CHAPTER IV

BAYEZID

THE OSMANLIS INHERIT THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

I

The death of Murad was immediately avenged upon the battle-field by the execution of the prisoners of noble birth. Practically all the Serbian aristocracy that had remained loyal to Lazar and the national cause perished.

In the midst of this bloody work, Bayezid sent servants to seek out his brother Yakub, who had distinguished himself during the battle, and was being acclaimed by his soldiers. Yakub was taken to Bayezid’s tent, and strangled with a bowstring.[428] The new emir justified this crime by a verse conveniently found for him by his theologians in the Koran: ‘So often as they return to sedition, they shall be subverted therein; and if they depart not from you, and offer you peace and restrain their hands from warring against you, take them and kill them wheresoever ye find them.’[429] They declared that the temptation to treason and revolt was always present in the brothers of the ruler, and that murder was better than sedition. These doctors of the law might better have pointed out to Bayezid the admonition of the Prophet: ‘But his soul suffered him to slay his brother, and he slew him: wherefore he became of the number of those who perish.’[430] For the abominable practice of removing possible rival claimants by assassination, thus begun on the field of Kossova, was elevated to the dignity of a law by Mohammed II,[431] and has been until our own times a blot upon the house of Osman.

Bayezid, however, was only following the example of Christian princes of his own century. Pedro of Castille killed his brother Don Fadrique;[432] Andronicus III Comnenos of Trebizond, killed his two brothers, Michael and George;[433] and Andronicus III Palaeologos assassinated his brother when his father was dying.[434]

An order was issued from the battle-field of Kossova to the Kadi of Brusa, enjoining him to keep secret the death of Murad, and to appear to be occupied only with public rejoicing for the victory ‘won from the _Hungarians_’. With this order, Bayezid forwarded the bodies of his father and brother for secret burial at Brusa.[435]

Agents of the Italian cities came to seek Bayezid after the battle to congratulate him, and to ask for the confirmation of the commercial privileges granted by Murad. Bayezid showed himself proud and distant. He declared that after he had conquered Hungary he would ride so far that he would come to Rome and there give his horse oats to eat upon the altar of St. Peter’s.[436] A change of attitude towards Europe is strikingly revealed in this boast. Murad, in spite of crusades projected against him, had been careful not to draw upon himself the attention, much less the ill-will, of the western Christian princes. He was aggressive, but never any more so than he needed to be for the moment at hand: and he was never aggressively Mohammedan. Bayezid, from the very beginning of his reign, took no pains to conceal his enmity to Christendom, and his desire to pose as the champion of Islam. He sought alliances with the Sultan of Egypt[437] and other Moslem rulers, and placed the utmost importance upon the extension of Ottoman sovereignty in Asia Minor.

II

After the bloodthirst of Kossova had been satisfied and his father’s death avenged, Bayezid was eager to enter into friendly relations with Stephen Bulcovitz, son and heir of Lazar. He felt that the Serbians had learned their lesson, and that they would be more helpful to him as allies than as crushed and sullen foes. He needed their aid in the Anatolian campaign which he was contemplating, and they were essential to the safety of his European possessions as a buffer against the Hungarians, who he knew would take the opportunity of his absence in Asia to move down the Danube. So he treated Stephen and the surviving Serbians with great kindness. Stephen received all the privileges that had belonged to his father.[438] The Serbians were assured of an equitable share of the booty in the campaigns in which they would engage. On the other hand, Stephen agreed to allow Bayezid an annual tribute, secured by the revenues of the silver mines, to command a contingent in person in the Ottoman army, and to give his sister to the Ottoman emir.[439] Kossova was forgiven on both sides.

Bayezid took Despina, daughter of Lazar, as wife by a formal marriage act, which was read in the mosque of Aladja Hissar, near Krutchevatz, at the foot of Mount Iastrebatz, twenty miles north-west of Nish.[440] This was the last marriage ever contracted by a sovereign of the house of Osman.[441] It sealed an alliance that proved very advantageous to Bayezid. Throughout his life he was devoted to Despina, and his brother-in-law Stephen in turn was a devoted and steadfast friend. The Serbians were faithful allies to the Osmanlis, and fought with them at Nicopolis and Angora. On his side, Bayezid kept the allegiance of the Serbians by giving them opportunities for winning booty in the raids against the Albanians, Dalmatians, and Hungarians, and by favouring the Orthodox Church. When we see how complacently and cheerfully the Serbians--except the poets--took upon themselves the Ottoman yoke, we must believe that Kossova was regarded as a terrible calamity only by the generations of after centuries, who found the Ottoman rule harder than it had been for their ancestors.

Bayezid placed a strong Ottoman colony in Uskub, and settled Moslems in the country between Uskub and Nish.[442] There were probably many also who saw that conversion was to their advantage. However that may be, Bayezid never had any trouble from the Serbians during his reign.

Stephen Tvrtko, kral of Bosnia, did not consider Kossova a defeat. Seeing that his great enemy Murad and his great rival Lazar had found death on the battle-field, and that the Osmanlis did not follow up their victory, this view-point was natural. After Kossova, Tvrtko increased in power and prestige. He called himself king of Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. Like Stephen Dushan, he was planning ‘for great things’ when he died in March, 1391, after a reign of thirty-eight years.[443]

Shortly before his death, Tvrtko had successfully resisted an Ottoman invasion with the help of a Hungarian army sent to him by Sigismund. His successor, Stephen Dabitcha, however, departed from this wise policy. He quarrelled with the Hungarians, and played into Bayezid’s hand by opposing Sigismund in his final effort to stem the tide of Ottoman invasion. The Bosnians paid to the full the penalty of their king’s folly. In 1398, Bosnia was invaded by a great army of Osmanlis and Serbians, who ‘destroyed almost all the country and led away the people into slavery’.[444] In spite of the sweeping assertion of the chronicler, this must have been only a raid. For, from 1398 to 1415, the Bosnians, still independent, were fighting with Ragusa and Hungary. In 1415, they voluntarily allied themselves with the Osmanlis, and repeated the same old story of the other Balkan races. Mohammed I was called in to help them against the Hungarians.[445] The Osmanlis came, and they remained.

III

In the second year of his reign, after he had arranged a suitable _status quo_ with the Serbians of upper Macedonia, Bayezid began that policy of aggrandizement in Asia Minor which led finally to his downfall. His first encroachment was against Isa bey of Aïdin. Isa was too weak to oppose Bayezid single-handed. Instead of seeking to ally the independent emirs against the Osmanlis, Isa thought he could save himself with less risk by becoming a vassal of Bayezid. He was compelled to give up Ayasoluk, and make Tyra his capital. Bayezid almost immediately broke faith with Isa, and exiled him to Brusa or Nicaea, where he died.[446] His two sons, Isa and Omar, managed to escape to the court of Timur, who was rapidly becoming the most powerful Moslem ruler in Asia.

The occupation of Ephesus aroused momentarily Bayezid’s ambition to take possession of Smyrna. In 1391, he did in fact make some efforts to overpower the garrison, which was greatly weakened by pestilence.[447] Later he occupied the passes around Smyrna to prevent the entrance of provisions.[448] But Smyrna, like Constantinople, could not be starved out so long as the Osmanlis were not masters of the sea. Bayezid never pressed this mild form of siege to a definite assault. His hands were too full elsewhere. An unsuccessful assault against Smyrna would have destroyed his prestige in the new territory of Aïdin, which was not any too securely his by the suppression of its ruling family. Perhaps, also, he realized that Smyrna, more than any other place in the Levant except Rhodes, had become the city of promise to the Roman Church. He did not want to stir up an active resistance on the part of the chevaliers of Rhodes, for they might easily be induced to lend aid to the emirs whom he was destroying.

Sarukhan and Menteshe, during the reign of Murad, had lost the most virile element of their population in corsair expeditions. The Turks of whom one reads as the roving and raiding adventurers in the Aegaean and Mediterranean during the fourteenth century were largely from these emirates. Decades of outgo without a corresponding income in fighting men so depleted the maritime emirates that they were not in a position to withstand Bayezid as they had done his father and grandfather. Their population was seafaring, and their princes were traders rather than warriors. When the armies of Bayezid invaded Sarukhan and Menteshe, the two emirs attempted no resistance. They took refuge with Bayezid, emir of Kastemuni, and abandoned their emirates to the Osmanlis.[449]

The result of the acquisition of Sarukhan, Aïdin, and Menteshe was the immediate appearance of the Osmanlis upon the Aegaean Sea. This is the beginning of the Ottoman naval power, which did not, however, have any development during the reign of Bayezid. The first Ottoman naval expedition started out in the late autumn of 1390. Sixty vessels made a descent upon Chios, and devastated the island. Negropont (Euboea) and the coast of Attica suffered the ravages of the raiders.[450] Bayezid now forbade the exportation of grain from Asia to Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, and Rhodes. But he was hardly yet in a position to enforce this embargo.

The Christians of the Aegaean islands and of the eastern Mediterranean soon learned that a new design, which had before been lacking, animated the Turkish expeditions. It was the desire not so much for booty as for the permanent possession of land. Everywhere they went, the Osmanlis went as settlers. They fought for homes and wives.

In the south, Bayezid took Adalia, the last city of the emir of Tekke. It was in 1391 that the Osmanlis won this seaport, their first on the Mediterranean. If we except the southern ports of the Peloponnesus, a whole century passed before they added another on the Mediterranean.

Following up the pretext furnished him by a complaint against Alaeddin from his vassal, the emir of Hamid, Bayezid determined to measure his forces against the Karamanlis. As had been the case in the previous similar expeditions under his father, four years before, Bayezid called out the levies of his European Christian vassals. Among those who responded to the call was Manuel Palaeologos, who passed the winter of 1390-91 in the Ottoman camp at Angora. There he wrote his famous dialogues on the Christian religion, purporting to be discussions with a Moslem professor of theology.[451]

Bayezid invaded Karamania, and laid siege to Konia. Alaeddin, who had fled to the Taurus Mountains to escape being shut up in the city, saw soon that Konia could hold out against Bayezid for an indefinite period. The Ottoman emir was far from his base of supplies, and nervous about what was happening in Europe. So, when Alaeddin asked for terms of peace, Bayezid agreed to withdraw from Konia, if Alaeddin would formally cede to him the north-western corner of his dominions, including the cities of Aksheïr and Akseraï, which were already in the hands of the Osmanlis.[452] Bayezid left Timurtash as governor of the new acquisitions, and returned to Adrianople.

While Bayezid was occupied in Bulgaria, in 1392, in his first defensive campaign against Sigismund, Alaeddin decided upon a supreme effort to wrest from Bayezid the hegemony of Asia Minor. He reoccupied the ceded cities, and attacked by surprise the Ottoman army in Kermian. Timurtash was taken prisoner. One column of the Karamanlis set out for Angora, and the other for Brusa.

Bayezid earned for himself the nickname _yildirim_ (thunderbolt) by the rapidity with which he transported his army into Anatolia.[453] Fresh from a victory over the Hungarians, supported by the trained and hardened soldiery of his Christian vassals, Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, and Wallachians, his sudden appearance at Brusa caused Alaeddin to try once more to treat with the rival who was rapidly becoming more powerful than himself. He released Timurtash, and suggested a return to the _status quo_ of the previous year.

Bayezid was not only convinced that a decisive struggle was now advisable: he was also quick to see that for the first time the advantage was all on the side of the Osmanlis. Instead of meeting the enemy in the heart of his own country, after a long journey across wind-swept plateaux where food was scarce, it was the enemy this time who had made the journey and was far from home. Defeated, there would be no retreat possible for Alaeddin.

With characteristic celerity, Bayezid sent forward an army under Timurtash. Battle was joined in the plain of Ak Tchaï (the white river). One cannot determine the exact location, but it was probably in Kermian not far from Kutayia, for that is where the two retreating columns of the Karamanlis would naturally have formed a junction. Alaeddin and his sons Ali and Mahommed were taken prisoners. When Alaeddin was brought before him, Timurtash could not restrain his anger until Bayezid arrived. He remembered only that the one defeat of his long and brilliant career had been administered by Alaeddin. Its disgrace, and his feeling towards the emir of Karamania, was in no way palliated by the fact that Alaeddin had voluntarily released him. Timurtash ordered the prisoner to be hanged. When Bayezid arrived, his brother-in-law was dead. He was overjoyed that his rival had been removed so conveniently, and without any responsibility falling upon himself.

Karamania lay open before the invaders. The Osmanlis occupied Ak Seraï, Konia, and Laranda. There was no organized resistance. But it is a curious disregard of facts to record, as most historians have done,[454] that the result of this campaign was the permanent incorporation of Karamania in the Ottoman Empire.[455] The battle of Ak Tchaï had been decisive only to the extent that thereafter the Osmanlis, and not the Karamanlis, were to be the dominant race in Asia Minor. Konia and other eastern Karamanian cities were occupied by the Osmanlis after the battle because their ruler had been killed and his sons taken into captivity. Had Alaeddin escaped from the field, he might have organized a successful resistance to the Ottoman invaders. Bayezid conquered Karamania by the battle of Ak Tchaï no more than Napoleon conquered Prussia by Jena or von Moltke France by Sedan. To enter and occupy for a while the capital of a country does not mean that the country is ‘incorporated’ in the domains of the successful invader. The immediate restoration of the Karamanian dynasty after the advent of Timur proves how superficial had been the Ottoman occupation. While they were no longer able to be a political factor in western Asia Minor, the Karamanlis continued until after the fall of Constantinople--for seventy years after the battle of Ak Tchaï--to defy successfully the efforts of the Osmanlis to destroy their independence and amalgamate them.[456]

Burhaneddin, who had set up for himself a principality north-east of Karamania along the Halys River, which included Caesarea and Sivas, was the next rival on the east to be attacked. Burhaneddin is reported to have had twenty to thirty thousand followers.[457] This seems to be an exaggeration, for we read that he did not resist the Ottoman invasion. At the approach of Bayezid, he retired into the mountains of Armenia near Kharput. Here he was either killed by Kara Yuluk, founder of the famous White Sheep dynasty, or put to death by order of Bayezid.[458] His emirate was shared by Bayezid and Kara Yuluk, the Ottoman emir taking Tokat, Caesarea, and Sivas. There is no certainty as to the date of this expedition. From the events which followed, it most probably took place in 1395, the year before Nicopolis.[459]

Kastamuni, practically coterminous with the Roman province of Paphlagonia, stood between the Ottoman possessions and the Black Sea. In the campaign of 1393, Samsun and the cities of the interior between Samsun and Angora, were captured by the Osmanlis. When the Ottoman army advanced to attack Kastamuni, Bayezid offered to allow the emir to become his vassal, if he would surrender to him the emirs of Sarukhan and Menteshe. Whether the lesser Bayezid was unwilling to violate the laws of hospitality, or put little faith in the promises of the conqueror after the fate which had overtaken the emir of Aïdin, it is impossible to say. He and his guests fled to the court of Timur. The occupation of Sinope gave the Osmanlis an excellent port on the south coast of the Black Sea.

Bayezid was now master of the greater part of Anatolia, but master only in name. He had not assimilated these conquests. As later events proved, the inhabitants of these territories were still loyal to their former rulers.

IV

After his return from the first Anatolian campaign, Bayezid ordered a general advance along the northern and north-western frontiers. One band invaded Bosnia, but did not make much headway. Three bands entered Hungary, and initiated the system of rapid raiding that in time reached as far as Germany, and made the ‘Turks’ the nightmare of Slavic, Teutonic, and Italian Europe. The first battle on Hungarian soil was fought at Nagy-Olosz, in Syrmia, not far from Karlovitz, where three centuries later the Osmanlis signed the death-warrant of their _Weltpolitik_.

The Danube was crossed also near Silistria. Before the terrible akindjis could penetrate far into his country, the hospodar Mircea surrendered, or was made prisoner. After a short exile at Brusa, he regained his liberty by consenting to the payment of a tribute of three thousand ducats, thirty horses, and twenty falcons.[460] He agreed to help Bayezid against the Hungarians, who had long been asserting a sovereignty over Wallachia, and in return Bayezid promised to settle no Moslems and build no mosques north of the Danube. In the first Hungarian invasion, Bayezid received more valuable aid from the Wallachians than from his janissaries. There were no better fighters in the Balkan peninsula than these descendants of the soldiers of Trajan. The interference of Sigismund prevented an Ottoman invasion of Moldavia, whose hospodars remained altogether independent of the Osmanlis until the reign of Mohammed the Conqueror.[461]

When Louis of Hungary died, he left two daughters. The younger, Hedwig, was chosen as queen of Poland by the Polish nobles. Her marriage with Jagello of Lithuania, who was converted to Christianity and baptized under the name of Ladislas, definitely separated the crowns of Poland and Hungary, and had a far-reaching influence upon the subsequent fortunes of the Osmanlis. The crown of Hungary fell to Mary, whose succession was questioned by Charles of Durazzo, king of Naples, the nearest male heir. His invasion of Dalmatia, in 1385, brought into Hungary Sigismund, second son of Charles IV of Luxemburg, the German Emperor. For Sigismund was betrothed to Mary, but had been slow to take upon himself the rôle of bridegroom, owing to his disappointment over Hedwig’s election by the Poles. Now he entered into the struggle for the Hungarian crown. In 1387, it was placed upon his head. The union between Poland and Hungary was broken, but the fortunes of Hungary and Bohemia, to which throne Sigismund succeeded by blood, were joined in a way that has never been broken to the present time. The outside connexions of the new Hungarian king were a most important factor in the growth of the Ottoman Empire. A strong and vigorous king, whose sole interest lay in the crown of Hungary, might have prevented the spread of the Osmanlis. In fact, after Bayezid’s death, he might easily have destroyed the Ottoman power in Europe. But Sigismund, called in 1411 to the larger rôle of Holy Roman Emperor, became engrossed in the Hussite controversy and the Church councils to end the great schism. While retaining the crown of Hungary, he allowed the Osmanlis to make the preparations which were to end in the Moslem subjugation of that kingdom.

In the early days, when Sigismund’s interests lay in his newly-acquired Hungarian crown, he was alive to the menace of the Osmanlis. He sent a message to Bayezid, demanding by what right he was interfering with Bulgaria, which was a country under Hungarian protection. Bayezid made no response to the address of the king’s ambassador. He merely pointed to the weapons hanging in his tent, and gave a sign that the audience was over.

Sigismund understood, and accepted the challenge. In 1392, he invaded Bulgaria, won an initial battle from the Osmanlis, who would have been annihilated had it not been for their new allies, the Wallachians, and, after a long siege, took Nicopolis on the Danube.[462] By this time Bayezid was able to send a large army into Bulgaria. When Sigismund realized how numerous were the forces coming against him, he saw that his victory bade fair to be nothing more than the acquisition of a prison. Before the Osmanlis could surround him, he wisely abandoned Nicopolis. The retreat became a rout.[463] It was on the return from this expedition that Sigismund met Elisabeth Morsinay, in the county of Hunyadi. From their union was born the great champion, who, while his imperial father was engrossed in theological disputes and the complex interests of the empire, battled bravely against Mohammed I and Murad II.

The expedition of 1392 demonstrated to Sigismund that Bayezid was a foe worthy of a European ruler, that he must be checked if Hungary were to be saved, and that the Hungarians could not again take the offensive against the Osmanlis without aid from western Europe. For the pretensions of Louis to the overlordship of the Balkan States, and the heartless propaganda of the Catholic faith, thinly disguising Louis’s inordinate ambitions, had turned the Balkan peoples against Hungary and ‘crusaders’ from the west. They chose rather to stand on the side of their Moslem enslavers.

Sigismund’s invasion of Bulgaria determined Bayezid to put an end to the arrangement concluded just before Kossova between Murad and Sisman. Bulgaria, like Thrace and Macedonia, was to be an integral part of the empire, and to become converted to Islam and ottomanized, in so far as that was possible. For Sisman, who had re-established himself in his old capital, was too uncertain an ally to be trusted in the event of another Hungarian invasion. In the spring of 1393, an army under Soleiman Tchelebi, Bayezid’s oldest son, to whom this was the first command, surrounded Tirnovo. The bulk of Soleiman’s army was composed of Macedonian Christians and renegades of the first generation. In midsummer,[464] after a three months’ siege, Tirnovo was taken by storm from the side of the old castle, which is still, in part, standing.[465] The inhabitants who escaped fire and sword were carried into captivity in Anatolia. Among them was the patriarch Euthymius.[466]

This was the end of the independence of Bulgaria and of the national church. The loss of the church was a more serious blow than the loss of independence. For the Bulgarian nationality suffered an eclipse of centuries. Under the laws of Mohammed the Conqueror for the ‘self-government’ of the Christian elements of the empire, the Bulgarians were included in the Greek _millet_ (nation). Enemy to every influence, every movement that tended to lessen its temporal power, the Greek patriarchate of Phanar never wearied in its endeavours, and never withheld its approval of the foulest means, to stamp out the Bulgarian national spirit. One cannot visit the old monastery of Rilo without realizing that the Bulgarian sufferings have been more acute from Christian priests than from Moslem governors. One cannot follow the trail of unending persecution in the mute witness of unchurched communities from Monastir to the Black Sea through Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia, and to the Danube, through Bulgarian Serbia and trans-Rhodopian Moesia, without sympathizing with the Bulgarian aspirations of 1913, and without comprehending the wild rage and hatred that drove an ordinarily clear-headed and impassive people into the second Balkan war.[467]

When Tirnovo fell, Sisman was not found in his palace. His fate was a mystery even when Schiltberger went through Bulgaria with the crusaders three years later. Schiltberger believed that he died in captivity.[468] His son, Alexander, became a Moslem to save his life, and was given the governorship of Samsun.[469] He was killed fighting under the Ottoman flag, in 1420, in the rebellion of Dédé-Sultan. The royal family of Bulgaria had no other heirs.

Silistria, Nicopolis, Widin, and the other Danube fortresses were strongly garrisoned and fortified.[470] By conversion and immigration the Moslem population was cultivated, and grew rapidly on this northern frontier of the empire.

V

The battle of Kossova did not immediately affect Constantinople. Bayezid was intent upon arranging the new _status quo_ in Serbia. After he had assured himself that Sigismund was not ready to attack him, he passed over into Asia Minor. There he devoted all his energies to the destruction of the Turkish emirates.

The old family feud of the Palaeologi continued.[471] In April 1390, John, the son of Andronicus, entered Constantinople, and set himself up as emperor in opposition to his grandfather and uncle. But upon Manuel’s return from Asia in September, he was compelled to flee.[472] The obligations of Manuel as Ottoman vassal were stronger than the exigencies of his precarious position at Constantinople. Although his father was in an enfeebled condition and the danger of a return of his nephew was very real, Manuel left again in November to follow Bayezid in the war against Karamania.

We have a striking record from Manuel’s own pen of his humiliation. Proper food was too dear for the purse of the heir of Constantine the Great. He was on the verge of starvation. In sharp contrast to his own wretchedness, he describes the barbaric splendour of the court of Bayezid, and the feasting in which he was too insignificant to have a share. The Osmanlis treated him with studied insolence and contempt.[473]

While Bayezid was in Karamania, the old emperor repaired the walls of his capital. Churches were torn down in order to rebuild the towers on either side of the Golden Gate. They were given an ornate appearance to disguise the purpose of their having been repaired. Bayezid, informed through his couriers, sent word to John that the towers must be rased without delay, or Manuel would lose his eyes. The old emperor made haste to obey. Before the demolition was finished, he died in the arms of Eudoxia Comnena, whom he had taken for his mistress after having asked her hand for his son. Gout and debauchery rather than grief and humiliation ended his ignoble life; for he was only sixty-one, and, like his father and grandfather, had never opposed the Osmanlis with enough energy to undermine his constitution.[474]

When Manuel, in the spring of 1391, returned to Brusa, he learned of his father’s death, and of the threat that had been made concerning himself. Escaping in the night, he fled to Constantinople.

An ultimatum soon followed from Bayezid. Beyond the acknowledgement of vassalage and the payment of an increased tribute, Bayezid demanded the establishment of a kadi in Constantinople to judge the Moslem inhabitants. Upon the heels of his messenger came the Ottoman army. The Greeks of southern Thrace who had remained Christian were exterminated or carried off into slavery in Asia. Like locusts, the Osmanlis swarmed in all directions, and no village missed their notice up to the very walls of Constantinople.[475] The first Ottoman siege of Constantinople began.

The close investment of the city ended after seven months. Bayezid, needing his army in Bulgaria to oppose Sigismund, consented to lift the siege on still harder conditions than had first been imposed. Manuel authorized the establishment of a Mohammedan tribunal in the Sirkedji quarter, and to give seven hundred houses within the city walls to Moslem settlers. Half of Galata, from the Genoese Tower to the Sweet Waters, was ceded to Bayezid, who placed there a garrison of six thousand. The tribute was once more increased, and the Ottoman treasury was allowed a tithe on the vineyards and vegetable gardens outside of the city.[476] From the minarets of two mosques, the call to prayer echoed over the imperial city, which, from this time, began to be called by the Osmanlis Istambul.[477] This was the city of promise.

From 1391 until the advent of Timur, Constantinople was blockaded on the land side.[478] The Galata garrison and the posts at Kutchuk and Buyuk Tchekmedje were always alert to bully and harass travellers and provision sellers.

The Grand Vizier, Ali pasha, used the grandson and namesake of John V Palaeologos to make trouble for Manuel. It was in his blood to become the willing tool of the Osmanlis. In 1393, Ali pasha tried to get the inhabitants of the city to depose Manuel in order that John, as heir of the older son of the late emperor, might take the place which was rightfully his.[479] Two years later John actually attacked the city with Ottoman troops, but was repulsed.[480]

The overtures of Manuel for aid and money from Christian princes were received with little enthusiasm. On account of the schism in the Latin Church, Manuel could look for no papal support. Venice refused his offer to sell Lemnos.[481] The time had passed when the Senate set even the slightest monetary value upon a Byzantine deed of sale to an Aegaean island.

In 1395, at Serres, Bayezid held his first court as heir of the Caesars. He summoned before him Manuel and Theodore and John, the son of Andronicus. Theodore, who had been ruling in the Morea (Peloponnesus), sole remaining Byzantine theme, was charged with having encroached upon the rights of the lord of Monembasia. The few remaining Serbian princes were also present. Bayezid contemplated ridding himself altogether of the Byzantine imperial family. In fact, he ordered the death of all the Palaeologi. Ali pasha succeeded in putting off the execution long enough for Bayezid to change his mind. The sentence was revoked, but warning was given by cutting off the hands and putting out the eyes of several Byzantine dignitaries. The Palaeologi, and Constantinople, had been saved only by the intervention of a creature of Bayezid’s, who did not want to see the imperial family perish and the imperial city fall because these ghosts of princes were a source of revenue to him!

The peril at Serres had been so real that the Byzantine and Serbian princes plotted immediately to throw off the Ottoman yoke, and swore to each other that they would never again answer a summons from Bayezid. The compact was sealed by the marriage of Irene, daughter of Constantine Dragash, to Manuel.[482] But Dragash died shortly after the marriage,[483] and Vuk Brankovitch died three years later.[484] They were the last of the Serbians of Dushan’s following in Macedonia. The disaster of Nicopolis soon crushed the hopes of the conspirators.

VI

Urban VI, the first Roman pope of the Great Schism, did practically nothing against the Osmanlis. He sent, in 1388, two armed galleys for the defence of Constantinople, and issued letters broadcast promising indulgences to all who would take part in a crusade.[485] But he did not work for a league of the states which recognized him. His successor, Boniface IX, whose reign covered the same period as that of Bayezid, was too occupied in combating the Angevin party in Naples, and in trying to preserve intact the papal states and cities, to pay much attention to the Ottoman menace.

In 1391, Boniface urged George Stracimir, who called himself king of Rascia (Serbia), to conquer Durazzo from the ‘schismatics’, and commanded the Catholic archbishop of Antivari to prevent the Christians of Macedonia and Dalmatia from allying themselves with the Osmanlis.[486] Idle words these were, revealing at once the short-sighted policy of Boniface and his bigotry. For the Osmanlis, in the spring of 1393, were threatening Durazzo.[487] With warring Christian sects, their success was certain.

In Greece the interference of the Latin popes was becoming more and more bitterly resented. Ecclesiastics and laymen alike resented proselytizing and the invariable introduction of a bargaining clause in every appeal for western aid. In March 1393, Dorotheus, metropolitan of Athens and exarch of Greece, who had been justly charged by the Duke of Athens with wanting to introduce into his duchy the Osmanlis, was a fugitive at Constantinople. Tried on the charge brought against him by the Duke, a synod of eight bishops acquitted him.[488] This action was indicative of the feeling throughout the Eastern Church,--better the Osmanlis than the Franks with their Catholic missionaries. Even the changed attitude of Bayezid towards Christianity did little to modify this sentiment.

