Part 54

With the commencement of the war in 1779, the siege of Gibraltar may be said to have begun. It was, in truth, but an imperfect blockade, but it subjected the garrison to all the watchfulness, labour, and preparation of a real siege. The Spaniards were actively employed in fortifying all their best points; they encamped before the garrison, and erected additional batteries in their lines, but still did not fire upon the town or fort. General Elliott, however, found their proceedings so unmistakable in their purpose, and knowing that war had been declared, he saluted them at their works with a few rounds of shot.

This took place on the 5th of July, 1779; and from that date to the 26th of November, 1781, the siege or blockade was one continuance of mutual attempts at annoyance, interspersed with occasional want of provisions and attacks of the scurvy on the part of the garrison, frequent boat-assaults, always attended with repulses, on the side of the allies; with a strange but perpetual desertion of individuals from both garrison and army. But at the last-named period the enemy had constructed such formidable batteries, and appeared to be approaching so inconveniently near, that General Elliott determined upon the bold expedient of a sortie. This was effected with his usual prudence, foresight, and spirit. As soon as the gates were shut, and the evening gun fired, a considerable detachment was ordered to assemble on the Red Sands, at midnight, with devils, fire-fagots, and working implements, to make a sortie on the enemy’s batteries; the general and other officers to be employed were in the mean time convened, _and, lest some matters might have escaped him in the multiplicity of arrangements, the governor desired every person to propose, without restraint, whatever would, in his or their opinion, further promote the success of the enterprise_. We place the last passage in italics, as a lesson to self-sufficient commanders: no captain ever more completely performed the duties intrusted to him by his country, and yet he was never averse to receiving advice from the lowest of his staff. On a subsequent occasion an important use of red-hot shot was suggested to him, by Lieutenant-General Boyd, his second in command, and, without the least of the paltry jealousy some superiors would have felt, he not only openly adopted the idea, but intrusted the execution of it to his friend who had thought of it.

“The detachment being formed in three lines, the right column in the rear and the left in front, tools for demolishing the works were delivered to the workmen, and the following directions for their destination were communicated to the principal officers:--‘The right column to lead and march through Forbes’s barrier for the extremity of the parallel, keeping the eastern fence of the gardens close on their left. The centre immediately to follow, marching through Bay-side barrier, and directing their route through the gardens for the mortar-batteries. The left column to bring up the rear, marching along the strand for the gun-batteries. No person to advance before the front unless ordered by the officer commanding the column: and the most profound silence to be observed, as the success of the enterprise may depend thereon. The 12th and Hardenberg’s regiments to form in front of the works, as assaulting corps, and are to detach to the right and left, as occasion may require. The reserve to take post on the furthest gardens. When the works are carried, the attacking troops are to take up their ground in the following manner:--The grenadiers of Reden’s and La Motte’s behind the parallel; the 39th and 73rd flank companies along the front of the fourth branch; and the 72nd grenadiers and light infantry with their right to the fourth branch and left to the beach.’

“The force consisted of ninety-nine officers, one hundred and forty-seven subalterns, and two thousand and thirty-four rank and file.

“By the time the destination of the columns was made known to the different officers, and other arrangements had taken place, the morning of the 27th was far advanced; and as the moon had then nearly finished her nightly course, the detachment, about a quarter before three o’clock, began its march by files from the right of the rear line to the attack. Although nothing could exceed the silence and attention of the troops, the enemy’s advanced sentries discovered the right column before they passed Forbes’s barrier, and after challenging fired upon them. Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo, commanding this column, finding they were alarmed, immediately formed the attacking corps, and pushed on at a brisk pace for the extremity of the parallel; there, finding no opposition, he took possession, and the pioneers began to dismantle the works. Part of Hardenberg’s regiment, which was attached to this column, mistook the route of the grenadiers, owing to the darkness of the morning; and in pursuing their own, found themselves, before they discovered their error, in front of the St. Carlos battery. In this dilemma no other alternative offered but pressing forward, which they gallantly did, after receiving the enemy’s fire. Upon mounting the parapet, the enemy precipitately retreated, and with great difficulty they descended the stupendous work, forming with their left to the tower. They were thus situated, when Lieutenant-Colonel Duchenhausen, at the head of the 39th flank companies, entered the St. Carlos battery, and naturally mistaking them for his opponents, fired, and wounded several. Further mischief was, however, prevented by the countersign; and the Hanoverians joined the remainder of the corps, which now formed _en potence_ in front of the parallel. The 73rd flank companies were equally successful in their attacks, and Lieutenant-Colonel Trigge, with the grenadiers and light company of the 72nd regiment, carried the gun-batteries with great gallantry. The ardour of the assailants was irresistible. The enemy on every side gave way, abandoning in an instant, and with the utmost precipitation, those works which had cost them so much expense, and employed so many months to perfect.

