CHAPTER XXI.

THE REVISION OF THE TREATY.

I. PREPARATION.

Struggle for the observance of the treaty--Hope in the prospective revision--Information gathered by British Minister--Chinese apprehensive of force being used--Imperial Government consult provincial officials--Interesting memorials in reply--Especially from Li Hung-chang--His liberal views respecting foreigners--And wise advice to the throne.

The conflict between foreign aggressions and Chinese resistance had proceeded without intermission on either side for seven years. In the struggle the Chinese had gained many successes, but the fruits of them had not been secured beyond the risk of reprisal. Both sides were ill at ease. The foreigners on their part had been buoyed up under their grievances by the hope of a readjustment of international relations, which had been provided for in the treaties of Tientsin and Peking.

The decennial period was at hand when revision of the treaty of Tientsin might be claimed. To that important juncture all eyes looked forward. The foreigners hoped for freer intercourse; the Chinese wished to restrict what already existed. Great preparations were made for the revision campaign. On the part of the foreigners opinions were invited from all the trading-ports as to the points where modification could be advantageously claimed, and memorials from the Chambers of Commerce both in China and in Great Britain, from individuals, professional men, and from missionaries, poured in upon the British Minister during the years 1867 and 1868, extending even into 1869.

Sir R. Alcock had even taken every possible pains to acquaint himself with the local circumstances of the various treaty ports by personal inspection and personal communication--a practice which public opinion urged in vain upon his successors, who had much greater need of such local observations. Following up this tour of his own, he delegated to a subordinate the task of studying the conditions under which trade was carried on in the interior, in the districts most likely to be affected by any probable changes in the treaty. Under this roving commission Consul Swinhoe made an extensive tour through the canal district of the Yangtze delta, and finished up with an expedition to Szechuan in 1869, on which he was accompanied by delegates of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce.

The importance attached by foreigners to the occasion naturally stirred the Chinese Government also to make special exertions to meet the coming contest. From the measures to which they resorted it is evident that they were apprehensive lest force should be applied by the foreigners to gain their ends; for the idea of free negotiation and of voluntary agreement had not yet been assimilated by the Chinese. To them the foreigner represented force and nothing else. They had never really comprehended the reasons for the withdrawal of the Allies when in possession of Peking, and though the immediate danger of war was removed, the shadow of it never ceased to haunt the dreams of Chinese statesmen.

Mistrusting their own resources, the Central Government appealed to the provinces for confidential advice; and as these communications throw light on the inner--though not the innermost--thoughts of the Chinese, which it is difficult otherwise to gauge, some of them are worth perusing in the actual words of the writers.

The secret circular addressed by the Tsungli-Yamên to the high officials throughout the empire in 1867 opened abruptly with the proposition, "The barbarian question is one of old standing"; it then proceeded to review the difficulties and the dangers of "our present conjuncture," arising mainly from the improvement of communications and armaments combined with the earth-hunger of the various European nations. The foreigner at one time stood in awe of the Central Power, but that was before railways and steamships had been invented; and while the numbers who came to China were as yet insignificant, and were conveniently restricted to one spot, where they could be managed, now they occupy so many positions as to form a strategic cordon round the empire. Moreover, they are united in interest, and cannot suddenly be either isolated or weakened. How, then, can we confront them with our isolation and weakness? It is to be feared that we have no one who, taking a comprehensive view of the whole situation, can create disunion among our enemies through their own rivalries and insatiable avarice. Yet it is just here that the germ of an effective policy should be sought. If, however, circumstances render such a scheme at present impracticable, its execution may be deferred. We must be patient under suffering, diligently strengthening ourselves, and abide in hope. We bear in mind the calamities of 1860, and how to save the State the emperor was entreated to conclude a treaty. It was evident that the treaty, hastily concluded, would remain a fruitful source of future difficulty; nevertheless, good faith required that it should be fulfilled, and even the very fulfilment of it be turned into a means of limitation and restraint. The time for revision being now at hand, you are requested to give your suggestions as to the means of avoiding a rupture with foreigners, and in case of a rupture, what will ensure safety. The principal points likely to be brought forward at the revision conferences are here submitted for your consideration. To simply declare the whole impracticable is easy; the difficulty will be to devise a plan for safely avoiding concession. Deal with the matter, therefore, in a practical way, and not by an empty thesis; and let your memorial reach us not later than December. The points are--(1) The audience question. (2) The question of an embassy to foreign countries, which had been repeatedly urged by the various foreign Ministers in Peking. The arguments in favour of such a measure are, that "to know your adversary as he knows you" is a maxim of practical wisdom, and that it would be of great advantage to have the means of appealing from an unreasonable foreign Minister in Peking to his own Government. (3) Telegraphs and railways. (4) Residence of merchants in the interior. (5) Salt trade and coal-mining. (6) Extension of missions.

Such was the substance of the Tsungli-Yamên's circular to the governors-general and governors of provinces. The memorials in reply were distinguished by some plain speaking. Amid a good deal that was vaporous and fantastic, such as would characterise any general council, there were propositions of sound statecraft, maxims which it would have been good for the Central Government to lay to heart, and side-lights on their traditional conceptions of national policy well deserving to be studied by the Powers which have relations with the Chinese. One clause in the memorial of Tsêng Kwo-fan, for example, went to the root of the administrative difficulties which caused then, and still cause, the major portion of the angry friction between Chinese and foreign officials. He reminded the emperor, in fact, that he had a court of appeal in the provinces; so that though he might, under pressure, be forced to concede points to the foreign nations in Peking, yet it was the memorialist himself and his peers in the provinces who would have the last word to say. The elliptic and allusive style usually assumed in Chinese documents may allow this hint to be interpreted either as a veiled defiance of, or as an assurance of support to, the throne--perhaps both subtly compounded. But the practical inference remains, that, as experience has often proved, the provinces revise the decisions of the capital, and the execution rests with them.

The memorial, however, which is most interesting to foreigners, because the plainest to their comprehension, is that of Li Hung-chang, at that period Governor-General of the Hu-kwang; and as it affords a key to that statesman's subsequent career and the unique position he has occupied in regard to the foreign relations of the empire, it seems well worthy of reproduction. Omitting the preamble, and certain classic references without which a Chinese State Paper would be no more complete than a speech in Parliament or a leader in the 'Times' fifty years ago would have been without a Latin quotation, the substance of the memorial runs as follows:--

The humble opinion of the writer is, that in conducting business with foreigners the point of the greatest importance is to avoid exciting their contempt; that contempt once excited, they will thwart us at every turn, and even in affairs that are really practicable they will contrive a thousand schemes and devices to throw obstacles in the way of their practicability. But if they feel respect for China, all matters can be mutually arranged; and even difficult questions can be settled by compromise or agreement.

Foreigners, however, are not the only persons who are influenced by this feeling: it animates alike the minds of the whole human race.

