CHAPTER XXIV.

THE MURDER OF MR MARGARY, 1875--CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1876--RATIFICATION, 1885.

I. THE MURDER OF MR MARGARY, 1875.

Efforts to reach China from Burma--Expedition under Colonel Browne--Mr Margary appointed interpreter--Meets party at Bhamo--Precedes them into China, and is assassinated at Manwyne--Discussion thereon with the Chinese Government--Tsên Yü-ying, Governor of Yunnan--British Minister charges him with the murder--Demands his arraignment--Sends commission from Peking to Yunnan to take evidence--Unsuccessful.

Ever since the conquest of British Burma, and more especially since the treaty concluded with the King of Burma in 1862, political and commercial speculation had been busied with the mountainous country which divides it from the empire of China. The fact that next to nothing was known of that wild region, combined with the prospect of reopening the old caravan route which had been some time closed by disturbances among the frontier tribes and by Chinese insurgents, constituted a great stimulus to exploration. To this end projects were from time to time considered by the Indian Government--sometimes at the instance of enthusiastic officials, sometimes urged by the superior authority of the British Government under pressure from mercantile bodies in England. South-western China, however, was as jealously guarded from intrusion as the sea-coast had been, and no progress was made in penetrating its mystery.

After the failure of an exploring expedition under Colonel Edward B. Sladen in 1868, the Indian Government, in furtherance of the wishes of the Government at home, sanctioned yet another attempt six years later, though with decided misgivings as to any successful issue. Arrangements were made during 1874, and the expedition, under Colonel Horace Browne, was despatched from Burma _viâ_ Bhamo in the beginning of 1875. The British Minister in China had been asked for his co-operation, and in particular he was requested to furnish Colonel Browne with a competent interpreter. It was arranged that this official, armed with a Chinese passport issued by the Government at Peking, should make his own way through China from the coast and join Colonel Browne at Bhamo.

The choice of her Majesty's Minister fell upon one of the most promising officers in the consular service, Mr Augustus Raymond Margary, who proceeded from Shanghai by way of the Yangtze to the province of Yunnan, and in five months accomplished his perilous pioneering journey with perfect success, arriving on the 17th of January at the rendezvous, where he was received with the warmest feelings by Colonel Browne and his party, and with surprise and admiration by the Burmese.

On being joined by Mr Margary, the mission prepared to start from Bhamo towards China. Everything seemed auspicious for the expedition. On arriving at the Burmese frontier, however, the party were met by sinister rumours of armed opposition to their passage through the Kakhyen hills. Margary, having just come safely through these districts, volunteered to proceed alone to ascertain the truth of the reports which they had heard. How he was treacherously assassinated at Manwyne, the first city within the Chinese border, and how Colonel Browne's mission was assailed and driven back by armed bands, has been told by Dr John Anderson in 'A Narrative of the two Expeditions to Western China' of 1868 and 1875, and by Sir Rutherford Alcock, the sympathetic editor of Mr Margary's 'Letters and Journals,' as well as in numerous Government publications.

It became then a question of the gravest import to fix the guilt of this treachery, and to consider what means could be adopted for avenging the death of a young Englishman within Chinese territory, and bearing a passport from the Government of Peking. "Whether it be Burmese, Kakhyens, Shan tribes, or Chinese that are in question, it is impossible we can accept a defeat of this nature, brought on, too, by our own spontaneous acts," was the conclusion of Sir Rutherford Alcock. Governments which resorted to the assassination of individuals under their own safe conduct must be deterred, by persuasion or by force, from the use of such tactics. The demand for redress which was made direct to the Tsungli-Yamên was followed by a wrangling and evasive discussion as to the conditions on which the passport had been granted. These, it must be admitted, had not been so definitely stated as they might have been. Passports, as Mr Wade, then Minister in Peking, explained, were granted in two forms--for "business," meaning trade, or for "pleasure," rendered in Chinese "tour or travel." It was in the latter form that the passport for Colonel Browne was applied for, and the Chinese made a plausible defence of their position on this narrow ground, asserting that the subsequent declaration that the mission was intended to open a trade route through Chinese provinces, where they alleged no trading rights for foreigners existed, could not be covered by a passport granted for pleasure.

