The History of Currency, 1252 to 1896
CHAPTER I
From the Commencement of Gold Coinages to the Discovery of America, 1252-1492
The monetary history of Europe begins in the thirteenth century, and in the Italian peninsula. Its starting-point is the era of the reintroduction of gold into the coinages of the Western nations, and is definitely marked for us by the minting of the gold florin of Florence in 1252. For all practical purposes gold had gone out of use since the seventh century, and after the submersion of the Roman Empire; and the currencies of the nations of mediæval Europe rested on a silver basis entirely. There are limitations to the truth of this statement, but they are of such a nature as not materially to affect it. In Spain, for instance, the Moors kept up a tradition of gold coinage similar to that of Rome, from the eighth to the middle of the thirteenth century. But its influence on the monetary system of Christian Spain is not even a matter of question. At the other extremity of the Mediterranean, at Byzantium, seat of the Eastern Empire, the best traditions of the coinage system of Rome were preserved for centuries after the imperial city had fallen before the invasions of the northern barbarians. Indeed, the monetary system of the Eastern empire, by becoming, as it did, the model which Charlemagne copied in his currency enactments, became the basis of all the modern European systems. Further than this, the presence of gold _Byzants_ can be traced here and there, at isolated points and dates, all over the darkness of those early centuries of the Middle Ages, when all coining art seemed forgotten among the races of Central Europe.
Notwithstanding such limitations, however, it still remains true that the monetary history of the modern world dates from the thirteenth and not the seventh century, and from the little commercial states of Italy rather than from Byzantium. Previous to the minting of the gold florin of Florence there is no trace of any independent minting of gold coins on a commercial scale by any state of mediæval central Europe. The currency system of England, for instance, from the time of the Saxons to the days of Henry III. was based entirely on silver. In endless variety and under a diversity of names the silver penny was the unit coin current of the realm. Its equivalent in the Frankish Empire was the silver denarius, which Charlemagne had made the unit of his system, and which so continued for both the kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire till the fourteenth century. Finally, among the numerous states of Italy, with each their little independent Mint, there is no trace of the coinage of gold until the days of the commercial greatness of Florence and Venice. For eight centuries or more those races of Europe, which were to turn the course of the modern world and build its civilisation anew, were ignorant of the commercial use of what has been through all history the most potent factor in civilisation--gold.
[Sidenote: THE GOLD FLORIN OF FLORENCE]
The explanation of the reintroduction and recoinage of gold is to be found in the history of the Crusades and of the commercial growth of the petty independent states which sprang from the political confusion of Italy. No sooner had they achieved each their little autonomous existence than they threw themselves with feverish energy into the development of the trade with the East. Florence and Venice, Pisa and Genoa, led the way and reaped the fruits; and it was in her most flourishing time, when she had conquered her rivals, Pisa and Siena, and was enjoying a prosperous peace and active trade, that Florence, at the instance of the chief of her merchants, resolved on the coining of the gold florin (1252).[1]
The mere idea of such a gold coinage could only be derived from the East--from Byzantium. But it is a curious fact that the importation of it should be due in the first place to the Crusades. Frederick II. of Sicily was elected Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 1212. Sixteen years later he headed the Fifth Crusade, and the gold coin (_Augustale_) which he issued some time between his return from that crusade and his death, probably commemorates his wish to rival the appearance of opulence of the Eastern court. This Sicilian coin is the direct ancestor of the florin of Florence, and to it would fitly belong the honour of leading in a new era, were it not that the superior beauty of the Florentine coin gave it universal currency and reputation, and extinguished the memory of its predecessor.
The gold coin of Genoa (_Genoviva_) is supposed to have issued in the same year as the florin (1252). Five years later (1257) Henry III. of England imitated the florin in his gold _pennies_, and more than thirty years (31st October 1284) later Venice followed the lead of Florence and instituted a coinage of gold _zecchinos_, under the dogeship of Giovanni Dandolo.
Two conditions were essential to the bringing about so momentous a revolution as this, however little the mind of contemporaries may have known it as such. In the first place, the foreign trade of the Italian republics must have become so extensive as to demand a currency medium of higher denomination than silver; and, secondly, that trade must have developed in such directions as to tap gold-using or gold-bearing regions in order to supply the Italian mints. It is a curious fact that both these conditions were realised through the instrumentality of the Crusades. The quickening effect of these vast movements on the trade of the Mediterranean is well known, but their influence in the second direction has not hitherto been pointed out. In the Fourth Crusade Venice lent the force which captured Byzantium (1203), and when, by her arms, Baldwin, Count of Flanders, had been seated on the Eastern throne, Venice reaped her reward in three-eighths of the territories of the Eastern Empire. She received Peloponnesus and a chain of islands in the Ægean, and by the hold she had on Constantinople secured the virtual control of the Black Sea. In its turn the control of the Black Sea brought with it the monopoly of the overland trade with India.
[Sidenote: THE TRADE OF VENICE]
At one and the same moment, therefore, Venice acquired possession of a huge treasure of gold wrested from the conquered city, and of the then only gold-yielding districts--the Crimea--and of an intercolonial trade, demanding a more enhanced currency medium. The result of such a combination of circumstances was irresistible. During the continuance of the "Latin Empire" at Byzantium, Venice and her sister state were practically the only merchants of Europe.
The institution of a gold coinage among the Italian republics, therefore, marks for us an era of commercial expansion which is only fitly to be compared with that of Holland in the seventeenth century, or of our own country in modern times.
We are not concerned with tracing the effects of this extraordinary movement further than as they bore in their train the dower of a currency of gold.
In the European system, Venice was the intermediary between the spice-laden east and the wool-bearing north. England, the wool-growing country of fourteenth-century Europe; Flanders, the home of the weaving industry; the Hanse Towns of Germany and the gradually forming kingdom of France were successively brought face to face with the new medium of currency; and if the story of the gradual adoption of that new medium could be written, it would form one of the most instructive of all chapters of currency and commercial history.
As it is, we have only uncertain and scattered data.
In the case of Germany--of chief importance in the process by reason of her geographical position midway between the Mediterranean and the north--the first minting of gold in imitation of the Italian states fell in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. Of the two types of gold monies issued by the Emperor Louis IV., surnamed "Bavarian," the first, struck some short time before 1328, was in direct imitation of the florin of Florence. The second, struck some little time later, was a copy of the _écu d'or_ of Philip VI. of France.
In 1337 our own King Edward was made vicar-general and lieutenant to the Emperor, with powers to coin monies of gold and silver. He accordingly kept his winter at the Castle of Louvain, and caused great sums of money both of gold and silver to be coined at Antwerp. Two years later, this same Emperor Louis, the Bavarian, granted to the Duke Rainhold of Gueldres the right to mint gold coins, "after the valuation of the gold monies of the Archbishop of Cologne, the Duke of Brabant, and the Counts of Hainault and Holland." In the following year he granted to the free state of Lübeck a similar right--the patent expressly stipulating that their gold coins should not exceed in weight or value the gold florin of Florence.
[Sidenote: BEGINNINGS OF A GOLD COINAGE IN GERMANY]
Sixteen years later (1356) the general liberty of coining gold was conceded to the seven Electoral Princes by the Golden Bull of the Emperor Charles IV., and subsequently state after state and free town after free town purchased or were granted the right. Even as late as 1372, in the patent granting to Frederick of Nürnberg this so eagerly solicited liberty, the stipulation is made that the gold gulden to be coined should be of as good gold and weight as "the gulden or florin of Florence."
In the case of Lübeck direct documentary evidence of transactions relating to the introduction of a gold coinage has survived among the archives of that state. The privilege of a Mint and of coining (of silver) was first granted to Lübeck by Frederick II. in 1226. But it was not until a century and more later that Louis the Bavarian, by his bull of 28th November 1340, conceded the right of coining gold "in pieces which were to be neither heavier nor of higher worth than the florin of Florence." On the 8th September in the following year the Lübeck Mint made its first purchase of gold from a certain Jacob Grell of Zütphen in Holland. The purchase consisted of 4 marks 1 loth 8 pfen. weight of gold (Lübeck weight), and the price paid was 24 solidi the carat. In other parcels, up to Michaelmas of 1341, the authorities remitted to the Mint a total weight of metal of 50 marks 2 oz. 3-1/2 ang., varying in fineness from 15 to 23 carats. The consignment yielded in the pot 46 marks 1 oz. 7 ang. of pure metal, and was coined into 3199 pieces of a total weight of 47 marks 5 oz. 10 ang., being 67.08 gold pieces to the Lübeck mark. The coins were issued on the 18th February 1342, and bore on the one side the lily of Florence and on the other the figure of John the Baptist--all in direct imitation of the florin. The total issues made in the immediately succeeding years from the Lübeck Mint were:--
1342 24,783 florins 67.26 to the mark. " 5,483 " 67.11 " " 1343 30,436 " " " " 1344 32,590 " " " "
With more or less irregularity the earliest German guldens imitated the florin, and maintained something like a steady and uniform denomination quite up to the beginning of the last quarter of the fourteenth century.
