CHAPTER III

=Legislation on the Question of State Establishment=

In order to understand the status of the slave trade and slavery in the United States after their independence was achieved, it is necessary to glance at the progress of the Revolution and the adoption of the new form of government after its close.

In 1774, the contest between the mother country and the English Colonies of North America approached a crisis, and the first Continental Congress of delegates from the thirteen colonies assembled at Philadelphia on the 5th of September of that year. Fifteen articles, as the basis of an "American Association," were adopted and signed on the 20th of October, in which, among other things the slave trade was denounced, and entire abstinence from it and from any trade with those engaged in it, was enjoined. This had been preceded by the Virginia resolution on the same subject more than two months, but the war which ensued put an end to the trade during its continuance, much more effectually than any resolutions or laws could have done.

The "Declaration of Colonial Rights" adopted by this Congress enumerated eleven acts of Parliament as having been passed in derogation of the rights of the colonies since the accession of George III to the throne, to-wit:

1. "The Sugar Act."--This act was a modification of the "Molasses Act," by which the duties on molasses and sugar were lowered and a few unimportant articles were added to the list of those taxed.

2. "The Stamp Act."--This act never had been executed and had been repealed.

3 and 4. "The Two Quartering Acts."--The first of these acts had been passed in 1765, after the close of the war against the French in Canada, which resulted in the conquest of that country from France, greatly to the advantage of the northern colonies. It was intended to quarter troops on the colonies for their protection against the Indians and was in accordance with the views of the elder Pitt, who intimated that the colonies ought to bear a portion of the burthen of a war made for their benefit. By the terms of this act, the colonial authorities were required to furnish quarters, firewood, bedding, drink, soap, and candles to the troops sent into the colonies. It had been resisted or evaded and had been allowed to expire.

The second of these acts was a re-enactment of the first, in consequence of the disturbance at Boston.

5. "The Tea Act."--This act imposed a duty of three pence a pound on tea imported into the colonies, and allowed a drawback of the duty of a shilling a pound on the tea imported into England, when re-shipped to the colonies; the practical effect of which was to lower the duties paid by the colonists.

6. "The Act Suspending the New York Legislature."--This act was passed in consequence of the continued refusal of that legislature to comply with the terms of the quartering acts.

7 and 8. "The Acts For the Trials in Great Britain of Offences Committed in America."--These acts were passed in consequence of the resistance of all British authority at Boston.

9. "The Boston Port Bill."--This act was passed in consequence of the forcible destruction of tea in Boston Harbor.

10. "The Act For Regulating the Government of Massachusetts."--This Act was passed in consequence of the continuous disturbances by the people of that colony.

11. "The Quebec Act."--This act was for the government of Canada, and the other colonies had no right to complain, except so far as it extended to the country south of the lakes and west of those colonies.

It is well to keep these causes of complaint in mind, when considering the causes for the secession of the Southern States previous to the late war, and the course pursued towards those States.

In the war which resulted from the resistance to the acts specified, was involved a great principle of self-government, which the British government has since fully acknowledged in the treatment of all her other colonies, but it must be confessed that there was a good deal of turbulence and violence exhibited by American colonists in the first stages of the contest. Without depreciating the public spirit displayed by the people of Massachusetts during the war which ensued, there can be no question but that by violence and rashness the conflict was precipitated, and that much forbearance was show by some of the British military officials. A candid review of the history of the difficulties preceding actual hostilities must lead any honest mind to the conclusion that while the British ministers acted unconstitutionally and unwisely, as the quarrel approached its crisis, the people of Massachusetts, with whom the conflict began, exhibited a very turbulent spirit and often acted with unwarranted violence.