Although France was supporting the Avignon papacy, Boniface wrote in 1394 to Charles VI, asking him to help Sigismund or at least to allow his subjects to fight under the Hungarian standards.[489] In the course of the same year he twice ordered a crusade to be preached.[490] This was, however, rather an attempt to take under his wing, and give sanction to, a secular movement to help Hungary than an initiative which had originated the movement. For most of Sigismund’s allies were adherents of the other papacy.

At Avignon, Benedict XIII, a Spaniard, mounted the throne in 1394. His influence with the Duke of Burgundy, who dominated the insane French king, was almost as negligible as that of his Roman rival.

Philippe de Mézières, who had taken up the work of Marino Sanudo, and gave his life to the promotion of a crusade, left Cyprus in 1378, and settled in Paris, where he preached and wrote impassioned appeals to Christendom to rescue the Holy Sepulchre. His ‘Order of the Passion’, which was to furnish a race of fighters against the Moslem holders of Jerusalem, had replaced the celibate vow of the earlier orders by a vow of marital fidelity, so that ‘defenders of the Holy Sepulchre’ might be propagated, and trained from infancy for their mission. The whole idea of Philippe de Mézières was an anachronism. The age of the crusades had passed. After 1390 the new order fell into oblivion.[491] Like Marino Sanudo, Philippe de Mézières had actually contributed to the aggrandizement of the Osmanlis; for he turned the minds of those who were moved by his appeals from the real menace of Islam to a quixotic and wholly useless dream. The crusades had only emphasized the axiom of history that Syria, including Palestine, must be held either through Mesopotamia or through Egypt.

Against the Osmanlis as against the Moslems of the Holy Land, the Church was no longer able to move Europe. The Nicopolis crusade was undertaken and carried through by secular agencies. It had neither religious motive nor religious backing.

The interest of Hungary in checking the progress of Ottoman conquest was hardly second to that of Venice and Genoa. To the two Italian republics, who had not hesitated to stake their very existence a decade before upon the mastery of the Aegaean Sea and the free passage of the Dardanelles, one would suppose that the battle of Kossova would have been a salutary warning, and that they would have seen the necessity of opposing the Osmanlis to the full extent of their resources. The archives of these cities, however, during the entire reign of Bayezid, reveal a record of double-dealing and insincere diplomacy which was as futile and disastrous as it was shameful.

Immediately upon hearing the news of Kossova, the Venetian Senate sent to Andrea Bembo, who had been negotiating with Murad, a letter instructing him as to the course he should follow in view of the death of Murad. He was to seek out the son who had survived, or, if both sons were alive, to be very cautious until one son had killed or defeated the other. In the meantime, he was to make overtures to both, telling each one, without letting the other know, that the Senate ‘had heard of the death of his father, and on that account had great sorrow. For we have always regarded him as a most particular friend, and we loved him and his state. Likewise we have heard of his happy elevation to the power and lordship of his country, concerning which we have been very happy, because, in like manner as we have sincerely loved the father, we love and are disposed to love the son and his dominion, and to regard him as a particular friend.’ Then Bembo was to speak of the commercial privileges desired by the Senate, and to disclaim the action of the Venetian admiral, Pietro Zeno, who had attacked the galleys of Murad.[492]

Immediately upon hearing which son had become the successor of Murad, the Senate sent Francesco Quirini to Bayezid with gifts to secure the renewal of the commercial treaty concluded several years before with Murad. Bayezid readily offered to protect Venetian commerce, but he gave no guarantee.[493]

The appearance of the Osmanlis on the Aegaean Sea, and their sacking of Chios, Negropont,[494] and Attica, greatly alarmed the Senate. Fear was expressed for the safety of the Venetian fortresses in Negropont and Crete.[495] All garrisons were ordered, provisioned, and reinforced.[496] In 1393, forgetting their sincere love for Bayezid, the Senate decided to treat with Sigismund for an offensive alliance against the Osmanlis.[497] So it cannot be believed that the Venetians did not see the growing danger.

In September of the next year they responded favourably, although vaguely, to a letter in which Sigismund notified them that in the coming springtime he would ‘go against the Turks to their loss and destruction’.[498] But when, in May 1396, a Hungarian embassy arrived in Venice to announce the readiness for a forward movement, and to secure the promised aid, Venice pledged herself only to the extent of four galleys, and that on condition that Rhodes, Chios, and Mytilene would co-operate with the Venetians.[499] A high-sounding letter was sent to Tommaso Monicego, ordering him to move against the Osmanlis ‘for the preservation of the city of Constantinople and for the honour of the republic’.[500] Too weak and too inexperienced to withstand the hardened mariners of Italy, the Osmanlis disappeared from the sea for the moment. Their navy was only six years old, and could not yet match itself against the _ghiaours_. Monicego fought no battle, for there was no enemy to oppose him. But he made no effort to hinder the passage of the Osmanlis from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia. The sincerity of the naval co-operation in the Nicopolis crusade is open to the gravest suspicion.[501]

While the Senate was putting off Sigismund with assurances and promises that never materialized, they continued to treat with Bayezid and Manuel. In September 1394, the Osmanlis appeared in the Adriatic at the mouth of the Boyana, and seized Venetian subjects there. The danger to Durazzo was imminent, for the Osmanlis were now masters of the valley of the Drin. When the Senate deliberated on measures for securing the release of the prisoners and for the defence of Durazzo, they decided to make representations rather than threats to Bayezid.[502] He naturally paid no attention to the Venetians. They did not intend to apply force, so he continued the subjugation of Albania and Greece.

To Manuel the Senate wrote a letter in 1394, recommending him ‘to trust in God, to trust in the measures which the Christian princes would know how to take, to write to the pope and to these (the Christian princes), promoting a general alliance’.[503] But one finds in the deliberations of the Senate no speech or motion or letter from which one could infer that they themselves had any hope whatever of the efficacy of the procedure suggested to Manuel. In fact, within six months, in spite of the imminence of the Hungarian offensive campaign that was to ‘drive the Turks out of Europe’, the Senate actually decided to send ambassadors to Bayezid to urge upon him the advisability of an accord with the Byzantine emperor.[504] It was only because the crusade of Sigismund was already launched, and they realized the uselessness of it, that they gave up this questionable _démarche_, and discussed measures for the safety of the Venetian fleet, and for preventing Constantinople from falling into Bayezid’s hands without coming into any open rupture with the Osmanlis.[505] Did Venice, while ostensibly co-operating with the crusaders, fear that a victory at Nicopolis would bring about the hegemony of Hungary in the Balkan peninsula, and secretly wish for the success of the Osmanlis?

As for Genoa, no other policy was considered than that of outbidding Venice for Bayezid’s favour. Fulsome congratulations upon his succession were sent to Bayezid. In the autumn of 1390, a Genoese embassy appeared at Adrianople to remind Bayezid of the traditional friendship of the Consulta for his father and grandfather. Their assurances were backed up by valuable gifts.[506] While cultivating the friendship of the Osmanlis, the Consulta levied a compulsory tax upon all the communes where they could enforce their authority for the purpose of increasing the Genoese fleets in the Aegaean Sea and at Constantinople.[507] A watchful eye was kept on the Venetians and the Osmanlis. Neither Sigismund nor Manuel received real aid from Genoa.

For the necessary outside support and assistance in the crusade which appeared to him indispensable for the safety of Hungary, Sigismund had to look elsewhere than to the divided papacy, and to the republics of Venice and Genoa. Whether Sigismund’s fears of the ability of the Osmanlis to destroy Hungary were well founded is open to question. But there is no doubt that his activity prevented the capture of Constantinople in the early years of the reign of Bayezid.

VII

As early as 1384, the French Court was aware of the remarkable progress of the Ottoman conquest. The character and ambitions of Murad were presented to the boy-king Charles VI in a striking way. He was told that Murad, in a dream, had seen Apollon, one of his false gods, who offered him a crown of gold before which were prostrated thirteen princes of the Occident.[508] This childhood impression was revived in 1391, when Charles was at the zenith of his emancipation under the Marmousets. He received an embassy of pilgrims from the Holy Land, who brought news of a defeat they had experienced while fighting with the King of Hungary ‘against the Turks of Lamorat Baxin’. When Charles asked them about the genealogy and antecedents of the prince, whose name they confused with that of his father, they knew nothing of him except that he was ‘a vassal of the King of Persia’.

But of his character and ambitions they made a statement which we are justified in quoting, because it throws light upon the notions prevailing in the minds of the French aristocracy who went to their death at Nicopolis. ‘He was’, said the pilgrims, ‘a man of wisdom and discretion, who feared God according to the superstitious traditions of the Turks ... humane towards the conquered, because he oppressed them very little with exactions, and did not expel them from their lands so long as they were willing to promise allegiance under an annual tribute, however small. He kept his promises, and permitted them to live under their own laws.... His seal was so respected in his army that whoever saw it fell upon his knees. He had interpreters and spies in Europe to instruct him about the kings and their policies. _He told the pilgrims that he would come to France after he had finished with Austria._’[509]

The chronicler from whom this report is taken added that Charles was much excited by this threat. He was anxious to make peace with England, in order that he could accept the challenge of Bayezid, and go to fight him in single combat at the head of his army. But Charles, in the following year, so completely lost his mental balance that he could no longer maintain any personal power, and fell under the influence of the princes of the lilies. But his sympathies remained steadfastly attached to every scheme for fighting the Osmanlis.

In the spring of 1395, the Dukes of Berry and Burgundy, uncles of the king, who had for the moment all the power of the French crown in their hands, received at Lyons ambassadors from Sigismund, who came to demand aid against the Osmanlis. Philip of Burgundy was greatly interested in this mission. It is extremely improbable that he had any interest whatever in the Christians of the Balkan peninsula, the aggrandizement of Hungary, or even the preservation of Constantinople from Moslem sacrilege. But, since Flanders, Artois, and the county of Burgundy had come to him through his wife on the death of Louis le Mâle, Philip had begun to dream of establishing a new kingdom in Europe. It was the dream which was to plunge France into the most bitter of her civil wars, to call forth Jeanne d’Arc from the seclusion of Domrémy, and end in the death of his great-grandson under the walls of Nancy.

Philip had every reason in the world to aid the project of Sigismund. Apart from the fact that his immediate hold over the insane king, Charles VI, would be strengthened by the absence from France of the energetic scions of noble families, who, if successful in the struggle against Bayezid, might push on to the Holy Land and find permanent interests--or a grave--there, Sigismund was well worth cultivating. The elder brother of the king of Hungary, Wenceslaus, was Roman emperor, but insecure in his position. At that very moment, Wenceslaus was negotiating with Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti to create him Duke of Milan in exchange for his support.[510] Galeazzo was the father-in-law of Louis of Orleans, younger brother of the French king, and Philip’s formidable rival. The future of the Valois of Burgundy demanded an _entente_ with the German imperial family. As this could not be concluded with Wenceslaus, and as Wenceslaus might at any moment be deposed, it was policy for Philip of Burgundy to come into close contact with Sigismund, whose future in Bohemia and in the empire Philip foresaw. At the very least, by lending aid to Sigismund, Philip had an excellent chance of getting Luxemburg, which was essential to the consolidation of the new Burgundy in the Netherlands.

As earnest of the aid which would be forthcoming the following year, the Duke of Burgundy allowed the Comte d’Eu to proceed immediately to Hungary with some nobles and six hundred horsemen.[511] After the Hungarian envoys had gone through the formality of an audience with the king at Paris, they returned to Sigismund bearing a letter in which Philip promised substantial aid in cavaliers and mercenaries, under the command of his own elder son, Jean Valois, Comte de Nevers.

From England, the Netherlands, Savoy, Lombardy, and all parts of Germany, Sigismund received assurances that the cream of chivalry would flock to his standards, and that he could rely upon Europe to back him in the expedition which was to drive Bayezid out of Europe.

VIII

The crusade which ended in the disaster of Nicopolis is one of the most interesting events of the close of the Middle Ages, not only by reason of the historical importance of those who took part in it, but also because it was the last great international enterprise of feudal chivalry. It is the end of an epoch in the history of Europe. So widespread was the interest in Sigismund’s call to arms against the Osmanlis that there came to meet him at Buda in the spring of 1396 not only the French volunteers, but also scions of noble families from England, Scotland, Flanders, Lombardy, Savoy, Bohemia, and all parts of Germany and Austria. The English war in Normandy had ceased, Milan was supreme in northern Italy, and for the moment there was peace in the Holy Roman Empire. It was a favourable time to attract adventurers to unknown lands.

This expedition furnishes the most absorbing pages in the last portion of Froissart;[512] it is mentioned in more or less detail in a number of other French, Italian, German, and Latin chronicles. Several participants have left graphic accounts of the gathering of the chevaliers, the march down the Danube, the battle and its aftermath of massacre, the captivity and ransom of the prisoners. The archives of Dijon and Lille tell the cost of the fitting out of the French contingent and of the ransom of the prisoners. For this crowning event in Bayezid’s career, we have more source material than for any episode of Ottoman history until the fall of Constantinople.[513]

The French chevaliers numbered about a thousand. They were accompanied by six or seven thousand attendants and mercenaries. They gathered at Dijon, under the command of Jean de Nevers, the oldest son of Duke Philip of Burgundy, and grandson of King John, who had been captured in the battle of Poitiers. He was only twenty-two, and had just won his knighthood. The fact, though, that he was heir to Burgundy, and a prince of the royal blood, gave him the command. Philip charged the Sieur de Coucy, one of the boldest and most experienced warriors in France, to have an eye on the boy, and to guide the expedition with his counsel.[514]

Prominent among the French chevaliers were Philippe d’Artois, Constable of France, Henri and Philippe de Bar, cousins of the king, the Sieur de Coucy, Guillaume de la Trémouille, Jacques Bourbon de Vienne, admiral of France and prince of the royal blood, Boucicaut, marshal of France, the Sieur de Saint-Pol, and three Flemish princes who were the brothers of Jean de Nevers’s mother. The heir to the duchy of Bavaria was anxious to join the French chevaliers, but was restrained by the wise words of Duke Albert: ‘William, since you have the desire to travel and go to Hungary and Turkey, and carry arms against people and countries which have never done anything to us, and you have no reason for going there, except the vainglory of this world, let John of Burgundy and our cousins of France do their enterprises, and you do yours, and go into Friesland and conquer our inheritance ... and in doing this I shall help you.’[515]

The chevaliers travelled through Germany and Bohemia, and were hospitably received by the Duke of Austria. ‘On the way they spoke of Amorath-Bacquin[516] and admired little his power.’ When they reached ‘a city called Buda, the king made them a great reception and good cheer, and indeed he ought to have done so, for they had come far to see him and bear arms for him’.[517] At Buda they found the other chevaliers who had responded to the invitation of Sigismund, among whom were the Bastard of Savoy,[518] Frederick of Hohenzollern, grand prior of the Teutonic Order, Philibert de Naillac, grand master of Rhodes, with a contingent of chevaliers of Saint-John, the Elector Palatine, and John, Burgrave of Nürnberg, ancestor of the House of Brandenburg.[519] A scholarly biographer of Henry IV of England has recorded that he, as Count of Lancaster, was one of the participants in the Nicopolis expedition.[520] This error has found its way into one, at least, of our most reliable modern historians.[521] Although the successor of Richard II was not, as a matter of fact, at Nicopolis,[522] the blood of the Nicopolis crusaders is in the veins of the British royal house, as in that of practically every ruling family of Europe.

Sigismund claimed to have been assured by Bayezid that the Osmanlis would invade Hungary in the spring of 1396. When there were no signs of an Ottoman invasion, the crusaders decided that, as Bayezid did not come to seek them, they had best take advantage of the summer months to go and find the arch-enemy of Christendom.[523] Arrangements had been made with Mircea, voïevode of Wallachia, to break with the Osmanlis and join the coalition. Manuel, who had been invited to co-operate with the invaders, prepared secretly to declare against Bayezid.[524]

According to the chronicles, the invasion of Bulgaria was rather a picnic than a serious military operation. This was true, at least, for the western chevaliers, who had brought with them wine and women in plenty. Their baggage contained all the luxuries to which they were accustomed at home. The French auxiliaries travelled from Buda to the Danube by way of Transylvania and Wallachia, crossing the Carpathians through the pass between Brassó (Karlstadt) and Sinaia.

The Hungarians, following the Danube, spread out into Serbia, pillaging and murdering the inoffensive Christian population more thoroughly than Ottoman akindjis would have done.[525] In spite of a lack of opposition, they persisted in acting as if they were in the enemy’s country. Widin surrendered without a struggle, and Orsova after five days.[526] In September, the armies joined before the fortress of Nicopolis, whose surrender to the Osmanlis three years before had marked the disappearance of Bulgarian independence. They were destined to go no farther.[527]

For sixteen days Sigismund and his allies encamped in front of Nicopolis without giving assault.[528] They had no idea of the whereabouts of Bayezid. It was believed among the French (whose ignorance of geography and of distances equalled ours of modern times) that Bayezid was in Egypt, gathering a great army of all the Moslem world to oppose the triumphant march of the crusaders. One reads in Froissart that Bayezid was ‘in Cairo in Babylonia [_sic_] with the sultan to get men’, that he left the sultan there and rallied his forces at Alexandria and Damascus, that ‘under the command and prayers of the khalif of Bagdad and Asia Minor’, whose mandate went forth ‘to Persia, to Media, and to Tarsus’, Bayezid received a ‘mass of Saracens and miscreants’, and that in his army were ‘people of Tartary, Persia, Media, Syria, Alexandria, and of many far-off countries of the miscreants’.[529]

Sigismund made a speech to the chevaliers from western and central Europe, in which he declared: ‘Let him come or not come, in the summer which will return, if it pleases God, we shall get through the kingdom of Armenia and shall pass the Bras Saint-George and shall go into Syria and shall get from the Saracens the gates of Jaffa and Beirut and several other [cities] to go down into Syria, and we shall go to conquer the city of Jerusalem and all the Holy Land. And if the Sultan, with all the strength he can muster, comes before us, we shall fight him, and there will be no going away without the battle, in God’s pleasure.’ Froissart naïvely adds immediately after his report of this speech: ‘But it turned out very much in another way.’[530]

It certainly did. Bayezid, who had been directing the siege of Constantinople, knew no more about the khalif and the sultan and the ‘far-off countries of the miscreants’ than did Froissart. Neither he nor his ancestors had ever had dealings with the Moslem princes of Asia. Persians, ‘Saracens’ and Egyptians were lacking in his army. He gathered together his trained warriors, called upon his Christian vassals for their quotas, and set forth over the well-known route to the Danube. From several recent campaigns, he and his soldiers were thoroughly familiar with the country through which they passed, and in which the people were less afraid of him than they were of the Christians who had come to deliver them. When, after two weeks’ march, he pitched his camp near Nicopolis, he was simply returning to a place where twice before the Ottoman arms had been victorious.

Sigismund was dismayed at the prompt appearance of Bayezid with an army which was reported to him in numbers varying from one hundred and twenty thousand to two hundred thousand. In spite of his brave words to the chevaliers, Sigismund knew the worth of the Osmanlis as fighting-men, and that they could not be brushed aside by a few impetuous cavalry charges. So he begged Jean de Nevers and his companions to consult with him, and to formulate a definite plan of action. He suggested, and won over to this opinion the Sieur de Coucy, who was the most experienced warrior among the chevaliers, that a reconnaissance be made first of all to determine Bayezid’s position and intentions. Then, if Bayezid was actually moving to the attack, or on the point of moving, it would be the part of wisdom for the westerners to allow the foot-soldiers of Hungary and the Wallachians to sustain the first attack. The valiant horsemen and western mercenaries should form a second line, whether it be in attack or defence.

The chevaliers were furious at this suggestion. Philippe d’Artois, Comte d’Eu and Grand Constable of France, who knew Sigismund best from longer association with him, suspected him of an attempt to rob the chevaliers of the glory of defeating Bayezid. ‘Yes, yes,’ he cried, ‘the king of Hungary wants to have the flower of the day and the honour. We have the advance-guard, and already has he given it to us. So he wants to take it away from us and have the first battle. Whoever believes in this, I shall not.’ Then turning to the chevalier who carried his banner, he called out, ‘Forward banner, in the name of God and of Saint George, for they will see me to-day a good chevalier’.[531] This action was contagious. Without knowing where the enemy was, without thinking where or how far they were going, without waiting to agree upon a concerted action with the bulk of their army, the French, German, and English noblemen rushed forward to make the last charge of European chivalry against the followers of Mohammed.

The outposts of Bayezid, taken by surprise, were cut down. The Osmanlis who surrendered were massacred without mercy. Imagining that they were winning a great victory, and that they were breaking through the only obstacle between them and the Holy Sepulchre, the chevaliers rode to death and disgrace. In the picturesque language of Rabbi Joseph, ‘they said “Aha! aha!”. But their joy was quickly gone, for the horsemen of Bayezid and his hosts and chariots came against them, in battle array, like the moon when she is new.’[532]

The chevaliers had put all their strength of man and horse into the charge. Their swords ran blood. They thought the day was theirs, when suddenly they found themselves confronting the army of Bayezid. As was his invariable custom, Bayezid had sent out to meet the attack of the chevaliers, when he heard that they had commenced the battle, his worthless untrained levies to be cut down by the enemy and exhaust their strength. With deliberation he drew his trusted divisions in battle array in an advantageous position, which he had ample time to choose. His soldiers were intact and fresh. The Ottoman bowmen aimed their arrows at the horses of the chevaliers. Unhorsed and quickly surrounded by sixty thousand soldiers, there was nothing for the proudest warriors in Europe to do but surrender to the foe whom they had despised.

As far as the chevaliers were concerned, the battle was over in three hours. Jacques Bourbon, admiral of France, lay on the field with the banner of Notre-Dame clasped tightly in his hands. Guy de la Trémouille, Philippe de Bar, and others of the noblest blood of France, Flanders, Bavaria, and Savoy were killed in the charge. But the greater part of the high-born auxiliaries of Sigismund were prisoners in the camp of Bayezid. So handsomely were they accoutred that the Osmanlis believed them all to be princes of the Occident, and saved them for Bayezid to determine their fate.[533]

When Sigismund learned that the chevaliers had disregarded his advice, and had already ridden forth to find the army of Bayezid, he was greatly worried, for he knew the tactics of Bayezid, and feared the worst. He said to the grand master of Rhodes, ‘We shall lose the day through the great pride and folly of these French: if they had only believed me, we had forces in plenty to fight our enemies’.[534]

From a comparison of the chronicles, one does not get a clear idea of what happened after the failure of the assault of the chevaliers. A battle in which the bulk of the forces on either side were engaged undoubtedly followed. But it is impossible to state whether Sigismund followed up the way opened for him through the Ottoman lines by the French charge, or whether the Hungarians and their auxiliaries were on the defensive. Froissart and Morosini infer that Sigismund did not attempt to fight after the failure of the chevaliers, and it was believed in western Europe that the disaster of Nicopolis was due to the failure of Sigismund to support the chevaliers rather than to their own folly. The Hungarians and their king were bitterly denounced by the French survivors.[535] On the other hand, Schiltberger, who took part in the battle, declares that the king of Hungary was advancing in force, and that Bayezid was preparing to retreat, when the Osmanlis received sudden and substantial support from the krai of Serbia.[536]

The Serbians were so completely under Ottoman control after the battle of Kossova, that they made no attempt to throw off the yoke of Bayezid.[537] In Asia Minor as in the Balkan peninsula, against the Karamanians and Tartars as against the crusaders, at Nicopolis as at Angora, the Serbian auxiliaries were faithful supporters of Bayezid. Nicopolis was certainly won with the aid of the Christians of the Balkan peninsula. It was not only the Serbian reinforcements which won the day for the Osmanlis. As soon as Mircea of Wallachia saw how the battle was going, he quickly withdrew from the field, and got his forces across the Danube before the panic started.

Whether the action of Mircea was actuated by treasonable motives or not is open to debate. He may have honestly believed that it was a case of _sauve qui peut_. If so, his action was not more reprehensible than that of Sigismund himself. The future Holy Roman Emperor, who was to play so important a part in the history of Europe during the early decades of the fifteenth century, forgot his bold words of the previous week: ‘And if the Sultan, with all the strength he can muster, comes before us, we shall fight him, and there will be no going away without the battle, in God’s pleasure.’ Sigismund and the grand master of Rhodes hurried to the Danube, got away in a small boat,[538] and boarded one of the galleys of Monicego, the Venetian admiral. Abandoning his army and his allies to their fate, the king of Hungary sailed for home. He had the shame, if he felt it at all, when passing through the Dardanelles, of seeing the chevaliers and other prisoners of Nicopolis paraded before his eyes. One of these prisoners wrote: ‘The Osmanlis took us out of the tower of Gallipoli, and led us to the sea, and one after the other they abused the king of Hungary as he passed, and mocked him, and called to him to come out of the boat and deliver his people: and this they did to make fun of him, and skirmished a long time with each other on the sea. But they did not do him any harm, and so he went away.’[539]

Sigismund went to Modon, and then back to Hungary. This was the king who had boasted that he would not only turn the Osmanlis out of Europe, but that he had enough lances to support the sky, should it fall upon his army.[540] Although his manhood had been put to the test, and had been found wanting, he was saved to play a great, if unenviable, part in the closing events of the Middle Ages.[541]

After Sigismund’s escape, his great army, which was to redeem the Holy Sepulchre, fled before the Osmanlis. Those who were not killed, or drowned in the Danube, retreated through Wallachia. Froissart describes graphically the hardships of the French, German, English, Scotch, Bohemian, and Flemish crusaders in their painful march across the Carpathian Mountains. The chevaliers could secure a bare sustenance. Their pages and men-at-arms were stripped of their clothes and beaten by the peasants. It was not until they got into western Hungary that they felt themselves safe.[542]

On the day following the battle of Nicopolis, Bayezid rode from his camp to inspect the battle-field.[543] Orders had been given that the bodies of the nobles who had fallen be put in a place apart from the common dead, so that the identity of those who had lost their lives might be ascertained. An especial search for the body of Sigismund was ordered. The Hungarian king was not among the captives: it did not occur to Bayezid that he had fled. When Bayezid saw how heavy had been his casualties, and learned the story of the massacre of prisoners by the chevaliers after they had ridden through the Ottoman outposts, he could not control his anger. A general massacre of the prisoners was ordered.

Only because Bayezid hoped for a great ransom for the grandson of the French king was Jean de Nevers saved. There was in the suite of the Comte de Nevers a Picard chevalier who knew a little Turkish. Through him Jean was able to communicate with Bayezid, and to save twenty-four chevaliers who would bring heavy ransom. Among these were the Comte d’Eu, the Comte de la Marche, the Sieur de Coucy, Henri de Bar, and Boucicaut. But they were all forced to stand beside Bayezid and watch the massacre of their companions.

Because of his youth, for none under twenty years was killed, Schiltberger was spared to leave a description of this terrible massacre. ‘Then I saw the lord Hannsen Greiff, who was a noble of Bavaria, and four others, bound with the same cord. When he saw the great revenge that was taking place, he cried with a loud voice, and consoled the horse- and foot-soldiers who were standing there to die. “Stand firm”, he said, “when our blood this day is spilt for the Christian faith, and we by God’s help shall become the children of Heaven.” He knelt, and was beheaded together with his companions. Blood was spilled from morning until vespers, and when the king’s counsellors saw that so much blood was spilled and that still it did not stop, they rose and fell upon their knees before the king, and entreated him for the sake of God that he would forget his rage, that he might not draw down upon himself the vengeance of God, as enough blood was already spilled. He consented, and ordered that they should stop, and that the rest of the people should be brought together, and from them he took his share, and left the rest to his people who had made them prisoners. The people that were killed on that day were reckoned at ten thousand men.’[544]

So ended the last crusade.

