CHAPTER VII.

Difficulties of the Campaign--Prince Albert and the King of Prussia--The Prince goes to France--Military Commanders--Critical Relations of the Ministers--The Crimea--The Emperor Napoleon and Prince Albert--Austria and the Allies--The Landing in the Crimea--The Battle of the Alma--Royal Invitations--The Crimean Expedition--Lord John's Hostility to his Colleagues--False Report from Sebastopol--The Crimean Campaign--Anecdotes of Lord Raglan--The Russian Defence--Trade with the Enemy--Anecdote of Nesselrode--John Bright's Opinion of the War--Defence of Sebastopol--The Balaklava Charge--The Judges at the Nomination of Sheriffs--Lord John takes more moderate Views--The Battle of Inkerman--Impolicy of the War--Inkerman--Spirit of the Nation--Military Enthusiasm--Parliament summoned--Want of Foresight--Accounts of the Battle--Lord Raglan as a General--Sufferings of the Army--Agreement with Austria--Opponents of the War--Meeting of Parliament--The Government attacked--The Foreign Enlistment Bill--Foreign Enlistment Bill passed--Mr. Bright's Speech on the War--Review of the Year.

_August 29th_, 1854.--I have been out of town since the above was written; at Grimston for York races, where Lord Derby was in high force and spirits, carrying everything before him at the races, and not a word was ever uttered on politics. There is no news, but dreadful accounts of the health of both armies and of the prevalence of cholera both abroad and at home. The French particularly, who have lost the most, are said to be completely demoralised and disheartened, and to abhor the war which they always disliked from the beginning. My present impression is that we shall come to grief in this contest; not that we shall be beaten in the field by the Russians, but that between the unhealthy climate, the inaccessibility of the country, and the distance of our resources, Russia will be able to keep us at bay, and baffle our attempts to reduce her to submission.

PRINCE ALBERT AND THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

_September 4th._--At The Grove for a couple of days, where I had much talk with Clarendon, and he showed me a great many papers about different matters: a very good letter written by Prince Albert to the King of Prussia, who had written to him a hypocritical letter, asking where the English and French fleets were going to winter, and whether he might depend on them in case he was attacked by Russia in the Baltic, which Clarendon said was a mere artifice to obtain knowledge of our plans, that he might impart them to the Emperor Nicholas, as he well knew he was in no danger of being attacked by Russia. The Prince wrote an excellent answer, giving him no information, and entering into the whole question of Prussian policy without reserve. He starts to-day to Boulogne, invited by a letter from the Emperor himself, beginning 'Mon cher frère,' replied to very well and civilly by Prince Albert who began, 'Sire et mon cher frère.' Clarendon said Aberdeen was as hot as any one upon the Crimean expedition.

They are not at all satisfied with Lord Raglan, whom they think oldfashioned and pedantic, and not suited to the purpose of carrying on active operations. They wanted him to make use of the Turkish light cavalry, Bashi-Bazouks, who under good management might be made very serviceable, but he would have nothing to say to them; and still more they are disgusted with his discouragement of the Indian officers who have repaired to the army, and who are, in fact, the most efficient men there are. They look on General Brown as the best man there, and have great expectations of Cathcart. It is very curious that neither the Government nor the commanders have the slightest information as to the Russian force in the Crimea or the strength of Sebastopol. Some prisoners they took affirmed that there were 150,000 men in the peninsula, but nobody believes that, except Dundas who gives credit to it. They are impatient for the termination of Dundas's period of service, which will be in December, when Lyons will command the fleet.

_September 11th._--I went to The Grove on Friday, but was brought up on Saturday by gout, and detained in London ever since. We had much talk about a variety of things. The Prince is exceedingly well satisfied with his visit to the Emperor. The invitation to Windsor appears to have been publicly given in an after dinner speech. Clarendon said a great deal about the Government, its prospects and its difficulties, and of the conduct and dispositions of different men in it, that the Peelites had all behaved admirably, and he has a very high opinion of Newcastle, who is able, laborious, and fair. He does not see so much of Aberdeen as he did last year while the question of peace or war was still pending. He and Aberdeen do not very well agree, and therefore Aberdeen does not come to the Foreign Office as he used to do. I asked him in what they differed, and what it was Aberdeen now wanted or expected. He said that Aberdeen was quite of opinion that a vigorous prosecution of the war afforded the best chance of restoring peace, and that he was as eager as anybody for the expedition of Sebastopol, but he was out of humour with the whole thing, took no interest in anything that was done, and instead of looking into all the departments and animating each as a Prime Minister should do, he kept aloof and did nothing, and constantly raised objections to various matters of detail. In the Cabinet he takes hardly any part, and when differences of opinion arise he makes no effort to reconcile them, as it is his business to do. In short, though a very good and honourable man, he is eminently unfitted for his post, and in fact he feels this himself, has no wish to retain it, but the contrary, and only does so because he knows the whole machine would fall to pieces if he were to resign. John Russell Clarendon thinks a necessity as leader of the House of Commons, but he is disgusted with his perpetual discontent and the bad influence exercised over him by his confidants, and he thinks he has not acted a generous part towards Aberdeen in suffering him to be attacked and vilified as he has been by his (John's) followers and adherents, who endeavour to make a distinction between him and Aberdeen, which is equally unconstitutional on principle and false in fact. The same thing applies to Palmerston, and they have neither of them stood forward as they ought to have done in Aberdeen's defence, and claimed a joint responsibility with him in every act of the Government. We talked over what could possibly be done if Aberdeen did retire, and I suggested that he (Clarendon) might take his place, and that the rest would be more willing to accept him for the head of the Government than any other man. He expressed the greatest disinclination to this idea, to which he never could consent, but owned his present office was extremely agreeable to him and deeply interesting. Nevertheless, I do not think, if the case occurred and the place was offered to him _consensu omnium_, that his scruples would be insurmountable.

So certain are they of taking Sebastopol that they have already begun to discuss what they shall do with it when they have got it. Palmerston wrote Clarendon a long letter setting forth the various alternatives, and expressing his own opinion that the Crimea should be restored to the Turks. Clarendon is dead against this, and so, he told me, is Stratford. At Boulogne the Emperor and Newcastle agreed that the best course will be to occupy the Crimea and garrison Sebastopol with a large force of English and French, and hold it _en dépôt_ till they can settle something definitive; and Clarendon leans to this arrangement, which will at least be a gain of time.

VISIT OF PRINCE ALBERT TO FRANCE.

