Part 57

Phillipon, who, under the direction of Soult, governed in the town, took every precaution necessary; and the townsmen joined their efforts to those of the garrison to forward the works of defence.

Ground being broken for a false attack upon Pardileras on the 29th, the next night a parallel of eleven hundred yards was sunk against the castle, without the workmen being observed by the enemy; the same night another parallel, of four hundred and fifty yards from San Cristoval, and seven hundred from the bridge-head, was opened; one breaching and two counter mines were raised on this line, to prevent sallies by the bridge from the fort.

The attack against the castle proceeded favourably, but the soil and the situation rendered that of Cristoval slow and attended with loss: it was not finished before the night of the 1st of June. It was much impeded by some well-directed mortars from the garrison, which, strange to say, were stopped by Phillipon, from the mistaken idea that he was throwing their fire away.

On the night of the 2nd, however, the battery against San Cristoval began, and after the guns and men had got into practice, much mischief was done to the castle. On the 4th, the garrison added the fire of several guns to their artillery, and some of the besiegers’ were silenced.

The contest was kept up with tolerable spirit till two breaches were made in San Cristoval; and one of them appearing practicable, an assault was ordered, assisted by a diversion in another quarter.

The stormers reached the glacis and descended the ditch without being discovered; but they found the obstacles insurmountable, and the forlorn hope was about to retire before committing themselves to serious injury, when the main body, annoyed by a flank fire from the town, followed them into the ditch with their ladders. But the ladders proved too short, and the defence from within was so firm, that immediate retreat was necessary, and that attended with considerable loss.

The errors in this attack are subjects of military discussion; but we have not space to enter into them. The French acted with great skill and activity in clearing away ruins, presenting every obstacle that could be thought of, natural as well as scientific, and by the judicious disposition of well-armed men. Succours being at hand, a second attack was thought advisable, if any hopes could be entertained of the capture of the place. This time, things were better managed; but on the other side, Phillipon made adequate preparations to meet them.

But this attack proved no more fortunate than the former. It was led with infinite spirit by Major M’Geechy, who fell early. The French seem to have laughed at the affair, as they jeeringly called to the men in the ditch to come on. But barrels of powder rolled down among them, with the addition of shells and musketry, proved worse than their jeers. All went wrong: the troops quarrelled for the ladders, though not many of them could be reared; confusion ensued; and the enemy naturally took advantage of it: those who ascended the ladders were met with the bayonet; the ladders themselves were overturned; and a murderous fire was poured upon the unfortunate mass in the ditch. Soult’s approach rendered further attempts impossible; and the siege was converted into a blockade.

Sir William Napier’s remarks are very severe upon this siege. In addition to what we have before quoted, he says: “This siege, in which four hundred men and officers fell, violated all rules. The working parties were too weak, the guns and stores too few, the points of attack ill-chosen; the defences were untouched by counter-fire, and the breaching-batteries were too distant for the bad guns; howitzers on trucks were poor substitutes for mortars, and the sap was not practised. Lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been crowned and a musketry-fire established against the breach.”

SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE, A.D. 1812.

Lord Wellington having collected his troops in the Alentejo, marched against Badajos, and commenced the siege on the 16th of March, 1812.

On the 29th, previous to the opening of the breaching-batteries, the enemy made a sortie upon the Portuguese troops under General Hamilton, who invested the place on the right of the Guadiana; but they were immediately repulsed with some loss.

On the 31st, the English began to fire upon the face of the bastion to the south-west of the angle of the fort of Trinidad, and upon the flank of the bastion Santa Maria, with twenty-six pieces of artillery formed in two batteries in the second parallel. The fire of the batteries was constant and tremendous from the 31st to the evening of April 3rd, not less than sixty-four shots per minute being thrown. On the 4th of April, a battery of six pieces was opened upon the ravelin of St. Roque.

On the evening of the 5th, the breaches were declared practicable; but as the enemy appeared to be making most formidable preparations to repel any assault, Lord Wellington determined to wait till the third breach was also practicable. This being deemed to be so by the evening of the 6th, it was resolved to storm the place without an hour’s delay.

The arrangements made for this purpose were as follows: The third division under General Picton was directed to attack the castle by escalade, while the guards in the trenches, which were furnished from the fourth division, should attack the ravelin of St. Roque, on the left of the castle. The fourth division, under Major-General Colville, and the light division, under Colonel Bernard, were ordered to attack the breaches in the bastions of Trinidad and Santa Maria. Major-General Walker, with his brigade, was to make a false attack upon the fort of Pardileras and other works on the banks of the Guadiana; and General Power, with the Portuguese troops under his command, had orders to attack the _tête-du-pont_ and fort of San Cristoval on the right of that river.

