CHAPTER X

In the mean time events in North America continued to agitate the diplomatic world of Europe and to stir up trouble. As Great Britain had begun to interfere with the commerce and navigation of France, the relations between the two countries grew daily more strained. France had come to an understanding with Spain, that by the beginning of the year 1778, the two powers would have to combine to make war on Britain, but Carlos III., getting old and more and more conservative, did not want to depart from his policy of neutrality and wanted to end his days in peace. When on the thirteenth of March, the British secretary of state received from the French ambassador a note, saying that France and the United States of North America had signed a treaty of friendship and commerce without any definite advantage to France, but that the king was determined to protect the lawful commerce of his subjects, a state of war was established between the two kingdoms. Efforts to change the decision of Spain were repeated; the return of Florida to Spain was offered with the consent of the United States. But Florida had by this time lost all charm for the conservative court of Spain, so awed by the fact that a republic was to be the neighbor of her American possessions that it was bound not to do anything that might help the insurgents, and sooner or later kindle the desire for independence in their own colonies. Only the prospect of recovering Gibraltar might at that moment have swayed the decision of Spain. But that seemed beyond reasonable possibility.

The king was in an embarrassing position. The compact entered into by the two countries when the Bourbons ascended the Spanish throne, a certain respect for the senior branch of the family and the grudge which he bore Britain, tempted him many a time to revise his decision. His ministers, too, were by no means unanimous in approving Spain's neutrality. While some held that to assist rebels in their fight upon their mother country was morally wrong and politically imprudent, others, impatient of the passive inactivity to which they were reduced, modestly expressed their disapproval. One of them, Florida Blanca, more ambitious for himself than for his country, eager at any moment to embrace an opportunity of making a name for himself, continued to negotiate with the statesmen of France and secretly hoped that somehow he would have a hand in the return of Gibraltar to Spain. In this vague hope he quietly worked to enlarge and improve both the army and the fleet of his country; he collected a large number of battering cannon at Seville, and the port of Cadiz soon held a greater number of well-built vessels than it had seen since the golden age of Spanish maritime power. Cunningly holding out the prospect of a final alliance against the common enemy to France, while at the same time offering Britain to become a mediator in the bloody conflict, he succeeded in delaying any decisive action on the part of France. The French became irritable. Finally the diplomats of the two powers came to an agreement and on the twelfth of April, 1779, a treaty of alliance was signed.

The terms of this treaty were as follows: France was to invade Great Britain or Ireland; if she succeeded in wresting from the British Newfoundland, she pledged herself to share the fisheries exclusively with Spain; she also pledged herself to secure for Spain the return of Minorca, Pensacola and Mobile, the Bay of Honduras and the coast of Campeche. Moreover, the two powers pledged themselves to continue the war on Britain, until that country agreed to return Gibraltar to Spain. From the United States Spain expected as reward of her services the basin of the St. Lawrence and the lakes, the unrestricted navigation of the Mississippi and all the territory lying between that river and the Alleghany mountains. The United States were by this treaty to be free to make peace with Britain, as soon as their independence was recognized, but were not in any way expected to continue war until Gibraltar was returned to Spain.

The Spanish colonies in America proved at this time that the distance which separated them from the mother country, and the greater sense of space and elbowroom which they enjoyed and in which several generations of their people had been born, was beginning to differentiate the Spanish Americans from their kinsmen in old Spain. Unable in the varying aspects of rough pioneer life to preserve the old traditions and conventions, the character of the people themselves had changed. They were not to be bound by the numerous considerations that entered into every step European nations took. They were not slow in taking action, when there was cause and opportunity for such. The news of the alliance between France and Spain against Britain was received in Cuba and Louisiana with intense interest. Within a few days both colonies were swayed by the desire to avenge wrongs formerly suffered at the hands of the British, and with a remarkable promptness framed measures to this effect. Governor Navarro immediately issued privateering patents to Spanish ships and they as promptly set out on their quest and captured a number of British vessels. The coasts of Cuba were closely watched for the possible arrival of a hostile fleet, and the garrison of el Morro was keenly on the alert.

In Louisiana the feeling against the British ripened into the plan of reconquering Pensacola. D. Bernardo de Galvez, who had settled in that colony in 1776, had in 1779 been elected Governor and invested with full rights, proprietary and otherwise. The official council of the colony was of the opinion that Louisiana should assume a passive defensive, until advices and perhaps reenforcements were received from Havana. But Galvez, enterprising and energetic in all his undertakings, and a fighter whose valor had been tried before, was determined to attack the British without delay. He collected a force of only seven hundred men, according to Valdes, fourteen hundred according to Blanchet, among them many veterans and militia men, and marched towards Fort Manchac. It was a perilous and trying expedition through a country then little more than a wilderness. But he arrived at his goal and surprised the garrison, taking the British prisoners. Encouraged by this success, he left the captured fort under guard of a part of his force and turned towards Baton Rouge. There he found the enemy much stronger; the British under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson opposed his attacks so strenuously, that his forces had to entrench themselves in anticipation of a prolonged siege. But after nine days, on the twenty first of September, Dickson surrendered and his garrison, too, were made prisoners. Point Thompson and Point Smith, British establishments on the eastern bank of the Mississippi, followed, and leaving General de Camp in charge of the conquered territory, Galvez hurried to Cuba to secure reenforcements for his attack on Mobile and Pensacola.

