CHAPTER V.

OF THE VERB.

A verb has been defined to be “that part of speech which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer;” or more correctly, “that part of speech which predicates some action, passion, or state of its subject,” as “I strike,” “I am wounded,” “I stand.” Its essence consists in affirmation, and by this property it is distinguished from every other part of speech. The adjective expresses an accident, quality, or property of a thing _in concreto_; that is, when joined to the name of a substance, it expresses that substance, as accompanied by some attribute: in other words, it limits a generic name, confining it to that part of the kind, which possesses the character, which the attributive specifies; but it affirms nothing. Thus, if we say, “_a wise man_,” which is equivalent to “a man with,” or “having wisdom,” there is no affirmation; an individual is singled from a species, under the character of wisdom, but nothing is asserted of this individual. If we say “the man is wise,” there is something affirmed of the man, and the affirmation is expressed by _is_. If the attribute and the assertion be combined in the expression, as in Latin _vir sapit_, it is obvious that the essence of the verb consists, not in denoting the attribute wisdom, but in affirming that quality, as belonging to the subject; for, if you cancel the assertion, the verb is immediately converted into an adjective, and the expression becomes _vir sapiens_, a wise man.

The simplest of all verbs is that which the Greeks call a verb of existence, namely, the verb _to be_. This verb frequently denotes pure affirmation, as “God is good,” where the verb, or _copula_, as it has been termed, serves to predicate of the Deity, the attribute denoted by the following word. Hence, as it expresses mere affirmation, the Latins call it a substantive verb, in contradistinction to those verbs which, with an attribute, denote assertion, and were called by some grammarians adjective verbs.

Sometimes it predicates pure or absolute existence, as “God is,” that is, “God _exists_.” In the following example it occurs in both senses. “We believe that thou art, and that thou art the rewarder of them who diligently seek thee.”

As nouns denote the subjects of our discourse, so verbs predicate their accidents, or properties. The former are the names of things, the latter what we say concerning them. These two, therefore, must be the only essential parts of speech; for to mental communication nothing else can be indispensably requisite, than to name the subject of our thoughts, and to express our sentiments of its attributes or properties. And as the verb essentially expresses affirmation, without which there could be no communication of sentiment, it has been hence considered as the principal part of speech, and was therefore called, by the ancient grammarians, _verb_, or _the word_, by way of eminence. The noun, however, is unquestionably of earlier origin. To assign names to surrounding objects would be a matter of the first necessity: the next step would be to express their most common actions, or states of being. This indeed is the order of nature--the progress of intellect.

Mr. Tooke observes that, “the verb does not imply any assertion, and that no single word can.” “Till one single thing,” says he, “can be found to be a couple, one single word cannot make an assertion or affirmation: for there is joining in that operation, and there can be no junction of one thing.” This theory he illustrates by the tense _ibo_, which he resolves thus:

_English_ Hi[40] Wol Ich _Latin_ I Vol O _Greek_ Ι Βουλ Εω.

The first of each triad are the simple verbs, equivalent to _go_. The second are the verbs _Wol_, _Vol_, Βουλ, denoting _will_. The third are the pronouns of the first person. Whatever opinion may be formed respecting the truth of this analysis, its ingenuity will not be questioned. There are two objections, however, by which its justness may possibly be controverted. The first is, if the personal pronouns are contained, as Mr. Tooke says, in the Greek and Latin terminations of the three persons of their verbs, why is the pronoun repeated with the verb? If the _o_ in _volo_ be an abbreviated suffix for _ego_, why do we redundantly say _ego volo_? Now, in answer to this objection, it might be observed, were we disposed to indulge in mere hypothesis, that the involution of the pronoun may have eluded the attention of the Latins; or, if this explanation should be deemed too improbable, it may be supposed that usage, against whose decree there is no appeal, may have established the repetition of the pronoun at the expense of strict propriety. One thing particularly deserves attention, that the pronoun was seldom or never used, unless in cases where emphasis was implied, or an antithesis of persons was to be strongly marked. But without resorting to conjectures, which may be deemed vague and unsatisfactory, we may appeal to a fact which is decisive of the point in question. I have already observed, that in the Hebrew language we can distinctly mark the pronouns suffixed to the verb; yet we find the Hebrew writers repeating the pronouns even in cases where no emphasis is intended. Thus, in Gen. xlviii. 22, _Ve-ani nathatti_, “and I have given;” Job xix. 25, _Ve-ani iadahgti_, “and I knew;” Deut. ix. 2, _attah iadahghta, ve-atta shamahgh ta_, “thou knowest, and thou hast heard.” In these examples, the pronoun is both incorporated with the verb and repeated by itself. Whatever may be the abstract propriety of this phraseology, its existence in Hebrew is sufficient to obviate the objection proposed.

