CHAPTER V

THE PASSAGE OF THE AISNE (2ND BATTALION)

For a week now the Germans had been steadily retiring, and there was no apparent reason why they should stop doing so. Each time they held a position the question naturally arose whether they were really making a determined stand, or whether this was just a case of a rear-guard doing its best to hold up the advance. The only way to find out was to attack them and make them show their dispositions.

At the Marne, where it might well have been supposed that the Germans had a good enough position to make a stand, their resistance had proved to be merely in the nature of a rear-guard action. It did not at first dawn on our Army that at the Aisne, on the contrary, the enemy had occupied a carefully chosen and sedulously prepared position which suited their purpose in every way.

An ideal position it was, indeed. Sir John French, in his despatch of October 8, 1914, thus describes it:

The Aisne valley runs generally east and west, and consists of a flat-bottomed depression of width varying from half a mile to two miles, down which the river flows a winding course to the west at some points near the southern slopes of the valley and at others near the northern. The high ground both on the north and south of the river is approximately 400 feet above the bottom of the valley and is very similar in character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. The most prominent of the former are the Chivres Spur on the right bank and the Sermoise spur on the left. Near the latter place the general plateau on the south is divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, down which the small river Vesle flows to the main stream near Sermoise. The slopes of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of varying steepness and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which also stretch upwards and backwards over the edge on to the top of the high ground. There are several villages and small towns dotted about in the valley itself and along its sides, the chief of which is the town of Soissons.

The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some 170 feet in breadth, but, being 15 feet deep in the centre, it is unfordable. Between Soissons on the west and Villers on the east (the part of the river attacked and secured by the British Forces) there are eleven road-bridges across it. On the north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Soissons to Vailly, where it crosses the river and continues eastward along the south bank. From Soissons to Sermoise a double line of railway runs along the south bank, turning at the latter place up the Vesle valley towards Bazoches.

The position held by the enemy is a very strong one, either for a delaying action or for a defensive battle. One of its chief military characteristics is that from the high ground on neither side can the top of the plateau on the other side be seen, except for small stretches. This is chiefly due to the woods on the edges of the slopes. Another important point is that all the bridges are under either direct or high-angle artillery fire.

Until the afternoon of the 12th September it was still uncertain whether the enemy meant business this time or not, and then Sir John French came to the conclusion that, for the moment at any rate, they had stopped their retreat and were preparing to dispute vigorously the passage of the river. The presence of Germans had been reported by our cavalry south of Soissons and in the neighbourhood of Braine, but these were merely patrols.

The opposing forces were posted as follows: The German Army occupied the high ground north of the river, with Von Kluck still on the right flank. From the reports that came in, it appeared that the right of Von Kluck's army was resting on the forest of L'Aigle, and the left on the plateau of Craonne, while Von Bülow prolonged the line to the left. The French Army was now extended in an immense line from Compiègne to the Argonne, the British Army holding a portion of the front--about twenty miles--between Maunoury's Sixth Army and Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army.

On the left of our part of the line were the Third Corps, which was allotted the section from Soissons to Venizel, the Second Corps, which was between Venizel and Chavonne, and the First Corps between Chavonne and Bourg. In this last section there was a canal as well as a river to cross.

[Sidenote: Sept. 13.]

Rain was pouring down when the Battalion paraded at 5.30 A.M. on the 13th, but it cleared up later, with sunshine and a strong cold wind, which soon dried the men again. The 4th Brigade marched towards Chavonne, and stopped under the brow of a high hill overlooking the river Aisne. Here there was a halt of several hours in the middle of the day, during which the commanding officers went on ahead with Lieut.-Colonel Feilding, the acting Brigadier, to reconnoitre the opposite heights from the high ground above St. Mard, whence the movements of the Germans could be clearly seen. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion Coldstream went forward under the cover of our guns to make good the passages over the canal and the river, the bridges naturally having all been blown up by the Germans. After about two hours it succeeded in driving off the enemy, who were seen running up the hill and disappearing over the sky-line.

