The History of Cuba, vol. 4

CHAPTER XI

Chapter 325,421 wordsPublic domain

The supreme work of the Government of Intervention, from the political point of view, was to prepare Cuba for complete self-government and then to relinquish the control of the island to its own people. It was with that end in view that General Wood filled all possible offices with Cubans. It was also to the same end that the municipal election was held in June, 1900, under a new election law. Soon after that election there came a call for another, of vastly greater importance. On July 25, 1900, the President of the United States authorized General Wood as Military Governor of Cuba to issue a call for the election of a Cuban Constitutional Convention, which should be representative of the Cuban people and which should prepare the fundamental law of the independent insular government which was about to be erected.

General Wood issued the call, fixing September 15 as the date of the election. This call repeated and reaffirmed the Congressional declaration of April 20, 1898, concerning the purpose of the United States not to annex Cuba but to "leave the government and control of the island to its people." It also called upon the people of Cuba, through their Constitutional Convention, not only to frame and adopt a Constitution, but also, "as a part thereof, to provide for and agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist between that government and the Government of Cuba." That was a most significant thing. It made it quite clear that the United States expected and intended that some special relations should exist between the two countries, apart from those ordinarily provided in treaties.

Comment, criticism and protest were provoked; some temperate, some intemperate. Most of the unfavorable comments, and by far the most severe, came from the United States and were obviously animated by political hostility to the President. In Cuba the chief objection was based upon the ground that the island was thus required to do something through a Constitutional Convention which that body was not intended to do but which should be done by the diplomatic department of the government; and also to put into the Constitution something which did not belong there but which should be determined in a treaty. In this there was obviously much logical and moral force, and that fact was appreciated by General Wood, and by the government at Washington, with the result that assurances were presently given that the order would be satisfactorily modified. On the strength of this assurance, which was given in undoubted good faith, Cubans generally prepared for the coming election and for the great work which lay beyond it. They had been so disturbed by the original form of the order that many had declared that they would not participate in the election or serve as delegates to the Convention. The promise of modification mollified them, and thereafter all went smoothly and auspiciously.

The call for the election was issued on August 11. The qualifications for suffrage which were prescribed were the same as those in the preceding municipal election, and were generally accepted as fair and just. The election was held on September 15, and it passed off in very much the same fashion as its predecessor. Only a moderate degree of popular interest was manifested in it, and the vote cast was not a large one. The candidates were divided among the three parties already mentioned, but all save one were elected from the two radical organizations, the Nationals and the Republicans. Just one, Senor Eliseo Giberga, of Matanzas province, was returned by the Conservative Union Democrats. There were a few charges of fraud, but they were vague and general in terms and were not formulated nor pressed, and in the main the result of the polling was accepted in good part. The number of delegates from each province had been prescribed in the call for the election. The roll of the convention comprised the names of many of the foremost members of the Cuban nation, distinguished in war, in statecraft and in science, and was well representative of all parts and parties of the island.

The convention met for the first time on November 5, 1900, at two o'clock in the afternoon. All the delegates were present, and a great multitude of the people gathered in and about the palace to witness the spectacle and to pay honor to the occasion. They were not alone from the capital, but from all parts of Cuba. Every province and almost every important municipality was represented. Expectant optimism prevailed. There was only one note of uncertainty. That was concerning the promised modification of the order concerning relations with the United States. The modification had not yet been announced. There were a few who began to doubt whether it would ever be; but most put faith in the Military Governor and were sure that he would keep his word.

He did. At the appointed moment, when all were assembled, General Wood called the Convention to order and addressed it briefly.

