Politics

The Federalist Papers

FEDERALIST No. I. General Introduction FEDERALIST No. II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence FEDERALIST No. III. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. IV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers...

Summary

FEDERALIST No. I. General Introduction FEDERALIST No. II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence FEDERALIST No. III. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. IV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. V. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) FEDERALIST No. VI. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States FEDERALIST No. VII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) FEDERALIST No. VIII. The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States FEDERALIST No. IX. The Union as a Saf...

Chapters

39. Part 39

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for the...

14. Part 14

Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these wil...

51. Part 51

The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious for a constitutional establishment of the trial by jury in civil cases, and will be the most ready to admit that the chan...

50. Part 50

From these observations it must appear unquestionably true, that trial by jury is in no case abolished by the proposed Constitution, and it is equally true, that in those contro...

46. Part 46

To this reasoning it has been objected that the President, by the influence of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views. This supposition...

19. Part 19

Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the government, for want of being able to command...

44. Part 44

A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration. By NECESSITATING a change of men, in the...

15. Part 15

Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the a...

35. Part 35

The remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time...

17. Part 17

Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument’s sake, that the revenu...

13. Part 13

This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts. In this cas...

38. Part 38

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscu...

43. Part 43

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a...

42. Part 42

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a schem...

37. Part 37

I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be...

49. Part 49

The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely called in question in regard to matters of law; but the clamors have been loud against it as applied to matters of...

5. Part 5

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the possibility of foreign i...

36. Part 36

We have seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what w...

9. Part 9

There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a sense of common interest would presi...

7. Part 7

There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity, and would in...

18. Part 18

These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They have been held up to the people in all the exa...

41. Part 41

The President is to be the “commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the Un...

2. Part 2

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobatio...

48. Part 48

The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be...

6. Part 6

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.

25. Part 25

Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on...

12. Part 12

The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate sup...

40. Part 40

There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inve...

20. Part 20

As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but the supposition is susceptible of a more p...

47. Part 47

But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of t...

27. Part 27

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerica...

8. Part 8

Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the g...

45. Part 45

Though this provision has been assailed, on different grounds, with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my firm persuasion, that it is one of the best digeste...

28. Part 28

It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to...

31. Part 31

To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? T...

33. Part 33

Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented b...

16. Part 16

We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to...

21. Part 21

What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the people, cannot...

3. Part 3

Queen Anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, whic...

10. Part 10

The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will chief...

1. Part 1

FEDERALIST No. I. General Introduction FEDERALIST No. II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence FEDERALIST No. III. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers...

4. Part 4

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the ear...

24. Part 24

The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been for...

11. Part 11

In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himse...

52. Part 52

Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that may attend the establishment of the proposed government. The first thing which presents itself is that a gr...

32. Part 32

I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, “that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. “ If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which be...

23. Part 23

There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowe...

29. Part 29

Lastly, a number of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative department. As the appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is in its nat...

26. Part 26

May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of thos...

34. Part 34

The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs...

30. Part 30

One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of power against the invasions of the stronger, is...

22. Part 22

On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Re...