CHAPTER XIX.

Prospects of the Government and of the Opposition--Mr. Disraeli's commanding Position--Preparation of a Reform Bill--A Congress--Death of Macaulay--The Affairs of Italy--Policy of the Emperor Napoleon--The Commercial Treaty with France--M. de Cavour resumes Office--Opening of Parliament--Negotiation of the Commercial Treaty--The Emperor a Free Trader--Perplexity of Italian Affairs--Moderation of Lord Derby--Opposition to the Commercial Treaty--The Reform Bill of 1860--Tory Opposition to Reform--Mr. Gladstone's great Budget Speech--Opposition to the Treaty and the Budget--Triumph of Mr. Gladstone--The Italian Correspondence--Democratic Opinions of Mr. Gladstone--Introduction of the Reform Bill--The Annexation of Savoy and Nice--Annexation of Tuscany to Piedmont--The Dénouement of the Plot--Complete Apathy of the Country as to Reform--Lord Derby declines to interfere--Lord John's adverse Declaration to France--Consequences of Lord John's Speech against France--Our Position in Europe--Anecdote of the Crimean War--Designs of the Emperor Napoleon in 1858--Lord Palmerston's Distrust of Napoleon III.--Lord John's Indifference to his own Reform Bill--Mr. Gladstone's Ascendency--Designs of the Emperor and Cavour--Unpopularity of the Reform Bill--Correspondence of Lord Grey and Lord John Russell--Reaction against Mr. Gladstone's Measures--Opposition to the Repeal of the Paper Duties--Coolness with France--Garibaldi's Expedition--Lord Palmerston attacks the Neapolitan Minister--The Paper Duties Bill rejected by the Lords--The Reform Bill withdrawn--Lord Palmerston adjusts the Difference between the two Houses--Mr. Gladstone supported by the Radicals--Mr. Senior's Conversations in Paris--A Letter from the Speaker--Mr. Cobden's Faith in the Emperor Napoleon--Conclusion of these Journals.

[Sidenote: THE APPROACHING SESSION.]

_London, December 25th_, 1859.--The Government are getting ready for the session which is near at hand, Palmerston with his usual confidence, but Granville, who is not naturally desponding, and who I dare say represents the feeling of his colleagues, is conscious of the want of that strength and security which a commanding majority alone can give, and, without thinking the danger great or imminent, anticipates the possibility of their being defeated on some vital question. The Opposition, conscious of their numerical force, but anything but united, profess the most moderate views and intentions. Derby professed at Liverpool to have no wish to turn out the Government or to come into office himself. Disraeli himself told me that he and all his party desired the Reform question to be settled quietly, and that if the Government only offered them such a Bill as they could possibly accept, they should be ready to give them every assistance in carrying it through. Since this, Walpole has made a formal communication to Granville (through Henry Lennox) of his and Henley's disposition to the above mentioned end. We are told, moreover, that a great number of the Conservative party will not only support a fair and moderate Reform Bill, but support the Government generally, not so much, however, from wishing well to the Government as from their antipathy to Disraeli and their reluctance to see _him_ in power again. That they will join in carrying through a safe and moderate Reform Bill is no doubt true, but it is not probable that the division amongst them and the hostility to Disraeli will last long, or continue a moment after the appearance of any prospect of the return of the Conservative party to power.

Disraeli raised himself immensely last year, more, perhaps, with his opponents and the House of Commons generally than with his own party, but it is universally acknowledged that he led the House with a tact, judgement, and ability of which he was not before thought capable. While he has thus risen, no rival has sprung up to dispute his pre-eminence. Walpole and Henley are null, and it is evident that the party cannot do without Disraeli, and whenever Parliament meets he will find means of reconciling them to a necessity of which none of them can be unconscious, and I have no doubt that whenever any good opportunities for showing fight may occur the whole party will be found united under Disraeli's orders.

With regard to the Reform Bill, it is being proposed by a large committee of the Cabinet, but George Lewis has the chief management of it. The state of public opinion admits, indeed compels, the utmost moderation, but hitherto the anticipated difficulty has been the sort of pledge which John Russell foolishly gave last year with reference to the franchise, to which it has been supposed he must consider himself bound. But there is reason to believe that he is not taking any active part in the concoction of this Bill, probably on account of his being so absorbed in foreign affairs, and under these circumstances we may not unreasonably expect that a fair Bill will be produced, and the question eventually settled.

[Sidenote: A CONGRESS PROPOSED.]

The question of still greater and more pressing interest is that of the Congress. The nomination of Hudson met with such opposition in the Cabinet that it was not pressed, and Lord Wodehouse was named instead. He is a clever man, well informed, speaks French fluently, and has plenty of courage and _aplomb_; his opinions are liberal, but not extravagant. Clarendon, who had him down at the Grove, was pleased and satisfied with him. Granville is much _contrarié_ that Clarendon himself has not been asked to go, thinking justly that he would have much more weight than any other man, and would be far more likely to conduct our affairs in the Congress with credit and success; but Clarendon now tells me he certainly would not have gone if it had been proposed to him. My own conviction _was_ that he would have accepted a proposal, and though for many reasons he would not have liked such a mission, I think he is somewhat mortified that it was not offered to him.

The recent appearance of the pamphlet of '_Le Pape et le Congrès_,'[1] which has produced such a sensation and so much astonishment, has no doubt been a great thing for us, and rendered our diplomatic course much more easy and promising. Clarendon writes to me: 'This last pamphlet of the Emperor's is important and I am sure authentic, as it is simply a developement of what I have heard twenty times from his own lips. It ought of course to have been reserved for the Congress, but as far as we are concerned it is well timed.' It was a bold, but a clever stroke of policy to give notice to the whole world of the sentiments and intentions with which the Emperor enters the Congress, and it renders a good understanding and joint action between France and England feasible and perhaps easy, unless Palmerston spoils everything by some obstinate and extravagant pretensions which he may insist on his plenipotentiaries bringing forward. But if he should be so ill advised, I believe that he would meet with an insuperable resistance in his own Cabinet and at Court, and that Cowley certainly, perhaps Wodehouse also, would decline being made the instruments of such a vicious and mischievous policy.

Footnote 1: [The object of the Congress proposed by the Emperor Napoleon was to extricate himself from the embarrassments in which he was placed by the terms of the Peace of Villafranca with reference to the affairs of Italy. The proposal to establish a Confederation of the Italian States was found to be impracticable, and the unification of Italy was a more difficult problem than the conquest and cession to Piedmont of the Milanese territory. M. de Cavour was the only statesman who contemplated the entire realisation of this vast scheme, which was at last accomplished by revolutionary means, without the concurrence of France. His views were shared and supported by Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, and Mr. Gladstone.]

[Sidenote: DEATH OF MACAULAY.]

_January 2nd, 1860._--The death of Macaulay is the extinction of a great light, and although every expectation of the completion of his great work had long ago vanished, the sudden close of his career, and the certainty that we shall have no more of his History, or at most only the remaining portion of King William's reign (which it is understood he had nearly prepared for publication), is a serious disappointment to the world. His health was so broken that his death can hardly create any surprise, but there had been no reason lately to apprehend that the end was so near. I have mentioned the circumstance of my first meeting him, after which we became rather intimate in a general way, and he used frequently to invite me to those breakfasts in the Albany at which he used to collect small miscellaneous parties, generally including some remarkable people, and at which he loved to pour forth all those stores of his mind and accumulations of his memory to which his humbler guests, like myself, used to listen with delighted admiration, and enjoy as the choicest of intellectual feasts. I don't think he was ever so entirely agreeable as at his own breakfast table, though I shall remember as long as I live the pleasant days I have spent in his society at Bowood, Holland House, and elsewhere. Nothing was more remarkable in Macaulay than the natural way in which he talked, never for the sake of display or to manifest his superior powers and knowledge. On the contrary, he was free from any assumption of superiority over others, and seemed to be impressed with the notion that those he conversed with knew as much as himself, and he was always quite as ready to listen as to talk. 'Don't you remember?' he was in the habit of saying when he quoted some book or alluded to some fact to listeners who could not remember, because in nineteen cases out of twenty they had never known or heard of whatever it was he alluded to. I do not believe anybody ever left his society with any feeling of mortification, except that which an involuntary comparison between his knowledge and their own ignorance could not fail to engender. For some years past I had seen little or nothing of Macaulay. His own health compelled him to abstain in great measure from going into the world. He bought a house at Campden Hill, from which he rarely stirred, and to which he never invited me, nor did I ever call upon him there. I have often regretted the total cessation of our intercourse, but what else could be expected from the difference of our habits, pursuits, and characters? I have only recently read over again the whole of his 'History of England' with undiminished pleasure and admiration, though with a confirmed opinion that his style is not the very best, and that he is not the writer whom I should be most desirous to imitate; but what appears to me most admirable and most worthy of imitation in Macaulay is the sound moral constitution of his mind, and his fearless independence of thought, never sacrificing truth to any prejudice, interest, or preconceived opinion whatever. Above all he was no hero worshipper, who felt it incumbent on him to minister to vulgar prejudices or predilections, to exalt the merits and palliate the defects of great reputations, and to consider the commission of great crimes, or the detection of mean and base motives, as atoned for and neutralised by the possession of shining abilities and the performance of great actions. Macaulay excited much indignation in some quarters by the severity with which he criticised the conduct and character of the Duke of Marlborough, and the Quakers bitterly resented his attacks upon Penn. He was seldom disposed to admit that he had been mistaken or misinformed, and I thought he was to blame in clinging so tenaciously to his severe estimate of Penn's conduct after the vindication of it which was brought forward, and the production of evidence in Penn's favour, which might have satisfied him that he had been in error, and which probably would have done so in any case in which his judgement had been really unbiassed. I always regretted, not for the sake of Penn's memory, but for the honour of Macaulay himself, that he would not admit the value and force of the exculpatory evidence, and acknowledge, as he very gracefully might, the probability at least of his having been in error. But the case of the Duke of Marlborough is very different, and reflects the highest honour on his literary integrity and independence. Undazzled by the splendour of that great man's career and the halo of admiration which had long surrounded his name, he demonstrated to the whole world of what base clay the idol was made and how he had abused for unworthy ends the choice gifts which Nature had bestowed upon him. Macaulay no doubt held that in proportion to the excellence of his natural endowments was his moral responsibility for the use or abuse of them, and he would not allow Blenheim and Ramillies to be taken as a set-off against his hypocrisy, perfidy, and treason. Macaulay's History is the best ethical study for forming the mind and character of a young man, for it is replete with maxims of the highest practical value. It holds up in every page to hatred and scorn all the vices which can stain, and to admiration and emulation all the virtues which can adorn, a public career. It is impossible for anyone to study that great work without sentiments of profound admiration for the lessons it inculcates, and they who become thoroughly imbued with its spirit, no matter whether they coincide or not with his opinions, will be strengthened in a profound veneration for truth and justice, for public and private integrity and honour, and in a genuine patriotism and desire for the freedom, prosperity, and glory of their country.