The voluminous discussion on international rights which followed, although academical in form and irrelevant to the question at issue, betrayed the animus of the Chinese Government in regard to commercial concessions in the interior; but it is possible that the true motive for the repulse of Colonel Browne's expedition, of which Mr Margary's murder was but an incident, lay deeper. Europeans are accustomed to make light of oriental suspicions, and the idea that Colonel Browne's party was the vanguard of a hostile force to be treacherously introduced into Chinese territory under passport may seem too fantastic to have been entertained in good faith. Yet if we consider on what trivial grounds even the civilised Powers of Europe will at times suspect each other of the most grandiose designs, and how often the suspicion is justified, we need not dismiss as incredible the fact that, in a frontier province which had recently been the scene of a formidable rebellion, an armed escort accompanying a foreign tourist party should have caused sincere misgivings in the minds of the authorities. Nor do the facts of the case exclude the possibility of such suspicions being suggested from without, even if they did not arise spontaneously within. Apart from these special considerations, the chances of success would probably have been greater if the mission had started from the Chinese side, where the right of travel and exploration had already been established.

The verbal polemic over the conditions of the passport did not, however, touch the matter in hand, which was the murder of a British official for whom the Chinese Government, both imperial and provincial, were expressly responsible. It is not necessary at this day to pronounce judgment on the identity of the actual criminal. The murder was the result of a conspiracy in which Chinese and Burmese were both implicated. They were alike interested in preventing the passage of the mission, and the strong opposition of the Burma Government was not unknown to Mr Margary, for he had noted it in his Journal.

The King of Burma, the father of the well-known Theebaw, was a learned pandit and a devout Buddhist, as severe in regard to heretics as the crowned heads of Europe were in the days of the Inquisition. The Court of Ava, in its claims to obeisance from foreigners, was almost as exacting as the Son of Heaven himself, and the priests lorded it over the community with the arrogance of a pampered caste. Thus foreign intercourse was heavily hampered, and a good understanding rendered almost impossible. Fears for their prerogatives must have inspired the royal and priestly coterie with aversion to that restless element which was always trying to "open up" other people's country and to explore trade routes. Hence the motive for obstructing the passage of a foreign expedition between Burma and China was as strong on the Burmese as on the Chinese side.

Tsên Yü-ying, the Chinese governor, held an exceptionally strong position in his province, and the officials stood very much in awe of him. Though not a pure Chinese, having been born in the mountains of Kwangsi, of aboriginal parentage on one side, his personal prestige was very great. A fighting man from his youth, he had acquired an immense reputation in suppressing the Mohammedan rebellion in Yunnan. This he did in oriental style, extirpating the rebels so far as he could, root and branch. To save the trouble of burying many thousands of old people and children, he had them drowned in the Tali Lake. The military commander who was told off for this pleasing duty palliated the massacre, when in after years narrating these occurrences, by saying there were not really 10,000 but only 3000 thrown into the lake. This official had remonstrated with the governor against the sentence, saying that such severity was not in accordance with Tao li (principle); but Tsên replied, "You have nothing to do with Tao li; you must conform to the Leu li" (Penal Code).