"It will," he said, "be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a Constitution for Cuba, and when that has been done, to formulate what, in your opinion, ought to be the relations between Cuba and the United States. The Constitution must be adequate to secure a stable, orderly and free government. When you have formulated the relations which, in your opinion, ought to exist between Cuba and the United States, the Government of the United States will doubtless take such action on its part as shall lead to a final and authoritative agreement between the people of the two countries to the promotion of their common good." He also reminded the Convention that it had no authority to take any part in the existing government of the island, or to do anything more than was prescribed in the order for its assembling. In thus speaking he was in fact reading to the Convention official instructions from Washington; in which the order concerning Cuban and American relations was materially modified. There was nothing in the revised version about making the agreement a part of the Constitution. The Convention was merely to express its opinion on the subject, to serve as a basis for further negotiations. General Wood emphasized this point distinctly, and it was received with entire satisfaction by the Convention and by the public.

Having thus delivered to the Convention its instructions and having expressed his personal good will and wishes for its success, General Wood retired and the Convention was left to its own counsels and devices. Thereupon Pedro Llorente, the oldest of the delegates, took the chair by common consent as temporary president, and Enrique Villuendas, the youngest delegate, similarly occupied the desk of the secretary. A fitting oath of office was administered to all by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the island; containing a formal renunciation of all other citizenship and allegiance than Cuban, because several delegates had become naturalized citizens of the United States and it was necessary for them thus to resume their status as Cubans. On the principle that "What was good enough for us when we were struggling in the field is good enough for us here," the rules of the Cuban Revolutionary Congress were adopted to govern the Convention. Finally Domingo Mendez Capote was elected permanent President of the Convention, and Alfredo Zayas and Enrique Villuendas permanent Secretaries.

There followed the usual experience of such bodies: Divided counsels, cross purposes, and what not; all gradually working together toward a common end. A few public sessions were held, at which there was more speechmaking than work, but after a few weeks private sessions and a great deal of committee work became the rule. There was no division on party lines, and there was a lack of dominant leadership; both favorable circumstances. Much attention was given to studying and analyzing the constitutions of all other republics in the world, in order to learn their good features and to avoid their errors and weaknesses. The constitution of the United States was of course among those studied, but rather less regard was paid to it than to others, for two reasons. One was, a desire to avoid even the appearance of making Cuba a mere appanage to or imitation of its northern neighbor, and the other was the very practical thought that the constitutions of Latin republics might be better suited to the Latin republic of Cuba than that of an Anglo-Saxon republic.

By January 21 the Constitution was drafted in form sufficiently complete to permit it to be read to the whole convention in a public session, and thereafter there were daily discussions of its various provisions. Differences of opinion ranged from mere verbal form to the substance of the most momentous principles. There was a characteristic passage of verbal arms over a phrase in the preamble. That paragraph after stating the purpose of the Convention and of the Constitution, closed by "invoking the favor of God." When this was read the venerable Salvador Cisneros, formerly President of the Republic, moved that the phrase be stricken out. Manuel Sanguilly made a long and dramatic speech, arguing with much passion that it really did not matter whether the phrase were included or not, but that it would best be left in, because that might please some and could hurt nobody. Then the dean of the convention, Pedro Llorente, made an impassioned appeal for the retention of the words, to prove to the world that the Cubans were not a nation of infidels and atheists. In the end the phrase was retained.

Another animated debate arose over the question of religious freedom and the relations of church and state, which was ended by the adoption of an article guaranteeing freedom and equality for all forms of religion that were in accord with "Christian morality and public order," and decreeing separation of church and state and forbidding the subsidizing of any church. The question of suffrage was intensely controversial. There were those who dreaded the result of giving the ballot to tens of thousands of ignorant and illiterate men. Yet to disfranchise them would mean thus to debar thousands who had fought for Cuban independence in the late war, and it was not unreasonably feared that it would also cause dissatisfaction and resentment which would culminate in disorder and insurrection. In the end universal equal suffrage was adopted.

