CHAPTER XXXII

JULY AND AUGUST 1918

_Diary of the War_

[Sidenote: 1918.]

After some successes on a small scale by the French at St. Pierre Aigle, and by the Americans at Château-Thierry, the Germans launched their third and last offensive on a fifty-mile front in the direction of Rheims, and penetrated the line to a depth of two to three miles. Thirty German divisions took part in this battle, and the fighting was very severe. On July 18 Marshal Foch began his brilliant counter-stroke on a twenty-seven-mile front from Fontenoy to Belleau, and drove the Germans back over the Marne, capturing a large number of prisoners. Although in full retreat, the Germans continued to offer a stubborn resistance, and counter-attacked all along the line.

In August Sir Douglas Haig struck with the Fourth Army under Sir Henry Rawlinson, and succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Germans and capturing 22,000 prisoners. Hardly had the enemy recovered from this blow, when the Third Army under Sir Julian Byng advanced on a nine-mile front, and recovered a large portion of the ground that had been lost in the spring.

In Italy the Austrians were completely defeated by the Italians, who took a large number of prisoners and guns, and the whole Piave Delta was cleared. These successes were quickly followed up until the Austrians were in full retreat.

In Albania the Allied Forces made considerable progress and compelled the Austrians to retire.

In Palestine the British positions covering the passages of the Jordan and the north of Jericho were attacked by the Turks.

OPERATIONS FROM AUGUST 21 TO 28

_Divisional Account_

[Sidenote: Aug.]

After Rawlinson's success on the Somme Byng was ordered to advance, recover the Arras--Albert railway, and generally to hustle the Germans, who were now falling slowly back. This was to be the prelude to the main operation.

The attack on August 21 was planned and carried out at exceedingly short notice, and was completely successful. The subsequent daily attacks, executed in pursuance of the policy laid down by higher authority, gave the enemy no rest and no opportunity of organising a new line of resistance, but they rendered the task of coordination with the division on the flanks almost impossible. By the time the position of the advanced troops of the Guards Division at the end of the day's fighting had been ascertained (probably not before 4 A.M.), there was usually only just time to plan and issue orders for the next day's operations. It seldom happened that the situation and intention of the flank divisions could be ascertained before orders were issued, with the result that each division had to work independently.

[Sidenote: Aug. 21.]

The Guards Division was at that time in the Sixth Corps, which had been ordered to capture the Ablainzeville--Moyenneville spur on the morning of the 21st. The attack was carried out by the Second Division on the right, followed by the Third Division and 2nd Guards Brigade from the Guards Division on the left, with the 5th Infantry Brigade from the Second Division in reserve.

In the 2nd Guards Brigade (Sergison-Brooke) the attack was carried out by the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards and 1st Battalion Scots Guards, with the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards in reserve. When the first objectives had been secured the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards was pushed through, and captured the line of the railway. The attack was supported by seven brigades of field artillery and heavy guns under Colonel Phipps. One company of the 4th Battalion Guards Machine Gun Regiment was attached, and sixteen tanks (Mark IV.) were to co-operate.

The 1st Guards Brigade (with Gort temporarily in command) was ordered to advance towards the railway, and be prepared to occupy Hamel Switch in the event of the leading brigade finding it unoccupied. There was very thick mist in the early morning, and the contact patrols were unable to work, but the enemy had expected this attack, and had withdrawn all his guns, leaving only a very small garrison in the forward area. Moyenneville was secured without difficulty, while the Second Division captured Courcelles. On reaching the railway the resistance stiffened; and when General Sergison-Brooke reported that all the tanks appeared to have been drawn away south-east, and that there were none operating on the front of the Brigade, Major-General Feilding warned him that no advance beyond the railway must be attempted without them. In the meantime the Third Division on the right had some stiff fighting on the railway, and the Fifty-ninth Division on the left made some progress towards Boisieux St. Marc. Gort's Brigade reached the quarries on the other side of the railway in the afternoon, and found there was heavy hostile shelling from the north of Courcelles. That night the patrols entered Hamelincourt Trench, and early the next morning the Germans counter-attacked, but failed to eject the companies which were occupying Hamel Works.

[Sidenote: Aug. 22.]

On the 22nd orders were issued for a farther advance the next day. Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke, in command of the 2nd Guards Brigade, was instructed to advance. On his left the Third and Fifty-sixth Divisions would operate, and on his right the Second Division would capture Gomiecourt. The enemy was to be pressed continuously in order to conform to the attack by British and French troops elsewhere. On the 23rd the enemy shelled Boiry with gas and high-explosive shells, but did not offer any serious resistance. Sergison-Brooke's 2nd Guards Brigade met with little opposition, and gained all their objectives along Hamelincourt Trench, capturing Hamel Mound. Orders were then sent to Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke to advance on the line Judas Farm--St. Leger Mill, while Brigadier-General Follett was told to move up the 3rd Guards Brigade, and be prepared to relieve the 2nd Guards Brigade in the evening. Meanwhile the Second Division had captured Ervillers.

The great feature of the day's fighting was the advance of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, which had been placed at the disposal of General Sergison-Brooke. After a long approach march, this Battalion, advancing with both flanks exposed, passed through Sergison-Brooke's Brigade, and seized the key-position south-west of St. Leger. The capture of this position enabled the divisions on both flanks to advance the following day with little loss.

[Sidenote: Aug. 23.]

That night when the 3rd Guards Brigade relieved the 2nd, the Guards Division had reached the line running through Mory Switch as far as Judas Trench, thence to Judas Farm, and on to Boyelles Reserve, where it was in touch with the Fifty-sixth Division.

The next morning--the 24th--the 3rd Guards Brigade continued the pursuit of the Germans, and was ordered to advance on St. Leger, which was not to be entered by the battalions engaged in the attack, as the battalion in reserve would be responsible for the "mopping up" of the town. This advance was successfully accomplished, but after St. Leger had been secured, it was found impossible to make any further progress until Mory Copse was cleared. The Second Division was accordingly ordered to take and hold Mory Copse, while the 3rd Guards Brigade was to push forward at once, and conform to the general advance. As soon as Mory and Mory Copse had been secured, the Second Division advanced on Behagnies and Sapignies.

[Sidenote: Aug. 25.]

The attack continued on the 25th, and the Guards Division advanced towards Ecouste and Longatte _via_ Bank's Trench and Bank's Reserve, while the Fifty-sixth Division tried to gain the Hindenburg support line. The occupation of Behagnies and part of Sapignies was successfully accomplished by the Second Division on the right. Follett's 3rd Guards Brigade advanced supported by tanks, but these were quickly put out of action by the anti-tank rifles of the Germans. Considerable resistance was met with in Leger Wood, and there was heavy hostile machine-gun fire from Croisilles. The 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards made a wonderfully fine advance on the right of the Brigade, but was strongly counter-attacked and suffered heavy casualties. The Sixty-second Division was unable to capture Mory on account of the division on its right being held up; later in the evening it succeeded in reaching Camouflage Copse. That night De Crespigny's 1st Guards Brigade relieved the 3rd Guards Brigade.

