Part 49
On the 10th of June, Louis XIV. appeared before Maestricht with an army of forty thousand men. This place, esteemed one of the keys of the Netherlands and the United Provinces, was defended by a garrison of five thousand men, and by an intrepid governor, named Farjaux, a Frenchman by birth, but in the service of Holland. On the 17th the trenches were opened, and five batteries were directed against the city. Vauban, who in this siege first distinguished himself, employed the parallels invented by some Italian engineers in the service of the Turks, before Candia. He added places of arms in the trenches, to draw up troops in battle order, and the better to rally them in the event of sorties. Louis proved himself, in this famous expedition, more particular and laborious than he had ever been. By his example he accustomed a nation till that time accused of having nothing but a brilliant courage which fatigue easily exhausted, to patience in labour and endurance in protracted operations. As long as the siege lasted, he was up the whole night, from ten o’clock in the evening till five in the morning. After having ordered everything he thought necessary for the attack, he retired to his tent to take some repose till dinner-time. On leaving table, he mounted on horseback to make the tour of the lines and visit the quarters: in consequence of this, the companions of his labours went to the assaults and performed their duties in the most exemplary manner. The most furious assault was that of the 24th of June, and was made at the counterscarp of the Tongres gate; in it the French and the Dutch were by turns conquerors and conquered, whilst disputing an advanced half-moon. The first company of musketeers was commanded to fall upon this half-moon, whilst the second precipitated itself upon the palisades between that post and the hornwork. “The signal was given,” says M. de Saint-Foix; “they marched, and in spite of the vigorous resistance of the enemy, in spite of the fire of the _fourneaux_ which were sprung, and the terrible reports of the grenades which were incessantly cast among them, these works were carried almost at the same moment.” Four bloody conflicts were necessary; and they only triumphed in the last, after losing many men. Night separated the combatants. The action of the morrow was still more warm and murderous; it was believed that the lodgments were secured, and the musketeers had returned to the camp. The enemy sprang a _fourneau_, which the French had not discovered, in the half-moon: there was reason to think it was not the only one. Farjaux, who had placed himself at the head of the best troops of his garrison, profiting by this moment of alarm, entered the work and drove out the French soldiers. The musketeers were ordered to take it again, and they did retake it. In an obstinate and sanguinary conflict, fifty-three musketeers were wounded and thirty-seven killed, with the famous count d’Artagnan, commander of the first company. “The musketeers who returned from this fight,” says Pelisson, “had all their swords blooded up to the guards, and bent and notched with the blows they had given.” So many repeated and terrible attacks destroyed the defenders of Maestricht without weakening the courage of the survivors. Farjaux in particular was determined to hold out to the last minute; he preferred a glorious death to life at the hands of a conqueror, and he formed the resolution of making one more attempt. A mine was dug, and set fire to with too much precipitation; the soldiers of Farjaux were blown up by it instead of the French. This accident so completely disconcerted the besieged, that even their bold governor was forced to think of composition. They were satisfied, on the 29th of June, with a favourable capitulation. The remains of the garrison retired with the honours of war, and the inhabitants retained their privileges. This conquest cost France nearly eight thousand men; the besieged lost more than three thousand.
FIFTH SIEGE, A.D. 1676.
Louis XIV., aware of the importance of his victory, placed in the city a garrison of six thousand foot and twelve hundred horse. Three years after, the prince of Orange laid siege to Maastricht with an army of twenty-five thousand men, whilst the duke of Villa-Hermosa on one side, and the count de Waldeck on the other, intrenched in advantageous posts, watched the operations of the French, and held themselves in readiness to prevent their succouring the besieged. The count de Calvo commanded in Maestricht, in the absence of Marshal d’Estrades, the governor. This officer was a Catalan, in the service of France; the king had not a braver soldier; but as he had all his life served in the cavalry, he was thought to be more in his place at the head of a squadron of horse than of a garrison. As soon as the place was invested, he assembled the principal officers: “Gentlemen,” said he, “I have served all my life as a cavalry officer, and have very little acquaintance with the defence of cities. All that I know is that I will never surrender. Concert among you the means of an obstinate and insurmountable resistance, and I will undertake to have them executed with as much vigour as celerity.” The frankness of the commander won all hearts, and the confidence he placed in his subalterns elevated and expanded their minds. There was established, without pride, mistrust, or jealousy, a communication of ideas which saved the city, and which places the name of Calvo among the few that will descend to posterity.
