CHAPTER XVII

THE ADVANCES FROM MEDO TO KORONJE AND MSALU

All that remained of the Portuguese _boma_ at Medo was the deep ditch by which it had been surrounded, and the mound or earthwork fashioned from the earth that had been excavated from it. Any buildings that these fortifications may have been designed to protect had long ago been burned to the ground, and save for a big red-brick store, with an iron roof, situated outside the ditch, there was no habitable place in the immediate vicinity. It can never have been of much military value, except against attacks delivered by natives armed with primitive weapons, and its capture and occupation by the British conferred upon the latter no material advantage. Medo, however, or rather the place a few miles east of it where Rock Camp had been formed, marks the beginning of a stretch of very blind and difficult country, where big clumps of bamboos are numerous, where bamboo-brakes of considerable extent are not infrequently encountered, and where elephant grass nine feet high is a common feature. Further on along the road, as the columns advanced, more broken ground was met with, and numbers of isolated rocky hills, often fantastically shaped—the solitary curved horn of the rhinoceros being one of the forms most commonly represented—provided the enemy with excellent observation-posts from which every movement of the British troops could be watched and provided against.

On the 13th April the two columns camped at Medo, and on the following day a strong officer’s patrol of the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles went down the road toward Mwalia, and speedily found itself engaged with the enemy. Von Lettow-Vorbeck and Kohl had allowed the British, very slowly and painfully, to work their way inland from the coast from a distance of eighty-four miles to Medo; and having now drawn them on into a very difficult belt of country, they were preparing to ambush the advance once or twice daily, to make the troops fight as often as possible and in disadvantageous circumstances, for the camping-ground and for their supply of water, and to withhold from them any chance of dealing a very effective blow at their ubiquitous and elusive enemy.

The campaign was at once more harassing and less hopeful than had been the advance from Narungombe to Lukuledi in the preceding year, for then “Linforce” had been working its way inland from Lindi, and there had always been a chance of the enemy being enveloped by the converging columns; and the country, though thick and difficult, had not been so blind and so impenetrable as that through which “Pamforce” was at present engaged in making its way. Now, too, there was no British force closely co-operating with “Rosecol” and “Kartucol” to threaten the enemy’s flank and rear, though some of General Northey’s troops had made their way in a south-easterly direction from Mahenge, and were known to have crossed the Rovuma, and Colonel Rose, while still in command in Portuguese East Africa, had succeeded in getting the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles dispatched to Mozambique, where, under Colonel Phillips, they were brigaded with a Portuguese force under Major Leal. There was, however, no immediate prospect of bringing von Lettow-Vorbeck to a definite action, for there no longer existed German posts, such as Ruponda, Massassi and Newala, the defence of which was important to him because their capture would work him a measure of moral and even of material injury. Instead von Lettow-Vorbeck, at this time, seemed to have the whole of the vast continent of Africa into which to retreat, and the prospect of surrounding or cutting off any large body of his forces was felt by all to be more remote than ever.

None the less, “Pamforce” continued to move forward down the road from Medo to Mwalia and from Mwalia to Koronje, with ever-lengthening lines of communication stringing out behind it, and with daily ambushes delaying its progress. These, often enough, were laid for it by small enemy posts consisting of one native non-commissioned officer and half a dozen _Askari_, but in such blind country it was on each occasion necessary to clear up the situation before the advance could be continued, lest the column should find themselves caught in some more elaborate trap with results that might well prove to be disastrous. Moreover, the character of the country, which greatly favoured the tactics that the enemy was now adopting, practically confined the British to a series of frontal attacks, as it did not admit of flanking movements being successfully carried out.

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On the 15th April “Rosecol” left the camp at Medo, and began to advance down the road in the direction of Mwalia. The 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African rifles formed the advanced guard, the Gold Coast Regiment being in reserve. The former’s advanced points were attacked, as usual, and the Battalion engaged a small enemy rear-guard, the progress made during the day amounting to only four and a half miles. From this time onward, the Gold Coast Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles took it in turns to lead the advance, and each was preceded at a short distance by an advanced detachment consisting of 300 rifles with the usual complement of machine and Lewis guns, and two Stokes guns of the Gold Coast Regiment. This leading detachment had points thrown out ahead on each side of the road and a line of skirmishers deployed behind them, the remainder of the detachment advancing in open order on both sides of the road, with connecting files between them and the main body in their rear.