The following day orders for a further attack were issued. The advance was to be continued by the Sixty-second, Fifty-sixth, and Guards Divisions, the latter directed on high ground north and south of Ecouste and Longatte, while the Fifty-sixth Division was to envelop Croisilles, moving down the Hindenburg line. The advance was not to be pressed if strong resistance was encountered. The 1st Guards Brigade was to advance under barrage in a line from Croisilles Copse to the Crucifix, and the heavy artillery was to concentrate on Sensee Valley.

[Sidenote: Aug. 27.]

Early on the 27th the Sixty-second Division captured Bank's Trench, and De Crespigny's Brigade reached Burnhill Trench. Here the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards was held up by heavy machine-gun fire, while the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards was counter-attacked from both flanks, and driven back to the line of Leger Reserve--Bank's Trench. The Fifty-sixth Division was also in difficulties, and could make no headway against the machine-gun fire from Croisilles. The situation as regards the Guards Division was as follows: On the right the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards was in touch with the Sixty-second Division on the ridge south-west of L'Homme Mort, the line then reaching a sunken road leading to St. Leger. There were some men in Bank's Trench, but there were also isolated parties of the enemy still there, which made reorganisation impossible until dark. Major-General Feilding sent orders to Brigadier-General de Crespigny to reorganise the battalions in front, and to endeavour to secure the line from Bank's Trench to Leger Reserve. If it was found that the Germans had withdrawn, the 76th Brigade was to pass through the 1st Guards Brigade and follow them up. During the night Bank's Trench was cleared of Germans, and 150 prisoners were taken.

On the 28th De Crespigny's Brigade was holding a line along Mory Switch--Bank's Trench and St. Leger Reserve, and the enemy was reported to have withdrawn to Longatte support. At mid-day the Fifty-sixth Division captured Croisilles, and continued its advance towards Bullecourt. The whole of Bank's Trench up to the Mory--Ecoust road had now fallen into the hands of De Crespigny's Brigade, and patrols had been sent out some way in front. During the day the Germans withdrew towards Ecoust and Bullecourt, followed by our patrols. Orders were given for this brigade to be relieved by the 76th Infantry Brigade, and to retire to the area between the Arras--Bapaume road and the Arras--Albert railway.

The total number of prisoners taken by the Division from the 21st to the 29th was 30 officers, and 1479 other ranks.

The casualties were: Killed, 28 officers, 278 other ranks; wounded, 58 officers, 1675 other ranks; missing, 3 officers, 239 other ranks.

[Sidenote: 1st. Batt.]

THE 1ST BATTALION

_July and August_

ROLL OF OFFICERS

Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer. Major the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Second in Command. Capt. R. D. Lawford, M.C. Adjutant. 2nd Lieut. E. G. Hawkesworth Intelligence Officer. Lieut. R. F. W. Echlin Transport Officer. Capt. J. Teece, M.C. Quartermaster. Capt. P. Malcolm King's Company. Lieut. J. A. Lloyd " " Lieut. L. G. Byng, M.C. " " 2nd Lieut. R. G. Buchanan " " 2nd Lieut. C. O. Rocke " " Capt. A. T. G. Rhodes No. 2 Company. Lieut. G. Hughes " " 2nd Lieut. J. L. Campbell " " Capt. A. A. Moller, M.C. No. 3 Company. 2nd Lieut. A. Grant " " 2nd Lieut. A. A. J. Warner " " 2nd Lieut. L. F. A. d'Erlanger " " Capt. R. Wolrige-Gordon, M.C. No. 4 Company. Lieut. the Hon. P. P. Cary " " Lieut. H. B. Vernon " " Lieut. B. H. Jones " " 2nd Lieut. R. L. Webber " " 2nd Lieut. A. M. Brown " " Lieut. W. B. Evans, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.

[Sidenote: July.]

After six days spent at Barly, the 1st Battalion marched to Bavincourt, where it entrained for Blaireville. On arrival the men were provided with tea and cigarettes by the Thirty-second Division, and the Battalion took over trench shelters from the 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment, whose Adjutant was Captain Kaye, formerly a sergeant in the King's Company, and whose Second in Command was Major Marshall, late Irish Guards. On the 10th the Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which was the battalion in support, and some high-velocity shells fell in its area, wounding three men. On the 14th the Battalion moved up to the front line, which had become very slippery owing to the heavy rainstorms, and the ground was so deep in mud in some places that the relief was not completed till 2 A.M. The enemy was quiet on the whole, but some movement was observed round Boyelles. The following day the Germans showed an inclination to push machine-guns forward on the south side of the railway in order to get close to our lines. Hostile aircraft was more active, but was kept well in hand, and in the evening two German aeroplanes were brought down near Hamelincourt. On the 19th the Battalion was relieved, and retired to the reserve line trenches. The period spent in reserve was uneventful, but on the 27th, when the Battalion had moved up in support, the Germans carried out a concentrated gas bombardment of the area Boisleux-au-Mont village and station, and eight men in No. 4 Company were gassed. On the 30th Second Lieutenant J. L. Campbell, Company Sergeant-Major Frost, and two men were wounded during some severe shelling. The former recovered, but Sergeant-Major Frost succumbed to the wounds he had received, and died that evening. On the 31st six platoons from the 320th Regiment of the American Army, in addition to the Second in Command and the Lewis-gun officer, were attached to the Battalion. The enemy's artillery that evening showed an increased activity, and put down a destructive barrage which lasted for three hours.

[Sidenote: Aug.]

From the 1st to the 6th of August the 1st Battalion was in the front line at Boisleux-au-Mont, where, except for intermittent shelling, everything was unusually quiet. During one of the periods of shelling Lieutenant G. Hughes was severely wounded, and died in the evening. There were 2 men killed and 11 wounded, in addition to two of the American troops. On the 6th the Battalion returned to the reserve trenches at Blaireville, where it remained until the 15th. In the absence of Brigadier-General de Crespigny, Lord Gort assumed temporary command of the 1st Guards Brigade, and Major Bailey commanded the Battalion. On the 21st Sergison-Brooke's Brigade attacked in a thick mist on the right of the 3rd Guards Brigade, and the Germans put down a heavy barrage of shells and Minenwerfer on the trenches occupied by the 1st Battalion. The mist rendered smoke-bombs useless, and a patrol was sent out to get touch with the enemy, who was expected to retire. Lieutenant Hawkesworth with nine men entered Marc trench supported by a platoon from No. 3 Company, and captured two Germans; a strong party of the enemy which tried to recapture them, was beaten off with several men killed. On the 22nd the Battalion was relieved, and proceeded to Boiry St. Martin.

[Sidenote: Aug. 23.]

In accordance with General Follett's order, the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards moved to the low ground east of Ayette, while the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards was ordered to send an officer to Brigade Headquarters. Lieutenant Hawkesworth, who was selected for this duty, sent back word that the Battalion was to be ready to march at once. At 12.50 P.M. Major Bailey received orders to move up his Battalion to the east of Moyenneville, and to report to Sergison-Brooke's Brigade as soon as he arrived there. Accordingly the Battalion marched off, and reached its destination about 3.15 P.M. There was no time to issue written orders, and General Sergison-Brooke was able to explain only verbally to Major Bailey the objective of the Battalion. Having summoned his Company Commanders, Major Bailey informed them of the general situation. The 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 1st Battalion Scots Guards were holding the general line of Hamerville trench and also Hamel trench, while the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards was established on the high ground about Judas Farm. The situation on the right, however, was not clear, and no troops of the Second Division had been seen east of Ervillers. The 1st Battalion was therefore to move forward as soon as possible, gain touch with the Second Division about Ervillers, and in conjunction with it, capture Mory Switch.

