CHAPTER XXVI

CAMBRAI AND GOUZEAUCOURT

_Diary of the War, October, November, December 1917_

Successful operations were carried out by Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig in front of the Passchendaele Ridge at the beginning of October, when a large number of prisoners were captured, and, in spite of repeated counter-attacks by the Germans, the British forced their way to Houthulst Forest. The French made a successful advance on the Aisne front across the Soissons――Laon road, and penetrated the German line in several places. At the beginning of November the Germans retreated from the Chemin des Dames, and were closely followed by the French.

Sir Julian Byng with the Third Army gained a remarkable victory in the direction of Cambrai, and penetrated the Siegfried line. Farther advances were made, until the whole of the Bourlon Wood fell into the hands of the British, but the Germans attempted an encircling movement, to cut off the troops in the salient that had been created, and forced back the British line at Gonnelieu and Bourlon. After some very heavy fighting Sir Julian Byng was able to bring up reinforcements, and restore the line.

In Italy the Austrians, reinforced by some German divisions, gained a decisive victory over the Italians, and advanced far into Italy. So serious was the situation that the Allied War Council decided to send British and French Divisions to the aid of the Italians. The Italians continued to retreat until they reached the Piave, and at one time Venice seemed threatened, but eventually the Italian resistance stiffened, and the Austrian invasion was checked.

In Palestine, after a series of brilliant operations, General Sir E. Allenby captured Jerusalem.

From Mesopotamia came the sad news of the death of General Sir Stanley Maude from cholera, and the appointment of General Sir W. R. Marshall as his successor.

CAMBRAI AND GOUZEAUCOURT

[Sidenote: Nov.]

In November Sir Douglas Haig determined to take advantage of the concentration of the enemy’s forces on other parts of the line, to carry out a surprise attack in the direction of Cambrai, and to penetrate as far as possible into the German lines, with a view to dislocate one of the enemy’s nerve centres. In his despatch he makes it clear that the capture of Cambrai itself was a secondary consideration, and that his main object was to secure the right flank of the principal objective north-east of Bourlon.

Sir Julian Byng, to whom these operations were entrusted, received instructions to dispense with artillery preparation, and to depend entirely on the tanks, to cut through the enemy’s wire. This was an entirely new departure. Hitherto it had been generally admitted by both sides that no infantry attack could possibly succeed, without an artillery preparation and a creeping barrage, and it remained to be seen whether the absence of all artillery support would be compensated for by the tanks, and by the undoubted advantage of attacking without giving the enemy any warning. With the utmost secrecy Sir Julian Byng assembled flotillas of tanks, and hid them in the woods.

The attack started on November 20, and succeeded beyond all expectations, for not only was the Siegfried line pierced to a depth of six miles, but over 10,000 prisoners and 142 guns were taken. The capture of Bourlon Wood was successfully effected, but the Germans soon recovered from their surprise, and commenced to bring up reinforcements, with the result that the Guards Division on attempting a farther advance on Fontaine found the enemy in great strength.

The ground that had been gained during the British advance formed an awkward salient about ten miles in width and six miles in depth, and the problem that confronted Sir Douglas Haig was whether to continue the advance or to withdraw. After weighing the various considerations involved, he came to the conclusion that it would be best to advance. On the enemy’s side the Germans were at first rather staggered at finding that their impenetrable Siegfried line had been pierced, but Ludendorff determined to take advantage of the situation that had been created, and to strike on each side of the salient with a view to cutting off the troops in front.

On November 30, after a severe bombardment with gas shells, the Germans advanced under cover of the morning mist, and surprised our men in the trenches. From Bonavis to Gonnelieu, the Germans pushed through masses of men, and succeeded in capturing a large number of prisoners, although their attacks between Mœuvres and the Scheldt Canal were not so successful. The situation was extremely critical, and at one time it seemed that the enemy would succeed in cutting off all the British troops in the salient. They would undoubtedly have done so, had it not been for the gallant stand made by the Twenty-ninth Division at Masnières. This enabled Sir Julian Byng to bring up reinforcements, and the Guards Division was thrown in to stop the rush. The British troops retook the St. Quentin Ridge, and entered Gonnelieu and Gauche Wood; but meanwhile the position at Masnières had become precarious, and the Twenty-ninth Division was ordered to withdraw. Although the situation was saved, Sir Julian Byng saw that he must either retake Bonavis Ridge, or else withdraw to the Flesquières line. The latter course was considered best under the circumstances, and accordingly the shortening of the line commenced on December 4.

_Divisional Account_

After the successful operations in October the Guards Division had a month’s rest. On November 9 the move southward began, although the eventual destination was not known, and many days were spent in long marches. On the 11th Major-General Feilding was informed of the proposal to attack Cambrai, but was warned that the success of the whole operation depended on its being kept a profound secret. The Guards Division was to move by easy stages to that area, marching invariably by night, and the eventual attack was to depend on the result of the operations then in progress in Bourlon Wood. If they were successful, the Guards Division was to advance on Cambrai, but if not, the attack was to be altered to a raid on a large scale. Major-General Feilding confidentially informed his Brigadiers and Commanding Officers of the impending attack, but in order that some ostensible reason might be given for these continual marches, he told them to announce that the Division was on its way to relieve the French. It was, however, necessary to account for the order to leave the kits behind, as this was generally associated in the men’s minds with an impending attack. It was consequently announced that, on account of the lack of accommodation in the part of the French line to which the Division was going, the kits must be stored. It was generally believed that these orders were also due to the transfer of large forces to Italy and the consequent dearth of transport.

It was not until the 23rd that the Guards Division reached the neighbourhood of Flesquières, and De Crespigny’s and Seymour’s Brigades were sent up to relieve two Brigades of the Fifty-first Division. This was a very long day for the men, involving a march of over fifteen miles across an unknown country in the dark, and it was far more difficult to find the way than it need have been, because the positions of the Brigade and Divisional Headquarters were incorrectly given by the Corps Staff. The cavalry, to be employed in certain eventualities, stood about in large numbers, and blocked the road, but eventually the relief was successfully accomplished. The Divisional front extended from the south-eastern outskirts of Cantaing to the north-eastern corner of Bourlon Wood, and was supported by four Brigades of R.F.A. and two of Guards Divisional Artillery.

[Sidenote: Nov. 24.]

Although the situation remained unchanged during the 24th, the Fortieth Division, on the left, had some severe fighting in Bourlon Wood. The same night General Feilding placed the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards under the orders of General Ponsonby, commanding the Fortieth Division, and sent them up to reinforce General Crozier’s 119th Brigade, which was hard pressed. This Battalion moved up to the south-east corner of Bourlon Wood, where it received orders to clear the wood of the enemy. This attack, which started at 2 P.M., had the effect of advancing the line some distance.

[Sidenote: Nov. 25.]

Meanwhile the 4th Battalion Grenadiers, which had taken the place of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, received orders on the 25th to move up in support of the Fortieth Division. This meant that it had to advance in full view of the Germans, who at once put down a heavy barrage in front of it. With the utmost coolness and steadiness the 4th Battalion advanced through this barrage as if it was on parade, and earned special praise from General Ponsonby. Though the 4th Battalion moved up into close support in Bourlon Wood, its services were not needed, as the Fortieth Division had secured all its objectives.

[Sidenote: Nov. 26.]

Next day General Feilding held a conference of Brigadiers, and discussed in detail the plan of attack on Fontaine, which was to be carried out by General Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade. The general scheme did not appear to offer much prospect of success, since the whole country between Bourlon Wood and Flesquières was overlooked by the enemy, whose guns were posted on the ridges, west of Cambrai, north of Bourlon Wood, and east of the Canal. The Germans would therefore be able not only to concentrate their fire on Fontaine but to sweep the back areas where our reserves would be massed. Major-General Feilding had already pointed out that, unless these ridges were captured, it would be quite impossible for any troops to remain in Fontaine. He had only six available Battalions, and the line was 3800 yards in length, so that it was expecting a great deal of half a division to attack a position so strongly held. The Higher Command, in spite of these weighty arguments, however, decided to attempt the experiment. The attack was to be undertaken by the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, 1st Battalion Coldstream, and 2nd Battalion Irish Guards, while the 1st Battalion Scots Guards was to hold the right of the line.

ATTACK ON FONTAINE

[Sidenote: Nov. 27.]

It was 6.20 on the morning of the 27th that the attack started. As the tanks were late in crossing the line, the infantry did not wait for them. Advancing with the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right, the 1st Battalion Coldstream in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards on the left, the force at once came under heavy machine-gun fire. All the ground on the way to the first objective――approximately 1000 yards off――was covered with houses, which were practically untouched by shell-fire, and afforded cover to the enemy’s machine-guns. Moreover, our artillery were not allowed to shell Cambrai. But in spite of innumerable difficulties the three Battalions went gallantly forward, and captured the first objective by 8.30 A.M.

The casualties, however, were very heavy, and so weakened the attackers, that they had not enough men properly to “mop up” the houses in the village and the dug-outs north of it. The tanks, which had been detailed to move round the outskirts of Fontaine, were knocked out almost at once, but one or two that later went through the village itself were of great assistance in clearing the streets. Everywhere the enemy were in large numbers, and though at one time over 1000 prisoners had been taken, only 600 eventually reached the Divisional cage, owing partly to the small numbers available for escort, and partly to the incomplete “mopping-up.” Just the same difficulty confronted the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards, which had to go through Bourlon Wood, lost many prisoners in the thick undergrowth, and on reaching the northern edge of the wood, came in for a deluge of shells from the enemy’s artillery.

When General Sergison-Brooke received the report that the first objective had been secured, and that the Battalions had been greatly weakened, he sent word to Lord Gort, in command of the 4th Battalion Grenadiers, to move forward in support. One company was to support the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, and two others the 1st Battalion Coldstream, while the remaining company was to watch the left flank of the 2nd Irish Guards. At the same time he asked that the 1st Welsh Guards from General Seymour’s Brigade might be lent to him. This was immediately done.

In the meantime the Germans had developed very strong counter-attacks against the Irish Guards in Bourlon Wood, and, finding there was a gap between that Battalion and the 1st Battalion Coldstream, endeavoured to drive in a wedge. In their endeavours to close this gap the Coldstream only succeeded in creating another gap between them and the Grenadiers. The result was that the Irish Guards at the north edge of Bourlon Wood were completely cut off, and there seemed every prospect of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers in Fontaine and the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left being cut off too. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers’ casualties amounted to well over half of its attacking strength, including nine officers out of twelve killed and wounded. It was now seen that the enemy had brought up large masses of troops, and were attacking vigorously on the whole front. General Sergison-Brooke therefore gave orders for all three Battalions to withdraw to the line from which they started.

Such a move was most disappointing to the men who had reached the first objective, but in the circumstances there seemed no other alternative. The enemy continued to throw in more men, and once more the fighting became very fierce, but though our depleted Battalions were unable to maintain their hold on Fontaine, the enemy found it equally impossible to advance or make any impression on the line. Under cover of darkness the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards took over the line that evening, and Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade withdrew to La Justice, while the 4th Battalion Grenadiers retired to Flesquières.

This was the first real failure the Guards Division had. In part it was due to the enemy having masses of men available for the counter-attack, but there was also a notable lack on our side of any reinforcements at the critical moment, which was attributed at the time to the faulty arrangements of the Corps Staff.

On hearing of the heavy casualties suffered by the Guards Division, the Twenty-seventh Corps sent up two Brigades of the Fifty-ninth Division, but they had a considerable distance to cover, and there was no hope of their reaching the line that night. Consequently they were sent to Ribecourt and Trescault, while De Crespigny’s Brigade was moved from Ribecourt to Metz. Fortunately, the night of the 27th was fairly quiet, and these movements were carried out without much difficulty.

[Sidenote: Nov. 28.]

A day without any incident worth recording followed, and on November 29 the Fifty-ninth Division took over the whole area. The Guards Division was disposed as follows: the Divisional Artillery at Flesquières, the Royal Engineers at Trescault, De Crespigny’s Brigade at Metz, Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade at Ribecourt, and Seymour’s Brigade at Trescault. After a hard week in the line they were now to rest, and retire by easy stages to billets.

[Sidenote: Nov. 30.]

Suddenly a telegram arrived announcing that the Germans had broken through our line, and the whole Division was ordered to be ready to move at a moment’s notice. Then came a stream of orders, conveying instructions for different Brigades to be placed under different Corps, that followed one another with bewildering rapidity, only to be countermanded the next moment. Finally the whole Division was placed under the Third Corps, and General Feilding motored off to get instructions.

Information was now received that the enemy were holding the line Villers Plouich――Gouzeaucourt, and as De Crespigny’s Brigade was already marching on the latter place, orders were sent to divert Seymour’s Brigade, which was moving south, and bring it up on the left of De Crespigny’s forces.