In support of it, the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers advanced towards the river, but was then sent off to try and make the crossing about a mile to the east of Chavonne. The only means of getting over, apparently, was by three or four small boats of doubtful buoyancy, and it was clear that for the whole Battalion to cross in this way would be a lengthy business. Pushing ahead, however, to reconnoitre, Lord Bernard Lennox and Major Hamilton found a bridge which they thought at first the Battalion could use, but the moment they were seen on the bridge they were greeted with shrapnel, so well aimed that it was obvious the enemy had got the exact range. So they retired to report the result of their observations.

As it was now getting dark, and no foothold on the opposite bank could be obtained, Colonel Feilding decided to withdraw the 4th Brigade. The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers and 2nd Battalion Coldstream were therefore recalled, and sent into billets at St. Mard. Rain was again falling heavily, and the men were glad to be under cover, while the inhabitants cooked their rations and supplemented them with omelettes and vegetable soup.

Thus began the battle of the Aisne, and had the men only known that it was to go on, not for months but years, and that the same ground would be occupied by the Allies during all that time, they would hardly, I imagine, have shown quite the same dash as they did during the days that followed.

[Sidenote: Sept. 14.]

The morning of the 14th broke cold and wet. A thick mist hung over the valley of the river--fortunately for us, since this made artillery observation by the enemy impossible, and enabled the men to cross the river without coming under shell-fire. During the night the R.E. had managed to build a pontoon bridge over the river at Pont-Arcy, and at 5.30 A.M. the brigade moved off to this point. As this bridge was the sole means of crossing for all arms, there was naturally some little delay, and during the period of waiting Colonel Feilding sent for all the commanding officers; he explained the dispositions he had made, and instructed them to make Ostel their objective.

The 2nd Battalion Grenadiers was to form the advanced guard to the Brigade, and Major Jeffreys received orders to secure the heights about La Cour de Soupir, and then to push on and make good the cross-roads at Ostel, about a mile farther on. Accordingly the Battalion moved off, crossed the river, and marched to Soupir--without opposition. Had some German officer blundered, or did the enemy not intend to dispute the passage of the river? It seemed inconceivable that, if they intended to hold the position, the enemy should allow a whole battalion to cross unmolested.

At Soupir the road ran uphill through a dense wood, and it was impossible to see very far ahead. Progress was necessarily very slow, and the advanced guard had orders to move with the utmost caution. No. 1 Company, under Major Hamilton, formed the vanguard, and half of No. 2 Company, under Captain Symes-Thompson, was sent as a flank guard to the left, where the ground rose steeply above the road, and the trees were very thick. About half-way the vanguard came into touch with the German outposts. At the same time they were joined by some men of our 5th Brigade, who had gone too far to their left, and in consequence had narrowly escaped being captured by the enemy.

Word was sent back by Major Hamilton that he was not at all happy about his left flank, which was on the high ground towards Chavonne, and Major Jeffreys despatched the rest of No. 2 Company to support Captain Symes-Thompson and strengthen that flank. Two platoons of No. 1 and one platoon of No. 2 were sent off to the left, and, having got into touch with the cavalry on that flank, took up a position in the woods above Chavonne, where they remained for the rest of the day. Meanwhile, the leading men of the advanced guard, under Lieutenant Cunliffe, pushed on, and near La Cour de Soupir ran right into the enemy, who were in superior numbers. All the men were taken prisoners, and Lieutenant Cunliffe was wounded.

But the rest of the advanced guard were also pressing forward, and soon the positions were reversed. Faced with the alternative of capture or retiring before a stronger force, the German officer in command decided on the second course. This meant perforce abandoning the prisoners; but there was one thing at any rate that a German officer still could do. Remembering the teachings of his Fatherland, that the usages of war were a mere formula, and the most dastardly crime excusable if any advantage could be got from it, he deliberately walked up to Lieutenant Cunliffe, who was lying wounded on the ground, pulled out his revolver, and shot him dead.

As to what eventually happened to the German officer there is some conflict of evidence. Some of the men of the Battalion swore that they recognised him among the prisoners who were led away that evening. Another story, which was generally believed at the time, is that Captain Bentinck, with a company of Coldstream, happened to come up just in time to see this cold-blooded murder, and that the men were so infuriated that they bayoneted the German on the spot. But this version can hardly be true, for the Coldstream did not arrive till a good deal later.