LIST OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THESE OPERATIONS

Major the Hon. W. R. Bailey, D.S.O. Commanding Officer. Lieut. J. A. Lloyd Acting Adjutant. Lieut. E. G. Hawkesworth Intelligence Officer. Captain P. Malcolm King's Company. Captain the Hon. P. P. Cary " " 2nd Lieut. C. Cruttenden " " 2nd Lieut. C. O. Rocke. " " Lieut. H. B. Vernon No. 2 Company. Lieut. A. A. Morris " " 2nd Lieut. R. J. E. Conant " " Captain A. S. Chambers No. 3 Company. 2nd Lieut. G. S. Lamont " " 2nd Lieut. A. A. J. Warner " " Captain R. Wolrige-Gordon, M.C. No. 4 Company. Lieut. L. G. Byng, M.C. " " 2nd Lieut. G. E. Barber " " 2nd Lieut. R. L. Webber " " Capt. W. B. Evans, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.

At 4.10 P.M. the Battalion advanced in approach march formation with the King's Company under Captain Cary on the right, and No. 2 Company under Lieutenant H. B. Vernon on the left, with No. 3 Company under Captain Chambers in support and No. 4 Company under Lieutenant Byng in reserve. The frontage occupied by the Battalion was 1000 yards, with strong patrols preceding the two leading companies at a distance of 300 yards. On reaching the line of the Ervillers--Hamelincourt road, the leading companies came under a light field-gun barrage and long-range machine-gun fire, which forced them to deploy, and the support company conformed as soon as it arrived at the same place. Captain Chambers then moved his company to a position écheloned in rear of the King's Company, so as to be in a position to protect the right flank. When the leading companies reached the neighbourhood of Jewel trench, the Germans offered a certain amount of resistance, which caused a momentary check, but the threat of an outflanking movement by No. 3 Company broke down their defence, and they fled, pursued by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, leaving fifty men who were taken prisoners.

No. 4 Company was moved to a position on the high ground on the right to cover that flank, and was given orders to be prepared to move across the front of Ervillers, if a hostile counter-attack developed in that direction. The other three companies swept on to the next objective, which was carried without a further check. The three leading companies then proceeded forward to capture the final objective, and the defence of the enemy broke down, as soon as he saw that the victorious advance of the Battalion could not be stopped. By 5.45 P.M. the position was completely in the hands of the Battalion, many prisoners being taken, numbers of whom rushed forward with their hands up as soon as the leading companies appeared over the ridge. After the final objective had been secured, No. 4 Company returned to its proper position in reserve, its place on the right being taken by a sub-section of machine-guns. At dusk the Battalion was distributed as follows: No. 3 Company in Mory Switch trench as far as Hally Avenue (exclusive), No. 2 Company conformed from Hally Avenue (inclusive) to Judas trench, while the King's Company formed a refused right flank in shell-slits about Iscariot Work, and No. 4 Company was in reserve in Jewel trench.

Considering the extent of ground that had been covered and the rapidity with which the objective had been secured, the casualties were not heavy: Lieutenant Rocke, who had been with the leading platoon of the King's Company, was killed, and Captain Cary in the King's Company and Lieutenant Conant of No. 2 Company were wounded. The casualties amongst other ranks amounted to about forty.

[Sidenote: Aug. 24.]

At 4 A.M. Major Bailey received orders to continue the attack, and summoned a conference of Company Commanders. He explained to them that the Battalion was to advance at 7 A.M. on a front of 1000 yards and écheloned in depth. No. 4 Company was to lead the attack on a front of 500 yards, with the left flank on Hally Avenue; No. 3 Company écheloned at a distance of 250 yards on their right, No. 2 Company in support, covering the centre at a distance of 250 yards behind the left of No. 3 Company, and the King's Company in reserve.

The three leading companies were formed up by daylight in Mory Switch trench, but the King's Company remained in its position near Iscariot Work. The wire in front of Mory was too thick to cut before daylight, and the men were told to work their way through the gaps as best they could. As soon as the attack started, some thirty prisoners were taken; they were in positions outside the wire, and surrendered without firing a shot. A shrapnel barrage had been put down by our artillery, but it was placed too far in advance to be of any real assistance, and as the attack developed the Germans opened an intense machine-gun fire from Mory Copse and Hally Copse. It soon became evident that, until some advance was made on the right, there was no possibility of the attack succeeding, and even if it did succeed there seemed little prospect of the 1st Battalion retaining the position it had gained, unless the Second Division could keep pace with them. Nothing could be done but to wait until the situation on the right developed, and the difficulty of the position was increased by the fact that all communication with the leading companies was cut off for the remainder of the day. During the morning Germans could be seen dribbling forward small parties to Mory Copse, and the sniping and machine-gun fire from this direction became more intense. At 10.45 the Second Division made an attempt to come up on the right, but was immediately checked and suffered considerably.

The casualties in the 1st Battalion were naturally heavy. Second Lieutenant G. E. Barber was killed, and Lieutenant L. G. Byng, M.C., was so severely wounded that he died that evening. Major Bailey, Captain Chambers, Lieutenant Vernon, Second Lieutenant Warner, and Second Lieutenant Webber were wounded, and amongst the other ranks there were 150 casualties.

Lord Gort, who had been temporarily commanding the 1st Guards Brigade, returned to the Battalion that evening, and Captain Wolrige-Gordon, M.C., came up to take over command of No. 4 Company, while Lieutenant Hawkesworth left Battalion Headquarters to command No. 3 Company. On learning that the Brigade was to continue the attack on the following day with the assistance of eight tanks, Lord Gort went round the line at dusk, and decided that, as the King's and No. 3 Companies had suffered fewest casualties, they should undertake the attack. He therefore gave orders for these two companies to withdraw for the night, and get as much rest as they could in Mory Switch, while No. 2 and 4 Companies should supply the outposts; and he impressed on the officers commanding these companies, that in view of the attack the next day the men should be spared as much as possible, and that defensive measures for the night should be undertaken mainly by patrols.

[Sidenote: Aug. 25.]

After consultation with the officers commanding the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, and the tanks, Lord Gort returned to his Battalion Headquarters, and summoned the Company Commanders--Second Lieutenant Cruttenden, King's Company; Lieutenant A. A. Morris, No. 2 Company; Lieutenant Hawkesworth, No. 3 Company; and Captain Wolrige-Gordon, No. 4 Company. The details of the attack were explained, and orders were issued. The total fighting strength of the Battalion was only 212 with 7 officers, including the Battalion Headquarters Staff.

In order to increase the number of officers, Captain Malcolm was sent up to join the King's Company. He received this order only at 10 P.M. the night before, and the distance he had to go made it most improbable that he could reach the Battalion before the attack started. But his determination to lead the King's Company into action helped him to overcome all difficulties. By dint of riding and walking all night over appalling country, without any guide, he managed to find the Battalion in time.