_London, September 19th._--At The Grove again last week, where as usual I heard a great deal of miscellaneous matters from Clarendon and read a great many despatches from different people. I asked him what the Prince had told him of his visit to Boulogne, and what his opinion was of the Emperor. He said the Prince had talked to him a great deal about it all at Osborne, and this is the substance of what he said as far as I recollect it: The Prince was very well satisfied with his reception; the Emperor took him in his carriage _tête à tête_ to the great review, so that they conversed together long and without interruption or witnesses. The Emperor seems to have talked to the Prince with more _abandon_ and unreserve than is usual to him. The Prince was exceedingly struck with his extreme apathy and languor (which corresponds with what Thiers told me of him) and with his ignorance of a variety of matters which it peculiarly behoved him to know. He asked the Prince a great many questions about the English Constitution and its working, relating to which the Prince gave him ample and detailed explanation, and Clarendon said that all that he repeated as being said to the Emperor was as good, sound, and correct as it possibly could be. The Emperor said that he felt all the difficulties of his own position, and enlarged upon them with great freedom, particularly adverting, as one of them, to the absence of any aristocracy in France. The Prince, in reply to this, seems to have given him very judicious advice; for he told him that any attempt to _create_ an aristocracy in France resembling that of England must be a failure, the conditions and antecedents of the two countries being so totally dissimilar; that he might confer titles and distinctions to any amount, and so surround himself with adherents whom he had obliged, but that he had better confine himself to that and not attempt to do more. When they parted, the Emperor said he hoped it would not be the last time he should have the pleasure of seeing His Royal Highness, to which the Prince replied that he hoped not, and that he was charged by the Queen to express her hope that he would pay her a visit at Windsor, and give her an opportunity of making the Empress's acquaintance, to which the Emperor responded 'he should be very glad to see the Queen at Paris.' This _insouciant_ reception of an invitation which a few months before he would have jumped at is very unaccountable, but it meant something, for it was evidently a _mot d'ordre_, because when the Prince took leave of Marshal Vaillant, he said he hoped he would accompany the Emperor to Windsor, where, though they could show no such military spectacle as the Emperor had shown him, they would do what they could, to which Vaillant replied, 'We hope to see Her Majesty the Queen and Your Royal Highness at Paris.' There seems no disposition at present to give him the Garter which is supposed to be the object of his ambition, and which Walewski is always suggesting.

Clarendon is extremely disgusted at the conduct of Austria and her declaration of neutrality, and he said that the complaints of the doings of the Austrians in the Principalities were not without foundation. Drouyn de Lhuys spoke very openly to Hübner on the subject, and pitched into the Austrian Government without stint or reserve, and Cowley sent a despatch in which all he said was detailed, with the addition that it was Drouyn de Lhuys' intention to embody it in a formal despatch to Bourqueney to be communicated to the Austrian Government.

LANDING IN THE CRIMEA.

_September 22nd._--The army has landed in the Crimea without opposition. It is difficult to conceive that the Russians should have been so utterly wanting in spirit, and so afraid to risk anything, as to let the landing take place without an attempt either by land or sea to obstruct it. They have a great fleet lying idle at Sebastopol, and though, if it had come out, its defeat and perhaps destruction would have been certain, it would have been better to perish thus, _vitam in vulnere ponens_, and inflicting damage on its enemy as it certainly might have done, than to remain ingloriously in harbour and wait to be taken or destroyed, as it infallibly will be when the town itself shall fall. Great indignation is expressed at the prospect of Napier's returning from the Baltic without making any attempt on Cronstadt, or to perform any exploit beyond the Bomarsund affair. He is detested by his officers, and they one and all complain that he has been so little adventurous, and maintain that more might have been done. The justness and correctness of this, time will show.

_October 2nd._--At The Grove on Saturday, where I generally pick up some scraps of information from Clarendon on one subject or another. On Saturday came the news that Sebastopol had been taken, which we did not believe a word of, but after dinner the same evening we got the telegraphic account of the victory gained on the 20th on the heights above the Alma, and yesterday Raglan's telegraphic despatch was published. It is nervous work for those who have relations and friends in the army to hear of a 'desperate battle' and severe loss, and to have to wait so many days for the details and casualties. The affair does not seem, so far as we can conjecture, to have been very decisive, when only two guns and a few prisoners were taken. If it had depended on St. Arnaud, the expedition would have put back even after it had sailed; while actually at sea, St. Arnaud, who stated himself to be ill and unable to move, summoned a council of war on board the 'Ville de Paris.' The weather was so rough that it was determined that it would not be safe for Raglan to go, as with his one arm he could not get on board; so Dundas went, and General Brown, and some other officers deputed by Raglan to represent himself, together with the French Admiral. A discussion took place which lasted several hours. St. Arnaud strongly urged that the expedition should be put off till the spring, and he objected to all that was proposed as to the place of landing--in short, threw every obstacle he could in the way of the whole thing. Dundas and all the English officers vehemently protested against any delay and change of plan, and represented the intolerable shame and disgrace of putting back after having actually embarked, and their opposition to the French general's proposal was so vehement that he ended by giving way, rose from his sick bed, and consented to go on. He declared that he only agreed to the place proposed for landing in consequence of the urgent representations of his allies, and this he wrote home to his own Government. He is a very incapable, unfit man, and Clarendon told me that his own army recognised the great superiority of Raglan to him, and that the French were all delighted with the latter.

THE INVITATION TO WINDSOR.

It seems that there was some misunderstanding as to the invitation given by the Prince to the Emperor at Boulogne, and the latter gives a very different account of what passed from that given by the Prince. The Emperor says that when he took leave of the Prince, he said, 'I have not been able to give you such a reception as I could have wished, but you see I am only occupying an hotel; if you will come to Paris, where I should be delighted to receive the Queen, I could give her and yourself a more fitting reception;' and then, he says, the Prince invited him to Windsor, which he only seems to have taken as a civility unavoidable under the circumstances. It is impossible to say which account is the true one, but I rather believe that of the Emperor to be correct. Clarendon wrote this to the Queen, whose answer I saw; she said the intention was to make the invitation something between a cordial invitation and a mere civility, which the Emperor might avail himself of or not, according to his convenience. However, Her Majesty says she thinks the matter stands very well as it is, and she desires it may be notified to the Emperor that the most convenient time for his visit, if he comes, will be the middle of November.

The Duke of Cambridge and Prince Napoleon have both been strongly opposed to the Crimean expedition; the latter, they say, does nothing but cry, and is probably a poor creature and a poltroon. I am surprised the Duke should be so backward; however, I hope to hear he has done his duty in the field. The clamour against Dundas in the fleet is prodigious, and the desire for his recall universal, but he will stay out his time now, which will be up in December. It is the same thing against Napier in the Baltic; he will come away as soon as the ice sets in, and next year Lyons will be sent in his place, as the war will then be principally carried on in the north.

I think a storm will before long threaten the Government from the quarter of John Russell, who has been for some time at Minto. He wrote to Clarendon the other day, and alluded to the necessity of having an autumn session, to which Clarendon replied that he was not so fond of Parliament as Lord John was, and deprecated very much any such measure. To this Lord John sent as odious and cantankerous an answer as I ever read, and one singularly illustrative of his character. He said that he was not fonder of Parliament than other people, and his own position in the House of Commons had not been such as to make him the more so, and that it had been rendered more disagreeable by the fact of the two morning papers which professed to support the Government being always personally hostile to him; but, he went on, if we were fortunate enough to obtain a complete success in the Crimea, he did not see why he should not be at liberty to retire from this, which he thought the very worst government he had ever known. Of course, if there was any failure, he must remain to bear his share of the responsibility of it. Clarendon was immensely disgusted, but wrote back a very temperate answer. He said that it was equally difficult to go on with him and without him, for the Whigs, though often very angry with him, would follow him and would not follow anybody else. He thinks, however, that he is in a state of mind to create all sorts of embarrassments, and particularly that he will propose to bring forward his Reform Bill again, the consequences of which nobody can foresee. He says Palmerston has behaved much better, for though he might complain, having been disappointed in certain objects he had (such as being War Minister), he has made no difficulties, and been very friendly. Clarendon confirmed what I had heard, that Aberdeen is in a state of great dejection and annoyance at the constant and virulent attacks on him in the press; his mind is dejected by the illness of his son, whom he never expects to see again, and this renders him sensitive and fretful, and he is weak enough to read all that is written against him instead of treating it with indifference and avoiding to look at the papers whose columns are day after day full of outrageous and random abuse.

