Part 1

Produced by Brian Coe, David King, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive.)

THE ESSENTIALS OF GOOD SKIRMISHING

THE ESSENTIALS OF GOOD SKIRMISHING:

_SECOND EDITION_.

TO WHICH ARE NOW ADDED,

A BRIEF SYSTEM OF

COMMON LIGHT INFANTRY DRILL;

A METHOD OF PRACTICE FOR

THE SPEEDY ACQUIREMENT OF PROFICIENCY IN THE USE OF THE RIFLE;

AND SHORT OBSERVATIONS ON SERVICEABLE APPOINTMENTS AND DRESS.

BY

COLONEL G. GAWLER, K.H.

_Late of the 52nd Light Infantry._

LONDON: PARKER, FURNIVALL, AND PARKER, MILITARY LIBRARY, WHITEHALL. 1852

LONDON: SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET.

TO

SIR JOHN MACDONALD, K.C.B.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO THE FORCES,

THE FOLLOWING REMARKS,

IN REFERENCE TO ONE OF THE BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE

COMMITTED TO HIS ESPECIAL SUPERINTENDENCE,

ARE, BY PERMISSION,

MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

BY HIS VERY OBEDIENT

AND FAITHFUL SERVANT,

THE AUTHOR.

_August, 1837._

CONTENTS.

I. The Essentials of Good 13 Skirmishing

II. A system of Common Light 35 Infantry Drill, adapted to the Long Range Rifle

III. A Method of Practice for 51 the Speedy Acquirement of Proficiency in the Use of the Rifle

IV. Short Observations on 59 Dress and Appointments

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Under the immense increase which is now taking place in the length of range and accuracy in effect of small arms, there must, of necessity, come an increase of the importance of skill in skirmishing. The reconnoissances of mounted staff officers, the patrolling, skirmishing, and menacing of charges by small bodies of cavalry, and even the action of artillery on that very large proportion of the surface of the earth in which vision is limited to at most one thousand yards, will be greatly controlled by the accurate and distant infantry marksman. Nay, even columns and lines of infantry will now only be able to repel his power of destructive annoyance by meeting him with troops in extended order. Of old, if he pressed too near to a closed body of infantry, an impatient volley might sweep him and his comrades into annihilation, but now, ensconced in his distant cover, he may “beard the lion in his den,” a battalion of infantry in position, with something like impunity.

With this distant power of the individual skirmisher, however, there stand connected increased difficulties of combination with his surrounding and supporting comrades. Such general unity of action is most important at times for reasonable security, and always for the production of general and total effects.

These advantages must depend, more than ever, upon well-impressed individual acquaintance with the essential principles of good skirmishing.

Under these considerations the following pages, which were received at the time of their first publication with public[1] and private testimonials of approbation, are reprinted, with some corrections and additions to make them suitable to the present standard of military efficiency, and with remarks which may be useful, at this period, upon light infantry drill, rifle practice, dress, and appointments.

Footnote 1:

Blackwood’s Magazine, Oct. 1837, page 521; United Service Journal, Nov. 1837, page 415; Naval and Military Gazette, 1837; &c., &c., &c.

_February, 1852._

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

Some high continental military authorities have of late years proclaimed that British soldiers are incapable, or next to incapable, of acting as light infantry. Than this announcement there never was a clearer illustration of the golden maxim, “Assertions are not proofs.” If our censors had taken the trouble to search for evidence, southern and western Europe would have told them, that in these portions of the civilized world there have not been known, in the middle and modern ages, light troops superior to those of Britain. In archers, the light infantry of “the olden time,” by what nation in the world was England surpassed? Her troops of this class, the direct forefathers of a large proportion of our present soldiery, gained for themselves a name that might, one would think, have sounded even to the shores of the Baltic, which at least has rung upon every ear familiar with the tales of Poictiers, Cressy, and Agincourt. All of these, as described by foreign pens,[2] were won mainly by the skill and conduct of the British bowmen. At Cressy 12,000 Genoese, then the most renowned light troops of continental Europe, were driven like chaff before unerring cloth-yard shafts from the tough old English yew.[3]

Had our critics inquired concerning more modern warfare, their Hessian neighbours would have told them that in the North American revolutionary contest, in that six years’ war of surprises, skirmishes, and ambuscades, among unequalled woods and wildernesses, the British soldier in himself was more than a match for the skirmisher-bred American woodsman; and, to say the least, as alert and intelligent at the outposts as his well-trained German fellow-combatants. The struggle, indeed, ended unsuccessfully to Britain; but, let the blame rest where it may, it cannot be thrown upon the British soldier; he never came short of his duty.

In the protracted and astonishing conquest of Hindoostan, which had some European inimical spectators, the flank companies of battalions did three-fourths of the work; not only concentrated at the breach and escalade, but also, when necessity required it, extended in the jungle.

