Chapter 31

For reasons that were never quite fathomed by Madero's Government, Huerta took his time about obeying these orders. Thus, he lingered first at Ciudad Juarez, then at Chihuahua City, then at Santa Rosalía, next at Jimenez, and presently at Torreon, where he remained for over a week, apparently sulking in his tent like Achilles. This gave rise to grave suspicions, and rumors flew all over Mexico that Huerta was about to make common cause with Orozco. President Madero himself, at this time, told a friend of mine that he was afraid Huerta was going to turn traitor. About the same time, at a diplomatic reception, President Madero stated openly to Ambassador Wilson that he had reasons to suspect Huerta's loyalty. At length, however, General Huerta appeared at the capital, and after a somewhat chilly interview with the President, obtained a suspension from duty so that he might have his eyes treated by a specialist.

Thus it happened that Huerta, who was nearly blind then, escaped being drawn into the sudden military movements that grew out of General Felix Diaz's unexpected revolt and temporary capture of the port of Vera Cruz last October.

General Huerta's part in Felix Diaz's second revolution, four months later, is almost too recent to have been forgotten. He was the senior ranking general at the capital when the rebellion broke out, and was summoned to his post of duty by President Madero from the very first. He accompanied Madero in his celebrated ride from Chapultepec Castle to the National Palace on the morning of the first day of the famous "Ten Days," and was put in supreme command of the forces of the Government after the first hurried council of war. President Madero, totally lacking in military professional knowledge as he was, confided the entire conduct of the necessary war measures to General Huerta; but it soon became apparent that the old General either could not or would not direct any energetic offensive movement against the rebels. From the very first the Government committed the fatal blunder of letting the rebels slowly proceed to the Citadel--a fortified military arsenal--the retention of which was of paramount importance, without even attempting to intercept their roundabout march or to frustrate their belated entry into the poorly guarded Citadel. Later, when it became clear that the rebels could not be dislodged from this stronghold by street rushes, no attempt was made to shell them out of their strong position by a high-angle bombardment of plunging explosive shells.

After it was all over General Huerta explained the ill-success of his military measures during the ten days' street-fighting by saying that President Madero was a madman who had spoiled all Huerta's military plans and measures by utterly impracticable counter-orders. At the time, though, it was given out officially that Huerta had been placed in absolute, unrestricted command. When the American Ambassador, toward the close of the long bombardment, appealed to President Madero to remove some Federal batteries, the fire from which threatened the foreign quarter of Mexico City, President Madero replied that he had nothing to do with the military dispositions, and referred the Ambassador to General Huerta, who promptly acceded to the request. On another occasion, later in the bombardment, when Madero insisted that the Federal artillery should use explosive shells against the Citadel, General Huerta did not hesitate to take it upon himself to countermand the President's suggestions to Colonel Navarrete, the Federal chief of artillery. Afterward General Navarrete admitted in a speech at a military banquet that his Federal artillery "could have reduced the Citadel in short order had this really been desired."

Whether General Huerta was really able to win or not is beside the issue, since the final turn of events plainly revealed that his heart was not in the fight, and that he was only waiting for a favorable moment to turn against Madero. Before General Blanquet with his supposed relief column was allowed to enter the city, General Huerta had a private conference with Blanquet. This conference sealed Madero's doom. Later, after Blanquet's forces had been admitted to the Palace, on Huerta's assurances to the President that Blanquet was loyal to the Government, it was agreed between the two generals that Blanquet should make sure of the person of the President, while Huerta would personally capture the President's brother, Gustavo, with whom he was to dine that day. The plot was carried out to the letter.

When Huerta put Gustavo Madero under arrest, still sitting at the table where Huerta had been his guest, Huerta sought to palliate his action by claiming that Gustavo Madero had tried to poison him by putting "knock-out" drops into Huerta's after-dinner brandy. At the same time Huerta claimed that President Madero had tried to have him assassinated, on the day before, by leading Huerta to a window in the Palace, which an instant afterward was shattered by a rifle bullet from outside.

Neither of the two prisoners ever had a chance to defend themselves against these charges, for Gustavo Madero on the night following his arrest was shot to death by a squad of soldiers in the garden of the Citadel, and President Madero met a similar fate a few nights afterward. General Huerta, who by this time had got himself officially recognized as President, gave out an official statement from the Palace pretending that Gustavo Madero had lost his life while attempting to escape, and that his brother, the President, had been accidentally shot by some of his own friends who were trying to rescue him from his guard.

Few people in Mexico were inclined to believe this official version. Yet the murder of the two Maderos, and of Vice-President Pino Suarez, as well as the subsequent killing of other prisoners, like Governor Abraham Gonzalez, of Chihuahua, was condoned by many in Mexico on the ground that these men, if allowed to remain alive, were bound to make serious trouble for the new Government. It was generally hoped, at the same time, even by those who condemned these murders as barbarous, that General Huerta might still prove himself a wise and able ruler, no matter how severe.