“When our troops had taken possession, the attacking corps formed agreeably to their orders, to repel any attack which the enemy might make to prevent the destruction of the works, whilst the 12th regiment took post in front of the St. Carlos battery, to sustain the western attack; and the reserve, under Major Maxwell, drew up in the further gardens. The exertions of the workmen and artillery were wonderful. The batteries were soon in a state for the fire-fagots to operate, and the flames spread with astonishing rapidity into every part. The columns of fire and smoke which rolled from the works beautifully illuminated the troops and neighbouring objects, forming altogether a _coup d’œil_ from the rock, not possible to be described.

“In an hour, the object of the sortie was fully effected; and trains being laid to the magazines, Brigadier Ross ordered the advanced corps to withdraw, and the sustaining regiments to cover their retreat; but by some oversight, the barrier at Forbes’s was locked after the flank companies had returned; which might have proved of serious consequence to Hardenberg’s regiment, as they were from that circumstance under the necessity of following the 12th regiment through Bay-side barrier.

“Several small quantities of powder took fire whilst the detachment was on its retreat; and just as the rear had got within the garrison, the principal magazine blew up with a tremendous explosion, throwing up vast pieces of timber, which, falling into the flames, added to the general conflagration. Although the enemy must have been early alarmed, not the smallest effort was made to save or avenge their works. The fugitives seemed to communicate a panic to the whole; and instead of annoying the English troops from the flanking forts, their artillery directed a ridiculous fire towards the town and our upper batteries, whence we continued a warm and well-served discharge of round shot on their forts and barrier. Only two officers and sixteen privates were taken prisoners, and, so little opposition being made, very few were killed in the works.

“Thus was this important attack executed beyond the most sanguine expectations of every one. The event challenges greater admiration, when we reflect that the batteries were distant near three-quarters of a mile from the garrison, and only within a few hundred yards of a besieging enemy’s lines, mounting one hundred and thirty-five pieces of heavy artillery. The detachment had only four privates killed, and one officer and twenty-four privates wounded. The ordnance spiked in the enemy’s works amounted to ten thirteen-inch mortars and eighteen twenty-six pounders. Although subject to the little derangements naturally attending on a night attack, not one musket, working-tool, or other instrument, was left behind.”

Such is Captain Drinkwater’s account of a spirited and successful action of which he was an eye-witness. The French historians of the siege say that the British could not stand against the fire of the batteries, and retreated. This is one of the innumerable contradictions to truth offered by French authors whenever the military honour of their country is concerned. They always forget that their contemporaries and posterity will judge which party was victor in a conflict, by the results. Victor Hugo _poetically_ said, that Buonaparte was never conquered: _at Moscow it was fire--at Waterloo it was fate_. Headers of history are nevertheless convinced of the reality of the two defeats, by the events which followed them.

The affair had now been so prolonged, and had excited so much attention throughout Europe, that the Spaniards and French began to think it a point of honour to subdue this general on his rock; and the duke de Crillon, accompanied by the eminent French engineer D’Arçon, and followed by an army of thirty thousand men, came to Algeziras. Immediately upon his arrival, D’Arçon changed the mode of attack: it had been previously mostly confined to the land side of the rock; he, most unfortunately for the cause he served, directed almost all his offensive efforts from the sea, and yet by no means neglecting his fortifications. General Elliott’s principal _extraordinary_ preparation consisted in grates and various apparatus for heating shot, as he found red-hot balls by far the most efficient instrument of destruction he could employ. But he was too watchful and prudent a commander to let this engross all his attention: in addition to constant labours at the works, he ordered holes to be blasted in the rocks, nearly on a level with the water, from which he could pour showers of stones and other missiles upon his assailants. He likewise had a number of gun-boats built; and, having received supplies and reinforcements from the British fleet under Lord Hood, he felt himself in a condition to cope with his powerful enemies. Determined to have no idle hands, even the serjeants and drummers were armed with muskets; and musicians, who had before been exempted from duty, had to exchange their instruments for firelocks and shovels. The strength of the garrison with the marine brigade, including officers, amounted to seven thousand five hundred men.

The comte d’Artois and the duke de Bourbon joined the Spanish and French armies; after whose arrival many civilities passed between the besieging camp and the garrison. The French general sent presents of game, fruit, vegetables, and ice, to the governor, accompanied by a letter breathing the highest respect and admiration for his courage, talents, and firmness. Here again is the beautiful simplicity, combined with military virtues, displayed in the character of Elliott; he might be imagined an ancient Roman rather than a modern soldier of fortune. He accepts the presents with a courtesy due to the kindness with which they were offered; but requests they may not be repeated, as it is his pride and pleasure to live as plainly as the humblest soldier in his army.