The settlers of Massachusetts, on account of their peculiar religious theories, had from the very beginning, been impatient of all control from the mother country and anxious to thrown it off. They had hailed the Commonwealth with joy, had been greatly chagrined at the restoration of the royal authority and had been very much embittered by the vacation of their charter and the loss of the theocratic form of government, and their ministry kept alive the fires of discontent and fanned them into a flame on all occasions. The same feeling existed throughout New England. Virginia on the contrary had been always a loyal colony and had not acknowledged the Parliament or the Commonwealth in Cromwell's time, until compelled to do so by a force sent for its conquest. Its people had hailed the restoration with delight and there was no sentiment in the colony demanding a separation from the mother country which was not engendered by actual or supposed infringement of their rights as British subjects. Though the people of that colony had little direct interest in the grievances complained of against the British government, as the articles taxed entered very little into their consumption, and no troops had been quartered among them in an offensive manner since the Parliamentary expedition, they made common cause with the people of Massachusetts, as it was a question of power which involved the rights of all the colonies. The difference was that the people of Massachusetts and New England were anxious to bring on a separation, while those of Virginia were not, unless it was necessary for the protection of the rights of all of the colonies. The statesmen of Virginia entered warmly into the dispute both by speaking and writing, and when the actual collision took place the people sprang to arms and sent to Massachusetts aid in both men and provisions.

It was the attempt to coerce the people of Massachusetts, in an unconstitutional manner, to compliance with unconstitutional laws, on the part of the British government, more than any actual grievances of their own, that aroused the people of Virginia to action, as that coercion if successfully applied to one colony, might be used for the destruction of all self-government in the others. This became the traditional policy of Virginia as a sovereign State. After the struggle began, she gave a leader to the continental army, her wisest and best statesmen to the colonial councils, her arms-bearing citizens to the ranks, and her resources to the prosecution of the war. That war which was begun in Massachusetts, long after it ceased to exist within the limits of that State, was finally, practically, ended on the soil of Virginia, after that soil had been terribly ravaged by the invading armies of Great Britain.

Motives similar to those which actuated Virginia, prompted the action of all of the other Southern colonies, and none suffered greater losses in war for the common defence than South Carolina. This statement is not made in order to claim for Virginia and the other Southern States more than their due share of credit for services in the war of the Revolution, nor to depreciate the valuable services rendered by the more northern states of the confederation.

The war was prosecuted by the colonies as a confederacy of sovereign States. The Continental Congress was in fact but a congress of commissioners or embassadors, whose acts derived their validity from the tacit adoption and sanction of the several States, and the delegates were at all times subject to recall and substitution, by the appointment of others--a power which was repeatedly exercised. The Declaration of Independence itself, was made in accordance with powers expressly delegated for that purpose to the representatives of the several appointing powers, and derived its force not from the action of Congress, but from the adoption of that action by those represented in that body.

In the case of Virginia, her independence had been declared by a convention of her own, and a State Government had been actually organized in advance of the action of Congress, and she was the first thus to assert her sovereignty. On the 15th of May, 1776, the Virginia convention resolved to adopt a bill of rights and frame a State government, and on the 29th of June following, the government was put into operation by the election of a governor and other officers--a Bill of Rights and State Constitution having been framed and adopted in the meantime.

Articles of confederation were proposed in 1777, more than a year after the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, for ratification by the thirteen sovereign States. These articles required the unanimous ratification of all of the States, and as Maryland withheld her consent to this, until the 1st of March, 1781, they did not go into effect until that time. In the meanwhile the Congress had continued to exercise its permissive powers in the prosecution of the war, but it had no means of enforcing its edicts except in the voluntary compliance of the several States.

The first three articles were as follows:

Article I. The style of this confederacy shall be "The United States of America."

Art. II. "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled."

Art. III. "The several States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defence, the security of their liabilities and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force opposed to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade or any other pretence whatever."

The other articles of confederation conferred upon Congress very little more power than it had been exercising. All important measures required the concurrence of nine States, the votes being given by the delegates from each State as a unit, and not in their individual capacity.

The right of the States to recall their delegates and to appoint others was expressly reserved, so that five States acting together, could at any time block the government, and the latter had no means of enforcing its decrees when made, but had to rely upon the voluntary compliance of the States as before. It will thus be seen that the government organized under the articles of confederation remained still a mere confederacy of several independent States. When peace was finally made with Great Britain, that power recognized the sovereignty and independence of the several States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia by name, and not the sovereignty and independence of the United States.

After the treaty of peace, under the navigation laws of Great Britain, American vessels trading with that country, were restricted to the importation of products of the several States to which they belonged, which put those States upon the footing of so many separate nations.

