CHAPTER XI

RUANGWA CHINI TO MNERO MISSION STATION

The operations which have formed the subject of the three preceding chapters were designed to drive von Lettow-Vorbeck’s main force in a south-easterly direction, until its progress should be stayed by “Linforce.” This latter column, in the face of stubborn resistance, and hampered, too, by the inadequate harbour facilities available at Lindi, was fighting its way mile by mile down the road which leads from that place to Massassi, where, as we have seen, von Lettow-Vorbeck had established his General Headquarters. As must inevitably happen in fighting of this character, all the British columns engaged occupied the anomalous, one might almost say the paradoxical, position of attacking forces which were incessantly and perpetually on the defensive. For them were combined all the risks of the attack upon prepared and unreconnoitred positions with all the moral and actual disadvantages which ordinarily attach to the defence. They were, indeed, only properly to be described as attacking forces because it was they that were advancing, the enemy which was retreating before them; but in the daily conflicts with the enemy, in which they were so constantly entangled, the actual attack was usually delivered by the latter. It was he, not the British, who selected the spot where fighting should take place; to him, not to them, were secured, in practical perpetuity, the advantages of surprise and of being the first to open fire; and while he could concentrate all his attention upon the task of hampering, embarrassing and resisting the advance of his opponents, the commanders of British columns and units alike were for ever distracted from the actual fighting by a knowledge of the extreme vulnerability of the formation in which they were compelled to move, and by the precautions necessary to protect it, as far as possible, from assaults upon its flanks. In this rough country, where an advance was only possible along the main roads or along well-worn paths, each column, with its inevitable train of pack-animals and loaded carriers, sprawled down the tracks for miles in the rear of the advancing force, men and beasts alike being often compelled to go in single file. The pace of such a column is that of the slowest man in it, for it is essential that straggling should, as far as possible, be prevented. It is fortunate if the progress made averages a modest two miles an hour—it will much more often approximate to half that rate of advance; yet the actual fighting force, which can be spared from the work of mere protection, cannot abandon the transport and press on ahead for any great distance without the risk of becoming paralyzed for lack of supplies and ammunition, or without exposing the long, snake-like column of unarmed men and terrified animals to an attack that may work in a few moments its complete disintegration.

The circumvention or outflanking of an enemy in these circumstances and in such country, and still more the envelopment of him, are for the most part impossible military feats. Such movements are generally dependent upon the rapid man[oe]uvring of troops, and upon the enemy being kept in complete ignorance of the strategy which his opponent is adopting; but rapidity of movement was the one thing which could not be insured in the East African bush, save only where a very small body of men was concerned; and the forces at von Lettow-Vorbeck’s command were sufficiently numerous to expose any weak unit, temporarily detached from the main body, to imminent danger of being cut off or overwhelmed. As for secrecy, that was unattainable in country where the enemy’s scouts could creep up to within a few yards of a British column without running any save the most slender risk of being observed, and where, when once the main roads were quitted, the passage of any large body of men through the bush inevitably caused an amount of noise and commotion that was nicely calculated to advertise its presence to even the least watchful and suspicious of enemies. When to these things are added the fact that the British attack was always delivered upon an opponent who was perfectly familiar with the geography of the country in which the operations were being conducted, and to whom it was a matter of complete indifference which point of the compass he should select as the direction of his temporary retreat, the handicaps under which the British commanders laboured can be to some extent appreciated.

Where possible mechanical transport was used, and this fact alone served in a great measure to anchor the British columns to the main roads. Sooner or later, however, there came a time or a place at which it was no longer possible to depend even mainly upon motor transport, and thereupon hosts of pack-animals and of head-carriers became the machine of military supply, and the clamorous, snake-like column thus evolved wriggled, with incredible slowness and clamour, into the wilderness of grass and bush. Of the transport mule much has been written, and much more has been said—most of it being unprintable. As for the East African carrier, the late Sir Gerald Portal said the last word about him a full quarter of a century ago. “As an animal of burden,” he wrote, “man is out and out the worst. He eats more, carries less, is more liable to sickness, gets over less ground, is more expensive, more troublesome, and in every way less satisfactory than the meanest four-footed creature that can be trained, induced, or forced to carry a load.”

The men who took part in the East African campaign are louder than any in the expression of their admiration for von Lettow-Vorbeck, for the pluck and grit and resource which he displayed, for his dogged resolution, and for the fine resistance which he put up, and which may justly be attributed to his individual energy and force of character. Members of the British public, who happily for themselves have no personal experience of bush-fighting, would do well to realize, however, how heavy was the balance of the military advantages which he throughout enjoyed, how completely these discounted any that could be derived by his opponents from mere numerical superiority, and how practically impossible is the task of rounding up in the bush a well-armed and elusive enemy, which had been entrusted to the British commanders. It may even be said that von Lettow-Vorbeck did not really make the most of his opportunities, and that, given the superiority of his armament, he played this game of bush-fighting less skilfully and successfully than it had been played in their time by the Burman and by the Malay. Had he realized, as the Burmese and the Malays both realized, how small a force is needed to check and delay the advance of an enemy column through the bush, and had he thereafter devoted most of his attention to constant harassing attacks upon the terribly vulnerable transport trains, it would have been altogether impossible for the British to drive him, in the course of two dry-weather campaigns, steadily southward from the country north of the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika Railway to beyond the Rovuma River into Portuguese territory.