After a good deal of sharp preliminary sparring on both sides, the awful conflict came on. In our account of this, we shall mostly adhere to the very words of the historian of the siege, convinced that no other can lay it so plainly and yet so interestingly before our readers.

“In the evening of the 7th of September, a little before midnight, two large lights appeared on the shore of the Orange-grove battery, and at the same time, two similar fires were seen behind Fort St. Philip; whence, if a line was produced, it would to appearance have intersected the former about eight hundred or nine hundred yards to the north-west of the old mole head. These unusual signals made many conjecture that the enemy were sounding in that quarter. A few rounds were accordingly fired at intervals in that direction from the north bastion.

“By the morning of the 8th, the preparations in the department of the artillery, under General Boyd’s direction, were completed, and the success of the attack in a great measure depending upon embracing the favourable moment, it was no longer deferred. At seven o’clock, the town-guards being relieved, the firing commenced from all the northern batteries which bore upon the western part of the parallel, and was supported through the day with admirable precision and vivacity. The effect of the red-hot shot and carcases exceeded our most sanguine expectations. In a few hours, the Mahon battery of six guns, with the battery of two guns on its flank, and great part of the adjoining parallel, were on fire, and the flames, notwithstanding the enemy’s exertions to extinguish them, burnt so rapidly, that the whole of these works before night were consumed. The St. Carlos and St. Martin batteries, however, on this occasion, escaped the fate they had formerly experienced, but they were so much damaged, that the greater part was taken down.

“For near an hour, the enemy continued silent spectators of our cannonade. About eight, they fired a few guns from the St. Martin battery, and between nine and ten returned our fire from Fort St. Philip and Barbara, with the seven-gun battery in the lines, and soon after, from eight new mortar-batteries in the parallel. This tardiness in returning our fire in some degree we attributed to the works being confused with materials, and some of the batteries being deficient in ammunition. It might, however, be owing to want of discretionary orders, as an officer of rank was observed to enter the lines about the time when their cannonade became general; a reinforcement also marched down from the camp.

“The astonishing bravery displayed by the enemy in their repeated attempts to extinguish the flames, could not fail to attract the particular notice and admiration of the besieged. Urged on most probably by emulation, they performed prodigies of valour, so that their loss, under so well-directed a fire, must have been very considerable. The French brigade had one hundred and forty killed and wounded, and the Spanish casualties most likely bore an equal proportion. About four o’clock in the afternoon the cannonade abated on both sides, and the enemy soon after were totally silent, though the garrison continued its usual fire. The British had two or three killed and several wounded. Lieutenant Boag, of the artillery, and Ensign Gordon, of the 58th regiment, were of the latter number. The former officer had been wounded before; on this occasion, he was pointing a gun from Hanover battery in the lines, when a shell fell in the battery. He had scarcely time to throw himself down in an embrasure, when the shell burst, and fired the gun under the muzzle of which he lay. The report immediately deprived him of hearing, and it was some time before he recovered a tolerable use of that faculty. Major Martin, of the same corps, had likewise a very fortunate escape from a twenty-six pounder, which shot away the cock of his hat close to the crown. This anecdote is inserted because it is commonly believed that if a cannon-ball of large diameter passes so near the head of a person, the wind of it is generally fatal. The major was considerably stunned by the passage of the shot, but experienced little further injury. In the forenoon of the 8th, two more ships of the line removed to the Orange-grove, followed some time afterwards by twenty-two gun and mortar boats; and in the evening, one of the French men-of-war joined them from Algeziras. In the course of the day, a number of troops were embarked on board such of the battering-ships as were finished; and at night, the garrison artillery replaced the ammunition in the expense magazines, which had been used to such good purpose in the morning.

“This unexpected insult undoubtedly precipitated the duke’s measures; and, by provoking him to the attack before the preparations in the other departments were ready to combine with him in a general and powerful effort against the garrison, served greatly to frustrate the enterprise. Apprehensive probably, that, elated by their good fortune, they might renew their attempts finally to destroy the land-works which had escaped, the duke determined to avoid the blow, which might be so dangerous in its consequences, by opening his batteries, even in their unfinished state. Actuated most probably by these motives, the embrasures of the new batteries were unmasked during the night of the 8th; and the succeeding morning at daybreak, the garrison were surprised to find every appearance in their works for firing upon them. Two rockets from the forts in the lines were the signals to begin; and the cannonade commenced at half-past five o’clock, with a volley of about sixty shells from all their mortar batteries in the parallel, succeeded by a general discharge of their cannon, amounting in the whole to about one hundred and seventy pieces of ordnance, all of large calibre. Their firing was powerful, and entirely directed against the works of the besieged, but was not, after the first round, altogether so tremendous and destructive as might have been expected from such a train of artillery. At intervals, from ten to twenty shells were in the air at the same moment, but their effects were not equal to the numbers expended. The town, southward of the King’s bastion, was little affected; but the northern front, and line-wall, leading from the Grand Parade to the North bastion, were exceedingly warm; and the lines and Landport were greatly annoyed by the shells from the howitzers, which were distributed in various parts of their parallel; Montague’s and Orange’s bastions seemed to be the centre of the enemy’s cross-fire, whilst the line-wall in their vicinity and to the southward was taken _à revers_ by the shot which passed over the lines from the sixty-four-gun battery.