[Sidenote: GOLD COINAGE IN FRANCE]
In France, as in Germany, the first coining of gold can only be dated approximately, but for all practical purposes quite safely. The generally accepted view is that the French series of gold coins was initiated in 1254 by Louis IX., "St. Louis," and that the issue was connected with the Sixth Crusade which he had headed five years before. There is documentary evidence extant to disprove this. _Florins d'or appelez Florences_ are mentioned as early as 1180, not vaguely but quite definitely with an exact statement of weight standard and equivalence. Unless the record of the first minting of the gold florin at Florence is untrustworthy the coin here referred to can only be an imitation in gold of the silver florin of Florence. The same document which contains this reference (De Saulcy, i. 115) also specifies _petits royaux d'or_ as minted not only in 1180 by Philip Augustus, but also in the days of his father, Louis VII. Similar mention of at least two gold coins of Louis IX. occurs as early as 1226, one evidently of the florin type, the other a _pavillon d'or_. It is quite safe to assert, however, that these coins were for show merely, due to an emulation of Byzantine and Italian opulence, and indicate no wide or commercial employment of gold. Of the gold florins of 1226, for instance, thirteen pieces were struck, twelve for twelve peers of France as a gift, the thirteenth for the King himself, "and know you that this is the most beautiful money that can be found, and the finest and best engraved." The interest of such issues is entirely numismatic and not commercial or monetary.[2] It is not until late in the reign of St. Louis--until 1265 or thereabouts--that there is mention in France of any such gold coinage as could have this commercial rather than merely numismatic importance. For the purposes of metallic or currency history proper the real starting-point for France is marked rather by the _gros royaux d'or_, coined in 1295 by Philip le Bel, than by the more meagre coinage of St. Louis and his predecessors. The _gros royaux_ of Philip were double the value of the _petits royaux_ of St. Louis, of which latter Philip le Bel speaks thus in his proclamation. "We have commanded to be made in our name money of gold after the _petits royaux d'or_, which shall be 70 to the Paris mark and cut as the _petits royaux_ have been used to be, being issued at an equivalence of 11 sols Parisi." From this date (1295) onward the gold coinage of the French Mint became one of the most important factors in the monetary history of Europe.
In Flanders the first gold coins were struck in 1357, under the rule of Count Louis II.[3] Both the coins issued by him are copied directly from French types----his _real au lion_ from the French _écu_ of Philip IV., and his _mouton d'or_ from the French coin of the same name. And it was the same French original which furnished the types to William V., Count of Holland (1356-77), when he followed the fashion and coined gold. Of the six types minted by Count William during his reign, two are an imitation of the French _mouton_, and the last is derived from the universally prevailing type, the florin.
[Sidenote: GOLD COINAGE IN SPAIN AND ENGLAND]
In Spain the first coining of gold by the Christian powers fell in the same epoch and derived from the same source. Alfonso XI. (1312-50), surnamed the "Noble," was the first King of Castille who coined the _oro gran modulo_ (_doblas de oro_), while in Aragon Pedro IV. (1336-87), "the Ceremonious," in his _oro florines_ directly imitated the Florentine type, though his later pieces are more original in design.
Finally, with regard to England,--to whose monetary history a central importance attaches,--the course of events was most evidently controlled by the revolution in the continental currencies. It is, at the same time, comparatively easy to ascertain. The first of our kings to issue gold coins was Henry III., who in 1257 coined a penny of fine gold, of the weight of two silver pennies of the time, and ordered it to be current for twenty pence.
There can be no doubt that the idea of such a coinage was derived from that of St. Louis of France; and, just as in France, the issue seems to have been premature. Probably neither in the one country nor the other did there exist a sufficient store of the precious metal itself, nor sufficient activity of trade to attract such a store, or indeed to make a gold coinage at all a matter of mercantile advantage. It is only a developed and active or considerable trade that demands so enhanced a medium of exchange. Accordingly, just as in France, there is a noticeable gap between the first actual minting of gold by the predecessors of St. Louis, and the minting of it in such quantities as to make a factor in commercial and monetary history, in the days of Philip le Bel (1295); so, in England, the first issue of Henry III. was followed by an interval of nearly ninety years, during which no coinage of gold by our kings took place. The real introducer of this metal into English currency and commerce was Edward III., and the first practical issue of it is to be dated in 1344, rather than 1257. It will be seen at a glance what this statement implies. The issue of Henry III. in 1257 had been premature--an act of kingly rivalry and show, rather than of commercial necessity. But the succeeding century saw a rapid development in the commerce of Northern Europe, and a gold coinage had gradually become both a possibility and a necessity. One after the other--in the order of time just detailed--the various commercial states with which England had intercourse had adopted it and profited by it. That England should follow in the movement scarcely more than sixteen years later than Germany, and a year or two before Flanders, is some evidence of the organisation of her trade, as well as of the intimacy of inter-commercial relationships. So purely a matter of trade and natural growth was this vast movement of the adoption of a gold coinage--a revolution indeed as it proved, though yet unwritten, more momentous in its influence on European civilisation than either the Renaissance or the Reformation.
[Sidenote: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRST PERIOD]
Approximately, therefore, the fourteenth century may be taken as the starting-point for a history of European bimetallism. The first period of that history embraces all the movements of the previous metals, from such starting-point up to the discovery of America in 1492--a matter of two centuries, roughly speaking.
The characteristics of this period are perfectly well defined, and repeat themselves with almost faithful and exact similarity of recurrence in the several states comprising the Europe of that date. In brief, such characteristics were those of--(1) a period of commercial expanse, necessitating an increasing currency and advancing prices; (2) a period of stationary production of the precious metals, necessitating a struggle among the various states for the possession of those metals; (3) a period of endless change in the ratio between gold and silver, necessitating continual revision of the rate of exchange. Broadly speaking, those characteristics fall into two classes, accordingly as they relate to--(1) the natural movement of prices i.e. having regard merely to the supply of the precious metals; (2) to the unnatural struggle for the metals themselves--for the material for currency--due to international rivalry and bad or crafty legislation.
With regard to the former of these, the period was distinctly one of insufficient and relatively diminishing production of the metals. During these two centuries, 1300-1500, the main sources of the derivation of gold were the Eastern trade and the finds on the eastern shores and northern interior of Africa. The chief supply of silver came from the mines in Germany. These latter--in Hungary, Transylvania, Saxony, and Bohemia--were of such importance and activity, in the fifteenth century and towards the time of the discovery of America, as partially to keep pace with the general trade expanse of the time, thereby helping to arrest a fall of prices that would have been absolutely disastrous to the civilisation of Europe. The combined production during this period cannot even be conjectured. At the close of it--during the reign of Henry VII.--the total coinage of England, both silver and gold, did not probably exceed £3,000,000, while the total stock of both metals in Europe in 1492 has been estimated at no more than £33,400,000. These figures stand alone, for we have no idea of the extent of the commerce which was worked on so small a monetary basis, and very little idea of the amount of aid which was extended to metallic money by such expedients as bills of exchange. To estimate, therefore, whether the period was one of depreciating, stationary, or appreciating currency, we are reduced to the testimony of prices and the Mint records.
[Sidenote: COURSE OF MONETARY DEPRECIATION]
In France, at the beginning of the period (in 1308), the mark of gold was coined into 44 livres, and the mark of silver into 2 livres 19 sols. At the close of the period, or towards it, in 1475, the mark of gold was coined into 118 livres 10 sols, and that of silver into 10 livres.
In Germany the mark of gold was coined into 66 gulden of 23 carats in 1386, and into 71-1/3 gulden of 18-1/2 carats in 1495--a depreciation of 34.36 per cent. In Spain the mark of silver was coined into 130 maravedis in the year 1312, and into 2210 maravedis in 1474. This latter case is, however, so inextricably complicated with considerations of mere, i.e. arbitrary, debasement, as to render it useless for any estimation of the natural appreciation of the metals. In England our earliest gold coin weighed 128-4/7 grains, and was tariffed at 6s. 8d. In 1489, 80 grains of gold were equivalent to the same, 6s. 8d.--a reduction of 37.94 per cent. Within the same period the weight of the silver penny sank from 22 to 12 troy grains, a reduction of 45.45 per cent. Eliminating cases of arbitrary debasement, a rough average for the period might fairly give 40 per cent. of depreciation through the two centuries.
The case need hardly be laboured statistically, for the legislative history of all the countries forming the circle of commercial Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries witnesses this general downward movement--this appreciation and restriction of currency--in grim and unmistakable manner; and it is the expression of this general movement in their legislations that gives the test and measure of the earliest bimetallic troubles of Europe. In many ways the problem before the various Governments was a more difficult one than that which besets the modern world. There was, for instance, nothing like an equal and generally recognised ratio of value between gold and silver prevailing at any one single point of time. At one and the same date a ratio of 7 or 8 to 1 prevailed in the Moorish parts of Spain, and 12 to 1 in the Christian parts (the kingdom of Castile). Similarly, at a later period, in 1474, the ratio in England was 11.15, in Germany 11.12, and in France 11.00, in Italy 10.58, and in Spain 9.82.
The natural result of such a state of chaos, if it had been permitted to work itself out unhindered, would have been arbitrage transactions of such a nature--a flux and reflux of the European currencies so perpetual--as would have induced a yearly and universal bankruptcy. In spite of frantic efforts on the part of ruler after ruler, such results did partially come about, and they sufficiently account both for the distraction of Governments and the hatred universally visited upon the Jew in the Middle Ages. The measures which were adopted by the various States to counteract this invisible, insidious, and wasting process, partake of the roughness and unscientific character of the age. The export of gold and silver was forbidden on pain of death; and it was no mere paper threat, for prominent London merchants were drawn and quartered for the offence. The rates of exchange of foreign coins were fixed by proclamation, and the office of exchanger limited to a particular place. When all this proved ineffectual, the coins were cried down, and violent and sudden changes in the ratio enacted. What made the jerk and friction of such a process worse was that such measures were not merely defensive, but intentionally offensive. The wish of the fourteenth and fifteenth century ruler was not merely to defend his own stock of precious metals from depletion, but--having gained the conviction of the insufficiency of the production of those metals for the needs of Europe--to attract to himself the stock of his neighbours by whatever craft. There was a general struggle for the coverlid of gold, and the methods of that struggle were almost barbaric in their rudeness, violence, craft, and dishonourableness.