Again, it may be urged, if the pronoun _ego_ be suffixed to the verb, why do not all the tenses in the first person singular end in _o_? This second objection may also be partly, if not entirely, removed. The Latin language appears to be a commixture of Greek and one of the northern languages. This commixture will account for the first person singular sometimes ending in _o_, in imitation of the Greeks, and at other times in _m_, in imitation of the Celts. The present tense of the Gaelic, a dialect of the Celtic, proceeds thus: _sgriobh-aim_, “I write,” sgriobh-air, sgriobh-aidh, sgriobh-amoid, sgriobh-aoidhesi, sgriobh-aidsion. Here, as Whiter observes, we have something resembling the Latin verb _scribo_: and it is to be remarked that the first person singular ends in _m_, which the Romans most probably adopted as one of their verbal terminations. And could we prosecute the inquiry, and investigate the structure of the Greek and Celtic tenses themselves, we should doubtless find, that they involve, along with the radical word, one or more terms expressing the accessary ideas of action, passion, state, person, time, and so forth. The same theory, we are persuaded, may be applied to all languages, in which the tenses are formed by variety of termination.

Nothing, I conceive, can be more evident, than that the inflexions of nouns and verbs, how inexplicable soever they may now prove, were not originally the result of systematic art, but were separate terms significant of the circumstances intended, and afterwards, by celerity of pronunciation, coalesced with the words of which they now form the terminations.

It has been observed, that the essence of the verb consists in affirmation. This theory, I have remarked, is controverted by Mr. Tooke. It must be obvious, however, from the preceding observations, that the difference between the opinion of this eminent philologist, and that which is here delivered, is more apparent than real. For Mr. Tooke will not deny, that an affirmation is implied in _ibo_; he merely observes, that every assertion requires “a couple of terms.” Now it is of little moment to the point in question whether the two terms be incorporated in one, as in _lego_, or remain separate, as “I read.” In either case the verb affirms something of its nominative, whether that nominative appear in a simple or in a compound state. Sometimes the affirmation is expressed by a separate and appropriate sign, as _ille est dives_, “he is rich:” and the verb of existence (_to be_) is supposed, by several critics and philologists, to have been coeval with the earliest infancy of language. In English, the affirmation, and also the action, are frequently denoted, simply by the junction of the name of the attribute with the nominative of the subject, whether noun or pronoun. Thus, if we say, “my will,” “the children’s will,” there is no affirmation implied, and the term _will_ is considered as a mere name. But if we say, “I will,” “the children will,” it becomes invested with a different character, and affirms the volition to belong to the subject. Thus also, “the hero’s might,” “the hero might,” “my ken” (my knowledge or ability), “I ken,” _I can_, or _I am able_; “my love,” “I love.” Mr. Tooke observes, that when we say “I love,” there is an ellipsis of the word _do_. This appears to me a probable opinion, though not entirely unobjectionable. For though we find the auxiliary more frequently used in old English than in modern compositions, yet it does not occur so frequently as, according to this hypothesis, we should naturally expect. Mr. Tooke indeed admits the fact; but observes, that Chaucer had less occasion to use it, because in his time the distinguishing terminations of the verb still remained, though they were not constantly employed. Now I find, as Mr. Tyrwhitt remarks, that Chaucer seldom uses the word _do_ as an auxiliary, even in those cases where the verb and the noun are identical. This circumstance might lead us to infer that the English present was derived from the Saxon, by dropping the termination, as _ic lufige_, _I love_; the affirmation and the action being sufficiently obvious from the construction, and that it was originally optional to say either “I love,” or “I do love.” Be that as it may, the assertion expressed by “I do,” equivalent to “I act,” appears clearly to be signified by the junction of the nominative pronoun with the sign of action. Whether a note of affirmation was at first separately employed, and afterwards involved in the verbal termination, or whether the affirmation be merely inferred and not signified, this is certain, that it is by the verb, and the verb only, that we can express affirmation.