“Not imagining, from the rough appearance of the enemy’s works, that they could possibly retaliate so soon, the guards and pickets of the north end of the garrison were for some time exposed, and some casualties occurred; but they soon discovered whence they were chiefly annoyed, and consequently became more cautious. Lieutenant Wharton, of the 73rd regiment, was dangerously wounded at Landport.

“Whilst the land-batteries were thus pouring forth their vengeance upon the northern front, nine line-of-battle ships, including those under the French flag, got under way from the Orange-grove, and passing along the sea-line, discharged several broadsides at the garrison, and particularly at a settee which had just arrived under their guns from Algiers. When this squadron had got round Europa Point, they suddenly wore, and returning along the Europa, Rosia, and New Mole battery, commenced a regular and heavy fire upon the garrison. The marine brigade and artillery returned the salute till they passed, when the men-of-war wore and returned to the eastward. About the same time that the enemy were thus amusing the garrison at the southward, fifteen gun and mortar boats approached the town, and continued their fire for some time; but the artillery giving them a warm reception from the King’s bastion, two of them were towed off with precipitation, and the rest retired in great disorder. One was thought to be very considerably damaged, and some imagined that her gun was thrown overboard to save her from sinking.

“This mode of attacking on all sides exactly corresponded with what the garrison had heard was the plan of M. d’Arçon. He hoped, probably, to confound and overwhelm them, by presenting destruction under such various forms, and by the enormous quantity of fire which he poured in upon the garrison. The governor, however, did not approve of his troops being thus subjected to be harassed at his pleasure, and resolved, if possible, to put a stop to the sea attacks. For this purpose the furnaces and grates for heating shot, at the New Mole, were ordered to be lighted, and some new arrangements took place in the ordnance upon Windmill-hill. Towards dusk the enemy abated in the fire from their cannon, increasing, however, in the expenditure of shells, which being generally fired with short fuses, broke in the air. This practice seemed well calculated for the purposes in view. In the day they could observe with greater certainty the effect of their shot, and alter as circumstances directed; the firing at night must unavoidably be less depended upon: shells were therefore burst over the heads of the workmen of the besieged, to prevent them, if possible, from repairing at night the damage received in the day. Nevertheless it did not obstruct the duties in the department of the engineers, and the artillery were not hindered from further completing the expense magazine with ammunition. The 97th regiment[19] was now so far recovered as for some time to assist in the fatigue duties of the garrison; and this day the officers, with one hundred men, were added to the general roster. The town guards were likewise ordered to assemble in Southport ditch.

“The enemy’s men-of-war, as General Elliott had expected, repeated their attack very early in the morning of the 10th. Each ship carried a light at her mizen-peak; but they did not appear near enough to produce much effect. They were received with a well-supported fire, and the next morning one of them was to be observed at Algeziras, with her bowsprit unshipped. The remaining eight renewed their cannonade about nine in the forenoon, and killed two of the marine brigade, and wounded a serjeant of artillery and two other men. After they had passed as before, they wore ship, apparently with an intention of continuing their visits; but suddenly put about, hauled their wind, and anchored off the Orange-grove. The governor was afterwards informed that the discovery of a red-hot shot on board one of the ships was the immediate cause of this hasty manœuvre.

“The enemy continued their firing from the isthmus, recommencing at morning gun-fire on the 10th from their gun-batteries. At seven o’clock, including the expenditure on the eighth, they had discharged 5,227 shot and 2,302 shells, exclusive of the number fired by the men-of-war and mortar-boats. The garrison, on the contrary, took no further notice of them than to return a few rounds from the terrace batteries at their working parties, who were repairing the damage done on the 8th, and completing the rest of the works. In the course of the day the _Brilliant_ and _Porcupine_ frigates were scuttled by the navy in the New Mole; and at night the engineers, with a working party, cleared the lines of rubbish, and restored those traverses which had been demolished. At night the enemy’s fire was under the same regulation as the preceding evening.