Part 25

Moreover, it gradually came to be known that, without being aware of it at the time, the English Fleet in the Baltic had conferred another all-important service upon Germany on land as much as at sea. It appeared that the object with which the French and Russian fleets were endeavouring to clear the Baltic of all German men-of-war was twofold. In the first place, if they had succeeded, the Russian Fleet was intended to co-operate with the Russian Army advancing from Kovno in an attack upon the German defences on the Baltic—Memel, Königsberg, and Dantzig. But this was not all. There was a considerable Russian force available at the beginning of the war for which it was impossible to provide transport and supplies towards the German frontier. This had been gathered along the Baltic ports of Russia, with a view to its being transported into Denmark. The Danish Army had been gathered along the fortified frontier of the kingdom, Denmark having declared herself neutral in the struggle. As soon as the Russian force had landed and advanced towards the frontier, the Danish Army would have joined the Russian. At an opportune moment a declaration would have been issued simultaneously by France and Russia, setting forth the wrongs which Germany had inflicted upon Denmark, and declaring that Russia and France were resolved to see justice done her. A French expeditionary force formed of troops which could not, in the blocked condition or the railways (already filled with ample numbers of troops and stores), be transported from west to east of France, had gathered in the western ports. This was to be transported as rapidly as possible to reinforce the Russo-Danish Army. Thus, a large army would have been collected within the frontiers of Denmark, where it would be completely in rear of the general line of German defence along the frontier. It might even threaten, at a time when the German forces were pushed out east and west, to move upon the unguarded capital of Berlin; or at least to break up and destroy railways and telegraphs essential to the forces gathered on the French frontier. All these dangers had been removed by the action of the English Fleet, which, when joining the German in the Baltic, had given command to the Central Allies of the sea communications.

Under these circumstances it was not difficult for the English Government to insist that, as a preliminary to all discussion of peace negotiations, every Russian soldier should evacuate the territories of Afghanistan. If the Indian bazaars had been fluttered by the temporary advance of the Russian Army to Herat, the compensation was ample. The ignominious withdrawal of the Russian Army was not the less effective because it was in exact accordance with the proclamation which had been made at home and in India, at the beginning of the war. Nor did it tell less on the native mind, because two English officers had alone appeared to be directly opposed to the might of Russia; while the whole English Army along the frontier had remained intact, and had not had occasion to put forth its strength.

GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR.

In order to explain our negotiations with France, it is necessary to give an account of the fate of the Australian expedition against New Caledonia. The French, fully aware that the expedition had been tardily sanctioned from home, and forewarned by the noisy preparations which had preceded its departure, had ordered a powerful fleet, gathered from all quarters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, to rendezvous in the neighbourhood of New Caledonia. The force thus gathered was so superior to any which the colonists could muster that, in order to avoid being simply blown out of the water, the expedition had to beat an ignominious retreat. It was a first point in the negotiations with France for the Home Government to secure arrangements in reference to Caledonia satisfactory to the Australian colonists. Indeed, so far as we were concerned, the restoration of Sierra Leone, and a final and definite settlement of the Newfoundland Question, were all that we had to demand in addition to this settlement of the Colonial question.

In the balanced condition of affairs as between Germany and France, it was obvious that no very material change of frontier was likely to be made. Germany had no disposition to yield any of the Reichsland; France was in no position to demand it. Things on that frontier, therefore, remained very much as they had been, with just this difference, that France, no longer able to count upon the support of a baffled and impoverished Russia, was not likely to become aggressive for many years to come. A general disarmament was discussed, and some steps for reducing the armaments on all sides were actually adopted. But the difficulties in the way of any general agreement were too great to admit of any formal stipulation being recorded in the treaty. The final ratifications have been delayed until quite recently.

Germany has already set to work to put right any weak points in her harness. In England the successes which have attended our arms have glossed over not a few weak points which have been detected in our organisation. The army, it is obvious, will be allowed to lapse again into a condition adapted to mere peace parading, despite the vigorous protests that were addressed by Lord Wolseley at the end of the war to the Government, against the dangers which must attend such a result. The country will continue in the belief that everything is for the best in the best of all possible armies. Prompt reductions in the fleet and army have been insisted on. These steps have prevented the Central Powers from entering into an alliance with us for guaranteeing the peace of Asia and of Europe, for which their experiences of the value of an effective alliance with England had at first made them very anxious. How far the future will justify our omission to secure the peace of the world by taking proper steps to secure it, it is for the experience of future generations to determine. For the moment, England has been once more fortunate in the circumstances under which she entered on the war, in the allies she found in it, and in that increased strength of her navy for which a recent awakening to her dangers had prepared the way. The reserves prepared for her army, despite the most fanatic opposition, have enabled her to place an effective army in the field. Fortunately, the war has not tested her resources beyond that point. One comparatively small, though absolutely great, improvement has been made. Those complaints as to the character of our artillery armament, which were ignored during peace-time, have been enforced by the experience of war. Both the Horse Artillery and Field Artillery are to be armed in accordance with war experience, and not on workshop decisions unconnected with their actual employment and use.