The attack commenced exactly at ten o’clock at night. The breaches were attacked in the most gallant manner by the fourth and light divisions, who got almost to the covered way before they were perceived by the enemy. But General Phillipon had brought the bravest of his troops to that point, and every obstacle that the shortness of the time would admit of was opposed to their advance; and notwithstanding the most determined and almost desperate efforts which were made by the British to overcome these obstacles, they were three times repulsed, and were unable to effect an entry by the breaches. Many a gallant man fell a victim to his bravery, and success had almost become hopeless, when the commander was informed that General Picton was in possession of the castle.

This cheering information soon spread through the ranks, and the allied troops returned to the charge with an impetuosity that nothing could oppose, and in ten minutes more they were in possession of the place. General Walker succeeded in his attack upon the Pardileras, which was taken possession of by the 15th Portuguese infantry, under Colonel de Regoa, and the 8th Caçadores, under Major Hill. General Walker also forced the barrier on the Olevença road, and entering the covered way on the left of the bastion of St. Vincent, he descended into the ditch, and scaled the face of the bastion. Phillipon fled with a few troops to the fort of San Cristoval, but at the break of the following day he surrendered the fort and garrison.

We have here set down the prominent facts of this siege with the brevity our space commands; but if we had the opportunity for going into the details enjoyed by the elegant historian of the Peninsular war, what a world of stirring instances of devotion, bravery, and suffering we should have to relate!

Although we are bound to hold the work of a contemporary sacred, we cannot resist offering a picture of the horrors of war, given by one evidently, on other occasions, fond and proud of his profession. At the close of this siege, Sir William Napier says:--

“Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which tarnishes the lustre of the soldier’s heroism. All indeed were not alike; hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the violence; but madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders, here all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fire bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos! On the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled: the wounded men were _then_ looked to, and the dead disposed of!

“Five thousand men fell in this short siege--three thousand five hundred in the assault--in a space of less than a hundred square yards!

“When the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers.”

CIUDAD RODRIGO.

A.D. 1812.

The allied army under Lord Wellington remained in cantonments till the 7th of January, waiting for the arrival of the artillery; the light divisions being advanced in front, observing the enemy’s movements.

The battering-train having reached Almeida on the 8th, Lord Wellington commenced the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo. Before this place could be even approached, it was necessary to take or destroy a palisadoed redoubt, which had been erected on the hill of St. Francisco, as also three fortified convents connected with that work. This operation was given to Major-General Crawford, who, as soon as it was dark, sent Colonel Colborne, of the 52nd, with a detachment of the light division, to take the fort. The attack was ably conducted by Colonel Colborne; it was stormed in gallant style, two captains and forty-seven men being made prisoners. Captain Mein, of the 52nd, who led the storming party, was severely wounded, but the British loss was trifling. In consequence of this success, the army broke ground the same night, within six hundred yards of the city, notwithstanding that the enemy held the fortified convents.

On the 14th of January, Lord Wellington opened his fire from twenty-two pieces of ordnance, which formed three batteries in the first parallel. On the night of that day, likewise, the approach was opened with the second parallel, and the besiegers were established in it, within a hundred and fifty yards of the walls of the place. This operation was rendered secure on the right, by General Sir Thomas Graham having surprised the enemy’s detachment in the convent of Santa Cruz, and General Colville equally secured it on the left by getting possession of the convent of St. Francisco.

January 15th, 16th, and 17th were spent in completing the second parallel and the approaches to it, and in erecting a battery in the neighbourhood of the convent of St. Francisco, which opened on the 18th. By the 19th the breaches in the _fausse-braie_ wall, and in the body of the place, effected by the batteries in the first parallel, were considered practicable, as was also a breach in the suburbs of St. Francisco, which had been made by the batteries opened on the 15th. Marmont was now, to all appearance, advancing with a powerful force from Salamanca, for the purpose of raising the siege; Lord Wellington therefore saw that no time was to be lost, and accordingly determined to make an instant attempt on the city by storm.