[Sidenote: THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY.]

_January 7th._--In a letter from Clarendon yesterday from the Grove he says: 'Cowley came over here last night. I had a long talk with him; he is low and unhappy, and does not see his way out of the labyrinth; he is not for the Congress meeting _now_, but still does not think we should abandon the Emperor altogether in his Italian policy. The fact is, we are in a great difficulty. If we had from the first taken the wise part of saying that as we had had nothing to do with the war or the peace, and should therefore not interfere with the arrangements the Emperor thought proper to make, we should now be on velvet; but from the moment we knew of the Villafranca arrangement we have been thwarting the Emperor, and goading him on further than he wished to go, and encouraging the Italians to persist in their own ideas, till at last when he does what we want, and is prepared to throw over the Pope and asks to be backed by us, it is rather awkward to break away and declare we only wanted the credit of recommending a fine liberal policy, but that we don't mean to be at any trouble or expense about it.' All this is undoubtedly true, but it is the old inveterate habit of Palmerston's policy, united with John Russell's crotchets, which has brought it to this pass. Palmerston has always been Conservative at home and Revolutionary abroad, and the gratification of a silly spite against Austria has always been paramount to any other consideration and object. While the enemies of the late Government accused them, very unjustly as the documentary evidence has shown, of having unduly favoured Austria during the recent conflict, and therefore having been neutral only in name, it is true that the present Government, _i.e._ Palmerston and John Russell, have gone out of their way to interfere in an underhand manner, and have been constantly patting on the back the insurgent Italians, and, as Clarendon says, urging the Emperor to go further than he wishes, or than he can do consistently with the engagement he has entered into. When Cowley was here some months ago, I remember his telling me that one day when he met Cavour, either at Compiègne or Paris, I forget which, when it was the question of the Congress before the war, Cavour said to him, 'So you are going to have a Congress.' 'Yes,' said Cowley, 'thanks to you and all you have been doing in Italy.' 'Thanks to _me_!' cried Cavour, 'I like that; why don't you say thanks to your own Minister at Turin, to Sir James Hudson, who has done ten times more than ever I did?'

_Hatchford, January 12th._--Clarendon writes to me (on the 10th): Cowley dined here on Saturday and did the same at Pembroke Lodge on Sunday. He is on very good terms with John Russell, but hardly understands what he would be at, and for the good reason probably that Johnny does not know himself. There is a Ministerial crisis going on at this moment about Italy, the three confederates wanting of course to do more than the sober-minded majority can agree to. I suppose it will be decided at the Cabinet to-day, and that some middle course will be discovered, as I shall not believe, till it is a _fait accompli_, that Palmerston will allow the Government to break up on a question which will not carry the country with him. The people dislike Austria and wish well to the Italians, but they want not to interfere in the affairs of either, and I doubt if they would give a man or a shilling to help Palmerston in blotting Austria out of the map of Europe and giving Sardinia a much larger slice of the map. That twofold object amounts to monomania now with Palmerston, and I believe he would sacrifice office to attain it, which is the highest test of his sincerity. The three confederates are Palmerston, John Russell, and Gladstone.

_London, January 22nd._--For the last three weeks the sayings and doings of the Emperor Napoleon have occupied all thoughts in every part of Europe, and he has wellnigh recovered in this country the confidence and popularity which had been exchanged for distrust, suspicion, and alarm. It would really look as if the sole or at least the main object of his policy was to conciliate English opinion and to ingratiate himself with the present Government; and he certainly has exhibited great courage and above all a boundless confidence in his own power and authority in his own country. There was a time when he paid great court to the Catholic clergy in France, and it was supposed that his motive in retaining the French troops in Rome (which it was known he very much disliked) was his apprehension lest their withdrawal should expose the Pope's person or Government to danger, which the clergy in France would not readily forgive him for doing. When he made peace with Austria he still evinced a desire to uphold the dignity and authority of the Pope, and therefore nobody was the least prepared for the pamphlet of 'The Pope and the Congress.' It fell like a thunderbolt, striking terror into the minds of all the Papal supporters and adherents, and filling with joy all revolted Italy, and with a more sober satisfaction all the Liberals and ultra-Protestants here.

[Sidenote: TREATY OF COMMERCE WITH FRANCE.]

We had hardly recovered from our amazement at this great change in the foreign policy of France, when we were still more astonished and pleased by the publication of the Emperor's letter to Fould, in which he announced his intention to change the whole commercial policy of France, and to make her a country of Free Trade. In thus confronting at once the Clerical body and the Protectionist interest in France, he has certainly acted with enormous boldness and reliance on his own influence and power, and it will be very interesting to see whether the success of his policy corresponds with its audacity. The Commercial Treaty has been in great measure the work of Cobden, who went over to Paris under the wing of Michel Chevalier and with letters to Cowley, who introduced him to everybody who could be of use to him in his endeavours to forward a Free Trade policy. The scheme seems to have been arranged between the Emperor and Fould without the knowledge or participation of any of the other Ministers. Cobden had no mission, but he reported his progress home, and as an acknowledgement of his exertions he is to be made joint Plenipotentiary with Cowley in signing the Commercial Treaty.

The return of Cavour to power looks as if there was a secret understanding between France and England that the King of Sardinia should be permitted to consummate the annexation of all the revolted provinces to his dominions; for this object, which Palmerston has so much at heart, he would gladly consent to the transference of Savoy to France, which most people think will take place; but everything is still and must be for some time in the greatest uncertainty in North Italy, the only thing _apparently_ certain being that the Dukes will not recover their Duchies, and still less the Pope his Romagna.

_January 24th._--To-day Parliament opens, and everything promises a prosperous session for the Government. So little spirit is there in the Opposition, that very few of them are expected to make their appearance, and Disraeli, under the pretext of a family affliction, gives no dinner; but the probable cause of this is not the death of his sister, which happened two months ago, but his own uncertainty as to whom he should invite, and who would be disposed to own political allegiance by accepting his invitation. Such is the disorganised state of that party.

Clarendon called on me yesterday, and told me various things more or less interesting about passing events, about Cobden and the Commercial Treaty. Cobden went over to Paris with letters from Palmerston to Cowley, begging Cowley would give him all the aid he could in carrying out his object of persuading the leading people there to adopt Free Trade principles, saying he went without any mission and as 'a free lance.' Cowley did what he could for him, and he went about his object with great zeal, meanwhile putting himself in correspondence with Gladstone, who eagerly backed him up, but all this time nothing was said to the Cabinet on the subject. At length one day Walewski sent for Cowley, and asked him whether he was to understand that Cobden was an agent of the British Government, and authorised by it to say all he was saying in various quarters. Cowley denied all knowledge of Cobden's proceedings, but wrote a despatch to John Russell stating what had occurred, and at the same time a private letter, saying he did not know whether he would wish such a despatch to be recorded, and therefore to number it and place it in the Foreign Office, or put it in the fire as he thought fit. John Russell accepted the despatch, and at the same time told him he might endorse whatever Cobden did in the matter of commercial engagements.

[Sidenote: THE EMPEROR ON FREE TRADE.]

