CHAPTER IV.

FROM DONELSON TO METAL LANDING--RESCUE FROM FLOODED CAMP--PITTSBURG LANDING--GRAND REVIEW--ESCORT WALLACE'S MEN TO CRUMP'S LANDING--THE LONG ROLL--DETAILED TO BRING UP WALLACE--HARDSHIP OF MEN--SECOND DAY'S BATTLE--RETREAT AND PURSUIT--DICKEY'S COWARDICE--CHARGE AGAINST FORREST'S MEN--PATHETIC INCIDENTS.

"And the old field lay before me all deserted far and wide; There was where they fell on Prentis,--there McClernand met the tide; There was where stern Sherman rallied, and where Hurlbut's heroes died,-- Lower down, where Wallace charged them, and kept charging 'til he died."

--_Willson._

We remained at Fort Donelson about five or six days after the battle, when the two companies, A and B, moved to Metal Landing on the Tennessee River, a few miles above Fort Henry. There was a deep slough north of the landing and the water from the river, which was very high and still rising, poured rapidly into it. A small log building at the landing stood on the highest point of ground and it was near this that our cooking was done. As the water continued to rise we were confined to a space about twenty-five by fifty feet, which was all that was above water. Most of our horses were standing in water. For four days we hailed all passing boats but none came to our relief. Finally, we were taken upon a transport and carried to another landing above water, where we remained a short time before being transported to Pittsburg Landing. At the latter place we found quite a large camp and were assigned to a position south of Snake Creek, upon the extreme right wing, next to General John A. McArthur's Division. Our camp was about a mile and three-quarters west-north-west of the landing and upon one side of us was the 12th Illinois Infantry.

The two companies did considerable scouting in the direction of Corinth. Troops continued to arrive and the camps of many were out two or three miles, the infantry being upon the outskirts, while the cavalry was stationed within the infantry and artillery lines. In the light of subsequent experience, it would seem that it would have been better had these conditions been reversed. The troops were assigned to their respective camps in the order in which they arrived; and inasmuch as the new arrivals were made up of troops of more recent levies, it followed that, whether intentional or not, the troops farthest out were those of least experience. Most of them had been drilled but slightly and but few had ever been in battle.

On Monday, preceding the date of the battle of Shiloh, a grand review was held and it was afterwards reported that the confederates were then sufficiently near so that from the tops of high trees they were enabled, with the use of field-glasses, to watch a given point and in that manner estimate our force. This may have been true as to some of their scouts but only as to them, for it was not until April third, four days later, that Johnson issued his "Order No. 8," for an advance from Corinth and the concentration of his forces at Mickey's, eight miles southwest of Pittsburg Landing. On the day before the battle, Company B and a part of our company were scouting and encountered the enemy's cavalry in considerable numbers. The remainder of the company was detailed to escort some of General Lew Wallace's men to Crump's Landing, seven miles north, where he was stationed, after which they returned to Pittsburg Landing.

This fact is significant as throwing some light upon a letter referred to by General Grant in a note on page 351, Vol 1, of his "Memoirs," which letter was written by General Lew Wallace to General W. H. L. Wallace and is referred to in the note in part as follows:

"* * * In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send 'to-morrow' (and his letter also says 'April 5th,' which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters and suggesting the propriety of W. H. L. Wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could 'act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps.'"

General Grant's note states that this letter was sent "over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg landing and Purdy road." It is presumable therefore, that they returned that way, but I was not with them and I do not know which way was taken. As far as I am aware, nothing has been published to show that the suggestion of General Lew Wallace was actually carried out. That they did return by way of the Purdy road is rendered still more probable by what occurred in connection with our company on the day of the battle.

On Sunday, April 6th, it was our intention to visit friends in the other commands, as was our custom when the weather was fair as it was that day, and we were off duty. We had arisen as usual, cared for our horses and had about finished breakfast, when the report of fire-arms arrested our attention and we rushed to saddle our horses. Just then the long roll greeted our ears from various directions and our bugler, J. L. Padgett, sounded "Boots and saddles." In three minutes our two companies, under command of Captain Hotaling, were in line ready for action.