Meanwhile General de Crespigny determined to ascertain for himself the exact situation in front of his Brigade, for the roads were all blocked with retiring troops, and all sorts of rumours had reached him. So off he rode at full gallop in the direction of the enemy. Having crossed the open, he came in view of Gouzeaucourt, and there saw the Germans making preparations for a farther advance. He quickly returned to his Brigade, and at once gave orders to attack. All the four Commanding Officers had also ridden ahead of their Battalions, to see for themselves what the ground was like; and so it came about that this Brigade, which a few hours before had been resting and preparing to retire, were now going forward to the attack, as if they had had plenty of notice. The advance of De Crespigny’s Brigade in perfect formation through all the stragglers and despite the general disaster was a splendid and heartening sight, which restored confidence to all the army in that area.

GOUZEAUCOURT

The ground consisted of undulating downs gradually descending from Gouzeaucourt Wood, which occupied a commanding position, to the village of Gouzeaucourt, and thence rising more steeply towards Gauche Wood and Gonnelieu. One great disadvantage Major-General Feilding had to contend with was the total absence of artillery support. The guns had been left in the line at Flesquières, and it was impossible for them to reach the Guards Division until 7 o’clock that evening. The attack had therefore to be launched entirely unsupported by artillery, and had there been any guns there was no Artillery Divisional Commander or Artillery Staff. When they did eventually come into action, they were too doubtful about the situation in front to be of any real assistance.

About noon the head of the Brigade reached Gouzeaucourt Wood, and as they arrived the Battalions formed up for attack. The 1st Battalion Irish Guards were on the left, with their right on the Metz-Gouzeaucourt road; the 3rd Battalion Coldstream in the centre, with their left on this road, and the 2nd Battalion Coldstream on the right; the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers were in reserve in Gouzeaucourt Wood. Each Battalion assumed artillery formation, with two companies in front and two in support, and was responsible for 500 yards of frontage. There was no time for written orders, and all instructions were given by word of mouth.

At 12.30 the attack was launched, and, as soon as the leading troops appeared on the crest of the hill, they came under heavy machine-gun fire. No very striking incident marked the initial stages of the attack, but when the leading Battalions came within 1000 yards of Gouzeaucourt they found a few men of the Royal Engineers and some remnants of the Twenty-ninth Division still holding on to a trench. Later on the 20th Hussars (dismounted) came up on the right of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream, and prolonged the line to the right. During the descent of the slope towards the village, the machine-gun fire became intense, but it never even checked the attacking Battalions, who swept on down the hill and up again to the far side of the village. When they reached the rise immediately east of the village, the shells from the enemy’s artillery on St. Quentin’s Ridge raked them at very close range, but in spite of this the whole objective, including the village, was captured by 1.30 P.M.

General de Crespigny now found that his left flank was in the air, but the Cavalry Corps sent up a regiment to fill the gap, and touch was subsequently gained with the 4th Battalion Grenadiers in Seymour’s Brigade. Soon after a cavalry regiment on the right came into action mounted, and made a gallant attempt to turn the enemy’s left flank, but was stopped by wire and machine-gun fire. The tanks came up on the right, but directly they were seen by the enemy four of them were put out of action. With great promptitude the crews got their Lewis guns out and joined the 2nd Battalion Coldstream. It was now beginning to get dark, and the battle died down. During the day about 100 prisoners were captured, besides a number of machine-guns, and many British howitzers were recovered. Two supply trains were found at Gouzeaucourt station untouched.

While De Crespigny’s Brigade was taking Gouzeaucourt, Seymour’s Brigade, which had come into the field with equal rapidity, was ordered to prolong the line to the right. But this order was subsequently cancelled, and they were told instead to hold the line Gouzeaucourt――Villers Plouich. Moving off in artillery formation, they advanced between Gouzeaucourt Wood and Havrincourt Wood, and lined the railway line between Gouzeaucourt and Villers Plouich.

At this juncture General Feilding received orders to continue his advance, and attack the ridge running from Gonnelieu through Gauche Wood to Villers Hill. To General de Crespigny he entrusted the attack on Gauche Wood, and to General Lord Henry Seymour the capture of Gonnelieu. Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Claud Willoughby, in charge of the tanks, had been kept at Divisional Headquarters in anticipation of an attack, and so only verbal orders for their assembly direct to him were needed. The tanks were to precede the infantry, while the Divisional artillery put down a heavy barrage. The Fifty-ninth Division were assigned to the left, and the Cavalry Division to the right. The whole attack was only to take place if the Twentieth Division failed, and it was not till 2.45 A.M. that the failure was announced.

CAPTURE OF GAUCHE WOOD

[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]

The orders originally sent to the Division were to attack the line from Gonnelieu to Gauche Wood (exclusive) but Major-General Feilding quickly realised that until Gauche Wood was taken, there was small prospect of success for the attack on the left. When the cavalry did not appear on the left, he instructed General de Crespigny to make Gauche Wood inclusive.

In De Crespigny’s Brigade the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and the 3rd Battalion Coldstream on the right and left respectively started off. But the tanks which were to have operated on the right of the Brigade were late, as well as the cavalry that should have joined in the attack. After waiting ten minutes in vain for the tanks, Lieut.-Colonel Rasch attacked without them. The tanks detailed to the left of the Brigade arrived just in time, and were of the greatest possible assistance; in fact, it is doubtful whether the ridge could ever have been taken without their help. However, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers reached the wood without any tanks to help them, apparently because the enemy’s machine-guns were aimed too high.

Immediately the wood was reached two counter-attacks were launched by the enemy, but a company from the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, which had gone out to protect the right flank of the Battalion, quickly disposed of them. After much fighting the whole wood was eventually cleared of the enemy, but the thickness of the trees gave the enemy’s snipers a good opportunity of picking off our officers and N.C.O.’s, and the casualties among them were very heavy. When the tanks on the right came up, they were of little use in the wood, and as they appeared to attract the enemy’s shells from all sides, they eventually retired. Although the cavalry on the right were over an hour late, when they did arrive they not only reinforced the men in the wood, but made the right flank of the Brigade quite secure. There was some difficulty in maintaining touch between the two Brigades, and a company of the 1st Battalion Irish Guards at one time had to be sent up to fill the gap. During this attack over 300 prisoners were captured, in addition to 3 field-guns and nearly 100 machine-guns, which had been packed, ready for removal, near the railway-station.

ATTACK ON GONNELIEU

Seymour’s Brigade meanwhile attempted the more difficult task of taking Gonnelieu and Quentin. There should have been a large number of tanks to help, but at the last moment only nine could be procured. Most of these arrived too late, but one that was working in conjunction with the Welsh Guards was of great assistance, and was largely responsible for clearing a trench held by machine-guns. The 1st Battalion Welsh Guards on the right and the 4th Battalion Grenadiers began the advance, but were at once met by heavy machine-gun fire――so intense was it that progress on the right was completely arrested, until a tank saved the situation.

It seemed almost impossible to take this village without the aid of artillery, as there were machine-guns bristling from every building, and since the Twentieth Division had failed there appeared to be but small hope of this second attempt succeeding. Yet so determined and persistent was the onslaught of the 4th Battalion Grenadiers that isolated parties managed to penetrate into the village. But this was not enough to silence the enemy’s machine-guns, and soon it became clear that all we could do was to hold the line 200 yards from the western edge of the village. On the left of the line two Companies of the 1st Battalion Grenadiers were sent up to strengthen that flank.

That night the position was as follows: the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards was established on the high ground on the right, in touch with De Crespigny’s Brigade; the 4th Battalion Grenadiers, reinforced by two Companies of the 1st Battalion, held the line west of Gonnelieu, with its left in touch with the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, who were covering Villers Plouich. Through the failure of the 183rd Brigade to arrive in time for the relief on the night of December 1, the men in the front line, who had had very heavy fighting, were obliged to remain where they were for another twenty-four hours. Next day the relief was carried out, and on the 3rd De Crespigny’s Brigade took over the line.

[Sidenote: Dec. 5.]

Two bombing attacks were made by the enemy on the front line on the morning of the 5th, and at one time they gained a foothold in our trenches, but a prompt counter-attack by the 1st Battalion Irish Guards soon re-established the line. On that night De Crespigny’s Brigade was relieved by the 26th Infantry Brigade.

The casualties in the Guards Division between November 25 and December 5 were:

Officers. O.R. 1st Guards Brigade (De Crespigny) 44 820 2nd Guards Brigade (Brooke) 40 1136 3rd Guards Brigade (Seymour) 34 928 Divisional Artillery 4 49 Royal Engineers 2 10 R.A.M.C. 1 19 4th Guards Machine-Gun Company -- 4 --- ---- Total 125 2966

On December 5 Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig telegraphed:

I desire to congratulate the Guards Division most warmly on their fine counter-attacks at Gouzeaucourt and Gonnelieu. The promptness of decision and rapidity of action displayed by them were successful in dealing with a difficult situation.

Lieut.-General Sir W. Pulteney sent the following message:

The Corps Commander wishes to express to all ranks of the Guards Division his high appreciation of the prompt manner in which they turned out on 30th November, counter-attacked through a disorganised rabble, and retook Gouzeaucourt. The very fine attack which they subsequently carried out against Quentin Ridge and Gauche Wood, resulting in the capture of these important positions, was worthy of the highest traditions of the Guards.

THE 4TH BATTALION

[Sidenote: Oct.]

[Sidenote: Nov. 9.]

On October 20 the 4th Battalion left the Houthulst Forest area, and went into billets at Le Marais, where the men were comfortably housed. There it remained until November 9, when the march to the south through Fiefs to Averdoingt was commenced. On November 2 Captain C. R. Britten, Lieut. L. R. Abel-Smith, and Lieut. the Hon. A. H. L. Hardinge joined. The village of Averdoingt proved too small for the whole Battalion, and one Company went to La Neuville Planquette, while another was billeted at the Le Haut Barlet Farm.

The transport had been very much reduced, owing, it was said, to the despatch of British Divisions to Italy, and an order was issued restricting the officer’s kit to a minimum of 40 lb., including the valise. But, as the officers never saw their kit after November 23, these regulations made very little difference. Officers and men lived out in the open, exposed to rain and frost, without any change of uniform or underclothes.

[Sidenote: Nov. 17.]

On the 17th the march was continued through Ivergny, Bienvilliers-au-Bois to Achiet-le-Petit, which the Battalion reached on the 20th. There the news was received that the forward movement of the British Army had resulted in a considerable gain of territory, and that the Division was now to continue the advance. Lord Gort sent for the Company Commanders, and explained the details of the operations, which were to take place the following days, giving a sketch of the part to be played by the Guards Division. There was still some distance to go before our men reached the area of operations, and in order to avoid aerial observation the advance was continued by night. The whole Brigade moved in buses through Bapaume and Le Transloy to Rocquigny, and reached Baumetz-les-Cambrai on the 23rd.

The following officers took part in the operations of November 24-28:

Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer. Capt. C. R. Gerard Adjutant. Capt. M. Chapman Intelligence Officer. 2nd Lieut. N. A. Pearce Transport Officer. Capt. H. H. Sloane-Stanley No. 1 Company. Lieut. C. E. Irby ” ” 2nd Lieut. E. H. Tuckwell ” ” Capt. C. R. Britten, M.C. No. 2 Company. 2nd Lieut. R. C. Denman ” ” 2nd Lieut. H. W. Windeler ” ” Lieut. C. S. Nash, M.C. No. 3 Company. 2nd Lieut. F. R. Oliver ” ” 2nd Lieut. G. W. Selby-Lowndes ” ” Capt. G. H. T. Paton, M.C. No. 4 Company. Lieut. E. R. D. Hoare ” ” Lieut. L. R. Abel-Smith ” ” Capt. N. Grellier, M.C., R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.

[Sidenote: Nov. 23.]

The march to Flesquières was very trying, and the whole Brigade had some difficulty in finding the way in the dark. Owing to the constant checks and hesitation, which betrayed the uncertainty of the leaders as to the direction, there were brief halts, not long enough even to allow the men to sit down, then sudden rushes followed again by abrupt halts, and so on for several hours. As a bridge had been blown up by the enemy, the 4th Battalion was forced to go some distance out of its way through Graincourt, which was within 100 yards of the outpost line. Flesquières itself was occupied by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, and the 4th Battalion was billeted just outside the village, in a portion of the famous Hindenburg line, which the Germans had considered impregnable!

Perfectly drained and dry underfoot, the trenches were 15 feet wide and 10 feet deep. The men’s quarters were in dug-outs constructed with massive wooden beams and reinforced concrete, and were fitted with tiers of beds. The communication trenches were perfectly camouflaged with rabbit-wire and boughs, so strongly staked to the side that a man with full equipment could safely use the wire as a bridge. The belt of wire in front of the trenches was 100 yards wide in places, and seemed untouched by shell-fire. The effect of the attack by the tanks was clearly visible, for great rides had been made through the wire, and a number of bodies crushed out of all human semblance lay across the tracks, while groups of dead Germans, killed in the act of flight, lay scattered about between the trenches and the village. The trenches were full of German equipment, abandoned in the panic, and two valuable periscopic observation sets were found by the 4th Battalion, and forwarded to General Headquarters.