As every subject of discourse must be spoken of as either doing or suffering something, either acting or acted upon; or as neither doing nor suffering; hence verbs have been divided by all grammarians into active, passive, and neuter.

The verb active denotes that the subject of discourse is doing something, as, _I write_; the passive verb, that the subject suffers, or is acted upon, as, _the book is burned_; and the neuter denotes neither the one nor the other, but expresses merely the state, posture, or condition of the subject, as unaffected by anything else, as, _I sit_, _I sleep_, _I stand_.

Action, energy, or motion may either be confined to the agent, or pass from him to something extrinsic. Hence active verbs have been divided into transitive and intransitive. An active transitive verb denotes that kind of action by which the agent affects something foreign to himself, or which passes from the agent to something without him, as, _to beat a drum_, _to whip a horse_, _to kill a dog_. _Beat_, _whip_, _kill_, are active transitive verbs; and it is the characteristic of these verbs that they admit a noun after them, denoting the subject of the action.

An active intransitive verb denotes that species of action or energy, which passes not from the agent to anything else; that is, it expresses what has been termed immanent energy. Hence an intransitive verb does not admit a noun after it, there being no extrinsic subject or object affected by the action. Thus, _I run_, _I walk_, _the horse gallops_, are examples of active intransitive verbs[41].

Webster, in his Dissertations on the English Language, delivers it as his opinion, that the division of verbs into active, passive, and neuter is incorrect; and that the only accurate distribution is into transitive and intransitive. “Is not a man,” says he, “passive in hearing? yet hearing is called an active verb.”

It is doubtless true, that _to hear_, and many other verbs, commonly called active, denote chiefly, perhaps, the effect of an extrinsic or foreign act. But whether we view the matter as a question either in metaphysics or in grammar, we shall perceive but little impropriety in adopting the common distinction. For, though the verb _to hear_ denotes, perhaps, chiefly, that a certain impression is made on the mind through the auditory organ, yet even here the mind is not entirely passive, as, were this the place for such a discussion, it would be easy to prove. _I see_, _I hear_, _I feel_, _I perceive_, denote not only the sensation in which we are passive, but also a perception, to which the consent or activity of the mind is unquestionably essential. Hence these verbs have, in all languages, been denominated active. But if the term transitive be the only correct name, it may be asked, why does Mr. Webster call this verb by that appellation? He would answer, I doubt not, “because something passes from the agent to something else.” What, then, is that something which passes? I am afraid Mr. Webster would have difficulty in answering this question, so as to justify the term transitive, without admitting the verb to be active. For, if it be not an act, an energy, or some operation of the mind, what is it, or how can it pass from one to another? The truth is, this objection of Mr. Webster to the term active in such cases, is founded neither on metaphysical nor grammatical principles; for by an active transitive verb is meant, that which admits a noun as its regimen; and, for the purposes of grammar, this name is sufficiently correct. If the point in question be metaphysically considered, it would be easy to demonstrate that, though in sensation the mind be passive, in perception it is active.

I would here observe, in passing, that there are many verbs neuter and intransitive, which, followed by a preposition, may be truly considered as active transitive verbs. These have been denominated, by the learned Dr. Campbell, compound active verbs. _To laugh_, for example, is a neuter verb; it cannot therefore admit a passive voice, as, “_I am laughed_.” _To laugh at_ may be considered as an active transitive verb; for it not only admits an objective case after it in the active voice, but is likewise construed as a passive verb, as, “_I am laughed at_.” Here an obvious analogy obtains between these two and the verbs _rideo_, _derideo_, in Latin; the former of which is a neuter, and the latter an active verb. Nor, as the same ingenious writer observes, does it matter whether the preposition be prefixed to the simple verb, as in Latin, in order to form the active verb, or be put after, and detached, as is the case in English. The only grammatical criterion in our language between an active and a neuter verb is this: if the verb admits an objective case after it, either with or without a preposition, to express the subject or object of the energy, the verb may be grammatically considered as a compound active verb; for thus construed it has a passive voice. If the verb does not thus admit an objective case, it must be considered grammatically as neuter or intransitive, and has no passive voice. _To smile_ is a neuter verb; it cannot, therefore, be followed by an objective case, nor be construed as a passive verb. We cannot say, _she smiled him_, or _he was smiled_. _To smile on_, according to the principle now proposed, is a compound active verb; we therefore say, _she smiled on him_. _He was smiled on by Fortune in every undertaking[42]._