And to come to those contests which offer the fairest estimate of the British soldier as he now is, and with which all civilized military critics may be expected to have become acquainted, the European campaigns of the Duke of Wellington; it is not sounding an empty boast, but a note of most sober and honest truth to say, that, than the British light troops of his army, better never guarded a camp or fought in a skirmish. In a fluctuating war of eight campaigns, over many hundred miles of varying country, opposed to the bravest and most intelligent soldiers of the continent, none were ever more constantly conquerors in action or more successfully vigilant on outpost duty.

It is true, indeed, that the British light infantry man has a practical system in some important particulars peculiar to himself; and in none more so than that, under all circumstances, he continues the well-disciplined soldier, never systematically assuming the character of the loose, lawless, free-corps freebooter. From this last peculiarity may have arisen the incorrect impressions of our foreign contemporaries. We, however, glory in the difference, and affirm that stern discipline and high soldier-like principle must form the basis of thorough military efficiency to the full as much in the light and extended services, as in those of a more concentrated description.

Free corps originate in long internal wars. Happily for Britain, she of late has not been distinguished for such nurseries of irregular military skill; but when her territories were desolated by them, there were not wanting bodies of this description as active, intelligent, and enterprising as any that ever graced the continent of Europe.

To assist in keeping up the remembrance of the essentials of the practical system of the modern British light infantry man, in that important branch of his duty, skirmishing; in order that foreigners, whatever be their theories, may continue to receive, when necessity requires it, practical evidence that British soldiers can act as light infantry, is the principal object of the Author in submitting to the army the following observations.

1837.

Footnote 2:

See “Le Nouveau Dictionnaire des Sièges et Batailles,” under these articles.

Footnote 3:

La première ligne des Français etoit composée de douze mille archers Génois. Meurdris et décomfits par les flèches que les archers Anglais leur tiroient si vivement que ce sembloit neige, ils lâcherent le pied et se renversèrent sur la seconde ligne.... Philippe, croyant qu’il y avoit de la trahison de la part des Génois, s’ecria: Or tôt tuez cette ribaudaille qui nous empêche la voie sans raison.—_Nouveau Dictionnaire des Sièges et Batailles, article Crècy._

THE ESSENTIALS OF GOOD SKIRMISHING.

Skirmishing is the art of fighting, with numbers insufficient to occupy, in close order, the ground contested.

In light infantry or skirmishing drill, as in all other instruction, the principal art is, to dwell _forcibly_ on things _really essential_; _moderately_ on things _merely important_; and _lightly_ on things _nearly indifferent_.

To good skirmishing there are _eight essentials_:—

1. Active Intelligence.

2. Correct Firing.

3. Daring Courage.

4. Making the best of Cover.

5. Presenting the smallest possible Marks to the Enemy’s Fire.

6. Maintaining Extension from, and Dependence on, a given File of Direction.

7. Preserving a sufficient Readiness to resist Cavalry.

8. A judicious Employment of Supports and Reserves.

Very deficient in any of these qualifications, skirmishers cannot be of the first order. Possessing them all in reasonable proficiency, _skirmishers must be very good, let the character of their other attainments and systems of drill be whatever it may_.

I.

The life and especial mark of the good skirmisher is ACTIVE INTELLIGENCE.

In the ranks, the closer men attain to a state of unreflecting mechanism, with nothing of mind but attention, the nearer they are to true soldier-like perfection. Not a thought should arise, an eye-ball turn, or a finger tremble, but in obedience, and that obedience should be accurate and instantaneous as the word. Not so the skirmisher; within certain limits he is his own general, and must think for himself. From the moment that he “shakes out” from the elbows of his right and left comrades, reflection must awake, and, in due dependence on a broad established system, be energetically directed to gain every advantage on the opposing foe.

The French as skirmishers excel in active intelligence. Every man manœuvres as if the fate of the day depended upon his conceptions. Their ability, in this particular, may spring in a great degree from the looseness of their instruction practice of all field exercise. This, while it is ill calculated to make steady soldiers at close order, is well adapted to give free scope to the natural intelligence of skirmishers.

The mechanical stiffness, formerly much seen in British light infantry, arose, there can scarcely be a question, from the formality of our old ordinary mode of applying the system of light infantry drill. The automatonism, proper to the ranks, was extended to skirmishers, and they also were taught to move only as they were wound up. The indignation of the drill instructor was poured out, not upon men who failed in the first-rate essentials of good skirmishing, but upon those who erred a foot in dressing or in distance—who did not step off, halt, or fire, precisely at the sound of the whistle or elevation of the signal fire-lock—whose unmusical ears refused to distinguish amid the endless variety of bugled orders—who could not run like racers, or who ran bewildered in some of the intricate evolutions, which were supposed to crown the very pinnacle of skirmishing perfection. Some corps did not drill according to this erroneous method, others did not carry it to its full extent; but, taking the army as a whole, unreflecting precision in the details of skirmishing was its system, and to this day that system has its votaries.