The most bitter debate of all, however, was over the qualifications of the President of the Republic. A strong and persistent effort was made to imitate the Constitution of the United States by requiring him to be a native citizen. But that would have debarred Maximo Gomez, who was born in Santo Domingo. For that reason the proposed restriction was passionately opposed by all the friends of Gomez, and also by many who were not his friends and who would have opposed his candidacy for the Presidency but who felt that it would be disgraceful to put such a slight upon the gallant old hero of the two wars. On the other hand, the restriction was urged chiefly for that very reason, that it would debar Gomez; for, idolized as he was by the great mass of the Cuban people, he had a number of unrelenting enemies, especially among these politicians whom he had opposed and overruled in the matter of the Cuban Assembly and the payment of soldiers at the end of the war. After several days of acrimonious discussion the friends of Gomez won by a narrow margin, and the offensive proposal was rejected.

There were many other controversial points, less personal and more worthy of debate in such a gathering on bases not of personality but of principle. The governmental powers of the Provinces gave rise to debates resembling those over state rights in America. The recognition of Cuban debts was a momentous matter. The method of electing Senators was also much discussed, as was the principle which the Military Administration had adopted of having the state and not the provinces or municipalities control public education. The right of the government to expel objectionable aliens was the theme of a long and spirited discussion. With all the animation, sentiment and rhetoric in which Latin debaters and orators more freely indulge than do the more phlegmatic Anglo-Saxons, all of these questions were very seriously considered according to their merits, and were disposed of on that same basis. There was no haste, and there was no undue delay; while everything was done "decently and in order." It took the Federal Convention of the United States four months of secret sessions to frame its Constitution, and its career was marked with many violent scenes, including the withdrawal of the representatives of one of the chief states from the Convention. The Cuban Convention had no incidents so unpleasant as that, and it completed its work in three months and a half.

February 21, 1901 was the crowning day. Ten days before the draft of the Constitution, as yet unsigned, had been published in pamphlet form. On the date named the Convention was to give it validity by signing it. The public was admitted to view the scene, the consuls of foreign powers were in attendance as specially invited guests, and a fine military band discoursed patriotic and classical music. The Constitution, finally engrossed, was read aloud, and then one by one the delegates marched up to the President's desk and affixed their signatures. When the last name was written, all stood while the band played the national anthem of Cuba. The President of the Convention, Mendez Capote, made a graceful address of congratulation and good wishes; and the Convention adjourned, its work well ended.

We have said that at the opening session, immediately after his introductory address, the American Military Governor left the hall. He did not revisit it, and neither he nor any American officer was ever present at any meeting of the Convention; nor was any American representative present at the closing function of the signing of the Constitution. The purpose of that abstention was obvious. It was to avoid so much as the appearance or the suspicion of American meddling or dictation in the work of the Convention. General Wood had told the Convention that it had nothing to do with his government of the island. Conversely he wished to show that he and his government had nothing to do with the work of the Convention.

The Constitution thus auspiciously brought into existence declares Cuba to be a sovereign republic. The powers of government are much more centralized than those in the United States. The six Provinces have no such rights as have the states of America, though they have a liberal measure of local governmental power. They are not states or provinces, however, but mere departments--fractions of the whole instead of integral units. Each has a Governor and an elected Assembly. So each city and town has a mayor and a council. Municipalities have the power to levy taxes for local needs. The control of railroads and telegraphs is a national function, and the judicial system is also national. There is freedom of speech, of press and of worship. No prisoner may be held longer than twenty-four hours without judicial process. Congress consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. There are six Senators from each department, elected by the municipalities for six years, one third retiring every two years. Representatives are elected from districts by the people for four years, there being one member to every 25,000 inhabitants. Senators and Representatives must be twenty-five years old, and if not native citizens must have been naturalized eight years. The President and Vice-President are elected for four years by the people through electoral colleges, with a provision for minority representation, each citizen voting for only two-thirds of the number of electors to which his district is entitled. Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed for life by the President with the ratification of the Senate. The civil law and constitutional guarantees can be suspended in case of emergency only by Congress when it is in session, but by the President when Congress is not in session. The House of Representatives may impeach the President, when the Senate may suspend him from office, try him, and upon conviction remove him permanently. Amendments of the Constitution must be voted by two-thirds of both Houses and ratified by a popular convention specially called for the purpose.