When all the facts above noted are borne in mind, therefore, it ceases to be in any degree wonderful that von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces—which from first to last never numbered more than five or six thousand _Askari_ and perhaps a thousand to fifteen hundred white men—were able to keep their British pursuers chasing them to and fro and up and down the jungles of East Africa for nearly four years, with all the grotesque lack of success with which a dignified middle-aged person runs after his hat upon a windy day.

On the 4th October the Gold Coast Regiment, rested and refreshed, and above all clean once more, took the field again.

As far as could be ascertained, the enemy appeared to be holding positions on the right bank of the Mbemkuru River on the road to Namehi, approximately four and a half miles to the west of Mitoneno. Patrols sent out on the preceding day had drawn fire from him from the hills to the south of the river, and it was General Hannyngton’s intention to attempt to hold the enemy by a frontal attack delivered by one battalion drawn from No. 1 Column, while the remainder of that force worked round his right and sought to possess itself of the hilly country to the south. The reserve of “Hanforce” was simultaneously to detail a weak battalion to hold the enemy’s left flank, the rest being held ready in support. Meanwhile, across the river on the British right, the 25th Indian Cavalry were to remain at Kihindi, holding themselves in readiness to move, at fifteen minutes’ notice, in any direction in which their services might be required.

At dawn on the 4th October No. 1 Column moved out of its camp at Mitoneno, and speedily found itself in action with the enemy. The Gold Coast Regiment, however, was in reserve on this day, and so did not take part in the action. The column fought its way forward for a distance of four miles, and when, fairly late in the afternoon, the Regiment arrived at the place where it was proposed that a perimeter camp should be formed for the night, B Company, under Captain Methven, was sent to hold a flat-crested hill upon the south, from which the camp was commanded. At dusk the enemy fired a few shells over the camp, but the night passed otherwise without incident.

At Ruangwa Chini, which is the name of the place in the neighbourhood of which No. 1 Column had been held up all day, the road at the spot near which the camp was being established runs east and west and roughly parallel to the river, which is distant from it a few hundred yards on the north—the right of the British advance. On the left the country was very difficult, the road being overlooked by a succession of red, laterite hills, for the most part bare of vegetation, though long rank grass sprouted wherever there was a foothold for its roots. The slopes of these hills were covered and strewn with outcrops and boulders of the same red rock, the colour of which is the deep, rich hue that in England is associated with the coombs and lanes of Devon. The principal feature was the high hill which, late in the afternoon, B Company of the Gold Coast Regiment was detailed to occupy in conjunction with the 129th Baluchis. This hill, of naked red rock, rose in an almost precipitous slope, from near the southern edge of the road, to a flat summit, barely fifty yards in breadth, but extending in a position parallel to the track for perhaps ten times that distance. Its southern and western slopes, which were both accessible to the enemy, were much less abruptly graded; but the approach from the east was again very steep. Near the western extremity of this hill the road curved about its foot in a south-westerly direction; and in the thickish bush, which lay between the road and the river on the right front of the British advance, the enemy had got a gun into position, whence it shelled the head of the column from a safe distance. Early in the day the Germans had contrived to shoot down a British aeroplane into the tree-tops in that locality; but the pilot and the observer both escaped without any serious injury, and were able to make their way back to No. 1 Column.

When that morning the British were advancing along the road from their camp at Mitoneno, the 129th Baluchis had scaled the eastern face of the flat-topped hill above described, and had worked along its summit to a point near to its western extremity. Here, however, they had come into contact with an enemy post, which had opened fire upon them with a machine-gun. The Baluchis had twice retired, but later in the day they had dug their way from the road to the base of the northern face of the hill, and thence had climbed the steep ascent to its summit, where they had dug themselves in in a line of rifle-pits drawn across the flat top at a point about halfway along its length.

Meanwhile Lieutenant Foster of the 27th Mountain Battery had climbed with his orderly up the eastern face of the hill, and from there was engaged in observing for his unit the German fire from the gun posted in the bush on the right front of the British advance. He presently became aware that a party of the enemy was working its way up the gentle slope on the southern side of the hill at a spot to the rear of the place where the Baluchis were dug in; and Lieutenant Foster and his orderly, taking cover behind a boulder, opened fire upon the enemy with revolver and rifle, and for a time actually succeeded in staying or delaying his advance.

This was the position of affairs when B Company, under Captain Methven, who had been ordered to dig himself in at a spot near the foot of the eastern extremity of the hill, in order to guard the left and left rear of the column, was instructed to quit his entrenchments and go to the assistance of the Baluchis on the summit. He and his men scaled the steep eastern face of the hill, which the Baluchis had climbed in the course of their first advance that morning, and were in time to relieve Lieutenant Foster and his orderly, who were still maintaining their plucky lone-hand fight. B Company then worked along the southern edge of the crest until it had lined up abreast of the Baluchis in their shallow rifle-pits, and thence pushed forward to the western extremity of the hill, from whence the enemy was already retiring down the slope leading to his main position. Here B Company dug itself in for the night, having effectually relieved the camp from the menace to which the occupation of this summit by the enemy had exposed it.