Clarendon said that when he was at Paris four years ago for the Congress, the Emperor one day said to him, 'I know you are a great Free Trader, and I suppose you mean to take this opportunity of advancing Free Trade principles here as far as you can.' Clarendon said certainly such was his intention, when the Emperor said he was happy to be able to take the initiative with him on this subject, and that he would tell him that it had just been settled in the Council of State that a great change in their commercial and prohibitive system should be proposed to the Chambers, which it was his intention to carry out as soon as possible. But not long after the Emperor renewed the subject, and told him he found the opposition so strong to his contemplated measures and the difficulties so great, that he had been obliged to abandon them for the present, and as there is no reason to doubt that the elements of opposition will be found as strong now as they were then, it is by no means certain that His Majesty will be able now to do all he wishes and has announced. It has already been stated in the French papers that something is to be done to meet the objection or allay the apprehensions of the French Protectionists, and Clarendon thinks it very doubtful whether the Commercial Treaty, which will confer advantages on France immediately without any reciprocal ones to us for eighteen months to come, will be received with much favour here, especially as the loss to our revenue will require the imposition of fresh taxes to a considerable amount.

We discussed the Italian question, and he said the Emperor is in a constant state of doubt and perplexity, one while inclining to the Congress, and another to leaving affairs to be settled without one. Granville told me last night there appears a chance of the Pope's consenting to enter the Congress with the expectation of being supported there by a majority of the Powers, and deriving considerable benefit from such support. The Emperor Napoleon, too, now shows some signs of drawing closer to Austria again, while Austria is quite determined never to consent to any of the schemes of revolution and annexation which France and England are intent upon carrying out. Apponyi told Clarendon, with tears in his eyes, that they were ruined, and quite unable to take any active part, but that in the way of _passive_ resistance they might still do a great deal, and that they should not only refuse with the greatest perseverance to set their hands to any paper acknowledging the new state of things, but that they should solemnly protest against it on every occasion and in every way in their power. Austria therefore never will consent to the annexation of Central Italy to Piedmont, and if it takes place in spite of her remonstrances and in direct violation of the conditions of Villafranca and Zurich, she will not only _refuse_ her recognition, but proclaim her intention of biding her time, with a view to avail herself of future possible contingencies to redress the wrongs of which she may justly complain. I asked Clarendon if he did not think it possible a _mezzo termine_ might be effected by which France and Austria might again be put _d'accord_, France saying, 'I would carry out the stipulations of Zurich if I could, but you see it is impossible. Still I will not consent to arrangements obnoxious to you and in direct violation of them, such as the annexations to Piedmont; let us recur to the formation of a Central Italian independent State.' Clarendon said this had been his own idea, and he still thought it was not impossible that such a compromise should be effected. It is hardly possible to doubt that if Cavour succeeds in annexing to Piedmont all the Central Italian States, a very short time will elapse before war will break out again between Sardinia and Austria, and that Austria will have to relinquish her Venetian possessions or fight for their retention.

_January 27th._--The session opened with great appearance of quiet and prosperity for the Ministers, which nothing that passed the first night in either House threatened to disturb. Derby made a very good and moderate speech. When he left office the Queen entreated him not to use the power he seemed to have from the nearly balanced state of parties to upset this Government, urging the great objections there were to eternal changes, and she repeated the same thing to him when he was at Windsor on a visit not long ago. Derby expressed his entire concurrence with her, and he promised to act in conformity with her wishes, and he has entirely done so. Nothing could be more temperate and harmless than the few remarks he made on Tuesday night, but leaving himself quite unfettered on every point.

[Sidenote: OPPOSITION TO THE COMMERCIAL TREATY.]

In the meantime there is apparently a strong feeling of doubt and quasi-hostility getting up against the Commercial Treaty, and it looks as if the English and French Governments would both have great difficulties in the matter. Public opinion here remains suspended till the Treaty is produced, and till we are informed what the immediate sacrifices may be that we shall have to make for it, and what are the prospective advantages we obtain in return. The French Protectionists are more impatient and have begun to pour out their complaints and indignation without waiting to see the obnoxious Convention. Thiers is said to be furious. So far from any Commercial Treaty like this cementing the alliance, and rendering war between the two countries more difficult, it is much more likely to inflame the popular antipathy in France, to make the alliance itself odious, and render the chances of war between the two countries more probable. In maturing his scheme Louis Napoleon has given it all the appearance of a conspiracy, which is in accordance with his character and his tastes. The whole thing was carried on with the most profound secrecy, and the secret was confined to a very few people, viz. the Emperor himself, Fould, Rouher (Minister of Commerce), Michel Chevalier, and Cobden. All the documents were copied by Madame Rouher, and Rouher was so afraid that some guesses might be made if he was known to be consulting books and returns that were preserved in the Library of the Council of State, that he never would look at any of them, and made Chevalier borrow all that he had occasion to refer to. Now the Emperor springs this Treaty upon his reluctant Chambers and the indignant Protectionist interest. His manner of doing the thing, which he thinks is the only way by which it can be done at all, naturally adds to the resentment the measure excites. They feel themselves in a manner taken in. The objections here are of a different kind and on other grounds, but Gladstone kept his design nearly as close as the Emperor did, never having imparted it to the Cabinet till the last moment before Parliament met. I do not know how the Cabinet looked at it, only that they were not unanimous.

[Sidenote: THE REFORM BILL OF 1860.]

While, however, it seems at least doubtful how the Government will fare when they produce this Treaty, it appears certain that they will get into a scrape with their Reform Bill. I had imagined from all I heard that the Government were certain to bring forward a measure so moderate as to insure the support or at least prevent the opposition of the Conservatives, or certainly of a large proportion of them. Everything rendered this probable. The assurances conveyed to the Government by Walpole, the professions of Disraeli, the apathy of the country, and the total failure of Bright's attempts to get up the steam, all encouraged them to take this course, and the Duke of Bedford told me Lord John was not so tied and bound by his declarations last year that he would not concur in any moderate measure that the Cabinet might frame. A few days ago, however, I asked Clarendon what the Bill would be, and he alarmed me by his reply that 'it would be as bad as possible,' John Russell having insisted upon the franchise being in accordance with his pledges, and upon his consistency being entirely preserved. This meant of course a 6_l._ franchise, which everybody denounces as full of mischief and danger.

Just now Henry Lennox came to me and told me that all the dissensions and jealousies of the Conservative party and the Carlton Club had been suddenly appeased, and that from being split into little sections and coteries, squabbling among themselves and forming plots to oust Disraeli, and elevate one man or another in his place, they were suddenly reunited as one man in opposition to the Bill that they hear is to be offered to them, and that Disraeli will be higher than ever in their confidence and support. The Government estimate their majority at four, leaving out of calculation the Irish Catholics, who will probably all vote against them on every question, and the Conservatives boast of having 320 men who will cling together with immoveable constancy in opposition to the 6_l._ clause. That they will be able to carry it under these circumstances seems impossible. Lord John is himself to bring on the Reform Bill. The best thing that could happen (unless they are warned in time and alter their measure) would be that he should be beaten on the 6_l._ franchise, go out upon it and the rest stay in; but whether they would think themselves bound to stand or fall with him and break up the Government for his sake, I have at present no idea. The Queen would no doubt do all in her power to induce Palmerston to let him go, replace him, and carry on the Government without him. His loss would be a gain in every possible way, and the Government would be strengthened instead of being weakened by his absence, even though he should throw himself into the arms of Bright and join him in a Radical opposition to his former colleagues.

_Bath, February 15th._--When I left London a fortnight ago the world was anxiously expecting Gladstone's speech in which he was to put the Commercial Treaty and the Budget before the world. His own confidence and that of most of his colleagues in his success was unbounded, but many inveighed bitterly against the Treaty, and looked forward with great alarm and aversion to the Budget. Clarendon shook his head, Overstone pronounced against the Treaty, the 'Times' thundered against it, and there is little doubt that it was unpopular, and becoming more so every day. Then came Gladstone's unlucky illness, which compelled him to put off his _exposé_, and made it doubtful whether he would not be physically disabled from doing justice to the subject. His doctor says he ought to have taken two months' rest instead of two days'. However, at the end of his two days' delay he came forth, and _consensu omnium_ achieved one of the greatest triumphs that the House of Commons ever witnessed. Everybody I have heard from admits that it was a magnificent display, not to be surpassed in ability of execution, and that he carried the House of Commons completely with him. I can well believe it, for when I read the report of it the next day (a report I take to have given the speech verbatim) it carried me along with it likewise. For the moment opposition and criticism were silenced, and nothing was heard but the sound of praise and admiration. In a day or two, however, men began to disengage their minds from the bewitching influence of this great oratorical power, to examine calmly the different parts of the wonderful piece of machinery which Gladstone had constructed, and to detect and expose the weak points and objectionable provisions which it contained. I say _it_, for, as the Speaker writes to me, it must be taken as a whole or rejected as a whole, and he adds the first will be its fate.

[Sidenote: MR. GLADSTONE'S BUDGET.]