Italy.
On account of their knowledge and practice of the science of exchanges and finance, the metallic history of the Italian states is of chief importance for this earliest period. At a time when the northern nations show signs of an infancy of commerce merely, Italy was advanced in the art and practice of a most highly developed commercial and financial state. It is to her that we owe our system of book-keeping and the use of bills of exchange, not to speak of the pawnbroking and funding systems; and it is permissible to conjecture that Italy, keeping her finger as she did on the monetary pulsations of Europe, reaped her harvest, and far the largest harvest, from the bimetallic fluctuations of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In their turn those fluctuations acted on herself, and occasionally disastrously. On account of their pre-eminence as the commercial states of the peninsula, Florence and Venice are chosen to illustrate in brief the monetary history of Italy. The account of the general course of depreciation in both these states, and of the fluctuations of Mint rates is given in the Appendix (Nos. I. and II.). As regards the bimetallic influence of these changes of rates, there is one telling record in the history of Florence.
[Sidenote: THE FLORENTINE TROUBLES OF 1345]
The second quarter of the fourteenth century witnessed a decided rise in the value of silver as against gold. It told immediately upon Florence, on account of her Mint rates. By the regulation of 1324 the ratio in Florence was 13.62, whereas in France the ratio was approximately 12.6, and twenty years later, 1344, hardly more than 11 in both France and England. The result on Florence was immediate, and silver disappeared from circulation. In 1345, says her historian, Villani, there was great scarcity. There was no silver money with the exception of the _quattrini_. It was all melted down and transported. Silver of the alloy of 11-1/2 oz. fine was worth in other parts out of Florence more than 12 _lire a fiorino_, whence arose great discontent to the woollen merchants, who feared that the gold florin, in which they received their foreign payments, should fall too much. Being a powerful factor in the little state, they agitated, and the recoinage of 1345 was the result. The precedent evil and the remedy applied by this recoinage may be thus illustrated:--
By law--
Fiorino d'oro = 29 soldi. 20 of these soldi = la lira a fiorino. Therefore 12 lire a fiorino (the price of the libbra of silver as above, purchased abroad) = 8 fiorini 8 soldi. = 26 lire 8 soldi di piccioli. One fiorino d'oro being then current for about 3 lire 2 soldi piccioli.
The silver species current in Florence in 1345 were _quattrini_ and _Guelfi del fiore_. These coins were of the same standard as above (11-1/2 oz.), were coined at a tale of 167 to the libbra, and issued at an equivalence of 30 piccioli. The libbra of this silver, therefore, by Florentine Mint rate was valued at 20 _lire_ 17 _soldi_ 6 _denari di piccioli_. Abroad, therefore, the price of silver was a matter of slightly more than 5 lire higher than in Florence.
The same result could be got by taking the billon money of Florence and calculating from its silver contents.
The natural result was a disappearance of silver. The only remedy was a recoinage, and this was applied by the law of 19th August 1345. By this law the standard of 11-1/2 oz. was retained, the tale of the _Grossi_ was increased to 134 pieces to the libbra (132 being rendered to the merchant, and 2 retained for Mint expenses), and each piece issued at an equivalence of 4 soldi.
4 x 132 = 528 soldi. (= 26 lire 8 soldi di piccioli.)
It will be seen at a glance that this equalised the internal and external price of silver.
Rather strangely this enactment of the 19th of August was followed by another no more than four days later (23rd August 1345), by which a slight reactionary change was made in favour of silver. The tale was decreased from 134 to 132 pieces, to be struck from the libbra of the same standard, and issuable at the same equivalence.
Slight as the backward change was, it was sufficient to leave the monetary system exposed to the same influence of differential exchanging, and within two months it had to be repealed by the law of October 1345. Under the name of _Nuovi Guelfi_ a fresh coin was thereby instituted of the same standard and equivalence as above, but at a tale of 142 per libbra (140 being rendered back to the merchant, and 2 retained for expenses of coinage).
140 x 4 = 560 piccioli. (= 28 lire di piccioli.)
This established a considerable advantage, and turned the flow of silver back again to Florence.
[Sidenote: FLORENCE IN 1345]
The process might in many respects be compared to our raising of the bank rate, were it not that the two operations represent quite different and separated financial epochs. It is noteworthy, too, because the process will be found immediately imitated in both France and England, that these laws of 1345 represent preponderatingly the sense of the class of exchangers of Florence,--i.e. the financiers professed,--men who would profit individually in their exchange operations as much as the state would in its restored currency of silver. "The above lords," says the preamble to the first-cited Act, "considering the numerous petitions made to them by many artificers, merchants, and honourable citizens, of the incredible lack of silver money in the state of Florence, on account of which the citizens of the said state suffer many inconveniences and wants, have determined to have and have had counsel of the twenty-one guilds of the city, who have [by a roundabout method] chosen eight men, skilled and prudent in the aforesaid, who have had counsel with the officers of our Mint and with certain others of the trade of exchangers," etc., with such result as above.
Yet even so, the effort was only temporarily successful. Before two years was out the price of silver abroad, outside of Florence, had advanced to 12 _lire_ 15 _soldi a fiorino_ = 27 _lire_ 14 _soldi di piccioli_, whereas the price fixed by a fresh Mint law of 1345 had been again reduced to under 26 _lire_ 10 _soldi di piccioli_. The result was a second melting down and disappearance of the silver coins of the state, a second agitation on the part of the Florentine woollen merchants, and renewed legislation.
By the Mint regulation of 1347, a new-named money was introduced called _Guelfi Grossi_, coined at a tale of 117 to the libbra (111-3/5 being rendered cash to the merchants, and 5-2/5 retained by the Mint for the state), at the same standard as before (11-1/2 oz.), but at an equivalence of 5 instead of, as previously, 4 piccioli per piece.
117 x 5 = 585 piccioli. (= 29 lire 5 soldi di piccioli);
a figure which is considerably above the 27 _lire_ 14 _soldi piccioli_, which Villani gives as the price of foreign silver at the time. Even taking the lower tale of 111-3/5 pieces, which the importer of silver to the Mint got for his bullion, there is a distinct margin of profit.
111-3/5 = 558 piccioli. (= 27 lire 18 soldi di piccioli.)
Indeed, in its entirety, this operation of 1347 has a sinister look. At home the woollen merchants of Florence were obliged to pay wages in silver, abroad to receive payment in gold. It was to their interest to cry down the equivalence of silver; they paid less and received more. The means by which they brought the state to put upon silver a price so far removed from the market price could only be the bribe contained in the relinquishing of 5-2/3 pieces in each libbra. But such a process is in reality the beginning of debasement.
If this is not the true import of the Act of 1347, it testifies all the more to the only other possible motive--the monetary straits of Florence, her want of silver for currency, and the violent effort she was prepared to make to get it.
Whether by way of effect or cause it is hard to say, but certainly silver in the middle of the succeeding century had so far disappeared in the Italian peninsula, or gold so far increased during the fifteenth century, that the commercial ratio remained persistently low--1: 9.25, both in Milan and Florence; and the Mint regulations of 1460 adopted by the latter state (see under table of Florentine silver coins, Appendix), can only be looked upon as a simple repetition of the measures of 1345 and 1347.
Spain.
The currency history of Spain up to the conquest of America is one long list of alterations in the coinage, and of petitions from merchants and various Cortes for or against changes in the rating of the coins. The _oro gran modulo_ was rated at 100 pesetas, under Alfonso XI. of Castile, 1312-50, and at 1000 under his successor, Peter the Cruel, 1350-69. The _oro dobla Castellana_ was rated at 60 pesetas under Henry II., 1369-74; at 40 under Henry the Crafty, 1390-1406; and at 100 under John II., 1406-54. In the case of this country the troubles in the fourteenth century arose from the proximity of France, the circulation of lower-rated French coins, and the consequent depletion of the treasure of the kingdom. In Aragon, for instance, the charter of Peter IV. in 1346 had ordered the coining of gold after the same weight and fineness as of the florin of Florence. It was found too high, and three years later he was obliged to cancel it by another proclamation, ordering his own gold coins to be made of the same weight and fineness as the _écus_ of the French kings. The close of his reign and the early part of that of his successor witnessed acute crisis and distress, which led to Henry II.'s celebrated reduction of the coinage at the Cortes of Medina del Campo in 1371.
In 1391-93 another general proclamation was issued, ordering a reduction of the value of the monies and fixing new rules of exchange, and this was followed by one in 1398, prohibiting the circulation of foreign coins in Spain, except at bullion value. This latter was a common device, as will be seen in the case of our own country. It proved ineffectual to prevent the outflow of the metals, and when re-enacted in 1413 was found to be of as little avail. The Cortes of 1442 (Valladolid) complained bitterly, in a petition, of the money drawn away from the realm by foreign merchants, and in the same year a fresh ordinance was issued to readjust the values of the native monies to the foreign coins. In this schedule, _doblas de la Banda_ were rated at 100 _maravedis_, and the _florin d'oro d'Aragon_ at 65 _maravedis_. In 1473, only thirty or so years later, by the charter of Henry IV., issued at Segovia, these coins were rated at 300 and 200 _maravedis_ respectively. It was only with the advent of the Catholic sovereigns that the internal disorder and want of unity of the Spanish system was effectually remedied, in the very hour of that discovery of a new world which was to put upon Spain the vital function of distributing the new stores of precious metals (see account of Spanish monies, Appendix III.).