Calvo made a vigorous and considerable sortie, the commencement of which was fortunate. The prince of Orange, informed of what was going on in the trenches, flew to the succour of his people with the greatest courage, drove back the French with the sword to their gates, and being wounded in the arm, exclaimed to those who had fought without spirit, “This is the way you should act, gentlemen! It is you who have caused the wound for which you appear to entertain so much regret.” Calvo first introduced the use of back-handled scythes; his soldiers, armed with these in the sorties, killed three men at a stroke. The trenches were opened on the 19th of July, and the batteries were erected on the 22nd: during eight days the firing never ceased. At length a large breach was made in the Dauphin bastion, and an assault was ordered for the 30th. It was terrible, but proved useless. The Dutch retired with loss. The next day the prince of Orange ordered a second attack, still more sanguinary and quite as unsuccessful. A suspension of arms was then entered into to bury the dead. Not at all discouraged, the prince gave a third assault, and succeeded in gaining the bastion. Scarcely had he gained a lodgment, when the French sprang two mines, the bursting of which they followed up by a furious sortie: they were, however, repulsed, and the work remained in the hands of the Dutch. Some days after they took another bastion, and drew near to the counterscarp. Whilst the Hollanders were preparing to pour their thunders upon this part of the fortifications, the powder and grenades of the besieged were suddenly set fire to. Taking advantage of the consequent disorder, the enemy gained possession of the counterscarp: they then prepared to attack the hornwork. Twice they gave the assault, and twice they were driven back with loss. The dragoons and the cavalry having dismounted to sustain the infantry, discouraged by so many repulses, a third effort was made. It was so terrible that the covered way was choked with dead bodies, and the blood of the slaughtered discoloured the waters of the fosse. But the assailants were forced to regain their former posts, after having lost a host of soldiers.
But now news was brought that Marshal Schomberg was hastening to the succour of the place, and the prince of Orange, having already lost twelve thousand men, did not think it prudent to wait for him. He decamped in the night of the 26th of August, after forty days of open trenches, and, to make the more haste, embarked thirty pieces of cannon, five hundred wounded, and a great quantity of munitions on the Meuse. At daybreak, the garrison perceiving the retreat of the Dutch, pursued them, and took some prisoners.
SIXTH SIEGE, A.D. 1748.
“Peace is in Maestricht,” said the Marshal de Saxe. It was with preparations for this siege that the campaign of 1748 commenced. It was necessary to secure all the passages, to force an army to retreat, to render it powerless for action, to deceive the enemy, and leave his own troops in ignorance of his secret. Marshal Saxe succeeded in all this; he only communicated his views to M. de Cremille; he made the allies believe that his object was Buda, and he went, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, to conduct a convoy to Bergen-op-Zoom, feigning to turn his back towards Maestricht. Three divisions advanced upon Tirlemont, Tongres, and Luxembourg; and at length all four took their route towards Maestricht. The enemy quitted their posts precipitately, abandoned immense magazines, and knew nothing of the designs of the count de Saxe until it was too late to oppose them. The city was invested, without a possibility of any succour being introduced. The siege was pushed on with vigour. The baron d’Aylva, the governor, and the count de Marshal commanding the Austrian garrison, displayed in vain all their skill to dispute the ground, and drive back the besiegers. They were on the point of submitting to the conqueror, when a courier, despatched by the duke of Cumberland, came to announce the cessation of hostilities, and to confirm the saying of Marshal Saxe with which we commenced this article.
There is scarcely a siege on record which does not convey a lesson to students in the military art, even to experienced generals, and above all to kings or ministers directing a war--the lesson in this is secrecy before the attempt: had Maurice de Saxe told all the world what was the object of his preparations, he might as well have attempted to besiege the moon as Maestricht.
Maestricht was besieged in vain by the French, under Meranda, in 1793, but yielded to the troops of that country, commanded by Kleber, in 1794, after eleven days of open trenches.
ANTWERP.
The great commercial city of Antwerp has been several times subjected to sieges, of two of which only we think it necessary to offer any details.
FIRST SIEGE, A.D. 1583.
The Netherlands, tired of the Spanish domination, made the false step of getting rid of one evil by adopting another quite as bad, and elected as their sovereign Francis of France, who, known as the duke d’Alençon, had recently assumed the title of duke d’Anjou. The worthy brother of Francis II., Charles IX., and Henry III.--the son of Catherine de Medici--the duke of Anjou, might have been thought the last prince to be selected for the purpose of reigning over a people so situated as the Netherlanders were; but France was the enemy of Spain, was the most powerful neighbour they had, and the wily Catherine and wicked Henry III. were liberal in their promises.