The labour entailed in digging this stupendous work, which may fairly be compared in conception and execution to the great Chinese Wall, was clearly beyond the powers of any army actively engaged, however high might have been its discipline and capacity for work. But the problem of how this wonderful result had been achieved was solved when a notice-board was discovered on which was printed “For Russian Prisoners Only.”

BOURLON WOOD

[Sidenote: Nov. 24.]

On the morning of the 24th, a cold, wet day, with a gale blowing, a warning order arrived, instructing the 4th Battalion to move to the neighbourhood of Bourlon Wood. Later this order was cancelled, and the Battalion was told to take over from the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards the position north of Flesquières. It moved into its new position that night, and by midnight the relief was complete. The Battalion Headquarters were in a dug-out, cut out of the solid chalk, and formed a good example of the comfort and luxury in which the Germans had been living. The former occupant of this palatial abode had provided himself with a wardrobe, looking-glass, and other luxuries, and had actually arranged a number of flowering shrubs in pots at the entrance to improve its appearance.

[Sidenote: Nov. 25.]

Early next day the 4th Battalion was placed under the orders of the 119th Infantry Brigade, and was sent up to relieve the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in Bourlon Wood. The Fortieth Division were engaged in the difficult task of capturing Bourlon Wood, and both these Battalions had been lent to Major-General Ponsonby. While Lord Gort went off to Graincourt to report to his new Brigadier, Captain Chapman proceeded with the Intelligence Party to Anneux chapel, to reconnoitre the position to be occupied by the Battalion and the route it was to follow.

By now the Germans had begun to recover from the defeat inflicted on them, and were bringing up a number of guns to bear on our position. Bourlon Wood and Anneux chapel were subjected to a severe shelling, and the 119th Brigade suffered very heavy casualties. The Intelligence Party had been ordered by Colonel Benzie, commanding the forward area round Anneux chapel, to remain in the sunken roads, and were therefore protected from shell-fire; but, when they returned by the road which had been selected for the 4th Battalion to march by, they came in for a certain amount of shelling and lost 2 men, while Captain Chapman himself was slightly wounded. It seemed perfectly clear that, if a small party could be seen by the enemy from Fontaine, a whole battalion would necessarily offer a tempting target to the German artillery. Captain Chapman therefore decided to alter the route, and approach Anneux chapel by another road, leaving Graincourt on the right.

Meanwhile the 4th Battalion, with No. 4 Company under Captain Paton leading, waited in the position held on the previous night, south of La Justice, along the southern edge of the Graincourt――Marcoing road, until the Intelligence Party returned, and then advanced by the new road that had been chosen. For the first 200 yards nothing happened, and then suddenly the enemy put down a heavy barrage across the line of advance. No doubt he imagined that his barrage would effectually prevent any troops coming up; in practice it proved a perfectly useless barrier, for the Battalion took not the slightest notice of it. There was about half a mile to be crossed, on which the shells continually fell, and the Battalion did not even check its pace.

Assuming artillery formation, it went straight through the barrage. Spouts of earth sprang up at the men’s feet as if by magic, and the noise was deafening, but they plodded on. So steady was the behaviour of all ranks that General Ponsonby afterwards issued a special order of the day, stating that the 4th Battalion had come up to his support as steadily as if it had been on parade. It suffered 30 casualties, which, in view of the amount of shell-fire, may be considered astonishingly light.

The following graphic description of these two days was written by Captain M. Chapman in a sketch entitled “Intelligence,” which he began, but which he never lived to finish.

“On the morning of the ―― the Battalion marched up a long wet _pavé_ road in the direction of the gun-flashes and the Véry Lights, whilst the Battalion ‘drums,’ somewhere in the dark, played the tune that Grenadiers call their own, and the C.O. in silence watched his men file by. The test of discipline and training had begun. The figures of the men looked tall and grim, magnified by the shadows cast from the shrouded lanterns of the motor-lorries. The night was dark, and a driving rain soon soaked the tramping men. In an hour’s time you could see by the light of a torch a mist rising from the soaked and perspiring humanity in front.

“A halt was called and men were detailed to pick up bivouac-sheets and petrol-tins of water. The already heavy-laden troops moved on again more slowly with their increased burden, along slippery wooden tracks laid across a field of mud. Another halt. An officer appeared, dripping with moisture, accompanied by guides who took charge of the companies and allotted them their area in which to bivouac.

“To-morrow was zero day, not for the 4th Battalion, but for some one else. If some one else failed, then the Grenadiers would have to put matters straight; that is to say, the Grenadiers were in reserve. The Intelligence Officer gave one last look at the inky darkness, and going down on hands and knees crawled into a long, low-arched dug-out. Sleeping men sprawled across the floor, while at the farther end a solitary candle burned. Picking his way across the recumbent figures he saw the Commanding Officer lying on his back, his head propped against a pack, silently smoking a cigarette and thinking. The Intelligence Officer lay down by his side, and, watching the Adjutant writing orders and speaking down a telephone, fell into a fitful sleep.

“Zero hour for some one else left him cold, unmoved. The accustomed environment of war and great fatigue dull the sensibility of man. The steady roar of countless guns was a pleasing murmur as of rippling water in his sleepy brain.

“A ray of sunlight struggled through the narrow entrance of the dug-out, and the sleeping mass of humanity near the door stirred uneasily. The Intelligence Officer shivered, and, cautiously rising into a stooping posture, crawled out into the open air. The sun was trying to pierce a passage through the heavy ground-mist. The troops were cooking their breakfast and beating their chests with a flapping motion to restore the circulation in their half-frozen limbs.

“On a modern battlefield, lines of wooden ‘duckboards’ run like arteries across the trackless waste towards the front. Up the arteries flow fresh men, new blood, human forms complete; food to support life, ammunition to destroy it. Down the arteries flow ghosts of what yesterday were men, with tissues torn, and muscles rent; gibbering prisoners and men who have been spared to be shattered another day.

“An artery passed the dug-out door. The Intelligence Officer observed the circulation to and from the battlefield, and speculated on the fate of the tide going up, watching the expression on the faces of the advancing and receding groups. The men lazily watched the passing tide, exchanging jokes with friends going either way. Prisoners alone excited interest, but not sufficient to make men move more than a few yards from where they stood.

“French gunners in a wood near by ran hotfoot to see each band of prisoners pass, but our men with British phlegm stayed where they stood, and eyed the foe with casual glance. The passing wounded drew no expression of pity from the onlookers, nor did the fate of the ingoing tide even raise a questioning expression on their faces. This was the last spot where selfishness still reigned supreme――the fringe of the battle. Death and danger were not sufficiently close to draw out the best in man; he behaved as he did in civil life――each man for himself and the devil take the hindmost.

“The men who marched up the endless ribbon to the front looked just like other men, and anxiety for their own safety left no trace in their expression. They might have been the crowd that streams through the factory gates in the early morning. The outgoing men were different. They hastened by and looked neither to the left nor right. They felt that fate had been too good to them and that it might change its mind and rend them if they loitered by the way. They had reached the fringe where the ‘Ego’ was whispering in their ears with insistent voice. They were alive; the others――they might be dead――what matter? They were alive.

“The wounded stared in front of them, except those in pain, and the prisoners looked cowed and miserable. The escorts walked with jaunty air, rifle slung, bayonets fixed, and exchanged jokes with all who would pay attention. The feeling of victory was still in their veins, for the slouching prisoners spurred their pride of race; were they not the symbol of all their friends ‘up there’ had done?

“The stretcher-bearers, intent on their work, passed the fringe of selfishness untouched. The bond of pain and suffering held them fast in unselfishness until the moment when they delivered their charge to the clearing-station in the rear. While other men hurried from the battlefield, these slowly and with aching arms and legs carried their burdens carefully. Human suffering must touch some special chord of self-sacrifice in man. Duty, discipline, and other self-taught virtues would never produce that careful studied plod of the stretcher-bearer under heavy shell-fire, or those deliberate halts to attend to their patients’ needs.

“Thus the second day passed. The Grenadiers were not called upon, but sat in the pit and watched the puppets moving on and off the stage. The Intelligence Officer had the critic’s box and made his notes. The night passed quietly and slowly, the news filtered back that our friends in front had taken all their objectives and that all went well. The morning brought the fateful news that the 4th Battalion was under orders to take over the front line that night, and afterwards to attack. Every one was busy, even the Intelligence Officer, and the passing puppets moved unnoticed. The 4th Battalion prepared to leave the pit and occupy the stage.

“The third day passed quickly in preparation. At 4.30 in the afternoon the first platoon stepped on to the wooden pathway and moved up towards the front. The Intelligence Officer started last, with Battalion Headquarters, while the Commanding Officer and Adjutant and orderlies plodded off alone. The sun had set and it was growing dark. That ribbon of wood which led to the unknown had its advantages, for it gave a hard, though slippery, foothold; but, once you stepped upon it, you became its slave. The Path began to assume a sinister character, when ahead you saw it lead into a wood full of bursting shells. Then it took the form of an endless moving staircase, surely leading to destruction. The serpent of men moved into such a wood. The very name it bore was ominous. No one spoke. The Intelligence Officer noticed his throat was very dry. His heart pumped at the scream of each arriving shell. He continued to move forward as in a dream. At intervals he made way for stretcher cases. The flash of the bursting shells disclosed a row of gun-emplacements. Two gunners pinned under an overturned carriage screamed.

“Still Battalion Headquarters moved on――out of the wood into the open――away from death to what seemed like security. An odd shell or two burst near the path, while others shrieked their way overhead, dealing death somewhere behind. The mind neglected the latter, focussing all attention on the former. The pathway crossed two streams. By now the darkness was complete. A snorting, sobbing noise came from somewhere in front, succeeded by a splashing sound. The path went by a dark and slimy pool, in which the head and ears of a bogged horse waggled this way and that pathetically. Then all was still. A man’s figure could be dimly seen attempting to cut off the pack saddle before it was buried in the slough.

“The wooden track abruptly ended. A white tape feebly glimmered in the dark, hanging loosely between upright iron stakes, rifles driven muzzle down into the sodden soil, and portions of broken branches.

“The Intelligence Officer seized the tape and floundered slowly on. The men behind him breathed heavily, and in quiet tones cursed the water and the mud, the tape and the hand that laid it. Some one tripped. A halt was called. The obstruction proved to be a comrade, some flotsam from the men ahead. He was alive, warm, but inarticulate. A sergeant felt him over in the dark. Some one said, ‘My Gawd, Sir, ’e’s got it through the throat.’ The Intelligence Officer spoke words of promise to the man and left him there. ‘Outgoing troops would pick him up,’ and other well-worn words of comfort, although he knew they might not see him. He felt he was leaving him to die. This is war.

“The tape suddenly ended. Heaps of broken stone disclosed the close proximity of a concrete dug-out. A guide cautiously felt his way into the darkness and presently led the Intelligence Officer down some steps below the ground. At the foot of the steps hung a soaking blanket, behind which a light glimmered feebly. The Intelligence Officer cautiously pulled the blanket to one side, and blinked at the group inside. Two Commanding Officers and two Adjutants were talking. ‘Handing over’ was in process. The outgoing were clearly anxious to be gone; the incoming were anxious not to let them go without knowing what lay before them.

“A succession of officers and orderlies peered through the doorway, saluted and uttered the magic words, ‘Relief complete, Sir,’ and vanished into the outer darkness. Their strained expressions did not belie the full meaning of the sentence. The outgoing C.O. pushing back his chair with a scraping noise said, with a half-apologetic air, he would be off, and he and his satellites vanished. He had laid down his burden; the 4th Battalion had assumed it. His footsteps sounded light and care-free as they died away.

“All that night officers and men groped their way through mud and filth, visiting outposts, distributing rations, each bent on a mission involving the safety and comfort of the other. The Intelligence Officer felt that the atmosphere had changed. The Commanding Officer could have reclined on the German bed in the dug-out, his feet out of the six inches of liquid slush. Actually he spent his time going round the line, four hours of intense physical strain. Shells and bullets do not sound more pleasant because it is dark.

“The Transport Officer might have dumped the rations beyond the barrage and returned to the security of the horse-lines, and the warmth of his valise. As a matter of fact, he led his struggling animals up a broken, shattered road, through the barrage, round the trunks of fallen trees, and delivered his consignment at B.H.Q. The Adjutant might have said with reason that the ration parties had lost their way, that conditions were impossible, but the Intelligence Officer watched him supervise everything in person――in the open. Before dawn the front line was rationed――every post established, no chances taken. The Intelligence Officer saw it all and said: ‘If this is war, some parts of it at least are good.’