IX

Immediately after the battle, Bayezid sent part of his army across the Danube to hunt down the fugitives and to punish Mircea. This force was defeated by the Wallachians in the plain of Rovine, and withdrew into Bulgaria.[545]

Other columns mounted the Danube through the Iron Gates, retaking on the way the fortresses captured by the crusaders, and made a raid into Styria. Everywhere the akindjis carried fire and death. The country was laid waste. Peterwardein was burned, and sixteen thousand Styrians were carried off into slavery in Macedonia and Anatolia.[546]

This invasion of Hungary made a deep impression upon the Slavic and Teutonic races, who believed that it was the beginning of a Moslem conquest of central Europe. The flagellants and the dancing processions of the plague days of 1348 and 1359 were revived. For a moment, even the Venetian Senate feared that Bayezid had led in person his army into Hungary, and was engaged in an aggressive movement that might bring the Osmanlis to the head of the Adriatic.[547]

But Bayezid was not carried away by the ease of his victory. He let well enough alone. For the moment, he had absorbing interests in the ransom of his prisoners, the developments in the Greek peninsula, the question of Constantinople, and the temptation to licentious pleasures that had come to him with success.

X

Bayezid announced his victory from the battle-field to the Kadi of Brusa, and later, from Adrianople, to the Moslem princes of Asia.[548] To the Sultan of Egypt and other rulers he sent gifts of prisoners to corroborate his letters.[549]

The intercession of Jean de Nevers had saved the more illustrious of the surviving French chevaliers. They were taken to Brusa. While not treated royally, they were allowed to hunt, and were given opportunities to see the grandeur of Bayezid.[550] But they were not kept together long. For some months, the heir to the Duchy of Burgundy was separated from his companions, and could talk with them only by the special permission of Bayezid. Some of them were sent to Mikhalitch, where Philippe d’Artois, grand marshal of France, died.[551] Enguerran de Coucy, worn out with anxiety for his family and the disgrace that had come to him at the close of his brilliant career, soon followed the Comte d’Artois to the grave.

In the meantime, Jacques Helly was sent by Bayezid to Paris to communicate to the Duke of Burgundy and the other relatives of the captives the conditions for their ransom--two hundred thousand pieces of gold, delivered to Bayezid at Brusa. Froissart describes the feeling aroused at Paris by the first news of the disaster. The stories of the survivors were not believed, and the bearers of bad news narrowly escaped hanging or drowning. An order of the king’s council forbade any man to mention Nicopolis. The anxiety of the families of the chevaliers was not set at rest until Jacques Helly reached Paris on Christmas night, three months after the battle. Only then was it known who had been saved for ransom. What was joy to some was a crushing blow to others. Not since the battle of Poitiers had such a calamity come to the noble families of France. There was great lamentation throughout the kingdom. Chief among the mourners was the Duchess of Burgundy, who had lost her three brothers, and whose son was in the hands of Bayezid.[552]

While Jacques Helly was in France, Marshal Boucicaut was given permission to go to Constantinople to try to raise the ransom. He spent the Lenten season of 1397 there without success.[553] The Duke of Burgundy resorted to every expedient to raise the enormous sum demanded by Bayezid. For the ransom of his son ‘great taxes were laid upon all the kingdom, and a large amount of money was gathered and transported to Turkey, which was a great and irreparable loss’.[554] It was not forgotten for many years. A decade later it was used as one of the indictments against the Duc d’Orléans, who met his death through the man he had helped to ransom.[555]

When, a year after the battle of Nicopolis, the money was at last delivered to Bayezid through the intermediation of Gattilusio of Mytilene and the Genoese, Venetian, and Cypriote merchants who traded with the Osmanlis, Bayezid gave the chevaliers their liberty. To the Comte de Nevers, he said: ‘John, I know well and am informed that you are in your country a great lord. You are young, and, in the future, I hope you will be able to recover, with your courage, from the shame of this misfortune which has come to you in your first knightly enterprise, and that, in the desire of getting rid of the reproach and recovering your honour, you will assemble your power to come against me and give me battle. If I were afraid of that, and wanted to, before your release I would make you swear upon your faith and religion that you would never bear arms against me, nor those who are in your company here. But no: neither upon you nor any other of those here will I impose this oath, because I desire, when you will have returned to your home and will have leisure, that you assemble your power and come against me. You will find me always ready to meet you and your people on the field of battle. And what I say to you, you can say in like manner to those to whom you will have the pleasure of speaking about it, because for this purpose was I born, to carry arms and always to conquer what is ahead of me.’[556]

It is not true, however, as one would suppose and as Froissart records, that ‘these lofty words were always remembered by Jean de Nevers and his companions so long as they lived’. The French chevaliers went to Rhodes, and then home by way of the Adriatic. The Comte de Nevers took to himself a title which he had not earned, unless one confuses folly with valour. To the end of his days, he was known as _Jean sans Peur_. He never burned with a desire to wipe out the disgrace of Nicopolis, but spent his whole life as a factional leader in the civil wars of France. After a career which continued as ingloriously as it had begun, he was stabbed to death on the Bridge of Montereau in 1420--tardy vengeance for his own openly acknowledged instigation of the murder of the Duc d’Orléans.

XI

There is recorded the capture of Thebes by the Turks in 1363,[557] and the surrender of Patras in Thessaly to the Osmanlis in 1381.[558] The first Ottoman army, however, to enter Greece went to the Morea in 1388, upon the invitation of Theodore Palaeologos, to support his waning power as despot against the indigenous Greeks and the Frankish lords. The Osmanlis under Evrenos carried devastation everywhere they went, and did little to help Theodore.[559] They were soon recalled by Murad to co-operate in the Kossova campaign. When Theodore was hard pressed, in 1391, by Amadeo of Savoy and the Venetians, he turned again to the Osmanlis. Once more Evrenos came to the Morea, and helped to destroy the coast towns.[560]

After the famous council of Ottoman vassals at Serres, in 1395, Theodore, who was one of the princes summoned by Bayezid to Serres, was compelled to sign the cession of Argos and Monembasia to the Osmanlis. He was then thrown into prison, and Bayezid contemplated having him assassinated. But before the cities could be delivered to the Ottoman emissaries, Theodore escaped, and declared the cession null and void.[561] The first impulse of Bayezid was to send an army upon the heels of Theodore. This punitive expedition was postponed on account of the activity of Sigismund, and the necessity of defending the northern frontiers against the Hungarians.[562]

In the spring of 1397, while Bayezid was superintending the construction of a mosque at Karaferia in Macedonia, he received a visit from the Greek bishop of Salona, who laid before him a formal accusation of adultery, sorcery, and oppression against Helena Cantacuzenos, who had been ruling the Duchy of Salona with her paramour after the death of her husband, Louis Fadrique. The bishop invited Bayezid to enter Greece, depicting to him the wonderful hunting he would have in a country full of game.[563]

The promise of good sport with the falcon was not needed. It had long been Bayezid’s intention to extend his sovereignty into the Greek peninsula. He had against Theodore not only the old count from Serres, but also the complicity of the Morean despot in the Nicopolis crusade. At the head of his army, he set out upon the first Ottoman invasion of Greece. In Thessaly, Larissa, Pharsala, and other strongholds surrendered without striking a blow. For thirty years the Greeks of Thessaly had felt that the Ottoman conquest was inevitable. When Bayezid crossed the pass of Thermopylae without opposition, Helena hurried to meet him. She offered her principality, her daughter, and herself to the conqueror. Bayezid did not want the duchess. She was set at liberty immediately. But the beautiful grand-daughter of John Cantacuzenos was sent to his harem. The duchy of Salona, in which was the shrine of Apollo, with all of Phocis, Doris, and Locris, was added to Thessaly, and made an Ottoman province.[564]

Bayezid by this time had tired of the campaign. He felt an irresistible call to return to the pleasures of the court. His military interests were beginning more and more to be centred upon an extension of his power in Asia Minor--the policy that was soon to prove his undoing. But there remained Theodore and the Morea to be dealt with. He left Yakub and Evrenos, with an army of fifty thousand, in charge of the invasion of the Peloponnesus.

Yakub struck south to Coron and Modon. The environs of Modon were pillaged and burned. He defeated Theodore at Megalopolis, and forced him to become a tributary of the Osmanlis. In the meantime, Evrenos had held in check the papal mercenaries at Corinth, and had then taken Argos by assault, with a terrible loss of life, and a booty of fourteen thousand male captives. Because the Venetians could so easily reinforce and reprovision it from the sea, the siege of Nauplia was abandoned. The two commanders, when October came, gave their soldiers licence to pillage wherever they could as a reward for their services, and afterwards withdrew to Macedonia.[565]

The population of the historic city of Argos was deported into Anatolia, and Moslem colonies settled in the north-eastern corner of the Peloponnesus. This was part of the general plan of Bayezid after Nicopolis. His successes in Asia Minor had made possible, for the first time, a movement of an unmixed Turkish element from Anatolia into the Balkan peninsula. While these colonists were arriving in Argos, there was a similar immigration to Adrianople, Eski Zagora, Philippopolis, and Sofia.[566]

Bayezid is credited by the Ottoman chroniclers with the capture of the two great cities of Hellenism, Athens and Salonika. Nowhere else than in the Ottoman historians can one find a record of the acquisition of Athens in 1397 by the Osmanlis. If it were true, one would certainly find this event in the Venetian archives, for Venice was particularly interested in Athens at this time.[567] Had the Osmanlis entered Athens, would they have restored it to the Acciajoli family? The fate of Argos in the same campaign makes this unlikely. Athens remained in Christian hands until after the fall of Constantinople.[568]

As for Salonika, one finds authority for its capture by the Osmanlis after the attempt of Manuel to retake Serres,[569] after a four years’ siege, in 1387,[570] and in 1391 by Bayezid himself.[571] But since there is neither record nor explanation of how the city returned to the Byzantines, even the temporary occupation of so rich and important a maritime city, and so strongly defended,[572] during the reigns of Murad and of Bayezid, is hardly possible. For in 1403 Salonika was sold by the Byzantines to the Venetians,[573] and was not captured by the Osmanlis until 1430.

Even if we cannot give to Bayezid the honour of the acquisition of Athens and Salonika, or of the conquest of the Morea, his campaign of 1397 was the beginning of the subjugation of Greece. Important districts had been added to the empire, and a permanent foothold gained in the Morea. The maritime character of the peninsula, however, made impracticable its complete conquest, until the Osmanlis were able to hold their own against the Italians and Greeks upon the sea.

XII

The blockade of Constantinople, in spite of all the concessions that Manuel had made to Bayezid,[574] had become an active and pressing siege before the Nicopolis expedition. In 1394, Bayezid had given orders from Adrianople to pursue the siege vigorously.[575] But it was not until the spring of 1396 that Bayezid contemplated seriously the taking of the city by assault. He was diverted by the coming of the crusaders to Nicopolis. After Sigismund and his allies had been defeated, Bayezid returned to Constantinople and called upon Manuel to surrender the city.

The Constantinopolitans, stunned by the disaster which had attended the Christian arms on the Danube, urged Manuel to yield, in order that they might be free from the calamities that would follow a successful assault. But Manuel had been cheered by the arrival of six hundred chevaliers and a small gift of money from France. He resisted his people, and gave no answer to Bayezid.[576] He married his eldest son John to the daughter of the Russian prince Vassili, whose dowry was in gold pieces.[577] An inventory was made of the treasures of St. Sophia.[578] Through the Patriarch, Manuel tried to get the Russian and Polish Christians interested in the fate of the seat of orthodoxy.[579]

From Europe came the usual promises of aid. It is a merciful dispensation of Providence that men ground their hopes upon desires rather than upon realities. Manuel was merely human when he continued to receive strength and inspiration from what experience should have taught him were will-o’-the-wisps. Henry of Lancaster was projecting a new crusade;[580] but his energies were very soon directed towards a crown rather than a cross. The Duc d’Orléans, in response to a letter from Manuel to King Charles VI, answered for his insane brother by promising to come in person to the relief of Constantinople. Almost immediately afterwards he accepted rich presents from Bayezid.[581]

Venice, in 1397, urged Manuel and the Genoese of Pera, ‘for the honour of Christianity’ and because the alternative ‘would be to the peril and shame of Christianity’, not to treat with Bayezid. This advice was weakened by a saving clause at the end of the letter to the effect that, if the Constantinopolitans and Perotes did treat with Bayezid, they should include Venice, for ‘it would be too risky for the Venetians to be at war alone with the Turks’.[582] Although Venice sent ten galleys to Constantinople, and Genoa five galleys,[583] the republics followed consistently their policy of flattering Bayezid, and trying to make him believe that their dispositions towards him were altogether friendly.[584]

At the time that he summoned Manuel to deliver Constantinople, Bayezid fortified the gulf of Nicomedia, and built at Scutari the castle called Guzel Hissar.[585] About the same time, the castle of Anatoli Hissar was built at the mouth of the Sweet Waters of Asia, the narrowest point on the Bosphorus. When Clavijo passed through the Bosphorus, in 1403, he spoke of this castle as strongly built and strongly fortified, in prophetic contrast to the ruined Byzantine fortress directly opposite on the European shore.[586]

Perhaps it was because of the advice of Ali Pasha, who told him that the taking of Constantinople would bring upon him a really effective European intervention, or because he preferred to expend his energies in the Greek peninsula and in Asia Minor, that Bayezid did not carry out his threat to Manuel. These are the common explanations of the failure to follow up the victory of Nicopolis with the extinction of the Byzantine Empire.[587] As far as the Greeks were concerned, the inheritance of the Caesars was his. He had successfully defended against Europe what he had won. Constantinople could have been taken by assault. In fact, from his spies within the city, Bayezid knew that the inhabitants were favourable to surrender, and would probably force the hand of Manuel, if the Osmanlis made a show of beginning the assault. Bayezid must have been deterred from this enterprise, however, by the realization of his inability to hold the city without having the mastery of the sea.

One of Bayezid’s chief claims to greatness as a statesman is the way in which he handled Venice and Genoa. At any time during his reign, the Italian republics could have cut him off from Asia if he were in Europe, or from Europe if he were in Asia. Bayezid was master of most of the Balkan peninsula and of half of Anatolia; but he did not control the path from one portion of his empire to the other. Since he had come to the throne, Genoa had fallen under the influence of France. There was a strong anti-Ottoman sentiment in the Venetian Senate, which at any instant might crystallize into open hostility.[588] Europe was for the moment stirred over the fate of the Nicopolis crusaders. Bayezid knew that this was not the time to take Constantinople.

Then, too, after the great victories of Kossova and Nicopolis, and his successful campaign against Karamania, Bayezid allowed himself to succumb to the insidious temptations that assail the warrior when he passes from the tent to the palace. It was not astonishing that the pleasures of the table and of the harem proved irresistible to him. Bayezid, who had the best qualities of his age, allowed himself to become debauched by indulgence in shameful and unspeakable vices. His brilliant mental and physical qualities began to suffer the inevitable eclipse. His example was contagious. For, as the Osmanlis say, ‘the fish begins to corrupt at the head’.

XIII

In April 1398, and again in March 1399, Boniface IX ordered to be preached throughout Christendom a crusade for the defence of Constantinople.[589] His appeals fell on deaf ears. Wenceslaus was approaching the end of his power in the empire, Richard of England was fighting for his throne, Florence was in a struggle with the Visconti, the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Orleans were disputing the regency in France. Only Venice and Genoa were vitally interested in the fate of Constantinople.

Because Genoa had put itself under the guardianship of the Duke of Orleans, brother of Charles VI of France, and son-in-law of Duke Giovanni Visconti of Milan, the interests of her Pera colony demanded some attention from the powerful Valois and Visconti families. This made possible the sole response to the appeals of Manuel and the Pope, the expedition of Marshal Boucicaut.

In the summer of 1399, a force of ten thousand Osmanlis, after coming into more or less open conflict with the Genoese of Galata, attempted to enter Constantinople. The defenders were few; for the inhabitants, as at the time of the final siege in 1453, were more likely to be found in the bazaars than on the city walls. They had little desire to prolong a condition which was paralysing their business activities. Clavijo, who visited Constantinople four years later, was informed that the attack failed only because of the lack of skill and energy shown by the Osmanlis.[590] Until they had cannon to help them, the Osmanlis never displayed fighting ability in an assault upon fortifications. At this critical moment, aid arrived from Europe.

Boucicaut was the only one of the prisoners of Nicopolis that accepted the challenge of Bayezid. He did not forget the biting words of the audience at Brusa at the time of their release. On June 26, 1399, with four ships and two armed galleys, he set sail from Aiguesmortes. His force of twelve hundred chevaliers and foot-soldiers had much more cohesion and experience than the volunteers who gathered round Jean de Nevers at Dijon three years before. He was joined at Tenedos by several Genoese and Venetian galleys. After a victory in the Dardanelles over seventeen Ottoman galleys, the first recorded naval combat of the Osmanlis, Boucicaut reached Constantinople ‘just in time to save the city’. He was received with great joy by Manuel, and given the rank of Grand Constable.[591]

For several weeks, Boucicaut and his followers spread terror among the Osmanlis in the Gulf of Nicomedia and the Bosphorus. The Ottoman sailors, no match for the Provençals and Italians, took to cover. An assault on Nicomedia failed, but the fearless marshal made several raids into the interior,[592] and against the Ottoman settlements on the shores of the Marmora and gulfs of Nicomedia and Mudania. His one notable success was against Riva, near the Black Sea entrance of the Bosphorus, on the Asiatic shore.[593] After the castle had been stormed, and the garrison put to the sword, Boucicaut attained the objective of his raid. In the mouth of the river Riva, from which the town takes its name, were hidden the Ottoman galleys and smaller vessels, which had taken refuge there when Boucicaut first appeared in the Golden Horn. All the Ottoman shipping was destroyed by fire.

In order to remove the danger to which Constantinople was subjected by the presence of John Palaeologos, son of Andronicus, at Silivria, constantly intriguing with the Osmanlis, Boucicaut urged Manuel to become reconciled with his nephew. He went, himself--it was less than a day’s sail--to fetch John to Constantinople.[594]

This intervention of Boucicaut in the quarrels of the Palaeologi was more helpful than his military aid. The expeditions in the neighbourhood accomplished little against Bayezid. The chronicler of Boucicaut would have been astonished had he known that Bayezid considered the exploits of Boucicaut’s chevaliers and sailors of too little importance to notice. Bayezid cared only that the Italian republics did not come out openly against him, and lend to the crusaders the powerful and decisive aid which they could have given. The enterprise of Boucicaut demonstrated, however, the impotence of the Osmanlis on sea, and how easily a united effort of Christendom, or of Venice and Genoa alone, could have limited the activities of Bayezid to either Europe or Asia.

When John had been installed as co-emperor, Boucicaut pointed out to Manuel that his force was exhausted, and that he would have to return to France to find recruits. According to some authorities, this action was due to the inability or unwillingness of Manuel to pay the adventurers of Boucicaut for their services in his behalf.[595] Men of their kidney were not fighting for fun or for a cause, and there was no booty to be had from Ottoman sailors and fishermen. Before he left Constantinople, Boucicaut secured the consent of Venice, Genoa, and the chevaliers of Rhodes to his suggestion that Manuel do homage to Charles VI for his empire. This honour the advisers of the French monarch refused to accept. They did not want the king of France bound by the obligation of protecting a vassal whose position was so precarious.

Boucicaut did not return. His restless energy found outlet later in Cyprus, where, as French governor of Genoa, he forced the Cypriotes to raise the siege of Famagusta,[596] and in pillaging the Syrian ports, where his adventurers did far more damage to the Italian merchants than to the Saracens.[597] Even had he returned to Constantinople, and with the highest motives personally, his followers would certainly have done the Constantinopolitans more harm than good, as had been the case with the Catalans, and, when money was not forthcoming, have ended by being in open conflict with those of whom they were posing as the defenders.

XIV

It was a bitter humiliation for Manuel to share the imperial throne with the nephew whom he hated and distrusted. With him, the case of John was one of ‘like father, like son’, and certainly John had never given the emperor any cause to think that he was more patriotic, more loyal than Andronicus. But there was a strong party in the city in favour of John, and his association in governing Constantinople would remove the pretext of righting a wrong, which Bayezid had so skilfully used to interfere in the politics of what was now no more than a city empire.

When France refused to receive him as a vassal, Manuel decided upon a voyage in person to solicit the intervention of Europe. In spite of his misgivings, he felt that this was the only way of salvation left. His own sons were too young to raise to the purple, and Theodore had his hands full in the Morea. There was nothing to do but to leave the government in John’s care.

On December 10, 1399, Manuel embarked on a Venetian galley to make his supreme appeal to Europe. He stopped at Modon to leave the empress and his sons with Theodore. The despot of the Morea was opposed to the project. He told the emperor how the chevaliers of Rhodes, in conjunction with the Pope, were trying to get possession of the last theme of the empire, and that this scheme would have been successful had it not been for the Greek hatred and fear of the Catholic Church. He declared that Manuel, like their father, was embarking upon a hopeless voyage. Not only that, but he would run a risk of losing his empire entirely by leaving it in charge of John, who was more friendly to Bayezid and the Osmanlis than to his own family and race.[598]

Manuel would listen to no remonstrances, to no arguments. He said that his position was like that of Esther before she went in to the king: ‘If I perish, I perish.’ With that optimism which was one of his most redeeming traits, Manuel bade farewell to his family, and set out for Venice.

In the only city of Europe that could rival his own capital in splendour, he received a reception worthy of the cause for which he had come. The Senate, as usual, promised much. But they had by this time become thoroughly won over to the policy of _quod vi armorum potest fieri, fiat arte et sagacitate_, to quote the words of a contemporary record in their archives.[599] At Padua, Vicenza, and Milan, Manuel received an imperial ovation. Giovanni Visconti, shocked at the wretched appearance of the emperor’s suite, gave him money to be used for apparel fitting to the successor of Constantine and his companions.[600]

There was no attempt to arrange a conference with Boniface IX. Manuel, at this stage of his career, could not play the hypocrite so easily as his father had done. In fact, his orthodoxy was beyond suspicion. He did not hesitate in Paris to celebrate high mass according to the eastern rite, and never allowed the reunion of the churches to be the basis of his solicitations. In 1399, Boniface IX wrote a long burning letter to the Bishop of Chalcedon, his nuncio in Hungary, ordering him to preach and cause to be preached a crusade against the Osmanlis for the relief of Constantinople.[601] In 1400, he had ordered a crusade, with increase of indulgences.[602] But, when the Byzantine Emperor came to Italy, Boniface seemed to be more interested in the Kingdom of Naples than in the Kingdom of God.

From contemporary records, the reception of Manuel Palaeologos in France and in England was all that the proudest and most important sovereign of Christendom could wish for. This shadow of an emperor, who ten years before had been a retainer at the court of Bayezid too insignificant to be bidden to the emir’s table, and who was not even undisputed ruler of a single city, was treated by Charles VI and Henry IV as if he actually held the dominions entrusted by Constantine to his successors. This was especially true in England, where barons and peasants, in spite of the crusades, were still uncouth and ignorant. To them the East stood for a superior civilization, to which they must bow. There was a glamour in the name of Constantinople and in Manuel’s imperial title. Perhaps, even if they had realized the straits to which Manuel was reduced, it would have been the same; for it was not to the intrinsic worth or power of the man, but to the ten centuries of glory which he represented, that they did homage. The cry of AVE IMPERATOR had outlived the empire.

Manuel did not appreciate this. Because his optimism could not grasp the difference between what costs and what does not cost, he allowed himself to be cradled with false hopes for two years.

Henry IV had personally great sympathy with the mission of Manuel; for in Africa he had borne arms against the Moslems with the cross upon his breast, and, until he succeeded Richard II, it had always been his dream to lead a crusade. He understood the peril of Constantinople, and in a letter from Westminster, in January, 1401, he called the attention of the Archbishop of Canterbury to the necessity of helping Manuel, in order that Constantinople might not be lost, and authorized a collection in all the churches of his realm.[603] But Henry was not secure upon his throne. In France, the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans were still struggling for the power that the insane king was unable to wield.

Manuel waited two years in western Europe. While he was making his heart sick with deferred hope, the great events that were to change the personal fortune of Bayezid, if not that of his family and his race, were shaping themselves in the East. It was a Moslem prince who was to afford a respite to Constantinople.

After Manuel left for the west, only the small force of chevaliers under Châteaumorand, who had remained behind from the crusaders of Boucicaut, saved Constantinople. The inhabitants of the city were so hungry that they slipped over the walls by cords, and surrendered themselves to the Osmanlis. John did nothing. There was no money in the imperial treasury. The crusaders got their own provisions by raids on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, and by intercepting galleys. After the shock of the fall of Sivas, Bayezid realized that he must expend the best of his force and energy in solidifying his conquests in Europe and Asia, and in raising a larger army to combat Timur, if he threatened again to invade Anatolia.

Although the siege was not pushed with vigour, the city was on the point of yielding. The miserable John made a treaty to give up the city, should Bayezid beat Timur.[604] Even the patriarch Matthew was supposed to have an understanding with Bayezid to retain his position if the city were taken. In a proclamation, which vividly depicted the misery of the city, afflicted by six years of siege and famine, Matthew urged the inhabitants to repent of their crimes, and defended himself from the charge of having treated with Bayezid.[605]

Not only against Constantinople was Bayezid preparing the final blow. In the Morea, the Greeks feared for the safety of Modon, where Manuel had left his family.[606] Since 1399, the Venetian Senate had been alarmed by the gradual Ottoman conquest of Albania, and finally for the safety of Corfu, because the Osmanlis had appeared in force in the Adriatic.[607]

In the early spring of 1402, Ottoman activities ceased in the Balkan peninsula, and every soldier that could be mustered--Christian as well as Moslem--was hurried into Asia Minor; for a greater than Djenghiz Khan was marching westward.

XV

When the Tartars first saw iron, and their strongest warriors failed to bend it, they thought there must be a substance under the surface. So they called it _timur_, which means something stuffed or filled.[608] It soon became a custom to name their great leaders Timur. But even among primitive peoples the qualities of leadership have not necessarily included purely physical strength. Many Samsons among the Tartars received the distinction of being called Iron. None of them made an indelible mark upon the history of the world, save the great Timur, who had his left arm and left leg partially paralysed.[609] At the height of his career, when his hordes marched against Bagdad, he was too weak to sit upon a horse, and was carried in a litter.[610]

Timur claimed descent from the grand vizier of Djagataï, son and successor of Djenghiz Khan. He came to the throne of Khorassan, with residence at Samarkand, in 1369. In thirty years, while Murad and Bayezid were winning an empire in the Balkan peninsula, Timur became master of the greater part of the Moslem world. Persia, Armenia, the upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the steppes between the Caspian and Black Seas, Russia from the Volga to the Don and Dnieper, Mesopotamia, the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and western and northern India was his path of conquest.

After he had captured Sivas, Bayezid had not been able to curb the altogether natural impulse that led him into the valley of the Euphrates. In his way stood Kara-Yussuf, a Turcoman prince of Kharput, who was to be, after Timur’s death, the founder of the famous dynasty of the Black Sheep.[611] In 1399, Bayezid had put his son Soleiman, assisted by several of his ablest generals, in charge of an advance movement to the east. Sivas was the base of operations.

Kara-Yussuf, who had a claim upon Timur’s protection because he had guided him on his first expedition into Armenia, appealed to the Tartar court. Before Timur could remonstrate, Kara-Yussuf was captured by the Osmanlis. When Timur learned this, his anger was for the first time directed specifically against Bayezid. There were old complaints against Bayezid. The refugee emirs had not lived at his court for years without impressing upon Timur their woes and the injustice that had been done to them. But Timur was busy with other plans and other conquests. Bayezid’s former activities had not directly touched him.

In his memoirs, Timur records that he tried first to bring Bayezid to reason. ‘I wrote to him a letter of which this is the substance: Praise to God, master of heaven and earth, who has submitted to my authority several of the seven climates and who has allowed the potentates and masters of the world to bend their neck under my yoke. God have mercy upon his humble servant, who knows the limits which are prescribed for him and who does not cross them by a single step. All the world knows your origin, and it is not fitting for a man of your extraction to advance the foot of pride; for you will be able to throw yourself into the abyss of affliction and of misfortune: resist the suggestions of miserable counsellors.... Refrain from opening to confusion and to evils the door of your empire. Send me Kara-Yussuf: if not, by the coming together of our two armies all that is hidden under the veil of destiny will be uncovered to you.’[612]

Instead of paying attention to this letter, Bayezid deliberately committed another overt act by summoning Taharten, emir of Erzindjian, whom he knew to be a vassal of Timur, to appear at the Ottoman court, bringing his treasures with him! When Timur again remonstrated with Bayezid and reminded him of his duty ‘gently and like a friend’, Bayezid responded by summoning Timur to appear before him, and threatening to deprive him of his harem if he refused to come. In order to express his contempt for the Tartar conqueror, Bayezid placed his own name first in letters of gold, and Timur’s name underneath in small black letters.[613]

Why Bayezid took this tack in dealing with Timur is inexplicable. It is impossible to believe that he underrated the power of Timur. One can only suppose that his informants and advisers, to whom Timur alluded in the first warning to Bayezid, urged upon the Ottoman emir the improbability of a Tartar invasion of Asia Minor; for, even after the terrible lesson of 1400, when Bayezid had two years of respite, he took no steps to placate Timur or to prepare adequately against an invasion. He went on blindly to his doom, and displayed none of the consummate diplomatic and military skill that had made the first eight years of his reign among the most brilliant of all Ottoman history.