It is no small proof of the strength of natural intelligence in British soldiers, that, when brought into actual service, they broke through the fettered stiffness of their instruction drill, let go what was indifferent in it, clung to that which was important, and soon rivalled their intelligent and experienced opponents.

The true summit of perfection in skirmishing is, _the preservation of order in disorder_ and _of system in confusion_; for the circumstances which accompany skirmishes of necessity produce, almost always, more or less mixture, inversion, and general irregularity. In hot contests over large extents of intricate ground, men of different companies regiments, brigades, and even divisions, mingle with each other. Soldiers should therefore be drilled, _not indeed to fall into such irregularities on principle, but to be ready for them in practice_. They should be made at times to skirmish in inverted companies, mixed companies, and mixed regiments—to form good skirmishing lines out of confused masses—to concentrate from similar mixed bodies into squares to resist cavalry, or into lines or columns for the purposes of charging or defending streets of villages, or other defiles—to extend again rapidly, and to perform every necessary evolution as if no mixture or irregularity had occurred.

_Such movements, when inculcated as necessary exceptions to good order, do not unfit soldiers for more regular manœuvres; but, by the contrast, increase order and intelligence in them._

Soldiers who have not been drilled on this principle, or who have not acquired it by experience, are, when extended under fire, continually liable to be transformed into unmanageable mobs. Skirmishers who understand it, will always show a formidable front, be ready for every changing event, and, under the worst possible circumstances, act together in the mighty energy of mutual confidence.

Unreflecting mechanical precision is at direct variance with such practice, active intelligence and a wise well-defined general system are its component elements. Active intelligence, therefore, in every point of view, is invaluable to the skirmisher; and the attention of all drill superintendents and instructors should be unremittingly directed to stamp it on his mind and to mix it with his practice.

II.

The soldier at close order always has, or should have, a large mark for his fire. Nothing can be more unsteady or unsoldierlike than for a closed body to pour a volley upon mere skirmishers: from troops concentrated, no object but an opposing mass or line within 200 yards should provoke a single shot.[4] The skirmisher has not this advantage, his mark is generally small and often indistinct; besides which, the temptation to careless aim is much greater to him, who fires away sixty or one hundred and twenty rounds over hedge and ditch without intermission, than to the battalion soldier, who seldom expends more than twenty at any one time. Hence the peculiar necessity for practising light troops to cool steady aim and accurate firing.

The immense importance of very great attention to the ball practice[5] of this branch of the service, is too obvious to require an enforcing observation; but it ought to be impressively remarked, that good practical aim is not to be acquired _only_ in front of the target, _but to the full as much_ in the every day drill firings, with or without blank cartridge.

It is not the case that careful firing is provoked by the sight of an enemy; on the contrary, arithmetical calculation has repeatedly proved, to the blush of the good soldier, that under no circumstances are balls so wildly and carelessly thrown away as in those moments when the fortunes of empires are thrown away along with them. In action, the greater number of the musquets are pointed _generally_ at masses of dust and smoke, and not _precisely_ at the dark active figures which they envelop.

For these reasons, on the drill field, instead of the loose careless practice too common in this particular, the soldier, and especially the skirmisher, should be unsparingly compelled to go through the motions of aiming and firing at a precise object, as accurately as if at actual ball practice, until the habit be engraven too deep on his mind to be obliterated by any circumstances of confusion.

III.

Daring courage, as an acknowledged essential to the thorough soldier of every class, it would scarcely have been necessary to have noticed in the present enumeration, did not an opinion appear to obtain, much on the continent and with some in Great Britain, that light troops are required to exercise it in a less desperate degree than men at close order.

Foreigners, when extended, often spend systematically much time in long shots and shy fighting, and give way, as a matter of course, before troops in weightier formations. In the British service this opinion does not prevail; there is no good reason why it should, and it is of great importance to the thorough efficiency of skirmishers that it should not.

The British soldier is as much a grenadier at heart, with a green tuft in his cap skirmishing through a wood, with no close support but his tried and trusty rear-rank man, as he is in designation, when mounting a breach, under a black bear-skin, with ten thousand bayonets at his back.

In extended order he is just as ready, as at any other time, to fix his bayonet and dash to close quarters, if the enemy, on tolerably equal terms, will stand for him; and if his piquet be pressed by a heavy attacking column, he sees no more reason than at any other time, to surrender an inch of ground, as long as he can stand upon it. Very remarkable instances of this kind occurred during the Peninsular war.[6]

It is well that it should be so; for if it be indeed true, as some insinuate, that the British soldier falls somewhat below his continental brethren in the policy of skirmishing, this important essential, _persevering unflinching courage_, will ever, as it always has done, make up for minor deficiencies, and carry him triumphantly through.

