The Great War of 189-: A Forecast

Part 19

Chapter 194,074 wordsPublic domain

During the night, however, a cavalry division belonging to the 2d Army—which had moved round our rear while the action was going on—beat up the bivouacs of the French, falling first on the artillery and some cavalry and stampeding their horses, who took flight right down the extent of the line. And this last blow turned the French retreat into rout. It was York’s manœuvre at Laon, in 1814, over again, only more thoroughly carried out.

Our Corps were too weary to follow, but the one next on our right, which had been squeezed out of line by our converging movement the day before, took up the pursuit before daybreak in the direction of Rethel.

ADVANCE OF THE SECOND AND THIRD ARMIES ON PARIS.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS.

WARMERIVILLE, _June 6_.

The general situation is as follows:—On the eastern wing the Germans eventually made some 30,000 prisoners, and drove the wreck of the Army of the East into Epinal and Belfort.

Leaving three Corps and the Bavarian reserve divisions to watch them—the remainder of the second and third Armies are moving by the valley of the Marne on Paris, their advance guards to-day reaching Epernay. The available troops of the western wing drove the enemy before them northwards into Laon and against the Belgian frontier, making 40,000 prisoners; but at least 60,000 are known to have escaped by rail into Paris.

Rheims has been closely invested—my Corps, which lost 25 per cent. in the last action, is in reserve round and about the village from which I write. The light siege-train arrived here to-day, and the remainder is expected shortly.

RIOTING IN RHEIMS.

RHEIMS, _June 14_.

The siege-train arrived here complete on the night of the 10th, on the 11th it was put in battery; and at daybreak next morning opened fire against the three forts, Brimont, Fresnes, and Berru. It was just the same here as before Verdun; within a few hours our converging fire from covered positions knocked the forts to pieces, and the French guns were buried in the _débris_ of their own parapets. Some of their guns, firing by indirect laying, remained unsilenced; on the other hand, their fire hit nothing to speak of. The advantage of smokeless powder, combined with indirect laying, turned entirely in favour of the attack.

At daybreak on the 12th we moved forward to the attack of the intermediate positions—not against the forts themselves, for these were mere mudheaps, so saturated with the carbonic oxide due to the explosion of our gun-cotton shells that they were equally untenable by friend or foe.

The fight presented no special features of interest. It was noticeable, however, how much the _morale_ of the other side had been shaken, and how devastating is the power of 40 and 60 lb. shrapnel fire. The hills on which Berru and Brimont stand were both in our hands by about noon. Fresnes was surrounded, and surrendered shortly after. We could pursue down the slopes with fire only, for Rheims itself was still protected by hasty entrenchments which, as the sun was beginning to decline, it was hardly possible to see.

During the night the light siege-train was put in battery on the captured heights, and our outposts reported sounds of firing and tumult in the town, and, indeed, scarcely had our guns opened fire next morning when the white flag flew out from the Cathedral tower; and about 10 A.M. we marched in as peacemakers, for a number of territorialists and armed workmen had broken out in the night, shot the Commandant, and began to plunder the inhabitants, and as all discipline was at an end the second in command yielded to the pressure of the inhabitants and consented to surrender. We cleared the streets without much difficulty, the rioters bolting like hares as we entered them; and the good people of Rheims, remembering the good behaviour of the troops in ’70, welcomed us as friends rather than enemies.

THE MARCH UPON THE FRENCH CAPITAL.

THE REVOLUTION IN PARIS—ARMISTICE DECLARED.

MEAUX, _June 21_.

After a day’s rest we marched to Dormans, and thence down the valley of the Marne, through the most lovely scenery. At every halting place, fresh news of Anarchistic trouble in Paris reaches us, and I fancy the end cannot now be far off, everything depends on the time our engineers and railway troops take to restore the communications, and I have seen no single case of injury which will require more than three days at the outside to make practicable.

CLAYE, _June 27_.

At daybreak this morning, after a preliminary bombardment of twenty-four hours, the position between the forts of Vaujours and Chelles was stormed. The effect of the bombardment was just what it had been before Rheims, and we left the forts untouched. The garrisons had taken shelter in the bomb-proofs, and at first refused to come out; but seeing themselves completely surrounded, and as the deadly fumes of our bursting shells began to penetrate into their retreat, they at last came out and laid down their arms, seeing the impossibility of further resistance.

The line between the two forts was closed with every resource of field fortification; but they proved of no avail, and only gave a fresh illustration of the old saying, related of a British soldier in the Crimean days, who, when taunted by a superior officer with being afraid of the Russian trenches, replied, ‘It ain’t the —— mud heaps, it’s the —— that stands behind!’