When Timur saw that Bayezid would not even treat with him, he took the field immediately. Soleiman sent an appeal to Bayezid, who was in Thessaly.[614] There was no response. With feverish haste, Soleiman attempted to put into condition the defences of Sivas, whose strong walls had been admirably constructed by the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin Kaïkobad

one hundred and sixty years before.[615] He then went boldly forth to meet the Tartars, but, when he realized that his twenty thousand horsemen could not hold their own against Timur, he withdrew to the north-west, abandoning the city to its fate.[616]

It took Timur eighteen days of incessant attack to weaken the defences of Sivas. The walls were sapped, and piles driven under them, which were smeared with pitch and set on fire. Only after several of the towers had fallen did the garrison agree to surrender upon Timur’s promise that their lives should be spared and the whole city preserved. As far as the Moslems were concerned, this promise was partially fulfilled. They were allowed to pay for their freedom. The city, however, was pillaged and burned, and its Christian inhabitants were sold into slavery. Three or four thousand Armenian horsemen, who had been bravest and most stubborn in the defence, were buried alive in the moats.[617]

The destruction of Sivas was in August, 1400.[618] The conduct of Timur after this victory lends colour to the supposition that it was not at all in his mind to subdue Asia Minor and overthrow the Ottoman Empire. He had come not to conquer, but merely to give Bayezid a salutary lesson. Instead of continuing his westward march, Timur withdrew to the Euphrates, and spent the next eighteen months in the famous campaigns that ended in the destruction of Damascus and Bagdad.

XVI

In the winter of 1401-2, fresh from his triumphs in Syria and Mesopotamia, Timur paused for several months on the confines of Asia Minor. He had not yet made up his mind to attack Bayezid.

Through a Dominican friar, who had been trying to convert him, he wrote to Charles VI of France, whom he believed to be the most powerful king of the Occident, making to him a proposal for sharing the world, such as no European sovereign had put before him again until Alexander met Napoleon on the raft at Tilsit.[619] There was also an exchange of gifts and embassies with Genoa. The Genoese ambassador pointed out to Timur the necessity of destroying Bayezid. When the Tartar embassy went to Pera, the standard of Timur was flown in its honour from the Galata tower.[620] Even the distant king of Castile had two ambassadors in the camp of Timur, who were privileged to witness the battle of Angora from the Tartar side.[621]

The fall of Sivas was the first set-back of Bayezid’s career. It came to him as a heavy blow, if we are to believe the Ottoman chroniclers. But it did not result in spurring him on to immediate military and diplomatic effort, as such a calamity would certainly have done in the early days of his reign. He had become a voluptuary, debauched mentally and physically. His pride and self-confidence had increased in inverse ratio to his ability to make good his arrogant assumptions.

Negotiations were reopened between the two great sovereigns of Islam. The letters became more menacing on the part of Timur and more insulting on the part of Bayezid.[622] Timur’s earlier admiration for Bayezid as champion of the Prophet against the infidels, and his earlier reluctance to make war against a nation of his own faith, had disappeared in the course of his last conquests. The fire at Damascus was one indication of Timur’s religious indifference: his willingness to treat with Christian Europe was another. At last determined to humble Bayezid, Timur brought his huge army into camp near Sivas. He did not, however, definitely decide upon the invasion of Ottoman territory until he heard that Bayezid was starting for Tokat.

To strike at Bayezid directly was impracticable, owing to the hardships that his large army would encounter in traversing the thickly wooded and mountainous country between him and the region in which his spies reported the Ottoman army to be. He followed the valley of the Halys to Caesarea. By keeping to the water-courses his army was enabled to live off the land. It was just harvest time, and the soldiers gathered in all the grain in the valley of the Halys and its tributaries. It took six days to get to Caesarea, and four days more to reach Kirsheïr. In the meantime, the advance guard of the Osmanlis had fallen back from Tokat and Amassia to Angora. By a reconnaissance from Kirsheïr, Timur learned that the bulk of the Ottoman forces were at Angora. Three days more brought him to the Ottoman outposts.[623]

There was no further parley. Timur saw in Bayezid an enemy that must be crushed. He had every confidence in his star. Bayezid had hardly recovered from the awakening which came when he realized that Timur was actually marching against him. His resourcefulness, his coolness, his marvellous judgement had left him. His soldiers were exhausted by forced marches in the hot midsummer sun, for it was the last week of July.[624] He could have withdrawn for several days to the mountains to recuperate, and let Timur do the seeking. Then Timur would have expended his strength in an attack upon Angora under the broiling sun. Timur could not have left Angora uncaptured behind him, or have moved westward in pursuit of the Osmanlis without waiting to replenish his food supply. But Bayezid, eager and lacking in self-control, as men sometimes are from the presentiment of disaster rather than the confidence of success, decided upon an immediate battle. This was just what Timur wanted.

Bayezid’s second mistake was in putting his Tartar allies in the first line. He did this in accordance with the established Ottoman tactics, that the enemy be allowed to expend his strength upon the untrained rabble, and to reach the second line exhausted. But he had not taken into consideration the fact that these Tartars were kin to his enemy, and could easiest desert when placed in front.[625] A third mistake was in taking the offensive rather than waiting for Timur to attack;[626] for Bayezid had the advantage in being able to choose his position. From Nicopolis to Plevna, Tchataldja and Gallipoli, the Osmanlis have always shown their fighting qualities best in a defensive action.

There was nothing the matter with Bayezid’s army. Like the empire he had been building, it was composed of all the Moslem and Christian elements of Asia Minor and the Balkan peninsula. With the exception of the Tartars, they were loyal to Bayezid, and had become accustomed to fighting together with a discipline and bravery fully equal to, if not superior to, that of Timur’s veteran warriors from central Asia. The right wing was under Stephen Lazarevitch, brother-in-law and faithful friend of Bayezid. In addition to Serbian horsemen, Stephen’s command contained the other European contingents, Moslem as well as Christian.[627] In the left wing were the troops of Anatolia, led by Soleiman Tchelebi, Bayezid’s eldest son. The emir himself was in the centre, surrounded by his janissaries and his three sons, Mustafa, Isa, and Musa. To Mohammed, whose reliability and judgement Bayezid esteemed second only to Soleiman’s among his sons, was entrusted the rear guard.[628]

Elephants were used on both sides. Timur’s first line threw balls of Greek fire into the midst of the archers who were covering the Ottoman advance. The desertion of the Tartar auxiliaries, who formed a quarter or more of Bayezid’s total strength, decided the battle before the fighting really started.[629] When Bayezid saw that he could not prevent the Tartars from going over to Timur, he ordered the left wing to advance to the attack.

Fifteen thousand men fell in a vain effort to pierce the Tartar lines. The slaughter was so great that Soleiman was unable to rally his forces.[630] When they broke and fled, the offensive movement of the Osmanlis was at an end. Bayezid, now on the defensive, was driven back step by step. His retreat was cut off. With his bodyguard and the refugees from other battalions, he made a gallant fight upon a small hill, holding off the enemy for hours.[631] Long after nightfall, when the main forces of Timur’s army, who had been pursuing the Osmanlis, returned to the scene of victory, they learned that the Ottoman sovereign was still fighting on the hill. There was no more hope for Bayezid. The last of the defenders were overwhelmed. ‘The Thunderbolt continued to wield a heavy battle-ax. As a starving wolf scatters a flock of sheep, he scattered the enemy. Each blow of his redoubtable ax struck in such a way that there was no need of a second blow.’[632] At last, as he tried to withdraw over the hill, he was overpowered,[633] his hands were bound behind his back, and he was sent to Timur’s tent.

With Bayezid, his son Musa and several of his highest officials, one of whom was Timurtash, were taken prisoners. Mustafa disappeared. Soleiman, Mohammed, and Isa succeeded in escaping.[634]

The battle of Angora is memorable in Ottoman annals as the only crushing defeat experienced by the Osmanlis in the first three centuries of their history, and as the one instance where a sovereign of the house of Osman has been captured. But it cannot be placed among the memorable conflicts that have changed the course of history; for it did not affect the fortunes of the nation that won or of the nation that lost. It was not like Kossova and Nicopolis.

XVII

Bayezid was brought before his conqueror at midnight, when Timur was seeking relaxation from the strain of the combat in his favourite game of chess with his son, Shah-Rokh. Bayezid had lost nothing of his haughty spirit, and did not try to win the good graces of Timur. He was never more the sovereign than in this moment of humiliation. So impressed was Timur with the manner and bearing of his prisoner, that he accorded him every honour due to his rank.

But this spirit of generosity quickly passed. Whether it was because Bayezid tried to escape or that Timur feared an attempt at rescue as he marched farther into Ottoman territory, Timur’s attitude soon changed. To break Bayezid’s spirit he began to mock him and treat him with contempt. He ordered him to be put in chains at night, and to be carried on the march in a litter with bars, which was nothing less than a cage.[635] At Brusa, Bayezid’s harem was taken from him. It has been recorded that Timur went so far as to use his unfortunate rival as a footstool for mounting his horse and at the table, and that Bayezid was compelled to witness the degradation of his wife, the Serbian princess Despina, who in a state of nudity served the Tartar conqueror with wine at his feasts.[636]

This disgraceful treatment, coupled with the fact that his sons made no attempt to bring another army to fight for their father’s freedom or even to ransom him, at last broke the spirit of Bayezid. For nine months he had been held up to ridicule in the Tartar army. He had seen his harem violated. He had seen Timur pass with ease from one portion of the Ottoman possessions in Asia to another. Smyrna, which he had never been able to attack, fell before the Tartars. The Turkish emirs whom he had dispossessed were settled again in their states. When Bayezid learned that he was to be taken to Konia, and then to Samarkand, his mind gave way. He died of apoplexy at Ak Sheïr.[637] Timur allowed Musa to take his father’s body to Brusa for burial.[638] He had by this time lost interest in the Osmanlis and Asia Minor, and was dreaming of new fields of conquest.

Bayezid died a victim not ‘to his destiny’, as the Ottoman historians put it, but to his vices, and to his abandonment of the policy of his predecessors, that assimilation should keep pace with territorial aggrandizement. There never need have been an Angora. Timur had no inclination to invade the Ottoman dominions. Bayezid goaded him into it. Even if the test of an Angora had been necessary, Bayezid would have sustained it and weathered the Tartar storm, had he been the same man he was at Nicopolis. In facing a Tartar invasion, the advantage was all on Bayezid’s side. He failed because his mental and physical faculties, which rivalled, if they did not surpass, those of any man of his age, had become impaired by a life of debauchery.

XVIII

After the victory at Angora, the Tartar hordes swept across Asia Minor. Timur sent his grandson, Mohammed-Sultan, in pursuit of Soleiman, who succeeded in escaping from Brusa just as the Tartar horsemen arrived at the gates of the city. The Tartars stabled their horses in the mosques, while the city was ransacked for its treasures and its young girls. Fire followed pillage.[639] The sons of Alaeddin of Karamania were set free, and Bayezid’s wives and daughters, with one exception, were sent to Timur, who had established his residence at Kutayia.

In the search for Soleiman, of whose movements he was in ignorance, Mohammed-Sultan sent soldiers north to Gemlik and Nicaea, and west to Mikhalitch and Karasi. These cities were pillaged, and their inhabitants reduced to slavery. When Mohammed-Sultan learned that Soleiman had escaped to Europe, he sent an embassy to him demanding unconditional surrender. There was no reply. The question of invading Europe was referred to Timur. In the meantime, the advance guard of the Tartars devastated the country which was the cradle of the Ottoman race, while their commander celebrated at Yeni Sheïr his marriage to the eldest daughter of Bayezid. Thus were united the families of Timur and his vanquished foe.[640]

Mohammed-Sultan went into winter quarters at Magnesia.[641] Timur left Kutayia in charge of Shah-Rokh, and moved on to Ephesus. He recalled the columns which had been devastating western Asia Minor, and concentrated his forces against Smyrna. What Bayezid had been unable to accomplish in seven years, Timur did in two weeks.[642] The assault of Smyrna was carried on with unceasing energy, and every possible measure was taken to bring it to a speedy conclusion. The walls were undermined, and bridges built out over the water in order that an attack might be made from the side of the sea. When the fortress which crowns the hill behind the city was entered from the land side, the chevaliers of Rhodes fought their way down to their galleys. With lance and sword and oar they beat off the despairing inhabitants who would have swamped their boats. All except a thousand succeeded in escaping. These were decapitated, and of their heads Timur built a pyramid to commemorate his victory.[643]

Timur returned to Ephesus. As he approached the city, children came out to meet him, singing songs to appease his wrath. ‘What is this noise?’ he asked. When his attendants told him, he ordered his horsemen to ride over the children. They were trampled to death.[644]

Smyrna fell in December, 1402. Timur spent the rest of the winter in Ephesus. He destroyed the work of Bayezid in Asia Minor by restoring to the deposed emirs or their heirs the emirates of Karamania, Tekke, Menteshe, Sarukhan, Aïdin, Kastemuni, and Erzindjian. When he saw that the sons of Bayezid were ready to quarrel about the succession of their father, he began to treat with Isa, Musa and Mohammed, encouraging in each the hope of recognition as sole heir. To Soleiman he sent a diploma, investing him with the Ottoman possessions in Europe as Tartar vassal.[645]

Timur enjoyed the position he had won of arbiter of the destinies of the Ottoman Empire. The princes of Europe were now seeking his favour more insistently than before Angora. Henry IV of England wrote to him most cordially, and expressed the hope that he would be converted and become the champion of Christianity.[646]

Manuel Palaeologos, who had learned from the Venetian Senate the news of Bayezid’s defeat at Angora, hurried home from Europe.[647] He banished John to Lemnos, expelled the Ottoman colonists from Constantinople, and closed their tribunal.[648] To Timur he sent an embassy offering to acknowledge his suzerainty, and expressing his willingness to pay to him the tribute that had been given to Bayezid. But when Timur responded with an order to prepare a fleet to help the Tartar hordes to pass into Europe, Manuel was seized with panic. Smyrna had just fallen, and he felt that a similar fate was now reserved for Constantinople. An ambassador was sent to Rome and Venice to implore the immediate aid of the Vatican and the Senate.[649]

Timur, however, had become tired of Asia Minor and the western campaign. He had no constructive policy. He never attempted to organize his conquests into a world empire. Like the earlier conquerors of his race, Timur was a raider. Satiety came with destruction and victory, that is, satiety for the particular conquest in which he was engaged. So he turned his back on Constantinople and the glittering possibilities of a European invasion. He wanted to return to Samarkand to enjoy the fruits of his victories. Perhaps his character was only the reflection of that of his followers.

The march had hardly started when Bayezid died at Ak Sheïr, in March, 1403. From this moment Timur forgot all about the Osmanlis. After a brief sojourn at Konia, he left Asia Minor. Within two years he died of fever while on his way to conquer China.[650]

XIX

After Angora the Ottoman army could have been annihilated; for Timur sent his victorious Tartars hot upon the heels of the refugees. Not only did they follow Soleiman to the Sea of Marmora, and the divisions which had retreated to the Bosphorus, but they pursued closely the main body of the army, which, to the number of possibly forty thousand, had fled along the customary line of march to the Dardanelles.[651] There Greeks and Latins vied in helping the refugees to cross.[652] A Venetian eye-witness of the crossing of the Bosphorus wrote that the Venetians in good faith offered to join with the Genoese in refusing to transport the Osmanlis who were crowded upon the Asiatic shore. But the Genoese started secretly to ferry them over to Europe, with the aid of the Greeks. Then the Venetians, fearing to lose favour with the Osmanlis, started in to help.[653] This testimony is corroborated by Clavijo, who visited Constantinople in the following year. He adds that Timur was disgusted with the way the Greeks and Latins failed to co-operate with him in destroying the Ottoman army.[654]

The astonishing fact is then clearly demonstrated that Greeks, Venetians, and Genoese made no effort to take advantage of their great opportunity. Nor did they, during the ten years of civil war that followed the death of Bayezid, make any move, in concert or separately, to drive the Osmanlis out of Europe. When it was not yet certain what Timur would do in regard to Asia Minor, or even whether he would invade Europe,[655] the Venetians and Genoese established with Soleiman at Adrianople the same friendly relations that they had been so careful to maintain with his father, and fought each other in the Bosphorus. Pope Boniface was straining every nerve to help Ladislas of Sicily to win the crown of Hungary against Sigismund,[656] who, alone of the princes of Europe, had his hands been free, might have contested the Balkan peninsula with the warring factions of the Osmanlis.

The decade of civil war among the sons of Bayezid passed without interference from the outside world, and without a single uprising on the part of the subjugated Balkan Christians. The house of Osman, although divided against itself, did stand. In 1413, Mohammed I, triumphing over his brothers, became sole sovereign of the Osmanlis. The crisis was over, and the career of conquest, interrupted for the moment by Timur, was resumed.

Nicopolis had proved that the Osmanlis could hold against Europe what they had won. Angora had proved that they were too firmly rooted in the Balkan peninsula and in north-western Asia Minor, as an indigenous race and as a nation, to be destroyed by the misfortunes of their dynasty. Since the test of possession is ability to hold, in foul weather as well as in fair, who can deny that the Osmanlis under Bayezid had inherited the Byzantine Empire?

APPENDIX A

TRADITIONAL MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF THE OSMANLIS AND THEIR EMPIRE

What has been said in this book on the origin of Ottoman power and the foundation of the empire is so different from statements which have found acceptance up to this time, that I am under the obligation to justify my position by a more technical discussion, and by a fuller citation of authorities, than has been given in Chapter I. I shall deal with these misconceptions singly.

1. THAT OSMAN WAS A PRINCE OF ILLUSTRIOUS BIRTH.

Chalcocondylas is responsible for the first and widest diffusion of this error in western Europe. He claims that Osman is the great-grandson of Duzalp, ‘chief of the Oghuzes’; grandson of Oguzalp, who, aspiring to succeed his father, reached ‘in a brief time the highest fame in Asia’; and son of Ertogrul, who, in 1298,[657] with his fleet, devastated the Peloponnesus, Euboea, and Attika.[658] Closely allied to the account of Chalcocondylas is that of Hussein Hezarfenn.[659] According to Ali Muhieddin,[660] Seadeddin,[661] and Hadji Khalfa,[662] the grandfather of Osman was Soleiman Shah, prince or bey of Mahan in the Khorassan, who was compelled to leave his country at the approach of Djenghiz Khan, and lived seven years in Armenia. As he was returning home, he was drowned in the Euphrates. Two of his sons, Ertogrul and Dundar, turned back into Asia Minor, and were, through the kindness of the Seljuk Sultan, Alaeddin I, given a residence near Angora, and, later, on the confines of Bithynia. Neshri places the time of residence in Armenia as 170 years, and declares that Soleiman Shah was leader of 50,000 families.[663] Practically all of the European historians who have written later than the publication in Europe of Chalcocondylas, Ali and Seadeddin have followed closely these authorities.[664]

The western writers, whose works appeared before the translation and publication of the eastern historians, or who followed earlier western authorities, are either vague or uncertain concerning the parentage of Osman,[665] or give an entirely different story of the rise of his family. He is supposed to be the son of a Tartar shepherd, called Zich,[666] who rises to fame at the court of Alaeddin I by defeating in single combat a Greek cavalier that had killed many of the favourites of the Seljuk Sultan.[667] According to others, who give nearly the same story, the name of Osman’s father is ‘the madman Delis, a shepherd’.[668] For his success in killing the Greek, the Sultan rewards him with the castle of Ottomanzich, which is often confused with Sugut, and is claimed to be the origin of Osman’s name.[669] By another story, which is asserted to be the invention of Mohammed II, who thus wanted to legitimatize in the eyes of the world his claim to the throne of the Caesars, Osman is the descendant of a certain Isaac Comnenus, a member of the imperial Byzantine family, who fled to the court of the Seljuks of Konia, and became a Moslem.[670]

In this, as in the discussion of other misconceptions which follow, we are not at all justified in throwing out categorically the testimony of the early western writers every time that they conflict with the eastern authorities, or in ignoring them entirely, as Hammer, Zinkeisen, and Jorga have done. We must remember that Chalcocondylas and all the Ottoman historians are _very late_, that they cite no sources upon which to base their assertions or inferences, and that they write with the intention to please, and under the necessity of pleasing, the Ottoman court, at a time when its rulers had become so powerful that they could not brook the recording of an humble origin for their royal house. The extravagant descriptions of Seadeddin, for example, when he speaks of Osman’s court, and his expressions such as ‘laying his petition humbly at the feet of his royal master’, &c., seem much out of place in a narrative about primitive and exceedingly plain and simple people. The western writers claim to have sources for information which are as early and as good as those of Ali and Seadeddin. Some of them certainly had.[671] We cannot claim for these writers that their stories be accepted as fact. But we can claim that they be accepted as an honest reflection of late fifteenth-and early sixteenth-century opinion concerning the founder of the Ottoman royal house--opinion derived from stories which were current in Constantinople at that time, and which, for lack of definite history, were circulated among the Osmanlis themselves up to a very much later period.[672]

The later western historians have taken, without critical examination, the Ottoman accounts of the origin of their royal family, as they have of the relationship with the Seljuks of Konia, practically at their face value. But it is not hard to prove a good case against the Ottoman historians.

The story of Soleiman Shah, prince of Mahan and leader of 50,000 families, living and ruling in the neighbourhood of Erzerum between 1224 and 1232, is very easy to disprove. The name of Mahan is often given to two cities, Dinewer and Nehawend.[673] It is rather the designation of a plain in which these two cities lay. In 1229, Sultan Djelaleddin, after his defeat by the Mongols at Mughan, passed the winter in the plain of Mahan. A certain Izzeddin was lord of the fortress there. He had been rebellious _some years before_, but was ‘now serving Djelaleddin devoutly’.[674] In the history of Djelaleddin, I find absolutely no mention of a Soleiman Shah in connexion with Mahan or any other place in that region. With 50,000 families, Soleiman Shah would have been a factor in Armenia between 1224 and 1232. For that is precisely the time when Djelaleddin, Sultan of Kharesm, his logical suzerain or his enemy, was struggling with the Seljuks of Konia in that very region! In 1229, Djelaleddin was at Erzindjian, and ravaged the whole country.[675] At the same time, a cousin of Alaeddin I, a very powerful ruler, Rokneddin, was lord of Erzerum, and was strong enough to be at enmity at the same time with Djelaleddin’s invading army and with Alaeddin of Konia.[676] Other Arabic historians, and the Seljuk historian of this period, confirm the history of Mohammed-en-Nesawi in its leading points, but they, no more than the historian of Djelaleddin, make any mention whatever of a Soleiman Shah, or of an Ertogrul.[677] Nor is Soleiman Shah and his family mentioned in any of the Arabic genealogies prior to the seventeenth century, although these exist in great numbers.[678] There is only one Ottoman genealogy prior to the tables of Hadji Khalfa.[679]

The best authority on the western Turks, the late Léon Cahun, conservator of the Mazarine Library in Paris, declares that the Turkish tribes of the time of the purported Soleiman Shah and Ertogrul had no family ties. They knew no rank other than that of a man higher up in the army. In inheritance, the younger son got the land, and the older sons the movable possessions of the father. There were no family names; there are none to this day. The Turks who came into Asia Minor were without name or family. They wandered far and sold their services to get established family ties.[680]

There is one more testimony concerning the humble origin of the Ottoman royal house. The different historians of the relations between Timur and Bayezid I all speak of the taunt flung by Timur at Bayezid concerning the Ottoman ruler’s lack of royal ancestors.[681] Bayezid never made any response to this taunt, and confined his boasting, which was by no means of a modest sort, to his own and his father’s achievements, and to his power as a European ruler.

We cannot establish the ancestry of Osman. It is altogether probable that he had none of note, but was what Americans would call ‘a self-made man’.

2. THAT OSMAN BEGAN HIS CAREER AS A VASSAL OF ALAEDDIN III, SULTAN OF ICONIUM, UPON WHOSE DEATH, IN OR ABOUT 1300, OSMAN AND NINE OTHER TURKISH PRINCES DIVIDED THE INHERITANCE OF THE SELJUCIDES; THAT OSMAN PROVED MORE POWERFUL THAN THE OTHER PRINCES, AND FOUNDED AN EMPIRE UPON THE RUINS OF THE SELJUCIDE EMPIRE.

When I call this statement, in its entirety, a misconception, I realize that I am attacking the idea of the founding of the Ottoman Empire which has been voiced by the most eminent historians and has an accepted and unquestioned place in textbooks and encyclopaedias, and in general histories.

In a French translation of Chalcocondylas, published in 1662, under the woodcut of Osman, we find these four lines:

‘De simple Capitaine en des Pays déserts, Près du grand Saladin la Fortune m’attire; Et là de ses débris je fonde cet Empire, Qui menace aujourd’huy d’engloutir l’Univers.’

I quote this verse because it seems to me to express concisely the commonly accepted idea of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, as I find it written everywhere. Hammer, whose eighteen volumes contain a wealth of material upon the Ottoman Empire not elsewhere to be found, and who shows remarkable erudition as well as care and critical powers, perpetuates the tales about Ertogrul and Osman and the court of Konia. He makes the categorical statement, ‘The empire of the Seljuks broke up, and on its ruins arose that of Osman’.[682] Creasy has popularized the opinion of Hammer in the English-speaking world.[683] Lane-Poole, who has written the only general history of the Ottoman Empire in English in our generation, has tacitly accepted the common tradition.[684] Zinkeisen and Jorga, the only later historians whose names can be coupled for scholarly work with that of Hammer, are most unsatisfactory in their failure to take up critically the Ottoman traditions of the early days of the Empire.[685] Leunclavius, the sole writer in Western Europe before Hammer, whose work might be called ‘scientific’, discusses exhaustively and compares critically all authorities existing at his time (1590) on most minute points of early Ottoman history, but is almost silent on the grave inconsistencies and contradictions arising from the question of the relation between the Osmanlis and the Seljuks of Konia.[686] There is the same silence in Cantemir and his translators.[687] The latest Ottoman historian says: ‘Osman’s military and political career naturally divides itself into two parts, that in which he was vassal of Alaeddin, and that in which he became sultan.’[688] An Oriental whose work has enjoyed great vogue in France declares: ‘Osman pursued through every obstacle the realization of his plan, which consisted in founding upon the ruins of the Seljuk Empire a great, free, and independent state.’[689]

I find one German scholar who, briefly touching upon the foundation of Osman’s power, rejects or ignores the connexion with the Seljuks of Konia; but he goes further afield, and makes the astonishing statement that Osman conquered Bagdad, allowed the Khalifs only spiritual power, called himself Sultan, and became master of the Moslem world, thereby connecting the Mongol conquest of Mesopotamia with the Mameluke conquest of Egypt, and attributing it all to Osman![690]

If we had good ground for rejecting the princely origin of Osman, our justification for impugning and discarding the connexion of Osman with the Seljuks of Konia is stronger still.

Kaï Kobad Alaeddin, the only Sultan to whom the name of Alaeddin is given by common consent,[691] died in 1236.[692] He was succeeded by Kaï Khosrew II, Giazzeddin, or Ghizatheddin, who was Sultan at the time of the great Mongol invasion of Asia Minor. In the spring of 1243, Erzerum was sacked without having received any help from Konia. Some months only after this event did Kaï Khosrew move. He was defeated at Mughan, near Erzindjian, in a decisive battle,[693] and fled to Angora, abandoning his baggage. Erzindjian fell next. Then Kaï Khosrew withdrew to Sivas, and from that city sent an embassy to the Mongols, making his submission and promising an annual tribute of four hundred thousand pieces of silver. The Mongol armies penetrated as far as Smyrna. Everywhere submission was complete, although no effort was made to provide a new government for the conquered regions in the western part of the peninsula. The Emperor of Trebizond became a vassal of the Mongols.[694]

The battle of Mughan cost the Seljuk Empire its independence.[695] After 1246, when Kaï Khosrew died, the situation of the Seljuks of Konia is depicted by Shehabeddin in these words: ‘The princes of the family of Seljuk kept only the title of sovereign, without having any authority or any power. There was left to them only that which concerned their own person and their houses, the insignia of royalty, and sufficient money for expenses of an indispensable necessity. The power belonged to Tartar governors, who managed everything without opposition. It was in the name of the princes of the family of Djenghiz Khan that the public prayer was made, and that gold and silver money was struck.[696] When the dynasty of the Seljucides had arrived at the last degree of weakness ... races of Turks seized a large part of these countries.... The Turks recognized the pre-eminence of the prince of Kermian.’[697] There is not a word of any possible Ottoman supremacy even in his own day, fifty years later. Every source on the latter half of the thirteenth century which I have consulted corroborates the testimony of Shehabeddin.[698] I have space to give only a few of the facts which I have gathered concerning the fortunes of the Sultans of Konia during the period 1246-1300, when Ertogrul and Osman are pictured by the Ottoman historians, and by the European historians who have followed them, as basking in the sunshine of Seljuk imperial favour.