Tsên Yü-ying was therefore something greater than an ordinary provincial governor, and wielded something more than the authority belonging to his office. Not only was he responsible, as all governors are, for what was done within his government, but it is difficult to conceive of any important incident occurring there without his personal sanction. But which was the leader in the plot, whether the acting-governor Tsên Yü-ying or the King of Burma, is comparatively unimportant; suffice it that her Majesty's Minister fixed, on grounds which satisfied himself, though of course on inferential evidence only, the instigation of the crime on the governor-general Tsên Yü-ying; and whether the direct guilt were brought home to him or not, there could be no question about his responsibility under the Chinese principle of administration. "From the governor-general downwards they are each and all individually and collectively held responsible for all that may happen in the limits of their jurisdiction." Accordingly, after much preliminary discussion, Mr Wade demanded that that high official should be censured for neglect of duty, and, on later information, that he should be brought for trial to Peking. To this demand the Peking Government refused to listen, and after feigning for many months to have no knowledge of what had taken place, they produced a report from the governor-general himself inculpating certain subordinates, of whom he seemed willing to make a nominal sacrifice. This report was so openly mendacious that Sir Thomas Wade threatened to haul down his flag if it were published.

Unluckily for the successful prosecution of the demand for the arraignment of the viceroy, the British Minister became entangled in a cat's-cradle of negotiations for the revision of the treaty of Tientsin, with which the Yunnan outrage got so mixed up that the different questions never could be, or at any rate never were, separated again. Throwing the net is the tactical device in which the Chinese excel. The demand for reparation for the murder was alternately put forward, modified, and withdrawn according as the general propositions were shuffled about, and thus the effect of a concentrated attack on the essential point was lost. The minister on his own showing found himself in a succession of dilemmas, while the Chinese defensive position was clear throughout: it was to refuse everything, evade when direct refusal was dangerous, and in short to baffle all attempts of the British Minister to get to close quarters with the question. Sir Thomas Wade was several times brought by these elusive tactics to the point of threatening withdrawal of the Legation, which in itself the Chinese would have welcomed as a householder might the "positively last visit" of a tax-collector, but for the ulterior consequences to be apprehended.

After many months of fruitless labour Sir Thomas Wade resolved to send a commission of his own to Yunnan to collect evidence as to Margary's murder. His right to do so was at first contested by the Chinese; but after considering the matter, and getting the best advice at their command, they assented, and named High Commissioners to meet the British officials. The Hon. T. G. Grosvenor, secretary of Legation, was detached for this duty, assisted by two of the most competent men in the consular service--Mr Colborn Baber and Mr Arthur Davenport. On the Chinese side were appointed the viceroy of the Hu Kwang, Li Han-chang, elder brother of Li Hung-chang, another official to whom Sir Thomas Wade objected strongly, but in vain, and Tsên Yü-ying himself, the inculpated party. The promises made to the British Minister before he would allow the mission to set out were broken as soon as it was fairly on its way, and Sir Thomas Wade had serious thoughts of recalling it, foreseeing that it was destined merely to waste time. What possible hope, indeed, could there be of isolated foreigners collecting evidence in a distant city against the high provincial officials? No evidence was taken. The British Commissioner was simply presented with the original report, to which was added the so-called "confession" of thirteen savages "kidnapped to do duty as prisoners at the bar." These savages could not speak Chinese, nor was their language understood by any one in the viceregal court; it was evident that they had never been near the scene of the crime, nor did they look in the least like men who were pleading guilty to a capital charge.

The motive of the Chinese in yielding to the appointment of the British commission, after refusing their assent to it, only occurred to Sir Thomas Wade when they recommended that Mr Grosvenor should remain in Yunnan until the case was closed. No coercive measures, they calculated, would be taken against them while these hostages remained in their hands. From first to last the only question that occupied the mind of the Chinese Government was whether force would be applied or not. And if they read--as of course they did--the English newspapers of the day they would see that the contingency of war was dwelt upon throughout the year 1875 as the sole alternative to the condign punishment of the Governor-General of Yunnan-Kweichow. This was, indeed, from time to time directly threatened by Sir Thomas Wade, and he had applied for the Flying Squadron to come on from India to support his demands. When at last, after eighteen months' struggle, he abandoned the negotiations, and "abruptly left Peking" for Shanghai in order to be in direct telegraphic communication with the Home Government, he wrote, "I had, in the last fortnight, again and again threatened either to remove the Legation or to recommend to her Majesty's Government the extremest measure of coercion unless I had secured a very moderate form of reparation."

