CHAPTER XXI

Cuba, so rich and fertile, was an object of desire, not alone to America, but at least equally to the countries of Europe. Thus England cast covetous eyes at Cuba, and some of the English papers intimated that the United States was anxious to acquire the island, and that if England wished to save her West Indian trade, she had best look to her interests and, if possible, wrest Cuba from Spain. Probably the strongest feeling in the United States in the early part of the nineteenth century was that Cuba must not pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other power, and that if Cuba was to be separated from Spain it must be either as an independent country or by annexation to the United States. The desire for annexation, _per se_, did not appear to be so strong as the feeling that the United States must not allow either France or England to acquire Cuba, and there were, of course, strong political and geographical reasons for this decision. In a former chapter we have recalled some of the circumstances of that time, and have cited some of the authoritative utterances of American statesmen concerning Cuba in the first half of the nineteenth century. Let us now recur to that part of Cuban history in its chronological order.

Early in 1823, those Cubans who were more or less secretly in favor of independence sent an agent named Morales to Washington to try to discover what course the United States would pursue in case Cuba should declare her independence. It was intimated that in case Spain continued her oppressions, and did not grant Cuba a more liberal government, Cuba would ask for the protection of the United States, possibly for admission to the Union; and in case this was refused, she would appeal to England. While no definite promises were made to Cubans, it seemed to be the sentiment in Washington that, should Cuba thus offer herself, it would be tempting fate not to accept the gift. Indeed, a considerable portion of the United States was at this time eager for the annexation of Cuba. There seems moreover to have been in the American cabinet a strong feeling toward urging Cuba to declare her independence, and this might have resolved itself into promises if not into decided action, had it not been for the counter current of opinion that, should she do so, she could not maintain such a status. John Quincy Adams was sure of this, and although he felt that the time was not ripe in the United States for the adoption of a policy of annexation, yet if Cuba should fall to the United States by the mere gravitation of politics, he believed it would be folly to refuse to accept the gift, particularly since the occupation of Cuba by England would give her a base from which to proceed against the United States; and matters between England and her former possession were by no means yet settled on a basis of enduring friendship. Indeed, Adams believed that the future might make the annexation of Cuba almost indispensable to the destiny of the Union; as on April 28, 1823, he said in his instructions to the American minister at Madrid which we have already quoted.

It was practically certain at this time that France would intervene in the affairs of Spain, and would try to overthrow the liberal government of that country, and it seemed probable that England would take advantage of the opportunity in an endeavor to secure Cuba for herself. The island was seething with an undercurrent of revolt, and Washington was uneasy as to what England might do. Reports had it that orders had been sent to British troops to take possession of Cuba, by force if necessary, and that Spain, in return for certain secret concessions from England, had consented to this course. Adams wisely saw that if the Holy Alliance overthrew the Spanish constitution, Spain could not hope to retain Cuba, and since the island was believed to be incapable of self-government, the natural inference was that it would become a dependent of either England or the United States. We may be sure that Washington did not intend that this dependence should be upon England. About this time, Mr. Miralla, a man of affairs who had been for some ten years a resident of Cuba, told Jefferson in a conference in Washington that public sentiment in Cuba was against the country becoming an English territory, and that the Cubans would rise to resist it. He stated that Cuba would prefer to remain as she was rather than to change masters--jump from Scylla to Charybdis, as it were--and that if any change must come she desired independence; that she realized that unaided she could not maintain herself a separate nation, but that she hoped for the support of the United States or of Mexico, or both, to help her to maintain her freedom. Cuba had a secret fear that should she seek independence, the turbulent blacks would try to seize the government, and of course that would mean ruin.

On December 2, 1823, President Monroe delivered his epochal Doctrine:

"In the wars of European powers in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America.... We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

This message had the desired effect. The Holy Alliance wisely kept its hands off from affairs in the southern Americas, including Cuba. But the United States naturally sought to cultivate closer relations with its neighbor. There were indeed practical reasons why it should do so; even for its own peace and comfort. For pirates preyed on United States shipping. A blockade was proposed to catch the offenders, but it did not find favor with the powers at the United States capital. Landing in Cuba, and reprisals on persons and property, were suggested, but it was considered unwise for the United States thus to take steps which would be opposed if any other power should assume a like attitude.

The United States government feared a secret transfer of Cuba by Spain and that such action would be taken before Washington could become cognizant of it. It therefore sought to be allowed to station consuls at Havana, and in Porto Rico, who were, of course, practically to be the eyes of the United States government, to detect any incipient plot to rid Spain of Cuba. This idea did not find favor at the Spanish court and a polite letter of demurrer was sent, stating that such a proposition was untenable at the time, owing to the turbulent condition of affairs on the island, but that later, when Cuba became more peaceful, it would be considered. The real reason for Spain's refusal doubtless was that she was still smarting from the United States's recognition of the independence of other South American countries, and she did not feel justified in allowing anyone who she felt would be a spy to have an official position on the island, particularly when that person came from a country which, having attained its own liberty, naturally had sympathy with those who had theirs yet to gain.

The state of affairs at this time was epigrammatically described by _The London Courier_, when it said: "Cuba is the Turkey of trans-Atlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who contend for the right of catching her in her descent."

Spain, always badly in need of money, made in 1838 a proposal to England to offer Cuba as security for a loan, which undoubtedly would have meant that England would eventually have to take Cuba in payment for the debt. The United States Minister at Madrid, hearing of the project, made it so clear that such a course would not be tolerated by his country, that the idea was abandoned. A few years later President Van Buren again expressed the American pro-slavery policy toward Cuban independence:

"The Government has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of these islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations connected with a certain class of our population made it to the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, which result could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States."

The United States had a selfish interest in keeping Cuba in a state of peace and prosperity. In 1842 it was found that Spain could not pay the interest upon her debt to the United States. It was suggested that she make it a charge upon the revenues of Cuba, and the next year it was arranged that the entire claim be settled by a sum paid to the United States annually by the Captain-General of Cuba. Naturally if there were constant revolutions and uprisings in Cuba, these revenues would not be forthcoming. On the other hand, taxation for the purpose of settling Spain's debt to America was not looked on with favor among Cuban patriots.

From the foregoing it will be seen that while the United States did not urge annexation,--since it was against her avowed policy to do so--she would not have been unwilling to accept Cuba, had that country knocked at her door and offered herself as a free gift. It will be equally clear that the United States had no intention that Cuba should be transferred by Spain to any other country than herself, and that she stood ready to combat such a project by force of arms if necessary. It will also be seen that some of her statesmen would have smiled upon the idea of Cuba as an independent nation, if they had for a moment believed that Cuba could maintain her independence, and that surreptitiously the United States might have lent her aid to this end, if it could have been done without embroiling herself with Spain. However, there was a division of opinion in Washington as to the effects on the Southern States of any change of condition in Cuba.

It might also be observed that France and England--particularly the latter--would have been glad to add Cuba to their possessions, but they feared war with the United States if they made the attempt. And as for Cuba herself, her first choice was freedom, but if it were necessary, in order to escape Spanish tyranny, she would have accepted annexation to the United States, or at any rate a protectorate from that government.