At 4.30 A.M. the attack started. A very thick mist covered the ground, which made it difficult for the tanks to find their way. Lieutenant Hawkesworth started off with No. 3 Company supported by one tank, but when he reached the neighbourhood of Bank's Trench the tank broke down, and when the fog lifted he found he had only forty men quite unsupported. Unfortunately, at this moment he was badly wounded, and therefore ordered his men, who were without an officer, to fall back on to Mory Switch.

The King's and No. 4 Companies moved up Mory Switch supported by one tank, while another worked on the southern flank. The fog was still thick, and as the first tank advanced it was suddenly engaged at very close range by a stray machine-gun post. Armour-piercing bullets were used, and the engine and water jacket were penetrated. It was therefore necessary to find the other tank, which could be heard working in the fog, and after an unsuccessful attempt to get it going in the right direction, it eventually succeeded in moving forward at 8.30 A.M., supported by the King's Company and a platoon of No. 4 Company. But soon afterwards the fog lifted, and the tank was immediately put out of action. Germans in bodies of fifty and one hundred could be seen standing about in Bank's Trench, but as the King's Company and a platoon of No. 3 Company were close by, Lord Gort did not give the order to engage these hostile parties with machine-gun fire, until he could ascertain if they were prisoners surrendering or not. After a lapse of five minutes fire was opened on them, and they disappeared into their trenches. Meanwhile the enemy opened a very heavy and concentrated machine-gun fire on Mory Switch, and engaged the disabled tank with a field-gun. Lord Gort having been called back to Battalion Headquarters to speak to the Brigadier on the telephone with reference to the attack of the Sixty-second Division, which was timed to begin at 9 A.M., ordered Captain Wolrige-Gordon to hold on to Mory Switch and Camouflage Copse. But the enfilade machine-gun fire made this impossible, more especially as the right flank was quite unsupported, and the three companies had to withdraw from Mory Switch to the north-west of Mory.

At 4 P.M. after a severe bombardment the Germans developed a counter-attack, which was met by the Sixty-second Division, and driven back. Battalions of this division returned to the attack, and regained some ground, while the 1st Battalion reoccupied Mory Switch. Lord Gort told the captain of the leading company of the battalion from the Sixty-second Division that he was prepared to push on to the sunken road, if his company would co-operate, but the Company Commander replied that the right flank of his battalion was entirely unsupported, and that therefore any further advance was out of the question. The Sixty-second Division was subsequently withdrawn to the line from which they started, but the 1st Battalion was able to maintain its position and to clear Hally Copse of the enemy. That night it withdrew to Boiry St. Martin, and was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards.

Captain Malcolm and Second Lieutenant Cruttenden were reported missing, and Lieutenant Hawkesworth was wounded. The total number of casualties during the three days' fighting was 13 officers and 258 other ranks, out of 18 officers and 489 other ranks who were engaged in the operations. 250 prisoners, 1 field-gun, and 20 machine-guns, in addition to several trench mortars, were captured by the Battalion.

In a letter which Brigadier-General G. B. S. Follett, commanding the 3rd Guards Brigade, wrote to Sir Henry Streatfeild, the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Regiment, he said:

As you have probably heard by now, we attacked on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th August--that is, this Brigade. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers gave the finest exhibition that has ever been made in this war. At 3 P.M. on the 23rd they were sent up to protect the right flank of the 2nd Brigade and take the heights south of St. Leger. There was just time to issue verbal orders and to collect the Company Commanders for a conference. Starting about 3.45 P.M. they had taken all objectives before 6 P.M.--that is, advancing 5000 yards from their starting point! Having been very highly trained by Gort during the past month or two, they proceeded to put their training into practice, with the result that it was a wonderful success. Commanded by Bailey (Gort was with the 1st Guards Brigade), they were magnificently manœuvred by their company and platoon commanders, moving in great depth on a very wide extension. They captured 197 prisoners, 15 machine-guns and several trench mortars, and killed a lot. Their casualties were 2 officers and 50 O.R. I say again, the finest attack in open warfare that has ever been made. During the night 23-24 they even did a relief, and we were up against the junction of two fresh divisions in great strength, with the result that no great advance was made and many losses.

[Sidenote: Aug. 26-31.]

After remaining for twenty-four hours at Boiry St. Martin, the Battalion marched to Berles-au-Bois, where it occupied shelters in a bank. Lieutenant E. B. Shelley and twenty-five men joined, in addition to a large draft from the 4th Battalion under Captain Simpson, and the following days were spent in reorganising the companies.

THE 2ND BATTALION

ROLL OF OFFICERS

Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. Commanding Officer. Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon, D.S.O. Second in Command. Capt. A. H. Penn, M.C. Adjutant. Lieut. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Assistant Adjutant. 2nd Lieut. S. C. K. George Intelligence Officer. Lieut. G. G. M. Vereker, M.C. Transport Officer. Capt. the Hon. W. E. Acraman, M.C., D.C.M. Quartermaster. 2nd Lieut. J. S. Carter Bombing Officer. 2nd Lieut. H. B. G. Morgan Lewis-Gun Officer. Capt. F. A. M. Browning, D.S.O. No. 1 Company. Lieut. S. T. S. Clarke, M.C. " " Lieut. L. St. L. Hermon-Hodge " " Lieut. G. F. Lawrence " " 2nd Lieut. R. C. M. Bevan " " Capt. O. Martin Smith No. 2 Company. Lieut. R. H. R. Palmer " " Lieut. W. H. S. Dent " " Capt. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 3 Company. Lieut. R. M. Oliver " " 2nd Lieut. H. White " " 2nd Lieut. F. J. Langley " " 2nd Lieut. the Hon. S. A. S. Montagu " " Lieut. F. H. J. Drummond, M.C. No. 4 Company. Lieut. F. P. Loftus " " Lieut. N. McK. Jesper " " 2nd Lieut. P. V. Pelly " " 2nd Lieut. J. A. Paton " " Capt. the Rev. Hon. C. F. Lyttelton Chaplain. Capt. J. L. Early, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer.

[Sidenote: July.]

The 2nd Battalion, which had been training during the first few days in July at Saulty, proceeded by train on the 5th to Ransart, where tea was provided for the men by the Thirty-second Division. Guides from the Royal Scots led the Battalion to the position which it was to take up as reserve battalion of the brigade 500 yards east of Ransart. The Guards Division was occupying a sector of the line with its right joining the Second Division between Ayette and Moyenneville, and its left joining the Canadian Corps on the outskirts of Boisieux St. Marc. While in reserve, companies carried out training round the outskirts of Ransart, and scouting and patrolling by day were practised. In order to accustom the men to night-work they wore darkened glasses, which produced much the same effect as night. On the 11th the Battalion moved up into support, and relieved the 1st Battalion Irish Guards near the outskirts of Hendecourt. A place was found for a cricket-ground in a sheltered valley, and two matches were played with composition balls and bats made by the pioneers. From the 17th to the 23rd the Battalion went up into the front line, which had been formerly held by isolated posts, but which was now a continuous trench. The weather was fine and the casualties were not heavy, although there was usually a certain amount of shelling in the early morning. From the 24th to the 28th the Battalion returned to the reserve trenches at Ransart, when Lieutenant T. A. Combe, Lieutenant M. H. Ponsonby, Second Lieutenant A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle, and Second Lieutenant D. L. King joined the Battalion. During the days in reserve an increasing stream of American officers were attached to the 1st Guards Brigade for instruction, and the following amusing messages show the excellent relations that existed between the officers of the two armies:

From:--Guards Division Q. To:--Transport Officer, 1st Guards Brigade.