There can be no question that this was a highly creditable production, and one which amply merited the qualified approval which was given to it by Elihu Root, Secretary of War of the United States, when he said: "I do not fully agree with the wisdom of some of the provisions of this Constitution. But it provides for a republican form of government; it was adopted after long and patient consideration and discussion; it represents the views of the delegates elected by the people of Cuba; and it contains no features which would justify the assertion that a government organized under it will not be one to which the United States may properly transfer the obligations for the protection of life and property under international law, assumed in the Treaty of Paris."

The first part of the Convention's work was thus done. There remained the second part, the expression of Cuban opinion as to what ought to be the relations between that island and the United States. Over this a most unfortunate controversy arose, chiefly provoked and fomented, however, not by Cubans but by the partisan enemies of the President of the United States and of his policy, who did not scruple to intrigue against him in the affairs of foreign lands. It will be recalled that this hatred of him, provoked largely because of his insistence on fulfilling the pledge of Cuban freedom instead of seeking to serve certain sordid interests by forcibly annexing the island, culminated in the assassination of President McKinley at the incitement of his political foes. The opposition to him and to his policy in Cuba was continued unabated against his successor, President Roosevelt; and it was most unfortunate for both countries that the establishment of Cuban self-government and the determination of her relations to her northern neighbor, had to be effected in such circumstances.

The United States government had to deal on the one hand with those who insisted that it should have no more special relations with Cuba than any other country had; and on the other with those who demanded the repudiation of the Congressional pledge and the forcible annexation of the island. In those circumstances it was not strange that many Cubans were disinclined to make any such arrangement as had been required in the call for the Convention. They recalled that the United States had declared that "Cuba is of right and ought to be free and independent," and they were not disposed to look beyond that declaration.

Three considerations were too much overlooked on both sides, save by the thoughtful American and Cuban statesmen who finally solved the problem. One was that the United States had for nearly a century exercised a certain degree of protection or supervision over Cuba. It had repeatedly forbidden European powers to meddle with the island, and had for many years guaranteed and protected Spain in her possession of it. It was held to be only reasonable that a similar degree of interest should be maintained in the island in its independent status. The second point was that in the Treaty of Paris in 1898 the United States had incurred a certain moral if not a legal responsibility for the future of Cuba. The third was the much less specific yet by no means negligible consideration that the United States had intervened in Cuba to put an end to conditions which had become intolerably offensive to it, and it was therefore equitably entitled to take all proper precautions against a recurrence of such conditions.

In pursuance of the requirements of the call for the Convention, then, immediately after the signing of the Constitution, a committee was appointed to draft a project concerning relations with the United States. It consisted of Diego Tamayo, Gonzalo de Quesada, Juan Gualberto Gomez, Enrique Villuendas, and Manuel Ramon Silva. These gentlemen conferred with General Wood, to learn the wishes of President McKinley, and then drafted a scheme which they presented to the Convention and which that body adopted on February 27. Unfortunately between the President's wishes and the committee's project there were radical differences. The President, through his Secretary of War, Elihu Root, had on February 9 expressed with much circumstance and detail and a wealth of argument the relationship which the United States government regarded as essential. It amounted to this: That the Cuban government should never make any treaty or engagement which would impair its independence, nor make any special agreement with any foreign power without the consent of the United States; that it should contract no public debt in excess of the capacity of the ordinary revenues of the island; that the United States should have the right of intervention for the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of a stable government; that all the acts of the American Military Administration should be validated; and that the United States should be permitted to acquire and to hold naval stations in Cuba at certain points.

The Committee of the Convention reported that in its judgment some of these conditions were unacceptable, inasmuch as they impaired the independence of Cuba. So it proposed and the Convention adopted proposals to this effect: That Cuba should never impair her independence by any agreement with any power, not excepting the United States; that she should never permit her territory to be used as a base or war against the United States; that she accepted the obligations expressed and implied in the Treaty of Paris; that she should validate the acts of the Military Government "for the good government of Cuba"; and that the United States and Cuba should regulate their commercial relations by means of a reciprocity treaty.