As all things exist in time, and whatever is predicable of any subject must be predicated as either past, present, or future, every action, energy, or state of being, coming under one or other of these predicaments, hence arises the utility of tenses, to express the times, or relative order of their existence. In regard to the number of these tenses[43], necessary to render a language complete, grammarians have been somewhat divided in opinion.

In our language we have two simple tenses, the present and the preterperfect[44]. The latter is generally formed by adding _d_ or _ed_ to the present, as _love, loved_; _fear, feared_. That the suffix here is a contraction for _did_, as Mr. Tooke supposes, I can easily imagine; thus, _fear_, _fear-did_, _feared_, or _did fear_; but the question returns, whence comes the termination _ed_ in _doed_, from which _did_ itself is contracted? This query seems to have escaped the attention of the learned author[45].

Actions and states of being may be predicated as either certain or contingent, free or necessary, possible or impossible, obligatory or optional; in short, as they may take place in a variety of ways, they may be spoken of, as diversified in their modes of production. Hence arises another accident of verbs, called a mood, expressing the mode or manner of existence. These modes are, in some languages, partly expressed by inflexions, partly by auxiliary verbs, or words significant of the model diversity. In English there is only one mood, namely, the indicative. The Greeks and Romans expressed by inflections the most common modes of action or existence, as conditionality, power, contingency, certainty, liberty, and duty. In our language they are denoted by auxiliary verbs.

The English verb has only one voice, namely, the active. Dr. Lowth, and most other grammarians, have assigned it two voices, active and passive. Lowth has, in this instance, not only violated the simplicity of our language, but has also advanced an opinion inconsistent with his own principles. For, if he has justly excluded from the number of cases in nouns, and moods in verbs, those which are not formed by inflexion, but by the addition of prepositions and auxiliary verbs, there is equal reason for rejecting a passive voice, if it be not formed by variety of termination. Were I to ask him why he denies _from a king_ to be an ablative case, or _I may love_ to be the potential mood, he would answer, and very truly, that those only can be justly regarded as cases or moods which, by a different form of the noun or verb, express a different relation or a different mode of existence. If this answer be satisfactory, there can be no good reason for assigning to our language a passive voice, when that voice is formed, not by inflexion, but by an auxiliary verb. _Doceor_ is truly a passive voice; but _I am taught_ cannot, without impropriety, be considered as such. Besides, as it is justly observed by Dr. Ash, our author, when he parses the clause, “I am well pleased,” tells us that _am_ is the indicative mood, present tense of the verb _to be_; and _pleased_, the passive participle of the verb to _please_. Now, in parsing, every word should be considered as a distinct part of speech: whether, therefore, we admit _pleased_ to be a passive participle or not, (for this point I shall afterwards examine,) it is obvious that on the principle now laid down, and acknowledged by Dr. Lowth, _am pleased_ is not a present passive, nor has the author himself parsed it in this manner. Into such inconsistencies do our grammarians run, from a propensity to force the grammar of our language into a conformity with the structure of Greek and Latin.

The same reasoning will also account for my assigning to English verbs no more than two tenses and one mood. For, if we consider the matter, not metaphysically, but grammatically, and regard those only as moods which are diversified by inflexion, (and, as Lowth himself observes, as far as grammar is concerned, there can be no others,) we find that our language has only one mood and two tenses.

