merchants to pay a salary to an interpreter, who might be some orphan, brought up very young among these people.

This fort, thus distant a short journey, might be built without obstruction, or giving any umbrage to the Indians: as they might be told it was built in order to be at hand to truck their furs, and at the same time to give them no manner of uneasiness. One advantage would be, besides that of commerce, which would be carried on there, that these forts would prevent the English from having any communication with the Indians, as these last would find a great facility for their truck, and in forts so near them, every thing they could want.

{99} The examples of the surprise of the forts of the Natchez, the Yazoux, and the Missouris, shew but too plainly the fatal consequences of negligence in the service, and of a misplaced condescension in favour of the soldiers, by suffering them to build huts near the fort, and to lie in them. None should be allowed to lie out of the fort, not even the Officers. The Commandant of the Natchez, and the other Officers, and even the Serjeants, were killed in their houses without the fort. I should not be against the soldiers planting little fields of tobacco, potatoes, and other plants, too low to conceal a man: on the contrary, these employments would incline them to become settlers; but I would never allow them houses out of the fort. By this means a fort becomes impregnable against the most numerous; because they never will attack, should they have ever so much cause, as long as they see people on their guard.

Should it be objected that these forts would cost a great deal: I answer, that though there was to be a fort for each nation, which is not the case, it would not cost near so much as from time to time it takes to support wars, which in this country are very expensive, on account of the long journeys, and of transporting all the implements of war, hitherto made use of. Besides, we have a great part of these forts already built, so that we only want the advanced works; and two new forts more would suffice to compleat this design, and prevent the fraudulent commerce of the English traders.

As to the manner of carrying on the war in Louisiana, as was hitherto done, it is very expensive, highly fatiguing, and the risk always great; because you must first transport the ammunition to the landing-place; from thence travel for many leagues; then drag the artillery along by main force, and carry the ammunition on men's shoulders, a thing that harasses and weakens the troops very much. Moreover, there is a great deal of risk in making war in this manner: you have the approaches of a fort to make, which cannot be done without loss of lives: and should you make a breach, how many brave men are lost, before you can force men who fight like desperadoes, because they prefer death to slavery.

{100} I say, should you make a breach; because in all the time I resided in this Province, I never saw nor heard that the cannon which were brought against the Indian forts, ever made a breach for a single man to pass: it is therefore quite useless to be at that expence, and to harass the troops to bring artillery, which can be of no manner of service.

That cannon can make no breach in Indian forts may appear strange: but not more strange than true; as will appear, if we consider that the wooden posts or stakes which surround these forts, are too big for a bullet of the size of those used in these wars, to cut them down, though it were even to hit their middle. If the bullet gives more towards the edge of the tree, it glides off, and strikes the next to it; should the ball hit exactly between two posts, it opens them, and meets the post of the lining, which stops it short: another ball may strike the same tree, at the other joining, then it closes the little aperture the other had made.

Were I to undertake such a war, I would bring only a few Indian allies; I could easily manage them; they would not stand me so much in presents, nor consume so much ammunition and provisions: a great saving this; and bringing no cannon with me, I should also save expences. I would have none but portable arms; and thus my troops would not be harassed. The country every where furnishes wherewithal to make moveable intrenchments and approaches, without opening the ground: and I would flatter myself to carry the fort in two days time. There I stop: the reader has no need of this detail, nor I to make it public.