The third and light divisions were fixed upon for this important service, as they happened to be the troops on duty that day, the army taking the duties of the trenches by divisions during the siege. They were formed into five columns. The two right, conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Toole, of the 2nd Portuguese Caçadores, and Major Ridge, of the 5th regiment, were destined to protect the advance of the third column, which was composed of General M’Kinnon’s brigade, to the top of the breach in the _fausse-braie_ wall. The fourth column was composed of the 43rd and 52nd, and part of the 95th regiments, and was directed by General Crawford. This was destined to attack the breach on the left, in the suburbs of St. Francisco, and to cover the left of the attack at the principal breach by the troops of the third division, under General Picton. General Pack’s Portuguese brigade, which formed the fifth column, was directed to make a false attack upon the south face of the fort. Besides these columns, the 94th regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, was ordered to descend into the ditch on the right of General M’Kinnon’s column, for the purpose of protecting it against the obstacles which it was supposed the enemy would construct to oppose its progress to the principal breach in the _fausse-braie_ wall.

The assault was made according to these arrangements. Major Ridge with his column escaladed the _fausse-braie_ wall, and stormed the principal breach in the main body of the place, together with the 94th regiment, which had moved along the ditch, and had stormed the breach of the _fausse-braie_ wall in the front of General M’Kinnon’s brigade, so that it not only covered the advance of that brigade, but even preceded it in the attack. Generals Crawford and Vandeleur, with the troops on the left, were equally forward in their movements, and in less than half an hour from the commencement of the attack, the city was in possession of the allies. General Pack converted his false attack into a real one. The Portuguese troops scaled the walls in every direction; and the advanced-guard, under Major Lynch, followed the enemy’s troops from the advanced works into the _fausse-braie_, where they made prisoners of all that opposed them.

Major-General M’Kinnon was blown up by the explosion of one of the enemy’s mines near the breach. General Crawford received a mortal wound while leading on his division; and Major Napier, one of the bravest men in the army, lost an arm. M’Kinnon had been a schoolfellow of Buonaparte.

The value of this capture of Ciudad Rodrigo was very great. 1st. It erected a wall, and a very strong one, against any new invasion of the Portuguese frontier. 2nd. It was so much gained towards clearing the country between the Douro and the Tagus. 3rd. It intercepted the communication of the enemy between the north and south of Spain, and thereby rendered the operations of their armies in the north, and their army in the south, two distinct lines, having the allied army between them. 4th. It paved the way for the siege of Badajos. 5th. It greatly raised the credit and popularity of the allied cause.

This siege only lasted twelve days. The allies lost twelve hundred men and ninety officers; among the latter of whom was one who appears to have been a general favourite, for it was said, “Three generals and seventy other officers had fallen, yet the soldiers fresh from the strife only talked of Hardyman:” he was a captain of the 45th.

It is lamentable to hear the historian of the Peninsular war attach the same blame to the allied troops in this siege as we have mentioned in that of Badajos. “Disgraceful,” he says, “were the excesses of the allied troops: the Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and helpless, yet all these claims were disregarded. ‘The soldiers were not to be controlled.’ That excuse will not suffice. Colonel Macleod, of the 43rd, a young man of most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach, and constrained his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorder commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.” This is a severe but just censure upon “the higher authorities.” We know that the British common soldier is taken from the lowest ranks of society, but we cannot agree that cold-blooded cruelty is a distinguishing characteristic even of these classes; we believe the British people to be averse to cruel triumph over a fallen enemy, and we should rather attribute the excesses complained of to the partisan portion of the army: civil warfare is generally the most inveterate. The Spaniards were most likely to be cruel towards their compatriots; few people are more inveterate when their passions are roused.

For this achievement Lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, and marquis of Torres Vedras by the Portuguese.

THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.

A.D. 1812.

This is a small fortress, but an important siege, filled with incident and instruction.

On the morning of the 18th of September, the army was in front of Burgos, and may be said to have commenced a siege, in which the historians of the different nations, without any just imputation upon their truth, may each claim for their country the palm of active courage and patient firmness. The town was as bravely defended as it was bravely assailed, and the ardent and persevering enterprise of the attack was met by corresponding vigour and vigilance in the defence.