After the death of Kaï Khosrew, the empire was divided between his three sons, who, however, seemed to rule in common as vassals of the Mongols, for their names were asserted to appear together on coins in 1249.[699] During the decade after the conquest, the Mongols overran western Asia Minor. We read that Sultan Rokneddin went with the Mongol general, Baïchu, into winter quarters _in Bithynia_,[700] and that Baïchu received orders from Khulagu Khan in 1257 to pillage the entire Seljuk dominions. In 1264, Abulfeda gives Rum, with its capital as Konia, among the provinces ruled by Khulagu.[701] Bibars, Sultan of Egypt, succeeded in occupying Konia for a brief time in 1276.[702] In 1278, Abaka Khan opened negotiations with Haython, king of Little Armenia, with the view of making him Sultan of Rum. In 1282, Bibars, writing to Ahmed Khan, says: ‘At this moment Konghurataï’ (a Mongol general) ‘is in the land of Rum, _which is subject to you and pays you taxes_.’[703] In 1283, Ghizatheddin, who was ruling with the merest semblance of royalty in Konia, was deposed by Ahmed Khan, exiled to Erzindjian, and replaced by Masud. There was anarchy everywhere in Asia Minor at this time.[704] The distinguished French Orientalist, M. Huart, who studied in Konia itself the inscriptions of the Seljuk Sultans, could find nothing after this period to indicate that the two final sultans who followed Ghizatheddin were more than playthings of the Mongols.[705]

The testimony of Marco Polo is most precious to us here. When he passed through this country in 1271 he says that Konia, Sivas, Caesarea and many other cities of ‘Turquemanie’ were subject to the Tartars, who imposed their rule there.[706] It was his impression that the Turcomans were subject to local rulers, and responded to no central authority.

The last days of the Seljuks are most obscure. Masud ruled until 1296, when he was deposed by Ahmed Khan. For two years there was no ruler. Whether Firamurs ever ruled is a matter of doubt.[707] The last Sultan is generally given as Kaï Kobad, who remained Sultan for four or ten years.[708] However, there was no Sultan actually ruling as sovereign in Konia either in 1290 or in 1300. Neither Masud nor Kaï Kobad could have given Osman feudal rights or a charter of independence. There was no dissolution of the Seljuk Empire in 1300. In all except mere name, it had become extinct before Osman was born.

The Mongol conquerors never extended their political system to western Asia Minor. But, from 1246 to 1278, the Anatolians, Moslem and Christian alike, were in constant terror of the Mongol hordes. After 1276, the Mongols were too occupied with the Mamelukes of Egypt, and with the dissensions arising in the eastern part of their great empire, to pay much attention to the remote Turkish tribes of Rum. During the last quarter of the thirteenth century, there was no change in the _status quo_ of the Seljuks at Konia that affected in any way the fortunes of these tribes. We can explain their rise into independent principalities, not by the disappearance of the Seljuk Sultans, but by the diversion of Mongol energy to other quarters.

Among early western writers there was great divergency of opinion about the number of the ‘Seljuk heirs’. I have found them represented as one,[709] three,[710] four,[711] five,[712] and seven.[713] Pachymeres, if we can trust the text of the Bonn edition,[714] is the earliest writer to mention the traditional number of ten.[715] When the Seljuk Empire fell before the Mongols, it had no heirs in Asia Minor. During the latter half of the thirteenth century and the first quarter of the fourteenth century (1250-1325) an innumerable number of village chieftains endeavoured to form states. There were many more than ten. The states which existed at the beginning of the reign of Orkhan I have put into another appendix.[716]

There is no record of Osman having attacked his Turkish neighbours. The testimony of the best Ottoman authorities is categorical on this point. Orkhan extended his father’s dominions very little to the south: not at all towards the east. Murad’s activities in Asia Minor were the least successful part of his career, and were by no means permanent. Sherefeddin Ali, whom we may regard as the best contemporary source for the end of the fourteenth century, states explicitly: ‘Bayezid reduced under his dominion a large portion of the country of Rum, that is to say, the provinces of Aïdin, of Menteshe, of Kermian and of Karamania, a thing which his ancestors had never been able to bring to an end.’[717]

In view of the facts of the case, it is strange that the idea of Osman as the powerful heir of the Seljuks, who mastered the other aspirants to that honour, has had such a long lease of life through centuries. Many of the early writers made Osman master of all Asia Minor.[718] It is commonly recorded that he captured Sivas.[719] One writer placed in that city his capital.[720] Another credited him with the capture of Konia.[721] Misinformation of this sort was given to Charles VI of France by returning pilgrims,[722] and, a century and a quarter later, to Frances I.[723] The early idea of the Osmanlis as an Asiatic people, of large numbers,[724] who conquered Asia Minor and then overthrew the Byzantine Empire,[725] has persisted to this day. One of the sanest Ottoman writers of modern times, who has brought wide knowledge and judgement to bear upon the history of the Ottoman army, is led astray by this misconception. He says, ‘It was the Arabic and Persian states that the Ottoman Empire had to fight _before_ _any other_’. So it is natural that he should be puzzled by finding in the military museum at Constantinople early Ottoman weapons on Byzantine and European models. He explains this by saying that these weapons were not used by the Osmanlis, but must have been captured, for the Osmanlis, naturally, would use Persian and Arabic models![726]

But Colonel Djevad is not more in error than the two greatest French authorities on Ottoman architecture. Saladin, in his summary of Ottoman history, instructs his readers as follows: ‘Alaeddin III, conquered by the Mongols, abandoned the sovereignty to Osman.... When the Osmanlis penetrated into Anatolia ... in proportion to the extension westward of the Ottoman Empire, we shall see the influence of Byzantine architecture increase.... Little by little, as the Turks approached Constantinople, this impregnation of the influence of Byzantium had an increasingly greater importance in the development of Ottoman art.’[727] This misconception of the origin of the Osmanlis leads him to state: ‘It is then indispensable to study the Seljuk monuments of Konia, which have _necessarily_ served as models to the first Ottoman monuments.’[728] From his premisses, Saladin has argued rightly. But his historical facts are wrong. Even if they were not, his conclusion could still be proved wrong. The refutation of his statement exists in the two earliest Ottoman buildings, the school and the kitchen for the poor at Nicaea, the date of whose construction Seadeddin places in 1331.[729] Both of these are typically Byzantine. In Brusa there is no Ottoman building of the Seljuk type which can be proved to have been constructed prior to Mohammed I (1413-21).[730] Parvillée, to whom the whole world owes a debt of gratitude for his able reconstruction of the precious historic monuments of Brusa, starts his scholarly work on Ottoman architecture in the fifteenth century with these words: ‘Towards the end of the thirteenth century the Seljuk Empire disappeared. On its ruins arose that of Osman.’ He not only follows Hammer: he uses his very words![731] From the historical point of view, I maintain that the Byzantine influence was an indissoluble factor in the evolution of Ottoman architecture from the very beginning. In this I am supported, from the expert architect’s point of view, by the two German authorities on this subject.[732] The Seljuk, Arab, and Persian influences entered in at a considerably later period.

There exists in tradition and in law an intimate connexion between the House of Osman and the Grand Tchelebi of Konia. This has been pointed to as a confirmation of the hypothesis that the Ottoman sovereigns derived their authority originally from the Seljuks of Rum. I do not deny the force of tradition. In the absence of early records, the beginning of this connexion must remain a moot question. But the evidence from outside sources makes reasonable my doubt as to the existence of this connexion before the reign of Mohammed I or Murad I.

There are two other arguments which might be adduced in this appendix, the questions of Osman’s title as an independent ruler, and of the chieftainship as an elective office among the Turkish tribes. But both of these have already been discussed in the text and the foot-notes of the chapter on Orkhan.

APPENDIX B

THE EMIRATES OF ASIA MINOR DURING THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

In order to support the contention of this book, that the Ottoman Empire was founded (in the durable sense of that word) upon the ruins of the Byzantine Empire _as it existed at the time of Osman_ (1300), and gained its power and prestige in the Balkan peninsula rather than in Asia Minor, there must be set forth, as far as it is possible to do so within the limits of an appendix, an _exposé_ of the extent and power of the other emirates of Asia Minor during the fourteenth century. Such a review is useful, not only to prove the argument, but also to enable the reader to follow intelligently the development of Ottoman power; for there are difficulties attendant upon the writing and the reading of a history where the geographical names are unfamiliar. The writer is faced with the dilemma of making his work meaningless or uninteresting: meaningless if he fails to enlighten his readers as to the places and peoples whom he mentions; uninteresting if he interrupts his narrative with technical, encyclopaedic explanations.

A special map accompanies this appendix. The list of emirates contains after each name a number in brackets, which refers to the map. As in almost all cases the geographical limits are vague, the general position only of each emirate can be given. To put in definite boundary lines would be mere conjecture. Then, too, at different times during the fourteenth century, independent emirates overlapped each other. Sometimes they were confined to single cities or villages.

In preparing this appendix, I am indebted to several modern scholars whose work is most suggestive.[733] But I believe that this

is the first attempt to compare the Asiatic possessions of Osman, Orkhan, Murad, and Bayezid with those of their Turkish rivals for the purpose of illustrating the slow growth of the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor, and the first time that contemporary sources have been drawn upon for this purpose.

From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, we are able to reconstruct the political status of Asia Minor, in a general way, from the narratives of pilgrims and the experiences of the Crusaders. From the beginning of the fifteenth century on to the present day, we have a wealth of sources for the history of Asia Minor in the writings of European travellers, which are valuable not only for their geographical indications and their observations on the life of the people, but also for their testimony in corroborating or disproving the statements of Oriental historians, who are so often lacking in precision and verisimilitude. For the fourteenth century, however, reliable European sources are lacking.

This lacuna is filled by the travel records of two Moslems of more than ordinary intelligence and powers of observation.

The long-lost manuscript of the travels of Ibn Batutah was one of those important finds that made the French occupation of Algeria so memorable an event in the annals of the advancement of learning. Its translation into French in 1843 made accessible for the first time a contemporary source of the highest value for the political and social life of the whole Moslem world during the first half of the fourteenth century. For Ibn Batutah travelled from his home in Morocco to the confines of China. He lived a while in each country that he visited, and wrote from the sympathetic and understanding point of view of a member of the Moslem clergy. Ibn Batutah visited Asia Minor between 1330 and 1340.[734]

Shehabeddin was an Arabic writer from Damascus,[735] who died in 1349. He wrote a voluminous work of twenty volumes, called _Footpaths of the Eyes in the Kingdoms of Different Countries_.[736] He was a contemporary of Ibn Batutah. Shehabeddin did not enjoy the advantage of visiting personally the many emirates of western Asia Minor, as did Ibn Batutah; but he states that he has based his record of these countries upon the eye-witness information furnished to him by word of mouth by Sheik Haïdar of Sir Hissar.[737] The agreement between Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin on the state of affairs in Asia Minor during the first half of the fourteenth century is so general that one can claim for their statements, which are, in large part, the basis of this appendix, most substantial grounding.

The other sources are the Byzantine historians, the chronicler of the Catalans, the Catalan Map of 1375,[738] the annalist of Trebizond, the points of contact with the Cypriotes, the chevaliers of Rhodes, the Italian traders, the Osmanlis and the Mongols and Tartars. For a few of the emirates there are coins extant. Inscriptions on public edifices, such as mosques, pious foundations, baths and fountains, are unfortunately lacking, not only for the history of the Turkish emirates but for the Osmanlis as well.[739]

In the list that follows, twenty-six of the emirates existed during the reign of Orkhan, between the years 1330 and 1350. They are mentioned either by Ibn Batutah or by Shehabeddin, in most cases by _both_, as independent in their day. The others are either earlier or later than Orkhan’s reign, and comprise a portion of earlier emirates, from which they had become detached. After the Turkish emirates, given alphabetically, are placed the non-Turkish independent states in Asia Minor.

Adalia: _see_ Satalia Adana (1) Afion Kara Hissar: _see_ Karasar Aïdin (2) Akbara (3) Akridur (4) Akseraï (5) Aksheïr (6) Alaïa (7) Altoluogo: _see_ Ayasoluk Angora (8) Armenia: _see_ Little Armenia (44) Arzendjian: _see_ Erzindjian Attaleia: _see_ Satalia Ayasoluk (9) Balikesri (10) Berkeri (Birgui, Berki): _see_ Aïdin Borlu (11) Brusa (12) Caesarea (13) Cilicia: _see_ Little Armenia (44) and Adana (1) Daouas: _see_ Tawas Denizli (14) Djanik: _see_ Kaouïa Egherdir: _see_ Akridur Ephesus: _see_ Ayasoluk Erzindjian (15) Fukeh (16) Germian: _see_ Kermian Gul Hissar (17) Guzel Hissar: _see_ Aïdin Halik (Halicarnassus): _see_ Fukeh Hamid (18) Iakshi(19) Ionia: _see_ Aïdin Kaïseriya: _see_ Caesarea Kandelore: _see_ Alaïa Kaouïa (20) Karamania (21) Karasar (22) Karasi (23) Kastemuni (24) Keredeh (25) Kermasti (26) Kermian (27) Konia: _see_ Karamania Kul Hissar: _see_ Gul Hissar Kutayia: _see_ Kermian Ladik (Laodicea): _see_ Denizli Larenda: _see_ Karamania Limnia (28) Lydia: _see_ Sarukhan Magnesia: _see_ Sarukhan Marash (29) Marmora (30) Menteshe (31) Milas: _see_ Fukeh Miletus: _see_ Palatchia Mikhalitch (32) Nazlu (33) Nicaea (34) Palatchia (35) Pamphylia: _see_ Tekke Pergama: _see_ Karasi Sarukhan (36) Satalia (37) Sinope (38) Sis: _see_ Adana Sivas (39) Sulkadir: _see_ Marash Tawas (40) Tekke (41) Theologos: _see_ Ayasoluk Tokat (42) Tralles: _see_ Aïdin Ulubad (Lopadion) (43) Little Armenia (44) Trebizond (45) Phocaea (46) Smyrna (47) Byzantine possessions (48) Cypriote possessions (49) Mongol and Tartar possessions (50) Rhodian possessions (51) Egyptian possessions (52) Catalan possessions (53)

The material that can be gathered about these Turkish emirates, the two independent Christian states, and the spheres of influence of outside Christian and Moslem states in Asia Minor in the fourteenth century, would make a book in itself. In this appendix I desire to give only enough to indicate the relative strength and vitality of each state. It must be borne in mind that my object is not to write the history of these emirates, or of Asia Minor as a whole, during the fourteenth century, but _to demonstrate how little of Asia Minor was really incorporated in the Ottoman possessions at the time that, and during the thirty years after, the capital of the new empire was established in Adrianople_.

ADANA (1)

In the Taurus Mountains, on the northern limits of Lesser Armenia, and to the south-east of Karamania, the Turcoman tribes through whom Marco Polo passed seemed to him to enjoy an independent existence. Up to the time of Murad I, they formed no state, but between 1373 and 1375 the family of Ramazan took the chieftainship. When the Mamelukes destroyed the Armenian kingdom (1375), the Ben-Ramazan dynasty established itself at Adana, on the Sarus, in the fertile Cilician plain.[740] The Ben-Ramazan emirs managed to keep from being absorbed either by the Karamanians or the Egyptians. After the complete subjugation of Karamania by the Osmanlis, they submitted to Selim I about 1510, under the stipulation, however, that the emir, Piri pasha, should hold office for life as vali of Adana and Sis. Sis was frequently coupled with Adana in the title of the Ben-Ramazan.

AÏDIN (2)

Aïdin comprised the greater part of Ionia, with a portion of Lydia, if we take its boundaries to be those of the present vilayet of the same name. It comprised, at the time of its greatest extent, Smyrna, Ephesus, and Tralles. Smyrna was captured by the crusaders in 1344. Ephesus was at times independent under the name of Ayasoluk. Tralles, called Guzel Hissar, and sometimes also Birgui or Berki, was the capital of Aïdin in the time of Orkhan. Later, Ayasoluk, and, last of all, Tira, were the successive capitals.

The emirate was founded by Aïdin, a contemporary of Osman, who was succeeded by his son Mohammed about 1330. Ibn Batutah regarded Mohammed as a very powerful prince, who was especially strong on the sea. His eldest son, Omar, who succeeded him in 1341, met death in an unsuccessful attempt to recapture Smyrna in 1348. His relations with Cantacuzenos are given in the chapter on Orkhan. Isaac, fourth of the line, reigned from 1348, until he was dispossessed by Bayezid in 1390. He died in exile at Nicaea. His sons, Isaac II and Omar II, were placed again on the throne in 1403. The line of Aïdin became extinct soon after. A usurper, Djuneïd, Ottoman governor of Smyrna, managed to keep the power until he was assassinated in 1425. It was not until then that Aïdin definitely passed into the hands of the Osmanlis.

After the death of Aïdin, the founder of the dynasty, the territory of the emirate seems to have suffered some diminution, aside from the loss of Smyrna. One of the sons, Soleiman, married a daughter of Orkhan, while another, Khidr, ruled independently at Ayasoluk, which was lost for a time to Rhodes twenty years later. Under Omar, the Turks of Aïdin were very active in the Aegaean Sea, and made large invasions of Thrace and Macedonia in 1333 and 1334. They co-operated with the Genoese of Phocaea against the Greeks and the Osmanlis, and were at times allied with the emirates of Sarukhan and Menteshe, with whom they are frequently mixed by the Byzantine historians. The western historians almost invariably gave credit to the Osmanlis for the maritime exploits of these emirates during the fourteenth century.[741]

AKBARA (3)

At some time before 1340, a certain Demir Khan, son of Karasai, emir of Pergama, ruled in Akbara, whose location is given by Shehabeddin as ‘south of Brusa and Sinope, and north of Mount Kasis’. This emirate was probably destroyed by Orkhan in the expedition of 1339-40. It was a region along the borders of Mysia and Phrygia, which had been able to resist the encroachments of Kermian owing to the mountainous character of the country.[742]

AKRIDUR (4)

This city was at the south end of the lake of the same name (to-day called Egherdir), and was within the limits of the emirate of Hamid. But, like Nazlu, it had frequently a wholly independent existence, and both Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, as well as other writers, mention its emirs as if independent of the emir of Hamid, and these rulers are given from the families of Tekke and Hamid. The Osmanlis first reached the northern end of Lake Egherdir in 1379, and incorporated Akridur about 1390.[743]

AKSERAÏ (5)

This is the ancient Archelaïs, and is three days north-east of Konia on the road to Kaïsariya (Caesarea). In the time of Ibn Batutah, it was one of the most beautiful and most solidly built cities of Asia Minor, and was ruled by the emir Artin, possibly an Armenian, who was vassal of the Mongol ruler of Persia. Later, Ak Seraï was incorporated in Karamania, to which it belonged at the time that the Osmanlis, under Bayezid, first entered it.[744]

AKSHEÏR (6)

Aksheïr, between Kutayia and Konia, belonged alternately to Kermian and Karamania--perhaps at times it recognized the suzerainty of the emir of Hamid. Its position made it a border city, prey to the changing fortunes of the Osmanlis and Karamanlis for thirty years. In 1377, when Murad compelled the emir of Hamid to sell a portion of his dominions, he regarded Aksheïr as having been in Hamid. It was, however, at that time practically independent, using the rival pretensions of the emirs to the east, west, and south as a means of preserving a precarious autonomy.[745]

ALAÏA (7)

This city was sometimes called Kandelore, a corruption of its ancient name Coracesium. Its fortunate position at the east side of the Gulf of Adalia enabled it to play an important part in the commercial history of the eastern Mediterranean for a century and a half. In the time of Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin, Yussuf, brother of the emir of Karamania, was its ruler. During the fourteenth century Alaïa was more or less dependent upon Karamania, but sometimes upon Tekke. For many years it paid tribute to Cyprus, and negotiated its affairs independently of both Karamania and Tekke. In 1444 its prince, Latif, meditated a raid upon Cyprus, from which he was deterred only by the defeat of the Egyptians before Rhodes. In 1450 Latif concluded a treaty of peace with the Cypriotes through the medium of Rhodes. His successor, Arslan bey, got help from Cyprus against Mohammed II. Alaïa was subdued by the Osmanlis only in 1472.[746]

ANGORA (8)

The history of Angora during the first half of the fourteenth century is obscure. It depended upon none of the emirates which arose after the break-up of the Seljuk Empire of Konia. Throughout Phrygia there were small village chieftains, such as Osman had been at Sugut. Angora may have acknowledged Kermian for a short period, but the proprietors of that region resisted the efforts of Karamania to incorporate them. The fortress of Angora was captured at the beginning of the reign of Murad, but it was not until Bayezid broke the power of Kermian and Karamania that the country round about the city became ottomanized.[747]

AYASOLUK (9)

This is the Ottoman corruption of Altoluogo, the Genoese name for the Byzantine Theologos (ἅγιος θεολόγος--St. John) which occupied nearly the same site as the ancient Ephesus. This city has caused much confusion to writers. It was captured from the Greeks by Sasan, who ruled there as its first Turkish emir in 1308.[748] Later it seems to have fallen into the hands of Aïdin, and became the principal commercial city of his flourishing emirate. The emir’s coins were for a time struck there, but later when Guzel Hissar (Tralles) was capital of Aïdin, Ayasoluk was practically independent under a younger brother of Mohammed, and uncle of Omar. In 1365 the chevaliers of Rhodes had evidently made a serious attempt to cut into the hinterland of Aïdin from Smyrna, for they struck coins at Ayasoluk. Its later history is that of Aïdin and Palatchia. Timur directed the operations against Smyrna from Ephesus in December 1402.[749]

BALIKESRI (10)

This city is to the south-west of Brusa, on the road to Pergama. It would naturally be included in the emirate of Karasi, but had an independent sovereign, Demir-Khan, when Ibn Batutah visited it. It was annexed by the Osmanlis after the deposition of the emir of Balikesri. The exact date of this acquisition cannot be determined.[750]

BORLU (11)

An inland district south-west of Kastemuni and north of Angora, possibly the same as Boli, where Ali, a son of Soleiman padishah, of Kastemuni and Sinope, ruled as independent sovereign between 1330 and 1340.[751]

BRUSA (12)

The descriptions of Orkhan’s realm, which to Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin was the emirate of Brusa, as it was seen through the eyes of his contemporaries, have been cited in the text of this book. Until the end of the reign of Murad, the Ottoman possessions were small enough to be distinguished under the name of Brusa, where the Osmanlis established an emirate at the death of Osman.

CAESAREA (13)

This important city, in the east of Asia Minor, on the confines of Armenia, was during the first half of the fourteenth century under the control of the Mongols, and, for a very few years, acknowledged the overlordship of Karamania. But, for the thirty years coincident with the reign of Murad, it had emirs of its own, as had Tokat and Sivas. For we know that Burhaneddin, through whose misfortunes Bayezid became involved with Timur, had been kadi of the emir of Caesarea, on whose death he divided ‘with two other emirs’ his dominions. Caesarea fell into the power of the Osmanlis between 1392 and 1398.[752]

DENIZLI (14)

This emirate was on the site of Laodicea on the Lycus, and was called Ladik by the Arabs, and Denizli, or Denizlu, by the Turks. Mount Cadmus and Hieropolis were also within its limits. It was at the upper end of the Maeander Valley, bounded on the west and north by Aïdin, and on the south by Menteshe and Tawas. In the fourteenth century, the city of its emir was probably on the Maeander and not on the Lycus. Shehabeddin compared the gardens of Ladik, or Denizli, to those of Damascus. No higher praise could have come from his lips. We know nothing of its later history. About 1350 it was probably absorbed by Aïdin or Menteshe.[753]

ERZINDJIAN (15)

Erzindjian, like Erzerum, was subject to the Mongols in the early part of the reign of Orkhan. There was a prince named Aïnabey ruling there in 1348, however, who, with two generals of Hamid, attacked Trebizond.[754] Coins were struck in the name of Alaeddin of Karamania in Erzindjian in the decade following 1350. But coins of Mohammed Artin, emir of Erzindjian, were struck there about 1360.[755] Bayezid pushed his conquests a day beyond Erzindjian to the castle of Kemath. He did not, however, conquer Erzindjian; for we have its emir, a vassal of Timur, appealing to his overlord for aid, when Bayezid summoned him to appear at Angora, bringing the treasures of his dependencies with him. His authority extended to and included Erzerum about 1400.[756]

FUKEH (16)

Ibn Batutah calls this country Milas. There were in fact two cities, Fukeh and Milas, under one sovereign at the time of Ibn Batutah and Shehabeddin. As Milas was near the site of Halicarnassus, or on that site, and was sometimes called Halik, the geographical position of this emirate, on the coast opposite Cos, is immediately grasped. It was dependent, in a certain sense, upon Menteshe, and was later absorbed by Menteshe. Orkhan was the emir about 1330. Some years later, Shehabeddin estimated that the emir of Fukeh had fifty cities and ten thousand horsemen. The last vestige of the independence of Fukeh was destroyed by the Rhodians with whom they were continually in conflict, and who got a foothold on the mainland and built a castle at Halik in 1399.[757]

GUL HISSAR (17)

At the time of Ibn Batutah, Mohammed Tchelebi, brother of the emir of Akridur, was established here on the border of Pamphylia and Caria, between Satalia and the Maeander River.[758] The fact that in such a position an independent prince could maintain himself as late as 1330--perhaps later--demonstrates that the emirates of Tekke, Menteshe, and Hamid must have been of very slow growth, like that of Brusa, and that these Turkish emirs who were rivals of the house of Osman evolved slowly, just as the Osmanlis did. The fiction of a tenfold division of the Seljuk dominions becomes very apparent when we consider the position of Gul Hissar (often called Kul Hissar), Alaïa, Tawas, and Fukeh--to cite instances only from the south-western corner of Asia Minor.

HAMID (18)

This emirate, of very late development in comparison with those of Sarukhan and Aïdin, was formed by the absorption of a number of little states--each hardly more than a village. The emir of Hamid started by incorporating Akridur and Nazlu. During the last decade of the reign of Orkhan, Hamid grew rapidly, until it extended from Aksheïr to the western end of the Taurus. It was entirely an inland emirate, and had little chance of resisting the Osmanlis under Murad. The last emir willed his dominions to Murad in 1381, but the country had to be conquered step by step. Bayezid made it an Ottoman province in 1391.[759]

IAKSHI (19)

A small emirate north-west of Sarukhan, on the sea-coast opposite Mitylene. It is mentioned only by Shehabeddin, and for the purpose of fixing the boundaries of Sarukhan.[760]

KAOUÏA (20)

This is the modern Djanik, on the Black Sea between Samsun and Sinope. It had an independent line of four emirs, and probably maintained its independence until after the Ottoman conquest of Kastemuni.[761]

KARAMANIA (21)

Until after the campaign of 1386, Karamania was a far more powerful emirate in Asia Minor than that of the Osmanlis. The Karamanlis were the actual successors of the Seljuks, and maintained themselves in Konia. While the Osmanlis were confined to a very small corner of Anatolia, the Karamanian dominions extended from the Euphrates and the Amanus to the Gulf of Adalia, on both slopes of the Taurus. Except in the maritime emirates of the Aegaean Sea, the Karamanlis and their emir were the great power in the peninsula of Asia Minor. Their independence was not broken by Bayezid, for they recovered their former glory after the intervention of Timur, and successfully withstood Mohammed I, Murad II, and Mohammed II. As in the latter half of the fourteenth century, the Karamanian emirs of the first half of the fifteenth century were allied by marriage with the house of Osman, but refused to do homage to the Ottoman sovereigns.[762]

Limits of space prevent mentioning here the many grounds upon which the Karamanians were able to and did keep their independence in the face of both Constantinople and Cairo. It was only at the end of the fifteenth century that we find the fiction of the Karamanian vassalage to the Osmanlis and of the connexion between the Seljuks and the Osmanlis appearing in the Ottoman chronicles, which on this count are, as I have pointed out elsewhere, wholly unreliable. It is astonishing that their version of the rise of the Osmanlis in Asia Minor has been accepted for so many centuries by western historians.[763]

KARASAR (22)

An abbreviation of Kara Hissar. This is probably the modern Afion Kara Hissar, a picturesque town between Eski Sheïr and Konia on southern limit of the emirate of Kermian, of which its prince was a vassal. Its importance was in its location at the junction point of the roads from the north-west and west into Karamania.

