Part 2

In all systems of movement composed of many distinct bodies, there must be a common centre of direction, connexion and extension, or unity of purpose and effect must cease, and confusion, dispersion or concentration ensue. Such a centre there is in the minutely regular mighty moving system of the universe; and from it, down through every degree of importance, to that in the more mob-like progress of a swarm of bees.

_Perhaps the greatest defect in modern skirmishing is, that, in extensive affairs, this principle of an established point of direction is not well maintained._ However much it may be recognised in mere theory, it is not, in instruction, explained in sufficient fulness, or required with sufficient rigour; and from these neglects arise, in a great degree, the inversions, mixtures, and other irregularities in actual service before noticed.

It is most injudicious to encumber the minds of men and officers with a multitude of intricate or non-essential recollections; but the principle in point involves nothing of this character; it is at the same time very simple and highly essential.

For all skirmishers of the same battalion acting together, until they become thoroughly mixed with other corps—in all cases of movement, excepting only those of changes of front on the principle of the wheel on the fixed pivot, and those of taking ground to a flank obliquely or directly; _the centre, or right centre file[12] of their own battalion skirmishers is_ THE POINT OF DIRECTION, _unless at the time_ OTHERWISE ESPECIALLY ORDERED.

When detachments from several battalions skirmish together, the battalion of direction for the line in rear, is that of direction for the skirmishers in front, unless _at the time_ otherwise ordered. If no such battalion has been pointed out, the officer commanding the extended line names to the officers in command of detachments the battalion skirmishers of direction, and takes care to keep these last to their true course and object.

Every officer in command of the skirmishers of a battalion has the option, in responsible dependence on the maintenance of the general alignement and proper communication, of changing his point of direction, _by order at and for the time being_, to the flank file nearest to the battalion skirmishers of direction, or otherwise as circumstances may appear to require.

In all changes of front on the principle of the wheel on a fixed pivot, that pivot is, of necessity, _during the evolution_, the file of direction.

In taking ground to a flank obliquely or directly, the leading file always becomes, during this movement, _and no longer, unless especially ordered at the time_, the file of direction.

When skirmishers become mixed and unmanageable, and there is neither time nor opportunity for re-forming them at close order on their covering serjeants, the officer in command fixes upon _any man_ as a point of direction, the others instantly extend away right and left (unless at the time especially ordered to extend to either flank in particular), without regard to their original proper places—double into files—take up the general alignment—officers and non-commissioned officers with alertness take charge of proper portions, and the whole move and act upon this new centre, as if no inversion or mixture had occurred.

Upon such simple rules, well impressed and strictly maintained, any number of skirmishers may fight over large extents of the most intricate ground, perfectly in hand and without confusion. Or, should extraordinary events produce irregularity, officers in command may easily, in an instant, under the worst circumstances, restore good fighting order, until leisure permits a more regular formation.

In extensive skirmishes, the eyes and feelings of men retiring are powerfully drawn towards the most apparently important points of defence; and upon these, without direct orders, they more or less concentrate. Assailants follow the same impulse, and direct their force principally against these identical strongly occupied points.

Hence follow of necessity on both sides a massing into large marks for the fire of opposing musquetry, sometimes even of artillery—great unnecessary bloodshed in violent struggles, and a neglect on the defensive side of ground which ought to be occupied, and on the assailing side of points which ought to be attacked. Nothing but keeping men in hand by the principle of well understood and well maintained centres of direction can prevent similar evils.

Supports, in their movements, should be guided by the same general principle as skirmishers—that is, the centre or right centre support of each battalion should be, unless otherwise ordered, the support of direction, except in the cases of wheeling on a fixed pivot, or of taking ground to a flank. In the first exception, all conform to the pivot, and in the last to the leading division, _unless at the time otherwise ordered_. Supports, not belonging to the battalion of direction, except in the two cases just noticed, conform under the orders of their senior officer to the movements of those which do belong to it, with due regard to their primary duty—_the proper support of their own skirmishers_.

VII.

Skirmishers, by the looseness of their formation, are dangerously exposed to charges from small parties of the enemy’s light cavalry; and in districts destitute of continuous fences, but abounding in hollows, isolated patches of wood, or other features convenient for concealment, such attacks may burst forth with most confusing suddenness. Except in ground absolutely impracticable for cavalry, skirmishers must move in constant expectation of them.

The eye of the officer should be accustomed to recognise habitually those frequently occurring posts of defence against cavalry, copses, walls, hedges, ditches, &c., which are preferable to small squares; and the minds of men should be well prepared by previous instruction _and explanation_, to recollect, in an instant, in what their strength in such cases consists, and to be undaunted in it.