_October 8th._--The whole of last week the newspapers without exception (but the 'Morning Chronicle' particularly), with the 'Times' at their head, proclaimed the fall of Sebastopol in flaming and triumphant articles and with colossal type, together with divers victories and all sorts of details, all which were trumpeted over the town and circulated through the country. I never believed one word of it, and entreated Delane to be less positive and more cautious, but he would not hear of it, and the whole world swallowed the news and believed it. Very soon came the truth, and it was shown that the reports were all false. Anybody who was not run away with by an exaggerated enthusiasm might have seen the probability that reports resting on no good authority would probably turn out untrue, but the press took them all for gospel, and every fool follows the press. When the bubble burst, the rage and fury of the deluded and deluding journals knew no bounds, and the 'Times' was especially sulky and spiteful. In consequence of a trifling error in a telegraphic despatch they fell on the Foreign Office and its clerks with the coarsest abuse, much to the disgust of Clarendon.

_October 20th._--At Newmarket all last week; very successful on paper, but won very little money. I am every day more confirmed in my resolution to get rid of my racehorses, but shall do it gradually and as opportunities occur, and then confine myself to breeding. The two objects I now have in view are this, and to get out of my office. I want to be independent, and be able to go where and do what I like for the short remainder of my life. I am aware that 'man never is, but always to be blest,' and therefore when I have shaken off racing and office I may possibly regret both; but my mind is bent on the experiment, and I fancy I can amuse myself with locomotion, fresh scenes, and dabbling in literature _selon mes petits moyens_. Of politics I am heartily sick, and can take but little interest in either governments or the individuals who compose them; with the exception of Clarendon I am on intimate and confidential terms with no one.

BATTLE OF THE ALMA.

Ever since the news came of the battle of the Alma, the country has been in a fever of excitement, and the newspapers have teemed with letters and descriptions of the events that occurred. Raglan has gained great credit, and his march on Balaklava is considered a very able and judicious operation. Although they do not utter a word of complaint, and are by way of being fully satisfied with our allies the French, the truth is that the English think they did very little for the success of the day, and Burghersh told some one that their not pressing on was the cause (and not the want of cavalry) why the Russian guns were not taken. The French, nevertheless, have been well disposed to take the credit of the victory to themselves.

Burghersh tells two characteristic anecdotes of Raglan. He was extremely put out at the acclamations of the soldiers when he appeared amongst them after the battle, and said to his staff as he rode along the line, in a melancholy tone, 'I was sure this would happen.' He is a very modest man, and it is not in his nature any more than it was in that of the Duke of Wellington to make himself popular with the soldiers in the way Napoleon used to do, and who was consequently adored by them. The other story is that there were two French officers attached to headquarters, very good fellows, and that the staff were constantly embarrassed by the inveterate habit Raglan had of calling the enemy 'the French.' He could not forget his old Peninsular habits.

In this war the Russians have hitherto exhibited a great inferiority in their conduct to that which they displayed in their campaigns from 1807 to 1812, when they fought the battles of Eylau and Borodino against Napoleon. The position of Alma must have been much stronger than that of Borodino, and yet how much more stoutly the latter was defended than the former. Then their having allowed the allies to land without molestation is inconceivable, and there is no doubt that they might have attacked Raglan with great effect as he emerged from the wood on his march to Balaklava, but all these opportunities they entirely neglected. I expect, however, that they will make a vigorous defence at Sebastopol, and that the place will not be taken without a bloody struggle and great loss of life.

RUSSIAN TRADE.

Within the last few days a very important question has arisen, the decision of which is a very difficult matter. It has been found that the commerce of Russia has not been materially diminished, as their great staples (hemp, &c.) have passed regularly through the Prussian ports, being brought there by land, and it is now desired to devise some means of putting an end to this exportation. Clarendon has written to Reeve about it, and Granville has obtained returns of the amount of hemp and linseed imported from Russia in past years and in the present, from which it appears that though there is a diminution it is not a very considerable one. The effect produced is only the inevitable consequence of the policy that was adopted deliberately and after great consideration at the beginning of the war; and how that policy is to be adhered to, and the consequences complained of prevented, is the problem to be solved. A blockade of the Prussian ports in the Baltic has been suggested--a measure, as it seems to me, very questionable in point of right and political morality, and certain to be attended by the most momentous consequences. Such a measure may not be without precedent, or something resembling precedent; but no Power with anything like self-respect or pride could tamely submit to such an outrage and such an insult, and as it would certainly afford a _casus belli_, Prussia could hardly, without abandoning all claim to be considered a great Power, abstain from declaring war _instanter_; and, whatever may be the sentiments of the Prussian nation and of the Germans generally with regard to Russia, it is by no means unlikely that such an arbitrary and imperious proceeding would enlist the sympathies and the passions of all Germans without exception in opposition to us, and to France if she became a party to it.

_Newmarket._--Granville told me on Saturday morning that he was much alarmed at the disposition evinced by John Russell, and he expects an explosion sooner or later.

_London, October 30th._--I returned last night and found a meeting of the Committee of Council settled for to-day, to consider the question of stopping Russian trade. Wilson has drawn up a paper in which he discusses the various modes of accomplishing this object, and recommends that the Queen should forbid all trade with Russia, and prohibit the importation of Russian produce, and require certificates of origin for tallow, hemp, &c. John Russell writes word that he cannot attend the meeting, but is ready, though reluctant, to vote for Wilson's proposal. Granville and Cardwell are both dead against it, after a discussion at the Council Office at which the majority were against the proposal.

_November 4th._--At The Grove from Wednesday to Saturday; the Walewskis, Lavradios, Granvilles, Azeglio, and Panizzi were there, a pleasant party enough. Walewski told me a curious thing which he said he knew to be true. We were talking of Nesselrode, and I asked if he knew what his present position was with his Emperor. He said he had been out of favour, but latterly had resumed all his influence and was very well at Court; that although in the beginning of the quarrel he had done his best to moderate the Emperor and to preserve peace, it was nevertheless true that he was perhaps the immediate cause of the war, which had turned upon the acceptance or refusal of the Turkish modifications of the Vienna Note; that when they arrived the Emperor was inclined to accept them, and that Nesselrode dissuaded him from doing so, advising him to adhere to the unaltered Note, not to listen to the modifications, and insisting that, if he did so, the allies would compel the Turks to waive their demands and to accept the Note in its original shape. Walewski also said that the Emperor was exceedingly incensed when the fatal circular, which made the Vienna Note an impossibility, was published. He said it was never intended for publication, and he found great fault with the document itself, insisted on knowing by whom it had been composed, and ordered the author to be brought before him. The man (whose name I forget) was not to be found, and events which pressed on drove it out of His Majesty's mind.