FINIS.

APPENDIX.

SIR CHARLES TUPPER ON IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

In conversation some months ago with Sir Charles Dilke, he assured me that he considered the suggestion made in the columns of _Black and White_ by one of the contributors to the ‘Great War of 1892’—that, in the event of an imbroglio with India, we might carry our troops by the American continent—one that was open to much argument. This criticism of Sir Charles Dilke’s I mentioned to Sir Charles Tupper.

‘Well,’ replied this doughty upholder of Imperial Federation, ‘let us discuss the whole question, and we will come to Sir Charles’s criticism, with which I do not at all agree, later on. I was much impressed by the way in which you fought out your Great War. The case was presented in a very strong light. Should such a contingency ever arise, the Canadian Pacific Railway will furnish a most important service to the Empire in providing a special route to India. As an alternative route to India under the British flag from end to end, and bringing England as it does certainly a fortnight nearer to Yokohama than Suez, it evidently may play a very important part in Imperial policy and defence. As has been stated in your paper, not only does the Canadian Pacific furnish a direct line from Quebec on British territory throughout, but in winter, with the Intercolonial Railway to Quebec, the service is made from ocean to ocean by a complete line. It has already been greatly used by the Admiralty. I do not see any force in Sir Charles Dilke’s argument that mercenaries in the States could be engaged to render the line impassable in time of war. Of course we assume we are at peace with the States themselves. We have not only the fact that the line is as capable of being defended against attack as any line here in England would be which might be threatened by dynamiters; but Canada would furnish protection for the line by large bodies of trained militiamen and mounted police in the North-Western Provinces; and there would be the further co-operation of the States in the same direction, just as they came to our aid in the Fenian raids in Canada, when the States heartily seconded us. England would have the entire force of Canada to help to make the protection of the line as complete as it would be between Liverpool and London. And another point is this: By making a _place d’armes_ of Esquimault or Vancouver you could send forward at a few weeks’ notice any number of soldiers you required to those two points, and hold them there at a point as near to India as they are now here, _i.e._ within as easy striking distance of India as they are in England going by Suez. And you may always trust to Canadian loyalty in any struggle in which England might be engaged.’

‘I am glad to hear that,’ said I, ‘for when I was in Washington last year I heard much talk of the annexation of Canada by America, and of the pleasure with which the Canadians themselves would receive such a measure.’

Sir Charles shook his head. ‘I have said repeatedly,’ replied he, ‘that there is no annexation party in Canada, and I say so again. I mean that out of the 215 members we send to Parliament not one would be elected if he declared in favour of American annexation. Mr. Goldwin Smith, with all his ability, has laboured for twelve years to convince the people of Canada that it is their inevitable destiny to become part of America. By his pen, with his tongue, and in the press, he has done all he can to bring this to pass; and at his own home, Toronto, a highly respectable and popular man holding Mr. Smith’s views was induced to offer himself as a candidate at a local election for the Legislature of Ontario, and out of 9000 votes at the election he only polled 175! No; we are not within even the remotest distance of an American annexation. How mad it would be! You do not know what our connection with England really means to us. Only a short time ago one of the most prominent members of the United States Government said to me, “The confederation of British North America under one Government and the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway has brought us face to face with a nation.”’

‘Which leads to another point,’ I replied. ‘Is there no chance of Canada becoming a nation on her own account?’