These fond hopes were changed to gloomy foreboding only a few weeks after Huerta's assumption of the presidency, when he was seen to surround himself with notorious wasters of all kinds, and when he was seen to fall into Madero's old error of extending the "glad hand" to unrepentant rebels and bandits like Orozco, Cheche Campos, Tuerto Morales, and Salgado.

Victoriano Huerta, whether he be considered as a general or as a president, can be expressed in one phrase: He is an Indian.

Huerta himself proudly says that he is a pure-blooded Aztec. His friends claim for him that he has the virtues of an Indian--courage, patience, endurance, and dignified reserve. His enemies, on the other hand, profess to see in him some of the vices of Indian blood.

From what I have seen of General Huerta in the field, in private life, and as a President, I would say that he combines in himself both the virtues and the faults of his race. In battle I have seen him expose himself with a courage worthy of the best Indian traditions; nor have I ever heard it intimated by any one that he was a coward. One of his strong points as a commander was that he was a man of few words. On the other hand, his own soldiers at the front hailed him as a stern and cruel leader; and some of the things that were done to his prisoners of war at the front were enough to curdle any one's blood.

It was during a moment of conviviality that General Huerta once revealed his true sentiments toward the United States and ourselves. This was during a banquet given in his honor at Mexico City on the eve of his departure to the front in Chihuahua. On this occasion an Englishman, who had long been on terms of intimacy with Huerta, asked the General what he would do if northern Mexico should secede to the United States and the Americans should take a hand in the fray. This question aroused General Huerta to the following extemporary speech:

"I am not afraid of the _gringoes_. Why should I be? No good Mexican need be afraid of the _gringoes_. If it had not been for the treachery of President Santa Anna, who sold himself to the United States in 1847, we should have beaten the Yankees then, as we surely shall beat them the next time. Let them cross the Rio Bravo! We will send them back with bloody heads.

"We Mexicans need not be afraid of any foreign nation. Did we not beat the Spaniards? Did we not also beat the French, and the Austrians, and the Belgians, and all the other foreign adventurers who came with Maximilian? In the same way we would have beaten the _gringoes_ had we had a fair chance at them. The Texans, who beat Santa Anna, at San Jacinto, you must know, were not _gringoes_, but brother Mexicans, of whom we have reason to be proud.

"To my mind, there are only two real nations in the world, besides our old Aztec nation. Those nations are England and Japan.

"All the others can not properly be called nations; least of all the United States, which is a mere hodge-podge of other nations. One of these days England and Japan and Mexico will get together, and after that there will be an end to the United States."

WILLIAM CAROL[1]

[Footnote 1: Reproduced in condensed form from _The World's Work_ by the kind permission of Doubleday, Page & Co.]

In order to understand the situation in Mexico, it is necessary to get firmly in our minds that there are in reality two Mexicos. One may be called American Mexico and the other Mexican Mexico.

The representative of the new, half-formed northern or American Mexico was Francisco Madero--rich, educated, well mannered, honest, and idealistically inclined. The representative of the old Mexico is Huerta--"rough, plain, old Indian," as he describes himself, pugnacious, crafty, ignorant of political amenities, without understanding of any rule except the rule of blood and powder.

By the law of 1894 Diaz changed the character of the land titles in Mexico. Many smaller landowners, unable to prove their titles under the new system, lost their holdings, which in large measure eventually fell into the hands of a few rich men. In the feudal south this did not cause so much disturbance. But in the north the growing middle class bitterly resented it. Madero became the spokesman of this discontent. In his books and in his program of reform, "the plan of San Luis Potosi," he attacked the Diaz regime. And then in 1910 he joined the rebel band organized by Pascual Orozco in the mountains of Chihuahua. With his weakened army Diaz was unable to cope with this revolution, and in October, 1911, Madero became President.

The country was then at peace, except for the band of robbers led by Zapata in the provinces of Morelos and Guerrero. These are and have been the most atrocious of the many bandits with which Mexico is infested. No outrage or barbarity known to savages have they left untried. Madero attempted to buy them off, but to no avail. He then sent military forces against them, one column commanded by General Huerta, but with no success.

In the mean time, Pascual Orozco, who emerged from the Madero revolution as a great war hero in his own State, was given no post of responsibility under the new Government, but was left as commander of the militia in the State of Chihuahua. The adherents of the old Diaz régime took this opportunity to win him over to their side, for Orozco's fighting was done purely for profit, not for principle. A reactionary movement, with Orozco at its head, broke out in February, 1912. Five thousand men were quickly got together. The Madero Administration--a Northern Administration in the Southern country--was not fully organized, and, with the army not yet rehabilitated, found itself seriously embarrassed. Had Orozco been an intelligent and competent leader he probably could have marched straight through to Mexico City at that time, as the only governmental troops that were available to fight him were only about sixteen hundred, which he defeated and nearly annihilated at Rellano in Chihuahua. Their commander, General Gonzalez Salas, Madero's war minister, committed suicide after the defeat.