Germany.
The movements of the precious metals in Germany--which, as far as the ratio of the two metals is concerned, may be held to include the Netherlands up to 1552, when Flanders withdrew from the monetary system of the Holy Roman Empire--is a record of exactly the same process of natural and gradual appreciation of the _metal_ (i.e. depreciation of the weight and fineness of the _coin_) as in Spain, France, and England. In the accompanying tables the movement of silver is illustrated by means of the groschen, and that of gold by the Rhenish gulden. These coins, it need hardly be said, were not unit coins, nor sole prevailing. They are chosen from the bewildering variety with which the numerous independent Mints of Germany have succeeded in perplexing posterity, as being of relatively greater repute and wider acceptance, and because it is a simply impossible task to combine all the denominations of these coins, in order to deduce an average.
Up to 1375 the German gold coin was minted in close imitation of the Florentine florin. The weight was 53 grs., as was that of the Florentine piece; and the lily and St. John, the guardian saint of Florence, were both employed in the two coins, the German piece being indeed issued at first under the denomination, _Florin d'or_.
From the above-named date, however, and onwards, each succeeding and various power altered type, weight, or alloy, with more or less arbitrariness, but always to the increasing of the confusion of the system as a whole. And it was to remedy this confusion, or to reduce it somewhat, that the monetary union of the four electoral princes of the Rhine was established (8th June 1386), under the lead of the three towns, Frankfort, Speyer, and Worms; under which the four princes, Frederick, Archbishop of Cologne, Carl, Archbishop of Treves, Adolf, Archbishop of Mainz, and Rupert, Count Palatine of the Rhine, agreed upon a common minting of gold gulden. According to the treaty, 66 such gulden were to be minted from the Cologne mark of gold, each of the alloy of 22 carats 6 grs. gold, and 1 carat 6 grs. silver. In 1402 this coinage was confirmed at Mainz by the Mint edict of Rupert II.[4]
Seven years later, 1409, the three spiritual electors, Frederick, Archbishop of Cologne, John, Archbishop of Mainz, and Werner, Archbishop of Treves, made a new and slightly different treaty, for the purpose of again reducing the alloy of the gulden from 22-1/2 to 22 carats.
At this rate the system was, in the same year, at Speyer, formally accepted for themselves by the Netherlands, and at Cologne also, in 1409, by the Empire generally.
The detailed and various changes which the independent princes and powers of Germany subsequently made, it is out of the question to follow. To instance only in brief. In 1419 Frederick of Brandenburg ordered the coining of gulden for his own states, at the rate of 64-1/2 to the Cologne mark, and of the fineness of 19 carats--a very considerable reduction in the metal value of the coin. In 1422, only three years later, Sigismund was coining gulden 66-1/2 to the mark and 22 carats 6 grs. fine--a value somewhat higher than that accepted for the empire in 1409. In 1428-29, accordingly, the Emperor Sigismund issued an imperial order, which was formally adopted by the Reichstag meeting at Eger (1437) and Nürnberg (1438), by which the Cologne mark was to be coined into 68 gulden and the fineness reduced to 19 carats. Four years later, 1442, the Emperor Frederick IV. projected a further reform and reduction, proposing to coin 72 pieces of 19 carats fine, but this was not carried into effect, probably as exaggerating the average depreciation of the content of the coin (or appreciation of the metal). The rate, therefore, established by Sigismund practically remained in force for a matter of sixty years.
In the diet of 1495-97 (at Worms), however, a further slight reduction in weight and fineness took place, 69-1/3 pieces being struck out of the Cologne mark, and the fineness lowered to 18 carats 10 grs.
On the whole, therefore, the movement of gold during these two centuries is remarkably sluggish in Germany, putting aside, i.e., the internal variations between state and state; and remarkably corresponding to, and confirmatory of, that in England. And in all probability the mean of the quantities in the two countries would aptly measure the perfectly natural or normal appreciation of gold (depreciation of the content of fine metal in the current gold coin) throughout the period.
The movement of silver during the same two hundred years, 1300-1500, is much more excited, but shows an average or mean appreciation that tallies remarkably with that of gold just described, as also with that of silver in England. The various denominations of silver coins which arose in Germany, in those years, make it a work of extreme difficulty even to attempt averages. In the accompanying tables, therefore, the groschen is taken as most fairly averaging and widely current in the empire. In its first form, the _Gros Tournois_, struck at Tours, in France, this coin contained 55-1/10 parts of a Cologne mark, and was of the fineness of 15 loth 6 grs. In 1296, when it was first adopted in Germany (in Bohemia, and Meissen), 63-1/2 pieces were struck from the mark, and the fineness had been reduced to 15 loth. Its subsequent variations, up to the time of the discovery of America, are detailed in the accompanying table and in Appendix No. V., the principal points in which are marked by the years 1341, 1378 (a notable attempt at reformation by Charles IV. and Wenceslaus), 1390, 1412, and 1444 (marking also an attempt at reformation by treaty between the Duke of Saxony and the Margrave of Meissen).
MOVEMENTS OF SILVER IN GERMANY, 1300-1500, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE GROSCHEN.
+----------+-----------+---------+--------------------+ | |The Cologne| Of Alloy| Equivalent Value | | | Mark | |(as expressed in the| | Date. |coined into| |20-Florin Standard).| | +-----------+---------+----------+---------+ | | Pieces. |Loth. Qr.|Kreutzers.|Pfennige.| +----------+-----------+---------+----------+---------+ | 1226 | 55-1/10 | 5 6 | 21 |0-216/551| | (Gros | | | | | | Tournois | | | | | |of France)| | | | | | 1296 | 63-1/2 | 15 0 | 17 |2-110/127| | 1309 | 63-1/2 | 14 0 | 16 |2-18/127 | | 1324 | 64-1/2 | 15 0 | 17 |1-33/48 | |(Meissen) | | | | | | 1341 | 78 | 10 0 | 9 |2-6/13 | | 1350 | 91 | 14 0 | 11 |2-14/91 | | 1364 | 74-1/2 | 9 0 | 9 |0-36/149 | | 1378 | 70 | 14 1 | 15 |1-1/14 | | 1380 | 72 | 13 0 | 13 |2-1/6 | | -- | 91 | 11 0 | 9 |0-24/91 | |(Meissen) | | | | | | 1390 | 85 | 10 0 | 8 |3-5/17 | | -- | 90 | 9 0 | 7 |2 | |(Meissen) | | | | | | 1407 | 72-40/131| 8 0 | 8 |1-57/296 | | 1412 | 82 | 4 0 | 3 |2-26/41 | | 1444 | 88 | 7 13 | 6 |2-43/132 | | -- | 160 | 16 0 | 7 |2 | | 1459 | 101 | 5 9 | 4 |0-34/101 | | 1470 | 100-20/307| 5 0 | 3 |2-507/512| | 1490 | 103 | 5 0 | 3 |2-58/103 | +----------+-----------+---------+----------+---------+
THE MOVEMENT OF GOLD IN GERMANY, 1300-1500, ILLUSTRATED BY THE MOVEMENT OF THE GOLD GULDEN (RHEINISCHE GULDEN).
+-----------+------------+----------------+-----------------------------------+ | | Cologne | | Equivalent Value | | | Mark | Alloy. | (as expressed in the | | |coined into | | 20-Florin Standard). | | Date. | | | | | +------------+-------+--------+---------+-----------+-------------+ | | Pieces. |Carats.| Grains.| Florins.| Kreutzers.| Pfennige. | +-----------+------------+-------+--------+---------+-----------+-------------+ | 1252 | 44-3/8 | 24 | 0 | 6 | 22 |3-405/2911 | |(Florentine| | | | | | | | Florin). | | | | | | | | 1371 | 66 | 23 | 1 | 4 | 6 |2-434/781 | | 1386 | 66 | 22 | 6 | 4 | 1 |1-85/781 | | 1409 | 66 | 22 | 0 | 3 | 55 |3-517/781 | | 1419 | 64-1/2 | 19 | 0 | 3 | 28 |1-2851/3053 | | 1428 | 68 | 19 | 0 | 3 | 17 |3-18/1207 | | 1442 | 72 | 19 | 0 | 3 | 6 |3-14/213 | | 1477 | 69-1/3 | 18 | 10 | 3 | 3 |2-3104/15194 | +-----------+------------+-------+--------+---------+-----------+-------------+
FRANCE.