Draw 6 bottles of Whisky from Divisional Soldiers Club and deliver to Brigade H.Q. for American Officers attached.

From G.O.C. 1st Guards Brigade. To:--Guards Division Q.

On behalf of all officers of the American Army attached to the Brigade under my command, I wish to express my deepest thanks for the courteous present of whisky foreshadowed in your message. I am requested to add that these officers accept this gift as a proof of the solidarity of the union existing between the American and British nations, which will endure until the whisky runs out.

C. R. C. DE CRESPIGNY, Brigadier-General.

[Sidenote: Aug.]

While the Battalion was in support at Hendecourt, Captain A. H. Penn, M.C., resigned the adjutancy, much to the regret of all ranks, and was succeeded by Captain R. G. Briscoe, M.C. On August 4 the Battalion went up into the front line in front of Boiry St. Martin, and on August 5 six platoons of Americans who were to be initiated in the mysteries of trench warfare were attached for four days. The enemy was, however, not very active, and there was but little shelling. From the 10th to the 16th the Battalion remained in reserve at Ransart, where Lieutenant G. F. Lawrence took on the duties of Intelligence Officer from Second Lieutenant S. C. K. George, who was invalided home with dysentery. On the 18th the Battalion relieved the 320th American Regiment in the front line, where again the enemy was fairly quiet. Two advanced posts were established some 500 yards from the line, and the nights were spent in active patrolling to prevent the enemy occupying the dead ground in front of Moyenneville, which was to become the forming-up area for the attack on the 21st.

After three days spent in the reserve, the Battalion moved up into very inadequate trench accommodation in Boiry St. Martin. These trenches were now the reserve line, and out of range of enemy artillery owing to the advance on the 21st.

[Sidenote: Aug. 25.]

On the afternoon of the 25th the Battalion marched off to relieve a battalion in the 3rd Guards Brigade. A three hours' uncomfortable halt was made in a field at Hamelincourt, and as the ground had been well covered with gas, the companies had to move about to escape the drifting fumes. Respirators had to be worn, which rendered the eating of the evening meal no easy matter.

The relief in the front line of St. Leger was carried out without a hitch, although complicated by the fact that the Battalion was taking over a wide and sketchy front from the remnants of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards and the 1st Battalion Scots Guards. During the night Second Lieutenant H. A. Finch and eight men went out as a patrol to get in touch with the enemy and never returned. Second Lieutenant Finch was found killed 1000 yards in front of the line, when the Battalion advanced, which showed how thoroughly he had carried out his instructions.

August 26 was a very quiet day, with occasional shelling around Mory Trench. Judging by the extent to which he fired his machine-guns after dark, the enemy seemed very apprehensive. The following officers took part in the operations on August 26-28:

Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. Commanding Officer. Lieut. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. Adjutant. Lieut. G. F. Lawrence Intelligence Officer. Lieut. M. H. Ponsonby No. 1 Company. Lieut. N. McK. Jesper " " Lieut. C. C. T. Giles " " Capt. O. Martin Smith No. 2 Company. Lieut. C. Gwyer " " 2nd Lieut. A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle " " Capt. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 3 Company. Lieut. H. White " " Lieut. R. M. Oliver " " 2nd Lieut. F. J. Langley " " Lieut. H. B. G. Morgan No. 4 Company. 2nd Lieut. J. A. Paton " " 1st Lieut. E. L. Major (U.S.A. Army) Medical Officer.

[Sidenote: Aug. 26.]

At midnight on the 26th a conference held at Battalion Headquarters was attended by all Company Commanders, at which Lieut.-Colonel Rasch explained the general situation and the objectives of the advance for the following day as far as they were known.

Definite orders were not received until 1.30 A.M. on the morning of the 27th. The instructions the Battalion received were to push forward at zero hour (7 A.M.), with the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on its left, and the Sixty-second Division on its right, and to secure the enemy's trenches in and south of Ecoust and Longatte. Before dawn the Battalion was to be reorganised and disposed in battle formation. No. 3 Company under Captain J. C. Cornforth, M.C., extended along the whole Battalion frontage of 1500 yards, along the road in No Man's Land, running from Mory Copse to St. Leger. No. 2 Company under Captain O. M. Smith in left support lay concealed until zero in Hally Copse. No. 4 Company under Lieutenant Morgan was in right support in Mory Copse, and No. 1 Company under Lieutenant M. Ponsonby in reserve, with Battalion Headquarters in Mory Trench.

There were three points in these orders which caused a little uneasiness. In the first place, a very short space of time before dawn was allowed to re-dispose the Battalion, although fortunately strong patrols had been sent out earlier in the night to secure the Mory Copse--St. Leger road. In the second place, dawn being at 4.30 A.M. and zero at 7 A.M., No. 3 Company would be in an exposed position during daylight at some points within fifty yards of the enemy. It was a clear night, and even in the darkness this company got into difficulties, for while they were forming up, they were observed by the enemy, who spent the rest of the night sweeping the ground and putting up innumerable lights, probably thinking it was a patrol. Fortunately there were a number of large felled tree-trunks along the road, which enabled this Company to escape detection from ground observation, and from the low-flying aeroplanes, which continually patrolled No Man's Land at dawn. In the third place, although Bank's Trench was known to be held all along the whole front, the barrage table showed that on the left of the Battalion the barrage would open a considerable distance behind the trench, probably owing to the proximity of our front troops to the enemy position.

The reorganisation and forming up of the Battalion were successfully carried out before dawn. Unfortunately, while No. 1 Company was moving across the open to take up its position in reserve, a shell fell in the centre of No. 1 Platoon, mortally wounding Lieutenant M. Ponsonby, and causing casualties to the whole platoon, with the exception of three other ranks. Lieutenant Jesper took command of the remaining three platoons, and brought them to their allotted positions.

[Sidenote: Aug. 27.]

At zero hour (7 A.M.) the field-gun barrage came down on a line about 300 yards in front of No. 3 Company, creeping forward at the rate of 100 yards every two minutes. As soon as our troops moved off from their forming-up positions to close up to the barrage, the enemy covered his front with a deadly and accurate screen of bullets, fired from numerous carefully-sighted machine-guns, which were so well protected that our field-gun barrage had little or no effect upon them. In consequence we suffered heavy casualties from the very outset. On the left the troops of the leading company were mown down as soon as they got on to their feet, and were unable to advance. The right of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards had also suffered severely, and was unable to push forward.

As No. 2 Company, under Captain O. Martin Smith, debouched from Hally Copse, it was caught by the machine-gun fire, and nearly cut to pieces before it could extend from artillery formation. Captain O. Martin Smith made a determined effort to reinforce the left of No. 3 Company, and push forward the advance, but long before his Company reached the front troops it had suffered over 50 per cent casualties. Captain O. Martin Smith and Lieutenant de Lisle were wounded, and Lieutenant Gwyer, who was pluckily pushing forward in spite of the storm of bullets, was killed. Captain O. Martin Smith ordered his Company to lie down in the open, while the N.C.O.'s collected the men who were nearest to them, and eventually got in close support of No. 3 Company. As, however, the enemy was entrenched on the top of the rise, 200 yards in front, the slightest movement attracted a torrent of lead. This made it impossible to get communication in any direction or to collect the wounded, who had to remain in the open on the fire-swept ground until dark. Lieutenant R. M. Oliver, who had been in charge of the left platoon of No. 3 Company, had been killed earlier, so the left half of the Battalion was now without an officer.