“At dawn the next morning he arose and stood shivering in the cold mist. He visited his observation-post, and, watching trenches through his telescope as the sun slowly made its way through the haze, he smiled as he recognised well-known N.C.O.’s and men moving about in the nonchalant manner which all assume before the sniper starts his work, and when tired gunners take their rest. He knew that later he might search for hours and find no movement; all would be hiding in their shell-hole lairs.

“A distant hum reminding him of some gigantic insect, drew his attention from his work, and two aeroplanes appeared, flying very low. In a few minutes the moving figures vanished from the field of view of his telescope. The earth swallowed them up. Then commenced manœuvres that reminded him of sparrow-hawks quartering their haunting ground for prey. The droning insects flew back and forth. No movement was visible on the ground. A hooded head looked over the fuselage of each machine. The Iron Cross showed clearly on the wings. Then warning lights were dropped from each machine. Each light marked the position of a trench and seemed to say, ‘Eat, drink, and be merry, for soon you will die.’ The whole proceeding revolted the men watching from the O.P. They knew the full intent of it. Their imagination heard the scream of the shells which would surely fall where the lights had dropped. They felt for their friends out there. Discovered by their enemies, the hiding men used their weapons viciously. The rattle of machine-guns and rifles was mixed with the drone of the aeroplanes. The pilots knew their work was done. They turned to fly. One of them staggered in his course. The Intelligence Officer watched the machine crash in flames in a distant forest. The hiding men in their shell-holes sat down to wait for the punishment that they knew must come. The Intelligence men watched great spouts of earth rise skywards and listened to the rending crash that came slowly across the intervening space. They longed to help; instead they noted the time and place and entered the information in their Intelligence report.

“Zero was set for 5 A.M., this time a zero that concerned the 4th Battalion alone. The Commanding Officer and the Intelligence Officer moved forward through the darkness to an advanced position at three o’clock in the morning. Here the nerve centre of the 4th Battalion was established. Here would enter the news of battle. The Intelligence Officer established himself in a corner of the new dug-out. His carrier-pigeons made little noises to themselves, while the telephone operators tested and re-tested their lines. The Intelligence Officer’s hand kept wandering to his watch. The Commanding Officer snored. His plans had been truly laid; interference now would be fatal. He was a well-trained soldier, and he slept.

“Five minutes before zero the Intelligence Officer woke the Commanding Officer, and both waited for the well-known throb of innumerable guns. One of them at least thought of his friends waiting to follow up the moving death. What were those others, his enemies, doing? Did they realise what hell would break upon them? Did they suspect the impending stroke?

“The blow fell to the minute. The dug-out rocked. A sheet of flame lit up the sky. A thousand devils seemed to be forging a red-hot band on the earth as far as the eye could see. Their countless hammer-strokes were merged into one loud growling, rumbling noise. Gradually the ear became accustomed to the sound and detected the sharp crack of answering bullets and the rattle of machine-gun fire. Dawn was breaking and eyes were strained to pierce the half-light. Minutes seemed like hours.

“The first messenger arrived at the nerve centre. He brought good news. Others followed. All reported success. The Intelligence Officer took out one of his pigeons, attached a message to its leg, and released it. He noticed how clumsy his handling of the bird had become. The pigeon circled once and flew straight as an arrow in the right direction. This was dramatic, exciting, the cream of war. Then came the sordid side.

“The enemy artillery awoke. Great shells came hurtling through the sky.

“The shelling grew less. The machine-gun fire died away. The enemy was accepting the new situation. We had won; he had lost. Both sides prepared to settle down where they found themselves, too tired to prolong the struggle.

“The Commanding Officer was satisfied with the position. Emerging cautiously from its shelter, the party moved back to the original Battalion Headquarters. As they passed the trenches and the scooped-out holes in which the supports sheltered, inquiries were made as to casualties, and brave words spoken to cheer the exhausted men. The Intelligence Officer, ruminating on death, saw many signs of it. The true value of the body in which for a short period resides the soul of man was brought home to him. Three men crouched in a trench. Two were cooking; some conversation was in progress. The third man sat by their side and took no part. He seemed by his attitude to be thinking deeply, immersed in the solution of a problem. His face was turned away. The attitude was one of puzzled thought.

“The Intelligence Officer made inquiries as to how they had fared. Two of the men looked up; they gave him a friendly smile and told him all they knew. The other sat with his head bent, still studying that inscrutable problem. The Intelligence Officer noticed with a start the colour of his ears, how wax-like in appearance; then he knew in a flash――the man was dead. His comrades did not even explain the fact. They seemed to realise that the figure by their side no longer counted, that the soul and personality were fled, that there was nothing dreadful in the husk that sat there and still seemed one of them. War had taught them what a small thing the body really is, what a matter of indifference whether it is smashed or not. They had learned one thing at least――the proportionate value of the body and the soul.

“That night the 4th Battalion handed over its burden to some one else. It was due to be relieved. The Chaplain had arrived to see to it that the brave dead had decent burial. When it was possible, the Grenadiers always carried down their dead, so that in the future, grouped together, they would stand as a memorial of the cause they fought for, and indicate plainly to future generations how Grenadiers could fight and die――a monument to the power of discipline, self-sacrifice, and pride of race.”

No. 1 Company under Captain Sloane-Stanley, No. 3 under Lieutenant Nash, and No. 4 under Captain Paton, dug themselves in with entrenching tools along the Anneux chapel――Mœuvres road, while No. 2, under Captain Britten, was placed in Anneux chapel itself. The shelling was very violent, and all the roads, by which supplies and supports had to move, were accurately and persistently shelled. The Brigadier, Lord Henry Seymour, came along, quite unconcerned and not even wearing a helmet, to see how these companies were getting on, and told them they might have to move up later into Bourlon Wood. When it got dark snow began to fall, and it became bitterly cold. The position of a lent battalion is by no means an enviable one, and soon orders and counter-orders from different authorities succeeded each other with amazing rapidity. Finally definite orders were sent to the Battalion to take up a position in Bourlon Wood, and at the same time it was placed under the orders of the 186th Brigade. While this move was being carried out, Lieutenant Nash was wounded in the leg and sent back to the dressing-station. In order to keep in touch with the 186th Brigade, Second Lieutenant Tuckwell was sent to Graincourt to act as liaison-officer to General Bradford, V.C.

Bourlon Wood, which covers about 100 acres, might well have been a typical English covert, with its tall trees interspersed with undergrowth about eight feet high. The line to be held consisted of a road running north and south, parallel to the front line. The ground was soaking wet, and the men had to force their way through the dripping leaves and lie out in the wood with no protection of any kind. Digging through the stubborn soil and soaking undergrowth was no easy matter with light entrenching tools, but they soon produced some sort of cover. The Fortieth Division, however, had succeeded in its attack, and so there was nothing for the 4th Battalion to do but to remain in the wood where it was. In the evening, much to the satisfaction of every one, it reverted to the command of the Guards Division. Lieutenant Ingleby, the acting Quartermaster, arrived at Battalion Headquarters at 11 that night, having guided the transport up to Anneux chapel through intense shelling, and reported that Second Lieutenant N. A. Pearce, the transport officer, who had shown great determination and pluck in his efforts to bring all that was wanted up to the men in the trenches, had been killed by a shell. Major-General Feilding received the following message from Major-General Ponsonby:

I wish to express on behalf of my Division my sincere thanks for the support given us on the 24th and 25th by the Battalions of the Guards Division placed at my disposal for the defence of Bourlon Wood, namely the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards.

I should like to bring to your notice particularly the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, who throughout the period prevented the enemy from breaking through the right flank of the position, and assisted in repelling at least two of the enemy’s counter-attacks. I enclose extracts from the report of the Brigadier-General commanding the 119th Infantry Brigade:

“The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards reinforced the firing line, which had become very thin, early in the morning of November 25, and remained in action until they came under the orders of the 186th Infantry Brigade on the night of 26-27th November. All ranks behaved with the utmost gallantry, and assisted to repel at least two German counter-attacks in addition to continual enemy pressure. They inspired all with great confidence.

“The 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards came under my command in the afternoon of the 25th inst. To reach a position of readiness it had to cross the open in artillery formation for a great distance under enemy observation, and were heavily shelled in so doing. The men were as steady as if on parade. To the above-mentioned units I wish to express my gratitude.”

[Sidenote: Nov. 26.]

The next day passed quietly, and the company commanders were able to go in turn to Battalion Headquarters to have some rest. In the evening snow fell heavily, and the men had a cold and uncomfortable night. The 4th Battalion was again to be lent to another brigade, that of General Sergison-Brooke, who received orders to attack Fontaine. It was not actually wanted for the attack, but merely to form a defensive line, on which the assaulting waves could fall back in case of failure.

The enemy put down a heavy barrage on the whole line that night, and Lord Gort sent Captain Chapman to inquire from the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards what was happening, but it proved to be merely the outcome of nervousness on the part of the Germans, and no attack developed. The Battalion moved off at 5.30 A.M., to take up new positions facing east instead of north, at very short notice; and, as the night was very dark and wet and the enemy was so close, the advance into position required some care. In order to prevent any confusion in the jumping-off line, the Battalion was told to occupy a position immediately in rear of the line, and to move up in the line only when the attack had actually started.

ATTACK ON FONTAINE

[Sidenote: Nov. 27.]

In a drizzle of rain, and under an intense enemy barrage, the attack of Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade started at 6.30 in the morning of the 27th. It reached its objective, but the cost was so great, that the survivors found it impossible to maintain the position they had so dearly gained, without reinforcements. So weak were the attacking battalions, that they were in danger of being overwhelmed by counter-attacks. While the 4th Battalion was waiting for orders about 10 A.M., the German counter-attacks began to develop, and fire from the left became very heavy. No. 2 Company under Captain Britten was sent off to secure the left flank of the Division, which seemed to be in a dangerously weak condition. As they came up Second Lieutenant Windeler was killed by a sniper, and Captain Britten himself was wounded in the arm by a rifle bullet. Soon afterwards Second Lieutenant Oliver, who was now in command of No. 3 Company, was severely wounded in the chest, arm, and foot, while going out to bring in a wounded Irish Guardsman. The casualties among other ranks were proportionately heavy.

A warning order arrived from Brigadier-General Sergison-Brooke at 10.30 A.M., preparing the Battalion to supply two companies for the support of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Coldstream, but it seemed doubtful whether a couple of companies, or even four, would be of any use in the circumstances. Captain Gerard, the Adjutant, reported that he had heard from Captain Paton that already the 2nd Guards Brigade was falling back to the original line.

Lord Gort went off at once with Captain Chapman to the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion, and discussed the new situation with Colonel Thorne. They decided that it would be inadvisable, in view of the enemy’s strength, and the absence of any appreciable reserves on our side, to renew the attack, and so use up the 4th Battalion with small chance of success. Orders were accordingly issued for the original line now held by the 4th Battalion to become the line of resistance, under the command of Captain Paton and Captain Sloane-Stanley. That night the 4th Battalion was relieved, and returned to the Hindenburg line at Flesquières.

[Sidenote: Nov. 28.]

On the 28th it marched to Trescault, and pitched a camp on the open ground between the Trescault――Metz road and Havrincourt Wood. The enemy’s aircraft left them no peace, and so the tents were struck the next morning, and pitched again in Havrincourt Wood. The undergrowth was thick, and the cutting of it took some time, but when the camp was finished it proved snug and sheltered.

[Sidenote: Nov. 30.]

The officers had just finished breakfast on the 30th, and were about to inspect their companies, when the news arrived that the Germans had broken through the line near Gonnelieu. It was said that the enemy had been seen marching in fours through Gouzeaucourt. Immediately orders were given for the Battalion to be ready to start at a moment’s notice. Although the men had expected a quiet day, and were quite unprepared, so perfect were the organisation and discipline that in half an hour’s time the Battalion was ready to move off.

Lord Gort’s orders were to concentrate on Metz, and accordingly the Battalion moved off in that direction. The road was full of transport moving in the opposite direction, and with it ran a stream of men looking strangely unlike British soldiers, with no rifles or equipment――wounded and unwounded with incoherent stories, officers half-undressed, gunners with breechblocks in their hands, all with a hunted look. Some high-explosive shells came streaming over, and pitched not far from the road. Lord Henry Seymour with his commanding officers rode on ahead to try and glean some information, while the four battalions of his Brigade marched through Metz, past the beetroot factory and on to the open ground beyond, where they lay down and waited.

ATTACK ON GONNELIEU

About 2.30 P.M. the whole Brigade, in artillery formation, moved off in the direction of Gouzeaucourt, and in the meantime the attack of De Crespigny’s Brigade had been completely successful and required no reinforcements. The direction of the march was consequently slightly changed. The 4th Battalion crossed the Trescault――Gouzeaucourt road, where, thanks to Lieutenant Ingleby, the cookers arrived, and the men were provided with hot food. That night General Walker, commanding the 16th Brigade of the Sixth Division, held a conference at the 4th Battalion Headquarters. His object was to ensure that the 4th Battalion understood his scheme of attack, for if his brigade failed it would have to carry out his plan. The hurried manner in which the attack was planned, and the obviously scanty information on which the plan was based, seemed to indicate that it was not likely to succeed. At 1 A.M. a warning order was issued to the effect that Seymour’s Brigade would assault Gonnelieu, if the attack of the 16th Brigade failed. Lord Gort thereupon wrote out his orders with the very meagre information at his disposal.