When Prince Kung realised the fact that the British Minister had actually left the capital he became suddenly serious, and sent after him to say there had been a misunderstanding, which would have been cleared away if he had only waited. At the same time the prince had recourse to his foreign adviser, the Inspector-General of Customs, who stood to the Government somewhat in the relation of a "medicine-man." The inspector-general had taken an active part, both direct and indirect, in the comedy of the preceding eighteen months--whether as an ally or an opponent of the British Minister seems not to have been quite clear to the comprehension of the latter.

An imperial decree was immediately despatched to the Grand Secretary, Li Hung-chang, instructing him to detain the British Minister on his way through Tientsin, in order to confer with him on the Margary case. This proposal Sir Thomas Wade declined on several grounds: among others, that at a previous stage of the negotiations the promises made by Li Hung-chang had been repudiated by the Peking Government. This effort to stop him at Tientsin having failed, Mr Hart was despatched in hot haste after Sir Thomas Wade to Shanghai, ostensibly to discuss the "commercial question," but really to induce the British Minister to re-enter the arena of negotiation,[22] in which the Chinese felt themselves safe. Sir Thomas, therefore, consented to meet a special commissioner, but without committing himself as to the scope of the intended conference. The High Commissioner was Li Hung-chang, and the place of meeting Chefoo, the locality being selected by Sir Thomas Wade himself. There was concluded the famous Chefoo Convention.

II. CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1876.

Negotiations with Li Hung-chang at Chefoo--Mr Hart assisting--Sir Thomas Wade hurried into making an unsatisfactory settlement--Chefoo convention analysed--Net result an increase in the customs dues--Criticised by the merchants.

It was in the month of September, the summer not yet over, during which season the sea air and fine beach of Chefoo made it at that time the best health resort for the China coast. Visitors from Peking occasionally varied their summer residence at the Western Hills by spending a few weeks at Chefoo, and in 1876 there were several members of the diplomatic body taking their holiday at the watering-place, the meeting of the British and Chinese plenipotentiaries constituting for them an added attraction.

Sir Thomas Wade had originally no intention of concluding a formal convention, nor had he authority for closing the Yunnan question without further reference to his Government; but circumstances proved too strong for him to keep to his resolution. He, in fact, found himself in such a position of difficulty as is perhaps best described by the word "cornered"--the advantage of the game having passed entirely to the other side. The Chinese commissioner was powerfully reinforced by the inspector-general, supported by the local commissioner of customs for Chefoo; and the neutrality of those of the diplomatic body who were on the spot was believed to be benevolent to the Chinese. The "co-operative policy" of Mr Burlingame's day had for the time being at least lapsed, and particularist views among the Powers or their representatives began to prevail. The British Minister, deeming the matter in dispute with the Chinese a purely British concern, did not hold it incumbent on him to hamper his negotiations by daily consultations with his colleagues, who on their part resented his reticence, claiming it as a right that, considering how their national interests might be affected by the result, they should be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations. Sir Thomas Wade admits that, among other considerations, it was the impatience of these colleagues of his to see the discussion definitely terminated which induced him to close the case without waiting for further instructions from his Government.