Very little satisfied with the name of leader and a limited authority, the duke of Anjou soon made an effort to throw off the yoke of the States, and to reign as monarch. His first design was to gain possession of the citadel of Antwerp. On the 17th of January, 1583, he left his palace early in the morning, followed by several Frenchmen on horseback, and passed out of the city, by the gate of St. James. He had scarcely left the city, when those who accompanied him pretended to quarrel among themselves, and fell sword in hand upon the _corps de garde_, the soldiers of which they massacred, or put to flight, and, at the same time, seized upon that gate. All the citizens of that quarter hastened to the spot, whilst the French took possession of the Emperor’s gate, and of the curtain which was between those two entrances. The troops who had been left in the city, ran through the streets, exclaiming: “The city is won! the city is won! Vive la Messe! Vive la Messe!” which was their rallying cry. Fifteen ensigns of foot and ten cornets of horse came to their assistance. The Swiss were approaching likewise. But an accident they might have prevented, disconcerted the enterprise. They had forgotten to take possession of the portcullis of the St. James gate; and the citizens, on perceiving this omission, rushed to the top of it, let it down, and thus impeded the entrance of the French. The whole people took up arms, every man became a soldier. The enraged citizens combined instantly to drive out an enemy who aimed at their property and their lives. So much in earnest were they, that they took the money from their purses, and moulded or cut it into bullets with their teeth, and loaded their guns with it. The women disputed with the men the glory of defending their country. The disconcerted French were surrounded, pursued, and completely routed. In vain the duke endeavoured to withdraw them from the rage of the Flemings: they were all killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Fifteen hundred were left on the field of battle; among whom were persons of the most illustrious houses in France: the Flemings did not lose a hundred men.
SECOND SIEGE, A.D. 1585.
This is considered one of the most remarkable sieges of modern times, from its cause, the parties concerned, the events, and the result.
The prince of Parma presented himself, in 1585, before Antwerp, at the head of a powerful army. His operations commenced by the attack of the forts of Lillo and Liestenstoech, constructed by the Dutch upon the banks of the Scheld. The Italians conceived a stratagem which very much facilitated the capture of this last fort. They got together a large number of waggons, loaded with green hay, to which they set fire. The wind carried the smoke directly towards the fort. Smothered and stifled by this cloud, the garrison were constrained to draw a little on one side, and the besiegers taking advantage of this short absence, mounted the ramparts, and carried the place. The prince was not so fortunate at Lillo. Mondragone, not having attacked it briskly enough, allowed a reinforcement to enter, by which six weeks and two thousand men were lost. This enterprise was abandoned, and the Spaniards contented themselves with masking the fort on the land side, and stopping the excursions of the troops who were shut up in it. The duke next undertook to close the Scheld. In the month of September, he built two forts, opposite each other; furnished them with artillery, and then began the construction of a bridge, in appearance a chimerical project, but upon which the success of the siege depended. The Spanish general dug a broad and deep canal, two leagues in length, to facilitate the transport of materials; this was called the _Parma Canal_. To animate the labourers, the prince fixed his quarters in the village of Beversen. The count de Mansfeld, lieutenant-general, commanded on the Brabant side, and was encamped at Stabrock. Mondragone was intrenched on the banks of the river, opposite Lillo, where he held the enemy in check. On all parts forts were built, to secure the dykes, and prevent the Dutch from inundating the country; communication between the city and the neighbouring places was completely cut off, as was all means of its receiving succour by the Scheld. The marquis de Roubais was charged with the construction of the bridge. He exhibited so much activity in this important work, that a speedy completion of it was hoped for.
The besieged, terrified at the progress of the Spaniards, were a prey to the most serious inquietudes. In this wealthy place, every one trembled for his property, and yet could see no means of escaping the storm which growled over their heads. The firmest hearts were shaken. It was given out that they would no longer sustain a siege which must cost so much blood and treasure. Roused by this, Sainte-Aldegonde, the mayor of Antwerp, ventured, though alone, to combat this resolution. In speeches of fire he revived the fallen courage of his fellow-citizens, he inspired them with republican sentiments, and induced them to swear, with a common voice, an eternal renunciation of the yoke of Philip of Spain. An edict forbade, under pain of death, the least approach to accommodation with the royalists. The greatest ardour was evinced for the defence of their country. To prolong the means of resistance, provisions were distributed very economically, and every preparation that could be devised was made to thwart the construction of the fatal bridge which was to reduce Antwerp.
To prevent or retard this work, and destroy what was done, several singular vessels were employed, which were to be filled with fireworks. The redoubts the prince had built on the banks of the river interfered with the cruises of the Antwerp frigates; a vessel of enormous size was constructed, provided with large guns, for the purpose of attacking them. This immense mass in some sort resembled a floating fortress. The besieged conceived such magnificent hopes from this vessel, that they named it _The End of the War_; a boastful title, of which the skill and activity of the prince of Parma made the vanity known.