‘My dear sir,’ replied the High Commissioner, ‘Canada has _all_ to lose and nothing to gain by becoming independent of England. From being a very important part of the mightiest Empire in the world, Canada—or Australia either, for the matter of that—would sink at once, by becoming independent, into a position in which they would become the easy prey of those who desired to subjugate them. I would recommend the strengthening by every practicable means of the bonds that now unite the mother country and the outlying portions of the Empire. I have proposed in a recent article in the _Nineteenth Century_ that Australasia and South Africa should be each united under a central Government, as Canada now is, and that these three great British dominions should be represented in London by a leading member of the local Cabinet. You have to take things as they are, not as you might wish them to be. A Parliamentary Federation of the Empire, by forming an Imperial Parliament, in which all these great British possessions should be represented, I regard as utterly impracticable, because it is in antagonism with the constitution of this country, and also with the constitution of all the autonomous Colonies. Therefore I contend that the means of drawing closer the bonds between the Imperial Government and these great possessions must be found in some mode consistent with the constitution of England and the self-government now enjoyed by the Colonies. I come to the conclusion I have suggested, that the representatives of the three great British dependencies, being members of the Local Governments, should be made members of the Imperial Privy Council, and thus be brought into the closest intercourse and communication with Her Majesty’s Government here in England, and thus be in a position to give the most hearty and complete co-operation for the defence of the Empire everywhere. Another mode to which I attach great importance, and which is quite practicable, is the adoption of a fiscal policy that would have the effect of placing the Colonies fiscally in a different position as regards their relations to Great Britain from that occupied by foreign countries. Such a policy would lead to the elevation of the Colonies amongst the countries of the world, to their rapid development, and to a great expansion of trade between the mother country and them.’

‘Ah!’ said I, ‘doesn’t the kernel of the whole question of Imperial Federation lie in this Customs difficulty? If we were entirely a Free Trade empire, there would be little or no difficulty in securing Imperial Federation. The Union of Hearts, it seems to me, must be preceded by a Union of Pockets.’

‘Well,’ replied Sir Charles, ‘there is no reason that I can see why absolute Free Trade should be adopted, and in fact it is impracticable, or any objection taken to the adoption of the same policy pursued by every other country in the world with regard to their Colonies, by which they place their fiscal relations with them on an entirely different basis from that on which their relations with foreign countries stand; thus adding to the strong sentimental tie that binds mother and child, that still stronger tie of mutual self-interest; and the day is not far distant when a very powerful agitation will be promoted by the artisans here in England for the adoption of the policy that will most expand the trade of England, and promote the interests of all who are engaged in the manufactures of this country.’

‘Then,’ I interjected, ‘you thereby make the working-man the ultimate Court of Appeal, and he will decide as to whether Imperial Federation is to become an accomplished fact or not.’

Sir Charles said, ‘Yes; I believe this policy at no distant day will be sustained by the operatives.’

We drifted into other currents of thought, all bearing on the question how best to promote a true and lasting Federation. I alluded to a remark made to me some time since by a distinguished Cabinet Minister on the fatal policy, not to say the gross injustice, of pitchforking any scion of nobility, whether fitted for the post or not, into the vice-regal thrones of the Colonies.

‘Well,’ replied Sir Charles, ‘speaking as a Canadian, I can only say we have been most fortunate. The policy which has been pursued with us of sending out a Viceroy of Cabinet rank is, I think, attended with the greatest possible advantages; first, because it forms a close connection between the Crown and Canada, and after the period of service is over these gentlemen bring their great Colonial experience especially to bear here in England in Parliament, and at the Council, in a manner highly conducive to the interests of Canada. Canada owes much to the high standing and character and the abilities of all her governors since it became a united country.’

‘THE GREAT WAR OF 18—’:

AN INTERVIEW WITH THE RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES DILKE.

BY RAYMOND BLATHWAYT.

No man in England, few even on the Continent, are better qualified than Sir Charles Dilke to judge of the merits or demerits of the other articles which have called forth so much criticism both here and on the Continent. With him these subjects have been a matter of life-long study; to their consideration he has devoted all the energies of a singularly clear and powerful mind. There are few men, even in these days when the balance of education is so much more even than it used to be in the past, who have so thoroughly, and from so scientific a point of view, grasped the great political problems which now confront the thoughtful men in all civilised nations. The splendid potentialities that lie within an energetic and resolute Imperialism; the knitting and welding together of the mother country with her colonies and dependencies, the accurate knowledge and estimation of the means of attack and defence that belong respectively to our own country, and to the great Continental Powers; these and many other of the great questions, a proper comprehension of which is absolutely essential to every well-trained, well-furnished statesman, have for many years received from Sir Charles Dilke the most careful thought and attention. No English statesmen and few soldiers, even on the Continent, know more of the relative strength and capacity of foreign armies than this quiet student and calm observer in Sloane Street.

To no better authority, therefore, could the clever and interesting _brochure_ be submitted for judgment and criticism than Sir Charles.

A little older and greyer, a shade more thoughtful and careworn than when I last saw him some few years ago, upon the occasion of some political gathering, when he delivered a speech of much brilliance, and clear, well-defined, consecutive thought, he yet impressed me as he impressed me then, with a sense of wonderful versatility, and a plenitude of knowledge of the subject upon which I had come to talk.