The line depended on the forts for flank defence, and when these were silenced, the struggle degenerated into a purely frontal one, in which the immense superiority of our fire in accuracy told. It was, perhaps, in its commencement, the nearest approach to an ideal skirmishing fight we have yet had. Covered by the fire of every available heavy gun—maintained to the last moment possible—our skirmishers crept in to within the edge of the obstacles and entanglements, potting every Frenchman as he showed his head, so that the working parties who followed immediately behind could cut the wires, etc., at their leisure. In places dense lines of abattis could not be thus easily dealt with, but the value of these fell when once the flanks were turned; and when the troops told off for the actual storm broke cover there was practically nothing in front to stop them. We carried the place almost at the first rush; then ensued many long hours of wood fighting, and at the fall of night our outposts finally held the line, Dugny, Le Bourget, Raincy, Neuilly. Many of the officers had been there before. We are now within easy bombarding range of the city.

As I write a report comes in that great fires are raging in Paris. This cannot be caused by our shells.

CLAYE, _June 28_, 9 P.M.

All firing has ceased at the outposts. A report is current that a _parlementaire_ with a white flag has come in, and an armistice is looked on as certain.

LATER.

The report is confirmed. An insurrection has broken out in the city; the Government is deposed, and some members of it massacred. We are moving forward to the line of the old forts which will be given up to set free the garrisons to act against the Commune, and from them we hold the whole city at our mercy.

BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA.

DECISIVE DEFEAT OF THE RUSSIANS.

LONDON.

At length we have great news to report from the British Army. A great battle has been fought and won. Nay, more—the whole Russian Army in Bulgaria, caught like rats in a trap, has, after two days of fierce fighting, laid down its arms. It will be seen, therefore, that the British Army has, after all, not turned up in Asia Minor, but in Bulgaria. All the rumours and apparent demonstrations which led to the belief that a great campaign in Asia Minor was intended, were merely designed to distract attention from the real objects of the expedition. Those who are familiar with Lord Wolseley’s methods now profess to have been always made suspicious by the fact that, as we reported in our issue of June 4th, he had been talking a great deal of the advantages of a campaign in Asia Minor. They say that it is notorious that he holds strongly to the belief that what is supposed in your own army to be about to happen will soon be believed by the enemy. He succeeded in this way in imposing on Arabi so completely during the ’82 campaign, that (extraordinary as it may appear) the Egyptian leader was a prisoner in Ceylon, when he was for the first time made acquainted with the great movement of the English expedition from Alexandria to Ismalia. Lord Wolseley then succeeded in deceiving Arabi because he had imposed upon the world at large, although precisely in a similar manner he had, by spreading reports of a call from Captain Glover during the Ashantee campaign, managed to embark his troops for the surprise of the coast towns from which the Ashantees were drawing their supplies, without any one suspecting the direction in which he was going to strike. The former ruse had been forgotten, and caused no suspicion as to the second. If we may judge by the comments of our contemporaries on the reports which have been hitherto furnished of the war, they have been either very discreet and loyal, or have been completely bamboozled. And yet it was tolerably plain that the direction in which an English Army could at the moment be most effectively employed was in clearing Bulgaria of the aggressive force of Russians, which, from the peculiar circumstances of the case, she had not force to dispose of alone.

Seeing that it is immediately in behalf of Bulgaria, and only secondarily in behalf of Turkey, because of the support she had offered to Bulgaria, that we were engaged in the struggle, there was, independently of the military advantages of the movement, an important political object to be gained by exercising our strength at once in support of the gallant Bulgarian forces. Even if it had been altogether politically convenient to allow the Turkish Army to enter Bulgaria and move upon Tirnova and Shumla, the material obstacles in the way were very serious. On the other hand, twenty-four hours’ easy steaming would bring our troops to the place at which the Russians had originally landed. It was almost certain that as soon as the Russian General found that our ships had again cut his communications by sea, he would abandon his attempt to move upon Sofia and endeavour to make good his retreat by the Dobrudja. From Kavarna we could easily cut across such a movement, which it was to be hoped that the Roumanians would endeavour to delay by every means in their power. It appears that Lord Wolseley, all the time that he was at Constantinople, was in full and direct communication with the Bulgarian Generals, and that all movements were concerted in connection with them; while the Roumanians, assured of English support both by sea and land, were ready to do their utmost to hamper the Russian movements should any attempt be made, either from north or south, to force the passage of the Dobrudja.