On the 16th April the advanced detachment was supplied by A Company and two sections of I Company, under the command of Major Shaw. During the day small engagements were fought with an enemy rear-guard, consisting of one company, but the Stokes guns proved very useful and effective, the enemy being shelled out of successive positions from which, but for these guns, it would have cost much delay and probably many casualties to eject him. As it was, only two men of the Regiment and one Sierra Leone carrier were wounded. The column camped at 2 p.m., Major Shaw’s detachment digging itself in about a mile further down the road.

On the 17th April the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles furnished the advanced detachment, that regiment being at the head of the column, with the Gold Coast Regiment following in reserve. During the afternoon the King’s African Rifles became heavily engaged with the enemy, who had been reinforced and was now opposing the advance with three companies and six machine-guns. The road here ran through elephant grass nine feet in height, and it was found impossible to locate the enemy’s positions. On the other hand, the King’s African Rifles had dug themselves in across the road, the lie of which was accurately known to the Germans, and the former consequently sustained many casualties. The 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles was a newly raised force, largely composed of recruits, and the ordeal of being fired upon by an invisible enemy, against whom no effective retaliation was possible, was very severe. However, they held on, and in the afternoon A Company was sent forward to reinforce them. This company and the two Stokes gun-teams, which had been with the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles all day, sustained 28 casualties before dark, losing 3 men and 1 battery gun-carrier killed, and 13 men, 6 battery gun-carriers and 5 Sierra Leone carriers wounded.

Next morning the Gold Coast Regiment took over from the King’s African Rifles the position which the latter had occupied during the night, and was directed to hold the enemy in front while a strong detachment from “Kartucol” attempted a wide flanking movement on the right. Captain Duck with thirty rifles was sent forward from the position held by the Regiment to get in touch with the enemy in order to give the flanking detachment an objective. He speedily found and engaged the enemy, whereupon the rest of “Kartucol” advanced through the Gold Coast Regiment and joined in the fight. The enemy, however, had once again reduced his rear-guard to a single company, and on the 19th April “Kartucol” continued the advance, “Rosecol” following in the rear. On the following day the two columns were to have exchanged places, but the rations expected from the rear arrived so late on the night of the 19th April that this arrangement could not be carried out. The delay had been caused by the convoy being attacked by the enemy near Rock Camp. The officer commanding this convoy was killed, and much confusion was wrought by the ambush, though the carriers and their escort contrived to get through with the loss of a few bags of mails. There were many Europeans in camp who would far more willingly have foregone their dinners. In a captured diary Kohl was subsequently found complaining with disgust that the mails taken on this occasion contained no information concerning the progress of the war in Europe, and mainly consisted of “love to dear Jack.”

"Kartucol," therefore, continued the advance and occupied Mwalia, while “Rosecol” camped for the night at Kalima, about four miles short of that place. The distance from Medo to Mwalia is not quite five-and-twenty miles. The column had left Medo on the 15th April and “Kartucol” had reached Mwalia on the 20th April, the average daily progress being therefore little more than four miles.

On the 21st April “Rosecol” remained in camp at Kalima, where it was joined by General Edwards and his staff. “Kartucol” during the day was shelled by the enemy, and on the 22nd April it moved forward and occupied an enemy position two miles in front of the camp at Mwalia. Both columns remained in these positions until the 26th April, when “Rosecol” moved forward and occupied Makuku, about twelve miles down the road, “Kartucol,” which had preceded it, having advanced three miles further to a place called Mbalama. At Makuku the main road, hitherto followed, which leads from Mtuge to Lusinje, is crossed by another which runs south-west to Koronje; and Mbalama is situated some three miles down this latter track.

On the 27th April “Rosecol” advanced through “Kartucol,” and marched down the road towards Koronje, with Nanungu, some forty miles further to the west and slightly south of the former place, as its ultimate objective. The advanced detachment, under Major Shaw, consisted of the Pioneer Company and A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment with two Stokes guns. A small party of the enemy was engaged and driven back; “Rosecol” camped for the night about four miles west of Mbalama.