Shells were now screaming through the trees with monotonous regularity, and the hail of bullets grew ever thicker as the advanced guard came up to La Cour de Soupir. It became evident that the Germans were not only in strength at the top of the hill, but were advancing across the open against our left flank, and at the same time trying to surround the advanced guard by working through the woods on the right flank. No. 3 Company, under Captain Gosselin, was sent off to the right with instructions to clear the enemy off some rising ground and protect the right flank. This it succeeded in doing, but found vastly superior numbers opposed to it, and could not make any farther progress. It was here that Lieutenant des Voeux was killed, being hit through both lungs by a chance shot in the wood.

Urgent appeals from the firing line induced Major Jeffreys to send two platoons of No. 4 to help No. 1 Company, and one to the right for No. 3, while the remaining platoon, with the machine-guns, under Lieutenant the Hon. W. Cecil, was posted on the edge of a clearing in case those in front were driven back.

The advanced guard had now done its part. It had ascertained where the enemy was posted, but if an advance was to be made, it was clear that it would have to be strengthened considerably. Colonel Feilding therefore sent the 3rd Coldstream up to the left of the road and the Irish Guards to the right. Pushing through the woods and picking up platoons of No. 1 and No. 2 Companies Grenadiers, these troops came up to the hard-pressed No. 1 Company on the open ground near La Cour de Soupir.

Here the Germans' attempt to cross the open was effectively stopped by our rifle-fire, and the whole of their firing line was wiped out. But even with these reinforcements we were still outnumbered, and an advance remained impossible.

On the right the Irish Guards had come up to No. 3 Company, and, carrying it on with them, managed gradually to clear the wood. As they did so they disposed of the German snipers, who had shot many of our officers. Lord Guernsey and Lord Arthur Hay of the Irish Guards were killed, and several other officers wounded. In the Grenadiers Lieutenant F. W. des Voeux was killed, while Captain Gosselin was wounded in the hand and Lieutenant Welby in the shoulder, but they refused to retire, and gallantly stuck to their posts.

During this wood-fighting a young soldier of the Grenadiers, Private Parsons, collected twelve men belonging to a battalion in another brigade, who were lost and had no officer or N.C.O. He got them together and commanded them for the rest of the fight, giving his orders clearly and coolly, and never making a mistake. He was promoted to Corporal on the field, and was mentioned in despatches of October 18, 1914. To the general regret of the Battalion, he died of wounds some ten days later.

By now the firing line was fairly well established behind the banks of some slightly sunken roads north and east of La Cour de Soupir; it was composed of Grenadiers, Coldstream, and Irish Guards, all mixed up together, as they had come through the woods by companies or platoons, just as the situation demanded. Though the German shells were still crashing into the trees and searching the woods, our own guns were answering back, in spite of having hardly a tenth of the ammunition.

During this time Lieutenant Walker, Lieutenant Harcourt Vernon, and Lieutenant MacKenzie were all badly wounded.

But while a satisfactory foothold had been obtained here, Sir Douglas Haig found that there was a gap between the First and Second Corps. Being very hard pressed, with no reserves available, he sent back for help to the Commander-in-Chief, who at once placed the Cavalry Division at his disposal. On foot, the cavalry was despatched to the left to prolong the line occupied by the 4th Brigade, and succeeded in repelling the German attacks.

A steady fire was being kept up by the 4th Brigade at the German front line, which was lying down close in front of it in a mangel and beet field, and therefore very hard to see. The German fire suddenly began to slacken, and the moment seemed to have arrived for a charge, when, without any warning, the men in the German leading line ran forward with their hands over their heads in token of surrender, and at the same time white flags appeared in various parts of the line. At once a large number of our men leaped up and ran to meet them. Major Jeffreys and Major Matheson, fully alive to the possibilities of danger, shouted and yelled to them to stop, but the men ran on, eager to capture so many prisoners, and soon British and Germans were mingled together in a confused mass.

At this point the German supports opened fire on them all, mowing down friend and foe alike, and killing a large number of both sides. Most of those who were unhit dropped down at once where they were in the root field, and when it got dark many of the Germans walked into our lines and surrendered. It must be added that there is no evidence that this treachery was deliberately planned. It would seem that the leading line had had enough, and genuinely meant to surrender; the supports had no such intention, and there is thus perhaps some justification for their action. But it was a lesson to the 4th Brigade which it never forgot. Thenceforth the white flag was looked on with suspicion, and whenever it was used, not a man moved from his place.