To have to select a definite objective after dark made things very difficult, since the final disposition depended upon the attack of the 16th Brigade, and whatever happened an indefinite front line would be the result. If the 16th Brigade succeeded, Seymour’s Brigade would simply relieve it, but if it failed the attack would have to be attempted a second time. These considerations alone made it necessary to work out alternative schemes. Lord Henry Seymour fortunately prepared a detailed plan for the worst event, and fully realised that his Brigade was to be employed in a manner generally accepted as impossible, except in a great emergency, involving the advance of infantry, unsupported by artillery, across the open against an enemy occupying trenches, and houses bristling with machine-guns.

The following officers took part in the attack on Gonnelieu:

Lieut.-Colonel Viscount Gort, D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C. Commanding Officer. Major W. S. Pilcher, D.S.O. 2nd in Command. Capt. C. R. Gerard Adjutant. Capt. M. Chapman Intelligence Officer. Capt. H. H. Sloane-Stanley No. 1 Company. Lieut. C. E. Irby ” ” 2nd Lieut. J. M. Chitty ” ” 2nd Lieut. B. J. Hubbard, M.C. No. 2 Company. 2nd Lieut. R. C. Denman ” ” 2nd Lieut. D. E. A. Horne ” ” Capt. J. B. M. Burke, M.C. No. 3 Company. Lieut. the Hon. A. H. L. Hardinge ” ” Lieut. L. R. Abel-Smith ” ” Capt. G. H. T. Paton, M.C. No. 4 Company. Lieut. B. C. Layton ” ” 2nd Lieut. J. J. M. Veitch ” ”

When the news of the failure of the 16th Brigade’s attack reached Lord Gort, he at once started off with the Battalion, and crossed the Villers Plouich road. On reaching the railway the companies extended, and dug themselves in. There they waited in the dark for zero hour.

The order of battle for Seymour’s Brigade was as follows: The 1st Battalion Welsh Guards on the right and the 4th Battalion Grenadiers on the left were to undertake the attack. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers was in support on the left, and had to protect the left flank as the attack advanced, while the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards had already occupied the high ground about Villers Plouich. In the 4th Battalion No. 2 Company under Second Lieutenant Hubbard on the right and No. 3 under Captain Burke on the left formed the first line. No. 4 Company under Captain Paton was in support, and No. 1 under Captain Sloane-Stanley formed the reserve. Captain Chapman was sent forward to establish a forward Battalion Headquarters.

[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]

Without any artillery preparation the attack started at 6.30 A.M. It was still fairly dark, but the Germans could see enough to use their machine-guns with considerable accuracy. The line of advance was over open ground, up a gentle slope leading to Gonnelieu, and there was no cover or protection of any kind for the attackers. On came the leading companies of the 4th Battalion in perfect order. The men never wavered for an instant, though they knew that they were to be sacrificed to save the situation. They all understood that the rules of modern warfare were to be defied, and that instead of following a creeping barrage they were to advance across the open, with not even a preliminary bombardment. Though they knew this, they never faltered.

The enemy’s machine-gun fire when it broke over them was terrible, like a driving hailstorm, but the pace was never checked for a moment. Especially on the right the fire was terrific, and No. 2 Company, which had gone rather too far in that direction, suffered heavy losses: one platoon was practically wiped out. Second Lieutenant Hubbard himself was killed, and Second Lieutenant Denman was mortally wounded, gallantly attempting to silence a German machine-gun, while Second Lieutenant Horne was also wounded. No. 3 Company under Captain Burke maintained its direction, and had few casualties until it came up close to the village. On reaching a road running in the direction of Vacquerie, it had to pause for a moment to allow No. 4 to come up before continuing its advance. Second Lieutenant Veitch had his thigh smashed by a bullet, and fell back into a shell-hole. Almost simultaneously a man shot through the head fell on the top of him, and being too weak to move the dying man, for twelve hours he remained in this cramped position.

The left of the line met with less resistance than the right, and so got far in advance. No. 3 Company dashed forward into the outskirts of Gonnelieu, but the village seemed almost impregnable against infantry unsupported by tanks or artillery. A small enclosure sheltered by ruined buildings was the only protected spot, the ground all round it was swept by machine-gun fire, and of course the shrubs and rank grass were no cover at all. Captain Burke dashed in on the left, and penetrated into the eastern outskirts of Gonnelieu, while Lieutenant Hardinge with a few men got round to the north of the village, and brought up a Lewis gun to a position in the cemetery. This had a most disconcerting effect on the enemy, for it threatened his right flank, and enfiladed the troops opposing Nos. 2 and 4 Companies.

The Germans quickly grasped the fact that this movement on Lieutenant Hardinge’s part required immediate action. They managed to press back the troops on the left of the Brigade, with a view of enfilading the cemetery. With great ingenuity they worked round with their machine-guns, and soon Lieutenant Hardinge’s position became untenable. All his men were killed or wounded with the exception of Sergeant Hull. Then the gun jammed. There was now nothing to be done but to get back as best he could, and being luckily only slightly wounded, he was able to make his way back, accompanied by Sergeant H. Hull.

Meanwhile Lieutenant L. Abel-Smith and Sergeant Williams went down a line of huts to the right, to see if an advance could be made in that direction, but were met with a withering fire from the right flank. With two platoons they therefore advanced a short distance down the centre of the village, but the enemy’s machine-gun fire was so fierce that the ground over which they crawled was plastered with bullets. Some men, who were creeping along behind a wall, were killed by bullets which pierced the brickwork, and Lieutenant L. Abel-Smith himself was wounded.

This most gallant attempt on the part of No. 3 Company to capture the village resulted in such heavy losses that it was obvious it would have to retire. A German counter-attack as it was attempting to consolidate its position settled the matter. A certain number of men managed to get back, but most of them were killed or taken prisoners, including Captain Burke himself, who died fighting to the last. The same fate befell Second Lieutenant Chitty, who, with a party of No. 1 Company, had succeeded in entering the village.

Captain Paton with No. 4 Company had the difficult task of deciding what he should do, on reaching the trench in front of Gonnelieu. No. 3 had gone on into the outskirts, and there was no sign of the Welsh Guards on his right. It was obvious that his best plan would be to hold the trench until the others came up into line, so that at least those who had gone on would have a strong supporting line to retire to. But there was a mixed medley of men on his left, who seemed to be wavering in the face of the counter-attack. Captain Paton thereupon leaped out of his trench, and ran across the open, with machine-gun bullets ploughing up the ground all round him. With almost reckless bravery he went from trench to trench in full sight of the German machine-gunners, encouraging these groups of men from various regiments. At first he seemed to have almost a charmed life, and his splendid example inspirited all who saw him. The situation was saved, and he fell soon afterwards mortally wounded. For this conspicuous act of gallantry he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. Captain Gerard, the Adjutant, who came up to obtain information for Lord Gort, found that owing to Captain Paton’s efforts the left flank was secure.

It was now clear that without considerable reinforcements and unlimited sacrifices the village could not be taken. The enemy’s machine-guns were too strong. The Germans were counter-attacking, and were able to overpower any parties that had gained a footing in the village. Only one of the fourteen tanks that had been expected appeared, and, although it was undoubtedly a great help to the Welsh Guards, it was quite inadequate by itself. The Brigade on the left and the Welsh Guards on the right had been held up, so that even had the Battalion taken the village they would not have been able to hold it. A German officer captured that day stated that his battalion had attacked from behind Gonnelieu at 6 A.M., and as our attack started at 6.30 they had been completely disorganised by our advance, which they imagined was a counter-attack delivered with amazing rapidity.

Captain Sloane-Stanley, who had come up with No. 1 Company, determined to consolidate the trench immediately in front of Gonnelieu, so that it might be held with what remained of the attacking Companies. Lieutenant Irby of the same Company held a block in the trench against persistent bombing attacks, and eventually knocked out a German machine-gun by counter-bombing. Lord Gort himself now came up to see exactly how matters stood, and walked about, as he always did on such occasions, with an absolute disregard for all danger. It was not long, however, before he was severely wounded; the only wonder was that he had not been hit before. There were many acts of individual bravery, and perhaps the gallantry displayed by Sergeants Canham and Buckle was one of the most conspicuous. At one time, when the enemy were advancing dangerously near our line, these two sergeants left their trench, and charged. The Germans, imagining that these two wore only the foremost of a large party, fled in confusion.

Major Pilcher, who now assumed command of the 4th Battalion, was confronted with a very difficult situation. The sadly depleted ranks of the Battalion were holding the trench in front of Gonnelieu, and there were only three officers left――Captain H. Sloane-Stanley, Lieutenant Layton, and Lieutenant Irby. The tactical position was hazardous in the extreme, for both flanks were in the air and dangerously large gaps in the line seemed to invite a German attack. When the troops on the left retired, Major Pilcher called on the 1st Battalion Grenadiers to send up one Company to his assistance, and Captain Rhodes was sent to form a defensive flank. Later, when further assistance was required, two more Companies under Captain Spence and Captain Lawford advanced down the sunken road, and prolonged the line to the left. This timely assistance undoubtedly saved the left flank of the 4th Battalion, and enabled it to maintain its position.

[Sidenote: Dec. 3.]

The line now formed a salient in front of Gonnelieu; the apex being held by the 4th Battalion with some men of the Northants Labour Battalion. On the left was the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, which formed a defensive flank, while the Welsh Guards écheloned back to the right. This position was maintained until December 3, when the 4th Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, which latter had been due the night before. Owing to the delay the already exhausted officers and men had to spend a further twenty-four hours in the trenches, exposed to a hard frost. It was only through almost superhuman efforts that they received their rations on the morning of the 2nd, as the failure to relieve them had upset all arrangements for supply.

On the night of the 3rd they marched back, and bivouacked in the open on some ground north of Gouzeaucourt Wood, where they remained ready, in case their services should be required.

When the Guards Division left the area of operations near Gouzeaucourt, the 4th Battalion proceeded to Etricourt, where they entrained for Laherliere. Thence they marched to Gouy-en-Artois, and were placed in comfortable billets in a château. On December 11 they proceeded to Dainville, where they remained till the end of the month training. The weather became very cold and misty, and later there was a good deal of snow. On the 23rd the following officers joined the Battalion: Lieutenant F. C. Lyon, the Hon. C. C. S. Rodney, Second Lieutenant B. R. Osborne, Second Lieutenant R. D. Richardson, and Second Lieutenant C. J. Dawson-Greene.

THE 1ST BATTALION

[Sidenote: 1st Batt. Nov.]

After the operations at Bixschoote in October, the 1st Battalion remained in billets at Zudroue, near Watten. During this period the following officers joined the Battalion: Lieutenant I. C. Gascoigne, Second Lieutenant D. B. Topham, Lieutenant R. D. Lawford, Second Lieutenant A. H. Forbes, Second Lieutenant C. Cruttenden, and Lieutenant H. G. Wiggins. Captain H. H. Castle, R.A.M.C., also arrived to take the place of Captain P. H. Wells, R.A.M.C. While the Battalion was at Zudroue, the Colonel of the Regiment, Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, paid them a visit.

On November 9 the move south began, and the 1st Battalion marched to Enquin-les-Mines, continuing its march on the following day to Fabain Palfart, and then on to Foolinricametz. Second Lieutenant S. J. Hargreaves joined from the base on the 15th. The march was continued on the 17th through Ivergny Pommier to Achiet-le-Petit, where the men had twenty-four hours’ rest. The greatest secrecy was preserved, and no orders were issued to the Company Commanders till the last moment, though from the great concentration of troops it seemed clear that some big move was impending. The 1st Battalion was brought up in buses to Beaumetz-les-Cambrai, and from there it marched with the rest of Seymour’s Brigade to Flesquières. Though two Battalions of the Brigade were sent up to support the Fortieth Division, which was taking Bourlon Wood, the 1st Battalion did not take part in these operations. On the night of the 27th the 1st Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, assisted by two Companies from the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, relieved the 2nd Guards Brigade in the front line. The following officers took part in these operations:

Lieut.-Colonel M. E. Makgill-Crichton- Maitland, D.S.O. Commanding Officer. Capt. L. G. Fisher-Rowe, M.C. Second in Command. Lieut. W. H. Lovell, M.C. Acting Adjutant. Lieut. L. de J. Harvard King’s Company. Lieut. J. A. Lloyd ” ” 2nd Lieut. J. H. Frere ” ” Capt. A. T. G. Rhodes No. 2 Company. 2nd Lieut. L. G. Byng ” ” 2nd Lieut. E. G. Hawkesworth ” ” 2nd Lieut. W. U. Timmis ” ” Capt. P. M. Spence, M.C. No. 3 Company. Lieut. H. G. Wiggins ” ” Lieut. S. J. Hargreaves ” ” 2nd Lieut. C. Cruttenden ” ” Capt. R. D. Lawford No. 4 Company. Lieut. the Hon. P. P. Cary ” ” 2nd Lieut. C. C. Mays ” ” Lieut. N. G. Chamberlain ” ” Capt. H. H. Castle, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.