Next day, 28th April, the advance was continued, being led this time by the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles, two Stokes guns of the Gold Coast Regiment, as usual, accompanying the advanced detachment. About six miles were covered during the day, and as “Rosecol” was forming camp at about 3.30 p.m., patrols from the advanced detachment came into touch with the enemy, and Lieutenant McEvoy was wounded in the hand by a stray bullet, and a trumpeter belonging to the Stokes Gun Battery was killed.

On the 29th April the enemy was found to have abandoned the positions which he had occupied the night before; and at 7 a.m. the advanced detachment, consisting of half I and B Companies with two of the Gold Coast Stokes guns, advanced, the rest of “Rosecol” following half an hour later. Major Shaw, who was, as usual, in command of the advanced detachment, came into contact with the enemy at about 10.30 a.m., and thereafter the latter fought an intermittent rear-guard action—a series of harassing ambushes—until 4.30 p.m., when camps were formed for the night, Major Shaw’s men occupying a position about a mile in advance of the rest of the column. In the course of the day only two men of the Gold Coast Regiment were wounded, the Stokes guns once more proving very useful in dislodging the enemy from successive positions.

On the 30th April, “Kartucol” passed through “Rosecol” with the intention of attacking an enemy position, which was known to be held by four companies and one gun. The Headquarters of the Gold Coast Regiment, with half the Stokes Battery, the Pioneers and I Company, marched in the rear of “Kartucol” as reserve troops. Touch was not gained with the enemy until the afternoon, but owing to the country traversed being very difficult and blind, the progress made was so slow that no attack could be delivered upon the German position owing to the lateness of the hour. The two columns, therefore, formed a perimeter camp at about 4.30 p.m. at a place on the Koronje road about four hundred yards west of the Montepuez River. One Battalion from “Kartucol” occupied an advanced camp about one thousand yards further down the road leading to Koronje.

On the 1st May, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles advanced along the road toward Koronje, while the 2nd Battalion of the same Regiment went out on the right to attempt to outflank the enemy’s left. The country was still very difficult and extremely blind, and progress was again very slow. It was subsequently discovered, moreover, that from an observation post on the summit of Koronje Hill, to the left of the road, the enemy could follow every movement of the British troops. While, therefore, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles was laboriously working its way round to the right, its attempt to surprise and outflank the enemy was foredoomed to failure from the outset. Meanwhile, of course, this movement greatly delayed the advance of the rest of the force.

The detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment which, under the command of Major Shaw, was with “Kartucol,” was employed to escort the 22nd D.M.B. and the ammunition column of that force.

At about 5 p.m. the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles became heavily engaged, and simultaneously an enemy party of about forty rifles, which had worked its way through the bush to the rear, attacked the D.M.B. which was being escorted by fifty rifles of I Company. The latter, under Lieutenant Kay, acted with great steadiness and promptitude. At the moment when the attack was delivered, the Mountain Battery, which had just come out of action, was limbered up. For a moment the guns were in peril, but Lieutenant Kay held the enemy and beat off the attack while the mules and their loads were got away in safety.

The sound of the firing misled the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles, which was out on the right, with the result that it rejoined the column in the rear of the enemy.

A perimeter camp was formed for the night, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles digging themselves in at a point about eight hundred yards in advance of the main body.

On the 2nd May, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles pushed out patrols which quickly came into touch with the enemy, who was soon after engaged by “Kartucol,” which drove him back. No progress, however, was made during the day, and on the morrow it was found that, while the enemy’s rear-guard was fighting “Kartucol,” the position at Koronje had been evacuated. “Kartucol” then advanced and camped near Koronje, the detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment under Major Shaw rejoining “Rosecol” in the afternoon.

On the 4th May “Kartucol” again advanced and located a strong enemy position near the Milinch hills, about six and a half miles west of Koronje, through which the road passes. On this day three officers and ten British non-commissioned officers belonging to the Gold Coast Regiment arrived from Port Amelia.