Already the staccadoes, which formed the butments of each end of the bridge, approached completion, in spite of the efforts of the citizens, who gave unceasingly brave and sanguinary battle. In one of these conflicts, Roubais took Teligny prisoner, a captain equally brave and skilful. The count of Hohenloe was named in his place. This able officer did everything possible, both by land and on the Scheld, to impede the operations of the besiegers. But, notwithstanding all his efforts, they at length succeeded in procuring a sufficient number of vessels to close the river in the middle of its course; and, on the 25th of February, 1585, the bridge was entirely finished.
The spot for this famous bridge was chosen between the villages of Ordam and Calloo, because the bed of the river was narrower there than at any other part. Its course made a marked elbow, which would prevent the vessels of the enemy from sailing full upon the bridge. On commencing it they had driven, on each side of the Scheld, long rows of large piles, which were continued as far as the depth of the river would permit. They were joined together transversely, and in all their length, with very strong and solid pieces of wood: this formed what they called _staccadoes_: that of Calloo was two hundred feet long, and that of Ordam nine hundred. The space left between them was twelve hundred and fifty feet. Upon each of these was formed a kind of place of arms, capable of containing a body of troops sufficient to defend it, and to protect the vessels which were to continue the bridge. These were lined by a parapet, from which the soldiers, protected from the shots of the enemy, could annoy them with their fire. The two forts constructed at the two _têtes du pont_, that is to say, at the extremity of the staccadoes, on the land side, protected the two flanks of them; for this purpose they were furnished with a numerous artillery. Batteries also were established in the places of arms. To these precautions was added that of bristling, on both sides, the staccadoes with large posts, terminating in sharp iron points. They protruded a considerable distance; and great piles, driven into the bed of the river, held them fast just above the water. It was proposed by this to keep off the enemy’s vessels, and weaken their attacks. When the staccadoes were completed, the vessels were brought up that were intended to close the remainder of the course of the Scheld in the deepest and widest part. Thirty-two barks, sixty feet long and twelve feet wide, were selected for this purpose; they were placed at twenty-two feet from each other; they were fixed in their positions by two good anchors each, and were fastened together by a great number of strong chains. Each bark was manned by thirty soldiers and four sailors, and armed with two cannon at the extremities. The total number of cannon distributed over the staccadoes and the bridge amounted to ninety-seven. The bridge likewise was protected by an outward defence, in order to secure it from surprise. It was known that the garrison were preparing fire-ships, with which they meant to assail the bridge. It was likewise feared that the armed vessels in the besieged city might attack it from above, at the same time that the ships of the confederates might attempt it from below. To secure it from this double danger, some large rafts were made with a great number of masts solidly fastened together, which were set afloat in the width of the bridge, and presented a sort of rampart or large parapet to the enemy. This immense work, which was two miles four hundred feet in length, required for its construction seven months of incessant fatigue and application. The engineers who had the direction of it were named Jean Baptiste Plato and Prosperce Barrochio. It was the latter who formed the idea of the rafts which covered the bridge. The duke of Parma, to reward them for their labours, made them a present of all the materials, after the capture of Antwerp.
The city, however, neglected nothing that might impede or destroy this astonishing undertaking. It retained in its service a celebrated Italian engineer, named Frederic Giambelli, a native of Mantua. It was he who invented and brought into play those destructive vessels since known by the name of _infernal_ machines. They were built of very thick and solidly-joined timbers, among which were constructed chambers for mines, proportioned to their size. These were formed of good bricks and mortar, and required but one light to set fire to the powder with which they were filled. These terrible vessels were loaded with blocks of stone, bullets of different calibres, in short, with all sorts of materials of great weight, heaped together as closely as possible, in order that the effect of the mine might be increased by the resistance opposed to it. Giambelli employed more than eight months in getting everything ready. The large vessel of which we have before spoken was not so soon completed. It was a ship with two very lofty decks: the under one was armed with several large and small cannon; the upper was a large place of arms, whereon were a number of troops, who from the elevation of that deck could keep up a warm fire of musketry. This enormous vessel had but two large masts of equal size, placed at the two extremities, and of nearly the same shape. To facilitate its approach to the redoubts constructed by the royalists upon the banks of the river, it was quite flat, and only sunk into the water in proportion to its weight, being kept afloat upon a vast raft of enormous beams, supported by empty barrels. Such were the means to which the inhabitants of Antwerp had recourse to keep open the navigation of the Scheld. They had placed all their hopes in them. The confederates were expected to aid their endeavours. A great number of armed vessels awaited near Lillo the effects of the infernal machines, with the view of acting at the same time. They attempted to recapture the fort of Liestenstoech, and succeeded.