After a hurried consultation between Major Matheson, Major Jeffreys, and Major Lord Bernard Lennox, it was agreed that, while Major Jeffreys held the enemy in check in front, the other two should take some men with them, and try to work round the German flank. This operation took some time, but evidently it surprised the Germans, who were holding a ridge about 500 yards in front of our firing line. Many of them could be seen running from right to left across the front, and offered a fine target for our men posted at the edge of the wood--the shooting was good and hardly a man escaped. Lieutenant Stewart was ordered to advance with a platoon of No. 4 Company, and managed to get on another 300 yards when he was wounded.

The difficulties of the situation were now borne in on Major Jeffreys and Major Matheson. It was getting dark, and they could get no orders from Brigade Headquarters, as the telephone wires had all been cut by bursting shells. Signalling was out of the question owing to the density of the woods. Meanwhile, the Germans were still shelling the road, and it seemed only too probable that the orderly who had been bringing instructions from the Brigade had been killed on his way. The men were dead-tired, having had nothing to eat all day, and Major Matheson, who had found it a very hard matter to get through the wood to the right, came to the conclusion that no advance could be made in this direction without reinforcements.

Therefore it was decided that the only thing to do was to re-sort the battalions and to dig in where they were. A point of junction was arranged, and the much mixed battalions were reorganised; digging started, and the men, tired out as they were, set to work with a will, and soon produced a trench. Thus was the beginning made of that long line of trenches which was eventually to stretch from the Argonne to the Belgian coast, and which formed the battleground of the two armies for years to come.

Converted into a dressing-station, the farm of La Cour de Soupir was filled with wounded, British and German. The ground in front of our trench was covered with dead and wounded Germans, but though as many stretcher-bearers as possible were sent out and worked all night long, it was not easy to find them in the darkness. It was a striking point of difference that while our wounded hardly made a sound, the Germans never stopped groaning and crying out: there was a continuous chorus all through the night of "Kamerad, Kamerad," and "Wasser, Wasser." A regular pile of Germans was discovered round two haystacks, while in a stubble-field close by was an almost complete firing line, laid out in a row, and all dead. Shelling began again at dawn before all the German wounded could be brought in.

Soon the farm was crowded, and the men for whom there was no room were put in the out-buildings. The removal of the wounded from the farm to the rear proved a great difficulty. The pontoon bridge at Pont-Arcy had been smashed, and on that side of the river, unfortunately, there were only four horse ambulance-wagons; these, with their fagged-out horses, had to plod throughout the night up and down the steep hill which led to the farm, taking only a few wounded at a time.

Behind the farm was a deep quarry with several caves in it; here the men not actually required for the firing line were stationed--comparatively safe except for an occasional shell from a German howitzer. The three or four hundred prisoners the Battalion had taken were herded together in the quarry under a guard and sent downhill next day. They made no attempt to hide their pleasure at escaping from the battle.

While Major Jeffreys was superintending the digging, a man of the Irish Guards arrived and said that as he was searching for the wounded, a German officer had come up to him and expressed a wish to surrender, but added that he would only give himself up to an officer. Thereupon Major Jeffreys told the man to find the German, if possible, and bring him in. When the man came back he reported that the original officer had refused to come so far, but that he had met another, who as willingly accompanied him. Out of the darkness stepped a tall, smart-looking Ober-Leutnant, who clicked his heels, saluted, and said in perfect English, "I wish to surrender." Major Jeffreys was at no pains to conceal his contempt for this poor specimen of an officer, and handed him over to one of the junior officers of the Grenadiers to take to the quarries.

That night the position of the 4th Brigade was as follows. On the left, in touch with the Cavalry Division, was the 2nd Battalion Coldstream, then the 3rd Battalion Coldstream and the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers, with the Irish Guards on the right. The 2nd Battalion Coldstream had been in reserve, but when there seemed a danger of the enemy getting between the First and Second Corps, the two companies of this battalion were sent off to strengthen the left flank.

The First Corps had managed to establish itself across the Aisne on a line running from Chemin des Dames on the right, through Chivy and Soupir to the Chavonne--Soissons road, the latter portion being held by the 1st Cavalry Brigade. But the Fourth and Fifth Divisions had not been so successful, and had been unable to do more than maintain their ground. On the extreme left the Sixth French Army had got some distance over the Aisne, but the Fifth French Army had made no headway.