It is often said that foreigners are crafty and malign and full of unexpected ruses: but is it not the fact that Chinese are the same; or rather that the outrageous craft and malignity of the Chinese exceeds even that of foreigners? The truth is, that at present foreigners are powerful and the Chinese feeble. And whence arises the power of the former? It certainly is not innate in them, but depends upon the fact that "the requisites of Government are sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler" (Confucian Analects). And how is the weakness of China to be accounted for? This also is not innate, but is a result of the truth of the above axiom not being sufficiently recognised. The present condition of foreign countries resembles that of China before the union, or is perhaps even still more formidable.

In the course of time foreigners came to China, opened numerous marts, and conveyed their merchandise everywhere. They traded at as many as five ports, and all with no other object but that of making the wealth of China contribute to their own. A little consideration shows that those who ventured to come to this country must have placed their reliance upon something to have rendered them so fearless; and there is not the slightest reason why that which they confided in should not also become a source of confidence to China.

Many persons have offered their views upon the several questions now under consideration, and it is useless to take the trouble to recapitulate them. But all such appliances as telegraphs, railways, locomotives, and steamships--the things on which foreigners rely--can without exception be learned by the Chinese. It is often alleged that these inventions are attended with harm: how is it, then, that in foreign countries every district has its trains and steamers, every locality its telegraphs and railways? Natives of China, too, have travelled abroad and can bear testimony that these things, so far from being harmful, are advantageous.

Imperial audience is distinctly stipulated for in the treaty of 1860, and it is next to impossible to withdraw it; especially as his sainted Majesty Kanghsi admitted Japanese to his presence, and there will be no difficulty in ascertaining the ceremony then employed. And again, during the negotiations with the Russians on the boundary and trade questions, which took place about the same period, they were treated as an equal Power. It is but right, indeed, to consider such Powers as upon a footing of equality with ourselves.

The idea of the writer is to wait until the majority of the emperor, and then to receive all the representatives in a side-hall as was done by his sacred Majesty Kanghsi. It will, however, first be necessary to arrange distinctly whether such interviews are to take place once or twice a-year. Otherwise an impropriety will be caused by their constantly demanding audiences every few days on frivolous questions.

Such a course presents no difficulties from our point of view, and from theirs it is a _sine quâ non_. Moreover, they would see how the imperial magnanimity extends to every region. Their request may with great propriety be granted.

As to the appointment of an envoy, in the fourth year of Tungchih, Pin Ch'un and others were sent on a visit to the several foreign countries, and the Tsungli-Yamên has lately written to state that Chih kang and others have now proceeded thither. Thus the mission has been continuous, and it would be well to adhere to this system.

The question of separate missions at the Courts of the several Powers, however, still remains for deliberation. In discussing these questions persons are apprehensive, either that the emperor's commission will be disgraced, or that there will be an extravagant expenditure of the imperial funds. But such persons are not acquainted with the whole bearing of the subject.

Memorialist is of opinion that this question is eminently susceptible of a satisfactory solution. After selecting reliable and trustworthy men to reside at foreign Courts, it will be necessary to appoint subordinates and interpreters, who can be exchanged every three or every five years. Interpreters, indeed, should be selected from each country to which an envoy proceeds--a system which would give us the double advantage of facilitating public business, and of affording us an opportunity to display our amicable desires. Far from being detrimental, the project is attended with great advantages.

The matter of missionary extension is beset with greater difficulties than the rest, especially as it is not a State question with foreign Governments.[15] At the present moment innumerable churches are being erected in every province, district, and department for the explanation of their canon and the preaching of their faith; and the common people are one-half of them deceived, and the other half led to join them for evil purposes. Instructions should be issued to the superintendents of northern and southern trade, as well as to the generals, viceroys, governors, customs superintendents, and taotais, to become intimate with the foreign officials with whom they are in communication. Then, when anything is to be arranged, there would be no harm in telling them distinctly that when the common people misbehave the local functionaries must adjudicate; and that when it happens that the people refuse to become proselytes, the officials can on no account insist upon their doing so against their will--for such a course would but raise riots and disturbances, to the detriment of international amity. At the approaching revision of the treaty all possible arguments must be used with regard to this point, and on no account must any further clause be added.

With reference to the remaining points--viz., coal mines, importation of salt, erection of inland warehouses, inland steam navigation, and the like--these, although comparatively unimportant matters, nevertheless entail serious consequences. If their introduction is harmless, there is no necessity to waste words and ink in the raising of disputes and complications; but if, on the other hand, there are among them concessions which we are unwilling to make, it will be very proper to "explain the circumstances to them and argue the rights of the case," and they will hardly wish to press embarrassments upon us.

Should they, however, take advantage of their strength to impose upon our weakness by dividing our territory and sharing among them the fat of the land, in such a pressing crisis the greatest firmness would be necessary. But there need be no great apprehension of such a contingency, for the simple reason that, with the exception of Russia, foreign countries are all too distant from China, and the acquisition of its territory would be nothing but an embarrassment to them.

The fact is, that the prosperity of foreign countries is inseparably connected with the welfare of the Chinese people; and instead of draining that people to the last drop, would they not rather prefer to use, without exhausting--to take, and still leave a residue?

The present occasion of treaty revision with the English is a most important juncture. The English treaty once disposed of, there will be no difficulty with the other Powers. The danger to be apprehended is that during the revision of next year they will employ coercion to extort concession. This, however, may be known previously; and should it be the case, it will of course be necessary to select experienced troops and able officers to confront them. Should nothing of the sort occur, negotiations should be entered upon.

In short, supposing we are to cherish a feeling of revenge and devise schemes to subvert foreign Powers, it will be necessary to wait until--with large armies and abundant supplies, with no rebel or Mohammedan outbreaks in the provinces, and no difficulties in the capital--we can cope with them without hesitation. We shall be a match then for all adversaries; but otherwise we cannot engage in a rash and random conflict. Even when it is supposed that we are ready for the struggle, it will still be necessary to exercise extreme and continual caution, and to wait until our spirit is high, and our aspect, therefore, formidable. Then should there be no war, the question would be disposed of; but in the event of our taking the field, it would not be unvictoriously.

Memorialist, however, has had several years' experience in conducting business with foreigners, and is thoroughly familiar with their character. He has found that, no matter what they are engaged in, they act honourably without deceit or falsehood. But although it is possible to acquire a general knowledge of their mode of action in the conduct of their own affairs, yet there is no means of becoming thoroughly acquainted with the details and motives of their conduct. Their bearing, however, in military matters affords clear evidence of their straightforwardness. There is the instance of the Englishman Gordon, late commander-in-chief at Soochow, who, having organised 3000 troops of the Ever-Victorious Army, took the field against the rebels. Subsequently, at the capture of Soochow, the memorialist himself observed that officer personally leading in advance of his troops with a courage and _sang-froid_ worthy of all praise. He subsequently became the recipient of the imperial commendation and reward.

The writer has also, in conjunction with Tsêng Kwo-fan, acting viceroy of the two Kiang, been associated with foreigners in organising foreign-drilled infantry and cavalry, and in making arrangements for the building of steam-vessels. He is thoroughly convinced that they are actuated by upright and amicable principles, and entertain no feelings of animosity towards China. With the knowledge of these facts before us, it is possible to draw our conclusions upon other matters.