The action of the several States upon the subject of slavery and the slave trade during the war and afterwards to the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States was as follows:

Delaware, as before stated, by her constitution adopted in 1776, prohibited the further introduction of slaves.

Virginia did the same thing by her law adopted in 1778.

Pennsylvania, whose legislature had ceased to be under the control of the Quakers, as they refused to take part in the Revolution, adopted a law in 1780, prohibiting the further introduction of slaves and giving freedom to all children of slave mothers born after its passage.

Massachusetts incorporated a declaration in her bill of rights adopted in 1780, that "all men are born free and equal," and under that declaration it was decided by the Supreme Court of that State in 1783, that slavery was prohibited. It cannot be claimed that this declaration was intended to have that effect, for if such had been the case it would not have been left to judicial interpretation to give it, but an express provision would have been incorporated on the subject. It was a species of judicial legislation which was submitted to because no important interest was at stake. There were a little over 6,000 slaves in Massachusetts at the date of the Revolution, distributed in small numbers among the owners and employed mostly as household servants. The population was largely engaged in commerce, fisheries, manufactures, etc., and the character of the agriculture was not at all adapted to slave labor. Nothing of consequence therefore, was to be gained by contesting the validity of the decision, and it was the easiest way of getting rid of the matter by quiet submission.

New Hampshire adopted a similar clause in her second constitution in 1783, and under that it was held that freedom was guaranteed to all children born after its adoption.

Maryland adopted in 1783, laws in regard to the introduction of slaves similar to those of Virginia.

Connecticut and Rhode Island, in 1784, adopted laws on the subject of slavery similar to those of Pennsylvania.

The effect of these laws and decisions was to put an end to the slave trade in all of the states but North and South Carolina and Georgia; to abolish it in Massachusetts and provide for its gradual extinction in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, while it still remained as before in the other states. It has been alleged, and probably was true, that a large number of the slaves in the northern states were carried to the South and sold there, to avoid the operation of the emancipation measures which were initiated. This allegation receives very strong confirmation from a comparison of the free colonies' population at the north at different periods, with the number of slaves known to be there at the date of the institution of emancipation measures, when taken in connection with the increase to that colored population, from freed slaves and runaways from the South.

Notwithstanding the provisions for abolishing slavery in the New England states, the merchants and traders of those states resumed the importation of slaves from Africa to the Carolinas and Georgia immediately after the close of the war. North Carolina, however, had denounced the trade as impolitic, and imposed a duty on future importations which furnished an impediment to it, so far as that state was concerned.

The confederation which, during the war, under the pressure of the public danger, had answered the purpose, was found to work very badly when peace ensued and the states were no longer stimulated to comply with the requisitions of Congress by immediate necessity. Though the states were all vested with full powers to regulate their domestic affairs, yet there was a large debt contracted in common which it was necessary to provide for, and as the states were forbidden by the Articles of Confederation to make treaties, and Congress had no power to impose taxes or duties on imports or exports, which power rested entirely in the state legislatures, there was a very great derangement of the finances, commerce and business of the country, entailing very ruinous consequences upon all classes and interests. It became, therefore, necessary to provide a remedy for existing evils, and a convention of delegates from the states assembled at Philadelphia in the year 1787, for the purpose of revising the Federal system. This convention was assembled in accordance with the recommendation of a previous one, that had assembled at Annapolis on the invitation of Virginia, but found its powers inadequate.

The deliberations of the Philadelphia convention, which were presided over by General Washington, resulted in the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, for recommendation to the states for their ratification, and by the terms of the Constitution, it was provided that it should go into effect when ratified by nine states, as to the states ratifying it.

There were many difficulties in the way of the formation of the Constitution by reason of conflicting views and interests, and the instrument as framed by the convention was the result of a compromise of those views and interests. The only questions arising in regard to slavery was in relation to the basis of representation in Congress and taxation, the foreign slave trade and the restoration of fugitive slaves. The questions in regard to representation and taxation were settled by compromise, as was that in regard to the slave trade. Virginia and Maryland were in favor of an absolute and immediate prohibition of the foreign slave trade, while South Carolina and Georgia opposed any interference with it. With the two latter states some of the New England delegates sided, and after much discussion a compromise was finally effected, by adopting a provision prohibiting Congress from preventing, prior to the year 1808, the importation of any persons the states might think proper to admit, but giving the power to impose a duty on such persons in the meantime, not to exceed $10 per head. This compromise was effected by an arrangement between the delegates of South Carolina and Georgia on the one side and the New England delegates on the other, by which it was agreed to insert a provision vesting Congress with the power to pass navigation laws by a majority vote--which was earnestly desired by New England but was opposed by some of the other states--and to adopt the restriction prohibiting any interference with the slave trade until the time designated.