In his account of the day's achievements Sir John French wrote:

The action of the First Corps on this day under the direction and command of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skilful, bold and decisive a character that he gained positions which alone have enabled me to maintain my position for more than three weeks of very severe fighting on the north bank of the river.

[Sidenote: Sept. 15.]

On the 15th Sir John French made an endeavour to strengthen the line, and consequently there was no need for the 4th Brigade to advance. All day it was shelled, and had to meet vigorous counter-attacks. It was holding a line which was really too long for it with its scanty reserves, and it is inexplicable why the enemy did not take advantage of this and drive it back to the river.

The morning was spent by the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers in improving the trenches. About noon it was heavily shelled, and as the enemy seemed to have the range of the trench, the men were withdrawn into the wood, a certain number being left to keep watch. They proceeded to watch, not without some quiet satisfaction, the empty trench being plastered with shrapnel that did no harm to any one.

[Sidenote: Sept. 16.]

More parties were sent out at dawn next day to collect the wounded, some of whom must have been lying out between the lines for nearly two days. A good many were brought in, but the work had to be stopped as soon as it was light, as the Germans deliberately shelled our stretcher parties. About 11 A.M. a shell set fire to a large stack, on the right of the farm, occupied by Captain Ridley and two men--they had been posted on top of it to snipe the German fire observation post, more than 1100 yards away. Captain Ridley had taken no notice of the shells that had been bursting all round him, but coolly stuck to his work, but now he was forced to abandon it, dazed by the explosion, and unhurt, though both the men with him were wounded.

Helped by the blazing rick to locate the farm, the German artillery now began to plaster it with common shell, shrapnel, and H.E. It is possible that if they had known it was full of their own wounded they would not have gone for it quite so furiously. However that may be, they finally got it alight, and then followed a scene of hopelessly illogical chivalry, our men risking their lives to save the German wounded from their own shells. The wounded were eventually carried out of the burning building and put in a safer place. At the same time, the Battalion Headquarters and the horses were moved down into the quarry.

As this violent shelling seemed to portend an attack, the trenches were fully manned, with the result that there were many casualties. One shell landed right in the trench and killed Lieutenant Welby and the men near him. He had been slightly wounded in the shoulder a couple of days before, but had refused to go to hospital. Although our gunners replied gamely, they could not compete with the lavish German expenditure of ammunition.

A report having come in that the enemy were advancing, Major Jeffreys ordered No. 2 Company to come up from the quarry, and line its northern edge, so as to be available as a support. It had hardly been there a quarter of an hour when an 8-inch high explosive just missed the farm, and, grazing the roof, pitched right on the edge of the quarry. A terrific explosion followed, and out of the 103 men who had been brought up, only 44 were left, all the rest being killed or wounded.

This same shell also killed three officers and a large number of men of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, and Lieutenant Huggan of the R.A.M.C., but Major Jeffreys, Major Lord Bernard Lennox, Captain Powell, and Captain Pike escaped untouched, for some unaccountable reason, though they were sitting within a few yards of where it exploded, and men were killed and wounded on every side of them, some of them under cover. The trees on the bank fell down with a crash, and the whole quarry itself was filled with a dense yellow-black smoke.

It was a most disastrous shot, and, to make matters worse, the only medical officer on the spot had been killed, and there was no qualified person to attend to the wounded, with whom the caves in the quarry--seemingly the only safe spot--were now packed. The scene there was terrible. There was no light of any sort until a single candle was procured from somewhere. By its faint and uncertain glimmer ghastly glimpses could be caught of men writhing in pain, with their limbs smashed to pieces. Into one corner were crowded the German prisoners, glad of any shelter from the German shells, and there were also a large number of German wounded, who moaned and cried through the night. The officers and N.C.O.'s of the Grenadiers, who had just left the trenches to get a rest, had to give up all idea of that: they set to work and bound up with such skill as they possessed the wounds of friend and foe.

In the front trenches, meanwhile, shelling went on incessantly, and there were many counter-attacks, directed against the part of the line held by the Coldstream. During the evening two companies of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry were sent up to take over the trenches next morning. After dark the supports were brought from the quarry to the garden at the back of the farm, so as to be near at hand in the event of an attack.