KARASI (23)

The emirate which lay between the possessions of Orkhan and Sarukhan was called, after the founder of its dynasty, Karasi. Its capital was Pergama. There is a discrepancy between the accounts of Shehabeddin and Ibn Batutah, the forming making Pergama subject to Balikesri, and the latter giving Balikesri as independent. Ottoman historians make Balikesri the northernmost city of the emirate of Karasi. The limits of Karasi, outside of the immediate vicinity of Pergama, cannot be determined. There were several small independent emirates in the hinterland of the lower end of the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles. The emir of Karasi was an ally of Aïdin and Sarukhan in the first coalition formed to combat the growing power of the Osmanlis. Karasi was the first emirate to be destroyed by the Osmanlis, and the only one of importance incorporated under Orkhan. This was because it lay nearest to the Ottoman emirate.[764]

KASTEMUNI (24)

This emirate, at its zenith, comprised practically all of the ancient Roman province of Paphlagonia. It was formed by Ali Omar bey, who started as lord of the inland city of Kastemuni, and whose son Abdullah, in the lifetime of Osman, drove Ghazi Tchelebi from Sinope. The emirate had many vicissitudes and changes in dynasty. In the time of Ibn Batutah, Soleiman padishah was the sovereign, and had extended his rule from Heraclea on the Black Sea coast almost to Trebizond. His son Ali ruled at Borlu, and another son Ibrahim Shah, who succeeded Soleiman, contested Samsun with the emperor of Trebizond. Ibrahim was the younger son, and was designated as his successor by Soleiman. Under the third dynasty of Kastemuni, the ben-Isfendiar, the emirate was at the height of its power. Its fleets swept the Black Sea, and did much harm to the Greeks of Trebizond and the Genoese of Kaffa. Kaouïa was absorbed, and its eastern boundaries included Osmandjik. The emirs of Menteshe and Aïdin took refuge here, and the refusal of the emir of Kastemuni, Bayezid, to give them up, led to the invasion of 1392. Bayezid and the fugitive princes fled to Timur, who restored them after the battle of Angora. Isfendiar, son of Bayezid, managed to retain Sinope, and a large portion of the interior, for thirty years. He was father-in-law of the Ottoman sultan, Murad II. When Clavijo visited Sinope in 1404 Isfendiar had forty thousand men to put in the field against the Osmanlis. It was not until after the fall of Constantinople that Kastemuni finally lost its independence.[765] As the history of this emirate is involved with that of Sinope, see also below under Sinope.

KEREDEH (25)

This was a small emirate, sometimes called also Kerdeleh, between Kastemuni and Boli, which was absorbed by the Osmanlis in the latter part of the reign of Orkhan. It was already in danger of Ottoman aggression when Ibn Batutah visited it on his way from Brusa to Kastemuni.[766]

KERMASTI (26)

On the Adranos River, one day south of Mikhalitch, and two days west of Brusa, this city was conquered by Orkhan in his first campaign after the fall of Nicomedia.[767]

KERMIAN (27)

Kermian, or Guermian, took its name from a Turcoman chief who held Kutayia about 1300. It was the earliest definite emirate which arose in western Asia Minor after the dissolution of the Seljuk Empire. Shehabeddin wrote: ‘Turkish tribes seized the greater part of the Seljuk possessions. The Turks recognized the pre-eminence of the emir of Kermian.’ The great fortress which still crowns the hill of Kutayia is supposed to have been erected by Kermian.[768] Kermian’s son Ali became master of all of Phrygia, possibly at one time including Angora in his emirate. Orkhan wrote to Ali as equal to equal, and gave him the title of ‘emir of Anatolia’.[769] Ali had forty thousand horsemen and seven hundred castles and villages. He was the equal of the emir of Karamania and more powerful than Orkhan.

Kermian was the first of the larger emirates to feel the change which the successes in the Balkan peninsula had made in the fortune of the Osmanlis. A granddaughter of the older Ali, and great-granddaughter of Kermian, was married to Bayezid, and Murad compelled the emir of Kermian to cede the north-western portion of his estates as his daughter’s _dot_. When Bayezid made his first campaign against Karamania he annexed the remainder of Kermian. The emir, his brother-in-law Yakub, fled to Timur, and was restored. The Osmanlis definitely incorporated Kermian in their empire in the second decade of the fifteenth century.[770]

LIMNIA (28)

A small emirate in the mountains between Trebizond and Erzindjian, whose emir, Tasheddin, married the daughter of the emperor of Trebizond in 1379. In 1386, Tasheddin could put an army of twelve thousand men into the field. There were several other very small Turkish emirates around Trebizond. Not enough, however, is known of them to make it worth while to mention them.[771]

MARASH (29)

An independent emirate was established here after the fall of the Lusignans in Cilicia, which was also known by the name of the founder of the dynasty, Sulkadir. It maintained its independence against the Karamanians, Egyptians, and Osmanlis until 1515, when its last prince fell in a battle with Selim.[772]

MARMORA (30)

An emirate on the borders of the Sea of Marmora, between Cyzicus and the Dardanelles, which had struggles and alliances with the Catalans, Byzantines, and Turks of Balikesri. It became a vassal state of Karasi, and was ruled from Pergama. After the destruction of Karasi, its territory was shared by the Catalans of Bigha and by Orkhan.[773]

MENTESHE (31)

Like Hamid, Menteshe was of late formation. The chief who gave his name to this emirate was a contemporary of Orkhan, and was sometimes known by the same name. He was allied by marriage to Soleiman, son of Aïdin, through whom he gained the former possessions of Aïdin south of the Maeander River. The emirate probably started at Mughla, and did not have much importance until it had absorbed Tawas and most of Fukeh. The emir of Menteshe possessed great influence during the latter part of Orkhan’s reign and the reign of Murad, and, like Aïdin and Sarukhan, the Turks of Menteshe, through their trading, were more in contact with the outside world than were the Osmanlis. Their port, known to the Venetians as Palatchia, was the ancient Miletus. The emirate of Menteshe suffered decline in the latter days of Murad’s reign through the Venetian usurpation at Palatchia. At the time of Bayezid’s invasion, the emir fled to Sinope and then to Timur. The emirate was restored by Timur, and was not definitely incorporated in the Ottoman empire until the reign of Murad II.[774] (_See_ Fukeh, Palatchia, and Tawas.)

MIKHALITCH (32)

This was one day west of Brusa and a day south of Mudania. After the fall of Brusa, Turkish or Byzantine rulers maintained themselves in Mikhalitch until the expedition of Orkhan against Karasi. After that it became Ottoman.[775] Some of the prisoners held for ransom after Nicopolis were detained in Mikhalitch, and one of the most illustrious of them died there.[776]

NAZLU (33)

This was a small emirate east of Denizli, which was absorbed by Hamid about 1350.[777]

NICAEA (34)

Shehabeddin says that Nicaea was the centre of an emirate whose ruler possessed eight cities, thirty fortresses and an army of eight thousand horsemen. The emir was Ali, a brother and neighbour of Sarukhan. I have been unable to identify this place.[778]

PALATCHIA (35)

Like Ayasoluk in relation to Aïdin, Palatchia, the ancient Miletus, in relation to Menteshe was at times independent, and at times the capital and seaport of the emirate. Clavijo confused Palatchia with Ayasoluk, and claimed that Timur summered (he means wintered) there. In another place he speaks of having travelled with a brother of Alamanoglu, brother of the emir of Altoluogo _and_ Palatchia.[779] When Menteshe had his capital at Mughla, there was undoubtedly another emir at Palatchia, who might also have been the man spoken of above as emir of Fukeh. But there can be no certainty on this point. Venice, from 1345 to 1405--and later--was interested in Palatchia, and had a consul and large commercial interests there. Different negotiations and treaties, in which the Osmanlis do not figure, attest the interest of Venice, and the independence--at least from the Osmanlis--of Palatchia throughout the fourteenth century.[780] Cyprus and Rhodes at times tried to get the supremacy of Palatchia.[781]

SARUKHAN (36)

Sarukhan was throughout the fourteenth century an emirate of far more importance than its rather restricted territory would seem to indicate. This was largely on account of the high qualities of its rulers and the daring of its sailors. It extended from the Gulf of Smyrna on the south to the Aegaean coast opposite Mitylene on the north, and was wedged in between Aïdin and Karasi. The hinterland was indefinite, and did not matter much as the Turks of Sarukhan were first and last mariners. They were the most important factor in the triple alliance against Orkhan in 1329 and 1336. After the Ottoman occupation of Pergama, and the disappearance of Karasi, they held the Osmanlis back for a hundred years (with the exception of the few years of Bayezid’s invasion). They were frequently in alliance with the Genoese of Phocaea and the Byzantines, and hired out as mercenaries and for transporting troops and food to Christian and Moslem alike. The long lease of life which Philadelphia enjoyed as a city of the Byzantine Empire is witness of their friendly relations with the Greeks throughout the reigns of Osman, Orkhan, and Murad.[782] Magnesia was capital of this emirate. It was not destroyed until Smyrna fell into the hands of the Osmanlis in 1425.[783]

SATALIA (37)

Satalia is listed as an emirate separately from Tekke for the same reason that Ayasoluk is given separately from Aïdin, Palatchia separately from Menteshe, and Sinope separately from Kastemuni. It began and ended as a separate and independent emirate, with its own lord. Its history is treated below under Tekke. The modern name of Satalia is Adalia, from _Attaleia_, and gives its name to the gulf on the southern coast of Asia Minor. Nicolay has confused Satalia with Ayas, the ancient Issos.[784]

SINOPE (38)

An emirate was founded about 1307 in Sinope by the last descendant of the Seljuks of Rum, who was known as Ghazi Tchelebi[785] who in 1313, in co-operation with the Greeks of Trebizond, attacked Kaffa. But in 1318 we find the Turks of Sinope burning almost all of the city of Trebizond, and in 1323 massacring the Genoese colony in their own city. Soon after this the emir of Kastemuni conquered Sinope.[786] The Turks of Sinope were to the Black Sea what those of Sarukhan were to the Aegaean. In 1361 they nearly captured Kaffa.[787] Their later history is that of Kastemuni.

SIVAS (39)

The history of Sivas between the time of the Mongol withdrawal and the aggression of the Osmanlis is not known. But that it must have had independent princes can be inferred from the story of how Kadi Burhaneddin came to rule there (cf. above under Caesarea). Its disastrous conquest by the Osmanlis, and then by Timur, has been told in the chapter on Bayezid’s reign.

TAWAS (40)

This was a maritime emirate extending east into Lycia and west as far as the mainland opposite Rhodes. It was the only one of the early emirates to possess islands. Its pirates were true descendants of those whom Pompey opposed, and were continually in conflict with the Rhodians and Cypriotes. Tawas was absorbed by Tekke and Menteshe, but not before 1340.[788]

TEKKE (41)

Tekke grew up into a powerful emirate in Pamphylia and Lycia. Its expansion to the north was stopped by the Taurus, and to the west by Alaïa and Karamania. Tawas, which it later absorbed, Menteshe, Rhodes, and Cyprus were its other great rivals. Its history is centred around the city of Adalia, then called Satalia, in which there were merchants of the larger Italian cities. Adalia was taken from the emirs of Tekke in 1361, but they regained it when the Genoese were threatening Famagusta in 1373. The Osmanlis, under Murad, crossed the Taurus by way of Sparta, into Tekke, but failed to capture Adalia. It remained independent until 1450.[789]

TOKAT (42)

This city was either under the Mongols or independent throughout the fourteenth century. Its fortunes were similar to those of Caesarea and Sivas.

ULUBAD (43)

This city, between Bithynia and Mysia, was conquered by Osman, and then lost. It came again into the power of the Osmanlis in Orkhan’s campaign of 1339. A relative or ally of Andronicus III lived there.[790]

INDEPENDENT CHRISTIAN STATES

There were two Christian states in Asia Minor during the fourteenth century.

LITTLE ARMENIA (44), so called to distinguish it from the classical Armenia of the upper Euphrates valley and the mountains between Asia Minor and the Azerbaïdjan, was a portion of Cilicia in the south-eastern corner of Anatolia, south of the Taurus mountains. A dynasty of Armenian kings, who had successfully held off the Seljuks of Konia, and had maintained its position in the fourteenth century by siding with the Mongols and Tartars against the Egyptians, was overthrown between 1360 and 1374 in three invasions by the Egyptians, who made Tarsus their frontier fortress.[791] Ahmed ben Ramazan, however, in 1379 established a Turkish emirate at Adana, which survived throughout the fifteenth century. The Osmanlis were masters of a portion of Hungary before their power was felt in Cilicia.

TREBIZOND (45), in the north-eastern corner of the peninsula, in the country where Mithridates in his kingdom of Pontus had defied the Romans, came into no contact with the Osmanlis during the century. Nor was it the object of aggression on the part of Timur.[792] It resisted successfully, with its Greek and Laze population, on land and sea, the attacks of the Turks of its hinterland and of Sinope.

TERRITORIES DEPENDING ON OUTSIDE STATES

At the mouth of the Gulf of Smyrna, on the northern promontory, was the Genoese self-governing colony of PHOCAEA (46), of which much has been said in the chapter on the reign of Orkhan. Phocaea had many vicissitudes, but maintained its independence as a Latin colony throughout the fourteenth century, and knew how to turn aside the possible aggression of Timur. It was never even temporarily dependent upon the Osmanlis.[793]

SMYRNA (47) was wrested from the emir of Aïdin by the crusaders of 1344, and, for the rest of the fourteenth century was a Christian city, independent of the Osmanlis and the Turkish emirs alike. It was Timur who brought it again under Moslem control. But it did not pass to the Osmanlis for many years after this reconquest.

The Byzantines, after they had been driven out of Bithynia and Mysia, managed to maintain PHILADELPHIA (48), through their friendship with Sarukhan, until the end of Murad’s reign.

The CYPRIOTES (49) exercised a powerful influence in the southern portions of Asia Minor throughout the fourteenth century. As we have seen, they held Adalia for some years. In 1360, the emirs of southern Anatolia were so divided and opposed to each other, and needed so greatly the help of Cyprus against the Karamanians, whom they feared much more than the Osmanlis, that they became for many years tributary to Cyprus.[794] The Cypriotes were also interested in Cilicia.

In 1327, the year after Osman’s death, the power of the MONGOLS (50) reached for a few years the Mediterranean. After Bahadur Khan’s death, in 1335, the Mongol Empire was divided up. Suzerainty in Asia Minor fell to the Sultan of Irak (Persia), who, until Timur’s coming, fought with the Karamanians for some of the most important cities of eastern Anatolia. When Ibn Batutah went through the peninsula, Erzerum, Erzindjian, Sivas, Caesarea, Amassia, Nigdeh, and Ak Seraï were ‘cities of the Sultan’.[795]

The chevaliers of RHODES (51) did not come into Asia Minor until 1310, when they won from the Turks and Greeks the island which was to give them their most commonly used name. They were continually in conflict with Tawas, Alaïa, Adalia, Tekke, Menteshe, Fukeh, and Aïdin. But they never came into contact with the Osmanlis until after the fall of Constantinople. On the mainland, the chevaliers helped to take Smyrna in 1344, and defended it against the Turks for sixty years. They wrested Ayasoluk from Aïdin for a while about 1365. Several times they gained a foothold in Fukeh and Menteshe, and in the last year of the century established a fortress at Halik (Halicarnassus).[796]

The Mamelukes of EGYPT (52) were not only interested in Cilicia, and held that country from 1360 to 1379, and at other times, but also invaded Karamania on different occasions. They reached Konia at the end of the thirteenth century, the beginning of the fifteenth century, and again, under Ibrahim pasha, twice in the third decade of the nineteenth century. During the reign of Murad I, the Egyptians called Cilicia up to the Taurus _Bab-el-Mulk_, the Royal Gateway. Konia was entered by an Egyptian Sultan in 1418. The Karamanians of that day, who, according to the Ottoman historians, were vassals of the Osmanlis, had no interest in or fear of Mohammed I. They were engaged in a civil war which led to Egyptian intervention.[797] If Konia and the rest of Karamania was under the Osmanlis, why was there not Ottoman intervention in the quarrel between Mohammed and Ali for the Karamanian throne?

Last of all, the CATALANS (53), whose history is given in the chapter on Osman, did not all leave Asia Minor with the ‘Grand Company’. Throughout the reign of Orkhan the principality established at Cyzicus left its traces in the Marmora and Dardanelles coast and hinterland. Nothing more strikingly illustrates the lack of Ottoman activity in Asia Minor during Orkhan’s day, even at the very threshold of Bithynia, than the fact that he left the Catalans in possession of Bigha at his death. Murad, in 1363, although his presence was urgently needed on the Maritza to defend his new conquest of Adrianople against a Serbian invasion, was compelled to delay for months to eject the Catalans from Bigha.[798]

CONCLUSION

_Orkhan’s emirate, then, was but one of more than thirty independent states which existed in Asia Minor during the decade from 1330 to 1340._ During his lifetime, and the lifetime of his father Osman, the other better-known emirates had been slowly forming by the absorption of small independent villages and cities. Although several of the emirates that have been given above were ephemeral, and some of them duplicated practically the same territory at different periods in the fourteenth century, others, such as Aïdin, Kermian, Karamania, Sarukhan, and Tekke, were far more powerful in Asia Minor than Orkhan or than Murad. That Bayezid had not crushed the life out of the larger emirates is proved by the ease with which they were revived by Timur, and by their survival during the first half of the fifteenth century.

Karamania, for one, remained powerful and flourishing long after the political life of the Balkan states had become extinct. Karamania demanded one hundred years of strenuous effort on the part of the conquerors of the Byzantine Empire before it could be subjugated. _The Osmanlis crossed the Balkans more than a century before they crossed the Taurus._

This exposé was written in order to show:

1. That Osman fell heir to no part of the Seljuk dominions;

2. That the Seljuks had many more heirs than the traditional ten;

3. That Osman and Orkhan carved their state out of the remnants of the Byzantine possessions along the upper end of the Sea of Marmora and in the Valley of the Sangarius--a very small portion indeed of Asia Minor;

4. That Murad, the wonderful conqueror of the Balkan peninsula, was only one of several rulers in Asia Minor, and not the most powerful of these, and that there were large portions of Asia Minor with which neither he nor his successor Bayezid came into contact at all;

5. That neither Bayezid, with his tremendous prestige in Europe, nor his brilliant successors of the fifteenth century, gained undisputed possession of Asia Minor. The Osmanlis were not masters of Asia Minor until long after their inheritance of the Byzantine Empire was regarded in Europe as a _fait accompli_.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES

I. Approximate Dates in the Legendary Period.

II. Important Events in the First Century of Ottoman History.

III. Progress of Ottoman Congress under the First Four Sovereigns.

IV. Comparative Table of Rulers.

V. The Fourteenth Century in Byzantine History.

VI. Relations between Venice and Genoa and the Levant from 1300 to 1403.

VII. The Popes and the Moslem Menace in the Fourteenth Century.

I. THE LEGENDARY PERIOD

1219--Soleiman Shah, with 50,000 nomad Turkish families, settles in neighbourhood of Erzindjian.

1224--Soleiman Shah is drowned in the Euphrates. Ertogrul and Dundar, two of his sons, settle near Angora.

1230-40--Ertogrul establishes himself in the valley of the Kara Su, north-west of Kutayia.

1259--Osman is born at Sugut.

1289--Ertogrul dies.

Osman captures Karadja Hissar and Biledjik.

1290--Osman kills his uncle Dundar.

1290-9--Osman, having extended his possessions westward, founds an emirate, and takes up his residence at Yeni Sheïr.

II. IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE FIRST CENTURY OF OTTOMAN HISTORY

1299--Osman, Turkish emir in the valley of the Kara Su, makes Yeni Sheïr, between Brusa and Nicaea, his residence.

1301--Osman defeats the Byzantine heterarch Muzalon at Baphaeon, near Nicomedia.

1308--Kalolimni, island in the Sea of Marmora, is occupied. Ak Hissar and Tricocca are captured.

1317--Investment of Brusa begins.

1326--Brusa surrenders. Osman hears the news on his death-bed at Yeni Sheïr.

1329--Byzantines under Andronicus III are defeated at Pelecanon (Maltepé).

Nicaea surrenders.

1333--Alaeddin pasha, brother of Orkhan and first vizier, dies.

Death of Bahadur Khan removes the Mongol menace.

1337 or 1338--Nicomedia surrenders.

1338--Karasi, first of the Turkish emirates to be absorbed, is incorporated in Orkhan’s state.

_c._ 1338--Osmanlis reach the Bosphorus at Haïdar Pasha.

1343--Empress Anna makes overtures to Orkhan for aid against Cantacuzenos.

1345--Orkhan accepts proposal of alliance with Cantacuzenos.

First Osmanlis cross to Europe to fight for Cantacuzenos against Anna.

1346--Orkhan marries Theodora, granddaughter of the Bulgarian czar and daughter of Cantacuzenos, who is besieging Constantinople with Ottoman aid.

1348--The ‘Black Death’ ravages Europe.

1349--Cantacuzenos calls again upon Orkhan for aid. Twenty thousand Ottoman horsemen are sent to help in preventing Salonika from falling into Serbian hands.

_c._ 1351--First convention between Orkhan and the Genoese.

1353--Soleiman pasha, Orkhan’s elder son, in response to the third appeal of Cantacuzenos for Ottoman aid, brings an army into Thrace, helps in the recapture of Adrianople, and defeats the Serbians at Demotika. For this aid, a fortress on the European shore of the Dardanelles, probably Tzympe, is given to Orkhan.

1354--An earthquake, which damaged the walls of Gallipoli, enables the Osmanlis of Soleiman pasha to capture the city. Orkhan refuses to give up Gallipoli, breaks with Cantacuzenos, and orders the Osmanlis in the Hellespont to extend their conquest in the direction of Constantinople.

_c_. 1357--Demotika and Tchorlu are captured for the first time by the Osmanlis under Soleiman pasha.

1358--Soleiman pasha dies from the fall of a horse at Bulaïr.

1359--Orkhan dies, and is succeeded by Murad.

1360-1--Conquest of Thrace.

1361--Second serious ‘Black Death’ plague in Europe.

_c._ 1362--Murad creates corps of ‘janissaries’.

1362 (1363)--John V Palaeologos binds himself by treaty to recognize Murad’s conquests in Thrace, and to give him military aid against the Turkish emirs of Asia Minor.

1363--Serbian and Hungarian crusaders are defeated on the banks of the Maritza.

Murad takes up his residence in Demotika.

1365--Ragusa makes commercial treaty with Osmanlis, promising tribute.

1366--Adrianople becomes the first capital of the Ottoman Empire.

Amadeo of Savoy’s crusade; captures Gallipoli, but soon abandons it again.

1369--Capture of Yamboli forces Sisman of Bulgaria to become, like the Byzantine Emperor, a vassal of Murad.

1371--Battle of Samakov gives the Osmanlis control of the passes into the Plain of Sofia.

Battle of Cernomen opens up Macedonia to the Ottoman conquest.

1372--Moslem colonization of Macedonia, at Drama, Kavalla, Serres, and Veles, gives the Osmanlis a position of preponderance in the Balkan peninsula.

1373--John Palaeologos, failing to receive aid from the West, becomes Ottoman vassal.

1374--Unsuccessful conspiracy of Manuel to recover Serres causes Ottoman siege of Salonika.

1379--John and Manuel agree to increase their tribute of gold and soldiers, and to surrender Philadelphia, the last Byzantine possession in Asia, for Ottoman aid in ousting Andronicus IV from Constantinople.

1384--Osmanlis aid Thomas in besieging Janina.

1385--First Ottoman invasion of Albania.

Battle of Savra destroys Balsa’s power.

Osmanlis occupy Sofia.

1386--Osmanlis capture Croia and Scutari, but return these fortresses to prince of Zenta.

The fall of Nish makes Lazar of Serbia Ottoman vassal.

1387--Genoa concludes formal treaty with Murad.

Murad, with army containing Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian contingents, defeats Alaeddin of Karamania at Konia, but has to withdraw without tangible results.

1388--Venice concludes commercial treaty with Murad.

1388--Osmanlis are defeated by Serbians and Bosnians at Plochnik, thus preventing invasion of Bosnia.

League of Serbians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Wallachians, and Albanians formed against the Osmanlis.

First Ottoman army enters Greece upon invitation of Theodore Palaeologos to fight against the Franks.

1389--Osmanlis destroy Serbian independence at Kossova.

Murad is assassinated on the battle-field. Bayezid succeeds to the throne, and has his brother Yakub strangled.

BAYEZID (1389-1403).

1387--Bayezid marries sister of Stephen, son of Lazar, and makes Serbians his allies.

1390--First Ottoman naval expedition makes raid on Chios, Negropont, and Attika.

First Ottoman raids into Hungary.

1391--Second invasion of Karamania, followed by siege of Konia, results in cession by Alaeddin of north-western portion of Karamania.

First Ottoman siege of Constantinople.

1392--First defensive campaign against Sigismund is fought in Bulgaria. Hearing that Timurtash had been defeated by Karamanlis, Bayezid transports army to Asia, and destroys Alaeddin’s army at Ak Tchaï. The Osmanlis are now the dominant race in Asia Minor.

1394--Osmanlis first appear in the Adriatic at the mouth of the Boyana.

1395--Bayezid summons Ottoman vassals to his court at Serres.

Ottoman siege of Constantinople becomes pressing.

1396--Crusade of Western chivalry, co-operating with Sigismund of Hungary, meets with disaster at Nicopolis in Bulgaria.

Ottoman invaders of Wallachia are defeated at Rovine, but in raids into Hungary Peterwardein is burned, and sixteen thousand Styrians carried off into captivity.

1397--First Ottoman invasion of Greece. In the Peloponnesus, Argos is taken by assault.

After defeat at Megalopolis, Theodore becomes Ottoman vassal.

1397-9--Movement of Moslem Anatolian population into the Balkan peninsula.

1398--Osmanlis and Serbians make destructive raid on Bosnia.

1400--Timur captures and destroys Sivas.

1402--Timur defeats and makes prisoner Bayezid at Angora, overruns Asia Minor, occupies Brusa, and takes Smyrna from the Christians by storm.

1403--Timur withdraws to Samarkand.

Bayezid, still a prisoner, dies on the homeward march at Ak Sheïr. His sons dispute the succession.

III. PROGRESS OF OTTOMAN CONQUEST UNDER THE FIRST FOUR SOVEREIGNS

OSMAN (1299-1326)

1299--Osman, local chieftain at Sugut, has extended his conquests from the valley of the Kara Su westward to Yeni Sheïr.

1308--Kalolimni, island in the Sea of Marmora, becomes first Ottoman maritime possession.

Ak Hissar, at the entrance to plain of Nicomedia, and Tricocca, which ensured land communication between Nicaea and Nicomedia, are captured.

1308-16--Sovereignty is extended over the peninsula between the Gulf of Nicomedia and the Black Sea, almost up to the Bosphorus.

1317--Fortresses are erected near gates of Brusa.

1326--Brusa surrenders.

ORKHAN (1326-59)

1329--Occupies Nicaea.

1330-8--Conquest of shores of Gulf of Nicomedia up to Scutari on the Bosphorus.

1334-8--Conquest of emirate of Karasi.

1337-8--Occupies Nicomedia.

_c._ 1339--Acquires Mikhalitch, Ulubad, and Kermasti.

1353--Cantacuzenos cedes fortress on European shore of Hellespont.

1354--Gallipoli is occupied.

1354-8--The Osmanlis occupy the Thracian, Chersonese, and the European shore of the Sea of Marmora as far as Rodosto. Demotika is captured, and Constantinople cut off from Adrianople by the occupation of Tchorlu.

MURAD (1359-89)

1360--Captures Angora and suppresses independence of village chieftains between Eski Sheïr and Angora.

1360-1--Conquers Thrace from the Maritza River to the Black Sea, including Adrianople.