For the provision in regard to the slave trade as adopted, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Connecticut, the only New England States represented, voted, while Virginia voted with some of the other states against it in all its stages--the final vote being, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, North and South Carolina in the affirmative, and New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia in the negative; absent or not voting, New York, Rhode Island and Georgia.

The clause in regard to the restoration of fugitive slaves was adopted without any objection from any quarter, and it was worded in almost the identical language of the provision on the same subject contained in the old compact of "The United Colonies of New England." Without the provision for the return of slaves escaping into any of the states or the public territory, not a solitary Southern State would have accepted the Constitution, and its necessity, propriety and justice were conceded on all sides without question. When the Constitution was submitted to the states for ratification, it met with a good deal of opposition because it was thought to impose too great restrictions on the rights of the states, but it was finally ratified by the end of July, 1788, by eleven states, and steps were taken to organize the government under it, which was done in April, 1789, by the meeting of the first Congress under the Constitution and the inauguration of General Washington as President.

North Carolina did not ratify the Constitution until November, 1789, nor Rhode Island until May, 1790, and until they did ratify it they remained as foreign nations to the other states. When the ratification was under consideration, there was much discussion as to the construction of various clauses, and most of the states were induced to give their assent by the hope of adoption of amendments explaining all ambiguities and objectionable clauses, and the ratification was accompanied with the recommendation of such amendments as were desired.

In passing the ordinance ratifying the Constitution, the Virginia convention adopted an explanatory preamble, declaring that when the powers delegated should be abused they would be resumed, and the New York convention accompanied the ratification with a declaration of the right to withdraw it. It is curious in view of subsequent events, that Massachusetts proposed as an amendment "That all powers not expressly delegated to Congress should be reserved to the states," and another "That no person be tried for any crime (cases in the military and naval service excepted) without previous indictment by a grand jury; and that in civil cases the right of trial by jury be preserved." The first of these was recommended by Virginia and South Carolina also, and the last by Virginia, and both were subsequently adopted as amendments to the Constitution on the recommendation of the first Congress, with only a change of phraseology not at all effecting their import. Massachusetts has changed her views since she asserted these doctrines of states' rights and civil liberty.

The Constitution of the United States left slavery in the states precisely where it was before, the only provision having any reference to it whatever being that which fixed the ratio of representation in the House of Representatives and direct taxation; that in reference to the foreign slave trade, and that guaranteeing the return of fugitive slaves. Had it been proposed to insert any provision giving Congress any power over the subject in the states, it would have been resisted, and the insertion of such provision would have insured the rejection of the Constitution. The government framed under this Constitution being one of delegated powers entirely, those powers were necessarily limited to the objects for which they were granted, but to prevent all misconception, the 9th and 10th amendments were adopted, the first providing that "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people," and the other that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."

* * * * *

It has now been shown how slavery originated in the United States and that the Federal Constitution left its regulation in every particular, where it belonged, that is to the several states where it existed, save only in regard to the foreign slave trade and the guarantee for the return of fugitive slaves as mentioned.

State action had already provided for the removal of slavery from several of the northern states, and this was followed, later, by a law adopted in New York in 1799, providing that all children of slaves born after the 4th of July of that year should be free, males at 28 and females at 25 years of age, and a law adopted in New Jersey in 1804, providing that all children of slaves born after the 4th of July of that year should be free, the males at 25 and the females at 21 years of age. This was the last of the acts for the emancipation of slavery where it previously existed and therefore, so far as regarded the original thirteen states, slavery was confined to Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina and Georgia, except as to the remnants left in the other states by the acts for gradual emancipation, which lingered in some of them for a long time.