It must be borne in mind that the problem before the Chinese High Commissioner had never varied: it was the extremely simple one, how to screen the ex-governor Tsên Yü-ying, whether guilty or innocent, without encountering a British armed force. The fate of the negotiations depended entirely on the probable movement of the Flying Squadron, which was lying at Talien-wan, a hundred miles off. No greater service could have been rendered to the Chinese Government than to assure the High Commissioner that he had nothing to fear from the British ships. The foreign Ministers who were present had their Intelligence Departments in full activity, and they had a shrewd notion of the limitations of the Flying Squadron, which they were free to communicate to the Chinese plenipotentiary. They were aware that the time--September 1876--was not opportune for the British Government to embark on distant enterprises of indefinite possibilities. From one source or another the assurance was given to the Chinese negotiator, and once convinced, on whatever evidence, that the British guns would fire nothing but salutes, Li Hung-chang felt himself master of the situation. It then became his turn to force a settlement, and he at once assumed a peremptory tone with the British Minister, notifying him that he would leave Chefoo on a certain day, convention or no convention. Sir Thomas Wade had, or thought he had, no choice but to capitulate to superior force. Pressed by his diplomatic colleagues, as has been said, as well as by the expressed desire of his own Government to get the tedious matter settled, he had to accept the best agreement he could get, and the Chefoo convention was the result.

The fear of coercion being eliminated, the negotiation became reduced to a custom-house affair like the treaty revision of 1869, the Chinese seizing the occasion to renew their former efforts to obtain an increase of revenue from foreign trade. Instead of adding to the import duty on foreign merchandise as in 1869, they now proposed to extend the area of internal taxation, and in particular they prepared the way for an indefinite increase in the opium revenue. This was the substantial part of the convention. New ports were opened in harmony with the scheme.

A clause referring to residence at Chungking in Szechuan provided that British merchants would not be allowed to reside there so long as no steamers had access to the port. When, under this contingent clause, it was attempted to make the conditional permission effective by sending steamers to the port, the Chinese Government offered opposition, and the right was abandoned by Great Britain.

As for the Yunnan affair, the settlement of it gravitated to the form which had been universally condemned. "Do not let the nation lay itself open to the contempt of an Asiatic people by accepting money for life treacherously taken by official order," wrote Sir R. Alcock in July 1875. But "the series of bad precedents" was once more followed, and "blood-money was accepted for the life of a British subject."

It was thought important to publish far and wide the terms of settlement, and a proclamation with Sir T. Wade's _imprimatur_ was posted throughout the country. It was remarked, however, that this proclamation embodied the very falsities against the publication of which the British Minister had previously protested under threat of breaking off diplomatic relations. The guilt of notoriously innocent parties was assumed in it, but their pardon granted on the fictitious ground that the evidence against them would not suffice to convict by the processes of British law.

A separate article provided for a mission of exploration by way of Szechuan and Tibet in the following year.

A subject on which Sir Thomas Wade had long set his heart was an improvement in the terms of intercourse between foreign and Chinese officials, with a view of putting an end to the habitual assumption of superiority of the Chinese. This was treated in a few empty words providing that the Tsungli-Yamên should invite foreign representatives to consider with them a code of etiquette, a clause imposing no obligation whatever on either party.

Another question which had greatly occupied the minds of both the British Government and its successive representatives ever since 1833 was the establishment of a code of laws to regulate the civil and criminal relations between foreigners and Chinese at the treaty ports and elsewhere. This had formed a feature in the supplementary convention of 1869, the undertaking in which did not, however, extend beyond the general terms that "it is further agreed that England and China shall in consultation draw up a commercial code."

Strongly approving, however, of the abstract idea that China should adopt a written code of commercial law as a first step towards a general legal reform, Sir T. Wade nevertheless uttered a useful caution to those ardent reformers who see in a good code of laws a panacea for either national or international grievances. "No nation," he says, "worked harder at its legislation than China; but in the way of justice there are at least two serious impediments--an ignorance which renders due appreciation of the value of evidence, especially in criminal cases, impossible; and a dishonesty that would be fatal to the administration of any laws, no matter how enlightened." He illustrates this by relating an instance of the obstinate nature of the _chose jugée_ in China.