1361--Lalashahin captures Philippopolis.

_c._ 1362--Creation of the corps of janissaries.

1362 or 1363--John V Palaeologos binds himself by treaty to recognize Murad’s conquest of Thrace, and to give him military aid against the emirs of Asia Minor.

1366-9--Conquest of Maritza Valley up to the Rhodope Mountains, and of Bulgaria, up to the main Balkan range.

1370-1--Occupies the fortresses and passes in the Rhodope and Rilo ranges.

1371-2--Conquers Macedonia up to the Vardar River.

_c._ 1376--Portion of emirate of Kermian, including Kutayia is annexed as _dot_ of the emir’s daughter, in marriage arranged with Bayezid.

1377--Emir of Hamid sells to Murad territories between Tekke, Kermian, and Karamania. The acquisition of Ak Sheïr brings the Osmanlis to the frontier of Karamania.

1378--Conquers Tekke, except Adalia and Alaya.

1380--Conquers Macedonia, west of the Vardar. Prilep and Monastir become Ottoman frontier fortresses.

1385--Occupies Okhrida.

Plain of Sofia and upper valley of the Struma River are conquered.

1386--Valleys of the Morava and Nisava are conquered, and Nish falls.

1388--Invasion of northern Bulgaria reduces Sisman to more humiliating vassalage. The Osmanlis retain the fortresses of Shuman and Nicopolis.

BAYEZID (1389-1403)

1391--Captures Adalia, first Ottoman seaport on the Mediterranean.

Ak Sheïr and Ak Seraï ceded by Karamania.

1393--Bulgaria, to the Danube, becomes Ottoman territory.

1393-5--Conquers Samsun, Caesarea, and Sivas, and annexes emirate of Kastemuni.

1397--Conquers Thessaly, Doris, Locris, and the north-eastern corner of the Peloponnesus.

1398-9--Gradually occupies Southern Albania and a part of Epirus.

IV. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF RULERS

BYZANTINE EMPIRE[799]

_The Palaeologi_

ANDRONICUS II (the Old), 1282-1328.

MICHAEL IX (co-emperor), 1295-1320.

ANDRONICUS III (the Young), 1328-41, by whose second wife, Anna of Savoy, was born

JOHN V, 1341-01, whose three sons were:

ANDRONICUS IV (co-emperor), 1355-?

MANUEL II, 1391-1425.

Theodore, despot of the Morea, 1359-.

The son of Andronicus IV was

JOHN VII (co-emperor), 1399-1403.

_The Cantacuzeni_

JOHN VI, regent, 1341-7, co-emperor, 1347-55, two of whose daughters married Orkhan and John V, and whose son was

MATTHEW, co-emperor, 1355-6.

HUNGARY

LOUIS THE GREAT, 1342-82 (King of Poland, 1370-82).

His two daughters were:

Hedwig, to whom fell the crown of Poland, and who married Jagello of Lithuania, who became King of Poland under the Christian name of Ladislas V.

Mary, to whom fell the crown of Hungary, 1382-92.

Mary married

SIGISMUND of Luxemburg in 1386, who became sole ruler of Hungary after Mary’s death, and, later, Holy Roman Emperor.

HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

_House of Luxemburg_

CHARLES IV (I as King of Bohemia), 1355-78.

His two sons were:

WENCESLAUS, who succeeded to the imperial crown on the death of his father and was deposed in 1400;

and SIGISMUND, King of Hungary, who was elected emperor in 1410.

FRANCE

PHILIPPE IV, _le Bel_, 1285-1314, and his sons

LOUIS X, PHILIPPE V, and CHARLES IV, last of the Capetians. 1314-28.

PHILIPPE VI VALOIS, 1328-50.

JEAN, 1350-64.

CHARLES V, 1365-80.

CHARLES VI, 1380-1422.

Philippe de Bourgogne, son of King Jean, and father of Jean de Nevers, and Louis d’Orléans, second son of Charles V, were vying with each other for the control of their insane nephew and brother, Charles VI, during the reign of Bayezid.

ENGLAND

EDWARD I, 1270-1307.

EDWARD II, 1307-27.

EDWARD III, 1327-77

(took the title of King of France in 1339).

RICHARD III, 1377-99.

Deposed in 1399, and succeeded by

HENRY IV (of Lancaster).

V. THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY IN BYZANTINE HISTORY

1300--The emir of Menteshe invades Rhodes.

1301--First Byzantine defeat at hands of Osmanlis at Baphaeon.

1302--Michael IX takes command of Slavic mercenaries in Asia Minor: they force him to allow their return to Europe.

Roger de Flor arrives at Constantinople with eight thousand Catalans, and is married to a niece of Andronicus.

1303--Catalans sack the island of Chios.

1305--Death of Ghazan Khan frustrates Byzantine hopes of a Mongol attack upon the emirs of Asia Minor.

Catalans compel the emir of Karamania to lift the siege of Philadelphia, but quarrel with Greeks and Slavic mercenaries. Roger exacts title of ‘Caesar’ from Andronicus, and is later assassinated by Michael IX at Adrianople.

1306-9--Catalan ‘Grand Company’ forms state at Gallipoli.

1310--Catalans leave for Greece, and set up military democracy in Athens.

The Knights of St. John of Jerusalem capture Rhodes.

1311--The emir of Menteshe fails in attempt to recapture Rhodes.

1311-14--Turkish freebooter Halil defies the Emperor in the Thracian Chersonese, and is finally defeated with the help of the Serbians.

1317--Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomaedia begin to be menaced.

1326--Brusa falls. Andronicus III, on his wedding trip from Constantinople to Demotika, is set upon and wounded by raiding Turks.

1327-8--Andronicus III plots to oust his grandfather, who, in turn, invites Serbians to attack young Andronicus in the rear; young Andronicus besieges army of his grandfather and Serbians at Serres, and captures Salonika. Old Andronicus calls upon Bulgarians, but before their aid arrives, young Andronicus succeeds in entering Constantinople and deposing his grandfather.

1329--Andronicus III is defeated at Pelecanon by Orkhan in an attempt to relieve Nicaea. Nicaea surrenders.

Andronicus III, at Phocaea, tries to incite emirs of Aïdin and Sarukhan to attack Orkhan.

1333--Turks of Sarukhan make a raid on Macedonia, while their vessels enter the Sea of Marmora and seize Rodosto.

1334--Andronicus is compelled to send army to save Salonika from raiding Turks.

1336--Andronicus asks Turkish emirs to help him in siege of Genoese at Phocaea.

1337 or 1338--Nicomedia and the last Byzantine possessions in north-western corner of Asia Minor are conquered by the Osmanlis.

1340--Stephen Dushan crosses the Vardar, captures Serres, and crowns himself there as ‘master of almost all the Roman Empire’.

1341--After death of Andronicus III, Cantacuzenos crowns himself at Demotika.

1342--Civil war between Cantacuzenos and widow and son of Andronicus III, during which both sides make overtures to Osmanlis, Serbians, and Bulgarians.

1345--Cantacuzenos receives aid from Orkhan, and pays for it by marrying his daughter to the Ottoman emir.

1347--Dushan crowns himself Emperor of Constantinople. Agreement between John Cantacuzenos and John Palaeologos to share Byzantine throne.

Black Death plague reaches Constantinople.

1349--Cantacuzenos calls Osmanlis into Europe again to save Salonika from the Serbians.

1349-53--Civil war between Cantacuzenos and Palaeologos.

Palaeologos flees to Tenedos.

1353--The Osmanlis, who had been helping Cantacuzenos against Palaeologos, capture Gallipoli, and invade Thrace.

1354--Cantacuzenos, having vainly appealed to the Pope, Venice, Bulgaria, and Serbia to aid him against the Osmanlis, is deposed by popular revolution in Constantinople, and becomes a monk.

John Palaeologos recalled from exile.

1355--Dushan dies on his way to attack Constantinople.

1354-8--Palaeologos succeeds finally in subduing Cantacuzenos’ son Matthew.

1358--While Osmanlis are advancing in Thrace, John V, at command of Orkhan, is besieging Phocaea.

1361--Adrianople and Philippopolis captured by the Osmanlis.

1363--John V signs treaty of vassalage to Murad.

1366--John V journeys to Buda to enlist aid of Louis of Hungary, and on return journey is made prisoner by Sisman in Bulgaria.

1373--John V, seeing that his visit to Rome and his appeals to western princes are of no avail, recognizes Murad as his suzerain, promises to do military service in Murad’s army, and gives his son Manuel as hostage.

Thrace and Macedonia are practically lost, and the Byzantine Empire has become merely the city state of Constantinople.

1374--As the result of a rebellion undertaken by Andronicus together with the son of Murad against the two fathers, John V consents to deprive his son Andronicus of his sight, and shuts him up in the Tower of Anemas.

1375-89--Civil war between John and Manuel and Andronicus, in which Venice, Genoa, and Osmanlis play a decisive part. John and Manuel purchase Ottoman aid at the price of giving up Philadelphia, the last Byzantine possession in Asia Minor.

1391--Manuel, serving as vassal in Ottoman army, is threatened with loss of eyes, if Emperor John does not demolish the towers on the walls of Constantinople, which he has rebuilt. He obeys and dies soon after. Manuel escapes from Brusa upon learning of his father’s death. His flight is followed by the first Ottoman siege of Constantinople.

1396--Bayezid contemplates taking Constantinople by assault, but is deterred by arrival of crusaders in Hungary.

1397--Siege of Constantinople is renewed, after Nicopolis.

1399--Crusade of Boucicaut helps Byzantines temporarily.

1400-2--Manuel, having made peace with his nephew John, sails for Italy and spends two years in fruitless endeavour to get aid from western princes.

1401--John makes treaty to give up Constantinople, if Bayezid should win from Timur.

1402--After Bayezid’s defeat at Angora, Manuel returns to Constantinople.

John is banished to Lemnos, and Ottoman colonists expelled from Constantinople. Overtures are made to Timur.

1403--Manuel recognizes Soleiman as successor of Bayezid, and renews treaty with him.

VI. RELATIONS BETWEEN VENICE AND GENOA AND THE LEVANT FROM 1300 TO 1403

1328--Venetian sovereignty of Negropont is menaced by Turkish pirates.

1344--Venice aids Cyprus and Rhodes in the capture of Smyrna.

1345-50--Dushan negotiates frequently with Venice for aid in capturing Constantinople.

1351-3--War between Venice and Genoa. Sea power of Genoa is broken at battle of Lojera. Genoese are assisted by Orkhan.

1355--Matteo Venier and Marino Faleri warn the Senate that the Byzantine Empire must inevitably become the booty of the Osmanlis, unless Venice gets ahead of them.

1361--Venetian Senate make overtures to John V for alliance against Murad, but withdraw when they see the rapid success of Murad’s campaign in Thrace.

1370-1--Venice and Greece are engaged in a struggle for economic supremacy in Cyprus.

1375--John V gives Tenedos to the Venetians. The Genoese come into conflict with the Venetians over economic privileges at Constantinople.

1379-81--Venice and Genoa go to war over the question of Tenedos and the Byzantine succession to the throne. In the Peace of Turin, it is provided that Tenedos remain unfortified, and that Andronicus IV be recognized the heir to John V.

1386--Genoese make treaty with Byzantines.

1387--Genoese make commercial treaty with Osmanlis.

1388--Venetians make commercial treaty with Osmanlis.

1389--Venice and Genoa renew treaties with Bayezid.

1393--Venice decides to treat with Sigismund of Hungary for defensive alliance against Osmanlis.

1396--Venetian aid in Nicopolis crusade is half-hearted.

1397--Venice urges Genoese of Pera not to treat with Bayezid, and makes accord with Genoa to aid Byzantines.

1401--Venice and Genoa engaged in another sea struggle for supremacy in the Levant.

1402--Both Venetians and Genoese aid Osmanlis, fleeing from Timur after Angora, to cross into Europe. They renew their treaties with Osmanlis, recognizing Soleiman as Bayezid’s successor.

VII. THE POPES AND THE MOSLEM MENACE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

1306--Clement V exhorts the Venetians to co-operate with Charles de Valois in the reconquest of Constantinople.

1307--Clement V urges Charles II of Naples to re-conquer Constantinople, but his interest is diverted by a project of a crusade to support Cyprus and Cilician Armenia against the Egyptians.

1309--Papal court transferred from Rome to Avignon.

1310--Clement V encourages Knights of St. John to drive both Greeks and Turks out of Rhodes.

1327--John XXII does not respond to appeal of Andronicus II to aid Byzantium against the Turks.

1333--Similar unsuccessful overture is made by Andronicus III.

1334--Papal effort to form crusade against Turks results in the capture of Smyrna.

1347--Marquis de Montferrat, heir to the Latin Emperors, makes agreement with Clement VI to conquer Constantinople.

At the same time appeals are received at Rome from Cantacuzenos for union of western princes against Osmanlis.

1349, 1350, 1353--Cantacuzenos makes three more overtures to Clement VI and Innocent VI.

1352--Inhabitants of Philadelphia appeal to Pope for aid, promising return to Roman communion.

1363--Urban V on Holy Friday gives the cross to several princes of the Occident.

1366--Urged by Urban, Amadeo of Savoy sails for the crusade against the Osmanlis. He spends his efforts in releasing John V from the Bulgarians, and abandons the Byzantines when they refuse to return to the Roman Church. Urban writes to Louis of Hungary to put off his crusade until the union of the Churches is accomplished.

Urban V denounces the traffic of the Italian Republics with Moslems.

1369--Emperor John V, at Rome, abjures errors of Orthodox Church, and receives from Pope letters, recommending that Christian princes come to his aid.

1371--Gregory XI makes appeal to Christian nations to co-operate with Genoa in saving the last Christians of the Holy Land.

1372--Gregory urges Louis of Hungary to resist the Osmanlis before they advance farther into Europe, and orders a crusade to be preached in Hungary, Poland, and Dalmatia.

1373--Gregory, receiving the last envoy from John V, bursts into tears, and says that he will save Constantinople, if only the Byzantine Emperor will cause his people to renounce their heresies and return to the Roman Church.

1378--The Great Schism.

1388--Urban VI sends two armed galleys for the defence of Constantinople, but is unsuccessful in raising crusade.

1391--Boniface IX stirs up trouble between Latin and Greek Christians in the Balkan peninsula.

1398 and 1399--Boniface IX orders crusade to be preached throughout Christendom for the defence of Constantinople.

1399--Boucicaut, the only one to respond, goes to the aid of Constantinople.

1402--Smyrna is lost to Timur.

1403--The strife between rival Popes, Benedict XIII and Boniface IX, makes impossible a papal effort to take advantage of the civil strife between the sons of Bayezid, after Timur’s abandonment of his conquests in Asia Minor.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTE

The Classified Bibliography contains only the names of authors. Following the classification, the books and editions are given in detail under the authors’ names in alphabetical order.

I shall be grateful for corrections and amplifications. The work on this bibliography has been done largely in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, and I have been handicapped by the lack of a complete catalogue.

No attempt whatever has been made to follow a definite system of spelling of Oriental and Slavic names, for arbitrary changes in spelling on my part would confuse the reader who desires to find in a library catalogue the authors given. I have retained the spelling (except in rare instances where there were divergencies in different editions of the same book) of the author’s name as given by himself or by his editor or publisher. As far as the letter ‘G’, I have made the spelling conform to that of the General Catalogue of the Bibliothèque Nationale. Beyond ‘G’, there is, as yet, no norm.

=Bibliographers of Printed Books.=

Apponyi; Auboyneau; Boecler; Chevalier; Dherbelot de Molainville; Eichhorn; Fabricius; Fevret; Fitzclarence; Fraehn; Franke; Hadji Khalfa; Halle; Houtsma et al.; Oesterly; Omont; Pogodin; Potthast; Welter; Zenker.

=Bibliographers of Oriental MSS.=

Ahlwardt; Ali Hilmi; Apponyi; Auboyneau; Blochet; Browne; Cusa; De Goeje; De Jong; Derenbourg; Dorn; Dozy; Fevret; Flügel; Hadji Khalfa; Karamianz; Lampros; Pertsch; Rieu; Rosen; Schéfer; Slane; Smirnow; Sprenger; Welter.

=Numismatists.=

Blau; Djevdet; Engel; Friedländer; Ghalib; Karabacek; Lane-Poole; Lavoix; Makrisi; Pinder; Schlumberger; Serrure; Stickel.

=Chronographers.=

Aladdin Ali; Arabantinos; Assemanus; Hadji Khalfa; Knaus; Loeb; Mas Latrie; Mullach; Müller; Muralt; Rasmussen; Strzygowski; Wüstenfeld; _Chronicon Breve_ (in Ducas).

=Collections of Contemporary Records.=

OTTOMAN: Feridun, Collection of.

The authenticity of the documents in this collection cannot be definitely established.

BYZANTINE: Dieterich; Miklositch; Müller; Predelli; Sathas.

HUNGARIAN, SLAVIC, and RAGUSAN: Daničić; Fejér; Gelčić; Jorga; Ljubić; Makusev; Miklositch; Miltitz; Müller; Noradounghian; Racki; Safařík (Schaffarik); Sathas; Thallóczy; Theiner; Wenzel. (_See also under_ Kossova _and_ Nicopolis.)

VENETIAN: Alberi; Brown; Fejér; Jorga; Ljubić; Makusev; Miklositch; Minotto; Müller; Noiret; Noradounghian; Predelli; Racki; Romanin; Rymer; Safařík; Sathas; Testa; Thomas.

PAPAL (Avignon and Rome): Baluze; Bosquet; Dudik; Jorga; Romanin; Theiner; Werunski.

The literature about the individual popes, and the collections of documents published, registers, letters, etc., are so numerous, that I cannot include even a selection here. The reader is referred to Chevalier’s _Répertoire des sources historiques du Moyen Âge_, where, under each pope, will be found the most complete and most recent bibliographical references.

GENOESE (including Pera Colony): Belgrano; Jorga; Miklositch; Müller; Noradounghian; Olivieri; Predelli; Testa.

OTHER ITALIAN CITIES: Jorga; Müller.

FRENCH: Boislisle; Bongars; Bouchon; Charrière; Delaville Leroulx; Dorez; Garnier; Jorga; Kunstmann; Leuridan; Lot; Molinier; Moranvillé; Potansque; Raimboult; Roncière; Tarbé.

ENGLISH: Rymer.

=Contemporary Chronicles.=

BYZANTINE: Cantacuzenos; Nicephoros Gregoras; Pachymeres; Panaretos (for Trebizond).

CATALAN: Moncada; Muntaner. (_See also_ Frenzel.)

FRENCH: Enguerran de Monstrelet; Eustache des Champs; Froissart; Gilles; Marche; Nangis; Ursins; Wavrin; Anon.: Cronicorum Karoli Sexti; Chronique du duc Loys de Bourbon; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis; Chronique des quatre premiers Valois; Livre des faicts de Jean le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut; Relation de la Croisade de Nicopolis (serviteur de Gui de Blois). (_See also under the Editors_: Bellaguet; Géraud; Godefroy; Kervyn de Lettenhove; Lacabane; Lemaitre.)

HEBREW: Joseph ben Joshua.

MOREA: Chronique de Morée; Breve Chronicon (see Ducas).

ORIENTAL: Aboulpharadji; Hayton.

RUMANIAN: Urechi.

SAVOY: Anon. Anciennes Chroniques.

SERVIAN: Abbey of Tronosho; Chronicle of Pek.

VENICE: Bonincontrius; Caroldo; Guazzo; Villani (3).

=Venetian Archives (History and Guides to).=

Alberi; Baschet; Cecchetti; Mas Latrie; Toderini.

The archives for the fourteenth century are listed in the Alphabetical Bibliography.

=Travellers and Geographers=. (Those in italics are contemporary or nearly contemporary.)

ASIA MINOR: _Abulfeda_; Ainsworth; Baedeker; _Belon_; _Bergeron_; _Bertrandon de la Broquière_; Bruun; Busbecq; Chardin; Cholet; Cuinet; Edrisi; Evlia Tchelebi; Fresne-Canaye; Ghillebert de Launoy; Hadji Khalfa; Hellert; Houzeau; Huart; Huber; _Ibn Batutah_; Macarius; _Mandeville_; _Marco Polo_; Michelant; Mostras; Naumann; _Nicolay_; Ortellius; Ramsay; Rennell; Sarre; _Schiltberger_; Seiff; _Shehabeddin_; Sidi Ali Ibn Hussein; Tavernier; Tchihatcheff; Texeira; Texier; Trémeaux; Vivien de St. Martin.

Ibn Batutah is the best contemporary authority.

CONSTANTINOPLE AND BALKAN PENINSULA: _Abulfeda_; Baedeker; Belgrano; _Belon_; _Bergeron_; Boué; Bruun; Busbecq; _Clavijo_; Hadji Khalfa; Hammer; Hellert; Huber; Jireček; Macarius; Manutio; Miklositch; Mostras; _Nicolay_; Olivieri; Ortellius; Sathas; _Schiltberger_; Sefert; Sidi Ali Ibn Hussein; Tafel; Tozer.

Clavijo is the best contemporary authority for Constantinople in the latter part of the reign of Bayezid.

I have listed only those whose works I have referred to, or who seem to me to have intimate, direct bearing on the subject. Many others, however, could be consulted to advantage. _See_ Potthast, _Bibliotheca Historica Medii Aevi_, ii. 1734-5.

=Seljuk Historians.=

Ahmed Ibn Yusuf; Houtsma (editor); Ibn-Bibi; Mirkhond (Mirkhwand).

=Early Arabic, Persian, and Armenian Historians.=

Ahmed Ibn Yusuf; Ahmed Ibn Yahia; Hayton; Ibn al Tiktaka; Ibn Khaldun; Khondemir; Makrisi; Mirkhond (Mirkhwand); Mohammed-en-Nesawi; Reshideddin; Texeira; Anon. _Derbend Namé_.

=Ottoman Historians and Chroniclers.=

Abdul Aziz; Ahmed Jaudat; Alaeddin Ali (Ibn Kadi Said); Ali (Mustafa Ibn Ahmed); Ashik-pasha-zadé (Ahmed Ibn Yahia); Atha; Ayas Pasha; Djelaleddin, Mustapha; Djemaleddin; Djemaleddin-al-Kifty; Djevad bey, Ahmed; Fehmi; Feridun, Collection of; Geropoldi, Antonio (trans.); Hadji Khalfa; Hezarfenn, Hussein; Ibn Ali Mohammed Al-Biwy; Idris, Mevlana (of Bitlis); Kheirullah; Kourbaddinmakky; Mohammed Ferid bey; Moukhlis Abderrahman; Mustafa; Nedim; Neshri; Nichandji pasha Mehmet; Said; Seadeddin; Tahir-Zade; Anon. _Mira-ari-tarikh_.

No authenticated Ottoman records exist for the fourteenth century. The nearest writers to events are Ashik-pasha-zadé, Idris, Mouklis Abderrahman and Neshri. The historian enjoying the greatest reputation for authority is Seadeddin.

=Western writers on Ottoman Empire before 1600.=

Adelman; Aenaeus Sylvius; Alhard; Aretinus (Leonardo Bruni); Augustinus Caelius; Aventinus; Bertellus; Boecler; Bongars; Busbequius; Cambini; Camerarius; Campana; Cervarius; Chytraeus; Clavijo; Corregiaio; Cousin (Cognatus); Crusius; Cuspianus; Donado da Lezze; Drechsler; Egnatius; Foglietta; Foscarini; Geuffraeus; Giorgievitz; Giovio; Gycaud (ed.); Hoeniger; Konstantynowicz; Lonicerus; Menavino; Montalbanus; Pfeiffer; Podesta; Postellus; Ramus; Reusner; Richer; Sabellicus; Sansovino; Schiltberger; Secundinus; Spandugino; Traut; Anon. _Series Imp. Turc._ and _Tractatus de ritu et moribus Turc._

Most of the early western books are in Latin, but the authors are Greek, Italian, French, German, Spanish, Austrian, and Polish. The majority of them are as early as, if not earlier than, the first Ottoman chroniclers.

Clavijo and Schiltberger are contemporary and eye-witness authorities for the reign of Bayezid. Konstantynowicz’s book claims to be the memoirs of a janissary in the reign of Murad II.

Busbequius, Donado da Lezze, Geuffraeus, Giorgievitz, Menavino, Spandugino, and the author of _Tractatus de ritu_ gained their information first-hand from living in Turkey.

=General Western Ottoman Historians= (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).

Cantemir (a Rumanian); De la Porte; Du Verdier; Febvre; Formanti; Gibbon; Knolles; Mignot; Ohsson; Petits de la Croix; Ricaut; Sagredo; Schulz; Servi; Vanel.

=General Western Ottoman Historians= (nineteenth century).

Castellan; Collas; Creasy; Dräseke; Ebeling; Errante; Fehmi (a Turk); Ganem (a Syrian); Hammer; Hertzberg; Jonquière; Jorga; Jouannin; La Garde de Dieu; Lamartine; Lane-Poole; Lavallée; Lüdemann; Rambaud; Salaberry, de; Wirth; Wüstenfeld; Zinkeisen.

Hammer and Zinkeisen wrote the exhaustive and authoritative histories of the nineteenth century. The splendid work of Professor Jorga, of the University of Bucarest, belongs to our own twentieth century, and is the most important contribution of contemporary scholarship to the history of the Balkan peninsula under Ottoman domination. But none of these three authoritative historians pays particular attention to the actual foundation of the Ottoman Empire. Dräseke and Rambaud have only touched upon the problems involved in reconstructing the fourteenth century period.

=Mongol and Tartar History.=

Aboul-Ghazi-Bahadour; Bonaparte; Bretschneider; Cahun; Chavannes; Dorn; Erdmann; Guignes; Hammer; Hirth; Howorth; Khondemir; Mohammed en Newasi; Reshideddin; Vambéry; Wolff.

=Byzantine Empire and Frankish and Italian Greece.=

Ameilhon; Arabantinos; Berger de Xivrey; Byzantine Historians (_see under_ Alphabetical Bibliography, on p. 367); Curtius; Djelal; Ducange; Finlay; Florinsky; Gibbon; Gregorovius; Hammer; Hase; Hertzberg; Hody; Hopf; Kampouroglou; Karamzin; Lampros; Lüdemann; Migne; Miller; Moncada; Moniferratos; Mullach; Müller; Muntaner; Niebuhr; Paparregopoulos; Parisot; Rodd; Sathas; Stritter; Tafel; Tozer. (_See also_ Slavs of Balkan Peninsula.)

=Collections of Byzantine writers.=

Bonn (Niebuhr); Migne; Paris (Louvre) and Venice.

=Historians and Chroniclers of Rumania.=

Cantemir; Costin; Hasdeu; Miller; Picot; Urechi; Xénopol.

Costin and Urechi are nearest the events.

=Slavs of Balkan Peninsula.=

Borchgrave; Daničić; Dlugosz; Drinov; Engel; Florinsky; Guérin-Songeon; Jireček; Kállay; Kanitz; Konstantynowicz; Miller; Orbini; Pray; Pučić; Raić; Ranke; Safařík (Schaffarik); Thallóczy. (_See also under_ Kossova _and_ Nicopolis.)

No contemporary writers.

=Hungary= (including biographers of Sigismund).

Acsady; Aschbach; Beckmann; Bonfinius; Engel; Fessler; Furnhaber; Fvaknói; Kern; Kupelwieser; Levec; Maélath; Maurer; Pór; Pray; Sambucus; Schoenherr; Schwandtner; Szálay; Szentkláráy; Szilagyi; Theiner; Thurocz; Vambéry; Wenzel. (_See also under_ Kossova _and_ Nicopolis.)

=Venice.=

Agostini; Barbaro; Bembo; Berchet; Bonincontrius; Caresino; Caroldo; Cicogna; Dandolo; Daru; Guazzo; Hazlitt; Hodgson; Mas Latrie; Romanin; Sanuto; Sismondi; Villani; Anon. _Cronica Dolfina_.

=Genoa.=

Belgrano; Canale; Giustiniani; Sauli; Sismondi; Stella.

=Other Italian cities.=

Cambiano; Datta; Gattaro; Guichenon; Müller; Sismondi; Anon. _Anciennes Chroniques de Savoye_ and _Monumenta Pisana_.

=Collections of Italian writers.=

Muratori; Tartini.

=Rhodes.=

Bosio; Caoursin; Vertot.

=Cyprus.=

Bustron; Macairas; Mas Latrie.

Papal Archives, Guide to Brom.