One of the Battalion's much-regretted losses this day was Captain the Hon. W. A. Cecil. He had been in the thick of every engagement since the start, and had gained a great reputation in the past three weeks for the effective way in which he handled the machine-guns. On more than one occasion his keenness had led him into very dangerous corners, and it was while he was reconnoitring for a good position for his machine-guns that he was killed. Lieutenant Stewart was wounded, and Captain Gosselin, who had pluckily stayed with his company, though he was in great pain from the wound he received two days before, was now obliged to go into hospital.

[Sidenote: Sept. 17.]

The Battalion was relieved just before dawn, and went into billets at Soupir. Officers and men alike were dead-beat, and slept through most of the day. The cold, wet nights had begun to tell on many of them, and some went sick. Among these was Prince Alexander of Battenberg, who got a bad chill, and had to be sent down to the base.

[Sidenote: Sept. 18.]

On the 18th the Battalion went back to the trenches to relieve the Coldstream, to the left of the position it had held before. No. 1 and No. 2 Companies were in the firing line, and No. 3 and No. 4 in reserve. The moment they arrived they started digging and deepening the trenches, knowing that they would be under constant shell-fire during the day, and in places they could see the Germans doing the same, some 700 yards away. But before they could get through very much, the shelling began, and shrapnel came bursting all over them.

All through the day the roar of shells and rifle-fire went on, varied now and then by high-explosive shells from the howitzers, which made holes big enough to bury three or four horses in. Major Jeffreys, with Captain Howell, R.A.M.C., came to inspect the trenches, but at that moment the shelling became particularly vigorous and accurate, and they were obliged to accept the hospitality of Lord Bernard Lennox, who placed at their disposal the hole he had dug for himself. But as it had only been made for one, the owner was not altogether sorry when a lull in the firing made it possible for the visitors to continue their tour.

It should be mentioned here that the trenches during the first few months of the war consisted not of continuous lines of trench, but of a series of deep holes holding three to four men apiece, and separated from the next by some 10 feet of undug earth, which formed a natural traverse. There was hardly any parapet, and the earth was scattered to the front. The advantage of this type of trench was that it was difficult to locate and destroy by artillery, but if the enemy was near at hand vigilant communication either laterally or to the rear was practically impossible.

The supports and reserves were all hidden in caves very like those they had occupied in the quarry behind their first position. They were well rationed, with plenty of fresh meat, vegetables, and jam. They were, indeed, very much better off than the men in the trenches, for it turned very cold again at night, and rain fell heavily.

It was not hard to guess the reason for the severe bombardment and continual counter-attacks. This was one of the few positions where the Allies had succeeded in obtaining a foothold across the river, though why the Second Division was allowed to get over at Pont-Arcy unmolested has never been explained. The Germans were not only far superior in numbers, but had a supply of shells and ammunition out of all proportion to that of the Allies; moreover, they had chosen an exceptionally good position and possessed heavy guns, such as were unknown in the British and French Armies. Though General Maunoury's Sixth French Army had at first advanced some distance on the extreme left, it had afterwards been held up, and was now only just holding back the enemy counter-attacks, which threatened to drive it back on the river. The British Army's task was the hardest of all, and the Second and Third Corps had been unable to establish themselves securely on the other side.

After the first few days of the battle, the German General Staff determined to direct its energies against the Sixth French Army and the right of the British Army, and to force back over the river the troops which had crossed. So the line occupied by the 4th Brigade came in for more than its share of artillery fire. This hurricane of shells was no doubt intended to prepare the way for the infantry counter-attacks, but wherever the Germans attempted an attack they found our men coolly waiting for them, and absolutely unshaken by the bombardment.

Our artillery's work in this battle aroused the greatest admiration among the Guards Brigade. Vastly outnumbered, with none of the heavy guns the enemy had, and in obviously inferior positions, it fought on gallantly in spite of great losses, and often succeeded in silencing the batteries which were shelling our trenches.

[Sidenote: Sept. 19-20.]

