CHAPTER III.

THE SCEPTICS AND ECLECTICS: GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ROME pages 120-194

I. Philosophic embassy from Athens to Rome, 120—Lectures of Carneades on Justice _versus_ Expediency, 121—Public and private morality in Rome: position of Cato, 122—His motion for the dismissal of the embassy, 123—Carneades and Plato, 123.

II. Different meanings of the word scepticism, 123—False scepticism as an ally of orthodoxy, 125—Vein of doubt running through Greek mythology, 126—Want of seriousness in Homer’s religion, 127—Incredulous spirit shown by some of his characters, 127—Similar tendency in Aeschylus and Herodotus, 128—Negative and sceptical elements in early Greek thought, 128.

III. Protagoras the true father of philosophical scepticism, 129—The three theses of Gorgias, 130—Sceptical idealism of the Cyrenaic school, 132—Scepticism as an ally of religion with Socrates and Plato, 133—The _Parmenides_, the _Sophist_, and the _Timaeus_, 134—Synthesis of affirmation and negation in metaphysics and in dialectics, 135—Use of scepticism as a moral sanction by the Megarians, 136.

IV. Life and opinions of Pyrrho, 137—Denial of first principles: present aspect of the question, 139—Practical teaching of Pyrrho, 140—Encouragement given to scepticism by the concentration of thought on human interests, 141—Illogical compromise of Epicurus, 143—Parasitic character of the sceptical school, 143.

V. Origin of the New Academy, 144—Character and position of Arcesilaus, 145—The Stoic theory of certainty, 146—Criticism of Arcesilaus: his method of infinitesimal transitions, 147—Systematic development and application of the Academic principle by Carneades, 148—His analysis of experience, 149—His attack on syllogistic and inductive reasoning, 150—His criticism of the Stoic and Epicurean theologies, 151—Sceptical conformity to the established religion, 153—Theory of probable evidence as a guide to action, 154—_A priori_ reasoning of the ancient sceptics, 155—Their resemblance in this respect to modern agnostics, 156—and also in their treatment of ethics, 157—Obedience to Nature inculcated by Carneades, 158.

VI. Return of Greek thought to the Sophistic standpoint, 158—Obstacles to a revival of spiritualism, 159—Platonising eclecticism of the Academy: Philo and Antiochus, 160—Approximation of Stoicism to Aristotle’s teaching, 162—General craving for certainty and stability in philosophy, 163.

VII. Sudden paralysis of the Greek intellect, 165—Probable influence of the new Latin literature, 165—Adaptation of Greek philosophy to Roman requirements, 166—Increased prominence given to the anti-religious side of Epicureanism, 167—Its ethics ill-suited to the Roman character, 168—Growing popularity of Stoicism: Panaetius and Posidonius, 168—It is temporarily checked by the influence of the Academy, 169.

VIII. Academic eclecticism of Cicero, 170—His attempted return to the principles of Socrates, 171—Natural instinct as the common ground of philosophy and untrained experience, 172—Practical agreement of the different ethical systems, 173—The weakness of Cicero’s character favourable to religious sentiment, 173—His theological position, 174—Contrast between Cicero and Socrates, 175.

IX. The ideas of Nature, reason, and utility, 176—Meaning and value which they possessed for a Roman, 177—Cynic tendencies of Roman thought, 178—Influence exercised by the younger Cato in favour of Stoicism, 179—The philosophy of natural law as illustrated in Roman poetry, 180—Stoic elements in the _Aeneid_, 181—The Roman love of simplification and archaism, 182—Cynicism of Juvenal, 183.

X. Neo-Scepticism as a reaction against Naturalism: Aenesidêmus, 184—Return to the standpoint of Protagoras, 184—Critical analysis of causation and perception, 185—The ten Tropes, 186—Their derivation from the categories of Aristotle, 186—Ethical scepticism of Aenesidemus, 187—The Tropes simplified and extended to reasoning, 188—Their continued invincibility as against all appeals to authority, 189—Association of Scepticism with Empiricism, 189—Sextus Empiricus and Hume on causation, 190.

XI. The philosophy of the dinner-bell and its implications, 191—Subsequent influence of Scepticism on Greek thought, 192—Unshaken confidence of the Neo-Platonists in the power of reason, 193—Their philosophy a genuine return to the standpoint of Plato and Aristotle, 193.