Burgos is the capital of Old Castile, and was the cradle of the Castilian kings and monarchy. It is memorable for the noble stand which it repeatedly made against the Saracens. After the retreat of Massena, it was considered a critical and dangerous point, and its fortifications were repaired. The ruins of the castle were very strong, being stone, and of deep foundation, situated, besides, on the brow of a hill, commanding the river Arlanzon, on which the town stands, and the roads on both sides of it. These ruins were repaired, and strengthened by additional earthworks. Beyond the hill on which the castle is situated is another eminence, called St. Michael’s Hill, on which a hornwork was erected. Adjoining the castle was a church, which was converted into a fort. The above works were included within three distinct lines of circumvallation, which were so carried and connected as to form an oblong square, and each to defend and support without endangering (in the event of being itself lost) the others. The garrison consisted of more than two thousand men.

As Burgos is on the north side of the Arlanzon, whilst the allied army was on the south, and as the castle commanded both the river and the roads, Wellington had some difficulty in preparing the passage, and the remainder of the day of the 18th was employed in making the necessary arrangements. On the following day this operation was effected. The outworks of the hill of St. Michael were immediately seized, and the troops posted close to the hornwork. At night the hornwork was itself attacked and carried, and thus the whole of St. Michael’s Hill was obtained. This hill was, however, a mere outwork to the main fortress, inasmuch as the possession of it only brought the allies in front of the outermost of the three lines, behind which were the castle and body of the work.

The possession of this eminence afforded the allies a better knowledge of the defences of the fort, with a commanding view of some of the works. The besieged evinced neither tardiness nor want of skill; they had demolished, in an incredibly short time, the houses which interfered with their line of defence. They had raised ramparts of earth and biscuit-barrels, and constructed fleches and redans to cover the batteries and sally-gates. These works, considering the materials and the pressure of the time, were so solid and accurate as to command the general praise of the British engineers, whilst the Portuguese regarded them with astonishment: a proof of the value of the knowledge of field-work, as it then existed in the French army, when almost every soldier could assist the artillery, and take his share in the work of attack and defence in sieges. It is observed by a writer of the time, “We must confess that the patience of the English privates was more exemplary than their dexterity.”

From the 19th to the 22nd of September, the allies were employed in raising their own works upon St. Michael’s Hill, in front of the exterior line of the enemy, and more particularly in fortifying and completing the hornwork, of which they had possessed themselves. Everything being ready on the evening of the 22nd, it was resolved to give the first regular assault. Accordingly, at the hour of eleven at night, the storming body was moved forward in two columns: the one, consisting of Portuguese, to the south-west flank of the castle; and the other of British, under Major Laurie, to the front. The plan of the attack was, that the Portuguese should engage and occupy the eminence on the above-mentioned flank, while Major Laurie’s party should escalade the parapet in front.

The Portuguese, who were to begin the attack, commenced with much spirit. They were opposed to a deep ditch and a lofty parapet on the opposite side, and therefore had to descend into the one and fight their way up the other. It may be necessary to state to the uninitiated, that the shelving side of the ditch which adjoins the parapet is technically termed the scarp, and the opposite side of the ditch (the side nearest an advancing enemy) the counterscarp. They were stopped at the very edge of the descent into this ditch; their attack, therefore, as a diversion, became nugatory, and failed in the first instance.

In the meanwhile, the party in front, under Major Laurie, having seen the Portuguese commence, advanced with the most determined bravery to the escalade, and having the same works in opposition to them as the Portuguese, in an instant reached the head of the counterscarp, and in another instant descended it, cleared the palisades at the bottom, and planted their ladders to the parapet. The first assailants penetrated to the top of the parapet, and a fierce contest took place both there and in the bottom of the ditch. The assault was repelled with as much spirit as it was made and the ditch and scarp were covered with dead of both parties. Amongst these was the gallant leader himself, Major Laurie.

This gallantry, however, was rendered useless by the total failure of the Portuguese division. After much severe fighting, therefore, and a great consequent loss, the party was withdrawn,--an affair in itself of great peril and difficulty, as their ardour had carried them nearly into the lines. It was a matter of congratulation that the whole party had escaped being made prisoners. The total British and Portuguese loss on this occasion was not short of four hundred killed and wounded.

It would be of little professional instruction, and of less general interest, to follow the details of an irregular, and therefore inartificial siege, from day to day; we shall therefore confine ourselves to the attacks. Of those, during the whole siege, there were five; two we have already described.

After the failure of the storm on the 22nd, a mine was directed under the same exterior line. It was exploded in the midnight of the 29th, and a breach, erroneously deemed practicable, effected in the parapet. A storming party was immediately advanced, and at the same moment, for the purpose of diversion, a strong column was directed in front of the town. The storming party unluckily missed its way, and thereby the affair failed.