Against great charges of cavalry, large squares are unquestionably the safest and most efficient; but, in opposition to the small dashes which occur in skirmishing, large squares are often impracticable, and small ones more advisable, as being more rapidly formed and broken up.

Squares have a moral strength in proportion to the mutual acquaintance of the men and officers who compose them. Men of the same company stand better together than those of mixed companies, and men of the same regiment better than those of different corps. However, as in the field thorough mixtures do occur, and as they, if observed, are likely above all other things to bring on charges from the enemy’s cavalry, squares of mixed masses should, in instruction, at times be practised.

It is not necessary to describe the different modes by which, on the drill field, men may be thrown into confusion. When this state of things has been brought about, mixed, irregular, rallying squares can be formed by adding the “double quick” to the ordinary sounds for squares against cavalry.[13]

The “double quick” is required to mark the necessity for instantaneous irregular masses, in contradistinction to the more regular squares, _which on the drill field skirmishers should always endeavour to form, unless at the time otherwise ordered_. It cannot be too constantly upheld as a permanent principle that, even in skirmishing, _order is the rule and irregularity the exception_.

On the signal “double quick” in immediate succession to the sounds established for the formation of squares,[14] officers, exercising most actively their intelligence, in proper numbers and at proper distances, hold up their swords or caps, and the men rush round them into masses of defence without any regard to company or other distinctions.

These mixed squares, as well as all others, may “commence firing”—“cease firing”—“advance”—“retire”—“take ground to a flank,”—or “close” to any particular square, by order, or by the simple sounds for these movements. The “close” may be important to form a large square from several small ones, the cavalry still hovering near.

To these mixed squares also, the word or sound to “extend” may be given. The men then, without regard to regular places, extend away to the right and left from each square, and double into files.

When the ground is nearly occupied, the officer in command fixes on a point of direction, to which the whole conform.

In the event of infantry skirmishers pressing forward to harass a square, or of cavalry endeavouring to prevent its movements by hovering near without charging, one or two ranks from the rear face may, by order, move briskly round by the right and left—double into files—cover the front at a short distance, and rush round again to their places whenever there appears a necessity for the square itself to fire.

In drill in general, and in that of light infantry in particular, instructors confine themselves by far too closely to mere formal directions, to the neglect of pithy practical explanations. In nothing is this last addition more required than in reference to charges of cavalry.

A column of horsemen, coming rapidly on with all its denseness, its height, its dust, its shouts, and its clangour, appears to the untrained mind as altogether irresistible. But appearances are not in themselves realities—let cavalry to the utmost stretch of mortal might,—

“Come as the winds come when forests are rended;” And “come as the waves come when navies are stranded;”

one thing only will be required to enable squares of infantry, like deep-rooted rocks, to disperse these wild winds and waves, right and left, in dust, froth, and confusion—_a well impressed knowledge of their own strength_; accompanied as a natural consequence, by a deliberate employment of that, _when properly used_, most destructive weapon, the musket.[15] Nor can more blame attach to cavalry for such results, than would apply to infantry for failing, in clear day-light, before well-barricadoed buildings or well-scarped redoubts. Neither in similar cases owe success, when they get it, to their own conduct or efficiency, but to the needless panic of their enemy.

Such conclusions as to the relative strength of cavalry, are established by a string of facts more or less evident, stretching from Ilium, through Pharsalia, to Waterloo; and every fact is worth a thousand opposing ingenious speculations.

VIII.

Contending without a reserve is desperate risk in struggles of all kinds, civil and military. In such predicaments, if fortune frown, well nigh all is lost.

In skirmishes, reserves, including in the first place supports, are not only of great importance as rallying points, in extraordinary cases of misfortune, but also as necessary aids to the ordinary movements of the extended line.

In _attacks_, supports are useful for filling up accidental gaps in the front line—for prolonging its flanks or covering them obliquely or perpendicularly—for strengthening the skirmishers at any moment that these may find their numbers unequal to important work before them—for relieving them when they or their ammunition become exhausted—for coming up in close order to charge bridges, streets, villages, or other defiles, too strongly occupied to be forced by the skirmishers, and to serve as bases, when time allows it, for the formation of squares against cavalry.

In _defences_, in addition to the foregoing duties reversed as to bodies retiring, supports have the highly important responsibilities of leading the skirmishers in the true and best line of retreat—of opening that line in all suitable places for their convenient passage, and of taking care that it be not intercepted by the enemy.

Reserves, particularly so called, supply the places of supports when necessary, and go to the front for any object requiring the intervention of a particularly strong, steady, and concentrated force.

Without express orders, supports should not move forward to occupy accidental gaps in the extended line, except on ground so intricate, or under circumstances so emergent, that the skirmishers themselves cannot readily regain their lost communications.