Clarendon, who has all along disapproved of the Treaty, wrote to me that Gladstone's success was complete, and public opinion in his favour. He says: 'I expect that the London feeling will be reflected from the country, so that there will be no danger of rejection, though I think that the more the whole thing is considered, the less popular it will become. The non-provision for the enormous deficit that will exist next year will strike people, as well as the fact that the Budget is made up of expedients for the present year. The non-payment of the Exchequer bonds is to all intents and purposes a loan; the war tax on tea and sugar, the windfall of the Spanish payment, the making the maltsters and hopgrowers pay in advance, &c., are all stopgaps. If anybody proposes it, I shall not be surprised if an additional 1_d._ Income Tax in place of the war duties was accepted by Gladstone. He has a fervent imagination, which furnishes facts and arguments in support of them; he is an audacious innovator, because he has an insatiable desire for popularity, and in his notions of government he is a far more sincere Republican than Bright, for his ungratified personal vanity makes him wish to subvert the institutions and the classes that stand in the way of his ambition. The two are converging from different points to the same end, and if Gladstone remains in office long enough and is not more opposed by his colleagues than he has been hitherto, we shall see him propose a graduated Income Tax.' These are only objections to the Budget, and speculations (curious ones) as to the character and futurity of Gladstone.

In another letter he says: 'Gladstone made a fair defence of the Treaty, though there are things in it which deserve the severest criticism and will get it, such as tying ourselves down about the exportation of coal (which is a munition of war), letting in French silks free while ours are to pay thirty per cent., and establishing a differential duty of nearly fifty per cent. in favour of light French wines against the stronger wines of Spain and Portugal, for that will be the operation of the Treaty.' Since all this was written there has been a meeting of the Conservative party, and I hear this morning that Derby has decided to take the field with all his forces with a Resolution against the condition about the exportation of coal, and confining himself to that, which will very likely be carried. On the other hand, the publicans and licensed victuallers appear to be in arms against that part of the Budget which more immediately interests them, and are waging a fierce war in the Press by their paper, the 'Morning Advertiser,' so that in spite of his great triumph and all the admiration his eloquence and skill elicited, it is not all sunshine and plain sailing with his measures. Delane writes to me that Gladstone will find it hard work to get his Budget through, that Peel when he brought forward his Budget had a majority of ninety, all of which he required to do it, whereas Palmerston cannot command a majority of nine.

_London, February 22nd._--I returned to town on Monday. The same night a battle took place in the House of Commons, in which Gladstone signally defeated Disraeli, and Government got so good a majority that it looks like the harbinger of complete success for their Treaty and their Budget. Everybody agrees that nothing could be more brilliant and complete than Gladstone's triumph, which did not seem to be matter of much grief to many of the Conservative party, for I hear that however they may still act together on a great field-day, the hatred and distrust of Disraeli is greater than ever in the Conservative ranks, and Derby himself, when he heard how his colleague had been demolished, did not seem to care much about it. They say that he betrays in the House of Commons a sort of consciousness of his inferiority to Gladstone, and of fear of encountering him in debate.

_February 26th._--On Friday night Gladstone had another great triumph. He made a splendid speech, and obtained a majority of 116, which puts an end to the contest. He is now _the_ great man of the day, but these recent proceedings have strikingly displayed the disorganised condition of the Conservative party and their undisguised dislike of their leader. A great many of them voted with Government on Friday night, and more expressed satisfaction at the result being a defeat of Disraeli. The Treaty and Budget, though many parts of both are obnoxious to criticism more or less well founded, seem on the whole not unpopular, and since their first introduction to have undoubtedly gained in public favour. This fact and the state of the Opposition prove the impossibility of any change of Government. Gladstone too, as he is strong, seems disposed to be merciful, and has expressed his intention of taking fairly into consideration the various objections that may be brought forward, and to consent to reasonable alterations when good cases are made out for them. There seems no doubt that his great measures were not approved of by the majority of the Cabinet, but the malcontents do not seem to have been disposed to fight much of a battle against the minority, which included both Palmerston and Lord John.

It is curious how this great question has thrown into the background all the questions about Italy and foreign policy, in regard to which public interest seems to be for the moment suspended, while Italian affairs are at a dead lock. It would be very inconsistent with the Emperor's character if he had given up his design of appropriating Savoy, but he has certainly postponed it, and will probably employ his versatile imagination in weaving some fresh web by means of which he may get it into his power. I have been reading the Italian Blue Book, which is a creditable compilation. John Russell's positions are not unsound, but he is too controversial in his tone, and though he treats Austria with a decent consideration, and in no unfriendly spirit, he might as well have avoided arguing with Count Rechberg upon points and principles on which it was impossible they should ever agree. Throughout this compilation the embarrassment and perplexity of the Emperor Napoleon are conspicuous, and the difficulties into which he got himself by his vacillations and incompatible objects and obligations. His desire to adhere to the engagements he contracted at Villafranca is obvious throughout, and the advice he gave the Pope seems to have been the best possible, and given in all sincerity.[1]

Footnote 1: The Emperor told Metternich the other day that he had made one great mistake, which he had never ceased to regret, that immediately after Villafranca he ought to have marched 100,000 men into Tuscany on the plea of embarking them at Leghorn, and continued to occupy the country till the restoration of the Grand Duke was accomplished, but that he had never contemplated the invincible resistance of the whole population.--C. C. G.

[Sidenote: MR. GLADSTONE'S RADICALISM.]

_February 27th._--Gladstone is said to have become subject to much excitement, and more bitter in controversy in the House of Commons than was his wont. The severe working of his brain and the wonderful success he has obtained may account for this, and having had his own way and triumphed over all opposition in the Cabinet, it is not strange that he should brook none anywhere else. He has not failed to show a little of the cloven foot, and to alarm people as to his future designs. Clarendon, who watches him, and has means of knowing his disposition, thinks that he is moving towards a Democratic union with Bright, the effect of which will be increased Income Tax and lowering the estimates by giving up the defences of the country, to which Sidney Herbert will never consent, and already these old friends and colleagues appear to be fast getting into a state of antagonism. Aberdeen told Clarendon that they would never go on together, and he thought Sidney Herbert would retire from the Cabinet before the end of the session. This of course implies that Gladstone's policy is to be in the ascendant, and that he is to override the Cabinet.

There has been a dispute about the introduction of the Reform Bill. Lord John's colleagues wished him to defer bringing it on, till more progress had been made in the fiscal and commercial measures, and represented the inconvenience of having the two discussions going on at the same time, but nothing would induce him to postpone it, and for the absurd reason that he wanted to bring in this Bill on the _same day_ on which he had introduced the great Reform Bill in 1831, and to this fanciful object he insisted on sacrificing all others.

_Hatchford, March 7th._--Lord John Russell brought in his Reform Bill last week without exciting the smallest interest, or even curiosity, amidst profound indifference in the House and in the country. His measure was very moderate, and his speech temperate. It produces no enthusiasm, or satisfaction, or alarm. It will probably pass without any violent debates, and perhaps with very slight alterations. If the opponents should succeed in making some, Lord John is not prepared to adhere obstinately to his measure, but will come to terms. It was settled that no discussion should take place at the time, and nobody was inclined for any. It hardly delayed the progress of Gladstone's measures, so we heard no more complaints of Lord John's pertinacity in bringing it on upon March 1st.

[Sidenote: ASCENDENCY OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.]

The Treaty, the Budget, and the Reform Bill had thrown foreign affairs into the background, but the interest in them was suddenly aroused, and speedily absorbed every other, by the Emperor's speech and M. Thouvenel's despatches, all so mortifying and provoking to us. Up to this moment Palmerston had been highly elated, and he and Lord John had been exulting in the fancied glory of being the Liberators of Italy, and of having procured the complete success of their own objects. As Clarendon wrote to me, 'The Emperor must greatly enjoy the helplessness of Europe, and in feeling that he may do just what he likes with perfect impunity. Russia is crippled, Austria rotten, Germany disunited, and England, though growling, occupied in gnawing the Treaty bone he has tossed to her. All must submit to the laws made known to them through the "Moniteur."' If it were not so melancholy to see the miserable figure which England cuts in all this, it would be amusing to see it happen _regnante_ Palmerston, and after all his incurable meddling and blustering to see him obliged to eat so much dirt. He may (though probably he does not) think he has lived too long to be reserved at the last period of his political career for such mortification. The Emperor said to somebody, '_L'Europe boudera, mais ne fera rien_,' and he is quite right. We seem to have arrived at the last act of the Italian drama, but it is still very uncertain how the _dénouement_ will be worked out and what the Emperor's final will and pleasure will be. The Romagna seems to present the greatest difficulty; all the rest will find a tolerably easy solution. France will take what she wants of Savoy and give the rest to Switzerland, who upon those conditions is desirous of annexation, and Piedmont does not seem to care much about it. In this way the question of Savoy will be settled, if not by general consent, at least with general acquiescence and without any opposition.