In the course of this operation B Company lost 1 private killed, 5 wounded, and 1 machine-gun carrier wounded.

On the 5th October, patrols sent out at dawn came almost immediately into touch with the enemy, who was estimated to have some five companies in position at Ruangwa Chini, about two miles to the west—namely, in the direction of the column’s advance. The 129th Baluchis, the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, and the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of that corps were dispatched to attack the position, supported by the 27th Mountain Battery and the Kilwa Battery. This hilly and rocky laterite country was very difficult, however, and by 3.30 p.m. so little progress had been made that Colonel Orr decided to break off the attack, and to withdraw the units that had been engaged in it to the camp which the column had occupied on the preceding afternoon.

The Gold Coast Regiment was not engaged during the day, but one of its carriers was wounded by a stray bullet.

On the 6th October, No. 1 Column marched at dawn, working through the bush in a southerly direction for the purpose of outflanking the right of the enemy’s position, and of cutting off his retreat, should he attempt to make use of any of the paths leading toward the south. The troops in reserve remained in camp to hold the enemy in front, and to be ready to thrust forward if the flanking movement proved successful. The 27th Cavalry, meanwhile, had instructions to co-operate from the left bank of the Mbemkuru.

No. 1 Column was able to get into a position well to the rear of that which the enemy had occupied on the preceding day, but the Germans had retired from it during the night, leaving only a party of some forty men to watch and delay the movements of the British troops. On the approach of the latter this small band dispersed, and a part of it, which had apparently got “bushed,” consisting of one German and ten _Askari_, was captured.

No. 1 Column, suffering somewhat from the disillusionment and disappointment which are the prevailing sentiments that bush-fighting commonly inspires in a pursuing force, accordingly worked its way laboriously back to the main road, where it learned that the rest of the column, which had encountered no resistance, was encamped about two and a half miles ahead of it.

The check at Ruangwa Chini is, in a measure, typical of military operations in the bush. By it the enemy had been able to reduce the advance achieved in the space of three days by a force, greatly its numerical superior, to a matter of seven or eight miles; and in accomplishing this he had exposed himself to no inconvenience and to negligible danger.

On the 7th October No. 1 Column resumed its interrupted march down the main road, which here runs west, with the river parallel to it upon the right. The Gold Coast Regiment, less two companies and the battery, furnished the advance guard. A distance of between eight and nine miles was traversed during the day, and a camp was taken up for the night near Kiperele Chini.

The 25th Cavalry were encamped, with one company of the Gold Coast Regiment, at a spot about a mile and a quarter further down the road.

On the 8th October No. 1 Column marched down the main road, and camped for the night at Mbemba, which is distant some ten miles from Kiperele Chini.

From this point the road which No. 1 Column had been following more or less continuously ever since it started pushing south from Narungombe, runs on, in a south-westerly direction, still adhering closely to one or another bank of the river. About ten miles from Mbemba it strikes the main Liwale-Massassi road, at a place named Mangano, and here the 25th Cavalry captured large quantities of stores belonging to the Germans. These stores, however, consisted exclusively of native food-stuffs such as mealies, the kind of millet locally called _mantana_, cassava and a little rice—bulky stuff which, since it could not be carried off, was burned to prevent it again falling into the enemy’s hands.

On the 9th October No. 1 Column left the main road and the banks of the Mbemkuru River, and turning off to the left along a narrow track, pushed forward in a south-south-easterly direction to Lihonja, distant from Mbemba a matter of some seven miles. Here the main Liwale-Massassi road was struck by the Column for the first time—a really first-class laterite highway, some twenty to twenty-five feet in width, running through grass country and open bush, with a surface consolidated by constant traffic. This road was now followed for a distance of about nine miles, and the Column camped for the night at a mission station named Mnero. This is a pretty little station, with mission buildings and church perched upon a low hill, and with at least a mile square of well-cultivated land lying around it. The church was subsequently used by the British as an advance hospital for their sick and wounded.

During October 9th, as on the two preceding days, the advance of No. 1 Column had been accomplished without incident.

Eight miles down the road from Mnero Mission Station, to the east and slightly to the south of that place, lies Ruponda, where yet another large food depôt was known to have been established by the enemy, and this was now the Column’s immediate objective.

Having quitted the banks of the Mbemkuru, the British troops were once again dependent upon water-holes, but the country was here less arid than it had been further north between Narungombe and Nahunga; and at Mnero itself, and thence all along the line of march eastward and southward, a sufficient, and at times even an abundant, supply of water was available either in existing water-holes or to be obtained by digging.

With the quitting of Mbemkuru Valley and the push to the south upon which No. 1 Column was now embarked, the second phase of the advance may be said to have ended and the third phase to have begun.