In France during this same period the ratio of gold to silver was changed in a single century more than a hundred and fifty times, and with a roughness that is quite inconceivable to the modern mind. To take a period of ten years for example:--
In 1303 the ratio was 10.26 " 1305 " 15.90 " 1308 " 14.46 " 1310 " 15.64 " 1311 " 19.55 " 1313 " 14.37
France presents the utmost difficulty to the student of metallic money during this earliest period, by reason of these violent and arbitrary alterations of the coinage. The extreme diversity of the coins, and the perpetual changing of the composition or alloy, make it almost impossible to estimate the fluctuations in the value of money in relation to goods, or gold in relation to silver. Apart from the international struggle for the precious metals, France was torn and ruined by the English invasions, and debasement after debasement of the coinage was resorted to as a means of raising money to continue the struggle. Such debasements mark the reign of Philip le Bel, 1285-1314, and of each succeeding king, from his days to the final ejection of the English invaders, and after. A single instance will serve to show their nature. In 1342 the mark of gold, which in a normal time just preceding was valued at 41 livres 13 sols, was proclaimed equal to 117 livres, and in 1360 the mark of silver, valued normally at 5 livres, rose to 102 livres.[5] It stands to reason that such abnormal movements must be neglected in any attempt to determine the course of such fluctuations in value of the metals, and the ratio of gold and silver, as arose naturally from the metallic and currency history of the time. Eliminating, therefore, this element of forced and accidental debasements, due to political circumstance, the natural history, if it may be so styled, of the French coinage displays the same tendency to an appreciation of money metal which marks the history of the other European countries.
TABLE OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE COINAGE OF FRANCE, 1300-1500.[6]
+----------+--------------------+-------------------------------+ | | The Mark of Silver | The Mark of Gold | | | coined into | coined into | | Date. | | | | +-----------+--------+-----------+--------+----------+ | | Livres | Sols. | Livres | Sols. | Deniers. | | |(Tournois).| |(Tournois).| | | +----------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+----------+ | 1309 | 2 | 19 | 44 | 0 | 0 | | (Philp | | | | | | | le Bel.)| | | | | | | 1315 | 2 | 14 | 45 | 0 | 0 | | 1343 | 3 | 4 | 43 | 6 | 8 | | 1350 | 5 | 5 | 53 | 18 | 9 | | 1361 | 5 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 0 | | 1381 | 5 | 8 | 60 | 10 | 0 | | 1422 | 7 | 0 | 76 | 5 | 0 | | 1427 | 8 | 0 | 72 | 0 | 0 | | 1429 | 7 | 0 | 77 | 10 | 0 | | 1446 | 7 | 10 | 88 | 2 | 6 | | 1456 | 8 | 10 | 100 | 0 | 0 | | 1473 | 10 | 0 | 110 | 0 | 0 | | 1475 | 10 | 0 | 118 | 10 | 0 | +----------+-----------+--------+-----------+--------+----------+
In this table each of the points or dates taken marks a period of return to good money after a period of debasement, and in the mind of the legislator such return to good money (_monnaie forte_) can only be construed as based on an estimated general or normal rate of monetary values, for each particular succeeding point of time. At every return to good money a proclamation was issued, expressing the determination of the administration to adhere to good money, as in the halcyon days of St. Louis, etc. etc., and fixing the rate at which the monies should be coined and current. By taking these points or dates of return to good money, therefore, we eliminate the arbitrary action of the Government in periods of debasement, and arrive at a net result showing the _natural_ movement of the metals.
The general trend of the table--or of the metals whose movements it portrays--is perceptible at a glance, and will, moreover, be found exactly similar to that of the cases of England and Germany below. On account of the arbitrary debasements by the Kings and of the numerous feudal coinages struck independently by the bishops and subsidiary lords, the question of the friction with which this process of metallic appreciation worked itself out cannot be so well illustrated in the case of France as in that of England. But so much as this may be briefly indicated. In 1294 the scarcity of silver coinage was so great that a proclamation was put forth ordering silver to be brought to the Mint, and forbidding the export of the metals. In consequence of the futility of this ordinance, a further proclamation was issued in 1309, forbidding the circulation in France of English silver sterlings and gold florins of Florence, and crying down the exchange denomination of all other foreign coins. Similar proclamations were issued again and again--notably in 1328. But the complaints as to the depletion of the coin of the realm became much more serious in France after Edward III. had instituted his gold coin in 1344. There was henceforth a process of double friction--(1) as arising from the difference of the declared value of the French King's coin, as compared with foreign tariffs of coins; (2) as arising from the difference between the ratio of gold to silver in France and that prevailing in other countries.
[Sidenote: ALTERATION IN SILVER RATE]
In 1336 Philippe de Valois had fixed the ratio at 1:12, "the cause which moved us to this being that so our people who were in great privations and straits for money may more abundantly and quickly be filled again with money new and current." This was re-enacted in 1339, but proved quite inoperative to rule the market rate, and in 1346 Philippe found himself obliged to tolerate the advance which had been put upon the good monies in the market, by allowing provisionally the _chaise d'or_ to be current for 30 sols Tournois. Four years later the silver rate was altered by a proclamation conceived in these terms: "As the changers and merchants who are accustomed to bring bullion to our Mint have ceased, and do daily cease to do so, so that the working of our Mint is greatly impeded, to the great prejudice of our people if no remedy is applied, we therefore order that for each mark of silver brought to the Mint there shall be delivered out by the Mint another 8 sols Tournois in addition to the 112 sols Tournois fixed by law." The immediate consequence was a hoarding and disappearance of the gold coins, and in the following year, 1351, the tale of the _denier d'or aux fleurs de lis_ was altered from 50 to 54 to the mark.
There is here no question of an arbitrary debasement. It was simply an attempt to preserve the currency from the action of a changing market ratio, which led to the withdrawal now of the one, now of the other coins, and to the circulation meanwhile of foreign coins at a rate apparently disproportioned to the metallic content.[7] In 1361 evidence was given before the Mint authorities that "in payments the people do by abuse give foreign monies at a higher rate than they are worth, viz. the _moutons_ of Flanders and Brabant at a higher rate than the _franc d'or_, of which said _moutons_ the best specimens are worth 18 denars less than the said _franc d'or_; a silver piece called _chartain_ for 16 and even 18 denars, which is worth no more than 10," and so on. Two years later it was declared that the Mint at Tournay was on the point of stopping work, "the people having been accustomed for a long time to give a higher price for the mark of gold than in the case of other monies of this kingdom, and this by reason of the foreign merchants." Towards the close of his reign Charles V., finding his kingdom filled with depreciated imported specie, while all the good native pieces had been drawn out of the land, sought and obtained from the Pope, 1372, a Bull of Excommunication against neighbour powers who should counterfeit his monies. It was not until 1391 that the proper defensive measure of a change of ratio was resorted to, and by that time the conditions of the Mint rates in surrounding nations had so altered as to render the change partially inoperative. In 1393, accordingly, there was a great lack of the smaller silver coin, which led to a proclamation by Charles VI. on the 2nd April of that year for encouraging the minting of _petiz deniers Tournois_. The same complaint was, however, re-echoed in 1395 and 1396, but, as it appears, quite futilely, for nine years after another proclamation had to be issued against the currency of foreign coins of Scotland, Navarre, the Rhenish and Netherland provinces, etc., "which have course in our kingdom for a greater value than they are worth, by which means our monies are arrested in their course and greatly withdrawn; the gold and silver _deniers a l'écu_ which we have minted having been melted down."
[Sidenote: ACTION OF THE STATES-GENERAL IN 1420]
When the States-General met at Paris in 1420 the depreciated state of the coinage was laid before the assembly as of prime concernment, and it was by its advice that the proclamation of the following year was issued fixing the _écu d'or_ at a tale of 66 to the mark and of the _gros d'argent_ at 86-1/4, "it being come to our knowledge that for some time past the money in our kingdom is so diminished and enfeebled that by this means the gold and silver which abounded is in very great measure drawn away and transported, and the traffic of strangers here almost ceased, and all necessaries of life put at a great height," etc. The result of this reformation of 1421 was that during some portion of the succeeding years of Charles VII.'s reign silver came from all parts in great abundance, although in 1436 complaints were again heard that money was not being coined and did not suffice for the public needs. At this point, however, the complaints apparently ceased, and it was not till twenty years later that the step was again taken of decrying and forbidding the circulation of foreign specie.
The ceasing of the disorders in the French money is attributed to the expulsion of the English invaders, but there can be little doubt that much more simple and natural laws were at work. From the reign of Louis XI. onwards these natural laws had freer play as against the disturbing influence of mere arbitrary debasements, and it is easier to analyse their influence.
[Sidenote: FRANCE IN 1488]
From his accession in 1461 onwards the monetary history of France displays many analogies with that of the Netherlands (see Chapter II.). Thus in 1470, finding the market rate of foreign coins driven above the home Mint rate by the licence of the people (i.e. by normal market action), Louis issued a tariff to regulate the exchange rate in which the prevailing prices of the foreign specie were tolerated as an interim for a period of three months. At the end of that time it was manifestly impossible to secure a permanent reduction, and in order to prevent the transport of specie it was found necessary, 4th January 1473, to raise the value of the home coin both gold and silver (see account of French monies in Appendix No. VI.). Still the export continued, and in 1475 the process of enhancement had to be repeated as a measure of defence for the gold specie. Thirteen years later similar precautions were taken for the silver specie by Charles VIII.'s proclamation of 24th April 1488.
This is the last defensive measure of the first period of the monetary history of France, and no further act is on record previous to the great change in the relative values of the precious metals which ensued upon the discovery of the New World.
THE RATIO BETWEEN GOLD AND SILVER IN EUROPE, 1300-1500.