In the centre, during the first 200 yards, the machine-gun fire, although equally intense, was slightly less accurate; but on nearing the St. Leger--Homme Mort road Captain Cornforth found it swept by a practically impassable hail of machine-gun bullets, fired from three directions--the Homme Mort on the south, Bank's Trench on the east, and outskirts of St. Leger on the north. This last enemy position was off the Battalion frontage, and the troops opposite it had been held up. The only method of relieving this pressure on the left was to push on at all costs in our centre and right.

Lieut.-Colonel Rasch sent up No. 1 Company to reinforce the thinned ranks of No. 3, and to help in the capture of Homme Mort and the rushing of Bank's Trench. While going up this Company came under heavy fire, and Lieutenant Jesper and Lieutenant Giles were both wounded. Captain Cornforth therefore took over command of this Company in addition to his own.

With these reinforcements Lieutenant White and Second Lieutenant Langley led their platoons forward against the machine-gun nest at Homme Mort, but in advancing up the slope they were met with an increasing volume of accurate fire, and both the officers were mortally wounded before the position was reached. These platoons, however, with an inspired dash and determination took the position after a hard fight. Twenty prisoners were captured, in spite of the fact that, in the short rush up to the position, these platoons had been practically decimated.

At the same time Captain Cornforth decided to rush Bank's Trench, although the road was still swept by enfilade fire from the left, and by frontal fire from the trench itself. A party of men was sent over the road to cover the advance, but few succeeded in crossing it. Captain Cornforth thereupon collected a small number of men, led them across the road, and by short rushes succeeded with three other men in gaining Bank's Trench. Here fortunately they found a large supply of German hand-grenades, which they quickly detonated, and by this means succeeded in clearing the trench for 500 yards northwards, knocking out six German machine-guns and taking 40 men prisoners. Several other men soon succeeded in joining them, and this party, which eventually numbered one officer and 25 men, found that they were completely isolated. No other troops could be located on their flanks, and the ground was being swept by machine-gun fire from Bank's Copse in the front, from the high ground on the right, and from the outskirts of St. Leger on the left. It was impossible to advance farther, and the rest of the day was spent in resisting the efforts of the Germans to turn them out, and in endeavouring to gain communication on the flanks.

Lieutenant Morgan with No. 4 Company was more successful. At zero he advanced along Mory Switch and the southern end of Bank's Trench, eventually establishing a position in Vraucourt Trench. The lie of the land and the cover afforded by the trenches enabled this Company to keep up with the barrage, and to avoid coming under the intense fire that the remainder of the Battalion had experienced. During the advance this Company captured a German Battalion Commander and 180 men--a remarkably fine performance. Lieutenant Morgan led his Company forward with such dash that they succeeded in penetrating the enemy's position to a depth of 2000 yards. However, it was soon clear that they were completely isolated, as they were being fired at from all directions. When it was dark Lieutenant Morgan decided that it would be unwise to remain in such an advanced position, since neither the Sixty-second Division on his right nor our own troops on his left showed any signs of coming into line with him, and he consequently withdrew his Company until he was in touch with troops on his flanks.

[Sidenote: Aug. 28.]

During the night the enemy retired from our front, and in the morning the remnants of the Battalion were reorganised, and continued the advance over the original frontage for about 1700 yards to a marked-out trench called Bank's Reserve. Here some machine-guns were encountered, but a good and continuous line was established with connection on both flanks.

This line was handed over to the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders on the night of the 28th-29th, and the Battalion marched back to the trenches east of Hamelincourt. The only officers left with the Battalion were Lieut.-Colonel Rasch, Captain Cornforth, Captain Briscoe, and Lieutenant Morgan. The total casualties were 12 officers and 278 other ranks. Amongst the officers the casualties were as follows:

Lieut. G. F. Lawrence Killed. Lieut. R. M. Oliver " Lieut. C. Gwyer " Lieut. H. White " 2nd Lieut. F. J. Langley " 2nd Lieut. H. A. Finch " Lieut. M. H. Ponsonby Died of wounds. Capt. O. Martin Smith Wounded. Lieut. N. McK. Jesper " Lieut. C. C. T. Giles " 2nd Lieut. J. A. Paton " 2nd Lieut. A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle "

In a message, which Major-General Feilding afterwards sent to Brigadier-General de Crespigny, he said: "All Battalions of the 1st Guards Brigade discharged their duty splendidly. The attack delivered by the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on August 27 not only inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and brought in large numbers of prisoners, but also compelled him next day to relax his hold on the high ground south of Croisilles."

THE 3RD BATTALION

ROLL OF OFFICERS

Lieut.-Colonel A. F. A. N. Thorne, D.S.O. Commanding Officer. Major Viscount Lascelles, D.S.O. Second in Command. Capt. the Hon. A. G. Agar-Robartes, M.C. Adjutant. Lieut. E. G. A. Fitzgerald, D.S.O. Assistant Adjutant. Lieut. E. N. de Geijer Intelligence Officer. Capt. F. J. Heasman, M.C. Transport Officer. Capt. G. H. Wall Quartermaster. Capt. A. F. R. Wiggins No. 1 Company. Lieut. G. M. Cornish, M.C. " " Lieut. A. G. Elliott " " 2nd Lieut. E. L. F. Clough-Taylor " " 2nd Lieut. R. Delacombe " " Capt. G. A. I. Dury, M.C. No. 2 Company. Lieut. C. C. Carstairs, M.C. " " Lieut. A. H. S. Adair " " 2nd Lieut. W. B. L. Manley " " 2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther " " 2nd Lieut. J. Chapman " " 2nd Lieut. R. K. Henderson " " Capt. N. C. Tufnell No. 3 Company. Lieut. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C. " " Lieut. C. C. Brown " " Lieut. G. W. Godman " " 2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon " " 2nd Lieut. A. D. Cooper " " Capt. G. F. R. Hirst No. 4 Company. Lieut. C. H. Bedford " " Lieut. R. G. West " " 2nd Lieut. E. J. Bunbury " " 2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon " " 2nd Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter " " Capt. R. Anderson, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer. Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore, M.C. Chaplain.

[Sidenote: July.]

The first week in July was spent by the 3rd Battalion at Labazeque, and on the 7th it proceeded to Ransart, where it relieved the 10th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in the right sector of the front occupied by the Guards Division.

Two companies were placed in the front line with one company in support and one in reserve, and officers' patrols were sent out every night from dusk to dawn, but there was no movement on the part of the enemy. On the 10th the Battalion moved back into support, and on the 15th into Divisional Reserve, where it remained for three days. From the 19th to the 24th the Battalion went up again into the front trenches, where the work consisted of improving the line by laying down duckboards and digging sumps and latrines. Fifteen officers, 30 sergeants, and 55 corporals from the American Army were attached to the Battalion, and were distributed between the four companies and Battalion Headquarters. Lieutenant S. G. Fairbairn, Second Lieutenant H. P. Gordon, and Second Lieutenant S. Calvocoressi arrived during this tour of duty in the trenches, and on the 25th the Battalion retired into support, where more officers and men of the American Army were attached for instruction. On the 30th the Battalion moved back into Divisional Reserve.