It is from these considerations, therefore, that the writer suggests the policy to be pursued in intercourse with foreigners. There seems to be no necessity to dispose of the several questions hastily and on the instant, nor do the resident foreign Ministers at Peking apparently intend to insist upon an immediate settlement.

It would be well if H.I.M. on attaining his majority were himself to adopt the policy suggested, and in that case no difficult questions would arise.

6th year, 11th month, 6th day.

As perhaps the best essay yet extant in translating the Chinese imperial tradition into the language of the modern world, this paper of Li Hung-chang's is full of instruction for foreign diplomatists. Read in the light of the subsequent thirty years, we see that it sets forth the principles which have inspired the whole public life of the most prominent man in China. His recognition of the honourable character of foreigners, as he knew them, represented a notable advance on the like testimony of Commissioner Lin in 1841, inasmuch as Lin deduced from it the ease by which their good faith could be abused, while Li made it a ground of confidence in co-operation with them. His recommendation to his contemporaries, to cultivate intimacy with foreign officials in order to obviate misunderstandings in the execution of the treaties, was only preaching that which he has consistently practised throughout his official life. He was the first high official who braved public opinion by sitting with open doors. This conciliatory temper and open mind has made Li Hung-chang the lubricator in many jarring conflicts; and it kept him, contrary to constitutional usage, for twenty-five years at the diplomatic outpost of the capital.

His delicate handling of the suggestion of the Central Government, to resist by hostile means the proposals of foreigners, is also characteristic of the man who had seen war and hated it. While bowing to the imperial will, he proposed postponement of its execution. In a similar case many years afterwards a memorial of Li's was quoted as an incitement to war with Japan, whereas it was an extinguisher, in diplomatic form, put upon the bellicose proposal of another.

Not the least interesting part of Li's memorial is the ground on which he advocates reform--the proved superiority of foreign nations. His argument takes the identical form, and is expressed in the very words, used by the Daimios of Japan; and the circumstances of the two countries in their foreign relations were in the main so similar, that it cannot but be instructive to observe how they comported themselves respectively under the stress of the foreign irruption. Both had been overawed by foreign forces, and both sought revenge by using the strength of their opponents for their own regeneration. The difficulty, as we see it, in the carrying out of the scheme of regeneration was of the same nature in both countries--the want of unity and centralisation. Japan was divided up into feudal principalities; China into provinces and prefectures as independent as self-governing British colonies. The councils of the Daimios bore a rough analogy to the consultations with the governors and governors-general of China. The enemy was the same, and the means of overcoming him are as clearly laid down in Li Hung-chang's memorial as in the most perfervid of the Japanese manifestoes. How, then, did it come about that the same leaven should have fermented with such miraculous rapidity in the one country, while in the other it has been buried in a torpid mass? Obviously this is a matter which will repay the consideration of those who concern themselves with the state and prospects of China.

II. THE BURLINGAME MISSION.

Mysterious inception--American Minister becomes Chinese envoy to Western countries--Objects of mission concealed--Its first adventure--Mr Burlingame concludes treaty at Washington--Persuades British Government to adopt new policy in China.

Three processes--separate, though not independent--were going on simultaneously during the year 1868: the revision of the British treaty in Peking; an epidemic of anti-foreign demonstrations in the provinces; and the progress of the Burlingame mission in Europe. One of them cannot be understood without the other; but taking the revision of the treaty as the object towards which the other two converged, it will be simpler to reserve the special consideration of the treaty question until we have given a short outline of the accessory episodes.

Of the eight questions submitted to the provincials, one was disposed of, and that in a surprisingly precipitate manner, a month before even the memorials of the various authorities were sent in. An embassy to Europe and America was appointed, equipped, and despatched in the month of November 1867, and with a foreigner at its head. A proceeding so contrary to Chinese tradition naturally excited curiosity as to its origin,--a curiosity which has been tantalised but not to this day satisfied, though the mission itself soon became ancient history. It is certain none of the representatives of foreign Powers then in the capital were consulted, or in any way taken into confidence with regard to the scheme--except, of course, the one who transferred himself from the service of his own country to that of China. "No one," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock, "knew that the Chinese were on the eve of a revolution which would materially change the aspect of affairs." This by way of explaining an important memorandum he had just written on the state of China, which would have been of a different tenor had any hint of what was intended been given to him.

As the embassy was the first that China had sent to a foreign country, and as it was commissioned under some urgent demand which evidently would brook no delay, its composition, character, and objects are all interesting to the student of Chinese politics. There were three envoys, two Chinese and one foreign. The latter was the Hon. Anson Burlingame, Minister of the United States to China, who of course was the spokesman of the mission. A better selection for the purpose could not have been made, had even a larger choice of men been open to the Chinese. Mr Burlingame had been an active politician in his time, and was a practised orator. If we add the epithet "sophisticated rhetorician," which was ten years later applied to a still more eminent personage, that is little more than to say he was a special pleader. And he was engaged on special pleader's duty. Whatever the genesis of the mission, therefore, it was a master stroke of the Chinese Government, eclipsing all their other contrivances to resist the expected demands of foreigners at the revision of the treaties. It was the first open attempt by the Chinese to apply the homœopathic principle to their international affairs in using the foreigner as an antidote to the foreigner.

The Burlingame mission left Peking with the ostensible approval of the foreign representatives. The support of the British Minister was given in the most practical way by the permission granted to the acting Chinese secretary, Mr J. McLeavy Brown, to accept the secretaryship of the mission--a favour the more marked in that Mr Brown happened to be the _locum tenens_ of Mr Wade, who had just gone on leave, so that his departure left the British Legation destitute at a season of the year when it was impossible to call up substitutes from the ports, and at a time when the greatest burden of work was in prospect. And yet the true object of the mission was concealed from Sir Rutherford Alcock. "I do not know what Mr Burlingame's instructions may ultimately be," he wrote in January 1868, adding, "but it is very obvious what is the work which devolves upon him." Sir Rutherford's judgment of its purpose seems to have been based on his own inferences from the facts of the situation and his unquestioning faith in Mr Burlingame's loyalty to his professed principles.

He had known Mr Burlingame for two years as the _doyen_ of the diplomatic body, the most fervid champion of that "co-operative policy" whereby the treaty Powers agreed to act as a united body in pursuit of identical objects. He could not suppose that his late colleague had turned his back on those common objects without notice. Although, therefore, the suddenness and secrecy of the move might have suggested misgivings as to the mission being intended to promote the views of the diplomatic body in Peking, yet it is beyond question that Sir Rutherford Alcock heartily favoured the embassy. His confidence in it is further attested by a very long and elaborate memorandum which he addressed to Prince Kung, indicating the uses to which the embassy should be put in bringing about an understanding with the Powers, whereby Chinese interests would be safeguarded while the treaty rights of foreigners should be amply fulfilled. "I see in the mission a hope of improvement and a material change in the whole aspect of affairs.... Proves there are Ministers with power and influence in the councils of the emperor who believe the time has come for breaking with the past.... After a long night of weariness and futile efforts, daylight begins to appear.... I hail the appointment of a representative to the Western Powers as the beginning of a new era." Such was the Minister's valediction in his report to the Foreign Office. But he had been mightily deceived. The night had indeed been long, but it was not the true dawn which was welcomed with this joyful acclamation. How quickly the gloom settled down again on that scene of fruitless toil will presently be seen.