‘I feel some little hesitation in replying to your request,’ he began, ‘but since the Editor is evidently anxious that I should do so, I will endeavour to give you my views as briefly and clearly as I can. Mind you, I don’t think it is either an easy or a gracious task to criticise the work of the brilliant staff of experts who have fought this Great War. Any strictures therefore that I may have to offer will deal entirely with generalities, or with political and military considerations; the details of the War seem to me to have been admirably carried out; and nothing else could have been expected, considering who are the men who have had part in it. Then, too, I feel that the Editor was justified, when he wanted to make a war, in making a war which lent itself to literary and dramatic treatment, instead of the war which might be more natural but less picturesque. One of my criticisms also goes to the root of the whole matter, and must necessarily seem a little by the way. It is that we are assured that a Great War ‘will probably occur in the immediate future.’ I do not think so, and have indeed, during all the alarms of the last seventeen years, been an obstinate believer in the probabilities of peace.’

‘In which the writers clearly differ from you, Sir Charles,’ I replied; ‘I was much struck, however, by the clever manner in which they caused the war to break out in a small, insignificant country like Bulgaria, and then spread like a prairie fire, till the whole world was in a blaze. Do you consider that was a good and probable beginning?’

‘Well,’ replied Sir Charles, as he leaned forward and began to rapidly sketch out a little map of the Continent, to which he made constant subsequent reference, ‘it was, perhaps, more ingenious than either scientific or probable. For my own part, I do not believe that the next great war, when it does come, will arise from events in the Balkan Peninsula. Of course, Russia can cause a war whenever she wishes to do so, but I don’t think she does so wish. The writers of this brochure state that they have striven to make the imaginary conflict spring from the most likely source of conflicts. They therefore chose Bulgaria, and I think with a good deal of reason from their point of view. But, for all that, Russia has pursued an adventurous and indefensible policy with regard to these States, and however irritating her conduct may have been, she means peace at heart. Therefore it is, I think, they are wrong.’

‘It is quite fair then, Sir Charles, that I should ask you where you would have applied the match, had you been writing this war?’

‘Quite fair,’ he replied, with a very genial laugh, as he placed his finger on the Franco-German frontier. ‘The most probable cause of a war, which I nevertheless think wholly improbable, will be a frontier incident between Germany and France, exaggerated by the newspapers, and subject to the difficulty, as between two great Powers of equal strength and spirit, of making excuses. It is easy for excuses to be made by one side when there is obvious disparity of strength, and when that side, whether the stronger or the weaker, does not desire to face the risks of war; but, as I have pointed out in an article on the French grand manœuvres of last year, neither side could now make such efforts for peace as were made by the Emperor William I. a few years ago, when frontier incidents of the kind to which I allude occurred.’

‘Very good, Sir Charles, your war would obviously have very materially differed from ours; but now, given the causes of ours, what do you think of the strategy supposed?’

‘There again,’ was the reply of this keen politician, and endeavour as best I might I could not puzzle him for a single moment, ‘there again I have a criticism to offer. I cannot see why Russia should attempt a descent near Varna, when a descent near Constantinople would so much better suit her purpose. The garrison of Constantinople is not, numerically speaking, a strong one. It is very deficient in effective field artillery, and its infantry, numbering perhaps 18,000 men, could not make much of a defence, unsupported as they are by a real system of land fortification, against a Russian rush from the Black Sea coast by land, accompanied by another landing on the Asiatic side, and a vigorous naval attack against the Therapia batteries.’

‘Talking of Turkey, Sir Charles, should we be certain of her as an ally if France joined Russia, and we supported Germany?’

‘By no means,’ was his emphatic reply; ‘although I grant you that actual temporary circumstances in the Mediterranean would have a great bearing on their attitude, the Turks would look to the possibilities of the moment. If we could terrorise them—yes; if not——’ and here my companion smilingly shook his head.

‘Was _Black and White_ right in sending English troops to Belgium on the outbreak of a Franco-German war?’ I next asked.

‘I think not,’ slowly replied Sir Charles. ‘It is not likely that public opinion in England would force the British Government to such a course. And then again,’ he continued, ‘I think the writers wrong in another important movement. It seems incredible to me that the Russians should expose themselves to the three defeats which they met with in your War. It is much more probable, in my opinion, that when the time comes when they have to fight the battles described, against the Turks near Erzeroum, and against the Austrians on the Galician frontier, they will fight without having the young Emperor William at the same moment in the field against them. They will fight under conditions which will enable them to clear the Black Sea coast of the Turks and the Galician plain of the Austrian forces.’