_March 9th._--After all it is not improbable that Palmerston will have the gratification of seeing Tuscany annexed to Sardinia. Cavour has taken the line which Clarendon and I agreed that he would very likely do, and sets France and Austria at defiance. We have seen France and Sardinia joined in making war upon Austria, and now we have France and Austria joined in diplomacy against Sardinia. Nothing can be more curious than to see the unravelling of this web. Next week the Italian States will severally vote their annexation to Sardinia, or their separate existence. If, as is almost certain, the former is their decision, the King will accept their resolution, and Piedmontese troops will march into Tuscany. Then we shall see what the Emperor Napoleon will do, and what he will permit Austria to do.

_Savernake, March 18th._--The affair of Savoy has been summarily settled by the will of the Emperor and the connivance of Cavour. The whole affair now appears to have been a concerted villainy between these worthies, which as the plot has been developed excites here the most intense disgust and indignation. The feeling is the stronger because we have no choice but that of sulky and grumbling acquiescence. The one redeeming point in the French act of violence _was_ the apparent respect paid to Treaties and to the claims of Switzerland, Thouvenel having only the other day said that Faucigny and Chablais should be ceded at once to Switzerland; and now we hear that nothing of the kind is to be done, and that France seizes everything.[1] It is in vain that the Houses of Parliament are advised to cease barking, as they certainly do not mean to bite, and that the 'Times' recommends silence and moderation; such enormities as are unblushingly exhibited to the world excite an indignation which breaks through every restraint, and people _will not_ hold their peace, happen what may. The Opposition have turned the current of their wrath upon our Government, and have proved clearly enough that they had ample and timely notice of the Emperor's intentions, and that nevertheless they continued to urge with all their might that policy which was certain to lead to the annexation of Savoy. That the Emperor and Cavour have been plotting together seems now quite certain, but we are still ignorant, and may perhaps ever remain so, of the details of their delusive operations.

[Sidenote: THE TREATY, THE BUDGET, AND THE BILL.]

The three great subjects which have occupied public attention all this year have been the Italian and its branches, Gladstone's Treaty and Budget, and the Reform Bill. Up to the present time the two first have absorbed all interest, and the new Reform Bill has been received with almost complete apathy, nobody appearing to know or care what its effects would be, and most people misled by an apparent show of moderation and harmlessness in its details. But in the course of the last week the 'Times' set to work, in a series of very able articles, to show the mischievous and dangerous effects that the proposed franchise will produce, and these warnings, supported by ample statistical details, have begun to arouse people from their indifference and to create some apprehensions. I am informed that John Russell framed his Bill in utter ignorance of these important details, and, with the mixture of levity and obstinacy which has always distinguished him, has plunged the country into this dilemma for the sake of his own selfish and ambitious objects. But what is incomprehensible is that in such a numerous Cabinet as the present, and containing many men who certainly once had strong Conservative opinions, he should not have met with a more strenuous opposition, and have been forced to alter his most obnoxious propositions, and I think those who were better informed than Lord John, and saw whither his plan of Reform was leading them, are more to blame than himself. It is impossible to meet with any man who approves of this Bill, and who does not abhor the idea of any Reform whatever. All say that if the members voted by ballot there would be almost unanimity against it, and yet such is the disorganised state of the Conservative party, and such the want of moral courage and independence generally, that this Bill will most likely pass unaltered.

The prevailing hope is that the House of Lords will amend it, but Derby told somebody (I think it was Clarendon) that if those who dreaded the mischief of the measure in the House of Commons had not the courage and honesty to oppose it there and correct it, the House of Lords should not, so far as his influence went, incur the odium of doing the work which the House of Commons ought itself to do. Lyndhurst told me the other day that Derby had told Lady Lyndhurst he was so disgusted with the state of affairs at home and abroad, that he had serious thoughts of withdrawing from public life, and Clarendon told me that an eminent Conservative, who had begged not to be quoted, had said that he knew Derby was violently discontented with Disraeli, and prepared to dissolve their political connexion.

Footnote 1: [It is within my own knowledge that M. Thouvenel expressed at that time the desire of the Emperor to do anything he could _to help Lord Palmerston_, and accordingly he proposed, unofficially, to surrender and annex a considerable portion of the Faucigny district, down to the Fort de l'Ecluse, in the Jura, to the Canton of Geneva, provided the British Government would assent to the acquisition by France of the rest of Savoy. Lord Palmerston rejected the proposal, saying to the person who conveyed it to him, 'We shall shame them out of it.'--H. R.]

_Wells, March 21st._--I came here from Savernake on Monday. On Friday last in the House of Lords the Commercial Treaty and Budget, but the latter especially, were powerfully assailed by Grey, Overstone, and Derby, and very considerably damaged _in argument_, but probably in nothing else. The Government are as weak in the Lords as the Opposition are in the Commons, where, however, Disraeli seems to have made a very good speech against the Reform Bill on Monday night.

[Sidenote: LORD JOHN DENOUNCES NAPOLEON.]

_Torquay, March 28th._--The past week has been remarkable for the speech in which John Russell denounced in strong language the conduct of France, declared that we could no longer trust her, and that we must renew our intimacies with the other Powers. Whether all this was sincere and meant all it seems to do is yet to be discovered. The week was near being still more remarkable, for the Reform Bill was within an ace of falling to the ground by the House being counted out in the midst of a debate. This would have been very ridiculous, but would have been hailed with delight by the House of Commons, and without dissatisfaction by the country. Clarendon writes to me in a strain of bitter hostility to the Bill and disgust at everything, complains of the general apathy and the impossibility of rousing any spirit of opposition to what all abhor. Derby told him that if twenty-five or even twenty Liberals would _take the lead_ in opposing this Bill, the whole Conservative party would support them. Clarendon wrote to me when I was at Bath that the time would probably come when Gladstone would propose a graduated Income Tax, and lo! it has nearly come, for Gladstone gave notice the other night to people to be prepared for it. The Triumvirate of Palmerston, John Russell, and Gladstone, who have it all their own way, dragging after them the Cabinet, the House of Commons, and the country, will probably be the ruin of this country. They are playing into the Emperor Napoleon's hands, who has only to be patient and bide his time, and he will be able to treat all Europe, England included, in any way he pleases. Nothing but some speedy change of Government and of system can avert the impending ruin.

_London, April 2nd._--One day last week (as mentioned above), on one of the numerous discussions of the Savoy question in the House of Commons, John Russell electrified the House and rather astonished the country by delivering a very spirited speech, denouncing in strong terms the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon, and declaring the necessity of cultivating relations with the other Great Powers for the purpose of putting an effectual check upon the projects of French aggrandisement and annexation. I must own that my first impression was that this speech was made merely to deceive the House and the country, and was only a part of the collusive system between our Government and the French, by virtue of which Louis Napoleon has been enabled to work out all his objects and designs; but though it is impossible to doubt that John Russell and Palmerston have all along been aware of the Emperor's intentions with regard to Savoy, and that they have been more intent upon procuring advantages for Sardinia and provoking Austria than upon thwarting the projects of France, I am inclined to see Lord John's speech in another light from what I hear since I came to town. He made it without any previous consultation with his colleagues, it having been one of those _impromptus_ which he is so apt to indulge in, and Palmerston, seeing the way in which it was received in the House and by the Press, approved of its tone and expressed a full concurrence with it. Flahault, who went to Paris a few days ago, called on Palmerston before he went and asked if he wished him to say or do anything there. Palmerston said he might inform the Government that Lord John's speech expressed the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet here. In my opinion his speech was a great imprudence, and will probably involve the necessity of our eating a great deal of humble pie. We have long ago declared that though we disapprove very much of the annexation of Savoy, we should take no steps to prevent it; but Lord John made a great distinction between the question of Savoy and Nice and that of Faucigny and Chablais, and though he did not commit himself to any positive course, he gave it to be inferred that something more would be required from us, in the way of opposition to the seizure of the latter, than there was any necessity for our making to that of the former. But the Emperor makes no such distinctions, and if, as is most probable, he does not admit our right to draw them, we shall be in an unpleasant fix, and have to back out of the position we have assumed in a way neither dignified nor creditable.

[Sidenote: SCHEMES OF THE EMPEROR.]