If African slavery was a crime, who was responsible for it? Did the sole guilt or the greater part of it rest upon the shoulders of the colonists who purchased the slaves already ravished from their homes in the plains and wilds of Africa, or on the shoulders of the descendants of the original purchasers who found the institution already established as a settled policy, or did it rest with those who procured the enslavement of these ignorant and degraded barbarians and reaped the enormous profits resulting from their sale in their persons?

Treating it as national or individual sin, where does the guilt lie? The mercantile marines of Great Britain and New England are monuments to the African slave trade, upon the profits of which they were mainly built up.

It has been often said that the assertion contained in the Declaration of Independence "That all men are created equal, etc.," was entirely inconsistent with the continuation of slavery in any of the United States; and that the states which continued it were guilty of a great inconsistency. Who had then a right to make this criticism? Was it the Englishman, with Lord Mansfield's decision staring him in the face, and his boast of liberty under the common law on his tongue, while his heel was upon the neck of Ireland, his ships ploughing the main, freighted with human merchandise packed to suffocation, and his writs of execution levied upon the bodies of human beings to satisfy his demands? Was it the Frenchman, who, equally guilty in the traffic in human flesh, in the name of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" glutted the guillotine with the blood of his brethren, until he himself was forced to take refuge from his own "Liberty" under the protection of a despotism that kept watch upon his very thoughts? Was it the Dutchman, whose ships had carried the traffic in slaves to every clime and who landed the first cargo within the limits of the United States? Was it the Russian, who had bleeding Poland under his feet and caused order to reign in Warsaw, while he peopled Siberia with every age and sex, and his ears were gladdened by the sound of the well-plied knout? Was it the Prussian, the Austrian, the Dane, the Swede, or the Italian? The Portuguese, the Spaniard and the Turk have not troubled themselves about the matter.

The fact is that the assertion of independence was made by the Continental Congress, by a resolution adopted on the 2d of July, 1776, in the following words:

"_Resolved_, That these United Colonies are, and, of right, ought to be, Free and Independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved."

That was the authoritative assertion of the independence of the colonies, and the Declaration of Independence adopted afterwards was merely a manifesto put forth to the world to show the reasons which impelled them to the step and to justify it. The assertion that "all men are created equal," was no more enacted by that declaration as a settled principle than that other which defined George III to be "a tyrant and unfit to be the ruler of a free people." The Declaration of Independence contained a number of undoubtedly correct principles and some abstract generalities uttered under the enthusiasm and excitement of a struggle for the right of self-government.

The portion of it in question was not designed for the wide application which is sought to be made of it, nor is it capable of that application. The intention of it was to assert the right of the people, on whose part the declaration was made, to equality under the law with all other British subjects, and to maintain their right to set up a new government for themselves, when the one under which they had been living had been perverted to their oppression. If it was intended to assert the absolute equality of all men, it was false in principle and in fact.

Taken in its literal sense, it might be construed to mean that all men are created equal in every respect, but does any one believe, or will any one ever believe, that the native Congo, the Hottentot or the Australian negro, is the equal, mentally, physically and morally, of the Caucasian?

Whatever construction the words quoted and those following them may admit of, let it be borne in mind, that they belong to the argument and not to the fact. The separation and independence were asserted by the resolution adopted on the 2d of July, and not by the declaration adopted on the 4th, and the latter was no more a part of what was authoritatively established, than the _obitur dictum_ of a judge is a part of his decision.

The truth is, that several of the statesmen of the South and especially of Virginia, deplored slavery as an evil and expressed the hope that at some future time, in some way that might be desired, the institution might be abolished in such manner as to secure the welfare of both races, but none of them could suggest any mode for doing so, and though perfectly sincere, they contented themselves with expressing the hope that the way might be discovered.

Slavery was a fixed fact, fastened upon the colonies by the mother country, and in the South, the slaves bore such a proportion to the white population and the whole business of the country was so identified with their labor, that it was impossible to emancipate them, without entailing on both races evils far greater than those supposed to result from the existence of slavery itself. It was a practical question with which the statesmen of the country had to deal as practical men, and all they could do, was to allow the system to remain, as the best for all parties under the circumstances, without reverting to the dangerous experiment of the ideal schemes of a false philanthropy.