The mission was introduced to the notice of the world by a humorous prelude, which may be quoted for the sake of the light it incidentally throws on the chronic state of China. On their way from Peking to Tientsin, seventy or eighty miles, the envoys halted at a large market-town, where a report met them of a phenomenon not very uncommon in those parts, especially in winter--a band of marauders who had been annoying the neighbourhood. The mission took refuge in an inn, resolved to stand a siege until aid should come. In this strait Mr Burlingame seems never to have thought of applying either to the local authorities of the town or to the Government he was serving, but despatched urgent messages to Peking, where there were escorts kept at the Russian and British Legations, and to Tientsin, where was the British gunboat Dove. His appeals were answered with alacrity from both sides. From Peking came a relief party of British and Russian soldiers in charge of members of the two Legations; from Tientsin a party of mounted bluejackets under Lieutenant Dunlop. They met at the half-way house where the mission lay, but nothing could be seen or heard of the besiegers. Mr Burlingame's party reached their port of embarkation without further adventure. Indeed the only serious matter that arose out of the imbroglio was a difference of opinion between one Vodkansky of the Cossack guard and Mulvaney, a sturdy Hibernian of the British escort, which the latter proposed to settle by the means in vogue among heroes before the days of Agamemnon. Tragic consequences were, however, averted by the soothing diplomacy of the representative of her Majesty's Legation, Mr Conolly, and the two Burlingame relief expeditions returned to their respective stations nothing the worse for a couple of days' outing in the bracing November air.

Mr Burlingame made his _début_ in the United States, first by eloquent speeches in San Francisco, and next by what assumed the form of serious negotiations at Washington. An orator cannot reasonably be held accountable for every detail of his orations, but Mr Burlingame's mission may be most favourably summarised by a few carefully chosen words of his own:--

1st. It was the object of the mission to disabuse the foreign Powers of an impression they were supposed to entertain, that the Chinese Government had entered upon a retrograde policy.

2nd. To deprecate a precipitate and unfriendly attempt on their part to enter upon a policy which might make all progress impossible from its menacing tone and "violent shock to the feelings, and even prejudices, of the people."

Translated into practice, these propositions meant that China wished to be let alone; and that, we may safely assume, represented the whole extent of Mr Burlingame's instructions. This claim was embodied in a convention which he made at Washington, comprising certain "additional articles" to the American treaty of 1858, the purport of which was that the United States undertook to apply no pressure to China, which, it may be presumed, that Power had never the intention of doing. The convention was for several reasons not welcomed at Peking, but it served the only purpose which perhaps it was ever expected to serve, that of giving the keynote to the representations which the envoy was afterwards to make to the various Powers in Europe.

The next Government to which Mr Burlingame addressed himself was that of Great Britain, over which he obtained a more important success than over that of the United States. In fact, he persuaded Lord Clarendon to discard all the information that ever reached the Foreign Office from its own responsible agents in China--men who were bound by every consideration of loyalty and public duty to report only what was true, and to accept instead thereof the protestations of an agent hired to make out a case; for it is superfluous to add that Mr Burlingame was far indeed from representing the true state of facts. He succeeded in so altering the course of the British Government that their agent in China was discredited, stultified, and rendered powerless to effect the objects for which he had been labouring. This was the first step of the Foreign Office in the new departure which had many evil results--that, namely, of taking their cue not from agents in their own pay, but from others over whom they could exercise no control, and who had alien interests to serve.

From the Chinese point of view the Burlingame mission was a decided success.

III. CHINESE OUTRAGES--YANGCHOW AND FORMOSA.

Missions attacked at Yangchow--Redress refused by Chinese and enforced by consul--With naval assistance--Satisfactory issue--Continuous outrages in Formosa--Government affords no relief--Disturbances quelled by British forces--Lawlessness near Swatow--Communications with interior controlled by bandits--Order restored by Consul Alabaster with naval force--Peace and good feeling between Chinese and foreigners resulting from these various measures--Which were approved by Imperial Government--Disapproved by British Government in consequence of Mr Burlingame's representations--Consuls punished--Lord Clarendon, prompted by Mr Burlingame, sends fresh instructions to Minister and consuls.

The year 1868 was marked by serious anti-foreign outbreaks in widely distant provinces of the empire. At Yangchow, a wealthy city on the Grand Canal, twelve miles from the left bank of the Yangtze river, a favourite resort for retired officials, rich salt merchants, and gentry, the Inland missionaries under the orders of Mr Hudson Taylor established themselves. In no locality in China could they have been less welcome, for there they met their natural enemies in the greatest force. Before long an attack on them was organised at the instigation of the literati and gentry, and with the connivance of the local authorities. "The onslaught was sudden and severe, the mob set fire to the premises, the ladies and children of the mission had to be thrown out of the windows to save their lives." There was no mistake, therefore, as to the murderous intentions of the assailants. The nearest British consul was at Shanghai, the consulate at Chinkiang, twelve miles from the scene of the outrage, being in charge of an assistant, Mr Clement Allen. That young officer hastened instantly to the assistance of the missionaries, and made his protest against the culpable negligence, to say no more, of the Chinese officials, who on their part made a great to-do of hushing the matter up and repairing the injured house. Consul Medhurst promptly followed up the representations made by Mr Allen by personal appeal to the viceroy at Nanking, fifty miles distant. The mind of that high official had already been prejudiced by ingeniously falsified reports of the transaction supplied to him by the prefect of Yangchow, and in consequence he refused Mr Medhurst's request to depute an official to accompany him to that city for the purpose of investigating the facts. Thereupon Mr Medhurst, availing himself of the arrival of H.M.'s ship Rinaldo at Chinkiang, obtained from her commander a sufficient escort to accompany him to Yangchow; and then only did the viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan, appoint an officer, though of totally inadequate rank, to co-operate with the consul. The Chinese officer did not, however, keep his appointment, and Mr Medhurst proceeded without him, and placed in the hands of the prefect at Yangchow a written demand for redress, one of the items being the seizure and punishment of the gentry, whose names were submitted. The prefect at once declared his inability to deal with men of such influence, all being of higher rank than himself. As nothing, therefore, could be settled at Yangchow, the prefect agreed to accompany Mr Medhurst to Nanking to lay the whole matter before the viceroy. A deputy from the viceroy, however, met Mr Medhurst at Chinkiang and endeavoured to dissuade him from proceeding to Nanking, offering instead to accompany him back to Yangchow, according to the original programme. Mr Medhurst, in his turn, persuaded the deputy to return with him to Nanking on H.M.'s ship Rinaldo, which was to start from Chinkiang the following morning. But the deputy Chang did not keep that appointment, any more than he had kept his previous one. The prefect of Yangchow also found means of evading his promise to accompany the consul into the presence of the viceroy. After much pressure on the one side and evasion on the other, the viceroy offered to settle the matter by a charitable gratuity to the missionaries in lieu of damages, and showed his anxiety to get the affair patched up quickly by sending an official of rank to follow Mr Medhurst on board H.M.'s ship Rinaldo, where he spent two hours in attempting to persuade the consul to accept the terms offered. Matters were, in fact, in a fair way of settlement when, "just at this juncture," the commander of the Rinaldo fell sick and determined to proceed with his ship to Shanghai, the consul being thus left in a humiliating and helpless position, as Sir Rutherford Alcock describes it. The Chinese officials at once changed their tone, withdrew from negotiations, and nothing more could be done with them. The action of the naval officer in abandoning the consul was freely criticised at the time, and being in consequence asked by the Admiralty for an explanation, he stated, among other things, "that it never entered his head that the presence simply of a small man-of-war could have the effect of influencing the viceroy." He also stated that he had "been given to understand that the viceroy had expressed his willingness to comply with Mr Medhurst's requests, and would send a letter to that effect that night or the next morning." The gallant officer did not appear to perceive that the withdrawal of his ship before the viceroy's promise had been fulfilled completely changed the situation.