The accounts from Paris are that this speech has made the French very insolent, and the Emperor more popular than he has been for a long time, as even his enemies say that they will rally round him to chastise English impertinence. Then as to forming alliances with the other Powers, which of course will be taken (as was intended) as a menace to France, nothing could be more ill-advised than such an announcement, for the other Great Powers have neither the ability nor the inclination to join us in any coalition, present or prospective, against France. Russia and Austria hate us, as well they may, for we have done them both all the injury in our power, besides heaping every sort of insult upon them. Austria is totally ruined, hopelessly bankrupt and torn to pieces with internal disaffection and discontent. Russia is hampered with her great serf question, and overwhelmed with financial embarrassments, which she owes in great measure to the Crimean War, and the unfortunate dissension and estrangement between her and Austria are attributable to the same cause and to our policy. Prussia, the only one of the three that is able to make any efforts, and that has no cause of enmity against us, is always selfish and timorous, and is more occupied in trying to supplant Austria in Germany than in taking defensive measures against French ambition; nor is there in Germany any such strong sentiment of national independence as might induce the various States to sink their minor jealousies and partisanships in a general union, to meet any aggression that may proceed from France. Among the many schemes which the Imperial brain is supposed to be continually engendering, it is far from impossible that one may be the reconstruction of the kingdom of Westphalia, or at least of some Rhenish kingdom with the concurrence of Prussia, by concluding a bargain of partition with her. He might then replace old Jerome on the throne, and so get rid of his obnoxious son, of course taking as much of such acquired territory as he wanted for himself. All this is mere vague conjectural speculation, but it is _on the cards_, and it is at least as probable as that we should be able to form another coalition, like that which overthrew the first Napoleon, strong enough to cope with the present Napoleon. People are beginning at last to doubt whether the war we waged against Russia four years ago was really a wise and politic measure; but the whole country went mad upon that subject, I never could understand why. Palmerston took it up to make political capital out of it, and made himself popular by falling in with the public humour, and making the country believe that he was the only man really determined to make war on Russia, and able to bring the war to a successful end. Aberdeen, who was wise enough to see the folly of quarrelling with Russia and sacrificing all our old alliances to a new and deceitful one with France, was unable to stem the torrent, and fell under its violence. His fault was his not resigning office when he found it impossible to carry out his policy and maintain peace.

_A propos_ of the Russian War, I heard lately an anecdote for the first time that surprised me. Everybody knows that we beat up for allies and even mercenary aid against Russia in every direction, but it is not known that our Government earnestly pressed the Portuguese Government to join in the war, and to send a contingent to the Crimea, and that on the refusal of the latter to do so, the Ministers made the Queen appeal personally to Lavradio and urge him to persuade his Government to comply with our wishes; but Lavradio represented to Her Majesty, as he had done to her Ministers, that Portugal had no quarrel with Russia, and no interest in joining in the war; on the contrary, Portugal was under obligations to the Emperor of Russia, and she therefore would have nothing to do with the contest. This was a most extraordinary proceeding, and it was contrary to all usage as well as all propriety to make the Queen interpose in person on such an occasion.

[Sidenote: DANGER OF WAR WITH FRANCE.]

_April 4th._--Clarendon has just been here talking over the state of affairs, in the course of which he alluded to what had passed in the autumn of '58 between the Emperor and him, and between His Majesty and Palmerston. In September he had a long conversation with the Emperor, in the course of which he asked Clarendon, 'Supposing I find myself compelled to go to war with Austria, what part would England take in the contest?' Clarendon replied that it would depend upon the circumstances of the case and the cause that would be shown for such a war, and that he must not be misled by the language of the English Press and the prejudice which no doubt existed in England against Austria and her system of government, which would not be sufficient to make us take any part against her. On comparing notes with Palmerston afterwards, Clarendon found that Louis Napoleon had put the same question to Palmerston, who had given him the same answer. When they went to Compiègne in November of the same year, they both had conversations separately of the same character, and when they afterwards compared notes and Clarendon asked Palmerston what impression the Emperor's words had left on his mind, Palmerston replied he thought either that the Emperor had abandoned the design he had certainly been meditating to go to war, or he had resolved upon it, but did not choose to acknowledge his intentions to them, and this Clarendon said was exactly the same opinion as he had formed. This, however, was not above six weeks before his famous speech to the Austrian Ambassador (which was a declaration of war), and therefore the latter conjecture was the correct one. We talked over Lord John's speech and his letter in answer to Thouvenel. Clarendon said that this despatch was entirely written by Palmerston himself, that anybody as well acquainted with their styles as he was must be quite certain of this, but that _he_ knew it to be the case. He had a conversation with Palmerston the other day, who praised Lord John's speech and said it would do good, and he thought _the question of Savoy was in a very satisfactory state_.

Palmerston, he told me, had said more to Flahault[1] than I had been apprised of. Flahault went to him, and found him just going to the House of Commons. Flahault asked him to let him get into his carriage, which he did, and when Flahault asked what he should say to the Emperor, and Palmerston told him to say that the Emperor had better read Lord John's speech, and understand that he (Palmerston) agreed in every word of it, Flahault said, 'Then you mean that you have no longer any confidence in the Emperor, or place any reliance upon his word.' Palmerston replied, 'I do mean this. After having been repeatedly deceived and misled by his professions and assurances, it is impossible that I can place any further confidence in him.' Then said Flahault, 'There will be war,' to which Palmerston rejoined that he hoped not, that nobody could be more anxious to avoid war than he was.

This was very spirited and becoming, and Clarendon said he highly approved of such a tone. I said that I had all along suspected that there was a secret understanding and collusion between Palmerston and the Emperor, and that Palmerston had given His Majesty to understand that if he would set Italy free, he might do what he pleased with regard to Savoy, but that what had recently passed seemed to negative that idea. Clarendon replied he had no doubt Palmerston had very often said to Persigny what, if repeated by Persigny to the Emperor with some exaggerations and suppressions, would convey as much to His Majesty, for Palmerston had a dozen times said to him (Clarendon) that the liberation and settlement of Italy was of far greater consequence than the preservation of Savoy to Piedmont.

Footnote 1: [Count de Flahault was at this time French Ambassador in London.]

_April 8th._--To The Grove on Thursday afternoon, and returned yesterday. On Good Friday morning George Lewis and I were left alone, when we talked over the questions of the day, and he quite amazed me by the way in which he spoke of his principal colleagues. I asked him if John Russell was not exceedingly mortified at the ill-success of his Reform Bill and its reception in the House of Commons and in the country. George Lewis said he did not think he felt this, that at present his mind was entirely occupied with foreign politics, and he was rejoicing in the idea of having been largely instrumental to the liberation of Italy; and as to Reform, that he was satisfied with having redeemed the pledge he gave to Bright to propose a 6_l._ franchise, and having done this he did not care about the result, as he had never pledged himself to carry it. The most strange thing to me is, that George Lewis seemed not to be alive to the culpable levity of such conduct, or to the censure to which his own conduct is obnoxious in consenting to act with such a man, and to be a party to such a measure.

With regard to Palmerston, he said that Palmerston thought of nothing but his pro-Sardinian and anti-Austrian schemes, and he was gratified by seeing everything in that quarter turning out according to his wishes, that in the Cabinet he took very little part and rarely spoke. Gladstone George Lewis evidently distrusts, and his financial schemes and arrangements are as distasteful to him as possible. He is provoked at Gladstone's being able to bear down all opposition, and carry all before him by the force of his eloquence and power of words, and what I have said of his conduct in supporting John Russell is still more applicable to it in reference to Gladstone and his measures, which he thinks more dangerous by far than he does Lord John's Reform Bill and 6_l._ clause. I asked him what was to be the end of this Bill, and he said he did not expect it to pass, that probably the debates on it would be so spun out and so many delays interposed that either it would fail in the House of Commons itself, or even if it passed, the House of Lords would say it came up too late for them to examine and consider it, and it would be thrown out there. I gathered in the course of conversation that Palmerston (whose whole antecedents and recorded opinions forbid the idea of his approving such a measure) would be glad to see the franchise raised, and that 8_l._ and 15_l._ would in his view improve the Bill.

[Sidenote: MACHINATIONS OF NAPOLEON.]

_May 6th._--Since I wrote the above, nearly a month ago, I have been out of the way of hearing anything on public affairs, till a day or two ago when I called on Clarendon, when he told me some things not without interest, partly about domestic and partly about foreign affairs. The latter of course related to the inexhaustible subject of the Emperor Napoleon's projects and machinations. His Majesty, it seems, has recently had a conversation with M. de Moustier, French Minister at Vienna, in the course of which he told him that it was an absolute necessity to France to carry her frontier to the Rhine. About the same time Cavour had signified (I forget whether it was to the same de Moustier or to some other person) that Sardinia must obtain possession of Venetia. These necessities, it can hardly be doubted, are expressed and resolved upon by a common accord. Austria has been already completely crippled by the late war; if threatened in Italy she will employ all her resources in defence of her Italian territory, and she will be quite unable, even if she were willing, to join in any measures of resistance to the attempts of France upon Germany. Prussia has had the egregious folly to renew her feud with Denmark upon the affair of Schleswig-Holstein, and is about to provoke a fresh war on that question. Denmark thus threatened appeals to France for aid, which France is too happy to afford, as she will thereby in all probability find a good pretext for interference, and for the furtherance of all her designs. There seems no doubt that a Treaty of some sort has been concluded between France and Denmark. In this difficult and menacing posture of affairs, England will sooner or later have to play a part of some sort, and it is disquieting enough to reflect upon our diplomacy being under the charge of John Russell and of Palmerston.