In the 'Times' of yesterday appeared a very able letter of Bright's with his view of the war, and the faults committed by our Government in respect to it, which letter as nearly as possible expresses my own opinion on the subject. I have never agreed with those who fancy that by mere bluster we might have averted the war, but I think by more firmness towards not only Russia but towards Turkey, and still more towards the press and the public excitement here, together with a judicious employment of the resources of diplomacy, we might have prevented it. However, we are in for it, and I not only see no chance of getting soon out of it, but I do not feel the same confidence that everybody else does, that we are certain to carry it to a successful end.

SEBASTOPOL BESIEGED.

_London, November 13th._--At Worsley all last week; nothing was thought of but the war, its events and vicissitudes. The tardiness of intelligence and the perplexity and agitation caused by vague reports and telegraphic messages drive everybody mad; from excessive confidence, the public, always nose-led by the newspapers, is fallen into a state of alarm and discouragement. There is no end to the mischief which the newspapers and their correspondents have done, are doing, and no doubt will continue to do. There does not seem at this moment more reason to doubt that we shall take Sebastopol than there ever was, but the obstinate defence of the Russians indicates that its capture will not be effected without a tremendous struggle and great sacrifice of life. On the other hand, the Russians, instead of despairing of being able to hold the place, are full of confidence that they will be able to protract their defence, till our losses, and still more the weather, will compel us to raise the siege, and then they expect to compel us to abandon the Crimea altogether, and to make our re-embarkation a dangerous and disastrous operation. It is to be hoped that such a calamitous result is not in store for us, but there is no disguising from ourselves that we have got a much tougher and more difficult job on our hands than we ever contemplated, and that our success is by no means such a certainty as we have all along flattered ourselves that it would be; for supposing we succeed in entering the place by storm, our work will then be not nearly done. Sebastopol is not invested, and when the Russian garrison finds itself no longer able to hold the place, there is nothing to prevent its evacuating it on the other side and effecting a junction with the main Russian army. We shall then have to reduce the forts on the northern side, to put the place in a state of defence, and commence a fresh campaign against Menschikoff in the centre of the Crimea. All this presents an endless succession of difficulties, demanding large supplies and resources of all sorts which it will be no easy matter to afford. We are now talking of sending every soldier we possess to the scene of action, and expending our military resources to the last drop, leaving everything else at home and abroad to take care of itself, a course which nothing but an extreme necessity can justify, while at the same time it cannot be denied that having gone so far we cannot stop halfway, and having committed so large a part of our gallant army in this unequal contest, we are bound to make the greatest exertions and sacrifices to prevent their being overwhelmed by any serious disaster. But this very necessity only affords fresh ground for condemning the rashness with which we plunged into such a war and exposed ourselves to such enormous dangers, and incurred such large sacrifices for so inadequate an object.

It is not very easy to ascertain what the feeling is in Russia about the war, but there is reason to believe that the nobles are getting very sick of it, and are very discontented with the Emperor, not so much for having engaged in it as for the manner in which it has been carried on. At St. Petersburg there prevails an intense hostility to us, and great wrath against Austria, and instead of yielding, or any thought of it, the notion is that they mean to redouble their efforts next year, and bring into the field far greater forces than they have yet done. I perceive that the question of the disposal of the Crimea (when we get it) is still undecided. Some fancy that we ought to hold it, as a great advantage to have the power of offering it back to Russia when the question of peace arises. I am more inclined to the other view, of destroying the place, and if possible the harbour, and, after carrying off or destroying all the ships, to abandon the peninsula and leave the Russians to reoccupy it if they please. This would be very consistent with the object with which the war was professedly undertaken, and the Crimea, without Sebastopol and without a fleet, would be no longer formidable to Turkey for many a year to come; but no doubt there would be difficulty in this as in any arrangement, and much difference of opinion, not unlikely to produce dissension, amongst our allies and ourselves. There is good reason to believe that our late naval attack on the forts was a blunder, and that it did no good whatever. If Lyons had been in command, he probably would have declined to make it, and he could have ventured to exercise his own discretion, which Dundas could not. Then it was very badly arranged, and this was the fault of the French Admiral, who at the last moment insisted on altering the plan of attack, and (contrary to the advice of all his officers) Dundas gave way to him. In this, however, it is not fair to blame the English Admiral, who may have acted wisely; for his position was delicate and difficult, and he had to consider the alliance of the countries and the harmonious action of the two fleets, as well as the particular operation.

BALAKLAVA.

_November 14th._--Yesterday morning we received telegraphic news of another battle, from which we may expect a long list of killed and wounded. The affair of the 25th, in which our light cavalry was cut to pieces, seems to have been the result of mismanagement in some quarter, and the blame must attach either to Lucan, Cardigan, Captain Nolan who was killed, or to Raglan himself. Perhaps nobody is really to blame, but, if any one be, my own impression is that it is Raglan. He _wrote_ the order, and it was his business to make it so clear that it could not be mistaken, and to give it conditionally, or with such discretionary powers as should prevent its being vigorously enforced under circumstances which he could not foresee, or of which he might have no cognisance.

It is evidently the plan of the Russians to wear out the allied armies by incessant attacks and a prolonged defence, sacrificing enormous numbers of men which they can afford, but considering that they gain on the whole by the disproportionate, but still considerable, losses they inflict upon us. It is quite on the cards, if they can keep up the spirit of their men, who show great bravery though they cannot stand against our's, that they may _cunctando restituere rem_, and compel us at last to raise the siege, and at St. Petersburg they are very confident of this result. Here, though people are no longer so confident and elated as they were, no human being doubts of our ultimately taking the town.

Yesterday we had rather an amusing scene in the Court of Exchequer at the nomination of sheriffs, which does not often supply anything lively. The Head of Caius College, Cambridge, and this year Vice-Chancellor, was on the list, and Judge Alderson vehemently protested against his remaining there. A long discussion ensued, in which almost everybody took part, whether his name should be kept on or not, and if he should be struck off the roll. At last Alderson moved he should be struck off, to which somebody moved as an amendment (a course I suggested) that he should be omitted, but not struck off. It was to be put to the vote, when I asked if Alderson himself could vote, whether it was not a meeting of the Privy Council, at which the judges _attended_ to give in names for sheriffs, and that Privy Councillors only could vote as to the choice of them. Alderson vehemently denied this view, and asserted that it was no meeting of the Privy Council, the proof of which was that the Chancellor of the Exchequer took precedence of the Lord President, and that the puisne judges had a right to vote. They then desired to see the Act of Richard II., which the Chancellor examined and read out, and afterwards he gave it as his opinion that the judges could vote, and this opinion was acquiesced in by the rest. Ultimately they all agreed, Alderson included, to accept the course I had proposed, and the Doctor's name was omitted from the list, but not struck off the roll.

_November 15th._--The Duke of Bedford tells me that Lord John is in a better frame of mind than was apprehended not long ago, by no means satisfied with his own situation, and complaining of much that appertains to the Government, but conscious that his position cannot be altered at present, and not at all disposed by any captious conduct to break up or endanger the Government itself. With regard to Reform he is extremely reasonable, feeling the difficulty of his own antecedents in regard to the question; he is ready to conform himself to the necessities of the case, and does not think of urging anything unreasonable and impracticable. He is naturally enough very anxious that the Government should manage their affairs in Parliament better this year than last, and not expose themselves to so many defeats and the mortification of having their measures rejected or spoilt, and his notion seems to be that they should introduce and announce fewer measures, only such as are urgent and generally desired, and such as they may reasonably expect to carry, and, having taken that course, to stand or fall by them; this is the wisest and most becoming course, and I hope it will be adhered to and succeed. Its success depends very much on Lord John's own conduct, and the way in which he treats the Whig and Liberal party. I hear nothing of the intentions and expectations of the Opposition, but Lyndhurst tells me he considers them extinct as a party and in no condition to get into power. He spoke very disparagingly of Disraeli, and said his want of character was fatal to him, and weighed down all his cleverness.

BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

_November 16th._--A telegraphic despatch arrived from Raglan with account of the battle of the 5th,[1] from which we learn only that we were entirely successful in repulsing the Russian attack, but that our loss was very great. Another long interval of suspense to be succeeded by woe and mourning; but besides the private misery we have to witness, the aggregate of the news fills me with the most dismal forebodings. Raglan says the Russian force was even greater than at Alma, and vastly superior to his own. Menschikoff says that he is assembling all his forces, and preparing to take the offensive, that their numbers are very superior, and he confidently announces that he shall wear us out, and that our army _cannot escape him_. I do not see how the siege is to be continued by an army itself besieged by a superior force and placed between two fires. The reinforcements cannot possibly arrive in time, and even if they were all there now, they would not be sufficient to redress the balance. I dread some great disaster which would be besides a great disgrace. Whether every exertion possible has been made here to reinforce Raglan, or whether anything more could have been done, I cannot pretend to say; but if matters turn out ill there will be a fine clamour, and principally from those rash and impatient idiots who were so full of misplaced confidence, and who insisted on precipitating our armies on the Crimea, and on any and every part of the Russian territory, without knowing anything of the adequacy of our means for such a contest. To overrate the strength and power of the allies, and to underrate that of Russia on her own territory, has been the fault and folly of the English public, and if they find themselves deceived in their calculations and disappointed in their expectations, their rage and fury will know no bounds, and be lavished on everybody but themselves. In the height of arrogance few exceptions were found to those who imagined it would be quite easy to crumple up Russia, and reduce her to accept such terms as we might choose to impose upon her. All the examples which history furnishes were disregarded, and a general belief prevailed that Russia would be unable to oppose any effectual or prolonged resistance to our forces combined. When the successes of the Turks at the beginning of the war became known, this confidence not unnaturally became confirmed, and boundless was the contempt with which the Russians were treated; and the bare idea of granting peace to the Emperor except on the most ruinous and humiliating terms was scouted. We now see what sort of a fight the Russians can make; and though the superhuman valour and conduct of our troops still inspire confidence and forbid despair, it is evident that we have rashly embarked in a contest which from the nature of it must be an unequal one, and that we are placed in a position of enormous difficulty and danger.

[Footnote 1: The battle of Inkerman was fought on November 5.]

_November 23rd._--Last week at Savernake and at The Grange; came back on Tuesday; and yesterday morning arrived the despatches with an account of the furious battle of Inkerman, in which, according to Raglan's account, 8,000 English and 6,000 French resisted the attack of 60,000 Russians, and eventually defeated and drove them back with enormous loss, our own loss being very great. The accounts of Raglan and Canrobert do not quite agree as to the numbers engaged, but, admitting that there may be some exaggeration in the estimate of the numbers of the Russians and of their loss, it still remains one of the most wonderful feats of arms that was ever displayed; and, gallantly as our troops have always behaved, it may be doubted if they ever evinced such constancy and heroism as on this occasion--certainly never greater. My brother lost his youngest and favourite son in this battle--a boy of 18, who had only landed in the Crimea a few weeks before, and who was in a great battle for the first and last time. This is only one of innumerable instances of the same kind, and half England is in mourning. It is dreadful to see the misery and grief in which so many are already plunged, and the universal terror and agitation which beset all who have relations engaged in the war. But the nation is not only as warlike as ever, but if possible more full of ardour and enthusiasm, and thinking of nothing but the most lavish expenditure of men and money to carry on the war; the blood that has been shed appears only to animate the people, and to urge them to fresh exertions. This is so far natural that I, hating the war, feel as strongly as anybody that, now we are in it, and our soldiers placed in great jeopardy and peril, it is indispensable to make every possible exertion to relieve them; and I am therefore anxious for ample reinforcements being sent out to them, that they may not be crushed by overwhelming force.

MILITARY CRITICISMS.

In reading the various and innumerable narratives of the battle, and the comments of the 'correspondents,' it is impossible to avoid coming to some conclusions which may nevertheless be erroneous; and I have always thought that people who are totally ignorant of military matters, and who are living at ease at home, should not venture to criticise operations of which they can be no judges, and the conduct of men who cannot explain that conduct, and who are nobly doing their duty according to their own judgement, which is more likely to be right than any opinions we can form. With this admission of fallibility, it still strikes me that there was a lack of military genius and foresight in the recent operations. It is asserted that our position was open and undefended, that General Evans had recommended that precautions should be taken and defences thrown up, all of which was neglected, and nothing done, and hence the sad slaughter which took place. This was Raglan's fault, if any fault there really was. It is admitted that no tactical skill was or could be displayed, and the battle was won by sheer courage and firmness. Then Cathcart seems to have made a false and very rash move which cost his own life and 500 men besides. These are melancholy reflexions, and the facts prove that we have no Wellingtons in our army now.

_November 26th._--Government have determined to call Parliament together on the 12th of December, though it stands prorogued to the 14th. This is done under the authority of an Act, 37th George III. ch. 120. In the present state of affairs they are quite right, and it is better for them to have fair Parliamentary discussion than clamour and the diatribes of the press out of doors. The 'Times,' as usual, has been thundering away about reinforcements, and urging the despatch of troops that do not exist and cannot be created in a moment. I had a great battle with Delane the other day about it, and asked why he did not appeal to the French Government, who have boundless military resources, instead of to our's who have none at all, and accordingly yesterday there was a very strong article entirely about French reinforcements.

ADMINISTRATIVE BLUNDERS.

In the course of our talk he did, I must confess, make some strong charges against the Government, and particularly Newcastle. He complained that after the expedition was sent to the Crimea they remained idle, and made no attempt to form an army of reserve or to send continual reinforcements to supply the casualties which everybody knew must occur, and this is true. Again, when he returned from the East[1] he went to Newcastle and urged him to make an immediate provision of wooden houses against the winter, which would in all probability be required, and he suggested that this should be done at Constantinople, where, all the houses being built of wood and the carpenters very skilful, it might easily be done at a comparatively small expense, and whence the conveyance was expeditious and cheap. His advice was not taken; nothing was done, and now that the winter is come, and the troops are already exposed to dreadful suffering and privation, the work is begun here, where it will cost four times as much and, when done, will require an enormous time to convey the houses to the Crimea, besides taking up the space that is urgently required for other purposes. I was obliged to confess that this was inexcusable negligence and blundering, and I repeated what had passed to Granville last night, who could make no defence, and only said that Newcastle, with many merits, had the fault of wishing to do everything himself, and therefore much was not done at all; and that the fact was, nobody ever imagined we should be reduced to such straits, and there was a universal belief that all would have been over in the Crimea before this, and that such things would not be required. I am afraid Newcastle, who is totally ignorant of military affairs of every sort, is not equal to his post, and hence the various deficiencies; nor is Sidney Herbert much better--very well both of them in ordinary times, but without the ability or the resource necessary to deal with such an emergency as the present.