This doctrine, in respect to the cases, is very generally admitted. For though the Greeks and Romans expressed the different relations by variety of inflexion, which they termed cases, it does not follow that we are to acknowledge the same number of cases as they had, when these relations are expressed in English, not by inflexions, but by prepositions or words significant of these relations. The Latins would not have acknowledged _absque fructu_, without fruit, as forming a seventh case, though they acknowledged _fructu_, by fruit, as making an ablative or sixth case. And why? because the latter only was formed by inflexion. For this reason, I consider giving the name of dative case to the combination of words _to a king_, or of ablative case to the expression _from a king_, to be a palpable impropriety. Our language knows no such cases; nor would an Englishman, unacquainted with Greek or Latin, ever dream of these cases, though perfectly master of his own language.

In the same manner it may be asked, what could lead him to distinguish a diversity of moods, or a plurality of voices, where there is no variety of termination to discriminate them? The distinction of circumstances, respecting the modes of existence, he expresses by words significant of these accidents; but he would no more dream of giving these forms of expression the name of moods, than he would be disposed to call _from a king_ by the name of _casus ablativus_, or _permit me to go_ the first person singular of the imperative mood. If, indeed, he were somewhat acquainted with Latin, he might, in the true spirit of modern grammarians, contend that _let me go_, or _permit me to go_, is truly the first person singular of the imperative mood; assigning as a reason for this assertion, that such is the designation of _eam_ in Latin. With the most correct knowledge, however, of his own language only, he could never be seduced into this absurdity. A little reflection indeed might teach him, that even _eam_ in Latin is an elliptical expression for _sine ut eam_, the word _eam_ itself denoting neither entreaty nor command.

In truth, we may as reasonably contend that our language has all the tenses which are to be found in Greek and Latin, because, by the aid of auxiliaries and definitives, we contrive to express what they denoted by one word, as to contend that we have a potential, an optative or imperative mood, or a passive voice; because by auxiliaries or variety of arrangement we can express the circumstances of power, liberty, duty, passion, &c. No grammarian has yet gone so far as to affirm that we have in English a _paulo post future_, because our language, by definitives or auxiliaries, is capable of expressing that time. Or, what should we think of that person’s discernment, who should contend that the Latins had an optative mood, because _utinam legeres_ signifies “I wish you would read”? It is equally absurd to say that we have an imperfect, preterpluperfect, or future tenses; or that we have all the Greek varieties of mood, and two voices, because by the aid of auxiliary words and definite terms we contrive to express these accidents, times, or states of being. I consider, therefore, that we have no more cases, moods, tenses, or voices in our language, as far as its grammar, not its capacity of expression, is concerned, than we have variety of termination to denote these different accessary ideas.

As the terminations of most verbs in languages are varied by tense and mood, so are they also varied according as the subject is of the first, second, or third person. Thus, in the only two tenses that we have in English, namely, the present and the preterperfect tenses, the second person singular of each is formed from the first, by adding _st_ or _est_, as, _I love, thou lovest_; _I loved, thou lovedst_; and the third person singular of the present is formed by adding _s_, or the syllable _eth_ or _th_, to the first as, _love, loves_, or _loveth_; _read, reads_, or _readeth_. These are the only variations which our verbs admit, in concordance with the person of the nominative singular. The three persons plural are always the same with the first person singular.

Before I proceed to the conjugation of verbs in general, I shall first explain the manner in which the auxiliaries are conjugated. Of these the most extensively useful is the verb _to be_, denoting simple affirmation, or expressing existence. The next is that which signifies action, namely, the verb _to do_. The third is the verb _to have_, implying possession. The others are, _shall_, _will_, _may_, _can_, &c. I begin with the verb _to be_.

_Indicative Mood._

_Present Tense._

_Sing._[46] I am Thou art He, she, or it is _Plur._ We are Ye or you are They are.

_Preterite._

_Sing._ I was Thou wast[47] He was _Plur._ We were Ye or you were They were.

_Imperfect Conditional._

_Sing._ I were Thou wert He were _Plur._ We were Ye or you were They were.

_Infinitive._

To be.

It may seem inconsistent with the opinion which I have delivered concerning moods, to assign an infinitive to this verb; and the existence of this infinitive may appear, perhaps, a sufficient refutation of that opinion. I shall, therefore, briefly repeat what I have said, and offer a few additional observations.