The only general available at the time who had had experience in handling large forces in the field was Victoriano Huerta. Although he had never especially distinguished himself, Huerta's record shows that he was one of the most progressive members of the army.

Huerta's column encountered little resistance. Chihuahua City was occupied on July 7th, and later, Juarez. The rebels were not pursued to any extent away from the railroads. They separated into bands, keeping up a guerrilla warfare, raiding American mining camps and ranches, and seizing and holding Americans and others for ransom. Prominent among these leaders of banditti was Inez Salazar, a former rock driller in an American mine, who raised a force in Chihuahua and declared against Madero. Little was done to destroy these rebel bands by the Federals, and no engagements of any size took place. In fact, it was a current rumor that the Federals did not wish to put them down. In the first place, the regular army was the same old Diaz organization which considered Madero largely as a usurper and which remained with the established Government in a rather lukewarm manner. Besides, the bands of Orozco, Salazar, and others were instigated and supported by the adherents of the old regime, and, although opposed to the Mexican army, both had many ideas in common regarding the Madero Administration. Furthermore, the officers and men of the army were receiving large increases of pay for the campaign.

An instance showing this disposition on the part of the Federals occurred in the State of Sonora in October, 1912. General Obregon, now the commander of the Sonora State forces, was at that time a colonel of the army and had his battalion, composed largely of Maya Indians, at Agua Prietá, just across the border from Douglas, Ariz. Salazar's band of rebels had crossed the mountains from Chihuahua and had come into Sonora. Popular clamor forced the Federal commander at Agua Prietá to do something, and accordingly he ordered Obregon to take his battalion, proceed south, get in touch with Salazar, and "remain in observation." Salazar was looting the ranch of a friend of Obregon's near Fronteras. The rebel had taken no means to secure his bivouac against surprise; his men were scattered around engaged in slaughtering cattle, cooking, and making camp for the night. Obregon deployed his force and charged Salazar's camp. Forty of Salazar's men were killed, and a machine gun and a number of horses, mules, and rifles were captured; whereupon Salazar left that part of the country. Upon Obregon's return to Agua Prietá he was severely reprimanded and nearly court-martialed for disobeying his orders in not "remaining in observation" of Salazar, and attacking him instead. Had Obregon been given a free hand, he undoubtedly could have destroyed Salazar's force.

After Salazar's defeat at Fronteras, he moved east again, and about a month later appeared near Palomas, a town about three miles from the international boundary south of Columbus, N.M. At Palomas there was a Federal detachment of about one hundred and thirty men under an old colonel. They had been sent there to protect various cattle interests in that vicinity; and they had a considerable amount of money, equipment, and ammunition for maintaining and providing rations and forage for themselves and for some outlying detachments. Salazar, hearing of this, demanded that the money and equipment be immediately surrendered. Upon being refused, Salazar, with about three hundred and fifty men, attacked. A furious battle was fought, ending in a house-to-house fight with grenades--cans filled with dynamite, with fuse attached, which are thrown by hand. Salazar's force captured the town after the Federals had suffered more than 50 per cent. in casualties, including the Federal commander, who was wounded several times; the rebels suffered more than 30 per cent. casualties. The town, in the mean time, was wrecked. This particular instance shows that the Mexicans fight and fight well from a standpoint of physical courage. The general idea that the Mexicans would not fight, which Americans obtained during this period, was obtained because they did not care to in the majority of cases.

Meanwhile, General Huerta, having "finished" his Chihuahua campaign in the autumn of 1912, was promoted to the rank of General of Division (Major-General) and decorated for his achievement. It was rumored in many places at that time that General Huerta was about to turn against the Madero Government. Madero, suspecting his loyalty, ordered him back to Mexico City. Huerta took his time about obeying this order, and, when he reported in Mexico City, obtained a sick-leave to have his eyes treated. Huerta was nearly blind when Felix Diaz's revolt broke out in Vera Cruz in October, 1912, and probably thus escaped being drawn into that unsuccessful demonstration.