Nothing was left for the consul, then, but to lay the whole case before H.M.'s Minister, and in doing so he made these observations: "I can call to mind, out of my experience of British relations with China, scarcely one instance in which the outrage complained of has been more unprovoked on the part of the sufferers, and in which the evidence of neglect and culpability on the part of the local authorities has been more marked and incontrovertible. Few cases can have occurred, moreover, in which the power to grant prompt and reasonable redress was more within the reach of the supreme provincial authority."

The Minister, in his turn, had no resource but to call upon the admiral on the station "to repair the mischief by sending such naval force to the mouth of the Grand Canal as shall enable him, if necessary, to apply effective pressure both on the local authorities and populace at Yangchow and on the viceroy at Nanking," to whom the consul was once more instructed to address himself. Of course the Minister had before this applied in the usual form to the Tsungli-Yamên, and with the usual result. They deprecated hasty conclusions until they themselves had full information from the local authorities; but they admitted without hesitation that, assuming the facts, full redress must be granted.

The Minister's representations to the Central Government were renewed with greater emphasis on receipt of the news of the collapse of the consul's negotiations. Prince Kung then expressed his readiness to make the compensations demanded; but as regarded the punishment of the instigators of the outrage, he contented himself with tacitly indorsing the plea of the viceroy, "that the gentry indicated were men of high rank, and incapable of wilful disregard of treaty provisions, for which reason they need not be called to account." In reply the Minister stated that immunity to such offenders, more especially if highly placed, is wholly incompatible with the treaty rights of foreigners. A new inquiry, however, was instituted at Yangchow, and the Viceroy Tsêng, who had just been gazetted to another post, was warned not to leave Nanking until the affair was concluded. After an interval of two months, Consul Medhurst, escorted by a naval force despatched to his aid by Admiral Keppel, sent his cards once more to the Nanking viceroy. The old tactics were repeated, and negotiations threatened to be indefinitely protracted, but eventually promises were given for the full redress demanded. Promises, however, had been given before, and it was deemed not unreasonable in the circumstances to demand a material guarantee. There happened to be lying at anchor opposite the city a small steamer recently built for the viceroy, which he was induced to place under the orders of Captain Heneage, R.N., pending the execution of the arrangements. The end of the discussion was a complete and satisfactory settlement of the whole affair, which included the deprivation of the prefect and the magistrate of Yangchow. The after-effects have been no less satisfactory. For the last thirty years Yangchow has been the most peaceable missionary field in the whole empire. We have set forth this incident in some detail, because it was typical, isolated, and free from all obscurities.

While these events were passing on the Yangtze, similar troubles, which had been threatening for some time, came to a head in the island of Formosa. Outbreaks of mob-violence against the property and person of both missionaries and merchants took place in different parts of the island. At Banca, in the Tamsui district, two English merchants, Messrs Kerr and Bird, were murderously assaulted by a ferocious armed mob, and Mr Holt, the acting vice-consul at Tamsui, reported in October 1868 that "remonstrance, expostulation, despatches, letters, messages, and visits having alike failed in securing common justice" from the mandarin, he might be "driven at any moment to strike his consular flag and close communication with the authorities. Our lives are threatened by people who have proved that the will to murder us is not wanting," and with whom the authorities either could not or would not interfere. Mr Holt held his ground until assistance reached him, and he made no secret of his intention to back his diplomacy by a show of force whenever he got the chance. "Short of destruction of life and property," he wrote, "I intend using any means in my power to enforce that justice that the people who are supposed to administer it deny me. On the arrival of the gunboat I will at once inform your Excellency of the measures concerted between the commander and myself." Vice-Admiral Keppel reported to the Admiralty in December that "the opportune arrival of H.M. gunboat Janus and the United States Aroostook was followed by a full compliance with the demands of her Majesty's consul."

Matters did not run quite so smoothly at the other end of the island, where missionaries as well as merchants were the object of attack. The campaign was carried on with vigour for some six months. Redress was not only unobtainable from the Chinese authorities, but even personal access to them was rendered impossible by the obstruction of the mob. Mr George Jamieson was obliged to forego a visit to the magistrate at Taiwan in April on the latter confessing that he could not protect him from violence. Mr Gibson, five months later, found his road to the mandarin ambuscaded by three parties of sixty or seventy men each, armed with jingalls, swords, and spears. Outrage succeeded outrage during the whole period. The state of affairs was of course a subject of serious remonstrance with the Central Government, of whom the Minister first demanded, as in the Yangchow case, a joint inquiry into the facts. For this purpose the consul, Mr Swinhoe, who had been absent on other duty, was ordered to his proper post. At the same time Vice-Admiral Keppel was requested to send an adequate naval force to support the consul's position and prevent further outbreaks.

The Yamên went through the form of ordering to the spot a commissioner, who, however, left it again immediately, thus turning the orders of the Yamên into ridicule. This proceeding naturally encouraged the hostility of the local officials and of the mob who executed their behests. The situation became most threatening.

The squadron detached by Admiral Keppel for active operations at Takow and its neighbourhood consisted of three corvettes and five gunboats, to be reinforced if necessary by the flagship Rodney, carrying eighty-two guns. Before this imposing force arrived, however, the task they were intended to achieve had been already accomplished. "Driven to despair, and believing life and property to be in great danger, Mr Gibson, without waiting for instructions, called upon Lieutenant Gurdon of the gunboat Algerine to take possession of the Chinese fort, which resulted in a loss of life and a destruction of Government stores."

Mr Gibson's action was somewhat euphemistically described as "without waiting for instructions," seeing that he had positive instructions to maintain his ground until a naval force should arrive. Both the operation itself and certain details of its execution were adverted upon so severely, first by Sir Rutherford Alcock and then by the British Government, that, notwithstanding Commodore Jones's commendation of "the most brilliant exploit I have heard of in these seas," Lieutenant Gurdon fell under the displeasure of the Lords of the Admiralty, as the acting consul did under that of the Foreign Office. The object of the joint adventure, however, was attained, and the spirit of outrage among the Chinese completely subdued. This happened in December.