On the 5th May, “Rosecol” advanced and took over from “Kartucol,” which then fell back to the camp which the former had hitherto occupied. The 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles encamped at a point down the road about a mile in advance of the main body of “Rosecol”; and patrols were sent out to the right and left to try to find a way round the enemy’s position on the Milinch Hills. Both these patrols were furnished by A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, that on the right being commanded by Captain Harris and that on the left by Lieutenant Withers.

On the 6th May Captain Harris returned and reported that the country to the north was much more open than that through which the columns had recently been advancing, and that it would be almost impossible to make a flanking movement from the right side of the road. On the 7th May Lieutenant Withers came in from the south bringing a similar report; and meanwhile patrols sent out by the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles had on both days come into touch with the enemy just east of the Milinch Hills, and reported that the position which he was occupying was a very strong one. This was indeed the case, for the enemy was posted on the crests and slopes of two hills, both of which commanded the gut between them through which the road runs; yet on the 8th May it was discovered that the Germans had retired, and two companies of the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles went forward and occupied the position which he had evacuated.

Meanwhile the lines of communication were lengthening behind the columns, and now measured approximately one hundred and forty miles from Mtuge, which in its turn is twenty-eight miles by road from Port Amelia. Also the heavy and increasing traffic over the road had not tended to improve it; and though road corps, recruited from South Africa and East Africa, toiled ceaselessly at its repair, the difficulties of transport and supply were becoming daily more and more acute. At this time, the columns at the front had been on very short commons for a considerable period, and the company officers of the Gold Coast Regiment reported that their men were not getting enough food to keep them fit to take part in active operations of so trying and arduous a character as those at present in progress.

On the 9th May the Gold Coast Regiment took over the Milinch Hills from the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles; and on this day local natives reported to Colonel Rose that von Lettow-Vorbeck, with a large enemy force, was moving in a north-easterly direction toward Lusinje. This place lies about thirty-seven miles almost due north of Nanungu, on the main road from which the columns had branched off in a south-westerly direction at Makuku, as already noted. Accordingly the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles was dispatched across country to Msalu Boma, which is situated on that road at a point, as the crow flies, about twenty-three miles north-west of Koronje, and twenty-seven miles east by south of Lusinje. The orders issued to this battalion of the King’s African Rifles were that they should deal with any enemy parties weak enough to enable action to be taken with effect, but to avoid any serious engagement with his numerically superior forces.

It was believed that a fairly strong party of the enemy were occupying a hill on the right side of the road at a place called Jirimita, about five or six miles down the road from the pass through the Milinch Hills, and at dawn on this day two patrols were sent out, one under the command of Captain Leslie-Smith and the other under Lieutenant Bisshopp. Each patrol consisted of seventy-five rifles, drawn respectively from A and I Companies; and Captain Leslie-Smith, who went out on the right of the road, had orders to make a flanking movement and to come back to the highway at a point about four miles beyond Jirimita. Lieutenant Bisshopp, on the left, was instructed to make a wider and longer sweep, and to strike the road about three miles further on. It was hoped thus to outflank the enemy and to cut off his retreat. It was a difficult task in the broken country through which these two patrols had to work, at once to maintain a correct sense of direction, and accurately to estimate the distance traversed. However, both these small parties started off, expecting to be a night or two in the bush, and each in the end succeeded in exactly carrying out the orders issued to it.

Meanwhile, during the morning of the same day Lieutenant Wilson, with a patrol of twenty rifles drawn from the Pioneer Company, got touch with an enemy outpost of about the same strength at a point some two miles west of the Milinch Hills; and at 4.45 p.m. a second officer’s patrol, under Lieutenant Beech, was sent out down the road in the same direction for a distance of two and a half miles without coming into contact with the enemy, whose outpost had retired since the morning.

At 6 a.m. on the 10th May, Lieutenant Withers, with fifty rifles and one Lewis gun of A Company, was sent down the road with orders to brush aside any small party of the enemy that he might encounter, and thereafter to try and ascertain the real strength of the force which was opposing the advance of the column.