Conditions were favourable for carrying out the relief, and the next day passed without incident, although the enemy continued to shell the valley south of Bourlon Wood. On the evening of the 28th the 3rd Guards Brigade, having been relieved by the Fifty-ninth Division, marched to the reserve trenches south-west of Ribecourt. Next day it proceeded to Havrincourt Wood. A camp was pitched, and to make way for the tents it was necessary to clear away the undergrowth, which so delayed matters that it was not till 10 P.M. that every one had settled down.

[Sidenote: Nov. 30.]

Barely had the officers finished breakfast on the morning of the 30th, when rumours reached them that the Germans had broken through the line. At first no one believed this possible, and, as the camp was quite five miles from our front line, a further report that the Germans were not far off was received with incredulity. But soon small parties of men were seen coming over the hill, as well as gunners and horses without guns. By degrees these isolated parties became a mob, and the road was blocked by a torrent of transport and men. A few shells pitched not far from the camp, and confirmed the news of the approach of the Germans. At the same time there arrived a warning order to be ready to move at a moment’s notice, and soon the whole camp was filled with bustle and excitement.

The first warning said that Seymour’s Brigade was to be ready to take up a defensive position on the ridge of Havrincourt Wood. This was cancelled later, and the Brigade was told to concentrate at a point near Metz. As soon as the order was confirmed, the 1st Battalion moved off to join the rest of the Brigade on the Trescault――Metz road. The march was trying, as the road was blocked with traffic, all moving in the opposite direction. At some points the Brigade encountered as many as three limbers abreast. Sometimes, therefore, the troops had to go in single file through a mass of vehicles and men, and then to double so as to keep touch with those in front. Being on a hill, the road was clearly visible for miles, and the Germans soon started hammering it with high-explosive shells, which added to the general confusion. It requires a very highly disciplined force to move quickly against such a stream as this was, but the men never checked their pace for a moment. Spades and shovels were drawn in Metz, and the whole Brigade was soon ready to advance in artillery formation. The 1st Battalion followed the Welsh Guards across country in the direction of Gouzeaucourt and Villers Plouich. Brigadier-General Lord Henry Seymour rode on in front with his Staff.

ATTACK ON GONNELIEU

The position taken up by the Brigade was just under the crest of the ridge, running north from Gouzeaucourt Wood, and the 1st Battalion bivouacked for the night within half a mile of the camp in Havrincourt Wood, where the stores and transport had remained. As the night was bitterly cold, one blanket per man and the officers’ trench kits were fetched, and eventually, when the cookers came up, tea and porridge was given out to the men.

[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]

At 4 A.M., after the Company Commanders had returned from reconnoitring, orders were issued for the 1st Battalion to move by Companies in artillery formation, and take up a line on the railway between Gouzeaucourt on the right and Villers Plouich on the left. By 9 A.M. the Companies were in position: No. 2, under Captain Rhodes, on the right and in touch with the 4th Battalion Grenadiers; No. 3, under Captain Spence, in the centre; No. 4, under Captain Lawford, on the left; and the King’s Company, under Lieutenant Harvard, in reserve.

Both the railway and a sunken road which ran parallel with it were shelled incessantly by the enemy, while machine-gun bullets also swept down the line from the direction of Gonnelieu. The 4th Battalion Grenadiers and the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards were ordered to undertake the attack, while the 1st Battalion was to be in support, and guard the left flank as the advance progressed. At 6.20 A.M. the attack began, and a rather feeble bombardment was continued for ten minutes by three Brigades of R.F.A. Twenty-two tanks had been allotted to the Division, eight of which were to co-operate with Seymour’s Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel Maitland summoned the four Company Commanders to Battalion Headquarters, and they started off just as the Germans were putting down a heavy barrage on the railway. As they made their way along the embankment, shells were pitching among the men, and causing groups of casualties. As soon as any reinforcements were wanted, Captain Rhodes was to take his Company up the sunken road from Gouzeaucourt to Gonnelieu. No. 3 and No. 4 Companies were to advance across the open, so as to be near at hand when called upon. The Company Commanders scrambled back to their Companies, and explained the general idea to their Platoon Commanders as far as time would permit. It was a trying time for the men, who had to sit still as mere targets for the German gunners, and watch their comrades again and again being blown to pieces. They felt that even an advance under machine-gun fire would have been preferable.

As soon as the attack started, the 1st Battalion advanced under a hail of bullets, although there was no artillery fire, and many men fell at once. The 4th Battalion Grenadiers, which it supported, was at first so successful that it outstripped the troops on the left, and consequently had that flank in the air. Lord Henry Seymour sent orders to the 1st Battalion to secure the high ground to the north of Gonnelieu, hoping that by this means it would not only secure the left flank of the 4th Battalion, but also materially assist it to hold the village. The 1st Battalion had therefore to advance half left, and after going about 600 yards it was joined by men of various regiments.

Complete success attended the first part of the attack, and the three leading Companies, by a free use of the bayonet, captured the first German trench they reached. It was then necessary to “mop up,” and clear all possible hiding-places where any Germans might be lurking. Apparently the enemy had been taken unawares, and there were traces everywhere of surprise and precipitate flight. One German officer was caught while changing his clothes, and had nothing on but a shirt. The men stood up, and fired their rifles from the shoulder at the retreating Germans, and the Lewis gunners did their work well. A large number of the enemy were killed, and 110 prisoners were taken. No. 3 Company, under Captain Spence, was on the right, in touch with the 4th Battalion, and No. 4, under Captain Lawford, on the left, in touch with the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. No. 2, under Captain Rhodes, in the centre, had the most difficult task, as it had continually to swing round to keep up with the Companies on either flank.

Having succeeded so well with the first trench, the 1st Battalion continued its advance until it arrived at a well-wired trench north of Gonnelieu. The three leading Companies managed to get through gaps in the wire, and push on, but when they topped the ridge they were met with a terrific machine-gun fire, which staggered them, and caused many casualties. It seemed madness to advance in the open against well-posted machine-guns, and orders were therefore given to withdraw to the trench they had already gained. In the meantime five tanks were seen advancing up to the ridge south of Gonnelieu; three of them were put out of action before they reached the village, and none were able to enter the village itself. Captain Spence, finding that his Company had run short of ammunition, sent back a small party to fetch some from Battalion Headquarters.

During the last advance Lieutenant Chamberlain, who had gone on too far, had been either cut off or killed, and half of No. 2 Company, having gone astray, was nowhere to be seen. The whole line in fact had been bent to a semicircle, and needed reorganising. Lieutenant Wiggins was sent by Captain Spence to get touch with No. 2, which should have been on his right, and, after hunting about for some time, reported that he could find no trace of this half-Company. At the same time Second Lieutenant Cruttenden went off to find Lieutenant Chamberlain, and after a fruitless search was shot through the lungs by a sniper. By degrees every one got into his right place, and the missing half of No. 2 Company was retrieved by Captain Rhodes.

As soon as it became dark, began the difficult task of collecting the wounded and getting them down to the dressing-station. The stretcher-bearers worked indefatigably all night, and were assisted by any men who could be spared. Another search-party, under Sergeant Porter, went out to find Lieutenant Chamberlain, but was no more successful than the first.

Next day the Battalion remained in the same position, but two platoons were sent off to reinforce the line held by the 4th Battalion. That night the 1st Battalion was relieved, partly by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, and partly by a battalion of the 183rd Brigade, and was sent off to relieve the Welsh Guards. As the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards did not arrive till dawn, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies had to hold on all night. There was a rumour that Seymour’s Brigade would continue the attack on Gonnelieu the next day, but nothing came of it. On December 3 the whole position was severely shelled, and there were several casualties, including Lieutenant Bevan, who was wounded.

In the evening the Battalion was relieved, and retired to Gouzeaucourt, where it remained in reserve. On the 6th it moved to Etricourt, where Second Lieutenant F. H. Ennor and Second Lieutenant R. C. Bruce arrived, and on the 11th it retired to Arras, where it remained till the end of the month. Second Lieutenant A. Forbes and Second Lieutenant V. A. N. Wall rejoined from the Reinforcement Battalion on the 16th.

THE 2ND BATTALION

[Sidenote: 2nd Batt.]

For the rest of October the 2nd Battalion remained at Tournehem in the area between St. Omer and Calais, carrying out training of all kinds. Lieutenant O. Martin Smith and Lieutenant S. T. S. Clarke arrived on the 18th.

[Sidenote: Nov.]

On November 11 the Battalion with the rest of De Crespigny’s Brigade started their march south, through Herbelle, Lairs, and La Thieulloye. A Divisional Reinforcement Battalion was now formed. This was a new idea, which had gradually come to be adopted, whenever an attack was impending, and which had been rendered necessary by the large numbers of all ranks who were left behind whenever offensive operations were undertaken. Companies at that time neither attacked nor went into the line with a greater average strength than 32 other ranks per platoon and 3 officers per Company, and the Reinforcement Battalion was designed to take charge of the remainder. Though some such scheme was doubtless necessary, its application inevitably proved chaotic, for a hurriedly improvised Battalion Staff administered by the A. and Q. branches, who were themselves always at their busiest time, when the Reinforcement Battalion came into existence, hardly made an ideal administrative machine. From the Battalion point of view the result was desperate. All ranks returning from leave were usually detained at the Reinforcement Battalion, so that it was never known from day to day what officers, N.C.O.’s, and men would be available for duty, nor was it possible to obtain appropriate substitutes to fill deficiencies caused by sickness.

On the 13th there was a Divisional Conference, which was attended by the Brigadiers and Commanding Officers, when Major-General Fielding outlined the future operations. After four days spent at La Thieulloye the Battalion marched to Manin, and on the 18th went into camp between Blaireville and Hendecourt. There the Commanding Officer held a conference, at which he explained the scope and intention of the forthcoming operations. On the 19th the Battalion marched by night from Blaireville, through Hamelincourt and Ervillers, to a tented camp at Gomiecourt. A full moon lit the road, and the Battalion was in great spirits, all the companies singing on the march, and all ranks feeling the suppressed excitement which precedes an attack. The road passed through an area which the Battalion was to know very well four months later, when it was called upon to stem the German onslaught.

After two nights in this camp the Battalion proceeded in buses to huts near Barastre, where it was quartered in very comfortable billets. It was nearly dawn by the time the troops settled down, as the journey had been slow and laborious owing to the congestion on the roads, which, though deserted by day, were crowded with men and vehicles from dark to dawn.

November 23rd was one of the most remarkable days in the Battalion’s experience. Starting from camp near Barastre in the dark at 5.30 A.M., it marched through Velu to a field on the western outskirts of Doignies, which was reached about 9.30 A.M. Here the men drew bivouac-sheets, and set to work to make provision for the night, having been told that no move would be undertaken that day, whilst the Commanding Officer and most of the Company Commanders went out to reconnoitre various routes. Early in the afternoon an order was received that the Battalion would be required to move at short notice, and that it would relieve a Battalion in the line that night. Marching orders were issued, and bivouac-sheets returned. Shortly after 7 P.M. an order was received that the Battalion was to march off immediately; it was not known what Battalion was to be relieved, nor where it was, but it was said that definite orders would be received at the Canal du Nord. General de Crespigny had gone off to reconnoitre the forward area, and had not returned.

The whole of De Crespigny’s Brigade and part of Seymour’s Brigade were found to be on the same track, and as it was already congested by the passage in both directions of ammunition limbers, ambulances, and traffic of every description, progress was slow and wearisome. During the course of the march, the Lewis-gun limbers, which had started with the Battalion, but had become slightly separated in the press of the traffic, were diverted by a Staff Officer. The Battalion Headquarters were not informed of this, and consequently it was not until some time after their departure that the absence of the guns became known. On reaching the Canal crossing at Lock 7 the Battalion halted, and the men fell out on the side of the road to snatch a few minutes’ sleep, while Captain A. Penn, the Adjutant, rode forward to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Follett, who was commanding the Brigade in the temporary absence of General de Crespigny. From Colonel Follett it was learnt that the Brigade to be relieved was in the neighbourhood of Cantaing. Lieut.-Colonel Rasch thereupon rode forward to find the outgoing Battalion, to arrange for guides, and to borrow Lewis guns, while the Battalion wearily followed the road through Graincourt. The men who were not required to take part in the operations were diverted from the main body, and sent off under Lieutenant Drummond and Lieutenant Layland-Barratt, to find their way to Ribecourt. The march was undisturbed, and the night quiet, save on the hill crowned by Bourlon Wood, which all night was intermittently shelled.