[Sidenote: Aug.]

After four days in reserve the Battalion went up into the front line near Adinfer, where it remained for a week carrying out inter-company relief. In this part of the line patrols were sent out every night, and a company from the 320th Regiment of the United States Army, which accompanied the Battalion, supplied a certain number of men for this purpose. On the 6th Second Lieutenant R. P. Papillon when out on patrol duty, encountered a German patrol in Observation Trench, and after severely wounding one of the enemy, succeeded in bringing back an identification mark. The Higher Command, however, required further information, and accordingly a special patrol was sent out on the night of the 10th. Captain Churchill, whose great experience in all kinds of incursions into the enemy's line rendered him eminently fitted for the task, was sent from the Brigade Headquarters, to take charge of the party, which consisted of Second Lieutenant de Reuter and seven men. A covering-party composed of thirteen men, under the command of Sergeant Birtles, accompanied the raiders. Hardly had the patrol started, when a shell fell among them, wounding one man, who had to be carried back to the trenches. Following the German outpost line, which consisted of small adjacent rifle-pits, but which showed no sign of frequent occupation, the patrol came on the German wire. This formidable obstacle consisted of barbed wire in concertina shape, staked to the ground, with strands running through it. After a careful search a gap was found, and through this the patrol went. After following the track for about forty yards a German sentry was seen. The patrol stood still, and the sentry walked away unconscious of its presence. Soon afterwards some more of the enemy were seen moving round to the left of the track. They were evidently suspicious, as they only whispered. Three of them came crawling slowly towards the patrol. In dead silence the patrol waited, but the Germans turned back, and apparently reported all clear, for thirty to forty more Germans appeared, and stood up close together. They came to within thirty yards of the patrol, when Lieutenant de Reuter gave the order "rapid fire." Several of them were seen to fall. It was now merely a question whether the Germans would attempt to capture the patrol or not, but they contented themselves with firing and throwing a few bombs, while Véry lights were sent up. Captain Churchill therefore retired unmolested through the wire, having only had one man wounded.

On the 10th Second Lieutenant de Geijer and twenty other ranks raided a German post under an artillery barrage. At 3.15 A.M. a Stokes mortar barrage supplemented the artillery bombardment, and the raiding party in two groups, under Second Lieutenant de Geijer and Sergeant Butler respectively, rushed the enemy's post. The Germans had, however, abandoned the post just before the raid took place, and the last two were seen to run from it, as the raiders started. Much valuable information was gained, as the Germans left everything behind, but, with the exception of Lieutenant de Geijer who was slightly wounded, there were no casualties.

On the 11th the Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion Coldstream, and went into support, moving on four days later to billets in Saulty, where it remained until the 20th.

On the 20th the Battalion "debussed" between Blaireville and Heudecourt, and took up its assembly positions east and south-east of Boiry.

The orders General Sergison-Brooke received were to attack Moyenneville in conjunction with the Second and Third Divisions on the right. In the operation orders which he issued the capture of the first two objectives was to be carried out by the 1st Battalion Scots Guards on the right, and by the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was then to pass through, and secure the third objective. Eight tanks would co-operate in front of each Battalion.

The following officers of the 3rd Battalion took part in these operations:

Lieut.-Colonel A. F. A. N. Thorne, D.S.O. Commanding Officer. Lieut. E. N. de Geijer Intelligence Officer. Capt. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C. No. 1 Company. Lieut. C. C. Carstairs, M.C. " " Lieut. R. Delacombe " " 2nd Lieut. E. L. F. Clough-Taylor " " Lieut. A. H. S. Adair No. 2 Company. Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn " " Lieut. J. Chapman " " Capt. N. C. Tufnell No. 3 Company. Lieut. C. Clifton Brown " " 2nd Lieut. A. D. Cooper " " Capt. G. F. R. Hirst No. 4 Company. Lieut. R. G. West " " 2nd Lieut. R. C. G. de Reuter " " 2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon " " Lieut. Graff, U.S.A.M.O.R.C. Medical Officer. Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore, M.C. Chaplain.

[Sidenote: Aug. 21.]

There was a thick mist in the morning, so thick that it was impossible to see more than a few yards ahead. On the one hand this favoured the attackers; on the other there was always the risk of the Battalion losing its way and never reaching the enemy's lines. In spite of everything, however, the leading Battalions eventually succeeded in securing the first two objectives.

The 3rd Battalion had breakfasted, water-bottles had been refilled, and the companies were beginning to get ready for the advance, when this blanket of fog came down. At zero hour, 4.53 A.M., the barrage opened up and the attack began. Captain Smith, who commanded C Company 15th Battalion Tank Corps (Mark V. Star Tanks), arrived at Battalion Headquarters, and reported that his tanks had been delayed by gas in Coseul Valley, so that they would not be able to advance with the Battalion as arranged, but that they would endeavour to overtake it on the second objective. The Battalion started off with No. 3 Company under Captain Tufnell on the right, No. 4 under Captain Hirst on the left, No. 2 under Lieutenant Adair in support, and No. 1 under Captain Fryer in reserve. The fog was as thick as ever, and the smoke shells in the barrage increased its density. Keeping direction by compass was tedious and difficult, since it necessitated the removal of the steel helmet and box respirator, and even then it was far from accurate. To add to the difficulties, there were several pockets of German machine-gunners, which had been missed by the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in their advance, and which suddenly loomed out in the mist often in rear of the Battalion as it advanced. No. 12 Platoon captured two machine-gun posts in the first objective, and the markers under Lieutenant de Geijer, the Intelligence Officer, found German machine-gunners still holding out to the west of the second objective, in the area where the Battalion should have formed up. The 1st Battalion Scots Guards had captured the right and left of the second objective, but owing to the fog the centre was still in the hands of the Germans.

The 1st Battalion Scots Guards, on finding out what had happened, soon cleared out these Germans with the aid of No. 1 Company (the Reserve Company).

By 6 A.M. the Battalion Headquarters had reached its destination, namely, the two trees between the first and second objectives, but was unable to get in touch with any of the companies. Tanks were moving about in the fog, and the Lewis guns were engaging the German machine-guns at close quarters, and were firing indiscriminately into the fog. To give an example of how confusing the situation was, the Battalion Headquarters was charged from the front by two platoons of the Scots Guards, who mistook it in the fog for a German machine-gun post.