After lingering on for several weeks with unprecedented tardiness and delay, and a languid uninteresting discussion--debate it cannot be called--the second reading of the Reform Bill has at last passed without opposition. The last nights have been remarkable for the speeches hostile to the Bill of several Liberal members, and the increasing proofs of its prodigious unpopularity. Everybody is sick of the subject, and those who desire that some modified and amended measure may pass, only do so because they have a horror of seeing another Bill brought in next year, and they hope that they may now purge this Bill of its worst and most dangerous defects, and close the subject for several years to come. Some think that it is impossible to devise any means by which this Bill can be made anything like safe and expedient, and would therefore prefer to throw it out and run all chances for the future. At least one half of the Government, with Palmerston himself at the head of the dissentients, regard this Bill with alarm and aversion, and now that the difficulty, if not impossibility, of passing it is obvious, they are prepared to make every sort of sacrifice, even of its most vital provisions. Palmerston told George Lewis so, and that John Russell himself would submit to an alteration of the franchise to the amount of 15_l._ for the counties and 8_l._ for the towns. They know that no question of resignation is involved in this discussion, and that whatever may be the fate of their Bill, they will still keep their places, which no concession will endanger, and accordingly they are ready to agree to any compromise which will secure the Bill's passing through Parliament in any shape or way; but notwithstanding this pliant disposition, it is very doubtful whether the Bill can pass. It will not commence its career in Committee till the first week in June, and it is hardly possible it can reach the House of Lords before the middle or end of July, and the Lords may very well decline to enter on its consideration at that late period.

[Sidenote: CONFUSION OF PARTIES.]

_May 9th._--A correspondence appears in the newspapers between Lord Grey and John Russell, couched in terms of no small bitterness. Such a correspondence between men of such eminence and of the same political colour shows up to the world the insincerity with which, for political motives at the time urgent, they have spoken in their places in Parliament. It is no new thing that members of the same Cabinet should often differ, and that vehemently on particular questions, and yet when these questions come under Parliamentary discussion, that they should exhibit to the world the semblance of an agreement and concurrence which is remote from the truth. But though this is well understood to be of not unfrequent occurrence, and sooner or later the details of the truth often leak out, it is much to be regretted that men should exhibit themselves and each other in the way which this correspondence does, for such exhibitions cannot fail to excite suspicions of the sincerity, conscientiousness, and truth of public men. When Governments are entirely of one party colour, either wholly Whig or wholly Tory, and when they are presided over by some man of supereminent authority, such differences and consequent difficulties are not likely to happen often; but as of late years parties have been broken up, and composite Governments have been formed, combining men of the most opposite original principles, and imbued with very different and incompatible opinions on various subjects, it must be continually happening that candid discussions and disputes in the Cabinet should be followed by insincere and untruthful declarations and argumentations in public. The understood practice from time immemorial has been, that a dissentient from the general opinion of his colleagues upon any _important_ question must either consent to merge his own opinion in theirs, or retire from office; and then the conduct of the dissentient was regulated by his view of the _importance_ of the matter at issue. Of course if a man were to break off from his colleagues upon every matter of difference, however small, no Government could possibly go on for many months or perhaps weeks, but it is impossible in these days not to be struck with the fact that so many men are indisposed to consider anything of sufficient importance to resign their offices rather than sacrifice their enlightened consciences and mature judgements.

_May 12th._--Not more than three months ago Gladstone was triumphant and jubilant; he had taken the House of Commons and the country captive by his eloquence, and nothing was heard everywhere but songs of praise and admiration at his marvellous success and prodigious genius. There never was a greater reaction in a shorter time. Everybody's voice is now against him, and his famous Treaty and his Budget are pronounced enormous and dangerous blunders. Those who were most captivated now seem to be most vexed and ashamed of their former fascination. They are provoked with themselves for having been so duped, and a feeling of resentment and bitterness against him has become widely diffused in and out of the House of Commons, on his own side as well as on the other. It was the operation of this feeling which caused the narrow majority on the Paper Duties the other night, when it seems as if a little more management and activity might have put him in a minority, and it is the same thing which is now encouraging the House of Lords, urged on by Derby, to throw out the Resolution when it comes before them. Derby has announced that he shall exert himself to the utmost to procure the rejection of the Bill in the House of Lords, and if he perseveres he will probably obtain a very unwise and perilous success, which he will before long have to regret.

[Sidenote: REPEAL OF THE PAPER DUTIES.]

_May 17th._--Clarendon dined with Derby about a week ago, when Derby explained to him all his reasons for persisting in his opposition to the Paper Duties Bill. Clarendon said he did not talk rashly and in Rupert vein, but gave a well-considered and well-argued statement of the grounds on which he purposed to proceed. Clarendon evidently sympathised with him, but not without much apprehension and doubt as to the expediency of his course. Derby appears to have taken and to be taking prodigious pains with his case, and he said that his object was to have a great financial debate in the Lords on the Treaty and the Budget. Granville tells me they shall be beaten by a large majority, and he owns that the debate will be almost all one way. There is nothing on the Treasury Bench or behind it able to grapple with Derby, Monteagle, Overstone, and Grey on such a question, though Granville expects Argyll to get up the question and to speak well on it, and he expects something from Newcastle and Ripon, but Clarendon told me (which of course he had from Lewis) the curious fact that Palmerston himself views with pleasure the prospect of the rejection of the Bill. A queer state of things indeed when the Prime Minister himself secretly desires to see the defeat of a measure so precious to his own Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Frederick Cadogan came over from Paris the other day, and told Clarendon that Cowley was in very bad spirits about the aspect of foreign affairs, that all intimacy and confidence between the Emperor and him was at an end, and that it was more and more evident that His Majesty meant to follow his own devices, whatever they might be, without reference to anybody, or caring for the opposition or the assent of any other Powers.

The Garibaldi expedition is supposed to have given great umbrage to France, but not without some suspicions that secretly she is not sorry for it, and thinks in its complications she may find matter to turn to her own account. Everybody believes that Cavour has covertly connived at it, though he pretends to oppose it. Certainly no resolute attempts were made to obstruct the expedition by the Sardinian Government, and none whatever by France, who, if she really cared to stop it, might easily have done so by sending ships from Toulon for the purpose.

Talking of Neapolitan affairs, Pahlen told me yesterday an almost incredible anecdote, but of which he said there was no doubt of the truth. There is just arrived a new Neapolitan Minister, Count Ludolph, grandson of the Ludolph who was formerly here. He has replaced the former Minister, who by his own desire was recently recalled, and he had begged for his recall because he had been grossly insulted by Palmerston at the Queen's Drawing Room, his story being that in that room, in the Queen's presence (who was of course out of hearing), Palmerston had attacked him on the proceedings of his Government and the conduct of the King, telling him that a revolution would probably be the consequence thereof, which would be nothing more than they deserved, and which would be seen in this country with universal satisfaction. The man was so flabbergasted by this unexpected and monstrous _sortie_ that he had not presence of mind to make a suitable answer, and to _riposter_ with the spirit which the occasion required of him. I must endeavour to find out if this is true. Palmerston has always been noted for the vivacity and often acerbity of his language in despatches, but in oral communications and in speeches he has never been reproached with intemperance or incivility, but, on the contrary, has always evinced self-control and gentlemanlike and polite behaviour and language.

_May 28th._--Epsom engaged all my attention last week, and I could not find time to notice the debate in the Lords on the Paper Duties, and the extraordinary majority, so much greater than anybody expected. Lyndhurst undertook to speak on the constitutional part of the question, and got leave to speak early (between Granville and Monteagle) that he might go home to celebrate his birthday, which fell on that day, when he completed his eighty-eighth year. He made a very good speech, and met with an enthusiastic reception. Lady Palmerston was in the gallery, openly expressing her wishes that the Bill might be rejected by a large majority. Her language on this and other occasions so shocked some of the more zealous Whigs, that the Duke of Bedford was asked by one or more of them to remonstrate with her on the way she talked, but she knows very well that Palmerston is of the same mind, though he cannot avow his real sentiments in the way she does. Palmerston said to Gladstone, 'Of course you are mortified and disappointed, but your disappointment is nothing to mine, who had a horse with whom I hoped to win the Derby, and he went amiss at the last moment.' The affair has gone off very quietly, the House of Commons not being the least disposed to quarrel with the Lords about it. Even John Russell, who had talked very absurdly, held moderate and prudent language in the House.[1]

Footnote 1: [A Bill for abolishing the duty on paper was carried in the House of Commons on March 12 by a majority of 245 to 192. It was rejected on May 21 by the House of Lords by a majority of 193 to 104. The dispute was eventually settled by a resolution for removing so much of the duty on paper as exceeded the Excise duty at home.]

[Sidenote: REFORM BILL WITHDRAWN.]

_June 15th._--At Ascot last week. Palmerston was there, and went up to town on Thursday (going reluctantly) to assist at the withdrawal by John Russell of the Reform Bill. There was a Cabinet the preceding day, at which Palmerston said, 'We must now settle what is to be done about the Reform Bill.' John Russell said, 'I know what my opinion is, and if anybody wishes to hear it I am ready to give it.' They all said they did wish it, when he announced that he thought it ought to be withdrawn. Everybody agreed except Gladstone, who made a long speech in favour of going on with it, which nobody replied to, and there it ended. A discussion took place as to what should be said, and strong opinions expressed that nothing but moderate language should be employed, which John Russell agreed to, and he acted up to it by making a very becoming speech, which would have been faultless if he had not announced another Reform Bill on the earliest possible occasion. This, too, he did entirely off his own bat, and without any consultation or agreement with his colleagues. Fortunately these announcements are no longer so important or so binding as heretofore, and I think it probable, unless there is some great change in public opinion (which is not likely), that when the time draws near Palmerston and a majority of the Cabinet will not consent to a fresh attempt.