In most movements, set unvarying sentences of command promote alertness and prevent mistakes.

For prolonging in the same direction the flanks of the extended line—for covering them perpendicularly or obliquely—for strengthening the skirmishers by mixing others with them, or for relieving them; the following set, concise orders to supports obviously present themselves:—

NO. —— SUPPORT.: PROLONG THE —— FLANK. In the same direction as the general line understood.

DO. —— DO.: COVER THE —— FLANK, _perpendicularly_; with moderate licence, according to the features of the ground, understood.

DO. —— DO.: COVER OBLIQUELY THE —— FLANK. _An obliquity of one-eighth of the circle_, with the same licence, understood.

DO. —— DO.: STRENGTHEN NO. ——. To prevent mistakes, the word “strengthen” to be repeated with sufficient distinctness by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Support to which it is given, when they arrive near to the skirmishers or the skirmishers near to them.

DO. —— DO.: RELIEVE NO. ——. The word “relieve” to be repeated in like manner, for the same reason.

With regard to strengthening the extended line by mixing its supports with it, it may be objected that, in such cases, when there are no reserves at hand, the great rule of never fighting without them is rejected. It is true, the rule is violated; the party if actually engaged is fighting at a desperate risk, but there are cases in which desperate risks are wise and lawful ventures. These are in the not uncommon events with skirmishers of desperate extremities; at such moments methodical prudence is ill-masked imbecility.

On the 10th of December, 1813, some of the piquets of the light division, in thick weather and a close country, were suddenly assailed by the heads of heavy columns. The division in the rear was scattered in straggling houses. One of the companies on piquet was forced back upon another in support, near the point of junction of two important roads leading directly into the cantonments. Both companies were instantly extended, without any support, into a thick skirmishing line; nothing less would have been effectual. The ground was held with little variation for at least two hours—two heavy attacks were repulsed, every round of ammunition was expended, the brigade immediately in the rear allowed to pack and send off its baggage, and steadily to take up its fighting position, and the piquets to fall back upon it without further molestation. Similar circumstances have no doubt occurred, and may often occur again. The great maxim alluded to therefore has its exceptions, _and these, if carefully marked as exceptions_, may _sometimes_ with propriety be admitted into instruction skirmishing.

To attack or defend, with concentrated supports, a bridge, the street of a village, or other peculiarly important point, the word is simply passed, “Supports, close on No. ——,” the support in front of, or on, that point. Near this division of formation the officer in command places himself; and as each severally arrives gives his direction—“line,” “double column,” “open,” “close,” “quarter distance,” “half distance column,” or otherwise, as may be thought necessary. The support of formation in all cases standing fast as the basis.

To break up the formation, “Supports to your proper places, threes right and left shoulders forward, quick march,” will speedily restore all to common skirmishing order.

No duties of supports are more important than those in retrograde movements, of leading their skirmishers in proper lines of retreat; and of opening those lines sufficiently, but not more than sufficiently, for their passage. Circumstances have actually occurred, and, in intricate countries, are likely often to be repeated, of fine fellows, slowly retiring before an overwhelming enemy, their whole attention absorbed upon their front, suddenly finding further retreat intercepted by impassable obstacles, with no alternative remaining but to surrender, or fight their way right and left at the risk of almost utter destruction.

The principles advanced in the foregoing remarks, are not, in the main, of a character to be limited to the details of particular movements; but are rather to be kept continually on the mind, for the purpose of being thrown into effect as circumstances may require. _Practical_ differs from _formal_ skirmishing, even more by the style than by the method of its execution.

Not one sentence, it is believed, will be found to stand in opposition to the British established system. The few points in which they may at first sight appear to differ from it, consist simply in an application of principles already established to a practical extent somewhat beyond that usually adopted. If an officer who did not act upon this extent of application, were to succeed in the command of a corps to one who had adopted it, neither he nor those under him would experience any difficulty from the previous practice.

It should not be forgotten, that the thorough spirit of practical skirmishing is not to be communicated or maintained, with only one or two companies at a time, on the level, restricted, drill field. Soldiers, after having been _thoroughly_ grounded in elementary details and permanent principles, should be often taken out _in large bodies_ to skirmish, _with strict, universal and incessant attention to the duty_, across extensive and intricate tracts of country.

Such tracts are often to be found without restrictions in foreign stations; and at proper seasons of the year, a little management and promises of repairing damages will generally procure access to admirable skirmishing ground from British farmers and landed proprietors.