Brigadier-General the Earl of Cavan (an old Grenadier) arrived on the 19th, and took over the command of the Brigade, while Lieut.-Colonel Wilfred Smith assumed command of the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers. The Battalion remained in the trenches till the 21st and repulsed several attacks. Though the German infantry never seemed anxious to come to close quarters, their artillery made up for this hesitation by a prodigal expenditure of shells. Lieut.-Colonel Smith described in a letter a calculation he made during a bombardment which went on continuously for six hours; he timed the rate of the falling shells, and found that it came to an average of fifty shells a minute.

The nights were constantly disturbed by false alarms. It was the German practice to send out specially selected snipers to keep the whole line from having any rest. There is nothing more contagious than night firing; the snipers would start the men in front of them firing, and soon it would spread till there was a dull roar all down the line. Supports and reserves would stand to arms until it had died down, and then the Germans would start all over again in another part of the line, with the same result. By this time, too, the trenches were beginning to fill with water in places, which added to our men's hardships.

Every day there were some casualties, but considering the amount of ammunition expended they were really very slight. Lord Congleton had a lucky escape. He was sent for to Battalion Headquarters to make a report, and on his return found that his shelter had been blown to atoms. On the same day Lord Bernard Lennox had an even narrower shave. Taking off his greatcoat, he laid it on the back of the trench, but had hardly gone two or three paces when there was a terrific explosion. When he looked round, he saw that the right arm of his coat was gone altogether and the left cut to ribbons.

[Sidenote: Sept. 21.]

At 4 A.M. on the 21st the Battalion was relieved by the Irish Guards under Lieut.-Colonel Lord Ardee, who, with Captain Lord Francis Scott, had been attached from the Grenadiers, and retired to Soupir. Captain Ridley was sent to inspect the trenches occupied by the 3rd Battalion Coldstream with a view to taking them over next morning, but this order was afterwards cancelled, and Lieut.-Colonel Smith, Captain Symes-Thompson, and Captain Colston went with the same object to the trenches west of Chavonne.

[Sidenote: Sept. 22.]

Next day the Battalion marched at dawn to Chavonne, and took over the trenches held by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which was very glad to relinquish its position. Cavalry at that time had no bayonets, and so were at a serious disadvantage in a night attack. A company being so much stronger than a squadron, only two platoons of each company were needed for the front trenches, the other two being kept in reserve. No. 3 and No. 4 Companies went into the trenches, No. 1 and No. 2 into billets. Though there was continual shelling here too, it was nothing compared with what the Battalion had got accustomed to; in fact, the universal opinion was that it was quite a quiet spot.

[Sidenote: Sept. 22-Oct. 11.]

For nearly three weeks the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers remained in the trenches, two companies at a time. The general impression in the firing line seemed to be that the centre was waiting till the flanks could push on. There were also constant stories about the Russians. What really happened was that, with inferior numbers, General Joffre was unable to turn the enemy out of their positions. On the other hand, the Germans had given the Allies time to entrench themselves, and found it equally impossible to advance. Trench warfare had begun, and had come to stay. Months of comparative inaction were to follow, while the artillery pounded away at the infantry in the trenches.

"No man's land" between the trenches was covered with unburied bodies, but for either side to venture out merely meant adding to their number. The trenches were gradually improved and deepened, and communication trenches were dug in every direction. Rabbit netting was procured from the neighbouring woods and converted into wire entanglements, but at that time, with the exception of the Minenwerfer, there were none of the specially constructed infernal machines which later were to play such a large part in trench warfare. The infantry crouched in the trenches, while the artillery tried to reach it with every kind of shell; and though the casualties were sometimes considerable, on the whole the infantry succeeded in keeping itself protected.

Occasionally an extra heavy dose of shelling warned the firing line that a counter-attack was in view, but when it came to the point of cold steel the German troops showed no inclination to close with our men. Another indication of a coming attack was the playing of the band of some German regiment, which was heard on one or two occasions--evidently as a stimulant for the men who were to take part. Raids were periodically made to catch the enemy's snipers, hidden in trees and hay-ricks. Some N.C.O.'s showed themselves particularly clever and resourceful in carrying out these excursions, but rashness cost a good many lives.

A welcome end was at last put to the continual night firing in which the German snipers had succeeded in involving us. Lieutenant Donald Miller, who was in command on the left, which was their favourite approach, gave orders that no one was to fire without his leave. He took upon himself the responsibility of distinguishing between sniping and a regular attack, and with entire success. Isolated shots were ignored, and the supports and reserves had a quiet night; the other companies soon learnt the trick, and before long there were no more false alarms.