Near Brigade Headquarters at La Justice Farm, north of Orival Wood, the Battalion met guides from the 9th Battalion Royal Scots (152nd Brigade), which was holding the first line on the eastern outskirts of Cantaing. Thanks to the admirable arrangements made by this Battalion, which had been heavily engaged for some days past, the remainder of the relief passed off without difficulty. Just before daylight the Battalion completed a relief, which the Royal Scots at any rate believed to be impossible of achievement, in view of the demands it made on the endurance of the men, who had been on the move almost unceasingly for twenty-four hours.

When once the relief was complete, the tour passed without incident, except that Lieutenant Alexander was wounded in the hand, whilst throwing from the slit he was occupying an enemy grenade, which had fallen unexploded among his men.

No. 2 Company was on the right, stretching towards Bois Neuf, and in touch with the 8th Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment; No. 4 on the left held a line of posts just east of the Cantaing――Fontaine road, facing La Folie Wood, and in touch with the 1st Battalion Irish Guards, which stretched towards Bourlon Wood; No. 1 was in support, and No. 3 in reserve. Everywhere there were signs of the rapidity with which the British attack had swept the enemy from his trenches, and derelict and charred tanks, scattered in all directions, bore evidence of the stubborn resistance with which our advance had been met. The country was open and undulating, and the spires of Cambrai were distinctly visible in the clear wintry light. On the 26th the Battalion was relieved, and marched back in a blinding snowstorm to Ribecourt, passing the Battalions of the 2nd Guards Brigade, on their way to carry out the attack on Fontaine-Notre-Dame. The night spent at Ribecourt was one of the most miserable passed by the Battalion. Soaked by the snowstorm, through which they had marched from Cantaing, and sodden with mud from the line, the men, whose blankets and greatcoats had been stored when the advance began, found no accommodation but a few leaky shelters in the Hindenburg Line. All the dug-outs with any possibilities of comfort had already been occupied by the swarm of troops following the advance. In the afternoon of the 28th, orders were received to march to billets in Metz, and thither the Battalion went in the evening, finding on its arrival rather cramped but quite comfortable quarters.

THE CAPTURE OF GOUZEAUCOURT

At daybreak on 30th November the sound of a heavy bombardment on a wide front made it clear that the enemy was undertaking a counter-attack. At the same time a long-range gun began to drop shells into Metz, where the Battalion was resting, causing casualties to the troops billeted there. The village street was quickly choked with a miscellaneous rabble of soldiers of every kind, all streaming back in hopeless confusion, and spreading rumours of a break-through by the enemy. Soon after 9 A.M. a message was received from General de Crespigny that the Third Corps was being heavily attacked at Gonnelieu, about four miles away, and ordering the Battalion to move at short notice. At 10.30 Lieut.-Colonel Rasch was told to march the Battalion towards Gouzeaucourt, and to clear Metz by 12.25 P.M. He handed over the command of the Battalion to Captain Harcourt-Vernon, and rode off to the Brigade Headquarters to get as much information as possible.

The following officers took part in these operations:

Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. Commanding Officer. Capt. G. C. FitzH. Harcourt-Vernon Second in Command. Capt. A. H. Penn Adjutant. Lieut. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. No. 1 Company. 2nd Lieut. P. A. A. Harbord, M.C. ” ” 2nd Lieut. S. H. Pearson ” ” Lieut. F. A. M. Browning No. 2 Company. Lieut. F. H. G. Layland-Barratt, M.C. ” ” 2nd Lieut. F. H. J. Drummond, M.C. ” ” Lieut. A. W. Acland, M.C. No. 3 Company. Lieut. F. A. Magnay ” ” Lieut. R. Y. T. Kendal ” ” Lieut. G. R. Westmacott No. 4 Company. Lieut. W. H. S. Dent ” ” Lieut. F. P. Loftus ” ” Capt. J. A. Andrews, M.C. Medical Officer.

Half a mile from Metz, Lieut.-Colonel Rasch and the Company Commanders, who had preceded the Battalion, rejoined, with the news that De Crespigny’s Brigade was to advance immediately towards Gouzeaucourt, which was reported to be in the hands of the Germans: the 1st Battalion Irish Guards on the north of the Gouzeaucourt――Metz road, the 3rd Battalion Coldstream in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion Coldstream on the right; the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers in Brigade support.

The whole countryside was by this time dotted with men retiring, and the A.P.M. at the Metz cross-roads was busily engaged in dealing with stragglers; throughout the advance of the Brigade no trace was seen of any defending infantry. On clearing the village, the Battalion assumed artillery formation, and advanced to Gouzeaucourt Wood, a low scrubby plantation crowning the ridge which bisects the ground lying between Metz and Gouzeaucourt. Here the Battalion waited full of anxious curiosity. Shelling caused a few casualties, but the protection of the rising ground sheltered it from the rifle and machine-gun fire, directed at the leading battalions, which were now advancing towards Gouzeaucourt village. The capture of Gouzeaucourt was a fine achievement carried out with wonderful precision. So successful was it that the Battalion was never required: by nightfall the village had been completely cleared of the enemy, and all British stores had been recovered. When it was known that the Battalion was not likely to be called upon until the next day, cookers were brought up, and provision for the cold night was made as far as possible.

CAPTURE OF GAUCHE WOOD

[Sidenote: Dec. 1.]

At 2.30 A.M. General de Crespigny received orders to attack and capture Gauche Wood, in co-operation with Seymour’s Brigade on the left, and the cavalry on the right. The objective of the Battalion was the eastern edge of Gauche Wood, and the 3rd Battalion Coldstream was to be on the left. This wood was oblong in shape, and measured approximately 700 by 300 yards; its nearest corner was about 1200 yards from the line which the Brigade had taken up the night before. Orders were written and explained to the Company Commanders. The Battalion was to form up behind a sunken road on the eastern outskirts of Gouzeaucourt village, which then constituted the front line. Twenty tanks were allotted to the Brigade, but as there seemed grave doubt as to whether they would be able to reach their rendezvous at so short notice, companies were ordered not to wait for them.

In the 2nd Battalion the attack was undertaken by No. 1 Company under Lieutenant Cornforth on the right, and No. 3 under Lieutenant Acland on the left, each in two lines of two platoons, followed at a distance of 250 yards by No. 4 under Lieutenant Westmacott, and No. 2 under Lieutenant Browning, in similar formation. Lieut.-Colonel Rasch went on ahead with the Company Commanders to reconnoitre the forming-up ground, whilst the Battalion followed after breakfast, and picked up tools on the way. At 6.30 the artillery support, which was most attenuated, opened and searched the wood and the ravine behind it. No tanks had yet put in an appearance, and, after giving them ten minutes’ grace, the attack was launched without them.

The enemy retaliated with a heavy barrage, most of which fortunately fell behind the advancing troops, but the machine-gun fire made it doubtful whether any one would ever reach the wood. When the attack opened, all four companies advanced at a great pace over the intervening grass land, which rose in a gentle slope up to the wood. It is difficult to understand why, with the machine-guns posted at the edge of the wood, the enemy did not wipe out the whole Battalion. Ignoring all regulations about short rushes, both officers and men went straight for the wood as fast as they could. They instinctively felt that the only chance was to cover the mile of naked slope in the shortest possible time. In all probability the German machine-gunners in the half-light of the morning became flurried, at seeing this formidable attack sweeping over the ground, for, although the fire was very hot, the bullets passed over the men’s heads, and it was not until they had nearly reached the wood that casualties occurred. Here the fringe of German machine-guns, established at the edge of the wood, began to take heavy toll, and then began perhaps the fiercest fighting of all. When the leading companies reached the wood, it became a struggle of man to man. But the Germans soon found that with the bayonet they were no match for the Grenadiers. Back into the wood they were forced, and then-down into a hollow in the centre of it. Their machine-guns were all captured, and, although some fought stubbornly, most of them were driven slowly up the incline on the far side into the corner of the wood. Second Lieutenant Pearson was killed as he went through the wood, and Second Lieutenant Harbord, whilst most gallantly rushing a machine-gun, received wounds from which he died later in the day. Lieutenants Cornforth, Drummond, Dent, Kendal, Acland, and Magnay were all wounded, and the Battalion lost many valuable N.C.O.’s.

This left Lieutenant Browning and Lieutenant Westmacott responsible for the whole Battalion front, and to them the success of the attack was largely due. Between them they reorganised and controlled the whole line, making their dispositions with great skill. On reaching the wood, Lieutenant Westmacott faced part of his company to the right flank, to guard against a counter-attack from the south. Hardly had he done so when about seventy Germans appeared; they were met with steady rifle-fire from the wood, and wavered for a moment, uncertain as to what they should do, but they finally made for the wood. Our fire, however, was too steady for them, and accounted for all but a handful of men, who were taken prisoners. Soon afterwards another party of sixty appeared from the same direction, but they also were met with so well-directed a fire that they were staggered, whereupon the men of No. 4 Company charged them with the bayonet.

Lieutenant Westmacott now decided that he must push his men farther forward on the right flank of the wood, so as to command the valley, which lay between the wood and the village of Villers Guislain. He had just moved forward his company, and prolonged the right with two platoons of No. 2 Company, when some dismounted cavalry, consisting of the 18th Bengal Lancers and a detachment of the 7th Dragoon Guards, appeared from the same direction as the enemy attacks. Their orders had not enabled them to attack simultaneously with the 2nd Battalion, and it was in all probability this delayed advance that precipitated the two unfruitful attempts of the enemy to gain the wood. Their arrival was of the greatest value, and at Lieutenant Westmacott’s suggestion they proceeded to reinforce the other companies, which were meanwhile fighting their way through the wood. Several tanks had by now put in an appearance, although the majority had been knocked out before they reached the wood, by a most accurate shell-fire directed by a low-flying aeroplane. The lack of any particular trench for the surviving tanks to attack made their fire ineffectual, and their presence seemed to attract the shells of all the German batteries in the neighbourhood, causing many casualties in the Battalion.

Lieutenant Layland-Barratt, who had been assisting Lieutenant Browning to reorganise the companies in the wood, was wounded by a splinter of a shell, and had to retire to a dressing-station. This left only Lieutenant Browning in the wood, and Lieutenant Westmacott and Lieutenant Loftus outside.

Lieut.-Colonel Rasch went up to the line, and organised a readjustment of the companies. Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Corbyn, commanding the 18th Bengal Lancers, was asked to withdraw his men to the centre of the wood so as to form a reserve, and dig a support line on some commanding ground in the wood. The dash and fighting spirit of all ranks of this regiment, and the help and experience which Colonel Corbyn gave at that critical moment, made the greatest impression on the Battalion, and enabled the Grenadiers to realise how great a loss his regiment suffered, when he was killed by a shell later in the afternoon.

In a letter describing this attack an officer of the 18th Bengal Lancers wrote:

We then occupied the captured trench sandwiched in between the Grenadiers and Coldstream.… I have now seen His Majesty’s Guards in action and fought alongside of them, and I take off my hat to them. They can die like gentlemen, without a groan. Four of our men were carrying a Guardsman who appeared to be suffering considerably. I asked him who he was, and he instinctively straightened himself as best he could and said, “A Grenadier,” his tone implying how proud he was to be one, and, what I also thought, “how magnificent they were.”

The comradeship between the two regiments was later marked by the presentation of a Grenadier Bugle, with an inscription, which the Battalion gave to the 18th Bengal Lancers. Subsequently the Lancers presented the 2nd Battalion with a silver statuette of a mounted Bengal Lancer, on the plinth of which was the following inscription: “To Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O., and Officers of the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, as a memento of Gauche Wood.”

On the return of Lieut.-Colonel Rasch, Captain Harcourt-Vernon went up to the line, taking with him some ammunition and also a company of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream, under Captain H. Brierley, M.C., which had been sent to prolong the right flank, still dangerously in the air. In the afternoon a party of Strathcona’s Horse began an attack, and made very little headway. Half a squadron came into the wood, but was withdrawn later to link up the right of the Brigade line with the remainder of Strathcona’s Horse.

Shelling continued almost without cessation during the rest of the day, but no further enemy action developed, and about 10 P.M., in heavy rain, the Battalion began to be relieved by the Deccan and Poona Horse and one company of the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, under Captain Ridley, and marched back to bivouacs in Gouzeaucourt Wood. There it remained until December 5, when the Guards Division was relieved, and retired out of the area of operations. The casualties in the Battalion were 153 killed, wounded, and missing; among the twelve Company Officers who went into action, one was killed, one died of wounds, and seven were wounded. The percentage of N.C.O.’s killed was also very high, including many first-rate sergeants. Three field-guns and twelve machine-guns, in addition to many prisoners, were captured in this attack. The Battalion proceeded by train to Beaumetz, and went into billets at Berneville, where it remained until, the end of the month.