The writer is conscious that he can have advanced little, if anything, that must not have occurred to officers who have had experience in this branch of warfare, or that may not have been brought into instruction practice by them. He has not, however, seen the foregoing practical application of essential principles thrown _broadly_ into print; and it appears to him important that it should be so exhibited, in order that the spirit of actual skirmishing may not be confined to the regimental locality, or cease with the regimental employment of those who witnessed it.

Footnote 4:

With long range rifles, this limit will probably now be eight hundred yards.—(_Second edition._)

Footnote 5:

In this branch of instruction, there is unquestionably a very wide field for practicable improvement. In addition to some advances nearer to perfection in the construction of the musquet itself, _very much_ might be done towards the art of using it, in the ways of systematical scientific instruction, and improved local conveniences for ball practice. These of necessity would entail some public expense, but every reasonable outlay towards the maintenance of national military efficiency is true economy, and the neglect of it real extravagance.—(_First edition._)

Footnote 6:

The characteristic difference between British and foreign ideas of good light infantry is quietly portrayed at a stroke by Napier, when, in answer to St. Cyr’s remark, that “the Migueletes are the best light troops in the world,” he observes, “If, instead of _fifteen thousand_ Migueletes, the _four thousand_ men composing Wellington’s light division had been on the heights of Cardadeu, _General St. Cyr’s sixty rounds of ammunition would scarcely have carried him to Barcelona_,”—_Peninsular War_, vol. ii. page 104.

Footnote 7:

_Eight_ hundred yards, again, must now be about the proper limit.

Footnote 8:

With the long range, “the skirmishers’ charge” and “single line” must become _the exception_, and advancing by “alternate ranks” _the general practice_.

Footnote 9:

Exposed to the long range, it would appear that supports will be often obliged to loosen into extended order.

Footnote 10:

600 yards may be the distance now proper for this sentence.

Footnote 11:

Now, on exposed ground, often in _single rank_: at the word “form single rank,” the rear rank men taking ground to the left, and dressing up into the front line half way between their own front rank man and the man on his left.

Footnote 12:

This file should be calculated by the flanks and centres of divisions, and not by total arithmetical numbers—also small odd portions of divisions, which may happen to fall into the general formation, must not be taken into account.

Footnote 13:

Or, of course, by the word “rallying squares” from officers in command.

Footnote 14:

Sounds.—“Alarm” to excite attention, followed by “assembly” for _regular squares_ on the supports, or by “assembly” and “double quick” for instantaneous “rallying squares.”

Footnote 15:

If this were true in the days of the musket, how much more must it now apply to cavalry charges made for one thousand yards under deadly discharges from the rifle! unless indeed artillery be brought against the squares with greatly increased powers of destruction.

A BRIEF SYSTEM OF COMMON LIGHT INFANTRY DRILL, ADAPTED TO THE LONG RANGE RIFLE.

Ordinary Rules.

1. The company or division of _about_ sixty men, is the _unit_ of extended Light Infantry, in the same manner as the battalion of about six hundred men, is the _unit_ of a large military force at close order. Every company, or portion of a company, acting as Light Infantry, is therefore kept in hand by its immediate commander.

2. Extensions from close to skirmishing order, are always from _the centre_ of the company or portion of the company, unless at the time otherwise ordered.

3. Closings from skirmishing to compact order are always to _the centre_, unless at the time otherwise ordered.

(In both of the foregoing cases the word “centre” is _usually uttered_, but the rules are necessary for the prevention of uncertainty in circumstances of rapidity.)

4. Extensions are in single files six paces apart, and firings are carried on by alternate ranks, front rank commencing. The front rank and rear rank man must never be unloaded together.

_When not firing._

5. All movements are in “quick time.”

6. Skirmishers when halted, _stand_, with arms ordered.

_When firing has commenced_.

7. All movements of skirmishers are at the “double quick.”

8. Skirmishers while halting, on open ground drop on the right knee; on intersected ground they make the best of any cover near them, choosing their own bodily position.

9. In advancing, men whose rifles are loaded always pass by the _right_ of those who are loading; and in like manner in retiring, men who are not loaded pass to _the proper left_ of those who are nearly ready to fire.

10. In advancing, _all_ load “as front rank,” rifles on the left side, muzzles to the front; in retiring _all_ load “as rear rank,” rifles on the right side, muzzles to the rear.

11. In all movements directly to the front or rear, the right centre file of the company skirmishers, is the proper _file of direction_, to whose course all others conform, and from towards which they keep their relative distances.

12. In all movements directly or obliquely to a flank, the leading file of that flank is, _for the time being_, the file of direction.

13. In all changes of front on a fixed pivot, the file which is that pivot is, of necessity, _for the time being_, the file of direction. (See on this most important particular of “the file of direction,” Article VI. of “The Essentials.”)