In a case [he says] the termination of which is just announced at Peking, we have a woman wrongly convicted, on a confession extorted from her by torture, of the murder of a husband who died a natural death, the injustice being so patent that the fellow-provincials of the accused appealed to Peking. Orders being issued for a rehearing of the case, the former decision was affirmed in the province, and this a second and again a third time. The proceedings were then removed to Peking; and it is in the end established that magistrates of districts, prefects of departments, the governor of the province, and the high officer charged with the public instruction of the province, who had been specially commissioned to rehear the case, have all more or less combined to conceal the delinquency of the first authority who heard it; with whose guilt the rest, his seniors, had associated themselves either through carelessness or from a corrupt motive. These proceedings lasted over two years.

One point, however, was definitively gained in connection with jurisprudence, the recognition of the British Supreme Court as a means of discharging treaty obligations.

The convention as a whole was subjected to the same kind of criticism as that of 1869 had been. The Chambers of Commerce pointed out that it sanctioned Chinese exactions which had been up to that time consistently resisted as violations of the treaty of Tientsin. Imposts, condemned by the Chinese themselves,[23] which were to be abolished altogether by the terms of the Alcock convention, were by the Chefoo agreement not only recognised as lawful, but the area of their levy, within which the taxes were to be freed from all restrictions whether as to their amount or incidence, greatly extended. It would appear, therefore, said the merchants, "better to revert to the clear and simple provisions of the treaty of Tientsin, and insist on their being carried out without evasion." So far, they say, from simplifying the question of the taxation of foreign goods, the obliquely worded clauses in the Chefoo convention tend to quite the opposite result. "New elements of obscurity have been introduced, and if twenty years have been spent wrangling over the comparatively simple wording of the Tientsin treaty, it is to be feared that no person now living will see the end of the controversies which will rage over the indefinite arrangement set forth in the Chefoo convention."

Opium was also for the first time introduced into a treaty, for the purpose of increasing the Chinese revenue from it and of making the maritime customs, supported by the British Government, the agent for its collection. The Chinese had always been at liberty to levy what internal taxation they pleased on opium; but, said the Chamber of Commerce, for the "English Government to make itself even indirectly answerable for the collection from Chinese of an impost of indefinite amount, varying at each port according to the caprice or the necessities of local authorities who are not even specified, would surely be to introduce a most inconvenient precedent." The convention was left for nine years unratified by the British Government. It could not be ratified because, among other reasons, five of the treaty Powers took the same objection as the British and other merchants had taken to the curtailment of the area of exemption from inland taxation--in other words, to the legal sanction extended by the agreement to unlimited exactions of the Chinese tax-collectors which had up till then been resisted as illegal.

During the eight years following the signature of the Chefoo convention incessant discussion and agitation on the subject of the duties on opium and general merchandise kept the British Legation in Peking, and in a lesser degree the Foreign Office at home, in full activity. The question was turned over in all its aspects, threshed out on this side and on that, and numerous schemes were proposed for readjusting the imposts. The British Minister displayed the utmost ingenuity in evolving variations on the central theme, in which ethical, political, and sentimental considerations played their part, but without advancing the solution of the problem. The problem was altogether too simple for such recondite treatment. The Chinese throughout all the tortuous disquisitions pressed towards the one object of a substantial increase in their revenue, by whatever means it might be arrived at; and eventually they attained their object, as those generally do who concentrate their attention on a single point.

III. THE RATIFICATION, 1885.

Ratification postponed--Tedious discussion during nine years--Chinese claiming large increase in opium duty--Ultimately granted--By agreement signed in 1885--Hongkong and Macao made stations for collecting opium duties.