=Papal relations and Crusades against Turks.=

Baluze; Bernino; Boislisle; Bongars; Bosio; Bosquet; Caoursin; Cribellus; Datta; Delaville Leroulx; Dozy; Dräseke; Eubel; Jorga; Kunstmann; Lardito; Lot; Le Quien; Mas Latrie; Mézières; Molinier; Paris; Petrarca; Postansque; Raimboult; Raynaldus; Sanudo; Stewart; Theiner; Thomas; Torez; Wylie.

_See_ note above _under_ Collections of Contemporary Papal Records.

=Kossova.=

Avril; Mijatovitch; Novakovitch; Pavitch.

=Nicopolis.=

Brauner; Froissart; Kiss; Koehler; Rez; Schiltberger; Szentkláráy; Anon. _Relation ... par un serviteur de Gui de Blois_.

=Relating to Timur.=

Abderrezzah; Arabshah; Clavijo; Hayton; Hussein Abu Halib; Langlès; Mexia; Mezdob; Moranvillé; Nazmi Zadé; Perondino; Sherefeddin; Silvestre de Sacy; White; Anon. Dominican Friar and Memoirs of Tamerlane.

Arabshah, Clavijo, Sherefeddin, the Dominican friar and the Memoirs (possibly) are contemporary.

=Art and Architecture.=

Djelal; Franz; Karabacek; Kuhnel; Lavoix; Migeon; Parvillée; Saladin.

=Literature and Languages and Oriental Ethnology.=

Alberi; Aristov; Dethier; Dieterici; Donner; Dufresne; Fejér; Huart; Jacob; Koelle; Krumbacher; Kúnos; Liliencron; Miklositch; Mordtmann; Mullach; Nemeth; Pavitch; Rémusat; Toderini; Vambéry. (_See also under_ Kossova _and_ Nicopolis.)

=Commercial History.=

Charrière; Cornet; Delaville Leroulx; Depping; Heyd; Jorga; Mas Latrie; Pigeonneau; Schanz; Tafel.

=Black Death.=

Covino; Hecker.

Covino is a contemporary.

II. ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABDERREZZAH. _Hist. de Schah-Roch, des autres enfants de Tamerlan et des princes leurs descendants._ Trans. by A. Galland. Bibl. Nat., fonds fr. 6084-5. Same, with variations, 6088-9.

ABDUL AZIZ. _Razoat-ul-Ebrar._ History of Ottoman Empire from foundation to Sultan Ibrahim. Turkish. Unpublished and untranslated.

ABOULFEDA. 1. _Géographie d’Aboulfeda_, trad. de l’arabe en français, et accomp. par notes, par M. Reinaud et M. Stanislas Guyard. Paris, Impr. Nat., 1848-83. 3 vols. 4to.

In his _Dict. Bibl._, under no. 3472, fol. 552-3, Hadji Khalfa gives list of Aboulfeda’s sources.

2. _Aboulfedae Annales Muslemici_, arabice et latine, opera et studiis Jo. Jacobi Reiskii. Leipzig, 1754, 4to. Copenhagen, 1789-94. 5 vols. 4to (ed. J. G. C. Adler). Pocock MS. trans. into Latin by J. Gagnier, Oxford, 1722.

ABOUL-GHAZI-BAHADOUR-KHAN. _Histoire des Mongols et des Tartares_, éd. et trad. par Baron Desmaisons. Petrograd, 1871-4. 2 vols. 8vo. Latin trans. by C. M. Fraehn, with Tartar text. Kasan, 1825, folio. French trans. Leyden, 1726, 12mo. German trans. Göttingen, 1780, 8vo, by Dr. Dan. Gottlieb Messerschmid. English trans. by Col. Miles, London, 1838, 8vo.

ABOULPHARADJI, GREGORIUS. 1. _Syriac Chronicle_, trans. into Latin by Bruns and Kersch. Leipzig, 1789. 2 vols. 4to.

This edition contains a continuation by an anonymous author from 1286 to 1297, which is most valuable for end of Seljuks of Konia.

2. The author trans. his work into Arabic, which was published from Bodleian MS. with Latin trans. by Edward Pocock, Oxford, 1663-72. 2 vols. 4to. Trans, from Latin into German, Leipzig, 1783-5. 2 vols. 8vo.

ABOUL YOUSSOUF IBN TAGHRY. _Elmanhal essafy._ MS., Bibl. Nat., Paris, fonds arabe, 748.

Used by Ch. Schéfer in establishing relations between Bayezid and Sultan Barkuk of Egypt.

ABUL FALLAH FUMENI. _See_ Dorn.

ADELMAN or ADELMANSFELDEN. _De origine, ordine et militari disciplina magni Turcae._ Date and place missing. Fol.

ADLER, J. G. C. Editor of Abulfeda.

AEHRENFELD, MOSIG VON. German trans. of Safařík, P. J.

AENAEAS, SYLVIUS (Pope Pius II). _Opera quae extant omnia._ Basel, various editions. Fol.

AGOSTINI, GIOVANNI. _Istoria degli scrittori veneziani._ Venice, 1752-4. 2 vols. 4to.

AHLWARDT, WILHELM. _Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften der k. Bibliothek zu Berlin._ Berlin, 1887-94. 6 vols. 4to. Also edited Ibn al Tiktaki and Ahmed Ibn Yahia.

AHMED IBN YUSUF (ABUL ABBAS). Chapters 45 to 53 of his Universal History, which deal with Karamanlis, Seljuks, and Osmanlis, translated by Rasmussen, in _Annales Islamismi_, pp. 61-134.

AHMED IBN MOUSA (AL KHAYALI). _Religion ou théologie des Turcs._ Trad. anon. 2nd ed. Brussels, 1704, 12mo.

AHMED IBN YAHIA. _See_ Ashik-pasha-zadé.

AHMED IBN YAHIA (AL BALADOURI). Arabic text of chronicle from Petermann MS. no. 633, of Berlin, edited and published by W. Ahlwardt. Leipzig, 1883, 8vo.

AHMED JAUDAT. _Considérations sur l’histoire ottomane._ Bibl. de l’École des lang. viv. orientales, 2e série, vol. ix. Paris, 1886, 8vo.

AHMED MOHAMMED, Sheik. Ed. Calcutta edition of Arabshah.

AINSWORTH, W. F. _Travels and Researches in Asia Minor._ London, 1842. 2 vols. 8vo.

ALADDIN ALI IBN KADI SAID. Abridged Chronology of Ottoman Hist. Untranslated. See Hadji Khalfa, _Dict. Bibl._, no. 7754, fol. 1326.

ALBERI, EUGENIO. _Relazioni degli Ambasciatori veneti al senato nel secolo XVI_, raccolte et pubbl. da Eugenio Alberi. Florence, 1839-63. 15 vols. 8vo.

Ottoman Empire, 3 vols., 1840, 1844, 1855. Does not go back to our period. But there is an excellent glossary of Turkish words in the introduction to vol. i.

ALHARD, HERMANN KUMMEN. _De imperio turcico discursus academicus._ Ed. tertia, Hanover, 1689.

In Bibl. Nat., Paris, this book is bound with the Reiske ed. of Drechsler, and is wrongly attributed to Andrea Bosio on the title-page.

ALI (MUSTAFA IBN AHMED) or MUHIEDDIN. _Kunhu’l-Akhbar._ Chronicle of Ottoman History up to Mohammed the Conqueror. Text published Constantinople without date. German trans. (from MS. brought to Emperor Ferdinand by Beck in 1551) by Johannes Gaudier. Latin trans. by Leunclavius and J. B. Podesta. Italian trans. by Geropoldi, Venice, 1686. See these four names.

Zenker, in his _Bibl. Orientalis_, Leipzig, 1846-61, wrongly calls Leunclavius a translation of Seadeddin, which has led into error Jorga, the latest historian of the Ottoman Empire. See his _Gesch. d. osm. Reiches_, i. 150, note 1 (Gotha, 1908).

ALI BEN SHEMSEDDIN. _See_ Dorn.

ALI eff. HILMI AL DAGHESTANI. Catalogue in Arabic of Turkish and Persian books in the Khedivial Library. Cairo, 1888. 2 vols. 8vo.

AMEILHON, H. P. _Histoire du Bas-Empire._ Cont. by LEBEAU, CHAS. Tomes xviii-xxi. Paris, 1835-6. 4 vols. fol. Tomes xxii-xxix. Paris, 1781-1817. 8 vols. 12mo.

APPONYI, Graf ALEX. _Ungarn betreffende, im Ausland gedruckte_ _Bücher und Flugschriften_, gesammelt und beschrieben. Vols. i and ii, up to 1720. Munich, 1903.

Ed. limited to 125 copies.

ARABANTINOS, PANAGIOTIS. Χρονογραφία τῆς Ήπείρου. Athens, 1856-7. 2 vols. 8vo.

ARABSHAH, AHMED. _Portrait du Gran Tamerlan avec la suite de son histoire._ Trad. de l’arabe par Pierre Vattier. Paris, 1658, 4to. Arabic text, ed. Jacob Golius, Leyden, 1636, 4to. Also from collation of four MSS. by Sheik Ahmed Mohammed, Calcutta, 1812, 8vo. 2nd ed., 1818, la. 8vo. Latin trans. by S. H. Manger, Leovardiae, 1767-72. 3 vols. sm. 4to.

Slane in _Notices et Extraits_, 1re partie, vol. xix, introd. lxxxviii, warns against trans. of Manger, and also his Arabic reprint.

Turkish trans. by Nazmi Zadé, _Tarikh Timuri ghiurgian_. Constantinople, 1729, 4to.

ARBAUMONT, D’. Ed., in collab. with Beaune, of Olivier de la Marche.

ARCQ, DOUËL D’. Editor of Enguerran de Monstrelet.

ARETINUS (LEONARDO BRUNI). _Libellus de temporibus suis._ Venice, 1475, 4to. 2nd ed., 1485.

ARISTOV. _Bemerkungen über die ethnischen Bestandteile der türkischen Stämme und Völkerschaften._ Petrograd, 1897.

ARMAIN, M. MS. trans. in French of Hadji Khalfa’s _Djihannuma_.

ARNOLD OF LÜBECK. Continued Chronicle of HELMOLDUS.

ARNOLD, T. W. Editor of _Encyclopédie de l’Islam_. See Houtsma _et al._

ASCHBACH, JOSEPH. _Geschichte Kaiser Sigmunds._ Hamburg, 1838-45. 4 vols. 8vo.

ASHIK-PASHA-ZADÉ, AHMED IBN YAHIA. Tarikhi-Ashik-pasha-zadé. Vatican MS.

Dervish Ahmed cites the book of sheik Yakhshi ibn Elias, imam of Orkhan. He writes in reign of Bayezid I. This is the nearest approach extant to an Ottoman source for the 14th cent. _See_ no. 6 under Hammer.

ASSEMANI, J. S. _Kalendaria ecclesiae universae ... ecclesiarum orientis et occidentis._ Rome, 1755. 6 vols. 4to.

AUBOYNEAU, G. (in collab. with Fevret, A.). _Essai de Bibliographie pour servir à l’histoire de l’Empire Ottoman: livres turcs, livres imprimés à Constantinople, et livres étrangers à la Turquie, mais pouvant servir à son histoire._ Paris, 1911, fol., la. 8vo.

Of this work, planned to be an exhaustive Ottoman bibliography, only the first fasciculus, on _Religion, Mœurs et Coutumes_, has appeared. M. Auboyneau died in 1911. I have been unable to ascertain if M. Fevret intends to continue the work, for he is mobilised in the French army at present.

AUGUSTINUS CAELIUS (CURIO). _Sarracenicae historiae libri tres...._ Frankfort, 1596, fol.

AVENTINUS, IOHANNES. _Liber in quo causae miseriarum, quibus Christiana resp. premitur, indicantur, Turcicaeque saevitiae reprimendae ratio declaratur._ In Lonicerus, vol. i.

AVRIL, ADOLPHE DE. _La Bataille de Kossova_, Paris, 1868, 12mo.

AYAS PASHA. _Hist, des princes de la dynastie ottomane, précédée d’un abrégé de l’hist. des Selj. et des souverains du pays de Karaman...._ 17th cent. MS., no. 1021, Schéfer col.

BAECA, GASPAR DE. Spanish trans. of Paulo Giovio’s account of Timur in Clavijo.

BAEDEKER, KARL, editor. _Konstantinopel, Balkanstaaten, Kleinasien, Archipel und Cypern._ Mit 18 Karten, 50 Plänen und 15 Grundrissen. 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1914, 12mo.

BAIOCENSIS, PETRUS. _Chronicon_ (1350-92). Basel, 1512, fol.

BALUZE, ÉTIENNE. _Vitae paparum Avinionensium ab 1305 ad 1394._ Paris, 1693. 2 vols. 4to.

2nd volume contains documents.

BARBARO, FRANCESCO. On efforts of Venetians vs. Osmanlis before capture of Constantinople, _see_ Agostini, ii. 107-8.

BARONIUS, CAESAR. For _Annales Eccl._, see Raynaldus.

BASCHET, ARMAND. 1. _Les Archives de Venise._ Paris, 1857, la. 8vo. Amplified edition of same, Paris, 1870, 8vo.

2. _Histoire de la Chancellerie secrète_ (de Venise). Paris, 1870, 8vo.

BASSETT, R. Editor of _Encyclopédie de l’Islam_. See Houtsma _et al._

BASSIANATO, FRANCISCO. Latin trans. of Paulo Giovio.

BEALE, T. _An Oriental Biographical Dictionary._ New edition, revised and enlarged by H. Keene. London, 1894, la. 8vo.

BEAUNE. Ed., in collab. with d’Arbaumont, of _Les Mémoires d’Olivier de la Marche_.

BECKMANN, G. _Der Kampf Kaiser Sigmunds gegen die werdende Weltmacht der Osmanen, 1392-1437._ Gotha, 1902, 8vo.

BEKKER, IMMANUEL. Editor of Chalcocondylas and Pachymeres in Bonn edition.

BELFOUR, F. C. English trans. of Macarius.

BELGRANO, L. T. _Documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera._ pp. 97-336, 931-1004; appendix with engravings and map of Pera; in vol. xiii of _Atti della Società ligure di Storia patria_. Genoa, 1877-84. 2 vols. la. 8vo.

BELLAGUET. Editor of _Chron. du Religieux de Saint-Denis_.

BELLI, COSTI. Italian trans. of Ricaut.

BELON, PIERRE. _Les Observations de plusieurs singularitez et choses ... en Grèce, Asie, ..._ etc., rédigées en 3 livres. Paris, 1553, sm. 4to.

In second part is: ‘Les mœurs et façons de vivre en Grèce et en Turquie.’

BEMBO, Cardinal PIETRO. _Historiae Venetiae libri XII._ Aldine ed., Venice, 1551, fol. Numerous other ed., also Italian trans.

BERCHET, GUGLIELMO. _La Repubblica di Venezia e la Persia._ Extract from _Bolletino consolare_, vol. ii. Florence, 1865, 8vo. Also editor of Marino Sanuto the Younger’s _Diarii_.

BERGER DE XIVREY. ‘La vie et les ouvrages de l’emp. Manuel Paléologue.’ In _Mém. de l’Acad. des Inscriptions_, vol. xix, partie 2, pp. 1-301. Paris, 1853, 4to.

Based on Bibl. Nat., fonds grec, no. 3041.

BERGERON, PIERRE, ed. _Voyages faits principalement en Asie dans les XIIe, XIIIe, XIVe et XVe siècles._ The Hague, 1735. 2 vols. 4to.

Benjamin de Tudelle, Jean de Plan-Carpin, Père Ascelin, Guillaume de Rubruquius, Marco Polo, Hayton, Jean de Mandeville, &c.

BERNINO, DOMENICO. _Memorie historiche de ciò che hanno operato li summi pontefici nelle guerre contro i Turchi fino all’ anno 1684._ Rome, 1685, 8vo.

Starts with Urban V, 1362.

BERTELLUS, PETRUS. _Imperatorum Osmanidarum Historia._ Vicenza, 1699.

‘Paulus Iovius ne comparandus quidem ad hunc.’ Boecler, p. 103.

BERTRANDON DE LA BROQUIÈRE. _Le voyage d’outremer_, 1422-33, éd. par C. Schéfer. Paris, 1892, la. 8vo.

BLAU, O. _Die orientalischen Münzen des Museums der k. hist.-arch. Gesellschaft zu Odessa._ Odessa, 1876, 4to.

BLOCHET, E. _Cat. des MSS. orientaux Schéfer._ Paris, 1900. _Cat. des MSS. orientaux Decourdemarche_, Paris, 1909.

BOECLER, JO. HENRY. _Commentarius Historico-Politicus de Rebus Turcicis...._ Buda, 1717, 16mo.

In bibliography gives 317 titles of books on Turkey publ. up to 1704, but no oriental titles, and no MSS.

BOISLISLE, DE. ‘Projet de Croisade du premier duc de Bourbon.’ In _Bulletin de la Soc. d’hist. de France_ for 1872.

BOJNIČIĆ, IVAN. German trans. of Klaić.

BONAPARTE, Prince ROLAND. _Documents de l’époque mongole des 13e et 14e siècles._ (Documents lithographed.) Paris, 1895, la. fol.

BONER, JÉRÔME. German trans. of Bonfinius.

BONFINIUS, ANTONIUS. _Rerum Hungaricarum Decades Quatuor (373-1495)._ Basel, 1568, fol. Hanover, 1606, fol. German trans. by Jérôme Boner, Basel, 1545, fol.

BONGARS, JACQUES (editor). _Gesta Dei per Francos, sive orientalium expeditionum historia 1095-1420._ Hanover, 1611. 2 vols. fol.

BONINCONTRIUS, LAURENTIUS. _Annales ab 1360 ad 1458._ In Muratori, xxi. 1-162. Milan, 1732, fol.

BORCHGRAVE, ÉMILE DE. ‘L’emp. Étienne Douchan de Serbie et la péninsule balkanique au XIVe siècle.’ In _Bulletin de l’Acad. royale de Belgique_, 8e série, viii. 264-92, 416-45. Brussels, 1884, 8vo.

BOSIO, IACOMO. _Dell’ istoria della ... religione ... e militia di S. Giovanni Gierosolimitano._ Rome, 1594-1602. 3 vols. fol. Other editions, Rome, 1621; Rome and Naples, 1629-34; of vol. iii, Rome, 1676, and Naples, 1695.

Vol. ii, from 1292 to 1522.

BOSQUET, FRANÇOIS. _Pontificum Romanorum Avigniensium historia ab 1305 ad 1394._ Paris, 1632, 8vo. (Documented.)

BOUCHÉ-LECLERQ, A. French trans. of Curtius.

BOUCICAUT, MARÉCHAL DE. _See_ Anon., _Livre des faicts_.

BOUÉ, AMI. 1. _Turquie d’Europe._ Paris, 1840. 4 vols. 8vo.

2. _Recueil d’itinéraires dans la Turquie d’Europe._ Vienna, 1854. 2 vols. 8vo.

BRATUTTI, VINCENTE. Italian trans. of Seadeddin.

BRAUNER, ALOIS. _Die Schlacht bei Nicopolis._ Breslau, 1876, 8vo.

BRETSCHNEIDER, E. 1. _Notes on Chinese Mediaeval Travellers to the West._ Shanghai, 1875, 8vo.

2. _Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources_, fragments towards the knowledge of the geography and history of central and western Asia from the 13th to the 17th cent. (In Trübner’s Oriental series.) London, 1888. 2 vols. 8vo.

BRIOT. French trans. of Ricaut.

BROM, GISBERT. _Guide aux Archives du Vatican._ 2nd ed. Rome, 1911, la. 8vo.

BROWN, RAWDON L. _Calendar of State Papers ... in archives and collections of Venice, and in other libraries of northern Italy._ London, 1864. Vols. i (1202-1509), xx, la. 8vo.

BROWNE, E. G. _Cambridge Oriental MSS. Cat._, Cambridge, 1900. _Handlist of Gibb Col. of Turkish Books_, ibid., 1906.

BRUNS, R. J. Latin trans. of Abulfaradj in collab. with Kersch.

BRUUN, PHILIPP. 1. _Constantinople, ses sanctuaires et ses reliques au comm. du XVe siècle._ Extraits du voyage de Clavijo. Trans. from Spanish. Odessa, 1883, 8vo.

2. ‘Geogr. Bemerkungen zu Schiltbergers Reisen.’ In _Sitzungsberichte der k. Bayer. Akad. der Wiss._, 1869, Munich, vol. ii.

These notes, translated into English and revised, are given in Telfer’s trans. of Schiltberger.

BUCHON, J. A. C. Editor of Froissart; Ducange; and anon., _Livre des faicts de Bouciquaut_. French trans. of Muntaner.

BURY, J. B. Editor of Gibbon.

BUSBECQ, OGIER GHISELEN DE. 1. _A. G. Busbequii omnia quae extant._ Leyden, 1633, fol.

2. _Epistolae Turcicae._ Amsterdam, Elzevir, 1660, 12mo.

3. _Life and Letters of_, ed. by C. T. Forster and F. H. B. Danniell. London, 1881. 2 vols. 8vo.

4. _De re militari adversus Turcas instituenda consilium._ In Folieta, pp. 25-76.

BUSTRON, FLORIA. _Cronica_ (1191-1489). Island of Cyprus. In Italian. Ed. by Comte de Mas Latrie, in _Mélanges historiques_, v. 1-532. Paris, 1886, 8vo. Also in Sathas, _Bibl. graeca medii aevi_, vol. ii. Venice, 1873, la. 8vo.

CABASILAS, S. Editor of Martin Crusius.

CAHUN, LÉON. _Introduction à l’histoire de l’Asie: Turcs et Mongols._ Paris, 1896, 8vo.

CAMBIANO, GIUSEPPE. ‘Historico discorso.’ In _Mon. Hist. Patria Scriptorum_, i. 930-1421.

Excellent for relations of Piedmont with the Levant up to 1560.

CAMBINI, ANDREA. _Commentario della origine de’ Turchi et imperio della casa ottomanna._ Florence, 1527, 12mo (2nd ed. s. l., 1537). Also published in Sansovino, pp. 141-81.

CAMERARIUS, JOACHIMUS. _De rebus turcicis commentarii duo accuratissimi, a filiis ... collecti ac editi._ Frankfort, 1598, fol.

CAMPANA, CESARE. _Compendio historico ... con un sommario dell’origine de’ Turchi, e vite di tutti i prencipi di casa ottomanna...._ Venice, 1597, 8vo.

CANALE, MICHEL GIUSEPPE. _Nuova istoria della repubblica di Genova._ Florence, 1858-64. 4 vols. 16mo.

CANTACUZENOS, JOHN. _See under_ Byzantine Historians.

CANTEMIR, DEMETRIUS. _Istoria imperiului Ottomanu._ Rumanian trans. from Latin, by Joseph Hodosiu. Bucharest, 1876. 2 vols. la. 8vo. Eng. trans. from orig. MS. by N. Tindal, London, 1734, 2 vols. 4to. French trans., Paris, 1734; German, Hamburg, 1735.

CAOURSIN, GUILLAUME. _Historia ... von Rhodis...._ Strassburg, 1513, fol. Also found in his _Opera_, Ulm, 1496, fol. Anon. English trans. under title: _History of Turkish Wars with Rhodians, Venetians_, &c.... written by Will Caoursin and Khodja Afendy, a Turk. London, 1683, 8vo.

CARESINO, RAPHAEL. Continued Dandolo’s _Cronica_ in Muratori, vol. xii.

CARLI, GIO. RINALDO. Italian trans. of Hadji Khalfa’s Chronological Tables.

CAROLDO, GIOVANNI GIACOMO. _Chronique vénétienne._ Bibl. Nat., Paris, MS. anc. fonds, 9959-63. Extracts from years 1362-4 are printed in _Bibl. de l’École des Chartes_ (1873), xxxiv. 68-72.

CASTELLAN, A. L. _Mœurs, usages, costumes des Othomans et abrégé de leur histoire._ Paris, 1812. 6 vols., 18mo.

CECCHETTI, B. Collaborator with T. Toderini.

CERVARIUS, LUDOVICUS. _De Turcarum Origine, Moribus et Rebus Gestis commentarii._ Florence, 1590, 8vo.

CHALCOCONDYLAS, LAONICUS. Λαονίκου Χαλκοκονδύλοὺ ’Αθηναίου ἀπόδειξις ἱστοριῶν δέκα Greek-Latin editions, _see_ Byz. Hist, at end of bibliography. French trans. by Blaise de Vigénaire. Paris, 1662. 2 vols. fol. Latin trans. by C. Clauser and recension by I. Bekker (for Bonn edition).

I have found the Latin trans. very incorrect in many places: there are frequent glosses. (See Appendix A, first footnote.)

CHAMPS, EUSTACHE DES. _[Oe]uvres inédites de ..._, ed. by Tarbé. Paris, 1849, 8vo (vol. i).

CHARDIN, JEAN. _Voyage en Perse et autres lieux de l’Orient._ Amsterdam, 1711. 10 vols. 12mo.

CHARRIÈRE, ERNEST. _Négociations de la France dans le Levant_, ou _Correspondances, mémoires et actes diplomatiques des ambass. de France à Constantinople, ... Venise, Raguse_, &c. Paris, 1848-60. 4 vols. 4to.

CHAUVIN, VICTOR. French trans. of Dozy’s Essay on Islam.

CHAVANNES, ÉDOUARD. _Documents sur les Tou-kioue occidentaux._ With map showing disposition of Turkish tribes of Central Asia. Petrograd, 1903, 4to.

CHAZAUD, P. P. Editor of _Chronique du duc Loys de Bourbon_.

CHEVALIER, ULYSSE. _Répertoire des sources historiques du Moyen Age._ (Nouvelle édition, augmentée.) Paris, 1905-7. 2 vols. la. 8vo.

Most complete reference work in existence for bibliography of 14th Century Popes.

CHOLET, Comte ARMAND-PIERRE. _Voyage en Turquie d’Asie._ With map. Paris, 1892, 8vo.

CHYTRAEUS, DAVID. 1. _Historia ecclesiarum in Graecia._ Francfort, 1583, fol.

2. _Narratio belli cyprii inter Venetos et Turcas._ In Foglietta, pp. 96-111.

CICOGNA, E. A. _Storia dei Dogi di Venezia._ 3rd ed. Venice, 1867. 2 vols. fol.

CLAUSER, C. Latin trans. of Chalcocondylas.

CLAVIJO, RUY GONZÁLES DE. 1. _Historia del gran Tamerlan, e itinerario y enarracion del Viage de la Embaxada que Gonzalez le hizó, por mandada del muy poderoso Señor Rey Don Henrique el Tercero de Castilla._ Seville, 1582, fol. Madrid, 1782, 4to. English trans., by Clements R. Markham, in Hakluyt series, London, 1859, 4to. Russian trans., by L. Sreznavski, Petrograd, 1881, 8vo.

2. Extracts from above, describing Constantinople in 1403, translated into French with notes by Bruun, Philip, under whom it is listed.

COGNATUS. _See_ Cousin.

COLLAS, LOUIS. _Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman._ Paris, 1862, 16mo. Republished 1880, 1898. Fourth edition, revised by E. Driault, Paris, 1913, 32mo.

COLOTENDI. French trans. of Texeira.

CORREGIAIO, DON MARCO U. _Della vera maniera del vincere il Turco._ Padova, 1571, 12mo.

COURNAND, Abbé. French trans. of Abbé Toderini.

COUSIN, GILBERT. _Gilberti Cognati Chronicon Sultanorum et principum Turciae serie continua usque ad Solymannum magnum._ Frankfort, 1558, 8vo.

Best consulted in vol. i, pp. 399 f., of _Opera in 3 tomos digesta_, Basel, 1562, fol.

COVINO, SYMON DE. Bibl. Nat., Paris, MSS., fonds latin 8369-70: contemporary account of the Black Death of 1348 by a Paris physician, mostly in form of a hexameter poem.

CREASY, SIR EDWARD S. _History of the Ottoman Turks._ New ed. London, 1877, 12mo.

This abridgement of von Hammer has no historical value. It contains, however, an admirable chapter by Creasy himself on the legislation of Mohammed II.

CRIBELLUS, LEODRISIUS. _De expeditione Pii papae II in Turcas libri duo._ In Muratori, xxiii. 21-80.

From MS. in secret archives.

CRUSIUS, MARTIN. _Turco-Graeciae libri octo_ ... quibus Graecorum status sub imperio Turcico in politia et ecclesia ... describitur.... Edidit S. Cabasilas. Basel, 1584, fol.