There remained, however, yet another centre of turbulence which greatly impeded the operation of the treaty, at the port of Swatow. The villages which lie between that seaport and the district city of Chow-chow-fu, some 12 miles up the river Han, had banded themselves together to oppose foreign intercourse with the latter city. Not only were the business and property of foreign merchants interfered with, but a British man-of-war gig in the river was fired upon, and when the men landed to identify the offender they were overpowered by the whole population of the nearest village. This hostile attitude, resembling very much that of the Canton villages twenty years before, steadily increased until the native officials themselves were not safe in passing to and from the district city. Strong representations were made to the high authorities of the province at Canton. The viceroy had promised to send a military force to quell the riotous villages, but before he had proved the sincerity of his intention the Gordian knot was cut by British initiative in January 1869. The late Sir Challoner Alabaster, a man of uncommon resolution, was at that time acting consul at Swatow; and he, having secured the co-operation of Commodore Jones, led a force of marines and bluejackets against the offending villages. A stout resistance was offered at first, but when several of the villages had been taken and destroyed the whole eighteen made their submission. Thereafter the district enjoyed perfect peace and security. In the following March Sir Rutherford Alcock was able to telegraph to Lord Clarendon that "the accounts from all the ports showed that peace and order had been restored; that at Yangchow and Formosa entire security and an improved position had been obtained; that there was no more cause for anxiety at any point; that the best understanding existed with the foreign body at Peking; and that the relations with China had never been more satisfactory."

The bearing of these occurrences on the revision of the treaty may not at first sight be quite clear, but it is interesting to note in what manner they were connected with that operation in the mind of Sir Rutherford Alcock. He calculated that the necessity of using force to vindicate foreign treaty rights, of which both he and his predecessor had constantly warned them, would bring home to the Peking authorities the alternative which they would always have to face in case of failure to carry out the treaties. How very differently these outrages and the enforced redress affected the situation in Peking will now be seen.

The action taken at Yangchow and in Formosa having been fully explained to the Tsungli-Yamên, Wênsiang and the other Ministers expressed their entire concurrence. But what satisfied the Government of China produced quite another impression on that of Great Britain. Lord Stanley, as Foreign Secretary, had written on November 20, 1868: "Mr Medhurst appears to have acted with great prudence and firmness, and you will convey to him my approval of his proceedings.... I have to instruct you [Sir R. Alcock] to press the case in question upon the Chinese Government." Two months later Mr Medhurst was reprimanded by Lord Clarendon for his action, and the "full satisfaction for the outrage" was attributed exclusively to the "readiness with which the Central Government took measures that proved effectual." The change of Government which had in the interval taken place in England (December 9, 1868) was hardly sufficient to account for so diametrical a change of view in a matter of imperial concern. Another agency had effected the conversion of the British Government. Mr Burlingame had arrived fresh from fervid denunciations in the United States of the "tyrannic policy" and the "throat policy" of Great Britain as applied to China, and adroitly seizing on the repression of the Yangchow and Formosa outrages as flagrant examples, he succeeded in incensing Lord Clarendon against the various British officials concerned in these troubles, whom his lordship visited with punishment which scarcely stopped short of vindictiveness. Mr Medhurst, indeed, a man of long and distinguished service, had only a black mark set against his name; but Mr Gibson was publicly censured and degraded, and ordered to make an apology to the Chinese officials whose lawless aggressions he had lawlessly repelled. With some inconsistency, Lord Clarendon, about the same time, approved the conduct of Acting-Consul Holt at Tamsui, who succeeded in adjusting most serious misunderstandings with the Chinese through no other means than the visible force of the small gunboat Janus, for whose arrival he waited before preferring his demands.

That the sudden change in the policy of the British Government was the work of Mr Burlingame was frankly avowed by Lord Clarendon himself, who based the fresh instructions to the Minister in China on the arrangements he had concluded with the Chinese representative. In his letter of condemnation, January 14, 1869, he, moreover, intimated that he could not wait before pronouncing judgment for Sir Rutherford Alcock's complete report on the Yangchow affair, because his "communication with Mr Burlingame ... rendered it necessary that he should not defer making his observations." That a British Secretary of State could have so demeaned his office would not have been believed save on his own confession. He of course carried the Admiralty with him, and the same influence which inspired the new instructions issued to the Minister and consuls inspired those issued to the commanding officers on the China station.

Taken textually, the negotiations between Mr Burlingame and Lord Clarendon were of a platonic character. H.M.'s Government undertook to apply no pressure to China. It would have been a simple matter to refrain from applying pressure, and a tacit resolution to that effect with corresponding instruction to the Minister in Peking would have secured the object. To make it a subject of direct pledge to the Chinese Government seemed one of those gratuitous acts which all diplomatic experience condemns as fraught with future embarrassments. To save appearances, however, a nominal equivalent was taken. "Mr Burlingame was requested to bear in mind, and to make known to the Chinese Government, that we should henceforward have a right to expect on its part the faithful fulfilment of treaty engagements, the prompt redress of grievances referred to the Central Government, and friendly treatment of British subjects by the Chinese authorities"--as if all that had not been already stipulated for under the solemn sanction of the existing treaty.

IV. REVISION NEGOTIATIONS AND CONCLUSION.

Lukewarmness of British Government--Sir R. Alcock's misgivings as to success--Mixed commission in Peking to consider details--Mr Hart's predominance--Treaty becomes a custom-house concern--Increase of duties being the Chinese aim--Sir Rutherford Alcock attributes failure to Mr Burlingame's misrepresentations--Merchants oppose the treaty--Ratification refused by British Government--Inferences from this fiasco--Chinese influenced by force alone.

Let us now revert to the cause and origin of the Burlingame mission--the revision of the treaty of Tientsin. The instruction for revision was given by Lord Stanley on August 16, 1867, in such general terms as the following:--

Her Majesty's Government neither wish, nor have they the right, to impose sacrifices on China, even though they may be convinced that the inconvenience of such sacrifices will be only temporary, whereas the benefit which will result from them will be lasting.... We must reconcile ourselves to waiting for the gradual development of that [better] system, and content ourselves with reserving for revision at a future period any new arrangement we may come to in 1868.... You will of course act openly with the representatives of other Powers, inviting and availing yourself of their co-operation.

A note of misgiving as to the policy of asking for the revision runs through the whole correspondence. After the preliminary labours of sifting the voluminous memorials from merchants and others, Sir Rutherford Alcock sums up their demands thus: "All their wants turn upon three or four cardinal defects, not of the treaties so much as in their execution." And he adds the significant reflection: "The question arises, if nothing is to be gained by demanding a revision, ... whether much would not be lost, and an opportunity thrown away, which might, by reserving the right, be turned to better account when the emperor's majority is declared. I believe the true policy of foreign Powers would be to wait; ... to this conclusion ... all the representatives of foreign Powers now in Peking are led." "The Chinese," he also says, "would go much faster and better if left alone."

The question naturally suggested by these remarks--why a task involving enormous labour, of which only negative results were to be expected, was entered upon at all at such an inopportune moment--remains unanswered.