I saw a letter yesterday from Charles Windham, a Q.-M.-General on poor Cathcart's staff, with an account of the battle, and he says that if, directly after the march on Balaklava, Sebastopol had been assaulted, it must have been taken. This corresponds with the reports of Russian deserters, who declare that there were only 2,000 men in the place after the battle of Alma. There is always so much difference of opinion and fault finding in such affairs that it is not easy to come to a sound conclusion thereupon.

[Footnote 1: Mr. Delane had gone to the theatre of war in the autumn, and was there with Mr. Kinglake, the brilliant historian of the Crimean War.]

_November 29th._--My surviving nephew arrived from the Crimea yesterday morning. He gave me an account of the battle, and denies that General Cathcart ever refused, or was ever offered, the aid of General Bosquet, as has been stated. He says that Cathcart was not in command, and it was not therefore to him that the offer would have been made, and that Cathcart did not go into action till he was sent for by General Pennefather, when he got his Division out, and went on the field. He was killed quite early, about twenty minutes after he reached the field of battle. My nephew confirms what has been said about the non-fortification of the position, which seems to have been an enormous blunder, against which most of the Generals of Division remonstrated. He says Cathcart was opposed to the expedition to the Crimea, not thinking they were strong enough, and he strongly advised, and in opposition to Raglan, that the place should be attacked immediately after the battle of Alma, while the Russians were still panic struck, and before they had time to fortify the town on the south side. He says he left the army in good health and spirits, but not expecting to take Sebastopol this year. Their sufferings had not been very great, though it was a hard life--plenty to eat, but mostly salt meat. He thinks, though the French behaved very gallantly and their arrival saved the army, that they might have done more than they did; and a body of them that came late on the field actually never stirred and did nothing whatever.

In the evening I met Clarendon at the Travellers', and had a long talk with him about all sorts of things. He has been much disturbed at the 'Times,' especially as to two things--its violent abuse of Austria and its insertion of a letter from the Crimea, reflecting severely on Prince Napoleon. With regard to Austria it is peculiarly annoying, because we are now on the point of concluding a tripartite Treaty which is actually on its way to Vienna, and in a day or two it will be decided whether she signs it or not; and nothing is more calculated to make her hang back than such articles in the 'Times.' Then as to Prince Napoleon, it has annoyed the Emperor and all his family beyond expression, and to such a degree that Drouyn de Lhuys has written an official letter to Walewski about it--a very proper and reasonable letter, but still expressing their vexation, and entreating that such attacks may, if possible, be prevented for the future.

We talked over Lord Raglan and his capacity for command, and we both agreed that he had given no proofs of his fitness for so mighty a task. Clarendon said he was struck with the badness of his private letters, as he had been from the beginning by those from Varna, showing that he had evidently not a spark of imagination and no originality. We both agreed that it would never do to hint a doubt about his merits or capacity, and at all events that he is probably equal to anybody likely to be opposed to him. His personal bravery is conspicuous, and he exposes himself more than he ought. It is said that one of his aides-de-camp remonstrated with him and received a severe rebuff, Raglan telling him to mind his own business, and if he did not like the fire to go to the rear. Clarendon says there is no chance of taking Sebastopol this year, nor of taking it at all till we have an army strong enough to drive the Russians out of the Crimea. For this, 150,000 men would be required to make it a certainty; but with this force, no Russian army, however numerous, could resist the allies, and then the place would fall. This is a distant prospect. I expressed my wonder at the Russians being able to obtain supplies, and he said they got them from the Don and from Kertch.

SUFFERINGS OF THE ARMY.

_December 5th._--I was at Middleton on Saturday and returned yesterday. There I saw a letter from Stafford, who is at Constantinople tending the sick and wounded, writing for and reading to them, and doing all the good he can--a very wise and benevolent way of re-establishing his reputation and making his misdeeds at the Admiralty forgotten.[1] He says he had heard so much of the sufferings and privations of the soldiers, and of the bad state of the hospitals, that he resolved to go there and judge for himself of the truth of all that had been written and asserted on the subject; that he did so, and found the very worst accounts exceeded by the reality, and that nothing could be more frightful and appalling than it all was. It had greatly improved, but still was bad enough. The accounts published in the 'Times,' therefore, turn out to be true, and all the aid that private charity could supply was no more than was needed. I believe there has been no lack of zeal and humanity here, but a great deal of ignorance and inexperience, and, above all, culpable negligence on the part of Lord Stratford, who had _carte blanche_ from the Government as to expense, and who, after having done his best to plunge us into this war, might at least have given his time and attention to provide relief for the victims of it; but it seems that from some fit of ill-temper he has chosen to do nothing, and evinced nothing but indifference to the war itself and all its incidents ever since it broke out. This I am assured is the case. His wife has been very active and humane, and done all she could to assist Miss Nightingale in her mission of benevolence and charity. But to return to Stafford's letter. He says that while nothing could exceed the heroism of our soldiers, the incapacity of their chiefs was equally conspicuous, and that the troops had no confidence in their leaders; he adds, it is essential to give them a good general if the war goes on. This, and much more that I have heard, confirms the previous impression on my mind that Raglan is destitute of military genius or skill, and quite unequal to the command of a great army. It does not appear, however, that the enemy are better off than we are in this respect, and we do not know that in England a better general would now be found. The man, Stafford says, in whom the army seem to have the greatest confidence is Sir Colin Campbell. All this is very serious, and does not tend to inspire a great expectation of glorious results. From what Clarendon said to me it is evident that _he_ does not think much of Raglan, but it would never do to express any doubt of his ability or of his measures in public. Delane told me yesterday that he had received letters without end in this sense, and that he entertained the same doubts that I did, but should take care not to give utterance to them in the 'Times.' This reserve is the more necessary and even just because, after all, the opinions may not be well founded; and, as it is impossible to change the command, it is very desirable not to weaken the authority and self-confidence of the General by casting doubts upon his conduct of the war.

[Footnote 1: Mr. Augustus Stafford had been Secretary to the Admiralty under Lord Derby's first Administration, where he was supposed not to have done well; but when the accounts arrived of the sufferings and privations of the army in the dreadful winter of 1854-5, Mr. Stafford was one of the first persons to go out and endeavour to relieve the deplorable condition of the troops.]

_December 11th._--For the last week the Austrian Treaty has occupied everybody's thoughts, though, as the exact terms of it are not yet known, people do not very well know what to expect from it. The great question that lies behind it is, whether Prussia will follow in the wake of Austria, and the rest of Germany with her. If all Germany joins the Allies it seems absolutely impossible that Russia should offer any effectual resistance to such a combination of forces; and it will then be to be seen what impression can be made on an Empire which, with many political deficiencies, nature has made so strong for defensive purposes, and, if the contest continues, whether the opinions and object of the Allies will not diverge and ultimately break up the alliance.

MR. BRIGHT ON THE WAR.