From this time until the _coup d'etat_ of February 8, 1913, there was no large organized resistance to the Madero Administration, although banditism increased at an alarming rate in all parts of the Republic. The Diaz-Reyes outburst, in Mexico City on February 8, 1913, which resulted in the death of Madero and Suarez and the elevation of Huerta to practical military dictatorship, was brought about by the adherents of the old regime, who looked upon Madero's extinction as a punishment meted out to a criminal who had raised the slaves against their masters. This view prevailed to a considerable extent in Mexico south of San Luis Potosi. In the North, however, the people almost as a whole (at least 90 per cent. in Sonera, and only to a slightly lesser extent in the other provinces) saw in it the cold-blooded murder of their political idol at the hands of unscrupulous moneyed interests and of adherents of the old regime of the days of Porfirio Diaz.

The resentment was general in the North--this new, largely Americanized North, Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila, organized the resistance in the provinces of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas, while Maytorena, the governor of Sonora, and Pesqueira (later in Washington, D.C., as Carranza's representative), with Obregon as the head of their military forces, rapidly cleared that State of Federals, with the exception of the port of Guaymas. These fights were no mere bloodless affairs, but stubbornly contested, with heavy casualties, as a decided principle was involved in the conflict. Villa, the old bandit and personal enemy of Huerta, organized a force in Sonora, and Urbina did likewise in northern Durango. Arms, and especially money to buy them with, were hard to get. Funds were obtained from the tariff at ports of entry, internal taxation, amounting at times to practical confiscation, contributions, and gifts from various sources. It is said that the Madero family put aside $1,000,000, gold, for this purpose.

Though a few individuals went over to the Constitutionalist cause, the Mexican regular army remained true to the _ad interim_ Government. The revolutionists either held or rapidly possessed themselves of the great railroad lines in the majority of cases. Huerta, who is an excellent organizer, soon appreciated the magnitude of the revolt and rushed troops to the north as rapidly as possible, his strategy being to hold all railroad lines and cities with strong columns which would force the revolutionists to operate in the intervals between the railroads. Then Huerta, with these columns as a supporting framework, pushed out mobile columns for the destruction of the rebel bands.

The Carranzistas understood this plan and, to meet it, tore up all the railroads that they could and adopted as their fixed plan never to risk a general engagement of a large force. For the first few months, the rebels, who had adopted the name of Constitutionalists, continued recruiting their forces and destroying the railroads. The Federals tried to repair the railroads and get enough troops into the north to cope with this movement. They obtained new military equipment of all descriptions, the army was increased, and old rebels, such as Orozco and Salazar, sympathizers or tools of the old régime, were taken into the Federal forces as irregulars and given commands.

To understand the apparent slowness of the Federals in moving from place to place and their inability to pursue the rebels away from the railroads, some idea must be given as to their system of operating. The officers of the regular army are well instructed and quite competent. The enlisted men, however, come from the lowest strata of society, and, except in the case of a foreign war, have to be impressed into the ranks. They bring their women with them to act as cooks and to transport their food and camp equipage. Military transportation, that is to say, baggage trains of four-mule wagons and excellent horses for the artillery, does not exist in the Mexican army. In fact, when away from a railroad, the "soldaderas," as the women are called, carry nearly everything; and they obtain the food necessary for the soldiers' rations. A commissariat, as we understand it, does not exist. This ties the Federals to the railroads, as they can not carry enough ammunition and food for any length of time.

On the other hand, those who first saw Obregon's rebel forces in Sonora and Villa's in Chihuahua were surprised at their organization. There were no women taken with them. They had wagons, regular issues of rations and ammunition, a paymaster, and the men were well mounted and armed.

With Obregon, also, were regiments of Yaqui Indians, who are excellent fighting material. These forces were mobile, and could easily operate away from the railroad. They lacked artillery, without which they were greatly handicapped, especially in the attack on fortified places and on stone or adobe towns. As most of the horses and mules were driven away from the railroads, the insurgents could get all the animals they wanted.

The first large battle occurred on May 9-10-11-12th outside of Guaymas, between Ojeda's Federals and Obregon's Constitutionalists, at a place called Santa Rosa. The Federal advance north consisted of about twelve hundred men and eighteen pieces of artillery. They were opposed by about four thousand men under Obregon, without artillery. Eight hundred Federals were killed and all their artillery captured. The Constitutionalists lost two hundred and fifty men killed and wounded. Comparatively few Federals returned to Guaymas. Each side killed all the wounded that they found, and also all captives who refused to enlist in the captor's force. This success was not followed up and Guaymas remained in the hands of the Federals. The artillery captured by the Constitutionalists had had the breech blocks removed to render them unserviceable; new ones, however, were made in the shops at Cananca by a German mechanician named Klaus.

In the summer, Urbina captured the city of Durango, annihilating the Federals. The city was given over to loot and the greatest excesses were indulged in by the victors. Arson, rape, and the robbing of banks, stores, and private houses were indiscriminately carried on. Horses were stabled in the parlors of the homes of the prosperous citizens, and many non-combatants were killed by the soldiers before order was restored.