We galloped towards Shiloh Church, where heavy firing was heard but before reaching it there was a lull in the firing which lasted about thirty-five or forty minutes. While waiting in line, General Grant rode up and saluted Captain Hotaling. I was very near to him and heard his order distinctly.

"Captain Hotaling," he said, "I detail you on my staff today. I want you to take charge of the 10th Missouri Sharp Shooters. Place them and fight them."

Then turning to Lieutenant Bennett, he said:

"Lieutenant Bennett, you will take your Company A and go with as much dispatch as possible to Crump's Landing. Present my compliments to General Lew Wallace and tell him to come immediately, you being the escort."

He then gave orders to Captain Larison of Company B, but I did not hear them as we were off instantly.

The roads were very muddy, and after crossing Snake Creek, were almost impassable. The horses constantly floundered in mud and water which was often up to the saddle-skirts. As the road approached the river near to Crump's it became somewhat better but we were obliged to move slowly and it was about twelve o'clock when we reached Wallace's camp. He was apparently awaiting orders. The arms were stacked and the entire command was ready to march. Lieutenant Bennett delivered his message and the order was at once given to fall in line.

Wallace's command started out ahead and our company, instead of being in advance as an escort in accordance with General Grant's order, was in the rear, apparently acting as a rear guard. Why this was I do not know; but it would indicate that Wallace relied upon the knowledge of his men who had been to Pittsburg Landing the day before to lead him.

For some reason the River Road, the shortest route to the battlefield by several miles, was not taken. We marched a considerable distance until we came to an old overshot-mill, when, much to our surprise, we met the head of the column returning. They had spent several hours in marching upon the wrong road and were obliged to turn back to the River Road. From the old mill we could see a road which we thought to be the River Road but there was no apparent approach to it. We retraced our steps therefore, to the junction with the River Road which was followed to the battlefield, where we arrived about seven o'clock in the evening.

The condition of Wallace's men upon reaching the front was pitiable--especially that of the infantry. They floundered and wallowed in the mud and water in which they frequently sank to their hips; but, with all this, nothing but eagerness was shown by officers and men to get to the front.

Two regiments of Wallace's First Brigade, the 11th Indiana and the 8th Missouri, were conceded to have been the finest drilled of any regiments in the entire service. They had been in competitive drill against the 130th New York Zouaves and other famous regiments in both the volunteer and regular service and in every instance were the victors. Moreover, they were as brave and manly as they were matchless in manouvers. Upon the following day, in which a bloody and awful struggle occurred, they acquitted themselves nobly and did much to retrieve the almost fatal error of the day before.

On the seventh we acted as a support for a battery known to us as Hoatling's Battery, next to that of McAllister, and saw the field extending south and east over a mile from Shiloh Church. The ground was fought over three times inch-by-inch. Bragg's Battery, in the extreme corner, was cut to pieces by Hoatling's and McAllister's batteries. Bragg's men stood up to their work until every gun was dismounted or disabled and all of the horses and mules were killed or mortally wounded. In the rear, dead mules and horses lay everywhere and in the ravine in front, for a distance of about forty rods, one could have walked upon dead men. It was the most appalling human slaughter that I have ever witnessed. There had been a severe rain the night before and as the water ran down the ravine past the bodies it became literally a stream of blood.

In the afternoon of the second day's engagement, the rebels gave way and commenced to retreat. About four o'clock Companies A and B the 7th Illinois and the 5th Ohio Cavalry were placed under command of Colonel T. Lyle Dickey of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry who was ordered to pursue. These were fine regiments and we might have captured many prisoners had it not been for our commander. Dickey's cowardice, previously suspected, was soon demonstrated. As soon as the order to pursue was given, we started with a rush. This was not in accordance with Dickey's conception of pursuit. It meant overtaking the enemy who had shown a disposition to resent undue familiarities. Besides, what was the use?--it was raining hard anyway. So, we were ordered to halt and "await further orders," the meaning of which was easy to surmise, for night was approaching and the enemy was vanishing.