Bright has published his letter in a penny form (or somebody has done it for him) with _pièces justificatives_ extracted from the Blue Books and from other sources, and in my opinion he makes out a capital and unanswerable case. He does not, indeed, prove, nor attempt to prove, that the Emperor of Russia is in the right absolutely, but he makes out that he is in the right as against England and France, and he shows up the conduct of the Western Powers very successfully. But in the present temper of the country, and while the war fever is still raging with undiminished violence, all appeals to truth and reason will be totally unavailing. Those who entertain such opinions either wholly or in part do not dare to avow them, and all are hurried along in the vortex. I do not dare to avow them myself; and even for holding my tongue, and because I do not join in the senseless clamour which everywhere resounds, I am called 'a Russian.' The progress of the contest has changed the nature of public opinion, for now its principal motive is the deep interest taken in the success of our arms and the safety of the band of heroes who have been fighting in the Crimea. This is, of course, right and patriotic, and a feeling which must be common to those who have been against, and those who have been for the war.

_Panshanger, December 14th._--The debates on Tuesday night were on the whole satisfactory, and not bad for the Government. Derby made a slashing, effective philippic on the text of 'Too late,' asserting that the fault of the Government had been that they had done everything too late. Newcastle answered him, but was dull and feeble, totally unequal to meet Derby in debate. His case was not bad, but he could not handle it with effect. Government did better in the Commons, where Sidney Herbert made a capital speech, and produced a very good case in a very complete and satisfactory manner. He proved that reinforcements had been sent out month after month, and that they had never folded their hands and stood still as Derby charged them with having done. All the rage for the war which is apparent in the country was manifested in both Houses. According to present appearances, there will be very little done on the part of the Opposition against the Government during this short session.

_December 17th._--These smooth appearances were deceitful, for the Government met with an unexpected and violent opposition to their Foreign Enlistment Bill, and only carried the second reading by a majority of 12. Ellenborough, puffed up with conceit and soured by disappointment and the nullity of his position, commenced a furious attack on this bill in an able speech replete with bitterness and sarcasm. Derby, too happy to join in any mischief, brought the support of his party, and a debate ensued, in which, as usual, the speaking of Ellenborough and Derby gave them the advantage, but the Government got a majority enough for their purpose. The bill itself is very unpopular, nobody can tell why, except that all sorts of misrepresentations were made about it the first night, and people have not yet been undeceived. I doubt if it was worth while to bring in such a bill, but it is certain if they had not done so, and immediately, they would have been furiously reproached by those who oppose them now, and above all accused of being 'too late.' The imprudent speech which John Russell made about Austria the first night elicited a violent attack on him in the 'Times,' which is sure to have put him in very bad humour. The speech and the attack were equally unjustifiable and mischievous. I have no idea why he said what he did, unless it was for the sake of appearing to fall in with the vulgar prejudice against Austria.

THE FOREIGN ENLISTMENT BILL.

_December 18th._--The dislike of the Foreign Enlistment Bill is very general, but nobody can give any reason for their opposition to it.[1] It is, however, so great that it is not certain that it can be carried through the House of Commons, and so little is the Government cared for that I doubt many being found who will incur the resentment of their constituents or give an unpopular vote to save them. If they should be beaten, I think they must go out. John Russell is in a bad disposition of mind, as may be gathered from his _entourage_, who are in rabid opposition. Lord John, however, will probably do what he can to make this measure go down, as I find he is himself the author of it; but I much doubt if he would care for the Government being broken up, and he is not unlikely to regard such a catastrophe as the event best calculated to restore him to the post he so much covets. It is certainly possible that Derby, conscious he could not make a Government himself, would offer to support the Whig section of this Cabinet with all the Peelites eliminated from it, and that an attempt might be made to form a Government with Lord John, Palmerston, and perhaps Ellenborough. However, all this is vague speculation, and not worth following out.

[Footnote 1: The object of the Foreign Enlistment Bill was to enable the Government to enlist 15,000 foreigners in the British army to be drilled in this country. It was denounced and opposed especially in the House of Lords as a dangerous and unconstitutional measure, but it eventually passed, and a considerable number of Germans were enlisted under it.]

_December 20th._--Government got a majority of 39, better than was expected. Lord John threatened to resign if he was beaten. The debate will not do them much good when it is read, nor serve to render their measure more popular. Everybody thinks the whole affair has been grossly mismanaged, and that, instead of making a mystery of their intentions, they ought to have thrown out such intimations of them as would have elicited public opinion; but the truth is, not one of them had the least suspicion that the measure would meet with any resistance or even objection, nor would there have been any if Ellenborough had not started the hare, and then Derby and his party joyfully availed themselves of the opportunity to do mischief, and joined in the cry. When the bill was announced, Derby never dreamt of opposing it. The arguments against the measure seem to me very plausible, except the constitutional one, which is all stuff, and in which none of those who urge it are sincere; on the other hand, the former precedents do not apply in this case. The best argument for it is, that Raglan wants trained men as soon as possible, and complains that they send nothing but boys, who are of little use at first, and who die in great numbers under the hardships and privations the climate and the operations inflict on them. Not only were the Government totally unconscious of the opposition they should encounter, but, when they found the steam was getting up, they neglected to enter into such explanations and make out such a case as might, if well done, have extinguished dissension in the beginning. All this displays a want of prudence and foresight, for in a matter of such importance it is not enough to say that they did not expect any fault to be found with their proposal, and they ought to have employed some means to see what was likely to be thought of it before they committed themselves to it. They ought to have ascertained how it was to be carried into effect, and if they could count upon its success, and to be able to give Parliament some assurance of it, instead of saying they had taken no initiative steps out of affected deference to constitutional scruples, and knew not how they were to get the men they are asking for. It seems the general opinion of their own friends that they have mismanaged their case, and plunged into a difficulty they might have avoided.

LORD RAGLAN'S DEFICIENCIES.

The best way of avoiding it would have been to raise a regiment or two without applying to Parliament at all, mustered and arrayed them at Malta or at Heligoland, or wherever they pleased out of England, and sent them off as an experiment to the Crimea. Then, if they had done good service, and Raglan had expressed his satisfaction and asked for more, they might have raised any number and landed them here without cavil or objection; but to have adopted this course they must have seen the necessity of feeling their way, which not one of them did. The great complaint now is the want of organisation and good arrangement in the Crimea and generally at and about the seat of war, the confusion that has taken place in forwarding and distributing supplies, and the want of all expedients for facilitating the service in its various branches. There is much truth in all this, but the responsibility for it rests upon Raglan, who, if he had been of a prompt and energetic character, would have looked to these things, seen what was wanting, and have taken care to provide everything and set the necessary machinery in motion. He had _carte blanche_ from the Government as to money and everything else, and, if he had concerted what was necessary with Stratford, and insisted on his exerting himself, I believe none of the complaints would have been made, and none of the deficiencies have been found. This is what the Duke of Wellington would have done, and his despatches are full of proofs that it is what he was always doing.

_December 24th._--The third reading of the Enlistment Bill carried by 38, after a very fine speech from Bright, consisting of a part of his letter with its illustrations. In my opinion this speech was unanswerable, and no attempt was made to answer it. He was very severe on both Lord John and Palmerston. It is impossible that such reasoning as Bright's should not make _some_ impression in the country; but I do not think any reasoning however powerful, or any display of facts however striking, can stem the torrent of public opinion, which still clamours for war and is so burning with hatred against Russia that no peace could be deemed satisfactory, or, even tolerable, that did not humble Russia to the dust and strip her of some considerable territory. Yesterday the 'Times' ventured on an article against Raglan as the cause of the disorder and confusion and consequent privations which prevail in the army. Delane wrote to me about it, and said he was aware he should be bitterly reviled for speaking these truths. I agree entirely with what he said, and see no reason why the saddle should not be put upon the right horse.