On September 27 Captain Colston was seized with appendicitis, and had to be sent home for an operation. Captain Ridley took his place, but on the same day was hit on the head and between the shoulders by fragments of a shell which exploded near him. Fortunately his wounds were not serious, and after having them dressed he went back to the firing line.

[Sidenote: Oct. 1914.]

In the first week of the battle of the Aisne the losses had been exceptionally heavy, but during the latter part of the time in which the British occupied the position, they were comparatively light. Sir John French estimated that from the start of the battle to the day the British Army left we lost altogether--in killed, wounded, and missing--561 officers and 12,980 men. On October 5 Captain Robin Grey, an officer of the Grenadiers attached to the Royal Flying Corps, was brought down while flying over the enemy's lines and made a prisoner.

Now the situation again changed. All along the French line there had been very heavy fighting, but while the Germans had been unable to pierce the line our Allies had equally failed to advance, though Maunoury had managed to extend his flank up to the Oise, while the new armies of Castelnau and Maud'huy were gradually lengthening the line in a northerly direction. Simultaneously the Germans had grasped that as nothing could be done on the Aisne the only possible chance of success was to turn to the French left.

So they at once began to stretch out their forces to the right, sending out huge masses of cavalry, and in their endeavour to find the French left pushed farther and farther north. They were not content with merely parrying French moves; they determined to outstrip them. They had shorter lines of communication and many more men than the Allies, and it is therefore all the more to the credit of the French and British Armies that they should have won this race for the coast by a short head.

Having come to the conclusion that an advance on the Aisne was impossible, General Joffre decided that the first-line troops should be gradually replaced by Territorials and sent up to prolong the line on the left. Curiously enough, precisely the same instructions were at the same time issued to the German Army, and Landwehr troops were gradually brought into the trenches.

This decision was to alter the fortunes also of our own troops. When the French Army began its various moves, Sir John French went to General Joffre, and pointed out the difficulties in which the British Army was placed by being in the centre of the line. All the supplies in coming from England had to go through Paris and cross those intended for the left of the French line, with the risk of probable confusion. The right place for the British Army, therefore, was clearly on the left, where supplies could reach it with the least possible delay. He also put forward the purely sentimental advantage to be gained by our army operating as a separate unit and expanding on its own front.

General Joffre saw the force of these contentions, and agreed to the British Army being moved up to Belgium, French Territorials taking up its former position. It should be explained that Territorials in France are in no way the equivalent of our own; they are all men who have served in the Army, but are over the age for active fighting. In fact, they correspond to the German Landwehr.

The necessary arrangements for withdrawal and relief were made. The operation began on October 3, and the Second Cavalry Division under General Gough marched from Compiègne en route for the new front. The Army Corps followed in succession at intervals of a few days, and the move was completed by October 19, when the First Corps detrained at St. Omer. This transfer of hundreds of thousands of men from one point of the country to another without a hitch was a striking testimony to the qualities of the French General Staff.

[Sidenote: Oct. 12.]

On the night of the 12th the French Territorials arrived, and took over the trenches of the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers. Though a sturdy lot of men, they had not exactly the inches of a Guardsman, and so found great difficulty in reaching the loopholes, with the result that alterations had to be made all along the line.

[Sidenote: Oct. 13.]

Next morning at about 1 A.M. the Battalion marched by way of St. Mard and Vauxcéré to Perles, where it went into billets at a big farm, and had its first real rest out of the range of shell-fire for a very long while. It was generally thought that when the Germans discovered the change which was being made they would send a few high-explosive shells well to the rear of the trenches to catch the retiring troops. But as it happened, the enemy were far too busy with their own movements to pay any attention to what was going on in front, and the Battalion marched away unmolested.

[Sidenote: Oct. 14.]

It started off again at 4 o'clock on the 14th and marched to Fismes, where it was to entrain for the north. After the usual long wait for the transport it got off at 7.30. The men were very closely packed, thirty-five or forty having to be put into each small covered truck, so that there was hardly room even to sit down. Through Paris, Beauvais, Amiens, Étaples, and Calais the train slowly wandered on, and finally the Battalion reached Hazebrouck at 7 o'clock next morning.