As to the slave trade, Delaware, Virginia and Maryland had already put an end to it as soon as they were vested with the power to do so, and North Carolina followed suit very shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, and the prohibition would probably have been made general, but for the combination of the New England states with the two southern states that were in favor of having the trade continued.

It would not be amiss to notice what was transpiring in England on this subject at the time the Federal Constitution was being adopted. Clarkson, Wilberforce and others were agitating the question of the slave trade at this time, and the utmost that the younger Pitt, then at the head of the government, would venture to do, was to procure the passage of an act of Parliament, for the mitigation of the atrocities of the "Middle Passage" by which it was provided that slave ships should not carry beyond a certain number of slaves in proportion to the tonnage.

Even this bill met with strong opposition and among others, from Lord Chancellor Thurlow "the Ruler of the King's conscience." In opposing the bill he said: "It appears that the French have offered premiums to encourage the African trade, and that they have succeeded. The natural presumption therefore is, that we ought to do the same." He further said: "One witness has come to your Lordship's bar with a face of woe, his eyes full of tears and his countenance fraught with horror, and said 'My Lords, I am ruined if you pass this bill! I have risked £30,000 on the trade of this year! It is all I have been able to gain by my industry, and if I lose it, I must go to the hospital! I desire of you to think of such things, my Lords, in your humane frenzy and to show some humanity to the whites as well as the negroes.'"

The bill, however, passed with amendments to grant compensation for losses, and this was as far as English statesmanship would venture to go at that time. Was it to be expected that American statesmen should be better, wiser and more philanthropic than English statesmen?

Shortly after the close of the war, Virginia had ceded to the Confederation for the common benefit of all the states, the territory northwest of the Ohio river; and Massachusetts, New York and Connecticut had ceded their rights. (?) The claim of Connecticut skipped over Pennsylvania and that state made a very good bargain for herself by securing the title to the lands in what has since been known as the "Western Reserve," though no officer or soldier or, so far as is known, citizen of hers, had even been in the northwestern territory.

Virginia's original charter, the oldest of all covered the country, but independent of that, it had been conquered from the Indians and British by the forces of Virginia under George Rogers Clarke. It was a magnificent empire which Virginia thus surrendered for the common good and for the cause of the Union of the states, and the only compensation she asked was, that the land grants pledged her own soldiers should be ratified.

During the sitting of the convention which framed the Constitution, the Congress, which was in session, adopted the celebrated ordinance of 1787, for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio river, in which ordinance was contained a prohibition of slavery in that territory forever, and also a provision for the recovery of slaves escaping into the territory similar to that incorporated into the Constitution.

At the first session of the first Congress, under the new Constitution, an act was passed for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio river, by which the ordinance of 1787 was recognized and confirmed.

In 1787, South Carolina had surrendered her claim to all territory west of the present limits, and in 1790, North Carolina ceded to the United States that part of her territory which subsequently became the state of Tennessee, with a stipulation, "that no regulation made or to be made by Congress shall tend to the emancipation of slaves."

In 1791, Vermont, formed out of part of the territory of New York, with the consent of the legislature of that state, was admitted into the Union as one of the states and came in without slavery, which was forbidden by her constitution.

Kentucky (formed out of the territory of Virginia, south of the Ohio river, with the assent of her legislature) in 1792 was admitted into the Union, and came in with slavery as it existed in Virginia and with similar laws on the subject.

In 1793, Congress passed an act to carry into effect the provision of the Constitution for the restitution of fugitive slaves, providing for their delivery to the owners by order of any United States judge, or any magistrate of the city, town or county where they might be arrested, on due proofs of ownership, etc.

In 1796, Tennessee, formed out of the territory which had been ceded by North Carolina, was admitted into the Union, and came in with slavery as it existed in North Carolina and with similar laws in regard to it.

In 1798, Georgia adopted a new Constitution, in which was a clause forbidding the importation of slaves from "Africa or any foreign country." In this same year Congress passed an act for the establishment of the Mississippi territory out of the territory acquired from Great Britain, which constituted that part of British West Florida lying between a line drawn due east from the mouth of the Yazoo to the Chattahoochie river and the 31st degree of latitude. The act provided for the government and organization of the Mississippi territory in every respect like the North Western territory, except that slavery was not to be prohibited, but an amendment was incorporated into the act without opposition, on motion of a representative from South Carolina, prohibiting the introduction of slaves into the territory from without the United States.

Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, South Carolina had passed a law prohibiting the introduction of slaves from foreign countries for a limited period, which was continued by renewal from time to time, and as North Carolina had adopted a permanent law on the subject, the foreign slave trade was now prohibited in all of the states as well as in the public territories, but it continued to be carried on by English, New England and New York traders within the limits of South Carolina and Georgia despite the laws.

In 1802, Georgia ceded to the United States all of her territory west of her present limits, including her claim to the Mississippi territory. This cession including in it the Mississippi territory, embraced all of the states of Mississippi and Alabama which was north of the 31st degree of latitude and the compact made with Georgia stipulated that when the population reached the number of 60,000, the ceded territory should be erected into a state on the conditions contained in the ordinance of 1787, "That article only excepted which prohibits slavery."

In 1803, on the complaint of South Carolina of the importation, in violation of her laws, of slaves from Africa, as well as of free persons from the French West Indies, Congress passed an act imposing a fine of $1,000 on the captain of a vessel for the importation of such persons in violation of the laws of a state, with forfeiture of the vessel. Next year, however, South Carolina repealed her laws against the African slave trade, and it continued to be lawful there until 1808.

In the same year Ohio, erected out of part of the northwestern territory, was admitted into the Union and came in without slavery.

In this year Louisiana, which had been re-ceded to France by Spain, was ceded to the United States by the French government, with a stipulation in the treaty of cession that the inhabitants should be secure in their liberty, property and religion and should be admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution to the enjoyment of the rights of citizens of the United States. The territory thus ceded, embraced as claimed by the United States, all of the territory west of the Mississippi and south of the 31st degree of latitude to the western boundary of the old Spanish province of Florida. Slavery existed in Louisiana at the time of its acquisition, having been established there by the French government, and there could be no question as to the meaning of the guarantee to the inhabitants of security in their property, as the right of property in slaves was universally acknowledged in all of the civilized world, and both of the contracting parties recognized it.

In 1804, Congress passed an act organizing the ceded province of Louisiana into the Territory of Orleans and the District of Louisiana, the former to embrace all of the territory south of the 33rd degree of latitude; the latter to embrace that part north of the same degree. A provision was embraced in the act that no slaves should be carried into the Territory of Orleans or the District of Louisiana, except from some part of the United States by citizens removing thither as actual settlers, and this permission was not to extend to negroes brought into the United States since 1798. This was a direct admission of the right of the people to remove into the territory with all of their property, including slaves, and the restriction as to negroes brought into the United States since 1798 was in consequence of the fact that, from that time to the passage of the act, the introduction of such persons was prohibited by the laws of all of the States, showing that the right to introduce slaves was regarded as resulting under the constitution from the rights under the laws of the several States and from no other.

By an act passed at the same session, all of the territory ceded by Georgia was included in the territory of Mississippi.

In 1805, by Act of Congress, the Territory of Orleans was given a similar government to that of Mississippi, and the District of Louisiana was made a territory of the second class, that is with the power of legislation vested in the governor and judges of the territory. Settlements had been previously made within the limits of the District of Louisiana on the Arkansas River and within the present limits of Missouri, and slavery had been carried there by settlers from the slave States. The act organizing the territory of Louisiana provided for continuing in force all of the existing laws and regulations until repealed by the legislature, and thereby gave direct recognition of the system of slavery, as it had not only been protected by the law organizing the District of Louisiana, but existed by operation of the old French and Spanish laws still in force.

In 1807, at the second session of the 9th Congress, on the recommendation of Mr. Jefferson, then President, an act was passed for the prohibition of the slave trade from foreign countries to the United States, to take effect on the 1st day of January, 1808. Up to that time the trade had been continued by English, New England, and New York traders to South Carolina and Georgia by evading the laws against it, when such were in force, but it ceased after the United States law went into effect; many slaves were introduced into the port of Charleston within the last four years prior to the time when the law went into effect, brought in by English and Northern vessels.