+-----+------------------------+-------+--------+----------------+------+---------+-----+ |Date.| Italy. |France.|England.| Germany. |Spain.|Burgundy.|Date.| | +---------+-------+------+ | +-----+----------+ | | | | |Florence.|Venice.|Milan.| | | A. | B. | | | | +-----+---------+-------+------+-------+--------+-----+----------+------+---------+-----+ |1252 | 10.75 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1252 | |1257 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.29 | .. | .. | .. | .. |1257 | |1284 | .. | 10.84 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1284 | |1296 | 11.10 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1296 | |1303 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.1 |1303 | |1305 | 10.88 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1305 | |1308 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1308 | |1315 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1315 | |1324 | 13.62 | 13.99 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1324 | |1338 | .. | .. | .. | 12.61 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1338 | |1343 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1343 | |1344 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.59 | .. | .. | .. | .. |1344 | |1344 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.04 | .. | .. | .. | .. |1344 | |1345 | 11.04 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1345 | |1346 | .. | .. | .. | 11.11 | 11.57 |11.33| .. | .. | .. |1346 | |1347 | 10.91 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1347 | |1348 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.1 |1348 | |1350 | .. | 14.44 |10.59 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1350 | |1351 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.3 | .. | .. |1351 | | | | | | | | | (Lübeck) | | | | |1353 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.15 | .. | .. | .. | .. |1353 | |1361 | .. | .. | .. | 12.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1361 | |1365 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |11.37| .. | .. | .. |1365 | |1375 | 10.77 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.4 | .. | .. |1375 | | | | | | | | | (Lübeck) | | | | |1379 | .. | 13.17 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1379 | |1380 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1380 | |1386 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.76 | .. | .. |1386 | | | | | | | | | (Rhine | | | | | | | | | | | |Provinces)| | | | |1391 | .. | .. | .. | 10.74 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1391 | |1399 | .. | 11.69 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.16 | .. | .. |1399 | | | | | | | | | (Rhine | | | | | | | | | | | |Provinces)| | | | |1400 | .. | .. |11.630| .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1400 | |1402 | 10.58 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1402 | |1406 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.66 | .. | .. |1406 | | | | | | | | | (Rhine | | | | | | | | | | | |Provinces)| | | | |1411 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.0 | .. | .. |1411 | | | | | | | | | (Lübeck) | | | | |1412 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.33 | .. | .. | .. | .. |1412 | |1417 | .. | 12.56 | .. | 10.67 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1417 | |1421 | .. | .. | .. | 10.29 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1421 | |1422 | 10.16 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1422 | |1427 | .. | .. | .. | 9.00 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1427 | |1429 | .. | 11.04 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1429 | |1432 | .. | .. | .. | 10.87 | .. | .. | .. | 5.822| .. |1432 | |1435 | .. | .. | .. | 12.32 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1435 | |1441 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |11.12| .. | .. | .. |1441 | |1443 | .. | 12.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1443 | |1446 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1446 | |1447 | .. | .. | .. | 11.44 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1447 | |1450 | .. | .. |10.965| .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1450 | |1455 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.2 | .. | .. |1455 | | | | | | | | | (Lübeck) | | | | |1456 | .. | .. | .. | 11.77 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1456 | |1460 | 9.33 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1460 | |1462 | 9.37 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1462 | |1464 | 11.42 | .. | .. | .. | 11.15 | .. | .. | 9.824| .. |1464 | |1471 | 10.58 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1471 | |1472 | .. | 11.13 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1472 | |1474 | .. | 10.97 | .. | 11.00 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1474 | |1475 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |10.41 | .. |1475 | |1480 | 10.83 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |10.87 | .. |1480 | |1485 | 10.46 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1485 | |1486 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |10.98 | .. |1486 | |1488 | .. | .. | .. | 11.83 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1488 | |1495 | 10.46 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1495 | |1497 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |10.01 | .. |1497 | |1500 | .. | .. |10.975| .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |1500 | |1506 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |10.262| .. |1506 | +-----+---------+-------+------+-------+--------+-----+----------+------+---------+-----+
Germany--_A_, as determined by the purchase prices of the two metals in the Lübeck Mint. _B_, as determined by the Mint ordinances.
[Sidenote: ENGLAND: COINAGE OF 1344]
England.
Even before the adoption of a gold coinage by Edward III., England had felt the effect of loss by exchange, owing to the introduction of gold florins by means of the Flemish trade. In the Parliament of 1339, at Westminster, complaint was made of the want of coinage. It was proposed as a remedy--(1) that every merchant should bring in 40s. or more for every sack of wool that he should import, and (2) that it should be considered by the King and his council whether it might not be advantageous to permit _florins de écu_ (of France), and florins of Florence (i.e. gold), and other good florins to be current with the _esterlings_ (i.e. the silver penny), "but only esterlings to be compulsory for under 40s. value." In less than four years good money was being carried out of the realm, and false money brought in at such a rate that Parliament was seriously perplexed. In its debate on the matter at Westminster, 1343, the result is thus stated: "All orders of persons in the realm had loss for a long time, on account of the florins which were delivered in payment in Flanders, bearing so high a value there as to occasion a loss of one-third on all merchandise imported thence." Certain goldsmiths of London were therefore ordered to be called in to advise and to refine one or two of each kind of florin, so as to rate the fine gold in them according to the true value. And it was proposed that of this fine gold one kind of money should be made in England and Flanders, provided the Flemings were willing, to be current in both countries at such an alloy and value as should be determined by the King and Council, and all other gold money to be taken at bullion value, and all silver money to be reckoned thereby ("other sufficient money to be received according to the value of the fine gold").
The result was the first practical issue of English gold. In 1344 an indenture was made between the King on the one part and George Kirkyn and Lotte Nicholyn of Florence, goldmasters and workers, on the other, for the coining of three monies of gold, one to be current at 6s., and to be equal in weight to 2 _petits florins_ of Florence of good weight, 50 of these being coined out of the pound Tower of London.
In this indenture Edward copied the ratio prevailing in the French kingdom, viz. that of 12.61 to 1 between gold and silver. That ratio was considerably too high, and he quickly experienced the same effects which were felt by the French King from it. During his reign (1327-50) Philip of Valois coined more species of new money than all his predecessors put together, but owing to the adoption of this too high a ratio the country was gradually depleted of good money. In order to induce people to bring bullion to the Mint he offered to coin free of cost, but found nothing of avail until he followed the example of England and altered the ratio.
In our own country the same truth had been quickly grasped. It was found that the new gold money was rated too high, i.e. overvalued in relation to silver, and was therefore refused. By a proclamation of the same year, therefore, 9th July, it was withdrawn and ordered to be taken only as bullion, and a new indenture was made for the coining of gold nobles--39-1/2 out of the pound Tower, and at the value of 6s. 8d. The nobles were at once made current and tenderable along with silver, by proclamation; gold being ordered to be received in payment of 20s. and upwards.
[Sidenote: GOLD NOBLES COINED]
By this indenture the ratio was at once dropped from 12.59:1 to 11.04:1. This attempt to determine the rate of exchange is a common feature in the legislation of France and Spain as well as of England. It stands to sense, and is apparent on every page of the monetary history of the period, that it was absolutely imperative. The friction which accompanied the process can now only faintly be imagined, but that is a secondary consideration. The essential point was, that such changes were normal and inevitable, forced by sheer necessity upon Governments, such an one even as our own, which has always been most jealously conservative in matters of coinage.
TABLE OF THE VARIATIONS OF THE GOLD AND SILVER COINS OF ENGLAND, 1300-1500.
+----------------------+---------------------------------------------------+ | Silver. | Gold. | +-------+--------------+-------+--------+----------+-----------+-----------+ | | Weight of | | | Weight | | Price in | | Date. | the Silver | Date. | Coin. | in | Value | Pence per | | | Penny in | | | Grains. | Declared.| Grain of | | | Troy Grains. | | | | | Gold. | +-------+--------------+-------+--------+----------+-----------+-----------+ | | | | | | _s._ _d._ | | | 1300 | 22 | 1344 | Florin | 108 | 6 0 | 0.6666 | | 1344 | 20-1/4 | 1344 | Noble | 138-6/13 | 6 8 | 0.5777 | | 1346 | 20 | 1346 | ... | 128-4/7 | 6 8 | 0.6222 | | 1351 | 18 | 1353 | ... | 120 | 6 8 | 0.6666 | | 1412 | 15 | 1414 | ... | 108 | 6 8 | 0.7407 | | 1464 | 12 | 1460 | ... | 120 | 8 4 | 0.7500 | | | | 1470 | Angel | 80 | 6 8 | 1.0000 | +-------+--------------+-------+--------+----------+-----------+-----------+
In the first issue of Edward III. the Troy grain of gold had been valued at .6666 of a penny. At such rate it was overvalued and refused, and in the second issue of the same year the value was dropped to .5777 of a penny. Gradually, as the ratio on the Continent changed, and came to bear on the English rate, this was in its turn found an under-valuation, and only two years later, 1346, the value was raised to .6222, making a ratio of 11.57 to 1. The change was made in consequence of loud and serious complaints of the scarcity of coin, good money being carried out and false "Lusshebournes" (Luxembourgs), worth only 8s. in the pound, being brought in. The grievance was so great that Parliament petitioned Edward most urgently to interfere, instancing in special the Lombards, "that they purchased English florins at a lower rate than that which was appointed," and praying "that such persons should not buy or sell the said money, nor make any agreement, in the sale of their merchandise, what money they would receive in rejection of English money." To this it was answered, that it should be commanded throughout England that all persons should receive for their merchandise gold, according to the currency ordained, without any agreement to be made, under pain of imprisonment and heavy ransom, and when any agreement had been made it should be at the will of the purchaser to pay money of gold or silver as he should think fit. At the same time, an ordinance was issued forbidding any person to carry out the King's good money or to bring in counterfeit.