While thus awaiting we dismounted in front of the remains of Bragg's famous battery. In a tent nearby we found two men who had brothers in our company. One, Daniel Twiney, with both legs shot off and another, James Prescott, slightly wounded. Our men bore them from the field to the hospital. Twiney was sent to St. Louis where he died shortly after his arrival. We remained there until it became sufficiently dark and foggy to render pursuit useless, when the redoubtable Dickey ordered "right about for quarters."

On the morning after the battle, we received an early order to report to Dickey, whose martial figure was conspicuous at the head of his regiment. After marching about five miles from the battleground, we approached an opening more or less covered with scattered timber, where the enemy had taken a stand. Here the Colonel exhibited his remarkable characteristics as a military commander. The Fifth Ohio Cavalry and a regiment of Ohio infantry had preceded us. Dickey gave orders for the infantry to deploy as skirmishers in advance of the cavalry, with the Fourth Cavalry upon the right. Our two companies, A and B, and the Fifth Ohio were formed in line of battle upon the left. As soon as this disposition was made, our dauntless leader announced, loud enough, it seemed, to have been heard by the enemy, that "orders would come from the rear." General Forrest's cavalry, which was protecting the Confederate retreat, made a charge upon us. In doing so, they kept in column, a manouver I had never before heard of. In the meantime, the infantry regiment had deployed directly in our front. About the time the latter were engaged, Dickey gave orders for the cavalry to fire by battalion and retreat;--and this, while we were in line in a muddy slough.

Our two companies waited until the enemy was close to us, when we gave them a volley. This was followed by the order: "Right about, gallop, march." In a moment Lieutenant Bennett gave the command: "Rally Company A." We delivered another volley and then by common consent, without an order having been given, our company charged them. Instead of meeting our charge, they made a hasty retreat and we followed them for about a mile. A considerable number of the enemy were wounded and among them, their dashing commander, who was shot in the back. This we learned through some of our command who, about an hour after the charge, visited a temporary Rebel hospital where they were told by the surgeon that General Forrest, who had just left there, had been slightly wounded. He did not state the location of the wound, but that information was supplied by a citizen.

When we returned from the charge, our dapper commander with "orders from the rear," who was noted for his spick-and-span appearance, had retired; some said,--"to lace his corsets." In the absence of proof as to the character of his under-garments, the truthfulness of the statement is open to question; but whatever the reason, it must have been urgent, for we did not see him again that day.

Upon our return from the charge we went over the entire field where the fight occurred. About twelve or fourteen of our infantry men were killed and several wounded. One poor fellow lay with his musket still in his hand. He had apparently been in the act of shooting but his enemy had shot first. His eyes were open and in the right one there appeared a perfect image of a man upon a white horse.

This circumstance recalls another pathetic incident of the many which might be related. Battery A of the First Illinois Battery, which, with Battery B, stood next to that of McAllister's, had nearly all of its horses killed. With seven of his mates lying dead around him, one faithful old horse stood in harness all day on Monday and until Tuesday morning when he was cut loose.

There was no further attempt at pursuit and the enemy was permitted to return to Corinth where ample time was given him to collect re-enforcements and to strengthen his position.

The battle of Shiloh was the bloodiest of all the western battles. It has been claimed by some that our army was not surprised; but to those who were there, the claim is no less surprising than the fact appeared to be then. The successes at Forts Henry and Donelson had made our men and their leaders over-confident. They counted too much upon the moral effect of those victories upon the enemy. Besides, it seemed incredible that an army so recently defeated and apparently so demoralized, should leave a strongly intrenched position and march twenty miles over ground rendered almost impassable by mud and rain, to meet one of substantially equal force in an open field. If it was a surprise, as those who were there at the first onset and saw the conditions, believed it to have been, it is not for me, it may not be for anyone, to fix the responsibility. Let him bear it who may,--the thousands of graves and the long lines of trenches filled with Union dead, will remain as a proof of the appalling price that it is possible to pay for indifference and over-confidence.