Without entering into further details, it will be sufficient to say that Lord Wolseley’s delay at Constantinople was mainly in order to receive the very latest reports from Bulgaria as to the exact position and movements of the Russian Army. From the nearest point on the coast to which telegraphic communication has been carried from Constantinople swift dispatch boats were to bring off the cypher messages, either to the fleet or to Kavarna, whence, as the army advanced inland, the news would be carried. A second line of communication was also established by way of Kustenjeh and Bucharest. Thus the General had the great advantage of knowing more precisely than would usually be the case what the exact movements of his enemy were. To a certain extent those movements were tied. Detachments of too large force to be left to take their fate had been placed to watch Shumla and Varna. From the reports which reached Lord Wolseley, it was clear that the Russians having broken up their camp at Tirnova were marching by way of Shumla—either intending to call in their detachment from Varna and move from Shumla direct upon the Dobrudja, or to advance upon Varna.

In either case, an immediate landing at Kavarna would apparently be out of reach of any serious disturbance from the Russian forces until the landing was effected, and was extremely likely to tempt the Russians to move to attack us in that position. In that case, if we were only able to hold our own in a position already examined and surveyed, it was probable that our force would be amply sufficient to deal with the Russians, even alone, and that within forty-eight hours the Bulgarians who had undertaken to hang closely upon the Russian rear, might be expected to arrive and make the position of the Russians impossible.

Immediately after the ships had passed out of sight of land, the whole fleet changed its course to the N.-N.-West—and by mid-day following that on which the fleet had left the Bosphorus the greater portion of it was in the bay which extends from Kaliakra Cape towards Varna.

The landing had already been begun before our Correspondent arrived—but he was fortunate enough to be allowed to join Colonel French’s Hussars, who were landed soon after it was ascertained that the debarkation of the troops would meet with no immediate resistance. This regiment was pushed southwards, supported by a body of mounted infantry under Colonel Hutton, the second day after the arrival of the troops, and as soon as possible a couple of Horse Artillery guns, which were accompanied by Colonel Marshall, with a small cavalry escort were sent after them in support. The orders for the cavalry were to ascertain the condition of affairs at Varna; if possible to capture a few prisoners, and, taking advantage of the friendliness of the inhabitants, to endeavour to obtain reports of the movements of the enemy.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF VARNA.

AERIAL WARFARE.

Our Correspondent’s description of this march is most interesting and graphic, but we must abridge it in order to come to greater events. It will be sufficient to say that they ascertained that the Russian headquarters had arrived near Shumla without having had any news of the landing of the English Army. The Russian Army was moving on Varna. The Varna force had, however, evidently received orders to make an attempt, if possible, to induce the town to surrender. Just as the cavalry arrived on distant hills within sight of the town, they saw a balloon hanging over it. This at first gave them some anxiety lest their movements might be watched, and their position discovered. In a short time, however, they had reason to perceive that the balloon was there for a very different purpose. A sight, as our Correspondent describes it, at once appalling and magnificent met their view. A black mass of some kind was seen to drop from the balloon; as it about reached the level of the tallest buildings in the place it suddenly burst into a lurid glare which lighted up the minarets and pinnacles of the old Turkish town. Its course was marked by crashing buildings and falling ruins. It was evidently a dynamite shell of vast proportions, which had been deliberately dropped from the balloon.

The object could only have been to terrorise the inhabitants by a cruel and wanton destruction of property. If it had chanced on a magazine it might have produced some effect upon the defence. As it was, it could and did produce none. It indicated to the Englishmen who watched it, rather the parting attempt of Russian hopelessness than a serious effort of war. Nevertheless, a tremendous cannonade was simultaneously opened from all the works near the town, and was not put an end to until some of our ships, which had maintained communication with the garrison, closed in, to within range of the works, and though at a considerable distance threw such a mass of shells against the Russian field-guns that they were glad to cease their fire and withdraw.

We give in our Correspondent’s words the next scene. ‘Not so, however, the balloon. To our amazement we saw it deliberately change its course over the town and steer in teeth of the wind, which was at the time a comparatively light breeze setting seawards. As it reached the position which it was evidently seeking—nearly over the magazines of Varna—we again saw another shell drop out of the balloon, and as it burst on reaching the buildings, what seemed like a universal conflagration of all that part of the town, accompanied by frightful detonations and explosions, showed the effect it had produced.

‘Colonel Marshall was standing next me at the moment, and exclaimed, “Good God! I will tell you what it is; I remember hearing, just before I left England, from an engineer named Delmard, that the French were in possession of a war balloon capable of being steered backwards and forwards even against a light wind, and that they had an arrangement by which a particular form of shell, with a steel casing and some arrangement of liquid oxygen and blasting gelatine, could be dropped from the balloon. They expected great results from it, and must evidently, as a special favour to the Russians, have sent this specimen of the thing over to them.”