[Sidenote: EDWARD III.'S CHANGES OF RATIO]
The effect of Edward's change of ratio--from 12.59 (the same as the French rate) in 1344 to 11.04 in 1346--told immediately on the French currency, and at the first return to good money in the first year of King John (1350-64) the ratio in that country was changed at a stroke from 12.61 to 11.11. This in its turn acted upon precious metals in England, and for three years the English King found himself futilely struggling against an outflow of silver, by such measures as the hanging and drawing of merchants, before he discovered that it was due to an overvaluation of gold. In 1353, accordingly, he lowered the weight of the gold nobles from 128-4/7 grs. to 120. At the same time, the contents of the silver penny were reduced in a greater proportion (from 20 grs. to 18). By this means the ratio of 11.04, which had prevailed since 1346, was lowered to 11.15.
That this ratio achieved its purpose, as far as England was concerned, is apparent from the simple fact that it remained unaltered for over sixty years until 1414; that it acted adversely upon and drained France of her gold is apparent from the change of the ratio there at her first immediately succeeding return to good money. Two periods of debasement had marked the short reign of John of France (1350-64), and the effect of these and of the influence of the English ratio was such that in 1360 there was no gold in his kingdom. Towards the end of that year, and in the beginning of 1361, John promulgated a reformation of the coinage--a return to good or "forte" money, and in this reformation he adopted a ratio which would act on the English stock of precious metals.
In England, Edward's action in 1353 in lowering the contents of both silver and gold coins, and altering the ratio, had given rise to great discontent, to an extent which proved how wiser and truer to the nation's interest was the King than his people. This diminution of the value of these coins, says the Chronicle, made all things dearer, so that the workmen and servants became assuming and demanded greater wages.
There is as little foundation for such an innuendo as there is for the view which regards this depreciation as an issue of base money. It was simply a measure of precaution, as stopping an invisible and insidious outflow of the currency.
[Sidenote: ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN 1360]
Looked at historically, and not at all controversially, such results as have been just described can only be attributed to the European monetary system of the time. Apart altogether from the arbitrary debasement of the coin, as, e.g., in France--apart even from changes of the ratio enacted with the mere crafty design of inducing a flow of gold, the monetary system of the time was so rough, so unscientific; the tariffing of the coins of different nations against each other was so inexact, so much a matter of rule-of-thumb, of hasty average, that it was simply impossible to issue such general tables of equivalents of coins and such a ratio as would have given stability to the various coinages of Europe. If the currency system of England had been of silver alone, a single enactment lessening the content of the unit coin, or crying up its denomination, would have stopped any outflow caused by under-valuation as compared with foreign money value. The same if it had been only gold. But being combined of the two, being, as it was, both gold and silver, it was necessary, in the case of such outflow, not merely to call down one or both of them below the value of foreign gold or silver, but also and at the same time to establish such a ratio between the two metals for _internal_ circulation as would give no advantage to exchangers acquainted with a different ratio prevailing in some particular part of the Continent. And just the same for the other European money systems. If, for instance, the English sterling had been called down to a value which would of itself have forbidden export to the Continent, but at the same time such a ratio had been left standing between these sterlings and the gold nobles (say 12:1) as was so far in excess of the ratio prevailing in some parts of Europe (say 11:1) as to overlap the amount by which the sterling had been called down, then the result could, and doubtless would, be an outflow of silver, in face and spite of the apparent higher tariff of the English sterling, as against the continental silver coins. This is the historic, patent, undeniable defect and weakness in the bimetallic system of the Europe of that day. It must be borne well in mind how different the problem then was from that which now besets the monetary world. To-day the flow of the precious metals is natural, the indicator, facilitator, and safety-valve of international trade. Such a conception was an utter impossibility to the fourteenth century. The rulers of that age had only one idea, the maintenance or increase of the treasure of the realm, first for military purposes, and then for trade; and their mental horizon was limited by the boundaries of each their little dominion. They could not grasp the idea of Europe as a monetary whole, each fought for his own head or land, and each found a ready weapon to hand in the monetary confusion of the time. In any system so rough and so non-uniform as that of Europe in the fourteenth century, any variation of one metal served as a vantage-point against the other, as a lever to press upon and force it out. One metal would have been safe (so long as no partial depreciation was allowed), two metals served simply as fulcra to each other's oscillations, to the undoing of both. The mediæval legislator could not grasp that there was a double train of principle and event transacting itself under his very eyes--the one, changes of denomination of coins; the other, changes of ratio. In less than thirty years after Edward III. had cried down the English coins to below the competing denominations of the Continent, the changes of the European ratio had produced their effect, and Richard II. found the realm denuded of its treasure and currency.
[Sidenote: ENGLAND IN 1378]
From 1360 the ratio on the Continent gradually sank from 12:1 till towards the end of the first quarter of the fifteenth century, when it stood in France as low as 9:1.
That France experienced the process, which must have been perfectly natural and due simply to relatively diminishing production of silver in those years, 1360-1425, is seen in her alteration of the ratio from 12 to 10.74 in 1380 and to 10.29 in 1422.
In England the same train of events made itself felt at almost the same moment. In 1378 great complaints were made of the export of gold and silver, and of the enfeebled state of the money which remained in the realm, "so that if a remedy be not speedily applied, the King will receive no more than 4s. where he should receive 5s."
[Sidenote: THE MONETARY INQUIRY OF 1381]
Three years later--one year after the French King had lowered his ratio from 12.1 to 10.74--the Commons presented a petition to the King during the sitting of Parliament, 1381, complaining of the wretched want of the kingdom, which was devoid of treasure, monies of gold and silver being carried out of the realm, and those remaining being clipped to one-third their nominal value. No money at all was being minted in the Tower, and a heavy export of our metals to Scotland and Ireland was taking place. Simultaneously the officers of the Mint presented a petition to the King and his Council in Parliament, complaining that no money was being coined. The causes of this, in their opinion, were--
1. That the monies of gold and silver beyond the seas were more feeble than the monies of England, on which account the merchants could not bring bullion into England for their profit nor for the King's advantage. But if any manner of bullion of gold were brought into the kingdom, by persons travelling, it was sold to those who conveyed it out of England, to their great gain and to the injury of the whole realm.
2. That the silver of England which [i.e. when it] was found to be good and heavy, was taken into Scotland, because the money of that country was so light.
3. That the gold of England being so good and heavy, and that beyond sea so light, the _nobles_ which came from Calais were gone into Flanders, and the English _nobles_ were carried beyond the sea, to the great profit of those who exported them, etc. etc.
4. That the money of gold and silver of England was commonly clipped, so that they who thought they should have £100 would have no more than £90, unless a remedy were speedily applied.
The officers of the Mint were accordingly ordered to be called before the Lords of the Parliament for examination, and they were succeeded by others, private persons but mostly goldsmiths, who were called upon as experts. In the case of these latter the various statements of opinion are preserved for us in the Rolls of Parliament, and they possess a peculiar interest.
Richard Leye thought that the reason why no gold or silver was brought into England, but, on the contrary, that which had been in the kingdom was exported, was this, that the realm expended too much on merchandise, such as grocery, mercery, furs, etc. He therefore proposed that every merchant who imported goods into England should export an equal quantity of the produce of the realm, and that no one should take out gold or silver, contrary to the statutes.
As to the gold not agreeing with the silver (which was Article IV. of the inquiry), he thought that could not be remedied, unless the money were changed, and to change it in any manner would be productive of universal injury to Lords, Commons, etc.
To Article V. he advised that, whereas new money had been made in Flanders and in Scotland, proclamation be made that all manner of coins of Flanders, Scotland, and of all other places beyond the seas, should be no longer current in England, and that no one should receive them in payment except as bullion to be carried to the King's Mint.
Lincoln, a goldsmith, gave his opinion similarly against the permission to export gold and silver, and proposed that the gold noble should remain of the same weight as it had been, but at a greater value.
To the First Article Cranten said, that no more in value of foreign merchandise should be consumed within the realm than should be exported of commodities, the growth of England; and then, whether the money were enhanced or debased, it would hereafter remain within the realm. Also, that exchanges or other payments by letters should not be made out of Flanders, or other parts beyond the seas, to pay in England for any merchandise.
John Hoo advised a proclamation against the carrying out of gold or silver, and that the money should be received by weight.
The statement of opinion of the succeeding and last witness is extremely valuable and interesting. Richard Aylesbury opined that, provided the merchandise exported from England was properly regulated,--that is, if no more of foreign commodities were allowed to be imported than the value of the native products which should be taken out,--the money then in England would remain, and great plenty would come from beyond the seas.
He also conceived it to be expedient that the Pope's collector [of Peter's Pence] should be an Englishman, and that the Pope's money should be sent to him in merchandise and not in coin, and that the journeys of clerks should be entirely forbidden, on pain, etc.
For the feebleness of the gold, which was occasioned by clipping, he conceived there was no other remedy but that it should be universally weighed by those who received it, and that the proclamation should be made accordingly.
_The agreement of the gold with the silver he believed could not be effected unless the money were changed, but that he dared not to propose on account of the general damage which would ensue._
On account of the new money which had been made in Flanders and Scotland, he advised that all Scottish monies should be forbidden by proclamation, and also all other monies from beyond the sea, so that they should have no currency in England; and that no one should take them in payment, except at their value as bullion and for the King's coinage; that no one should export gold or silver, according to the statute in that case made, etc.