The convention simmered for nine years before its final ratification. The two Governments skirmished in the air all that time, misconceiving each other's aims and avoiding close quarters. The policy of Great Britain with regard to opium had been fatally deflected by unpractical considerations. The article had been placed by the trade regulations appended to the treaty in the exceptional position of being excluded from the privilege accorded to all other merchandise of exemption from inland taxation by payment of a fixed charge. The Chinese authorities were therefore at liberty to tax the article in transit to any extent they pleased. For reasons connected with their own administration, this unlimited power of taxation in transit was not deemed sufficient to produce the desired amount of revenue, and they were intent on supplying the deficiency by an enhanced import tariff. The difference between the two forms of taxation was that the inland duty was collected in a Chinese sieve, while the import duty was levied with the formalities of a banker's counter. Naturally, therefore, the Chinese Government missed no opportunity of pressing for an increase on the tariff fixed by treaty. It was the main object sought by them in the unratified convention of 1869. Failing then, they renewed their efforts in the Chefoo convention of 1876, seeking the same end by an inverted process, like taking a sea-fort from the land side. Instead of reviving the discredited proposal, they effected a turning movement by extending the area of the inland dues until it included the port of landing. Why, having full licence over the whole empire, a few acres added to their tax-collecting province should have been deemed of such vital importance is not perhaps at first sight self-evident. The reason was that under the proposed system the machinery of the Imperial maritime customs could be employed in collection, with the protection of the foreign consuls.

The concession was set forth in cryptic form in the convention, but the Chinese knew very well what interpretation they intended to give to the clause. That intention remained unaltered, though tactics varied. By the light of the vague and pointless correspondence carried on for seven years with the British Government they saw their way to advancing considerably beyond the position gained by the convention. They consequently raised their demands in proportion as they found the British Government yielding, until eventually they reached a vantage-ground where they could safely unmask and make direct for their object, an increase in the import tariff pure and simple. Eighty taels were added to the thirty allowed by the old treaty, and the opium duty was thus really trebled at a stroke.

The negotiations which led up to the convention are chiefly interesting as showing how easily the Foreign Office was chased from cover to cover by the Chinese Minister. Having once got the enemy "on the run," the Marquis Tsêng did not relax his pursuit until, notwithstanding one or two rear-guard actions, he capitulated without conditions.

After seven years of active deliberation the definitive diplomatic conference was opened by Lord Granville in January 1883. As a preliminary, the basis of the negotiations was rigidly defined by Mr (now Lord) Currie, in accordance with the Chefoo convention, thus: the regulation of the _likin_ taxation, and specification of the barriers at which collections were to be made.

But, as we have hinted, the Chinese aspirations had in the mean time far transcended the scope of any provision of any treaty. No longer content with regulating _likin_, their first step in the conference was to induce Lord Granville to abandon the preliminary stipulation he had so carefully laid down. The Chinese Minister proposed a general commutation rate, uniform at all the ports, supporting the claim by sundry specious arguments. The _likin_ barriers had been a chronic grievance of the merchants. The marquis held out a prospect of their abolition as a consequence of the single-payment commutation of inland dues on which he was intent. It is a feature of Chinese bargains of every description that something definite should be conceded on the one side, and something indefinite promised on the other,--the "bird in the hand" invariably for the Chinese. There was nothing surprising, therefore, in the time-honoured formula being employed in these diplomatic interchanges.

In moving from his base, Lord Granville, of course, ceded everything; but he made a final stand at the amount, declaring that "he could not agree that the _likin_ payment should be fixed at more than 70 taels"; moreover, that he "would require full information as to the guarantees which would be given that opium would not be subject to any further payment while in transit." One such guarantee was already provided for in the convention, which stipulates "that the nationality of the person possessing or carrying the merchandise would be immaterial." This was deemed of great importance to trade, because since it was not always possible for a foreign owner, or even a deputy of his own race, to accompany a parcel of goods into the interior, the permission for Chinese to accompany them was essential to the working of the transit business. The contention of the merchant had always been, that the exemption from dues was a privilege attaching to the goods, and not to the temporary owner or transport agent. On the other hand, as the goods could not speak, the option of sending either a native or a foreigner at the merchant's own choice was considered a useful check on illicit exactions.