It is useful to observe, how much the flinching practice of foreign light infantry has influenced, and perhaps been influenced by, their systems of drill. The old method, which we borrowed from them, of firing advancing by alternate ranks or files, may be practicable with long shots and cautious movements, but is only partially applicable to the service practice of British light infantry, who, even when close to their enemy, count it most unsoldier-like to fire without an immediately important purpose in view; who seldom fire at all until within two hundred yards of their object;[7] and who, after a few quiet shots to get within the length of their breath and to draw on the enemy’s fire, dash at the opposing line of defence with that peculiar rush which may be called “the skirmishers’ charge.”[8]

The present established mode of advancing firing by “single line,” is that into which daring skirmishers always do, and of necessity always must, fall. On the drill ground, when required, this mode may be completed to a perfect copy of “the skirmishers’ charge,” by the sound “double quick” at about eighty yards from the supposed enemy’s line of defence. The whole then, still partially firing, dash on at an accelerated pace, until, the cover gained, “the halt” is sounded, to take breath behind it, and prepare for another forward effort.

IV.

Conduct which in some cases, under fire, is disgraceful, in others is meritorious. The man in the ranks who shrinks away from a shell or cannon ball, or who goes out of his commanded course to cover himself from musquetry, has little claim to the name of a _brave_ soldier; while he who in a trench or battery does not bow low at the cry “shot,” or fall prostrate before a blazing shell, _or who in a skirmish neglects to make the best of every foot of cover_, has no right, to the title of a wise one.

The difference arises from the line of military perfection being struck, not according to what will suit or save the individual, but by that which will benefit the general service.

Between the duties peculiar to compact fighting and skirmishing, the distinction should be drawn broad and deep on the drill field; because on the battle field, it is natural on either side to be forgetful.

There are two kinds of cover—_ball proof_ cover, and _mere concealing_ cover. Ragged rocks, large trees, brick and stone walls and buildings, stout fences and thick mud-banks, constitute generally the first class; young plantations, gorse and underwood, hedges, abattis, slight fences and narrow sand hills, the second.

It is for the first that the eye of the good skirmisher continually seeks. The second, after fire completely opens, turned even to best advantage, _is worth but little more than no cover at all_; and is worse than no cover at all, if the men, which they are much disposed to do, collect in groups behind it.

In this way, that very frequent out-lying piquet defence, abattis across roads, is often more injurious to friends than to foes. Instead of being planted, as an obstacle to the enemy, 100 yards in front of the intended line of defence, it is but too commonly placed _on_ that line, and when the struggle comes, is thickly occupied as a sort of rampart. On such striking objects the enemy’s fire concentrates, every ball goes through, and the loss behind is severe.

Skirmishers must not only seek for cover, but _make the best of it_. Good cover loses half its advantages if stupidly occupied, and ingenuity will often make bad cover ball-proof.

However, notwithstanding all that may be said in favour of “making the best of cover,” it must be thoroughly remembered, that this duty, at the moment of a close attack, is altogether secondary to those of courage and activity.

When it comes to short distances, the quicker the affair is settled the less will be the loss of the assailants; and the more daring the front exhibited, the greater the probabilities of success.

At every change of situation supports should, if possible, be placed under cover by their commanders; if exposed, as large bodies they form most inviting marks to the enemy’s long shots. This precaution, when opportunities offer, should not be forgotten on the drill field.[9]

V.

One man at 200 yards[10] is a very small mark. Two abreast together, a tolerably good one; three abreast together should almost always be hit, and four never be missed. Our opponents, therefore, in skirmishing, cannot serve us better than by grouping together; and that which we would wish them to do, we ourselves must carefully avoid. Skirmishers should move in single files,[11] except in thick “concealing cover,” when two or three together may, without exposure, increase mutual confidence; or behind patches of “ball-proof cover,” on which small groups may concentrate as to temporary breast-works; in either case extending again at once when good cover ceases. Even in single files, men loading should incessantly cover with precision their file leaders, so as to offer marks of but one in front.

_In skirmishing, more than in any other branch of warfare, men may be uselessly thrown away_; and therefore in this, more than in any other, economy of life and limb should form a paramount object of attention.

On British soldiers also, perhaps more than on any others, it is important to impress these observances; for there is in them such a peculiarly strong national perception of that great military maxim, “concentration is strength,” that overlooking its exceptions, they are always powerfully impelled the hotter the fire to group the closer together.

Nothing but deeply impressed instruction, or dearly bought experience, can break in them the bonds of a propensity so thoroughly at variance with good skirmishing.

VI.