It would be insufferably tedious, and of no practical utility, to track the windings of a maze leading nowhere, for the revised treaty was never ratified. But the labours of two whole years could not but leave landmarks to guide succeeding travellers over the same ground. It could not be but that with so much beating of the bushes the game would be started, if not brought to bag. It was a reconnaissance in force which, for the first time, compelled the respective parties to the struggle to reveal their true character and intentions. Such a discovery was perhaps not too dearly bought by the time and trouble expended on it.

The first definite step in the process of revision was the nomination of a mixed commission of British and Chinese "to devise means of securing a more prompt redress of commercial grievances." The members were Mr Fraser, second secretary to the British Legation; Mr Hart, Inspector-General of Customs; and two secretaries of the Tsungli-Yamên--a heavy preponderance on the Chinese side of the question. To the same commission was added another British member, Mr Adkins. And here it is not impertinent to observe that the absence of both the Chinese secretary, Mr Wade, and the acting Chinese secretary, Mr Brown, left the Legation in a condition too crippled to engage on work which would have taxed its full strength. The members of the commission held many sittings, reporting proceedings from time to time to their respective principals, the Tsungli-Yamên and the British Minister.

It needs no great effort of imagination to divine, in a body thus composed, whose would be the dominant voice. Mr Hart conducted the proceedings throughout. The discussion had not gone far when it was found hopeless to revise the provisions of the treaty in any sense compatible with progress or freer intercourse; and the dangerous questions which had caused the Government so much anxiety, and which had inspired both the Burlingame mission and the various secret memorials, being thus happily ruled outside the controversy, the Chinese Ministers seem to have given themselves no further concern about the revision. This distant attitude of theirs was severely commented on by a contemporary writer in 'Fraser's Magazine,' who said:--

After ten years of conciliatory blandishments on our part, the high Chinese authorities had so far disobeyed the spirit of the treaty that, although they had not actually prevented our Minister from corresponding and visiting with them, yet they had had the audacity to render all such intercourse absolutely nugatory, and had constrained him, after a long and successful diplomatic career, to descend to the extremely humiliating position of treating with them indirectly through the medium of Mr R. Hart.

As, however, the proceedings became focussed on a tariff revision destined to add to the duty receipts, a "collector of revenue wanting money," as Mr Hart described himself, was the most fitting negotiator, and the Chinese ministers were well pleased to leave him free to make his own bargain, so long as it yielded that result.

To give colour to the Chinese demand for higher duties a bold formula was resorted to, and supported by equally bold reasoning. The expedient was a rearrangement of the method of collection of inland dues on foreign merchandise, which was then, as it continues to be, the great bone of contention between foreign traders and the Chinese authorities. The treaties conferred on merchants the right of compounding for all inland taxation of their merchandise by a single payment at the port of entry; but the practices of the Chinese officials had rendered the privilege a nullity. In the new negotiations Mr Hart, on the part of the Chinese, took the high ground of maintaining, with subtle dialectic, that the protection which foreigners claimed was not in fact given by the treaties. So strongly did the Chinese entrench themselves in this contention, that heavy artillery was required to dislodge them. "Could any negotiators be so dull or incompetent," wrote Sir R. Alcock in reply, "as to sign a treaty of commerce with an Eastern potentate, extorted at the point of the bayonet, and leave this unlimited power in his hands to turn against us the next moment, or whenever he pleased, and nullify all that had been stipulated, destroying the trade for which alone war had been made?" Defeated in argument, the Chinese next begged that what they could not claim as a right might yet be accorded to them as a favour, thus copying the tactics of the Japanese in an analogous case.

As this proved to be the crux of the whole transaction, the rock on which the convention eventually split, it is useful to consider how the subject was treated in the negotiations. The treaties of Nanking, 1842, and of Tientsin, 1858, provided for the transit of British goods throughout the empire on payment of a fixed charge. But in securing exemption from arbitrary imposts in the interior, the treaty of Nanking signally failed; that of Tientsin had proved equally ineffective, and why? From inherent difficulties in the nature of things--obstacles absolutely insuperable so long as the country remained under the same organic conditions. Such were the propositions with which the British Minister entered upon the discussion of the subject; and as no proposal was made for changing the organic conditions of the empire, the prospect of obtaining a satisfactory fulfilment of those treaty provisions did not seem very encouraging.

But then a suggestion, apparently emanating from Consul Robertson at Canton, was made for simplifying the problem by doing away with the option which had been reserved in the treaties for foreign merchants, either to pay the commutation at the port of landing, or to allow their goods to run the gantlet of the Chinese customs stations. Instead of this, it was suggested that a single compulsory payment, amounting to half the import tariff, might be levied on the landing of the goods, which should thereafter be freed from all other imposts throughout the empire. It was not unnatural that a "collector of revenue" should appropriate this conception, and introduce it into the revised treaty; but then the doubt immediately arose on the other side, whether the promised exemption would be any more of a reality than it had been under the existing _régime_. If the difficulties in the way of fulfilling the stipulation in the treaty of Tientsin and Nanking were really insuperable, would they now disappear merely because the Chinese Government received an increased import duty? In considering Mr Hart's proposal, "the question would be," according to Sir Rutherford Alcock, "Could we obtain a sufficient guarantee that such additional import due would effectually exempt British goods from all other dues, local, provincial, and what not?" And again, "Security for exemption from all but the fixed 2½ per cent was the one question on which depended the value of any revision."

A necessary condition of any successful treaty was the assent of all the other Powers to its provisions, seeing that under their most-favoured-nation clauses any one of them by holding aloof could render the treaty inoperative. The various foreign representatives were therefore kept informed of the progress of negotiations. In this way their opinions were obtained from time to time as to the merits of the various proposals. On the subject of the compulsory payment of transit dues the opinions which the British Minister received from his colleagues were all unfavourable. They considered that some "additional guarantee would be necessary against failure, and as against security for additional losses which would be entailed upon the merchants." To give effect to the new proposals an edict was to be published acquainting all provincial officials with what had been agreed upon. But still the diplomatic body maintained "that nothing is really certain but the addition of 2½ per cent to the import duties. This will be rigorously exacted and paid; but whether the equivalent exemption from all other taxation will be obtained must be held doubtful, ... seeing that in the past the same provincial authorities have shown the most persistent disregard of treaty stipulations and proclamations." "Under such circumstances," Sir Rutherford adds, "it would seem reasonable that, during the first year at least, all amounts collected under the new arrangements ... should be carried to a separate account ... to meet claims for compensation." In the end, however, he saw reason to waive this proviso, to disregard the views of his colleagues, and to assent to the new impost, without any guarantee. Attempts to obtain concessions from the Chinese in the way of freer intercourse proved, as we have said, hopeless from the first. The renewal of the Chinese demand to establish a customs station in Hongkong--that "immense smuggling depot"--was refused on the British side; while the British request for recognition of Hongkong as a port of call for goods in transit to Canton was in like manner refused on the Chinese side, because it "would give the place a respectable name" as well as make it the "great emporium of the south." Hongkong, it is fair to remember, was, not unnaturally, odious in the eyes of the Chinese. The more prosperous the colony became, the more they hated it; and the more patriotic among them--as, for instance, the Minister Wênsiang--detested it the most.