The following officers joined during December: Second Lieutenant F. J. Langley, Lieutenant G. B. Wilson, Second Lieutenant R. T. Sharpe, Second Lieutenant C. C. T. Giles, and Second Lieutenant S. C. K. George.

THE 3RD BATTALION

[Sidenote: 3rd Batt.]

During the last ten days of October and the first week of November, the 3rd Battalion was in good billets at Moule. During that time, Lieutenant G. W. Godman, Second Lieutenant G. H. R. Hoare, and Second Lieutenant E. C. Long arrived. On the 21st the Battalion was inspected by the Duke of Connaught, and lined both sides of the Calais――St. Omer road. On the 25th the whole Guards Division was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig.

[Sidenote: Nov. 10.]

[Sidenote: Nov. 26.]

On November 10 the march south began, and the 3rd Battalion proceeded to Enquingatte. On the following days it marched through Heuchin, Hernicourt, Houvin, Bailleulval, Courcelles-le-Comte, Beulencourt, and Le Bacquiere to Ribecourt, which it reached after a fortnight’s hard marching. There the men had twenty-four hours’ rest, during which they managed to collect a considerable amount of salvage, and on the 26th they quietly took over the line, round the south-east edge of Bourlon Wood, opposite the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, from the 3rd Battalion Coldstream. That evening Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade received orders to attack a front, extending from the village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame to a point about 1000 yards east of the centre of Bourlon village――that is to say, a front of about 3500 yards. The intention to attack Fontaine was only decided upon at the last moment after much discussion, and even General Sergison-Brooke himself knew nothing of it till the afternoon of the 26th. The orders reached the 3rd Battalion only as it was on its way up to relieve the 3rd Battalion Coldstream.

ATTACK ON FONTAINE

The first objective, which was to be the main line of resistance, ran through the road junction at the east end of Fontaine to the northern edge of Bourlon Wood. The second objective was the station and the eastern outskirts of Fontaine, which was to become the outpost line. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was to be on the right, the 1st Battalion Coldstream in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards on the left. The first objective of the 3rd Battalion was half-way through the village, including the church on the right, after which it was to push its outposts on to the road leading from Fontaine to La Folie Wood.

As soon as Colonel Thorne received his orders, he rode off, and collected the Company Commanders, as the Battalion was moving through Flesquières. Detailed orders were dictated, and the maps were carefully marked. Two hours later the Company Commanders overtook their companies, and the relief began. No. 1 and No. 3 Companies, under Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon and Second Lieutenant G. Hoare, were to form the first line, with No. 2 and No. 4, under Captain Beaumont-Nesbitt and Captain Hughes, in support.

The following officers took part in the attack:

Lieut.-Colonel A. F. A. N. Thorne, D.S.O. Commanding Officer. Capt. E. D. Ridley, M.C. Second in Command. 2nd Lieut. C. C. Carstairs Intelligence Officer. Lieut. G. P. Bowes-Lyon No. 1 Company. 2nd Lieut. H. St. C. Cooper ” ” 2nd Lieut. E. C. Long ” ” Capt. W. H. Beaumont-Nesbitt, M.C. No. 2 Company. Lieut. J. F. Worsley ” ” 2nd Lieut. C. B. Hollins ” ” 2nd Lieut. G. H. R. Hoare No. 3 Company. 2nd Lieut. A. C. Knollys ” ” 2nd Lieut. W. B. Ball ” ” Capt. J. S. Hughes No. 4 Company. 2nd Lieut. C. W. Carrington ” ” 2nd Lieut. Sir J. L. Hanham, Bart. ” ” Lieut. H. Dearden, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer. Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore Chaplain.

The night was bitterly cold, with snow and sleet soon after midnight. At 5.30 A.M. Colonel Thorne, accompanied by the Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Carstairs, went round the line and found all the companies ready for the attack, which started at 6.20, after a very short and light artillery preparation. It was practically dark, and as the sleet had turned to a steady drizzle of rain it was difficult to see more than a few yards ahead. The tanks were late, but it was decided not to wait for them, and the signal to advance was given. Directly the 3rd Battalion left its trenches, it was met by a heavy machine-gun fire from a small house 200 yards to its right front, as well as from the line of trenches, just east and south of Fontaine, and began to suffer casualties. On reaching the German line, the wire was found to be uncut, and this, combined with the absence of the tanks, nearly ruined the success of the whole movement.

In spite of these difficulties, however, Nos. 1 and 3 Companies got through the wire, and captured the trench, but their losses were very heavy. It was asking a good deal of a battalion to advance against a number of machine-guns, with strands of uncut wire intervening, and it was truly a marvellous performance to take the enemy’s trench under such conditions. Actually Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon with No. 1 Company managed not only to penetrate the wire, but to seize the machine-guns in the small house.

Second Lieutenant G. Hoare, who was on the left with No. 3 Company, was wounded in the face by a bullet, as he arrived at the enemy’s wire, and Second Lieutenant A. C. Knollys took over command. This company was more fortunate than the others, for after it had penetrated the enemy’s wire and was entering Fontaine, the tanks came up, and enabled it to secure the first objective without much trouble or many casualties. The difficulty was the mass of isolated houses, which were admirably suited for defence, and which provided good cover for the enemy’s machine-guns. The first house on the north side of the road held up the advance, until Second Lieutenant Carrington with some of No. 4 Company came up in support of No. 3, and seized the house, together with all its occupants. On the south side of the road the enfilade machine-gun fire was terrific, and before the men could reach the shelter of any house, Captain Beaumont-Nesbitt was killed. The two companies in support now came up, and the Battalion continued from this moment to fight practically as two half-battalions. No. 1 and No. 2 Companies suffered most, and all the officers and most of the N.C.O.’s were killed or wounded. In the village it became a difficult matter to distinguish between the houses held by the enemy and those occupied by our men, and thus several parties were cut off.

After some very fierce fighting the Germans were slowly driven back all along the line. Lieutenant Bowes-Lyon, who had gallantly rushed on, was killed, and Lieutenant Worsley shared the same fate. The remaining officers of these two companies were all wounded: Second Lieutenant Hollins through the foot, Second Lieutenant Cooper through the arm, and Second Lieutenant Long in the face and arm. A dozen men of one party, without an officer, fought their way through to the church, where they joined up with some men of No. 3 Company.

The first objective was now secured, although the price paid had been heavy, and the village had to be mopped up. Here was another difficulty: the companies were so weak that they could not even find enough men to escort the prisoners they had taken. Then the ammunition began to run short, and the supply of bombs became alarmingly low. The enemy remained in possession of two derelict tanks, captured in an earlier attack, and from the trenches just south of the village were able to keep up a harassing fire. Captain Hughes, when he came up with No. 4 Company, determined to push on, but could find no signs of No. 2 Company in the labyrinth of houses. He divided his company into two parties, one of which he himself led to attack the trench on the Cambrai road, while the other, under Second Lieutenant Carrington, was ordered to secure the Station road as far as the Crucifix. Both parties secured their objectives, and began to consolidate their position.

It was shortly afterwards discovered that the right flank of No. 3 Company was in the air. At the time nothing was known of the failure of No. 1 and No. 2 Companies to carry their objective, and in anticipation of their arrival a defensive flank of a sergeant and twelve men with a Lewis gun was formed. The valley to the south of the village was filled with the enemy, and under the wall of the churchyard there was a deep dug-out full of Germans, one of whom was so placed at the entrance that he could not be seen. Every time a bomb was thrown from round the corner he fired at the thrower’s hand, and managed to kill one man and wound another. As no phosphorous bombs were available, a guard was placed over the entrance, and the dug-out was left for future treatment.

But it was beginning to dawn on the remaining officers of the 3rd Battalion that all was not well, since not only did no reinforcements arrive, but the troops on the left seemed to be in great difficulties. Colonel Thorne went round, and told all the parties he saw to hold on where they were, until reinforcements came up, but the men were being shot at from houses in all directions. A determined counter-attack by the Germans, who seemed to be in some force, drove back Captain Hughes’s platoons, and Second Lieutenant Sir J. Hanham was wounded, but the tables were soon turned when the tanks came up, and poured a terrific fire into the retreating enemy. Captain Hughes, who had dealt successfully with a very complicated operation, was now wounded, and Second Lieutenant Carrington took command of No. 4 Company.

The situation had begun to look very precarious. The houses in the village, most of which were undamaged, might easily mask the advance of considerable numbers of the enemy, and the men did not know how long they could hold on to their position, without being cut off. Although the tanks had done wonders in clearing the streets, as well as the trenches along the embankment, they were of very little assistance in the village itself, where so many houses were still untouched by artillery fire. The enemy’s shells, which never ceased to fall, combined with the snipers’ bullets, made the position anything but pleasant.

Two companies from the 4th Battalion were ordered up, but the situation demanded more drastic measures, and before these small reinforcements even started, the enemy made very heavy counter-attacks, first from the railway-cutting north-east of Bourlon Wood, on the left flank of the 1st Battalion Coldstream, then against the junction of the 1st Battalion Coldstream and 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, while a third took place round the southern edge of the village. Colonel Thorne decided to hold the village with three centres of resistance, one from the cross-roads in the centre of the village to the south corner of the village beyond the church, under Second Lieutenant Knollys, the second at the cross-roads in the centre of the village, under Lieutenant Mackay of the Machine-Gun Guards, with two machine-guns, and the third on the left from the cross-roads to the right flank of the 1st Battalion Coldstream, under Second Lieutenant Ball. At the same time Lieutenant Carstairs was sent up with six men, to get touch with Lieutenant Carrington, who with thirty men was stubbornly holding on to the position he had gained.

These measures would have been very effective if it had been merely a matter of clinging on till reinforcements arrived, but as these depleted companies could not expect to hold their own for long unsupported, Colonel Thorne determined to go back himself, and press for more troops to be sent up. It now appeared that there was a gap of nearly 500 yards between the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers and 1st Battalion Coldstream, and that the enemy were creeping through. But so intent were they on cutting off the Coldstream that they did not appear to notice the Grenadiers, with the result that they were heavily enfiladed. They retired precipitately, but their retirement was only momentary, for in a short time they returned with two machine-guns. At the same time Germans were reported to be advancing from the north in large numbers, while the counter-attack against the Irish Guards was developing with renewed vigour.

The position of the 3rd Battalion was now perilous in the extreme. They were outflanked, and the enemy in front was visibly increasing in numbers. Lieutenant Mackay with the centre party was forced to retire before a large number of the enemy, and his withdrawal rendered the position of both Second Lieutenant Knollys and Second Lieutenant Ball untenable. Quite apart from the danger of being cut off, these platoons were not nearly strong enough to resist any attack in large numbers.

Thus No. 4 Company, under Second Lieutenant Carrington, was practically cut off, with the enemy already behind it. It had held on under the impression that another brigade would come to its support, but found itself in danger of being surrounded. So the men faced about and fought their way back to the original line. No attempt was made to hold the old German front trench, for it was without a field of fire on the east, and the wire was all on the wrong side, while it could be raked by fire from the buildings on the western end of the village at a range of about fifty yards.

This, as already remarked, was one of the only failures in which the Guards Division took part. This splendid Brigade had been practically decimated, and no advance had been made. The first objective had been taken, and in some places even the second objective was reached, but all the work was wasted, owing to the failure of the higher command to bring up any reinforcements.

The casualties were: Three officers killed and six wounded; while among other ranks the total casualties were 270.

[Sidenote: Nov. 28.]

On the 28th the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, 1st Battalion Coldstream, and 2nd Battalion Irish Guards were relieved by three battalions of Seymour’s Brigade, and remained in support in La Justice area. That night the Guards Division was relieved by the Fifty-ninth Division, and withdrew to Trescault, Metz-en-Couture, and Bertincourt.

[Sidenote: Nov. 29.]

[Sidenote: Dec.]

On the 29th Sergison-Brooke’s Brigade moved from Trescault to Bertincourt. There they remained until the dramatic news arrived that the Germans had broken through our line, when it moved to Gouzeaucourt Wood, where it bivouacked in the open, but its services were not required. On December 1, when De Crespigny’s and Seymour’s Brigades attacked Gauche Wood and Gonnelieu, it was in reserve, and that evening it relieved De Crespigny’s Brigade in the front line and occupied chalk trenches, in part of Gauche Wood, and in bitterly cold weather, with no coats or blankets, until December 4. During those four days there was the usual amount of shelling, but no attack was made by either side. On the night of December 1 the Germans brought up teams of horses to remove two field-guns, which had been abandoned within twenty yards of the trenches by Villers Guislain, occupied by No. 3 Company, but were driven off by rifle and revolver fire. On December 4 the 2nd Brigade was relieved by the 1st and 2nd South African Regiments, and retired from the area of operations with the rest of the Guards Division. On the 7th the Battalion moved to Simencourt, where it remained till the end of December. The following officers joined during December: Second Lieutenant W. A. Pembroke, Captain N. C. Tufnell, Lieutenant C. H. Bedford, Lieutenant W. Champneys, Second Lieutenant E. J. Bunbury.