‘The evening sun had long set in the direction of Shumla. A crescent moon had risen, and some brilliant stars shone in the sky. As we looked over the undulating ground which separated us from the burning town, the flames lighted up the ships in the offing to the east, making a picture difficult indeed adequately to represent.

‘One thing, however, was clear to us, that the attention of the force round Varna would be entirely occupied by the attempt to take advantage of the destruction they had produced, which, disastrous as it was for the inhabitants, did not seem likely, as far as we could judge, to enforce any surrender.

‘The cavalry, finding themselves not observed, maintained their position for the following day, sending scouting parties in all directions, and reporting to headquarters.

‘This was the evening of the third day since the debarkation had begun. Another cavalry regiment, with the remainder of the Horse Artillery battery, had been sent up to support us; and early the following morning Lord Wolseley, with several of his Staff, including Sir Baker Russell, who is in command of the Cavalry Division, joined us. About 6 A.M. I was looking down over the plain, when I saw two Bulgarian peasants apparently in fierce altercation, coming up towards the position where we were, escorted by one of the Hussars, who was vainly endeavouring to make himself intelligible to them. Presently they came in, one of them holding up a letter in his hand. One of the interpreters with Lord Wolseley in a short time made out their story. It appeared that a Russian officer, who had missed his way, had been seized and murdered by the villagers in the place to which these two men belonged. One of the Hussars had found them in possession of certain property of this officer, and had noticed that a bag of letters was part of it. Being an intelligent fellow, he had managed to make them understand that they should accompany him to Colonel French. The letter the man was holding up proved to be one of no importance, but it was only intended as an indication of the purpose for which he had come. His companion had what was evidently an officer’s sabretash, and on this being opened, several letters were found in it, evidently dispatched from the Russian headquarters to the commandant of the force before Varna. It informed him of the fact that the English troops, which were reported to have entered the Black Sea, were believed in Russia at the latest news to have all gone on towards Trebizonde. It informed him further that the Russian General proposed to make a direct march to the Dobrudja, and gave him the different halting points on the march. It informed him of the point at which he was to join the march, and told him that the greater part of the Cossacks and the remainder of the Russian cavalry would be required to watch the Bulgarian force, which, though inferior to the Russians, and at some marches distant, might be expected to follow up their retreat. It would therefore be necessary for the rather considerable cavalry force which was attached to the troops at Varna to protect the right flank, and to watch the advance of the main army when it arrived. Without troubling your readers with the very ample information which this dispatch conveyed, I may say generally that the period at which the Russian Army, marching in two columns along two roads at some distance from one another, would arrive at about the level of Kosluji with its left column, was still about four days off. All this information we received later. At the moment I saw Lord Wolseley carefully reading through the translation of the dispatches as it was put into his hands.

‘Admiral Markham had ridden out with the party, and the first person to whom Lord Wolseley turned, after he finished, was the Admiral. A short discussion took place between them, the nature of which I did not at the moment hear, but which I have reason to believe related to the question of the amount of transport and supplies that could be landed in the next day or two. At all events, it was evident to all of us in a very short time that the plans had been changed. Orders were immediately issued for the march that afternoon of the three brigades which had first landed; fortunately they were in the neighbourhood of Baltjik, so that they were the nearest to Varna. The Cavalry, with the mounted Infantry, were at once brought up, and extended so as to cut off all communication between the main Russian Army and Varna.

‘Fortunately the country in this neighbourhood consists of a series of undulating uplands, with numbers of features permitting the concealment of large bodies of men.’

To tell the story as we now know it from various sources, the opportunity which presented itself to Lord Wolseley’s mind as he read the intercepted dispatch was just this. It was evident from the information brought in by the Bulgarians, and from other sources, that the Russians were still ignorant that an English force had landed in the country. If he could immediately surprise the camp at Varna, he would have at least a highly probable opportunity of breaking in upon the Russian columns on their march, and annihilating one before the other could come to its support; especially seeing that they were relying upon the Cavalry of the Varna force to cover their movements. This was a far more brilliant opportunity than that which had been at first hoped for when the taking up a position, which would oblige the Russians to attack, had been designed. The intention was for the three Infantry brigades to move up that night in two marches into a position within reach of attack of the Russian camp at Varna, and actually to make the attack at grey dawn on the following morning.

Lord Charles Beresford was, according to arrangement, to land in the evening with no particular attempt at concealment with a party of Blue Jackets and Marines, and to arrange with the Bulgarian Officer in command at Varna, for a sally of the whole Bulgarian garrison so as to attract the attention of the Russians towards the Varna side at the moment when our attack was made. Watches having been carefully compared, three o’clock in the morning was fixed upon as the hour for the simultaneous attack. The three brigades were to attack respectively the right, left, and centre of the Russian position.