Obviously, there was a wide divergence between the two schemes. It was unfortunate that the American Congress was about to adjourn, on March 4, and was reluctant to reassemble in special session, and also that the political passions to which we have referred were raging at so high a pitch. In more favorable circumstances the matter would have been settled diplomatically without friction or ill-feeling. There was, indeed, a very considerable conservative party in Cuba, probably comprising a majority of the substantial, well informed and orderly inhabitants, who favored some such scheme of American supervision and control as that which had been proposed, and if there had been a little more time for calm deliberation they would probably have won the Convention and the whole island to their point of view. Unhappily the government at Washington determined to finish the matter up before Congress adjourned on March 4, and in the short time which intervened the passionate voice of faction was much more in evidence man the thoughtful and measured voice of patriotic counsel.

Senator Orville H. Platt, of Connecticut, one of the ablest and fairest-minded men in that body, was the Chairman of the Committee on Relations with Cuba. It was probably he who suggested the modification which was made in the instructions to the Convention. He now declared that--which was perfectly true--the United States Congress had no power to approve, reject, or in any way amend or modify the Cuban Constitution. Cuba was entitled to establish her own government without let or hindrance. But he also held that by virtue of the grounds of its intervention in Cuban affairs the United States possessed certain rights and privileges in that island above those of other powers, and that it was in duty bound, for the sake of both Cuba and itself, to provide in some assured way for the permanent safe-guarding of those special interests. These views were approved by the best thought of both countries, and ultimately prevailed.

In accordance with the views thus expressed, Senator Platt prepared as an addendum to the Army Appropriation bill, on February 25, the historic measure known as the Platt Amendment. This, consisting of eight brief paragraphs, embodied the very points which the President had already made on February 9, with the addition of three more. One of these was, that the Cuban government should maintain the work of sanitation already so auspiciously begun, for the protection of its own people and also the people of the United States from epidemic pestilence; a requirement which was probably quite superfluous, seeing that the Cubans were as intent as the Americans upon the elimination of yellow fever and malaria. The second was, that the Isle of Pines should be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left for future adjustment by treaty. This extraordinary demand was a bad blot upon the measure, and it is difficult to understand how it ever was permitted to be inserted at the behest of some unscrupulous and sordid scheme of exploitation. Happily, subsequent treaty agreements and court decisions defeated its purpose and confirmed Cuba in her title to the Isle of Pines. The third was the requirement that Cuba should make this Platt Amendment either a part of her Constitution or an ordinance under it and appended to it, and should also embody it in a permanent treaty with the United States.

At this the storm broke. The great mass of the conservative and thoughtful people of Cuba, while they regretted the need of it, recognized the necessity of such an arrangement, and earnestly favored the acceptance of the Platt Amendment, even with the one or two objectionable features. But the radicals vigorously opposed it, and in their opposition were greatly encouraged by the factional enemies of the President in the United States, who broke all bounds of decency, and not only raged against him there but organized a propaganda in Cuba itself, to incite Cubans to oppose and resist the United States. In this the foremost of such agitators were doubly false. They were not only stirring up a foreign people against their own country, but they were doing so with the deliberate and malignant hope of precipitating an armed conflict between the two countries which would result in the conquest and forcible annexation of Cuba. While pretending to sympathize with Cuba and to resent the alleged American impairment of her sovereignty, they were really scheming for the utter destruction of Cuban independence.

Agitation, discussion, proposals and counter proposals, upon none of which could the Convention agree, continued week after week. At the end of March the question arose of sending a Commission to Washington to see the President. This was opposed violently, chiefly at the incitement of American emissaries, who busied themselves in Cuba in urging the rejection of everything that promised a settlement of the controversy. On April 1 some unscrupulous intriguer caused a message to be telegraphed from Washington to the effect that if a Commission came it would not be received; and this was received in Havana just as the Convention was about to vote to send such a Commission. Naturally, the Commission was not sent. On April 9, having learned that the message was unofficial and mischievous, the Convention reconsidered the matter and by an overwhelming majority voted to send a commission. Again mysterious dispatches came from Washington, saying that the President was resolute in refusing to recognize any Cuban envoys, and in consequence the sending of the Commission was delayed.