Three and a half miles from the Milinch Hill Lieutenant Withers met a small party of the enemy, which he drove back; and about five miles out he found an enemy camp, strongly entrenched, which had evidently been designed to accommodate some four companies, but which had been recently burned. As far as it was possible to judge, this camp had been destroyed and abandoned two days earlier; and though the tracks leading from it were at once confused and confusing, conveying at first the impression that the enemy had retired in a northerly direction, it was subsequently ascertained that he had retreated down the main road. Just beyond the burned camp this road was found to bifurcate, one fork leading west-north-west and the other west-south-west. It was the latter route which the enemy had taken.

The main patrol camped at a point where the road bifurcated, and sent out small parties to reconnoitre along each of the forks, but neither of them came into touch with the enemy.

On the 11th May the patrols under Captain Leslie-Smith and Lieutenant Bisshopp, which had been sent out on the 9th May, rejoined the Regiment. As has already been noted, they had achieved the difficult feat of striking the road at the points aimed at, but for the rest, though Lieutenant Bisshopp’s patrol had surprised and killed one enemy _Askari_, who had probably been left behind to watch the movements of the British, nothing more had been seen of the enemy, who must have passed down the road while these patrols were still making their way through the bush.

On the 12th May one of the battalions of the 2nd King’s African Rifles from “Kartucol” took over from the Gold Coast Regiment, which returned to the main camp occupied by “Rosecol.” On the following day the latter marched across country, in the wake of the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles, which had preceded them on the 9th May, in the direction of Msalu Boma. The way led along a native footpath which only admitted of men marching in single file, but in order to beat out a track for the transport through the high grass and standing crops of maize and millet, the column advanced four abreast—a hard task for troops who had been insufficiently fed for many days, and who were now required to cover between daybreak and dusk a distance of eighteen miles. The column camped in the bush, and on the following day it joined up with the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles at the _boma_ at Msalu. This place, too, had once been a stronghold of a Portuguese revenue-farmer, and had been fortified against attack by the natives, but it had now been completely destroyed by fire.

At Msalu news was received that von Lettow-Vorbeck and the whole of his main force were at Nanungu, and that so far they had given no signs of any intention to move to the north toward the Rovuma River, or south to the Lurio, which divides the territory of the Nyassa Company from the Province of Mozambique. It was also learned that the King’s African Rifles Mounted Infantry were at Lusinje, some six-and-twenty miles along the main road west by north of Msalu, and about thirty-two miles almost due north of Nanungu.

“Rosecol” remained at Msalu on the 14th and 15th May, the neighbourhood being clear of the enemy, but much infested by lions. The proximity of these brutes got upon the nerves of some of the inmates of the camp, and on the night of the 13th—14th May a carrier, who had had a nightmare in which they played a prominent part, awoke in a panic, shattering the silence with his yells and outcry. Instantly an indescribable scene resulted. Tumbling over one another to get at the camp-fires, the porters fought and scrambled for firebrands which they waved wildly, and impeded by which they made desperate efforts to climb into neighbouring trees. The country here is orchard-bush, and the only trees available are small and stunted—altogether inadequate as places of refuge from the onslaught of a lion. The terrified carriers, however, were long past reason, and appeared to consider that their one chance of salvation lay in getting even a foot or two above the ground. The lions on this occasion existed only in their imagination, and order and confidence were presently restored. During the same night, however, the 4th King’s African Rifles lost two sentries, one killed and one badly mauled by these brutes, so the terror of the carriers had at any rate some measure of justification.

With the arrival of “Rosecol” at Msalu the second phase of the advance, which had its beginning with the fight at Medo, may be regarded as concluded. The enemy had offered a persistent and fairly effective resistance to the progress of the columns along the main road through the difficult country which lies between Medo and the Milinch Hills. His main force, which was believed to be at Nanungu, was really encamped at Wanakoti, about three and a half miles to the north of that place; and against him were advancing “Kartucol” from the east, “Rosecol” from the north-east, and a weak column of perhaps 800 rifles, which General Northey had dispatched across the Rovuma in a south-easterly direction, under the command of Colonel Griffiths. Von Lettow-Vorbeck still had the choice of several lines of retreat, for at Wanakoti many tracks cross one another, and though the road to Koronje on the east and to Chisona on the north-west were closed to him by the British advance, the track leading south-west to Mahu was still open, and while retreating along it he would have opportunities of breaking off, should it suit his convenience to do so, in almost any direction.