By 7.30 No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant Adair, had gone through the junction of the 1st Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Coldstream, and was advancing on its objective, which was the valley between the railway and Moyenneville. A little later Captain Tufnell and Captain Hirst reported that Nos. 9 and 12 Platoons of No. 3 Company and all No. 4 Company were near Moyblain Trench, having completely lost their way. No. 11 Platoon had also lost its bearings, and after moving round in a semicircle, was discovered heading towards the rear instead of towards the front.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Duff Cooper, with No. 10 Platoon, having entirely lost touch with the remainder of the company, had wandered too far to the south, and after pushing on in what he thought was the right direction for three hours, found himself in the outskirts of Courcelles. There he met a platoon of the 7th Battalion K.S.L.I., which had also lost its way, and, knowing that the Halte on the railway was the eventual objective, he determined to make for it. Together these two platoons started off, and as they were clearing the dug-outs on the road, they fell in with a tank which suddenly appeared out of the fog. With its assistance they attacked and captured the railway on each side of the Halte, where a German aid-post was placed. There is no doubt that these two isolated platoons were the only units that succeeded in reaching the third objective for some hours, on the whole front of the two Northern Divisions.

When Lieut.-Colonel Thorne received a message from Lieutenant Duff Cooper, saying that the Halte had been taken, he sent up No. 1 Company under Captain Fryer to the assistance of this isolated platoon, and in order to save time directed No. 2 Company to advance on the objective originally assigned to No. 4. Lieutenant Forbes with two machine-guns was sent up to co-operate with No. 1 Company, and Lieutenant Hulme with two more to assist No. 2 Company. No barrage could be arranged for this attack, and it was impossible to obtain any assistance from the tanks, which were now returning to their rallying positions, since they were all suffering from engine trouble or the lack of petrol.

At 10 A.M. the fog began to lift, but Captain Fryer had by this time brought up Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons to the assistance of No. 10 Platoon. Captain Fryer and Lieutenant Duff Cooper made a most valuable reconnaissance of the railway north of the Halte under heavy fire, and on returning decided at once to attack the German posts they had discovered. No. 10 Platoon started off, and supported by Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons succeeded in capturing the whole of the objectives allotted to No. 3 Company. This attack was carried out with great dash, but Lieutenant Delacombe and Second Lieutenant Clough-Taylor were wounded.

Nos. 7 and 8 Platoons of No. 2 Company had in the meantime commenced their advance on the railway cutting, but soon found that they were exposed to heavy enfilade fire from the railway north of the Halte. They made but little headway at first, but, when the attack of No. 10 Platoon lifted the enemy's fire off them, they pushed forward, and rushed the railway and hollow ground to the east of it, capturing 5 machine-guns and 60 prisoners, and gaining touch with the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards on the left and No. 1 Company on the right.

No. 3 Company now moved up into support of No. 1, and four machine-guns were placed in Magazine Trench as barrage guns. No. 6 Platoon made a farther advance, and seized the hollow east of the railway and west of Hameau North, where 10 machine-guns and 60 prisoners were captured. Nos. 3 and 8 Platoons advanced to the east of the railway, and completed the capture of the whole objective allotted to the Battalion. Although twelve hours behind the scheduled time, Lieut.-Colonel Thorne was able to report that the task of the Battalion had been successfully carried out.

The leading of No. 10 Platoon and Nos. 1 and 2 Companies was particularly fine, and the response made by the men was beyond all praise. The fact that in spite of the fog each platoon managed to get to its own place was entirely due to the persistence with which Platoon Commanders advanced whenever opportunity offered, and to the determination on the part of the men to reach the enemy. After the fog lifted the attack was carried out steadily and relentlessly across ground swept by shell-fire and machine-guns, and succeeded in spite of the lack of an artillery barrage or tanks.

After dark, ammunition, water and rations were sent up by pack animals, and all the platoons rejoined their companies. Reconnoitring patrols under Lieutenant Clifton Brown and Lieutenant West were sent out to locate the new German line, and discovered that the enemy was holding the line of the sunken road about half a mile east of the railway. The Germans were apparently in some strength, and very much on the look-out.

[Sidenote: Aug. 22.]

The next morning a heavy hostile barrage came down on the whole position occupied by the Battalion, and the outposts could see the enemy advancing in three waves. The S.O.S. signal at once went up. Immediately our artillery put down a magnificent and accurate barrage, and the companies in front opened a concentrated fire with Lewis guns and rifles on the advancing enemy. The German counter-attack stood no chance at all, and completely crumbled away; only in one place did the Germans succeed in gaining a footing, and that was on the right, where they captured a trench. When the attack utterly failed, this party of Germans had to withdraw with heavy loss.

The following German orders that were subsequently taken from a prisoner give the details of this counter-attack. It will be seen that they advanced in some strength, and it is all the more remarkable that this carefully planned attack should have been repulsed by only two companies of the 3rd Battalion.

CAPTURED GERMAN DIVISIONAL ORDER

234 Div. Div. H.Q., Abt. la. 2802. 21-8-18.

DIVISIONAL ORDER

1. According to information received from the Army we have repulsed 4½ English Divisions to-day. The enemy has been beaten and he knows it.

The enemy has reached the Achiet le Grand Boisleux Railway. New artillery positions have been located, large enemy concentrations and movement observed.

2. XVIII. Corps will retake the old main line of resistance.

For this operation the 234 Div.--under the orders of the 40th Div.--will attack with the 2nd Guards Res. Div.--under the orders of the 6th Bav. Res. Div.--on its left.

3. The infantry will be divided into three attacking groups under the command of Col. Reichart (Comdr. 88 Inf. Bde.).

_Right attacking group._ Major v. Kluefer.

181 I.R. 3rd Bn. 452 I.R. 3 Batteries, 32 F.A.R. Res. Pion. Coy. 55.

_Centre attacking group._ Major v. Pape.

104 I.R. 451 I.R. less 2nd Bn. 3 Batteries 32 F.A.R. 3 Coy. Pion. Bn. 22.

_Left attacking group._ Capt. Heine.

1st and 3rd Bns. 453 I.R. 2nd Bn. 452 I.R. 359 Pion. Coy. 360 Pion. Coy.

Objective:-- Moyenneville--Aerodrome ridge.

4. The 21st Res. Div. will detail one Bn. to support the attack on Moyenneville. 88 Inf. Bde. will establish liaison with this Bn. Zero hour on the whole front of attack will be 5.45 A.M. (German time).

5. 134 I.R. with three Batteries F.A.R. 32 as Divisional Reserve will be held in readiness N.E. of Mory.

6. Col. v. Bibra (Comdr. 234 Inf. Bde.) with the battalions formerly in support (1st Bn. 452 I.R., 3rd Bn. 451 I.R., 2nd Bn. 453 I.R.) will hold the artillery defensive position. These Battalions will remain as "safety garrison" and will hold the line at all costs in the event of a hostile counter-attack.

7. Duties of the Artillery:

_X-15 to X._ Burst of fire on the enemy front line on the Railway embankment.

_X._ Heavy bombardment on Moyenneville and Courcelles. Lift on to the line Eastern outskirts Moyenneville Eastern outskirts Courcelles, continue heavy bombardment on Moyenneville and Courcelles.

_X plus 20._ Lift to the line _Eastern_ outskirts Moyenneville--_Western_ outskirts of Courcelles.

_X plus 40._ Lift to the line W. of the Moyenneville--Ablainzeville Road.

_X plus 60._ Lift to the trench which extends from Moyenneville across Aerodrome ridge towards the S. (former main line of resistance).

X " 5.45 A.M. Three Batteries F.A.R. 501 and Foot Art. Bn. 401 have occupied positions E. of Ervillers.

11. Div. H. Q.... Queant.

V. STUMPFF, G.O.C., 234 Div.