_The Grove, December 31st_, 1854.--The last day of one of the most melancholy and disastrous years I ever recollect. Almost everybody is in mourning, and grief and despair overspread the land. At the beginning of the year we sent forth an army amidst a tumult of joyous and triumphant anticipation, and everybody full of confidence and boasting and expecting to force the Emperor Nicholas in the shortest possible time humbly to sue for peace, and the only question was, what terms we should vouchsafe to grant him, and how much of his dominions we should leave him in possession of. Such presumptuous boasting and confidence have been signally humbled, and the end of this year sees us deploring the deaths of friends and relations without number, and our army perishing before the walls of Sebastopol, which we are unable to take, and, after bloody victories and prodigies of valour, the Russian power hardly as yet diminished or impaired. All last week I was at Hatchford with Lord Grey, when we did nothing but talk over the war, its management and mismanagement, Raglan, etc. Grey's criticisms are clever and not unfair, far from favourable to the Government, but detesting Derby, of whom he has the worst opinion, formed from a very ancient date and upon long experience of his character and conduct. Grey's idea is that there has been much mismanagement here and still greater on the spot, and that Raglan is quite incompetent and, as far as we can see, nobody else any better. The opinion about Raglan appears to be rapidly gaining ground, and the Ministers have arrived at the same conclusion.

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.

I came here yesterday to meet Cowley, come over for a few days from Paris, and to have a talk with him and Clarendon. Cowley says that the alliance between the two countries is very hollow, and in fact there is nobody in France really friendly to us except the Emperor, Persigny, and perhaps Drouyn de Lhuys. The Emperor is bent on pursuing the war with vigour, and is sensible of the importance to himself of the French flag being triumphant. I asked him what they thought of our armies and our generals; he said from the Emperor downwards they had the highest admiration for the wonderful bravery of the troops, but the greatest contempt for the military skill of the commanders, and for all our arrangements and _savoir faire_. He told us the following anecdote as a proof of the blundering way in which our affairs are conducted. Newcastle wrote to him lately to beg he would ask the French Government to give us a model of certain carts their army used in the Crimea, the like of which our people there had applied to him for. The French Minister replied that he could give drawings, but had no model; but at the same time he advised us not to think of having similar ones, as these carts are so ill adapted for the purpose that they had discarded them, and had ordered others and better ones to be made, which were now in course of construction _at Malta_. So that we propose to get these machines without finding out whether they are suitable or not, while the French supply themselves with the proper article _in our own territory_.

I find from Clarendon that he is not only fully alive to Raglan's inefficiency, but has all along suspected it, and now the Government seem to have the same conviction; still they can take no step in the matter, for he has done nothing and omitted nothing so flagrantly as to call for or justify his recall, and if they were to recall him they do not know where to look for a better man to replace him. The war has hitherto failed to elicit any remarkable abilities or special aptitude for war, except in one instance, that of Captain Butler, the defender of Silistria, a young man of remarkable promise who, if he had lived, would probably have done great things and have risen to distinction.

Canrobert writes to his Government that he hopes soon to attempt the assault, but the Emperor and M. Vaillant by no means approve of it, and have sent him orders not actually prohibiting it, but enjoining caution in such a manner as will most probably effectually deter him from doing anything. They all think that the capture of the place could only be achieved (if at all) at a great cost of life, and that the captors could not hold it for many hours, as they would be pounded from the Northern forts which entirely command the place.

We discussed Austria and what she will do when the Russian answer comes to the last communication of the Conference at Vienna, and what she can do. Even if she recalls her ambassador from St. Petersburg and declares war, Cowley thinks she will never cross bayonets with the Russians or fire a shot unless attacked; and he believes, on what appear good grounds, that if any fighting takes place between the Austrians and the Russians, the former will get beaten, and that the Russian army is much the best of the two. This is the reverse of the general notion, but it seems that the Austrian officers themselves are of that opinion. It is no wonder, therefore, that they have no mind to go to war and to encounter this danger to accommodate us, whom they still cordially hate on many accounts, but especially for the Haynau affair, which still rankles in their hearts and in which they think their uniform was insulted. _À propos_ of this, Clarendon told me that the Queen was talking to him very lately about this affair, and told him that she had entreated Palmerston at the time to write some expression of regret to the Austrian Government, but that nothing would induce him to do it, and he never did.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.

I asked Clarendon what was Palmerston's present tone about the war. He said he was very uneasy about the army and its condition, but just as confident as ever as to the final result of the war, and as lofty in his ideas of the terms of peace we should exact from Russia. He is all for restoring the Crimea to Turkey, and, what is more, he has persuaded the Emperor Napoleon to embrace that opinion. As usual, he never sees any difficulty in anything he wishes to do. I told Cowley and Clarendon what Grey said--viz. that he agreed entirely with Bright's letter, and that the war might have been avoided by either of the two courses--to have told the Emperor of Russia in the beginning we would make war on him if he persisted, and compelled to understand that we really meant it, or to have forced the Turks to accept the Vienna Note; and, in either case, war would have been avoided, but that, the Cabinet itself being divided, everything was done in a spirit of compromise, and a middle course adopted which led to all the mischief. Cowley answered the first alternative and Clarendon the second. Cowley said that one of the great difficulties of the British Government was to secure concert with the French, and to explain their own conduct without hurting the susceptibility of their allies or divulging what passed between the two Governments. The French were perpetually blowing hot and cold, with a false air of vigour superior to our's at one moment, and at another wanting to do what our Ministers would have been torn to pieces for consenting to. For instance, in spite of us they would send their fleet to the Dardanelles to support the Turks, and afterwards they proposed to send the two fleets to Constantinople to compel the Sultan to sign the Vienna Note. Cowley told me this war in its present shape and with these vast armaments had gone on insensibly and from small beginnings, nobody could well tell how. In the first instance, the Emperor told Cowley he had no intention of sending any land forces to the East, and when we proposed to him to despatch there a small corps of 5,000 English and 10,000 French he positively declined. Soon after Sir John Burgoyne was sent to examine and report on the state of the country, and he gave an opinion that it would be desirable to send such a force to occupy a fortified position at Gallipoli in case of the Russians making a sudden attack with their fleet on Constantinople, in which case our fleets might be in some danger. Cowley took him to the Emperor, to whom he told his story. The Emperor said he thought his reasons good, and this was a definite and tangible object, and he would send the troops. When Raglan was offered the command of the forces we were to send out, he said he would not go with less than 20,000 men; and when we agreed to send this force, the French said if we sent 20,000 they must send 40,000, and so the expedition began, and it has since swelled to its present magnitude--our's in consequence of the clamour here and pressure from without, and their's to keep pace with our's in relative proportions. With regard to the Vienna Note, Clarendon said Stratford never would have let the Turks sign it, and if they had recalled him the Cabinet here would have been broken up, Palmerston would have gone out, Stratford would have come home frantic and have proclaimed to the whole country that the Turks had been sacrificed and betrayed, and the uproar would have been so great that it would have been impossible to carry out the intention. I think the first answer is more weighty than the last, and that the popular clamour and Palmerston's secession ought to have been encountered at whatever hazard rather than persist in the fatal course which could hardly fail to lead, and did eventually lead, us into this deplorable war.