The ruling factor in eliminating all measures of progress from the negotiations and reducing the whole to a customs question was Mr Burlingame.

After the arrival of the mission to Washington [wrote Sir Rutherford on February 27, 1869] the hopes which the signature of the additional articles was calculated to excite undoubtedly exercise a very prejudicial effect on my efforts.... With Mr Burlingame's enthusiastic reception, and the prompt signature of the convention by which the United States Government pledged itself to leave China free to adopt or reject all such innovations and internal improvements, and even to use its influence with other Powers for the same end, they gained precisely the assurance they wanted.... From that moment further progress or successful negotiation became impossible.

He added in a subsequent despatch to Lord Clarendon:--

One result stands out more clearly than any other, and it is this: what we have gained by the last year's preliminary negotiations is not likely to be withdrawn. But if it was difficult to negotiate for large concessions before the assurance authoritatively given by your lordship to Mr Burlingame, ... it is now out of the question to hope for more than has already been conceded.... Strong in the assurances of two of the treaty Powers, ... it is quite certain that no further progress can be made at present. It simply remains for her Majesty's Government to determine whether they will carry out the revision on the basis proposed and already assented to by the Chinese Government, or defer the revision altogether to some later period.

The provisional report of the negotiations having been submitted by the Foreign Office to the other treaty Powers for their opinion, most of them contented themselves with amicable generalities, the only definite criticism elicited being that of the North German Confederation. Going straight to the core of the matter, in May 1869, Count Bernstorff wrote as follows, basing his remarks upon the opinion of the German merchants:--

Although the advantages which are to be expected for trade in general from the abolition of the "lekin taxes" would not be too dearly bought by this extension of the transit duty to all commodities, yet, on the other hand, the treaty Powers certainly have the right of demanding the abolition of the taxes levied contrary to treaty, even without giving anything in return, and they might probably obtain this result by common action. And then, moreover, it appears, from existing circumstances in China, exceedingly questionable whether this tax, even if abolished by imperial edict in consequence of a treaty, would not, nevertheless, still be levied by the mandarins, although perhaps in another shape, since now indeed they have their assignments thereon.

Doubts on the part of the Foreign Office led to further correspondence backwards and forwards, closing with the following ambiguous despatch, dated 29th September, which was transmitted by telegram, a very slow process in those days:--

If you should not have concluded an arrangement before this reaches you, her Majesty's Government think it would be better to protract negotiations rather than accept now a limited arrangement, which would be binding for so long a period as ten years, and which would not comprise a satisfactory arrangement respecting transit duties, and which might compromise the right of her Majesty's Government to take part in the negotiations of other Powers for a revision of their treaties.

Should you, however, have completed any arrangement, you may be assured that the best view will be taken of it here.

The supplementary convention was, in fact, signed in October, and Sir Rutherford Alcock took his leave immediately after, visiting the Yangtze, Shanghai, Hongkong, and India on his way to Europe. At these places he explained in general terms the bearing of the treaty, the Indian Government being specially concerned in the increase of the Chinese import duty on opium, to which the trade generally were absolutely indifferent.

The supplementary convention was exhaustively reviewed by the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce in a memorial addressed to Lord Clarendon (December 31, 1869). To the practical view of the merchants the treaty consisted of three clauses: one making compulsory what had previously been optional--the payment of half the import duty in commutation of inland dues on foreign merchandise; one doubling the export duty on raw silk; and the third more than doubling the import duty on opium. Of these, the first alone was deemed important. The consideration offered by the Chinese Government for the compulsory payment--that they would frank imported goods through nine of the eighteen provinces of China--was not regarded as an equivalent; for the treaty of Tientsin contained the same undertaking without the geographical limitation, but it had not been fulfilled. The ground alleged for this non-observance of the existing treaty had been the existence of insurmountable obstacles in connection with provincial and imperial finance. These obstacles, the merchants observed, were "now assumed to have been suddenly overcome," an assumption which they considered illusory. The question of transit dues was not new to them: it had been threshed out on all sides during weary years; it was the recurrent topic of the day with them, as it was destined to continue to be for a generation longer; and the merchants could not therefore believe that the difficulties against which they had been hopelessly struggling were suddenly removed by magic. They were not shown how the revolution was to be effected. In short, "the conclusion," they said, "was irresistible, that to a very great extent the commutation of transit dues, which is made compulsory by the new treaty, will simply become an additional tax on trade without any return whatever; and that the provincial authorities will as heretofore tax goods in transit very much as they please, the treaty stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding,"--a conclusion supported by arguments which could not be refuted.

Sir Thomas Wade some years later expressed the same views as the merchants had done. "I doubted," he said, "the good faith of officials when breach of faith could only be established by the evidence of those subject to their authority and entirely in their power.... I have since found reason to believe that the control of taxation in the provinces is a matter of no small trouble to the Central Government as at present constituted, if indeed it be possible at all." Nevertheless, he adds, "I have found occasion to regret that the convention has not been allowed at least a term of probation." A term of probation was the alternative suggested by the merchants also, but it seems never to have received any consideration from the Foreign Office.

The representation which the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce based upon their review of the treaty was adopted by influential commercial bodies in England, who in a "monstrous deputation," as Mr Hammond called it, urged on the Secretary for Foreign Affairs the non-ratification of the treaty. The British Government gave way, not, as they candidly admitted, convinced by the reasoning, but overawed by the electoral pressure of the merchants; and the supplementary convention was allowed to fall through.

Thus ended the first attempt to negotiate a treaty with China as a perfectly free agent. The conclusion to be drawn not only from the negative result, but from the whole process of the negotiations--from the memorials from the provinces, and still more from the Privy Council, the six boards, and the censorates--is, as stated by Sir Rutherford Alcock in May 1869, "that the old spirit of arrogance of the days of Lin and Yeh is still in full vigour, and the assumption of superiority over the barbarian absolutely unmeasured. That the anti-foreign element amongst the official and educated classes has suffered no diminution whatever; that if some two or three leading men take a clearer view of the political situation, they are evidently without power to take action upon it; and so the vessel of State is allowed to drift whichever way the tide of prejudice and ignorance may set. There are still some documents," he added, "wanting to complete the series, especially the answer of Li Hung-chang and a second memorial of Tsêng Kwo-fan [p. 184 _seq._], which it would be desirable to obtain as showing the policy advocated by two of the most prominent men in the empire at this moment."

One sentence of Sir Rutherford Alcock sums up the case China _v._ the West: "Pressure, indeed, there must always be here if anything is to be achieved for the advancement of foreign interests and commerce. In one way or other, however we may disguise it, our position in China has been created by force--naked, physical force; and any intelligent policy to improve or maintain that position must still look to force in some form, latent or expressed, for the results." Whether the Western nations, singly or collectively, are justified in using their force for such a purpose is a question which is not affected by this plain statement of the case. That the policy of the Western Powers has been largely influenced by sentimental consideration towards China is true; but their action has never been consistent with their professions, and their oscillation between coercion and submission has led to disastrous consequences.

FOOTNOTE:

[15] He now knows better.