And, further, he suggested, by way of information, that the pound of gold which was there made into the sum of 45 nobles (but which pound, by reason of clipping and otherwise impairing, was then valued at 41-1/2 nobles) should be made into 48 nobles, to be current at the same value as before.
This last proposition would have reduced the ratio to a fraction over 11:1--something higher than the ratio prevalent in France. Instead of acting on evidence such as this, however, and so changing the ratio, Richard's Government contented itself with the perfectly useless prohibition of export of gold or silver (statute 5 Rich. II. cap. 1). Four years later, accordingly, the matter was again pressed upon the attention of Parliament, and even by the Chancellor of the realm, Michael de la Pole himself, in his opening speech. The English money, he said, was in greater estimation and of higher value in all other places than in England. It was therefore sought out and craftily withdrawn, and the chief or greatest remedy was to increase the value or price of the said money.
In spite of such recommendation as this the measure was not adopted, and Richard fell back on his previous expedients, crying down by proclamation the value of the Scotch coins, 1387, and of the gold coins of Flanders and Brabant, 1393, and ordaining by enactment that exporters of goods should bring in 1 oz. of gold for every sack of wool which they sold.
Such an ordinance as this last is of the commonest and most frequent occurrence in the enactments of fifteenth-century England, but always unworkable as warring against the most elementary principles of international trade.
On his accession, therefore, Henry IV. found himself heir to an accumulation of monetary evil, through the impolicy and want of courage of Richard.
[Sidenote: THE RECOINAGE OF 1414]
He was obliged, at the request of the mayors and merchants of the staple of Calais, to abolish the last unworkable ordinance just referred to, and attempted at the same time to provide a positive remedy by reviving a proclamation against the currency of silver halfpennies brought from Venice, of which three or four only were equal to one sterling in value. In 1401 the Commons complained in Parliament that nobles of Flanders were so common in England that a man could not receive a sum of 100 shillings without taking three or four such nobles, each of them more feeble than the English noble by two-pence.
A statute was accordingly passed, enacting that all money of gold and silver of the coin of Flanders and all other lands, and of Scotland, should be voided out of the land, or put to coin to the bullion.
It was all in vain. Two years later, 1403, the Commons again complained of the depletion of gold, and again a statute was passed, and so on. This futile process actually reproduces itself yearly up to 1411, when at last the question of a recoinage was fairly faced. By the ordinance for, and regulation of, the money of the realm, of that year, it was provided that, "because of the great scarcity of money at the time," the Master of the Mint should make of every pound of gold 50 nobles, and of silver 30 shillings of esterlings of old alloy.
This recoinage was carried out and finished in the third year of Henry V., 1414. Under it the contents of the silver penny sank from 18 to 15 grs., and of the gold noble from 120 to 108 grs., the consequent change in the ratio being from 11.15, which had prevailed since 1353 to 10.33.
At this latter rate the monetary system of England remained for almost fifty years, viz. up to 1460. But, though the rate endured so long, it is not for a moment to be supposed that the ensuing period was one of repose. Within eight years of the accomplishment of the reform in the English coinage, the ratio in France was lowered to a point somewhat below the established rate in England, and with considerable variation remained lower through all the years in question, 1414-1460. In 1421 it was changed to 10.29, in 1427 to 9, in 1432 to 10.87, and in 1447 to 11.44.
The effect on England, as recorded in the complaints in Parliament, was almost parallel with that in the days of Richard. In 1414 complaints were made against the circulation of galley halfpence by the merchants of Venice. Three years later proclamation was made against the circulation of the gold monies of Flanders, called _Burgundy nobles_, which were of less value than the English nobles. In 1419 it was found that money was being exported "more largely, and in many other manners, than had been accustomed, to the great mischief and impoverishment of the whole realm." And in the following year the usual statute was enacted, on the petition of the Commons, commanding foreign money to be taken as bullion. Again, two years later, 1422, the enfeebled and depreciated state of the coinage was so apparent that the collectors of the subsidy granted in that year by Parliament were instructed to accept nobles as of the denominational value of 6s. 8d. (i.e. the full value), "provided they stretched verily to the value of 5s. 8d. by weight." At the same time silver money was so scarce that "though [i.e. even if] a noble were so good of gold and weight as 6s. 8d., yet men could get no white money for it." In 1423 the Commons complained of the want of silver coins in the realm, "to the great unease and harm of the poorer people of this land," "because [says the statute, which was accordingly enacted], that silver is bought and sold uncoined at 32s. the pound of Troy, whereas the same pound is no more of value at the coin than 32s., with an abatement of 12 dens. for the coinage."
[Sidenote: THE MONETARY TROUBLES OF HENRY VI]
From the twenty-fourth chapter of the statute of 1429 it appears, quite consonantly, "that the merchant aliens had of late introduced a custom of refusing to take silver, as they were wont, for their merchandises, and of taking only gold nobles, half-nobles, and farthings, which, from time to time, they carried out of the realm into other foreign countries, where they were changed to their increase and forged into other coins, so that they gained in the alloy of every noble twenty pence, against the tenor of the statutes, etc., and to the prejudice of the King and realm. Therefore the King, willing to provide a remedy, ordained that no merchant alien should constrain nor bind any of his liege people by promise covenant or liege, to make him payment in gold for any manner of debt due to him, nor refuse to receive payment in silver for any manner of such duty or debt, upon the pain of the double value of the same."
In 1439 provision was again ordered to prevent exportation of money by merchant aliens. It was renewed in 1448, and five years later the Commons petitioned that the silver mines of Devon and Cornwall, which had not been worked for a long time, might be again opened, on account of the great scarcity of money.
The confusion of the Wars of the Roses, however, renders it slightly problematical how far the two successive lowerings of the coinage, which took place in 1460 and 1465 or 1470, are to be attributed to arbitrary action or to a natural process. By the recoinage of 1460 the noble was increased in weight from 108 grs. to 120 grs., and the value from 6s. 8d. to 8s. 4d., being a real appreciation of the grain of gold from .7407 to .7500 of a penny. At approximately the same date, 1464, the weight of the silver penny was lowered from 15 to 12 grs. In the succeeding recoinage of 1465 and 1470 these rates were again altered. A new gold coin, the _angel_, was instituted, weighing 80 grs., and valued at 6s. 8d., while the weight of the silver penny was left unaltered. The ratio was accordingly changed to 11.15.
This was the last change of the coinage made in England before the era of the discovery of America. The internal effects which the changes had on the commerce of the time are hidden from us by the disturbing influences of the Wars of the Roses.
[Sidenote: CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PERIOD]
But it is, probably, in connection with this change of the English ratio--or with some wider, general movement, acting on both countries alike--that the last monetary ordinances of Louis XI. of France, referred to above, are to be understood.
These acts of conflicting policies mark the conclusion of the first period of European metallic monetary history, for no further changes were enacted previous to the close of the century and the discovery of America. As far as England was concerned, the monetary system remained comparatively unchanged till the days of Henry VII.
On a review of the whole period two simple facts emerge with unmistakable plainness and import.
1. It was a period in which the commercial expanse outstripped the reinforcing supply of the precious metals, and therefore in which a real decline of prices[8] prevails.
2. The evil effects of such decline were enormously increased by shortsighted, crafty manipulation of the currency by the European rulers, and by the rough, unscientific system of the prevailing coinage and exchange rates, and by the inability of the age to understand, or even to perceive, the hidden working of two metals see-sawing against each other--acting as levers against each other--cutting each other's throats. The discovery of America corrected the fall of prices and saved Europe, but it left her rulers as deadly ignorant as before of the workings of bimetallism--to give a name to what they had not even perceived as a phenomenon, much less as a system.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: This is the date accepted by the numismatic authorities. It is adopted by Orsini (_Storia delle Monete della Repubblica Fiorentina_, p. xxiv, where he states the authority for it). It is nevertheless open to serious doubt. See in De Saulcy, Documents I. pp. 115-131, references to florins d'or from 1180 onwards. On the other hand, as to the nature of the florin de compte and its distinction from the florin d'or, see M.L. Blancard, _Revue numismatique_, 1886, pp. 48, 218, and 1887, p. 259; and Vicomte D'Avenel, _Histoire de la propriété, etc._, i. p. 41.]
[Footnote 2: Est a notter que le Roi en fit forger aulcune quantité (some slight quantity) d'or du poids de 12 den. 16 gr. chacune pièce laguelle auvrage il dedia seullement pour sou aulmosne aux pauvres ausquels souvent il lavait les piedz par humilité. Et en fut jamais inventée ladite pièce d'or pour aultre cause que dessus et non pour monnaie uzuelle et publicque." (De Saulcy, _Documents, i._ 115, 122, 125).]
[Footnote 3: See, however, in De Saulcy, i. 31, a mention of _manteletz d'or de Flandre_ in 1265.]
[Footnote 4: Soetbeer considers the standard in 1386 as 23 fine, and asserts that, by the Mint edict of 1402, it was lowered to 22-1/2 carats.]
[Footnote 5: For an estimation of the _commercial_ effect of these debasements, see Vicomte D'Avenel, _Histoire de la propriété, etc._, i. 53-54]
[Footnote 6: For a similar table calculated in francs, see Vicomte D'Avenel, _Histoire de la propriété, etc._, i. 62, 481, where the figures are very different. On Le Vicomte D'Avenel's method of calculation, see the _English Historical Review_.]
[Footnote 7: See note on p. 397, infra..]
[Footnote 8: By prices here, and subsequently throughout this volume, is meant the price or tariff and Mint rate of the coins. There is no reference whatever to general prices.]