The confident manner in which the marquis brushed away both of Lord Granville's ultimata showed how well he had profited by his experience of Foreign Office diplomacy. To Lord Granville's maximum of 70 taels (the sum actually agreed upon with the Chinese Government) the marquis said he was sorry, but his instructions did not permit of his accepting less than 80 taels per pecul. It is not customary to ask for proofs of good faith from ambassadors acting "on instructions," and Lord Granville simply yielded the point, while entering a mild protest against being forced by a Chinese _non possumus_.

And the right of the foreigner to accompany his goods, on which so much stress had been laid, was disposed of with exquisite assurance by the Chinese Minister, who was confident that such a mere detail "would not be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement," notwithstanding that it involved a reversal of the Chefoo convention.

And as to the guarantees for fulfilment, the Marquis Tsêng was sure that "the strongest guarantee would consist in the moral obligation" on the part of the Chinese Government to carry out arrangements of their own proposing. Thus, by sheer persistence, the Chinese gained every point, securing not only a threefold duty on opium, but the assistance of her Majesty's Government in its collection, for that was the meaning of transferring the levy from the interior to the seaport. The agreement, concluded by Lord Granville in June, was signed by Lord Salisbury in July 1885, under the title of an "Additional Article to the Chefoo Convention."

It is right to add, on the authority of recent observers, that the convention has worked smoothly, no complaints being heard of inland exactions in contravention of its terms. It thus appears that the moral guarantee on which the Marquis Tsêng spoke so confidently was after all of some validity. But as the only source from which complaints could come would be those foreign agents who were by the terms of the convention expressly excluded from conveying or accompanying opium into the country, the negative evidence is not absolutely conclusive.

It would have been most interesting to gain from so enlightened a Minister as Tsêng some insight into the causes of the continual friction and recrimination which attend the operation of the commercial articles in the Chinese treaties, but his despatches have reference only to the question of the moment. "The Imperial Government," he says, "have often been held responsible for the friction caused in working arrangements but ill-adapted to the state of the country, and which a better knowledge of its internal conditions would have shown to those who framed them are incapable of execution." "The present scheme," he intimates, "being in harmony with existing institutions," may be expected to work smoothly. Existing institutions, therefore, are opposed to local taxation and in favour of single commutations. When, however, a different thesis has to be sustained, we are assured by other authorities that "existing institutions" claim arbitrary, variable, and unlimited taxation of goods in transit for the benefit of the provincial exchequers, and that it is the attempt to commute these by a payment at the port which is the true cause of the friction and disputation.

The natural corollary followed the ratification of the Chefoo convention. The desire of the Chinese Government, cherished for nearly thirty years, to establish a customs station in Hongkong was virtually consummated in the following year. The trade of the colony had been vexed by a perpetual blockade by so-called revenue cruisers which harried every native vessel entering or leaving the harbour. The hope of getting the investment relaxed may have induced the acquiescence of the colony in any alternative. The Chinese sought to grip the opium supply by the neck, which could only be done by their obtaining control over the harbour of Hongkong. This was conceded, and a customs station was established on the Chinese side of the anchorage, while an office was opened in the city of Victoria.

There was a second "neck" to the opium supply--Macao. The arrangement made with Hongkong without a corresponding agreement with Macao would have merely driven the trade from the one to the other. Overtures were therefore made to the Portuguese, who, unlike the English, were offered a valuable consideration for admitting the control of the Chinese customs into their waters. They then obtained for the first time a treaty of independent sovereignty for the colony.

The effect of all these negotiations and arrangements, whether intended or not, was to stimulate the cultivation of Chinese opium to a high degree, and this, according to the impartial testimony of an ex-German Minister, is, apart from the increase to the Chinese revenue, the net result of the anti-opium agitation.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] "Experience shows us that in the eyes of the Chinese negotiation is a sign of weakness."--Sir F. BRUCE.

[23] "_Likin_ is in its nature an oppressive institution only continued in force owing to the necessity of providing resources to meet the army expenditure in the north-west."--'Peking Gazette,' January 18, 1875.