Then the proposal was made that the Convention should reject the Platt Amendment outright, and afterward send a Commission to Washington; and this was actually carried, though by mistake, some members voting exactly contrary to the way they intended. Then it was voted to send a Commission, with special instructions to try to secure the inclusion of a commercial treaty in the Platt Amendment. With this in view the Convention on April 15 designated five members of such a Commission. They were Mendez Capote, the President of the Convention; Diego Tamayo, Leopoldo Berriel, Pedro Gonzales Llorente, and Rafael Portuondo; but as Dr. Berriel could not go, General Pedro Betancourt was named in his place. The Commission sailed for Washington on April 20. General Wood also sailed on the same day, though on another steamer. The Cubans reached Washington four days later, and the next day, in contradiction to the false dispatches which had been sent, they were courteously received by President McKinley. After a brief interview he introduced them to the Secretary of War, to whose department Cuban affairs, under a Military governor, belonged. He received them most cordially. Indeed, he had strongly wished them to come to Washington for a conference. He told them frankly that the Platt Amendment must stand, just as it was, and that it must be accepted and adopted by Cuba before any further steps could be taken for the establishment of a Cuban government. Then, at their request, he gave a detailed explanation of what the United States government conceived to be the meaning, the purpose and the effect of each of the provisions of that instrument. He especially showed that it was merely a logical continuation of long established American policy; that it was intended not for the gain of the United States but for the protection of Cuba; and that it would in no way interfere with the domestic self-sovereignty of the Cuban people, or with the rank of Cuba as an independent nation among the nations of the world.

The Committee returned to Havana and reported to the Convention the results of its mission, and the Convention resumed consideration of the American demands in the new light of Mr. Root's exposition of them. Faction was still furious. Enemies of the President in the United States went to Cuba or sent word thither, urging the radical element to hold out to the bitter end against the Platt Amendment, saying that it would need only a little longer resistance to compel the American government to abandon it altogether. Counsels were divided in the Convention, and numerous proposals of substitutes for the Amendment or for parts of it were made, but upon none of them could the Convention agree. Some of the most radical members suggested that the Convention adjourn without day. But on the whole wiser counsels prevailed. The Commission had been much impressed by Mr. Root's candid and cogent presentation of the case. It had also become convinced that if the Amendment were adopted a liberal reciprocity measure would be granted which would be of vast value to Cuban commerce and industry. Consideration of the subject continued until the latter part of May. On May 28 the question of adoption of the Platt Amendment with certain qualifications was presented to the Convention for a final vote. The Convention divided equally. There were fourteen ayes and fourteen nays. Thereupon the President, Mendez Capote, cast the deciding ballot. He voted aye. This caused a renewal of the storm. Diego Tamayo and Juan Gualberto Gomez were especially outspoken in their denunciation of all who had voted for the measure, and some of the former's remarks were so severe that their retraction was required. The qualified acceptance of the Amendment was not, however, satisfactory to the Washington government, and the Convention was promptly informed of that fact. In consequence the matter was reopened, and on June 12, after a brief and temperate debate, a final vote was taken on unconditional acceptance and adoption of the Platt Amendment. The result was sixteen ayes to eleven nays.

That ended the matter. The Amendment had become a permanent addendum to the Cuban Constitution, and the relations between the island's future government and the United States was irrevocably determined. There was little further criticism. The American agitators and speculators who had been inciting the Cubans to resistance, in order thus to make them compass their own ruin, abandoned their execrable intrigues for other ventures elsewhere, while the Cubans who had been their dupes, relieved of their pernicious influence, soon began to appreciate the reasonableness of most of the provisions of the Amendment and the very material benefits which it would bestow upon Cuba.