In Havana he found everything in readiness to engage in or furnish an expedition against the British possessions. He had in the meantime been raised to the rank of Field Marshal and everything seemed to favor his plan. During the preparations there arrived in the port the squadron of D. José Solano, consisting of eight thousand men under the command of the Lieutenant-General D. Victorio Navia. Receiving a valuable addition to his troops from Solano, Galvez prepared to embark with five regiments, a small squadron of dragoons, two companies of artillery and forty pieces of ordnance. The expedition was abundantly supplied with ammunition and provisions. On the sixteenth of October, 1780, they set sail with fifty transports, escorted by Solano, seven ships, five frigates and three brigantines. But on the following day a terrible hurricane surprised them out at sea, seriously damaging some of the ships and dispersing the others. Galvez was obliged to return to the sailing port without even knowing the fate of some of his vessels. A number of them on escaping from the storm drifted towards Campeche, others to the mouth of the Mississippi, still others to unknown ports and one was known to have been wrecked.

News coming to Havana, that the forces at Mobile, which had in the meantime been taken by General de Campo, were in need of food and threatened with an attack by the British, a council of generals was held and ordered two ships, capable of transporting five hundred men and carry a sufficient amount of provisions, to be immediately prepared and sent on their way. The convoy sailed on the sixth of December under the command of the Captain of the frigate, D. José de Rada. On arriving at the mouth of the Mobile, he did not dare to enter, having found some variation in the channel, and sailed directly for the Balize of the Mississippi. He left his cargo at the entrance and returned to Havana. Two days later two British frigates penetrated the very Bay of Mobile and the detachment of the village was reported to be attacked. D. Bernardo de Galvez urged that, although the state of things did not permit a repetition of the expedition that had sailed from Havana in October, some troops be given him with which to reenforce the garrisons of Louisiana and Mobile. There, as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself, he would pledge the inhabitants to a further effort and attack Pensacola. The plan was approved by the council, thirteen hundred and fifteen men were organized, including five companies of grenadiers, five vessels were equipped as transports and the war-ship _San Ramon_, under command of D. José Calvo, the frigate _Santa Clara_, commanded by Captain D. Miguel Alderato, the _Santa Cecilia_, commanded by Captain D. Miguel de Goicochoa, the tender _Caiman_, commanded by Captain D. José Serrato, and the packet _San Gil_ under Captain D. José Maria Chacon, were designated as escorts. The whole fleet was placed under the command of D. Bernardo de Galvez, who now bore the title of General.

A communication sent by the General of the Marine to D. José Calvo shows in what esteem Galvez was held and how eager were the Spanish authorities to help him with his attack on Pensacola:

"To the question contained in your paper of yesterday, that I manifest to you the terms under which you must subordinate to and obey the orders of the Field Marshal of the Royal armies, D. Bernardo de Galvez, I beg to advise that your honor shall put in practice with all your well-known and notorious diligence those that the expressed Don Bernardo shall give your Honor relative to the conquest of Pensacola, without separating yourself in other things from what the Royal Ordinances of the Armada provide, endeavoring that the strictest discipline be observed in all the ships under your orders as provided therein. May our Lord keep you many years.

"JUAN BAUTISTA BONET,

"Sr. D. José Calvo.

"Havana, 6th of February, 1781."

Galvez embarked on the thirteenth of February, the troops followed on the fourteenth and the convoy sailed on the twenty-eighth. The General had previously sent Captain D. Emiliano Maxent in a schooner to New Orleans with orders to the Commandant of Arms, so that the troops which D. José Rada had left and those that had arrived there on account of the October hurricane should set out to meet the convoy. He had ordered them to be ready to sail at the first signal. On the first of March the General sent D. Miguel de Herrera of the Regiment of Spain to Mobile by schooner with letters for D. José Espeleta, directing him to proceed to the east of Santa Rose island, fronting the port of Pensacola. He advised him to march by land to form a union with the troops of his command. Such were the extensive and well calculated preparations made by the Spaniards for the recapture of Pensacola. After Galvez had effected the junction of his troops with those of Mobile and New Orleans, he proceeded towards the place which was well fortified and garrisoned.

The progress of the blockade was at first very slow. Colonel Campbell, who commanded the British, offered a stubborn resistance to the attacks of the Spanish troops. But Galvez was equally persistent and undaunted continued in his operations. Very much smaller in number than the Spanish forces, the British seemed from the first to be doomed to defeat. But the decisions of the siege hung a long time in the balance. After a brave struggle against odds, the British began to relax in their firing, while the Spaniards seemed ever to bring into the firing line new batteries. Finally the powder magazine was blown up and demolished some of the advance works, and on the ninth of May, 1781, the British garrison surrendered with honors. The conquest of Pensacola decided the fate of Florida, which returned to Spanish dominion. As a reward for his valor the king promoted D. Galvez to the rank of Lieutenant-General and gave him the title Conde de Galvez. The British garrison had to pledge themselves not to serve during the war against Spain or her allies, but were left free to do so against the United States.

During the administration of Governor Navarro, which was soon to come to an end, there was one measure enacted, which anticipated our modern prohibition. It was promulgated by means of a proclamation of the year 1780, which prohibited, except for medicinal uses, the sale of liquor. So disastrous and wide-spread were the ravages caused by an immoderate consumption of distilled spirits, brandy, wine, etc., in the population of the island, and especially among the soldiers, that heavy fines were imposed upon the offenders; the first offence was punished by a fine of fifty pesos, the second by one of one hundred pesos and the third by banishment and a fine. The fear that the British would invade Havana or Puerto Rico caused a revival of all military activities and the building of additions and improvements of the fortifications. In the year 1781 Governor Navarro, being old and sickly, resigned his office and retired to Spain, where the king rewarded his services with the Captain-Generalship of Estramadura.