_July 8th._--I have been so ill till within the last few days that I have not had energy enough to do anything. I have known but little, and that little I could not bring myself to write down here. In fact, it is high time that I should close these records once for all, which I am morally and physically incapable of continuing with any probability of making them interesting. It is not very consistent with this opinion to fill a page or two with the recent transaction in the House of Commons, with reference to the duty on paper. Everybody allows that Palmerston got out of his difficulty with consummate tact and discretion, and that Gladstone's conduct was inexcusable. The Resolutions concocted by Palmerston had been fully discussed and agreed to in the Cabinet (reluctantly of course by Gladstone), and Palmerston's speech was received with general approbation in the House. It was excellent, fair and moderate, the argument logically consistent with the Resolutions, but displeasing to Gladstone and the highflyers because it made a sort of excuse for the Lords, or rather it set forth the grounds on which the Lords might think themselves justified in acting as they did, without having any of the motives and designs which the Gladstones and Brights attributed to them. All this elicited great applause from the Opposition side of the House, and their cheers were very offensive to and grated on the ears of the ultra-Liberals. Everything would have ended quietly, and the Resolutions would have passed without a debate, but Gladstone could not stand it, and, urged by spite and mortification, he must needs get up and make a most violent speech, really, though not avowedly, in opposition to Palmerston, and with the object of provoking a long and acrimonious debate. In this he only partially succeeded, and not for long. The debate lasted one night more, but nothing could be made of the Amendments. Palmerston kept his temper and displayed great firmness and resolution. The House was with him. Bright, partly from being very unwell, and probably partly from some discretion, made a moderate speech; everybody seemed determined to bring the matter to an end, and the Resolutions were very triumphantly carried. Granville told me yesterday morning that it was a toss up whether Gladstone resigned or not, and that if he did, it would break up the Liberal party, to which I replied that I was confident he would not resign, and if he did, it would have no effect on the bulk of the Liberal party.

[Sidenote: RADICAL ELEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.]

_July 17th._--I met Charles Villiers at dinner at the Travellers' last night and had some talk with him, particularly about Gladstone. He thinks it far better that he should not resign, as he could, and probably would, be very mischievous out of office. He says people do not know the House of Commons, and are little aware that there is an obscure but important element in it of a Radical complexion, and that there are sixty or seventy people who would constitute themselves followers of Gladstone, and urge him on to every sort of mischief. They are already doing all they can to flatter and cajole him, and once out of office, his great talents and oratorical powers would make him courted by all parties, even the Tories, who would each and all be very glad to enlist him in their service. It is impossible to calculate on the course of a man so variable and impulsive, but at present it looks as if he had made up his mind to swallow his mortifications and disappointments and to go on with his present colleagues, though Charles Villiers says he is very dejected and uneasy in his mind, and very gloomy in the Cabinet.

I asked him if he had seen Senior's last Journals, relating his visit to Paris, which he had not. I told him they were very interesting, and that all his interlocutors, however varying in opinions upon other subjects, were agreed as to the certainty of the Emperor's meditating fresh wars and aggressions, and sooner or later a war with us. He said he thought it probable that any attempt on Belgium would be deferred till after King Leopold's death (who is seventy-five years old), at which time in all probability the annexation would be attempted, and with very reasonable prospects of being assented to by the Belgians themselves, an idea which had not struck me, but which I think exceedingly likely.

_Buxton, August 11th._--I came here for my health and to try and patch myself up a fortnight ago, since which I have heard and learnt nothing of what is passing in the world but what I read in the newspapers. The session of Parliament was drawing to a close, and it was understood that there was to be one more fight in the House of Commons (on the removal of the Customs duties on paper), and then the remaining business was to be hurried through as quickly as possible. The Opposition made strenuous efforts to obtain a majority, and were sanguine of success. The Speaker wrote me an account of what passed, and I shall copy out the greatest part of his letter. 'The division of thirty-three on the Paper Duties was a surprise to all on the spot. As late as eleven that evening Sir George Grey told us the division seemed very doubtful. The Irishmen held off indignant at Palmerston's having mentioned with approval the landing of Garibaldi on the mainland. This was held to be an insult to the Pope, so More O'Farrell, Monsell, Sir John Acton, and eight or ten more would not vote at all. It seemed doubtful to the last. It is a great thing for the Government in many ways, not the least in having won the battle without the Pope and his men. It puts the Government in so much better and stronger a position with that party. The great result is to give some life to half-dead, broken-down, tempest-tossed Gladstone. When after the division he rose to propose the second Resolution, he was cheered by the Free-traders as he had not been cheered since the Budget Speech. Colonel Taylor tells me they had been led to success by promises from two quarters. First the paper-makers and the "Times" engaged to bring fifty men to the post, and only brought five. The Irishmen promised to be twenty-five, but were only eleven, the others standing off and not voting. I have a long letter from Cobden, angry about fortifications and Volunteers.' This morning I received another letter from the Speaker, enclosing Cobden's, which he has sent me to read. He says, 'It is written in rather a spirit of exaggeration, but it is the fault of Cobden's mind to see one object so strongly, that his view cannot embrace another at the same time.' Cobden's is well written, and contains much that is true, but he has evidently been so cajoled and flattered at Paris that he is now completely bamboozled, and so credulous that he takes for gospel all the Emperor says, and complains bitterly of 'all that is going on at home' and especially of the tone of Palmerston's and Sidney Herbert's speeches. 'Believing,' he says, 'that the new French tariff will realise a complete revolution in the commercial relations of the two countries, and having taken pains to impress this opinion on the Government, I am amazed at the course they are taking. The language of Palmerston and Sidney Herbert, coupled with the fortification scheme (he says), cuts the ground, on which I urged the Emperor to enter on the Free Trade policy, from under my feet. Nine tenths of his motives for making the plunge into that policy now were political rather than politico-economical; he aimed at conciliating the English people, and I did not hesitate to assure him that if he entered without reserve on the Free Trade path, it would be taken as a proof of his pacific intentions by the British public.'

[Sidenote: CONCLUSION OF THESE JOURNALS.]

_London, November 13th._--At the end of three months since I last wrote anything in this book, I take my pen in hand to record my determination to bring this journal (which is no journal at all) to an end. I have long seen that it is useless to attempt to carry it on, for I am entirely out of the way of hearing anything of the slightest interest beyond what is known to all the world. I therefore close this record without any intention or expectation of renewing it, with a full consciousness of the smallness of its value or interest, and with great regret that I did not make better use of the opportunities I have had of recording something more worth reading.

INDEX.

Aberdeen, Rt. Hon. Earl of, formation of Government, difficulties attending it, i. 17, 18; in part owing to Lord J. Russell, 19, 20; the new Ministry's first appearance, 24; discontent of Whigs, 25; list of Cabinet, 29; meeting of Parliament, 39; judicious answers of, in the House, 45; harmony of Government of, 65; divided Cabinet of, on Russo-Turkish question, 67; impending war viewed by, 69; attacks of Tory press on, 70; explanations of policy of, demanded in Parliament, 71; confidence of, in Russian Emperor shaken, 73; chances, hopes, of peace, 75; proposed Convention considered, 76, 79; Cabinet of, summoned on Eastern crisis, 91; agreement as to policy, 94; wish of, to resign, on failure of peace policy, 96; Cabinet discussion as to meeting of Parliament, 102; Protocol agreed on by four Powers, 109; charged by Lord Derby with imparting State secrets to the 'Times,' 146; denial, and defence against Lord Malmesbury, 147; attacks upon peace policy of, 166; difference of opinion of, between him and Lord Clarendon, 184; goes to Windsor to resign, 232

Adair, Sir Robert, death of, i. 291

Albert, H.R.H. Prince, attacks on, by Tory press, i. 126; charges against him of taking part in State affairs, 127; vindication of, in Parliament, 133; letter of, to King of Prussia, 183; visit of, to France, 183; conversation with the French Emperor, 186; made Prince Consort by patent, ii. 112; visits Brussels, 117

Alliance, the Holy, correspondence concerning, between Emperor of Russia and Prince Regent, i. 287

Alma, battle of the, i. 187

Anglesey, the Marquis of, death of, i, 155; character of, 155-56

Anson, General, letters of, hinting discontent in Indian Army, ii. 106; death of, from cholera, 112

Ashburton, Lady, death of; character of, ii. 107

Austria, policy of Austrians at Milan, i. 47; Emperor of, stabbed, 46; mediation attempted by, 72; hesitates to side against Russia, 135; fears to declare war against Russia, 170; new declaration of neutrality, 187; declares war against Sardinia, 244; armistice of Villafranca, peace concluded, 258

Bank, the, of England, empowered to exceed limits of Bank Act of 1844,