I have remarked that the first care of men, in a rude and infant state, would be to assign names to surrounding objects; and that the noun, in the natural order of things, must have been the first part of speech. Their inventive powers would next be employed to express the most common energies or states of being, such as are denoted by the verbs _to do_, _to be_, _to suffer_. Hence, by the help of these combined with a noun, they might express the energy or state of that thing, of which the noun was the name. Thus, I shall suppose that they assigned the word _plant_, as the name of a vegetable set in the ground. To express the act of setting it, they would say, _do plant_, that is, _act plant_. The letters _d_ and _t_ being nearly allied, it is easy to conceive how the word _do_, by a variation very natural and common to all languages, might be changed into _to_; and thus the word _to_ prefixed to a noun would express the correspondent energy or action.

In what light, then, are we to consider the phrase _to plant_, termed an infinitive, or to what class of words is it reducible? Previously to my answering this question, it is necessary to remind the reader, that a verb joined to a noun forms a sentence; that affirmation is essential to the character of a verb; and that, for this reason, and this only, it has been pre-eminently distinguished by the name of verb, or the word. Destroy this characteristic, and it is immediately confounded with the adjective, or the participle. It is its power of predication only, which constitutes it a distinct part of speech, and discriminates it from every other. _Vir sapit_, and _vir est sapiens_, are equivalent expressions. Cancel the assertion, and the verb is lost. The expression becomes _vir sapiens_, “a wise man.” This opinion, I am persuaded, requires only to be examined to be universally adopted. If this be the case, the infinitive which affirms nothing, cannot, without impropriety, be deemed a verb. It expresses merely an action, passion, or state abstractedly. Hence many grammarians have justly considered it as no part of the verb; and, in the languages of Greece and Rome, the infinitive was employed like a common substantive, having frequently an adjective joined with it, and subject to the government of verbs and prepositions. This opinion has been lately controverted by a writer of considerable eminence as a Latin scholar. But, after examining the matter with attention, I take upon me to affirm, that not a single example can be produced wherein the infinitive, as used by the Greeks and Romans, might not be supplied by the substitution of a noun. Wherefore, admitting the established principle, _voces valent significatione_, there cannot exist a doubt that the infinitive, which may in all cases be supplied by a noun, has itself the real character of a noun. And, if the essence of a verb consist in predication, and not, as some think, in implying time in conjunction with an attribute, which is the characteristic of a participle, then the infinitive, as it can predicate nothing, and joined to a substantive makes no sentence, cannot therefore be deemed a verb. When I say, _legere est facile_, “to read is easy,” it is obvious that there is only one sentence in each of these expressions. But if _legere_ (to read) were a verb as well as _est_ (is), then there would be two verbs and also two affirmations, for affirmation is inseparable from a verb. I remark also, that the verbal noun _lectio_ (reading) substituted for _legere_ (to read) would precisely express the same sentiment. For these reasons I concur decidedly with those grammarians who are so far from considering the infinitive as a distinct mood, that they entirely exclude it from the appellation of verb[48].

It may be asked, what then is it to be called? In answer to this query, I observe, that it matters little what designation be assigned to it, provided its character and office be fully understood. The ancient Latin grammarians, as Priscian informs us, termed it properly enough, _nomen verbi_, “the noun or name of the verb.” To proscribe terms, which have been long familiar to us, and, by immemorial possession, have gained an establishment, is always a difficult, and frequently an ungracious task. I shall therefore retain its usual name, having sufficiently guarded the reader against a misconception of its character.

Now, in our language, the infinitive has not even the distinction arising from termination, to entitle it to be ranked in the number of moods; its form being the same with that of the present tense, and probably, both in its termination and its prefix, originally identical. For, if the doctrine just proposed be correct, the word _do_ was put before each. To this rule the English language furnishes only one exception, namely, the verb of existence, in which the present indicative is _am_, whereas the infinitive is _to be_. This, however, can scarcely be deemed an exception, when it is considered, that the present indicative of this verb was originally _be_ as well as _am_; though the former be now in a state of obsolescence, or rather entirely obsolete. At the same time, as this is the only verb in which the infinitive differs in form from the present of the indicative, I have judged it necessary to note the exception, and assign the infinitive.

_Present part._ Being _Past part._ Been[49].

TO DO.