In the same year and about the same time that the United States law was passed, under the brief ministry of Lord Grenville, the Parliament of Great Britain passed the act to abolish the trade on the part of British subjects, though not without serious opposition. Among the opponents of the measure was another Lord Chancellor of England, Lord Eldon, at that time for a short period out of the office which he had held for many years, and to which he returned in about two months after the passage of the bill to continue in it until the year 1827. In opposing the bill, Lord Eldon said: "I do not believe the measure now proposed would diminish the transport of negroes, or that a single individual would be preserved by it, at the same time, that it would be utterly destructive of the British interests involved in that commerce." He asked "was it right because there was a change of men and of public measures in consequence, that the interests of those who petitioned against the bill should be disregarded and what was before considered fit matter of enquiry should now be rejected as immaterial and inapplicable?"

In the argument of Wilberforce and others, in favor of the measure, it was shown that there had never been any natural increase of the slaves in the British and West India Islands--the excess of deaths over births in Jamaica being as follows:

From 1698 to 1730, 3 1/2 per cent. " 1730 " 1755, 2 1/2 " " " 1755 " 1769, 1 3/4 " " " 1769 " 1780, 3/5 " " " 1780 " 1800, 1/24 " "

The supply had therefore been kept up by constant importations to meet the growing demands and the advocates of the measure urged the following reasons for its adoption:

"The grand, the decisive advantage which recommends the abolition of the slave trade is, that by closing the supply of foreign negroes to which the planters have hitherto been accustomed to trust for all of their undertakings, we will compel them to promote the multiplication of the slaves on their estates; and it is obvious that this cannot be done without improving their physical and moral condition. Thus not only will the inhuman traffic itself be prevented in so far at least as the inhabitants of this country are concerned, but a provision will be made for the progressive amelioration of the black population in the West Indies, and that too on the securest of all foundations, the interests and selfish desires of the masters in whose hands they are placed."

It seems from this that "slave breeding" was not considered a crime by the philanthropists of that day but this discovery was reserved for those of a later time.

Slavery in the United States has now been brought down to the time of the abolition of the slave trade by both the United States and Great Britain, and it will be seen that the former government had no jurisdiction over the matter in any way, except to give protection to that species of property in the states where it existed, in the same way that it was bound to protect every other species of property within the scope of its delegated powers. Slavery existed in the states prior to the creation of the government and independent of it, and the states in forming that government as sovereign states, reserved to themselves the exclusive power of continuing or discontinuing it at their option. Not only was this so with regard to the original states, but by express stipulation with the states of North Carolina and Georgia at the time of their cession of territory. Congress had bound itself not to interfere with slavery in that territory.

Kentucky had been formed out of part of Virginia and was admitted into the Union upon the same footing as that state, and by the treaty with France upon the acquisition of Louisiana, the faith of the United States was pledged to respect and protect the right of property in slaves within the limits of the acquired territory in the same way that it was pledged to respect and protect the right of property in every thing else. This embraced all of the territory within the limits of the United States except the northwestern territory, and to that the prohibition against slavery had been extended by the ordinance of 1787, prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution. The validity of that ordinance has been disputed, and certainly if it had any validity, that was given by the assent of Virginia from whom the territory was acquired. The act for the organization of the government of the Northwestern territory recognized the validity of the restriction contained in the ordinance, and did not create it.

The states which had thought proper to abolish or exclude slavery because it was not to their interests to have it, had no right to complain of its existence in other states. If they did not desire to be allied to states which tolerated slavery, then they should have refused to ratify the Constitution. Having ratified it, the faith of those states became pledged by every consideration that can bind states as communities, or men as individuals, to respect the institutions, rights and property of the other states and to faithfully abide by all of the compromises and guaranties of the Constitution. They were bound to respect and abide by them not only in the capacity of states, but they were bound by the exercise of their just powers of legislation and restraint, to compel their citizens to respect and abide by them. This obligation extended not merely to abstaining from all violent interference and active measures of wrong, but from all agitation or incitement to others to do wrong, by disturbing the peace, property or rights of other states and the citizens thereof.

The Constitution did not make the general government censors over the morals or domestic institutions of the several states, nor did it make the states or the citizens thereof censors of the moral or domestic institutions of each other. It was merely a compact formed between sovereign states for the common defence and protection of each other in their rights and liberties, as they existed before its formation.