_Indicative Mood._

_Present._

_Sing._ I do Thou doest or dost He doeth, doth or does _Plur._ We do Ye or you do They do.

_Preterperfect._

_Sing._ I did Thou didst He, she, or it did[50] _Plur._ We did Ye or you did They did.

_Participles._

_Present_ Doing _Past_ Done.

TO HAVE.

_Indicative Mood._

_Present._

_Sing._ I have Thou hast He hath or has _Plur._ We have Ye or you have They have.

_Preterperfect._

_Sing._ I had Thou hadst He had _Plur._ We had Ye or you had They had.

_Participles._

_Present_ Having _Past_ Had.

Liberty is expressed by the verb MAY.

_Indicative Mood._

_Present._

_Sing._ I may Thou mayest He may _Plur._ We may Ye or you may They may[51].

_Preterperfect._

_Sing._ I might Thou mightest He might _Plur._ We might Ye or you might They might.

Power or ability is expressed by CAN.

_Indicative Mood._

_Present._

_Sing._ I can Thou canst He can _Plur._ We can Ye or you can They can[52].

_Preterperfect._

_Sing._ I could Thou couldst He could _Plur._ We could Ye or you could They could.

Futurition and duty are expressed by the verb _shall_, but not each in the three persons.

_Indicative Mood._

_Present._

_Sing._[53] I shall Thou shalt He shall _Plur._ We shall Ye or you shall They shall.

_Preterperfect._

_Sing._ I should Thou shouldst He should _Plur._ We should Ye or you should They should.

Volition and futurity are expressed by the verb _to will_.

_Present._

_Sing._ I will Thou wilt He will _Plur._ We will Ye or you will They will[54].

_Preterperfect._

_Sing._ I would Thou wouldst He would _Plur._ We would Ye or you would They would.

Priestley and Lowth, who have in this been followed by most other grammarians, call the tenses _may_, _can_, _shall_, _will_, absolute tenses; _might_, _could_, _should_, _would_, conditional. That _might_, _could_, _should_, _would_, frequently imply conditionality, there can be no question; but I am persuaded that the proper character of these tenses is unconditional affirmation, and for these two reasons:

1st. Their formation seems to indicate that they are preterites indicative, proceeding from their respective presents, in the same manner as _did_ from _do_, _had_ from _have_, and having therefore the same unconditional meaning. Thus, _I may_, is equivalent to “I am at liberty;” _I might_, to “I was at liberty;” _I can_, means “I am able;” _I could_, “I was able;” _I will_, “I am willing;” _I would_, “I was willing.”

2dly. They are used to express unconditional meaning. If we say, “This might prove fatal to your interest,” the assertion of the possibility of the event is as unconditional as absolute, as, “This may prove fatal to your interest.” “This, if you do it, _will_ ruin your cause,” is precisely equivalent to, “This, were you to do it, _would_ ruin your cause;” equivalent as far, at least, as the unconditional affirmation of the consequence of a supposed action is involved[55]. “I may write, if I choose,” is not more absolute than “I might write, if I chose.” If I say, “I might have gone to the Continent,” the expression is as unconditional as, “I had it in my power,” “I was at liberty to go to the Continent.” “Can you construe Lycophron?” “I cannot now; but once _I could_.” “May you do as you please?” “Not now; but once I _might_.” Is there any conditionality implied in the latter clause of each of these answers? Not the least. They are unconditionally assertive. The formation of these tenses, therefore, being analogous to that of preterites indicative, and their import in these examples, as in many others which might be adduced, being unconditional and absolute, I am inclined to consider them as preterites indicative, agreeably to their form, and as properly unconditional in respect to signification.

I observe, however, that though _might_, _could_, _would_, _should_, are preterite tenses, they are frequently employed to denote present time[56]; but in such examples care must be taken that congruity of tense be preserved, and that the subsequent be expressed in the same tense with the antecedent verb. Thus I say, “I may go if I choose,” where the liberty and inclination are each expressed as present; or, “I might go if I chose,” where, though present time be implied, the liberty is expressed by the preterite, and the inclination is denoted by the same tense.

Before I proceed to show how these auxiliary verbs are joined with others, to express the intended accessary ideas, I shall offer a few observations on the participle.